Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. P-90-412 March 11, 1991

MARISOL C. HIPOLITO, complainant,

vs.
ELMER R. MERGAS, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Manila, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Respondent, Elmer R. Mergas, a deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Manila was charged by herein complainant Marisol C. Hipolito, an applicant for a small
scale mining permit, on January 4, 1990 in the Office of the Prosecutor, Province of
Tarlac, with acts allegedly amounting to the crime of swindling or estafa. 1

On January 18, 1990, a copy of an affidavit complaint, dated January 4, 1990, charging
herein respondent with grave misconduct and involving the same facts subject of the
aforesaid criminal case, together with its corresponding attachments, was received in the
Office of the Court Administrator.2

In a resolution of April 30, 1990 in I.S. No. 90-010 of the office of the aforesaid provincial
prosecutor, the charge for estafa was dismissed on the theory that the evidence shows
that there was no unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence on the part of respondent,
and the issue of falsification was not ruled upon since no evidence proving the same
was submitted for proper appreciation and consideration. 3

On the administrative case, in a resolution of this Court, dated July 9, 1990, 4 respondent
was required to comment on the affidavit-complaint filed against him. On January 26, 1990,
respondent filed his comment, 5 together with his counter-affidavit and those of two of his
witnesses which were allegedly the same documents filed with the provincial prosecutor of
Tarlac in I.S. No. 90-010.

The Court noted that the acts complained of appear to have been committed by
respondent over a period of at least four (4) months, presumably even during office
hours, and it does not appear that he was granted any leave of absence therefor from
his official station. Hence, on October 1, 1990, the Court resolved to refer the
administrative case to Judge Bernardo P. Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, for investigation, report and recommendation. 6

On January 22, 1991, the investigating judge submitted his report and recommendation, with
the following findings of fact which are borne out by the evidence:
1. Elmer R. Mergas, at all times material hereto, has been a deputy sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, duly appointed and performing his duties
as such.

2. Sometime in September, 1989, a certain Mirasol (sic) Hipolito, together with Abel
Mergas, respondent's brother, approached him and asked (for) his help in connection
with her application with the Bureau of Mines for a small scale mining permit for
pumice.

3. Although such undertaking was not part of his work as deputy sheriff, respondent
acceded to the request.

4. Consequently, on September 22, 1989, respondent deputy sheriff caused the filing
of an application for small scale mining permit for pumice in behalf of Marisol Hipolito
with the Bureau of Mines, Regional Office, San Fernando, Pampanga.

5. However, the site applied for was claimed by another person and the respondent
suggested another site. This second site was not acceptable to the applicant and the
applicant submitted a plan for still another site in San Luis, Tarlac, Tarlac which was
covered by an application of another person. Consequently, the application could not
be given due course.

6. In connection with such application, respondent sheriff received from Marisol

Hipolito the sum of P14,200.00 which was spent for the following:

P4,500.00, for the survey conducted on September 16 & 17,1989

P600.00, for filing fee of the application

P4,000.00, for project information filed on October 17, 1989

P3,000.00, for verification fee of the site on November 28, 1989

P3,500.00, for the survey of another site on December 7-8, 1989

P2,000.00, for travelling expenses, food and other expenses in following up

the application.

Respondent claims that Marisol Hipolito still owes him P3,400.00.

7. On January 4, 1990, Mirasol Hipolito filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac
a complaint for estafa against respondent deputy sheriff.

8. In his resolution dated April 30, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

Gregorio R. Bautista found that "complainant delivered sums of money to the
respondent that involves the duty for the respondent to help her work for her
application and approval of a small scale mining permit with the Bureau of
Mines" but "there was no unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence that is the
essence of swindling and deceit". Consequently, the Assistant Prosecutor
recommended that the case be dismissed which was duly approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor.
The investigating judge submitted that the acts of respondent deputy sheriff are
improper and not conducive to the best interest of the service. Respondent was held
to have committed acts which may be called "moonlighting" and which are contrary to
civil service rules and regulations. He observed that respondent is not supposed to be
following up extraneous matters outside Manila, in other government offices and for
private individuals, to the prejudice of his work in the judiciary as a deputy sheriff of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Consequently, his Honor recommended the penalty
of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months without pay effective
immediately.

Respondent failed to refute the fact that he was indeed involved in the work and processes
involved in the application for the small scale mining permit for complainant Marisol C.
Hipolito. This clearly shows that respondent failed to observe and maintain that degree of
dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as a deputy sheriff. Thus, it bears
mention at this juncture that although he appears to have been exonerated by the prosecutor
of the criminal charges proffered against him, such absolution is not per se a bar to
administrative sanctions where called for by the malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance
of a public officer.

A deputy sheriff, as an officer of the court whose duties form an integrated part of the
administration of justice, may be properly punished, even with a penalty short of dismissal or
suspension from office, by this tribunal which exercises administrative supervision over the
judicial branch of the Government, for an action committed in violation of the Rules of Court
and which impedes and detracts from a fair and just administration of justice. 7

While "moonlighting" is not normally considered as a serious misconduct,

nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held by respondent, it obviously
amounts to a malfeasance in office. In sum, he is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the
discharge of his duties that prudence, caution and attention which careful men
usually exercise in the management of their own affairs. 8

Finally, public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. This
yardstick has been imprinted in the 1973 Constitution under Section 1 of Article XIII,
thus: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employment shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people." 9 This is reiterated more emphatically in the 1987
Constitution. 10

WHEREFORE, as correctly evaluated and recommended by the investigating judge,

the Court finds respondent Deputy Sheriff Elmer R. Mergas guilty of serious
misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months without pay effective
immediately. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in the personal records of
respondent. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

RUFINO V. NUEZ petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special
Court, the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." 1 It came into existence with the issuance in
1978 of a Presidential Decree. 2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an
anti-graft statute was passed, 3 to be supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the validity of
which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court:
"Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality
in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its
objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing
called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device." 6 It should
occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of
the continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential
Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of
estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance
with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. 7 The informations were filed
respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. 8 A week later.
respondent Court denied such motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next
day; it met the same fate. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of
petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is
violative of the due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the
Constitution. 14

The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively with
dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether committed by government officials or
not, with the essential cooperation of the private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself
justify any departure from or disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due
recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in his pleadings
butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues
raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity
of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been
demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be
adjudged.

1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such
competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the
National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President "shall
continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus, there is
an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in
1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality
of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the
opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power
as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law. " 20

2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify
Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land
Tenure Administration: 21"The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that
none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded
and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which is of the very
essence of the Idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
exists "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given
a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. " 23 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being
sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 24

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum
thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because
- appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise
was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of
the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of
right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification
satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring
that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. 27 To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a
problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service.
It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware
as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co
Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
included among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give
way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the
operation of public services or utilities." 29 The scope of such a principle is not to be
constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.

4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of
appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." 30 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale
would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas
Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto
law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony. than the law required at the time of the commission to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." 32 Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition
fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become
entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial
matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo 33 a 1949 decision,
speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine
Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice
Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the
requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for
the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its
applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what is
prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided in 1903. Thus: "An ex
post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The
case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what way the act in
question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the
Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended

First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only
foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility. 36

6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Even the very language as to what falls with the category of this provision is well-nigh
Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the
intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict
the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." 38 The opinion of
Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The
expressions 'ex post facto laws,' are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution,
and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated
and judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law
precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr.
Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive
and accurate knowledge of the true principle of government. " 39

7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American Supreme Court
in April of 1898 - the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American
sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the
exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting edge,
but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the
challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous
pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this
realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an
accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular
statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at
the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision of the
American Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the
then Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically stated
that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation
of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws
surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition." 43

8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully
argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No.
1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as
to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-
cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time
of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are
"vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of
the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection
of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is
passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous
vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from
among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices,
and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
" 44 Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law
was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively
so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What Cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the
petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence 45has been
overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of
scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied.
The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People
v. Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is
need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could
be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty." 47 This Court has repeatedly
reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental and basic right to De presumed innocent
has been disregarded. 48 It does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the
omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss "vital protection" of
liberty.

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the
exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to
its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized
as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v.
Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words,
Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous
in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the
essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept
of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 50 What is required for compliance with
the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 51 this Court with Justice
Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal proceedings then, due process is
satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to
meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is
assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent
jurisdiction."53 The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American
Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during
the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has had frequent occasion to
consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within
the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law." 55

10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as passing on any question
not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is
true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional
objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the
Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as preclude
any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a
proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be
any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the
Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 56384. March 22, 1984.]

MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

Roberto C. Diokno for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION; SANDIGANBAYAN; JURISDICTION. It is clear from the

above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees
but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and
corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is
patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII titled
"Accountability of Public Officers."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 4(c), PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486, AS AMENDED, NOT VIOLATIVE OF NEW
CONSTITUTION. There is no merit in petitioners contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No.
1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because
the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body
the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan
shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority
and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in
Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporation, in relation to their office." (Italics supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all
public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not
review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the
lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH REGULAR COURTS UNDER SECTION 4,
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606. The crime for which petitioner is charged, grave coercion, is penalized by
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00 under the first paragraph of Article 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Respondent court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well established is the rule that once a court acquires
jurisdiction in a case where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising the same
to the exclusion of all other courts. In Laquian v. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551, We ruled that "in case of concurrent
jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts." Thus, respondents
denial of petitioners request for the transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque was well-
grounded and certainly not a grave abuse of discretion.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISPOSITION OF PENDING CASES AS OF EFFECTIVITY DATE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1861; CASE AT BAR. It is true that on March 23, 1983, Presidential Decree No. 1861 amended
Presidential Decree No. 1606, and it provides, among others, that where the penalty for offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office does not exceed prision correctional or
imprisonment for six(6) years, or fine of P6,000.00, they are no longer within the concurrent jurisdiction of
respondent court and the regular courts but are now vested in the latter. However, Section 2 of said Presidential
Decree No. 1861 states: "SECTION 2. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of
the date of the effectivity of this Decree shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are
pending." (Italics supplied) The information against petitioner was filed in 1980; therefore, respondent court retains
jurisdiction over the case subject of instant petition.
5. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICERS; IMPEACHMENT; EFFECTS. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office
with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
fundamental law. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office
of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded
against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the
constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 465-
466)." The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction
and the official is not hereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper.

DECISION

RELOVA, J.:

On October 21, 1980, petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed before
the respondent court, which reads: jgc:chanrobles.c om.ph

"That on or about July 2, 1979, in the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the mayor of Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque, taking advantage of his public position and which offense was committed in relation to
his office, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take over the operation and control of the
gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said
gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose, and padlock dispensing pump
thereof without authority of law, depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or
occupation, by means of threat, force and/or violence, thereby preventing said Pedro Par from doing
something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

(p. 10, Rollo)

On November 27, 1980, the information was amended with the insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen
companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline."

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the respondent court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in
Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed.

Respondent court denied the motion. Hence, petitioner instituted this proceeding for certiorari seeking the
same relief, alleging that

1. The offense for which he was charged is not related to his office as mayor;

2. The offense of grave coercion is not among those mentioned or determined by Section 4(c), Presidential
Decree No. 1486, as amended; and

3. Assuming that respondent has jurisdiction to try this case, it committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the transfer of the hearing of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque because all
witnesses of both the prosecution and defense will have to come from Marinduque, a far away island.

Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, provides for the creation of a special court known as the
Sandiganbayan and defines the jurisdiction thereof. It states:

"SEC. 5. The National Assembly shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall
have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." \

It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional
competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by
public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office,
though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. The intention of the
framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of
the same Article XIII titled "Accountability of Public Officers," which provides:

"SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

There is no merit in petitioners contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended,
is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges
what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of
"such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested
in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof
that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, in relation to
their office." (Emphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all public office-related
offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of
legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or
authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply.

The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when
he intimidated the gasoline stations owner in taking over the operation and control of the establishment, ordering
his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority.
Stated differently, if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the
latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Pars gasoline and padlocked the station.
The fact that he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the operations and control of
complainants gasoline station and padlock the same without observing due process.

The crime for which petitioner is charged, grave coercion, is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
P500.00 under the first paragraph of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Respondent court,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, has concurrent jurisdiction
with the regular courts. Well established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where said
jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other
courts. In Laquian v. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551, We ruled that "in case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that
the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts." Thus, respondents denial of petitioners request for
the transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque was well-grounded and certainly not a grave
abuse of discretion.chanr obl es.com:cral aw:red

It is true that on March 23, 1983, Presidential Decree No. 1861 amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, and it
provides, among others, that where the penalty for offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six(6) years, or fine of
P6,000.00, they are no longer within the concurrent jurisdiction of respondent court and the regular courts but are
now vested in the latter. However, Section 2 of said Presidential Decree No. 1861 states: jgc:chanrobles .com.ph

"SECTION 2. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of the date of the effectivity
of this Decree shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending." (Emphasis supplied)

The information against petitioner was filed in 1980; therefore, respondent court retains jurisdiction over the case
subject of instant petition.

The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like
constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution provides: jgc:chanrobles .com.ph

"SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption." cralaw virtua1aw librar y

Thus, the provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other
method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the
clear mandate of the fundamental law. chanrobles.c om.ph : virtual law librar y
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that "judgment
in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold ANY office of honor,
trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was
found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the, effect
of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter
punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of
the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party
convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not hereby
removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on
March 12, 1982 is hereby DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY.
FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the
OFFICE OF MALACAANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case

These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual
milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's
exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for
issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in
OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a
finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking
to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or
omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining
Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the
April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the
President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated against
petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition
likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the
President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor
unfamiliar.

In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute
coverage of a hostage drama that had slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the
City of Manila. While initial news accounts were fragmented it was not difficult to
piece together the story on the hostage-taker, Police Senior Inspector Rolando
Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police officer attempting to secure his
reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a life-long, and
erstwhile bemedaled, service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were
replete with stories not just of the deceased hostage-taker but also of the hostage
victims, eight of whom died during the bungled police operation to rescue the hapless
innocents. Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions.
One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as follows:

MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus
packed with tourists, and killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown
live on national television until last night.
Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m.
Mendoza hijacked the bus and took 21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his
reinstatement to the police force.

The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told
police that all the remaining passengers had been killed.

Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of
dead hostages hand-cuffed to the door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the
wheels of the bus to immobilize it.

Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with
intermittent fire from the hos-tage taker.

Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or
alive. When the standoff ended at nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive
while Mendoza was killed by a sniper.

Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending
bystanders scampering for safety.

It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang
out from inside the bus.

Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.

Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released
nine of the hostages during the drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national
television.

Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus,
which was delivered, and fuel to keep the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former
police officer was reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades.

Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start
after 3 p.m. today." Another sign stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."

Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big
mistake to correct a big wrong decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was
headed, "Release final decision," apparently referring to the case that led to his dismissal
from the police force.

Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.

Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from
the police force. "His problem was he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due
process, no hearing, no com-plaint," Gregorio said.

Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to
his brother's action. Tensions rose as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting
Gregorio in front of national television. This triggered the crisis that eventually forced
Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the remaining hostages.

Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried
to talk Mendoza into surrendering and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three
Filipinos, including the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Yebra reportedly lent a
cellphone to allow communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front
ofthe Quirino Grandstand.

Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators
hovered near the scene.

Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the
deployment of crack police teams and snipers near the scene. A crisis man-agement
committee had been activated with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno coordinating the actions
with the MPD.

Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss
Mendoza's case that led to his dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de
Jesus said Gutierrez gave a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus
did not elaborate on the contents of the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally
deliver the letter to Mendoza.

MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught
by the slow process of the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said
the PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already dismissed
crim-inal cases against him.

The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus
(TVU-799), pretend-ing to hitch a ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in
Intramuros when Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino Grandstand.
Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the passengers that they
would be taken hostage. "Having worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that
he already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle,
Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na Mendez, AP Grandstand
Carnage, The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri-guez.4

In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December

of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in
the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their
luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers
pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the
US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against them
and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the
source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine
Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the
boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer
of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P300 Million during his active
military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed
against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 196231

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before the Philippine National
Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely, Police Inspector
Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I Nestor David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino,
and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar charge was filed by the private complainant,
Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No.
08E-09512.

On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed
their respective verified position papers as directed.

Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence
at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same
police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings
despite due notice.

However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio

Gonzales III, a Decision9 in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by
the Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL

ROSARIO MENDOZA and PO3 WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig.
Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO
LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2 RODERICK SALVA LOPEA of
Manila Police District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be meted the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service pursuant to Section 58, Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, for having committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision,
followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On
December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for
review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia,
who released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to
petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more
particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records,
for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained
pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of
eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and
Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive
sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to
participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman
is an independent constitutional body.

Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified
petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC
made the following findings:

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and

gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction
is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.

More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not
without legal and compelling bases considering the following:

(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving
a case for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting
to grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The
same case, however, was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors
Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for
failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the
case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al.
against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due course by the
City Prosecutors Office.

(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued
motu proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR
- without citing any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting
policemen to his office for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue
interest on the case. He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty.
Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the
nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian
Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any
position paper as required.

(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged

liable for grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May
 21, 2009) based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian
Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the
PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely
motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a
supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto.

(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of
dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in
the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief
by sending several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.

xxxx

By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9)
months without any justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed complete and wanton violation of the Ombudsman prescribed
rule to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within
five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The inaction
is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily
enforced the judgment of dismissal and ignored the intervening requests for immediate
resolution, thereby rendering the inaction even more inexcusable and unjust as to amount to
gross negligence and grave misconduct.

SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious

disregard of due process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally
suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending
disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration.

By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for
over nine months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard
to due process and the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his
case. As long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza
was also effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary
restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.

As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it
should have provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal
without prejudice to its re-implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied.
Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled
to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the
motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman
cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for
execution.

xxxx

When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final
order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by
resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for nine months
and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that
same day, then they should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally
suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once
the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza
for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without
necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the
negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking
if his demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.

But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a
pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly
demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration -
rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review,
triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand,
the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for
Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty
under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.

The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be
referred to the Office of the President (OP) for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for
Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV,
Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent
Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.

Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint
dated October 29, 2010 was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before
the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner with "directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself
or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
also, with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards.18 In a Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which was approved by
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent

Emilio A. Gonzales III for violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of
R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby be [sic] DISMISSED.

Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for

Misconduct, the same is likewise DISMISSED.

Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to

the administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales
alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced
his suspension for one year due to his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already prejudged his case and that
any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the
scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on
February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the
proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the petition.

G.R. No. 196232

In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl
Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder (Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Criminal Case No.
SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition
for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail.
On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the
PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.

Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the
hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA.
At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24recommending to the President the dismissal
of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges
against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for
having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman
Act.

The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit. In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and
the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding
against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for preliminary
investigation on April 15, 2011.
 Hence, the petition.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:

(A)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER

INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.

(B)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER

INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND
RENDERED ITS DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

(C)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL

RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN
THE DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

(D)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL

RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST
IN MENDOZA'S CASE.

(E)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL

RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER FOR NOT RELEASING THE
RESOLUTION ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT
SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE
CRISIS.

(F)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL

RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the
question -

AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL
AND JUSTIFIABLE?26

Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the
President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created
Office of the Ombudsman.

The Court's Ruling

Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners
asseverate that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the
Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence
and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the
constitutional attributes of said office.

The Court is not convinced.

The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and

Special Prose-cutor is not exclusive.

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees,27 and is
subsumed under the broad powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.28

The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The
Swedish term, which literally means "agent" or "representative," communicates the concept
that has been carried on into the creation of the modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone
who acts as a neutral representative of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This
idea of a people's protector was first institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973
Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan, which wielded the twin powers of
investigation and prosecution. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provided
thus:

Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be

known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to
public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make
appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the
proper court or body.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested
with authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against
administrative officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and persuasive powers of
his office" in correcting improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from
the hampering effects of prosecutorial duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution enumerates the following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the
Ombudsman, viz:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with
due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption
in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of
high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.31

Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by
granting it "full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and
employees,"32 as follows:

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the
Ombudsman was explicitly conferred the statutory power to conduct administrative
investigations under Section 19 of the same law, thus:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance
with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and

covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the
judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

xxxx

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President
for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.34

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special

Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature,
which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations
on this matter are quite insightful, viz:
x x x Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the
Deputy Tanodbayan may only be removed for cause and after due process. He added that
the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.

Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the
Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and
that he can be removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.

However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman may try to protect one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the
phrase "after due process" with the words after due notice and hearing with the President as
the ultimate authority.

Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent
Office of the Tanodbayan, and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the
Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on the independence of the Tanodbayan.

Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal,
however, considering the Chair's observation that vesting such authority upon the
Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official
should be vested with such authority to effect a check and balance.35

Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and
Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to
address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try
to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the
Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in
favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole.36 In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor
of Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
6713, and the Revised Penal Code. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the
Ombudsman had been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over
said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which states:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any
erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President.

The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor
General that R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the
President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials.
Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative will, no
repeal of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act was inferred therefrom. Thus said the
Court:

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that
repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their
congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed
to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.37

While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to
discipline elective officials over the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A.
No. 7160, the more recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered the
exercise by the Ombudsman of such plenary power invoking Section 23(2)40 of R.A. No.
6770, which gives the Ombudsman the option to "refer certain complaints to the proper
disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees." The Court underscored therein the clear legislative
intent of imposing "a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection
with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus
declared that, while the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public
school teacher is concurrent with the proper investigating committee of the Department of
Education, it would have been more prudent under the circumstances for the Ombudsman to
have referred to the DECS the complaint against the public school teacher.

Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people

and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent
authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending
concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case
against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from
proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer
instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge
involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and
corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his
authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.

In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a
subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the
charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the
Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and
corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v.
Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a Regional
Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for
unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal
by the Ombudsman of similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy

Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the
law.

Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three
nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of
a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers,
including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.

That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the
enumeration of impeachable officials is clear from the following deliberations45 of the
Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has
been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman
will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the government. This
recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people,
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodies", who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the
Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also
removable only by impeachment.

MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?

MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.

MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the
rank of". We know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should
clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission
and the Committee.46
xxx

THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to
include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only
onimpeachment. Is that right?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.

MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special

Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may
be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI),
while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article
IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit
Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed
only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally
categorized into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to
inquire and obtain information and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive
measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman
was provided with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a
provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was
necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces
of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become the
common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and
neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:

In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal
association outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in
fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery and
perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The
Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the
field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources are used up in Manila instead
of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations
dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid
societies.

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to
the military establishment, just as it champions the common people against
bureaucratic indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary
foot soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course
work in close cooperation with the Minister of National Defense because of the necessity to
maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers, when they know they can
turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back on their own
informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop
morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military
authorities themselves. x x x

The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy
each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military establishment
shall likewise be appointed.(Emphasis supplied)

The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the
President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority
over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish
the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in
pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated
from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the
people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI.
Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without
reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section
10, provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14
and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of
independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional
strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government,
constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to
extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape
administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the

Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive,
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the
grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be
removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it
cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise
the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a
measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on
grounds provided by law.

In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the
Ombudsman's independence in this wise -

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This
Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling
short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.

Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the
administrative findings in OP Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the dismissal of herein
petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales, III.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because
the OP proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance
thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his
defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified
of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be
heard is sufficient. As long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and
present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because
what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only
has himself to blame for limiting his defense through the filing of an Answer. He had
squandered a subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded defenses by adamantly
refusing to attend the scheduled Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP recounted
as follows -

It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate
opportunities to explain his side and answer the Formal Charge against him.

In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with
his documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second
instance, this Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to
respondent's express election of a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however,
respondent Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear for said conference, interposing an
objection based on the unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the instant case.
Respondent having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend
himself in due course, the requirement of due process has been satisfied.59

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is

substantial evidence,60 which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.61 The
fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is not
a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on substantial evidence, which only requires
that a decision must "have something upon which it is based."62

Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial

evidence.63 The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and
the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on
the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of
public trust, which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the
Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the
President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.

The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained
action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office;
his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his
pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal
on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in
implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his
copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his
apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five
months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate
implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.

Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and
evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP
concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the
draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue
prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the
dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed
undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.

The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the
instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of
petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed
acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public
trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to
constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent
in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes
that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.

Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's

duties constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The
question calls for a deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal
of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative
offenses.

Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added
to the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation
of the oath of office,65 the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that
"such an overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary
exercise by the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that
referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the
officer unfit to continue in office"67 could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct
or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the
ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that
human error and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of
public trust" as embodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable
Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter
in understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit
in interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the 1971
Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of that Convention will show that it was
not included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just short of being criminal
but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable
negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers. I understand from
the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard
the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier
1973 provision on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid
confusion, would it not be clearer to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be
removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, and other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF
HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that
were enumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision or
phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words
"betrayal of public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are
amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment, where
circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of
public trust if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the
term."68 (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase
betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than
criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other
grounds for impeachment.

A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by
providing for their removal from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the
legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as
betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust,
for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and
plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for
impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature
nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover
acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for
impeachment.

The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate
events including system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to
what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete
resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should
petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon
the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's
requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting
to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act
upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared
to the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution
was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office
of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of
any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.

Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an
unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition,
the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for
betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be
an isolated case.

Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to
the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a
manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or
private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case
was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than
nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation
with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation.

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and

the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set
aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of
public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the
grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less
than diligent performance of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to
petitioner fall short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the
OP's factual findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it
appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the
charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the corresponding administrative
sanctions, if any.

Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is
entitled to reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of
backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed

administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of
the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to
remove her from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval
and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts
and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust," which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the
Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference
to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the
propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her
must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that
if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of
complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her
failings.

The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the
submission in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically
approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to
promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia
based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution declaring that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was warranted and that it
complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the
accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties,
both real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued
a resolution, which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-
gotten properties, ordered the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of
ownership of said properties to the Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer
of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of
the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the
Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major
General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for
sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and two sons.
Major General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the
Sandiganbayan, reads:

1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal
Accused MGen. Carlos F. Garcia (AFP Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the
act of one is the act of the others. Therefore, with the approval by the Honorable Court of the
Plea Bargaining Agreement executed by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-
Accused should likewise be dismissed since the charges against them are anchored on the
same charges against the Principal Accused.

On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead
guilty to the lesser offenses of direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as
amended. Upon Major General Garcia's motion, and with the express conformity of the OSP,
the Sandiganbayan allowed him to post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount
of P 30,000.00.

The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to

an administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's
determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's
administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the
conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient
performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State.
Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the
part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in
failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an
agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in
administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement
entered into.

Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The
essence of a plea bargaining agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a
lesser offense than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the
allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to
state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had
evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of
strong character that militates against the grant of bail."

Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to
plea bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly
insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the
"standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is
markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a
criminal case."76Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against accused Major General
Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and
wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.

The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the
pending administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left
to the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office of the
President.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has,
nonetheless, failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said
provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the
administrative action of removal taken against petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted
unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner Gonzales from office, it
was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in
its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority
vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule
12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.

Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of
the Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to
the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against
Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount
to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance
with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE
OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A.
GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D.
CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY.
FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF
OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS,Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our
September 4, 2012 Decision1which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions
challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770. 2

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found
Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of
public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.

Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary
proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to
disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against
her after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 1 O-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered
REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with
the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232,
We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of
the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.3

In view of the Courts ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).

We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for
reconsideration.

I. ANTECEDENTS

A. Gonzales petition (G.R. No. 196231)

a. Factual antecedents

On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police
Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutors Office against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.4

On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative
charge for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO
against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.5

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendozas case to his office. The
Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24, 2008. 6 Mendoza, et
al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order. 7

Pending Gonzales action on Mendoza, et al.s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaws complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaws failure
to prosecute.9

On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her
review.10 In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.11

Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsmans decision that approved Gonzales
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration 12 on
November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.13

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.s case records
to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14,
2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia
for review and recommendation.14
GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for
appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales
office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with the
case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman.16

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.s case,
Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully
resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several
others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the
incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales
accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against
Mendoza."17 The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales failure to promptly resolve
Mendozas motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx
"precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended the referral of its
findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.19

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross
Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in
Office.20

b. The OP ruling

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the
service.21According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendozas] Motion for Reconsideration [that spanned for nine (9) long months] xxx amounted to
gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsmans own
Rules of Procedure."22

c. The Petition

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April
27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to
the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on Mendozas motion for
reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it
took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only
within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order. 23

B. Sulits petition (G.R. No. 196232)

In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia
filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied
Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecutions
evidence against Garcia.

On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff,
entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i)
withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money
laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In
exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the
real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the
information.25

The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the parties submitted
Joint Motion for Approval.27

The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee
on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the
Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770.28The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and
the filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate
government office.

Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. 29 On March

24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OPs jurisdiction. 30 The question of
jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011,
prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.

II. COURTS RULING

On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales
petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the
Office of the Ombudsman. (As the full explanation of the Courts vote describes below,
this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect
to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Constitution. The prevailing ruling on this latter point is embodied in
the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Marvic Mario Victor Leonen).

A. Preliminary considerations:

a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners

At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the Courts September 4, 2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the
reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Courts review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the
validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional
authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then
any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs decision on the merits will be an empty one.
In other words, since the validity of the OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case including the
constitutional issue remains alive for the Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration.

b. The justiciability of the constitutional issue raised in the petitions

We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman)
is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently
susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law,31 as where the court finds that there
are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of
the government.32

In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress choice to
grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether
such statutory grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.

To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 grants where the Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a
vacuum, more so when the authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and
constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties granted
and imposed on it by Article VIII of the Constitution.

B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

a. The Philippine Ombudsman

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to
serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and
misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their
function as government critic.33

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-
mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate.
Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman
to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu
proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers
previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was
given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases. 34

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article
II35 and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned
to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of
the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary. [emphasis ours, italics supplied]

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court has upheld its actions,
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No.
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law
and the Constitution.38

The Ombudsmans broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of
the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad
powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the
pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external
reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution
expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed. [emphasis ours]

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."39 It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers. 40

b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsmans independence

Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as
"independent."41The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions
performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable
interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.

Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended
that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the
absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the
interference that the President may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility
of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to
our legal system.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition
of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not
only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based.

The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions need for independence.
In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by
providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law,
on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics.43 In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on
Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.44

Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although
it enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner
fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep the
Commission independent from the executive branch and other political leaders:

MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to
him our concept, he can advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the
committee is that we need a body that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive
because the Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this commission would need
not only the cooperation of the executive branch of the government but also of the judicial branch
of government. This is going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also
want a commission to function even under the worst circumstance when the executive may not
be very cooperative. However, the question in our mind is: Can it still function during that time?
Hence, we are willing to accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to reconcile this.
We realize the need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build in some
safeguards that it will not be rendered useless by an uncooperative executive.

xxxx

MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights
go to a country, the most credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often
these are private organizations, many of which are prosecuted, such as those we find in many
countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are proposing is an independent body on human
rights, which would provide governments with credibility precisely because it is independent of the
present administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be credible because it
is not subject to pressure or control from the present political leadership.

Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are
in opposition today and those who are in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow.
Therefore, if we have a Commission on Human Rights that would investigate and make sure that
the rights of each one is protected, then we shall have a body that could stand up to any power,
to defend the rights of individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and so on. 45

These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional

commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are
concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies
prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have
been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as
unconstitutional the Presidents act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as
Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however well-meaning"47 it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the
discretionary power of the President:

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created
by the Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights and vested with
the delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing
responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly
function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and
Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being
antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights
has to be declared unconstitutional.

Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,49 the Court considered even the mere review of the rules of
the Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of
independence of this body. Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less pressure
on a constitutional body than the Executives power to discipline and remove key officials of the
Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior
but is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to
the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican
democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning. 50

c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is
thus unconstitutional

Our discussions, particularly the Courts expressed caution against presidential interference with
the constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions,
speak for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for
violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the
constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By
so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks
and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act
as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need
for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the
Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the

Ombudsman fully support this position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional
Commission expressed his apprehension that any form of presidential control over the Office of
the Ombudsman would diminish its independence.51 The following exchanges between
Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod further reveal the constitutional intent to keep
the Office of the Ombudsman independent from the President:

MR. OPLE. xxx

May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an amendment
xxx, by way of designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good
government, efficiency of the public service and the integrity of the President of the Philippines,
instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which would be accountable
to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?

MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we
prepared the report, it was the opinion of the Committee and I believe it still is that it may
not contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of the
culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive department. Therefore, as we
saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous influence of
the President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a special fiscal. The
whole purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions and to produce a vehicle
that will give true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret that we cannot
accept the proposition.52

The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the
Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to
exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons
who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given
to the public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking
official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the Presidents favor, would be discouraged from
approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainants impression (even if
misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided.
To be sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the
Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.

d. The mutual-protection argument for crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770

In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack
of an external check against the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between
the Ombudsman and her Deputies.

While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that
this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already
in place. On the one hand, the Ombudsmans Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because
she is subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsmans
attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal
or certiorari. The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a non-
political independent body mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial
disputes, whose judges and employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less questionable. The Members of the Court
themselves may be subjected to the impeachment power of Congress.

In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly
implausible. At the same time, the Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the
independence granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from either
the Executive or Congress and is in full accord with constitutional intent.

e. Congress power determines the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable
officers is not a carte blanch authority

Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, 53 Congress is empowered to determine the
modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent
rule of "removal only by impeachment" to favored public officers.54 Understandably so,
impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office.
It is, by its nature, a sui generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a judicious and
careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; 56 the one-year
limitation or bar for its initiation;57 the limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined
instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases;59 and the number of votes required for
a finding of guilt.60 All these argue against the extension of this removal mechanism beyond those
mentioned in the Constitution.

On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment
proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the highest
echelons of responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of the negative practical
effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive process in terms of the
cost of prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation. 61 Thus, in a
cost-benefit analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting Congress power to
otherwise legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the country.

It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
should be read. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be
regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit.
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of
separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances.62

In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and
cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can
ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.

In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority is
not a blanket authority for Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without
running afoul of the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without
disrupting the delicate check and balance mechanism under the Constitution. Properly viewed
from this perspective, the core constitutional principle of independence is observed and any
possible absurdity resulting from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the
Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to determine the manner and cause of removal
of all non-impeachable officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in
Macalintal v. Comelec63 is apt:

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."

While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is
intended as a measure of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor since
these grounds are not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman that it creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles hangs
over the Deputy Ombudsmans head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external pressures
and influence of officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of external reprisal from the very office
he is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the
Office of the Ombudsman.

That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high
standard required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable
offense) and that the Presidents power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally
inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing of an
administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP
can already result in their suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in
violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section
11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced
to the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully
tried to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman,
its decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The OPs decision perfectly illustrates why the
requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered, even
at a minimum, a measure of protection of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue

a. The Office of the Presidents finding of gross negligence has no legal and factual leg to stand
on
The OPs decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct. The
assailed Decision of the OP reads:

Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the
inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain Mendozas Motion for
Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency in the performance of official duty.64

b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency

Let us again briefly recall the facts.

1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman,65 which was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration; 66

2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and
make his recommendation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;

3. April 5, 2010 GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate
superior, Dir. Cecilio;68

4. April 27, 2010 Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order;69

5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) Gonzales
endorsed the draft order for the final approval of the Ombudsman.70

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were
already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.71

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP 72 relied on Section 8, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendozas Motion for
Reconsideration within five days:

Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion

for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:

a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial
to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer
shall resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis
and underscore ours]

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to
Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not
simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed
decision, the period for resolving the case does not cover the period within which it should be
reviewed:

Section 6. Rendition of decision. Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared
submitted for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his
findings and recommendation for the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall
be reviewed by the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned. With
respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving
authority. Upon approval, copies thereof shall be served upon the parties and the head of the
office or agency of which the respondent is an official or employee for his information and
compliance with the appropriate directive contained therein. [italics and emphases supplied]

Thus, the OPs ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of
five days, to review a case was totally baseless.

c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates

The OPs claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on
Mendozas motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are
similarly groundless.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous
cases that involve the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot
conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendozas case should have been
prioritized over other similar cases.

The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of
the Ombudsman.73 This consideration certainly militates against the OSGs observation that there
was "a grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay"74 on the part of Gonzales.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among
others, quasi-judicial bodies,75 like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself a relative
concept.76 Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective constitutional sense.
Unfortunately, because of the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in dismissing
Gonzales, the political and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what is legal and
constitutional.

The facts do not show that Gonzales subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their
work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it
is noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review the case for
the first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four
months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.

The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and
discretion. If this Court rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the
Ombudsmans constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country would be
subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that these
periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this with
the established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases something the Court may be
hard put to justify.

d. No undue interest

The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendozas case by having the
case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis
of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.

The fact that Gonzales had Mendozas case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if
it were based merely on the request of the alleged victims father. The Constitution empowers the
Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
any public official or employee of the government.78 This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA
No. 6770,79 and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.80

Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on the prosecution officers recommendations, the finding of
guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al.
admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to stay the
whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was
allowed to leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his
promise to return with the proper documents.81 These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to
conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the proper
procedure for the apprehension of traffic violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a
case, when appropriate.82

Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales decision differs from the
decision of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we
cannot tie the hands of any judicial or quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur
with the decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have also taken cognizance
of the case. To do so in the case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be repugnant to the
independence that our Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify the
very purpose for which it was created.

e. Penalty of dismissal totally incommensurate with established facts

Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal imposed
by the OP necessarily suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only
be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made to account only for lapses in our
responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time
nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft took less
than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping incident
rendered Mendozas motion moot.

In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion,
however, does not preclude the Ombudsman from looking into any other possible
administrative liability of Gonzales under existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue

The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing
Tanodbayan at the time83 became the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution. While the composition of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing
discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to the

Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expounded in jurisprudence.

Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the
Ombudsman, known as the Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers.
Accordingly, on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted PD No. 1487.85

Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive
authority" to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.87 PD No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the
power of control and supervision over the Special Prosecutor. 88 Consistent with this grant of
power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail to the Office of the
CSP "any officer or employee of Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the
executive supervision thereof" to assist the Office of the CSP.

In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken
away from it by the Office of the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office
of the Chief Special Prosecutor" under the Tanodbayans control, 90 with the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Unlike the earlier decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint Special
Investigators and subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public
officer or employees who "shall be under the supervision and control of the Chief Special
Prosecutor."91 In 1979, PD No. 1630 further amended the earlier decrees by transferring the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan himself. 92

This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987
Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created. 93 The existing Tanodbayan
is made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now94 or hereafter may be provided by law."95

Other than the Ombudsmans Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman.96 Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command, Congress enacted
RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the extent of its disciplinary authority.

In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but
the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the President
the authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor, from a list of
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law
requires that the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence. 97

The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the
Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies.98 Their terms of office,99 prohibitions and
qualifications,100 rank and salary are likewise the same.101 The requirement on disclosure102 is
imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of
vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting
Ombudsman; the President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as
Acting Ombudsman.103 The power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other
government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by
the Special Prosecutor.104

Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would
insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the
Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman
was designed for.

Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the
Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and
supervision over that office.105 This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of
the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem
fit.1wphi1 Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her
duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.

Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-
ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and
removal powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office
militates against a differential treatment between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and
the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally
true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as
agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.

In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an argument that, at
bottom, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the
Court said:

Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate

that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the President. Xxx

In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan,
to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently
refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It
follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution
on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other
powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that
Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman.107

Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor
to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary
authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the
Constitution.

III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231).
We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary
jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108431 July 14, 2000

OSCAR G. RARO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (Second Division), THE HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying a motion to quash an
information on the ground that the preliminary investigation allegedly violated the
right of the accused to due process of law.

Petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate Secretary of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, petitioner was the Acting Manager of
the Special Projects Department that was in charge of the experimental Small Town
Lottery (STL), which under PCSO Resolution No. 118, dated April 1987, was to be
operated in certain areas of the country. On July 30, 1987, the PCSO, through Atty.
Reynaldo E. Ilagan of the Special Projects Department, authorized Elmec Trading and
Management Corporation (ELMEC) to operate the STL in the province of Camarines
Norte. ELMEC in turn employed Luis ("Bing") F. Abao, a resident of Daet, Camarines
Norte, as Provincial Manager of the experimental STL in said province.1 Abao
allegedly invested P100,000.00 in the STL operation in that province.

In a complaint that he filed with the Tanodbayan in Manila on May 20, 1988, Abao alleged
that petitioner, in his capacity as PCSO Corporate Secretary, "personally and directly
intervened in the operation of said lottery to his financial benefit and advantage" by
committing the following acts:

(1) Causing the employment of members of his family in the experimental STL
project that was under his supervision, in violation of Section 3 (d) of the Anti-
Graft Law;

(2) Deciding on the dismissal of certain lottery employees and in bad faith
driving Abao "to sever from the management of lottery" which at that time
was grossing about P250,000.00 daily under a "profit-sharing" agreement, thus
causing Abao "damage and injury" in the amount of P1,300,000.00, in
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law; and

(3) Regularly demanding from Abao amounts totaling more than P100,000.00
as his share in the experimental lottery, in violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-
Graft Law.
Abao maintained further that petitioner got mad at him when he gave petitioner a check
instead of cash, which petitioner later used to accuse Abao of issuing a bouncing check
notwithstanding that the check was not encashed. Abao added that petitioner was not only
dishonest but displayed such dishonesty.2 The complaint filed by Abaos counsel was
verified and subscribed before a notary public,3 and docketed in the Office of the
Ombudsman as OSP-88-01263.

Overall Ombudsman Jose G. Colayco, on July 1, 1988, endorsed the complaint to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4 On May 11, 1989, NBI-LED Officer-in-Charge
Gerarda G. Galang submitted a report stating that the investigation conducted by NBI Senior
Agent Salvador A. Duka yielded the following findings:

(a) On the charge of employment of relatives, Abao charged that petitioner asked
him to appoint his (petitioners) brother as station manager of the lottery in Labo,
Camarines Norte. Likewise according to Abao, petitioner imposed on him the
appointment of petitioners sister, Marissa Raro- Remigio as the STL provincial
cashier. Per the joint affidavit of Yoly Malubay, Ruben Galeon, Rosalio Poblete and
Francisco Villaluz, petitioners brother named Antonio, the lottery station manager,
signed payrolls, vouchers and other pertinent papers using the name Joel Remigio,
Marissas husband. In 1988, Antonio Raro was appointed Assistant Provincial
Operations Manager of the STL in Camarines Norte. On the other hand, Marissa
Raro-Remigio claimed that it was ELMEC that offered her the position of treasurer of
the STL and that on January 27, 1988, ELMEC terminated the employment of Abao
and the employees he had hired. However, the circumstances surrounding ELMECs
employment of petitioners brother and sister were not verified from the owners of
ELMEC.

(b) With respect to the charge that petitioner demanded from Abao the total amount
of P100,000.00, no receipt was shown to prove petitioners having in fact received
that sum although Ruidera and Galeon, in their affidavits, confirmed that said amount
was given to petitioner and to Atty. Ilagan. Since the sworn statements of Ilagan and
Cordez and those of Fernando Carrascoso and Rustico Manalo, who allegedly
received 25% of the proceeds of the STL, had not yet been taken, there were certain
aspects of the charge that should be considered. Hence, "no definite conclusion
could be made" thereon.

(c) The subject of dismissal of employees was not yet covered by the investigation.

With these findings, Galang recommended that further investigation be conducted and that a
copy of the "evaluation comment" be furnished the Ombudsman with the information "that
further investigation (was) still being conducted on some aspects of the case."5 Accordingly,
NBI Director J. Antonio M. Carpio endorsed on May 11, 1989 the "evaluation comment" and
the NBI agents report to the Ombudsman.6

On July 12, 1989, NBI Agent Duka submitted a Disposition Form stating that per the
joint affidavit of Yolly Manubay, Ruben Galeon, Rosario Poblete and Francisco
Villaluz, petitioners brother, Antonio Raro signed "numerous vouchers, payrolls and
other papers" in the name of Joel Remigio. The sworn statement of Teddy Aguirre and
xerox copies of vouchers supported this. However, the original copies of the vouchers
could not be secured on account of the cessation of operation of the STL in
Camarines Norte since July 1988. Neither could the sworn statement of Antonio Raro be
secured. Thus, NBI Agent Duka recommended that further investigation be conducted in
coordination with LUCSO in Lucena City.7

Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer II (GIO II) Theresa Medialdea-Caraos

submitted to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez a Memorandum dated March 15, 1990, with
the following recommendation:

"RECOMMENDED ACTION: The initial report of the NBI points only to the anomalies
allegedly committed by the respondents brother, Antonio. The appointment of his sister
which was supposedly imposed on the complainant is not supported by evidence other than
the mere allegation of the latter.

The misdeeds committed by respondent were not based on facts as presented by NBI.

It is therefore recommended that further investigation by NBI be conducted in order to

determine the veracity of the charges."

The Memorandum was recommended for approval by Acting Director Gualberto J. de

la Llana and approved on March 22, 1990 by Ombudsman Vasquez.8

On September 19, 1990, the NBI recommended the prosecution of petitioner based on
Abaos complaint.9 Thus, on May 14, 1991, GIO II Caraos formally directed petitioner to file
his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence to the complaint of May 6, 1988, with a
warning that his failure "to do so shall be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard and
the preliminary investigation shall proceed accordingly."10 On petitioners motion, the
Ombudsman granted him until September 7, 1991 within which to file his counter-affidavit.
On September 7, 1991, petitioner sought another extension within which to file his counter-
affidavit.11

Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit on October 25, 1991.12 He asserted that he removed
some employees from the lottery to avoid undue injury to the government. He denied that he
hired or caused to be hired his brother and sister in the "experimental lottery research" as
they maintained their affairs without his interference. He also denied demanding or receiving
any amount from Abao or from the lottery operator as it was impossible for him to demand
bribe money in the form of a check. He claimed that Abaos complaint was a desperate
effort to malign him.13

On November 29, 1991, GIO II Caraos issued a Resolution stating that:

"Evaluating the complaint, as well as the controverting evidence presented by the

respondent, we find prima facie case against herein respondent for Violation of R.A. 3019.

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in a preliminary investigation, it is not required that all
reasonable doubts on the accuseds guilt must be removed; what is required only is that
evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the offense
charged. Moreover, as between the positive assertions of complainant Abano and the mere
denials of the respondent, the former deserves more credence as it is acknowledged that the
same has greater evidentiary value than the latter. Probable cause has been established by
the clear and positive testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses pointing to the herein
respondent as responsible for various acts relative to the operation of the lottery in Violation
of the Anti-Graft law specifically Sec. 3 (a), (b), (c), (h) and (k). Such finding is duly supported
by the recommendation of the NBI report which also recommended the filing of proper
criminal charge against the respondent.

"Furthermore, most of the allegations of the respondents as contained in his counter-affidavit

are matters of defense which can be best ventilated in court during trial. In fact, the other
allegations of respondents which are mere insinuations as to the motive of the complainant
in filing the case, only deserve scant consideration.

"Wherefore, all legal premises considered, let an information be filed before the
proper court against respondent Raro.

"SO RESOLVED."14

Director Cesar T. Palana recommended approval of the above Resolution on

December 5, 1991.15 However, on January 27, 1992, Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr., who reviewed the Resolution, recommended its disapproval and the
dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that the NBI report was "based merely on
testimonial evidence" that "would not suffice to establish a prima facie case" against
herein petitioner. He averred that more than oral evidence should support the charge
of extortion and that petitioners witnesses had amply clarified the charge of
nepotism.16

On June 11, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer I (SPO I) Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit, after
reviewing the Resolution of GIO II Caraos, issued a Memorandum finding that said
Resolution "did not fully discuss the evidence that would support the particular charges
recommended to be filed" against petitioner. After analyzing each of the charges, SPO I
Barreras-Sulit concluded that petitioner should only be charged with violation of Section 3 (b)
of R.A. 3019 as there was prima facie case that petitioner received the total amount of
P116,000.00 on four different occasions. Attached to the Memorandum was the information
charging petitioner with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.17

SPO I Barreras-Sulits Memorandum was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De

G. Ferrer, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto and Ombudsman Vasquez.18 Hence, on
July 2, 1992, an information dated May 19, 1992 prepared by SPO I Barreras-Sulit was filed
with the Sandiganbayan,19 accusing petitioner with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019 committed as follows:

"That on or about the period from October, 1987 to January 1988, in Daet, Camarines Norte,
Manila and Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, a public officer being then the Corporate Secretary and Acting
Department Manager of the Special Projects Department of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), San Marcelino, Malate, Metro Manila, tasked to monitor and
oversee the Small Town Lottery Experimental Project of the PCSO in certain areas including
Camarines Norte, taking advantage of his said public position and while in the performance
of his official duties as such, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally demand
and receive on four different occasions the amount totalling to ONE HUNDRED SIXTEEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE PESOS and NINETY NINE CENTAVOS
(P116,799.99), Philippine Currency, from Mr. Luis "Bing" F. Abao, Provincial Manager of
the STL operations in Camarines Norte, as his share in the net proceeds of the said STL
which was not authorized under the law but which amount was given to and received by him
in his capacity as overseer and monitoring arm of the PCSO in the Small Town Lottery
operation in Camarines Norte.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."

On July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued an order for petitioners arrest and fixed
bail in the amount of P12,000.00.20 On the same day, petitioner applied for bail before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26,21 which forthwith approved
the application.22 On July 8, 1992, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation and motion for the lifting of the order of arrest.23 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan recalled its order of arrest the following day.24

Petitioner subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for the reinvestigation of the
Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 11 June 1992,25 alleging that:

1. The "prejudicial and indecent delay in the preliminary investigation" violated his
rights to due process of law and to speedy disposition of the case because while the
complaint was filed on May 20, 1988, the information against him was filed more than
four (4) years later.

2. Despite the delay in filing the information, hastiness attended the proceedings in
that he was not furnished a copy of the resolution on which the information was
based. Moreover, the information was dated May 19, 1992 or even before the
resolution that gave rise to it was finished on June 11, 1992. There was a need for a
reinvestigation to protect him from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.

3. The resolution of June 11, 1992 was a "picture of legal and factual infirmities."
While no evidence supported the complaint other than the reports of NBI Agents
Duka and Lasala and the affidavits dated June 30, 1988 of Rene Ruidera and Ben
Galeon, these bases for the information were "worthless pieces of documents."
Moreover, he was not furnished a copy of the NBI report showing that he received
P116,000.00 from the proceeds of the STL operation, and the NBI never conducted a
reinvestigation as required by NBI Director Carpio.

4. The complaint was based solely on the affidavit of Abao and those of Ruidera
and Galeon who were mere hearsay witnesses. The allegations in the complaint
were facts to be established (factum probandum) requiring further evidentiary facts
(factum probans). The only source of the charges, therefore, were the bare
assertions of Abao who was not a credible witness. He was "consumed by
vengeance", because petitioner had him audited for "unexplained disposition" of STL
funds during Abaos campaign for mayor of Daet. Hence, to get back at petitioner,
Abao circulated "fabrications and fairy tale" against him even before the
Sandiganbayan.

After hearing, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitioners motion for reinvestigation in a
Resolution dated July 28, 1992, and ordered the defense to file a motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days from July 29,
1992, and the prosecution to conduct such reinvestigation and to terminate it on or before
August 31, 1992. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan required the prosecution to furnish petitioner
a copy of the NBI Report of September 18, 1990, and reset the arraignment to September 8,
1992 at 8:30 a.m. The Sandiganbayans directives were based on the following findings:

"We have gone over the grounds and arguments alleged in accuseds aforesaid motion and
We do not subscribe to the claim that there was prejudicial and indecent delay in the
preliminary investigation, considering that the initial complaint filed by complainant Luis F.
Abalo (sic) on May 20, 1988 had been referred to the National Bureau of Investigation on
July 1, 1988 and the report of the latter agency was only submitted on September 18, 1990.
Thereafter, Graft Investigator II Theresa M. Caraos conducted a preliminary investigation,
wherein accused submitted his counter-affidavit denying the charges levelled against him,
culminating in the issuance of a resolution dated November 29, 1991, recommending the
filing of the proper information with this Court.

"The Caraos (sic) resolution was reviewed by proper officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman, the latest of which was made by Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell E.
Barreras-Sulit, who adopted the recommendation for the filing only of a charge under Section
3(b) of R.A. 3019 in her resolution of June 11, 1992. However, the information, as prepared
by Atty. Barreras-Sulit, is dated May 19, 1992 and approved by Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez on June 25, 1992 and filed with this Court on July 2, 1992. On this score, We find
nothing irregular with respect to the afore-cited dates, despite the contention of the accused
that there was "hastiness despite delay." Moreover, the doctrines enunciated in Tatad (159
SCRA 70) are not entirely on all fours with the situation depicted in the case at bar, having
been modified in Lecaroz (G.R. Nos. 918223-35, promulgated June 7, 1990)
and Gonzales (199 SCRA 298).

"On the other hand, there appears to be some semblance of validity to accuseds other
grounds, to wit, that he was not furnished a copy of the NBI report during the preliminary
investigation, hence, he was not able to refute the allegations contained therein and (2) (sic)
that he was not furnished a copy of the resolution upon which the information was based
before the filing thereof, thus, he was deprived of his right to file a motion for reconsideration.
Under Administrative Order No. 09, issued by the Ombudsman on October 15, 1991, which
amended Rule II, Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6770 (sic), a respondent has five (5) days from
receipt of the resolution finding a prima facie case against him within which to file a motion
for reconsideration. Likewise, under Section 7 of Rule II, supra, he may move for a
reinvestigation based on errors or irregularities during the preliminary investigation or on
newly-discovered evidence."26

Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for extension of time to file his motion for
reinvestigation,27 which was granted on August 13, 1992.28

On August 12, 1992, complainant Abao wrote a letter addressed to Special Prosecution
Officer III (SPO III) Roger Berbano, Sr. of the Sandiganbayan, alleging that:

(1) Petitioner was not able to refute the charges against him of violation of Section 3
(a), (b), (c), (h) and (k) of Republic Act No. 3019 "except to discredit the truth about
the P116,000.00 he demanded and got from me;"

(2) Petitioner admitted in a press conference the existence of a check in the amount
of P51,799.00 but his claim that it bounced was not true because the check with Atty.
Reynaldo Ilagan as payee was in his (Abaos) possession;

(3) The "bribe money" was good to the "exact centavo" because it was 25% of the
daily gross earnings of the lottery;

(4) He was not a dismissed employee of ELMEC because he financed and managed
the STL operation "upon the prodding of PCSO through Atty. Raro" and he received
commissions and percentages as late as March 1988 as shown by vouchers signed
by Marissa Raro-Remigio;
 (5) His candidacy for mayor in the January 18, 1988 elections was never affected by
allegations of mismanagement; he stayed as the general manager of ELMEC until
March 1988; and

(6) The findings of Senator Maceda of the Senate Committee on Games and
Amusement that the operation of the STL was the source of corruption and "milking
cow of corrupt PCSO officials" and hence, its discontinuance upon the order of the
President, was the "best evidence of corruption" perpetrated by petitioner.

On August 14, 1992, SPO III Berbano issued an Order stating that the grounds and issues
raised in petitioners motion for reinvestigation were "clearly matters of defense to be
ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits." Hence, he recommended the denial of
the motion for reinvestigation, which recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman,
Conrado M. Vasquez, on August 26, 1992.29

In the meantime, on August 18, 1992, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution of June 11, 1992. He
asserted that SPO I Barreras-Sulit based her Resolution on the NBI Report of September 18,
1990 and the affidavits dated June 30, 1988 of Rene Ruidera and Ben Galeon, all of which
had no evidentiary value because they are hearsay and basically based on information
furnished them by Abao. According to petitioner, the said Report was incomplete and
inconclusive because the findings therein needed further investigation. Reiterating his
arguments that factum probans is required during a preliminary investigation and that Abao
is not a credible witness, petitioner contended that he should be spared from the trouble,
expense and anxiety as well as the stigma resulting from an open and public accusation of a
crime.30

Subsequently, petitioner also filed with the Tanodbayan a "Motion for a Last Review" of the
Special Prosecutors Order of August 14, 1992. He alleged that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) failed to take into consideration the very motion for reconsideration that
should have been the subject of that Order. He contended that the OSP might not have been
aware of the motions he filed for extension of time within which to file the motion for
reconsideration, and the OSPs preparation of the Order of August 14, 1992 before it
received the motion for reconsideration constituted a gross procedural defect. Petitioner
further asserted that "the minimum requirement for a meaningful determination of probable
cause should take into consideration the strength of the evidence of the accused and the
inherent baselessness of the complainants." He thus prayed that the Resolution of June 11,
1992 recommending the filing of an information against him be reversed, the complaint
dismissed, and the information filed with the Sandiganbayan withdrawn.31

The scheduled arraignment of petitioner on September 8, 1992 was cancelled considering

that the reinvestigation ordered by the Sandiganbayan had "not yet been terminated." The
Sandiganbayan granted SPO III Berbano a twenty-day extension within which to resolve the
motion for reconsideration, and reset the arraignment for October 2, 1992.32

On September 24, 1992, SPO III Berbano denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and
the motion for a last review, upon a finding that the November 21, 1991 Resolution of GIO II
Caraos and the Memorandum of SPO I Barreras-Sulit, both of which bore the imprimatur of
the Ombudsman, "simply signify that there exists a prima facie case or probable cause"
against petitioner. Hence, he reiterated that the issues raised were evidentiary in nature and
should be resolved by the Sandiganbayan.33
Petitioner did not appear at his arraignment on October 2, 1992. Hence, upon motion of the
prosecution, a warrant for his arrest was issued. However, petitioners counsel arrived late
and undertook to bring the proper medical certificate showing that petitioner was ill. The
Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment for October 12, 1992.34 Later, petitioner sought the
reconsideration of the Order for his arrest on the ground that he was then suffering from viral
influenza and submitted a medical certificate to that effect.35 The Sandiganbayan considered
that incident closed and terminated, and directed that the arraignment should proceed on
October 12, 1992.36

On that date, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information,37 on
the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction in view of violations of accuseds
constitutional rights during the preliminary investigation. He argued that the determination of
probable cause by the prosecuting officer does not preclude the courts from demanding
further proof thereon. Citing Brocka v. Enrile38 where this Court held that a sham and hastily
conducted preliminary investigation may be lawfully enjoined, petitioner pointed out the
following as indicia of the "falsity and hastiness" of the proceedings before the Ombudsman:

1. While the Resolution recommending the filing of an information was issued on

June 11, 1992, the information was already prepared on May 19, 1992 thereby
showing that said Resolution was no more than a formality. For petitioner, the
situation was akin to "birth preced(ing) pregnancy."

2. SPO III Berbano denied the motion for reconsideration in his Order of August 14,
1992 or four (4) days before he filed the motion for reconsideration on August 18,
1992 thereby showing that the prosecutors were "hell-bent and determined, come
high or low waters, reason or no reason, to proceed" with their determination to
prosecute him. That procedure also made a mockery of the Sandiganbayans
Resolution of July 28, 1992 directing the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case.

3. At the hearing on September 8, 1992, SPO III Berbano confided to his counsel,
Atty. Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr., that on August 14, 1992, Abao had sent him a letter with
the admonition that Berbano should not be like petitioners U.P. fraternity brothers
who would cover up petitioners corrupt and foul deeds. Berbano was pressured by
said letter as indicated by his denial on August 14, 1992 "of the motion for
reconsideration yet to be filed on 18 August 1992." After all, Berbano was aspiring for
the Bench and it was not a "far-flung conclusion" that a favorable consideration of
said motion for reconsideration "may prompt Abao to accuse him of partiality,
Berbano being the UP fraternity brother of the accused." Berbano in fact admitted to
Roxas that he was being pressured to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration.

4. Because the crime charged was for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019, Abao should be charged as the briber. Abao never applied for immunity
from prosecution because his "testimony" was uncorroborated on material points.
Moreover, while petitioner was deprived information on what was happening with the
case, Abao was regularly furnished with progress reports thereon. Abao publicized
such reports in Camarines Norte in clear violation of P.D. No. 749 mandating that
proceedings in preliminary investigations shall be strictly confidential to protect the
reputation of the official involved.

Petitioner alleged further that there was a "jurally and constitutionally defective determination
of probable cause" as the complainant and his witnesses were never personally examined
by any of the officers at the Offices of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. Neither
was the complaint ever sworn to before them. He argued once again on the failure of the NBI
to conduct a reinvestigation of the case and the hearsay nature of the affidavits of Ruidera
and Galeon.

On November 19, 1992, SPO III Berbano filed an opposition to the motion to quash, arguing
that all the pleadings filed by petitioner were duly considered, as shown by the Orders of
August 14, 1992 and September 24, 1992, both of which were approved by his superiors,
including the Ombudsman. While Atty. Roxas "is himself a Fraternity Brod of the Alpha Phi
Beta Fraternity of UP," Berbano denied that he was ever pressured into denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, Berbano averred that petitioners ground for the
motion to quash, i.e., that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over an information
that was the result of a highly anomalous preliminary investigation, may only be "inferred"
from Section 3 (b) of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure requiring the court to
have jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. By filing a
motion to quash, petitioner was deemed to have admitted the allegations in the information
and hence, there was "only one way clear under the circumstances," and that was to
proceed with the trial of the case.39

The Sandiganbayan40 denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. It found "no persuasive
reason to depart from its earlier holding" in the Resolution of July 28, 1992 "that there was no
indecent delay in the manner by which the preliminary investigation was held." It ruled that
the long period of time that the preliminary investigation took was not meant to persecute
petitioner. Neither was there clear and convincing proof that SPO III Berbano succumbed to
pressure and considered petitioners pleadings with partiality. The Sandiganbayan stressed
that its authority to determine probable cause "is limited only for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest, and not for the purpose of justifying the filing or non-filing of the
Information." It found "no compelling justification to disturb the findings made by the
prosecution of the existence of probable cause that caused it to file" the information, and that
the objections raised by accused-movant on this point involve matters which could be best
passed upon by this Court during trial on the merits. Thus, the Sandiganbayan set
petitioners arraignment on November 23, 1992.41

Petitioners counsel once again moved for the resetting of the scheduled arraignment on the
ground that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution denying his
motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan gave him fifteen (15) days within which to file the
motion for reconsideration and the prosecution ten (10) days from receipt of said motion
within which to comment. Meanwhile, the arraignment was reset to January 11, 1993.42

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was filed on December 8, 1992. He reiterated therein
that the preliminary investigation conducted was "sham and attended by irregularities
amounting to violation of the very purpose for which preliminary investigation was instituted
in our statute books." He emphasized that SPO III Berbano was indeed pressured into
denying his motions because of his application for judgeship. He claimed that the
Sandiganbayan erred when it ruled that the "courts power to examine the conclusions drawn
by the prosecutor after the preliminary investigation is only for the purpose of determining the
existence of just and proper cause to issue a warrant of arrest." Relying on the ruling
in Salonga v. Cruz Pao43 wherein this Court reviewed the prosecutions findings of a prima
facie case against Salonga, petitioner averred that it is infinitely more important than
conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure to respect the citizens right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution.
The prosecution did not file a comment or opposition to the motion for reconsideration. On
January 5, 1993, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying said motion for lack of
merit and setting petitioners arraignment on January 11, 1993. The Sandiganbayan held that
petitioners allegations that the preliminary investigation was sham and that SPO III Berbano
was partial are not supported by competent proof. Brushing aside said allegations as mere
speculations, the Sandiganbayan found no reason to depart from its earlier conclusion that
there was no compelling justification to disturb the prosecutions finding of a probable
cause.44

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman and the People of the Philippines from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 17800. On February 4, 1993, this Court denied the prayer for temporary restraining
order and required respondents to comment on the petition.45 Petitioners arraignment
proceeded on February 19, 1993, where he entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged.46 On September 21, 1993, after respondents filed their comment and
petitioner his reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the instant petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.47 Meanwhile, the
Sandiganbayan suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 17800 on account of the
pendency of the instant petition.48

Petitioner alleges in this petition for certiorari and prohibition that: (a) the determination of
"probable cause" in Criminal Case No. 17800 was constitutionally defective because the
Ombudsman, before filing the information, and the Sandiganbayan, before issuing the
warrant of arrest, failed to examine the complainant under oath; (b) the preliminary
investigation was hasty, malicious, persecutory and based on inadmissible evidence thereby
violating his right to due process of law, and (c) the unexplained 4-year delay in resolving the
preliminary investigation, coupled with the favorable consideration of the complaint albeit
manifestly false and politically motivated, violated his constitutional rights to speedy trial and
to due process of law.49

At the outset, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. This is succinctly
underscored in Quion v. Sandiganbayan as follows:

"The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy against
interlocutory orders such as those assailed in these proceedings; i.e., an order denying a
motion to quash the information, and one declaring the accused to have waived his right to
present evidence and considering the case submitted for decision. As pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General (citing Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 [1990]), and
Acharon v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309; People v. Madaluyo, 1 SCRA 990), the
established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is
not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law. It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the
inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may
exceptionally be allowed. The Court has been cited to no such special circumstances in the
cases at bar."50

In the case at bar, there is no showing of such special circumstances. The jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman over the complaint is not even questioned by petitioner51 as his motion to quash
the information is based on the allegedly "highly anomalous preliminary investigation" that
amounted to a denial of his rights to due process and to speedy disposition of the charge
against him. However, an incomplete preliminary investigation52 or the absence thereof53may
not warrant the quashal of an information. In such cases, the proper procedure is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance any further proceedings conducted and to remand the
case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation or completion thereof. However,
granting arguendo that the preliminary investigation was sham and highly anomalous in this
case, that defect was cured when the above procedure was in fact observed by the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by
petitioner, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition must fail. However, in the interest
of justice, we shall resolve the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation erroneously and irregularly.

Petitioner contends that both the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan failed to
examine the complainant personally to determine the existence of probable cause that
would warrant the filing of an information against him and, consequently, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. He rues the fact that the complaint filed by Abao
against him was subscribed to before an ordinary notary public and that the sworn
statements of witnesses against him were sworn to before a provincial fiscal, not
deputized by the Ombudsman, but acting merely as an officer authorized to
administer oaths.54

Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which was in force and effect when
Abao filed the complaint against petitioner, provides:

"Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."
(Underscoring supplied.)

The mandate to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government is restated in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("The
Ombudsman Act of 1989"), approved into law on November 17, 1989. The same authority to
act on complaints "in any form, either verbal or in writing," is also reiterated in Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which is embodied in
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, issued pursuant to the rule-making power
of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 18, 23 and 27
of "The Ombudsman Act of 1989."

In accordance with the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, this Court, in Diaz v.
Sandiganbayan,55held valid charges that were not made in writing or under oath. This Court
found as sufficient basis the Solicitor Generals sworn testimony at the joint fact-finding
investigation conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Ombudsman for the
latter to conduct an investigation. On the other hand, in Olivas v. Office of the
Ombudsman,56 where the complaint against petitioner was initiated by anonymous letters,
this Court held that the PCGG, to whom the letters were addressed and who became the
complainant in the proceedings, should have reduced the evidence it had gathered into
affidavits. The submission of affidavits, provided for in Rule II, Section 4 (a) of Administrative
Order No. 07, is also required by due process in adversary proceedings.57 However, the
submission of affidavits is not mandatory and jurisdictional. Rule 1, Section 3 of the same
administrative order merely states that it is "preferable" that the complaint "be in writing and
under oath" for its speedier disposition. Clearly in consonance with the provision that the
complaint may be in any form, the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure does not require that the
complaint be subscribed only before the Ombudsman or his duly authorized representative.
In any event, the issue of the sufficiency in form of the complaint was rendered moot and
academic by petitioners filing of a counter-affidavit wherein he controverted the allegations
in the complaint.58

The referral of the complaint to the NBI does not mean that the Ombudsman abdicated
its constitutional and statutory duty to conduct preliminary investigations. Article XI,
Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the powers, functions
and duties to:

"(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of
any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, andrecommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith." (Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, by referring Abanos complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby
delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to that investigative
bureau. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the
preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.59 Notably, under
Rule II, Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 07, the investigating officer has the option
to forward the complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation.
While Administrative Order No. 07 took effect in mid-199060 or after the complaint in this case
was referred to the NBI, the inclusion of that constitutionally sanctioned practice in the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure lends validity to the Ombudsmans action in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Ombudsmans failure to personally administer oath
to the complainant does not mean that the Ombudsman did not personally determine the
existence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information.

Neither did the Sandiganbayan violate petitioners right to due process of law by its failure to
personally examine the complainant before it issued the warrant of arrest. In a preliminary
examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a court is not required to review in detail
the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. What is required is that the
judge "personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecution in determining probable cause."61 In the absence of evidence that the
Sandiganbayan did not personally evaluatethe necessary records of the case, the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official business shall stand.

At this juncture, it is apropos to state once again the nature of a preliminary investigation.
In Cruz, Jr. v. People, the Court said:

"It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof,
and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

"The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

"The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding
information if he finds it to be so. And, probable cause has been defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted."62

In determining probable cause, an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to warrant

conviction is not required. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.63 In the performance of his task to
determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag v.
Guerrero, this Court said:

"x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
as will establish probable cause for filing of information against the supposed offender."64

Neither is there merit in petitioners contention that the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman was "hasty, malicious and persecutory" and that it was based on
inadmissible evidence.

Petitioner emphasizes the fact that while the Resolution recommending the filing of the
information was issued on June 11, 1992, the information was already prepared almost a
month earlier on May 19, 1992.65 This may show oversight in the handling of the documents
pertinent to this case considering that the date of the information should have been corrected
to conform to the date of the resolution where its filing was approved by the prosecutors
superiors. However, such faux pas did not violate petitioners substantive rights. The error in
the date of the information did not affect its validity, especially since the recommendation to
file it was with the imprimatur of the Ombudsman himself.

With respect to the denial by SPO III Berbano of the motion for reinvestigation on August 14,
1992 or prior to petitioners filing of his motion for reconsideration on August 18, 1992, the
record shows that petitioner filed two motions for extension of time to file the motion for
reinvestigation without the knowledge of SPO III Berbano. What the latter resolved on
August 14, 1992 was petitioners motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan.
Likewise, petitioners allegation that SPO III Berbano was not an impartial prosecutor cannot
be given credence for lack of sufficient proof thereon. SPO III Berbano is presumed to have
issued the Resolution denying the motion for reinvestigation in the regular performance of his
duties.
Neither is there factual support to petitioners claim that the 4-year delay in the completion of
the preliminary investigation is unexplained. The record clearly shows that the Ombudsman
exerted utmost effort to determine the veracity of Abaos allegations against petitioner. That
it took the NBI almost two years to complete its report on the matter does not mean that
petitioners right to speedy disposition of the charge was brushed aside. If delay may be
imputed in the proceedings, the same should be reckoned only from October 25, 1991 when
petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.66 Thirty-six (36) days thereafter or on November 29,
1991, GIO II Caraos issued the Resolution recommending the filing of the information.
Further delay, if indeed it could be called one, was caused by the review of GIO II Caraos
recommendation by her superiors. Some seven and a half months later, or on June 11,
1992, the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. There is thus no reason to conclude
that the Ombudsman ran roughshod over the petitioners right to a speedy preliminary
investigation. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and weighed are "the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay."67

The length of time it took before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be
attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman and the NBI to the rules of procedure and the
rudiments of fair play. The allegations of Abaos complaint had to be verified; the
Ombudsman did not believe the same hook, line and sinker. Recently, the Court held that
while the Rules of Court provides a ten-day period from submission of the case within which
an investigating officer must come out with a resolution, that period of time is merely
directory. Thus:

"The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him. But such duty
should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and
correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of the
Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to freely
lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of government personnel, thus resulting in a
steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman."68

Finally, there is no ground to give credence to petitioners claim that the complainant should
be charged as a briber on account of his admission that he gave petitioner some sum of
money; or that evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, specifically the
affidavits of witnesses, were hearsay and inadmissible. As we stated earlier, this Court
cannot supplant the Ombudsmans discretion in the determination of what crime to charge an
accused.

All told, this Court finds no reason to reverse the assailed Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners insinuation that he was subjected to the proceedings
1wphi1

before the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan for politically motivated reasons, has
not been established with sufficient evidence. In the absence of any imputation that
public respondents were impelled by ill-motive in filing the case against him, it is
presumed that there is no such motive and that public respondents merely filed the
case to correct a public wrong.69

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 17800. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 120422 September 27, 1995

CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO ACOP and SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and HON. MANUEL B. CASACLANG, in his capacity as
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, respondents.

G.R. No. 120428 September 27, 1995

P/CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, P/CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, P/SR.
INSP. BASILIO LUCERO, JR., P/SR. INSP. ROLANDO B. MENDOZA, P/INSP. GIL B.
LAGMAN, P/INSP. MANUEL BUKARNO B. ALVAREZ, and OTHER TASK FORCE HABAGAT
PERSONNEL CHARGED BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN IN OMB-AFP-CRIM-95-
0084, petitioners,
vs.
BGEN. MANUEL B. CASACLANG, in his capacity as the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military, P/CHIEF SUPT. JOB A. MAYO, JR., MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA G. ALAP-AP, and
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

These cases, both filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, were consolidated as they arose
from the same factual milieu. At the oral arguments on 5 July 1995, the Court defined the
common issues within which the parties agreed to limit their arguments:

1. Whether it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special

Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over the complaint in question; and

2. Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military

Manuel Casaclang committed grave abuse of discretion when he set the
case for preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to submit
their counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of the complaint
as required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office
of the Ombudsman.

The first is the kernel issue raised in G.R. No. 120422 and the petitioners therein pray that
this Court re-examine the holding in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan. 1 Provoked during oral
arguments was the corollary issue of whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military can
conduct investigations involving civilian personnel of the Government.

The undisputed facts which gave rise to this controversy are summarized in the Consolidated
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:

On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the notorious robbery
gang, "Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite
teams of the National Capital Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management
Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), Central Police
District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).

On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the
Central Intelligence Command (CIC) made an expose', stating that there was no
shootout. De los Reyes stated that the eleven (11) suspected members of the
"Kuratong Baleleng" gang were victims of summary execution. The following day,
he executed a sworn statement to this effect. . . .

On May 24, 1995, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the
separate sworn statements of Myrna Abalora, Nenita G.
Alap-ap and Imelda Pancho Montero are relatives of the slain suspected gang
members, accusing the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder.

On May 26, 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, in a handwritten note,

directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to monitor the
investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Director for Investigation regarding the alleged shootout. . . .

In response to the above directive, public respondent Casaclang issued on the

same date Office Order No. 95-17, Series of 1995, directing Ombudsman
Investigator Bienvenido C. Blancaflor and Associate Graft Investigation Officers
Richard U. Correos and Ricardo A. Sullano to monitor the investigations being
conducted by the above-mentioned agencies. . . . .

On May 29, 1995, public respondent Casaclang sent written requests to Senator
Raul Roco, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
and Hon. Sedfrey Ordoez, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, for
documents relative to the May 18, 1995, alleged shootout incident. . . .

On May 30, 1995, the CHR, through Commissioner Narciso Monteiro, furnished
public respondent Casaclang with copies of the
sworn statements of the relatives of the slain suspected "Kuratong Baleleng"
gang. . . .

On May 30, 1995, SPO2 Corazon de la Cruz appeared and testified before the
Joint Senate Committee conducting a legislative inquiry into the May 18, 1995
incident. SPO2 De la Cruz corroborated the statements of SPO2 De los Reyes
stating that no shootout had taken place and that the eleven (11) slain suspected
"Kuratong Baleleng" gang members were summarily executed by the composite
teams. . . .

On June 1, 1995, public respondent Casaclang issued Office Order No. 95-18,
creating a panel of investigators with Ombudsman Investigator Bienvenido
Blancaflor as head of the panel and Investigators Avelino C. Macamus, Jr. and
Domingo Doctor Jr. as members. . . .

On the same date, respondent P/Chief Supt. Job A. Mayo, Jr., in a letter-
complaint addressed to the Ombudsman, charged petitioners and several others
with murder in connection with the killing of the eleven (11) suspected "Kuratong
Baleleng" gang members. He attached to his letter-complaint the Investigation
Report dated May 31, 1995, signed by him in his capacity as Chairman of the
Special Investigating Committee, PNP. . . .
 The letter-complaint was docketed at the Office of the Ombudsman as case
OMB-AFP-CRIM-95-0084.

On June 2, 1995, respondent Casaclang directed the Panel of Investigator[s] to

terminate the investigation and submit its resolution within 60 days from receipt
of his order. . . .

On June 5, 1995, public respondent Casaclang was furnished by the Senate

Committee on Justice and Human Rights with copies of various documents, as
well as transcripts of its proceedings, relative to its investigation of the May 18,
1995 incident. Respondents undertake to submit the documents and transcripts if
this Honorable Court so requires as they are voluminous and reproduction and
sorting thereof will take time.

On June 7, 1995, respondent Casaclang issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad

testificandum addressed to PNP Director General Recaredo Sarmiento, directing
him or his duly authorized representative to appear before the Panel of
Investigators and to submit the "After Operations Report" of the PNP relative to
the operations which resulted in the May 18, 1995, incident. . . .

On June 8, 1995, the Panel of Investigators submitted their Evaluation Report in

OMB-AFP-CRIM-95-0084 to public respondent Casaclang. The report
recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against herein
petitioners and all the participating personnel of the NCRC, PACC, CIC, TMC
and CPDC listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. . . .

On June 13, 1995, respondent Mayo, in behalf of the PNP Director General,
submitted to the, Ombudsman the required After Operations Report of the PNP.
The report contained the list of personnel and officers involved in the May 18,
1995, operations against the "Kuratong Baleleng" gang. . . .

On June 14, 1995, public respondent Casaclang issued the questioned order
directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence within ten days from receipt thereof. . . . 2

The petitioners did not comply with the 14 June 1995 order, neither did they move for
reconsideration. Instead, the petitioners questioned the conduct of the preliminary investigation
without the required preliminary evaluation in their respective petitions filed with this Court on: 19
June 1995 in G.R. No. 120422; 20 June 1995 in G.R. No. 120428; and on 3 July 1995, a
supplemental petition in G.R. No. 120428.

After the oral arguments on 5 July 1995, we ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 complied on 17 July 1995, while the petitioners
in G.R. No. 120428 and the public respondents on 19 July 1995. On 17 July 1995, we required
the respondents in G.R. No. 120428 to comment on the supplemental petition filed therein.

Further developments in G.R. No. 120428 which lead to the status quo are as follows: On 26 July
1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa ordered the petitioners in G.R. No. 120428 to file their
counter-affidavits to the complaint within ten days from notice. Consequently, on 27 July 1995,
the petitioners filed a motion with this Court to cite Acting Ombudsman Villa in contempt of court.
The petitioners contended that the 26 July 1995, order preempted this Court from ruling on the
issue regarding the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed against the petitioners. Thus, the petitioners concluded, the order contravened
Section 3 (a), (c), and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and prayed that Villa be cited in contempt
and a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin him from implementing his order.

Anent the turn of events in G.R. No. 120422, the progress of the case may be traced in this wise:
On 23 June 1995, the petitioners filed a motion with respondent Casaclang to suspend the
preliminary investigation against them pending resolution of the petition for certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court. On 28 June 1995, respondent Casaclang granted the motion, only to be
reversed by Acting Ombudsman Villa. In a memorandum dated 21 July 1995, Acting Ombudsman
Villa took over "the direct supervision and control of the preliminary investigation" and
subsequently issued the questioned 26 July 1995 order.

In a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion filed with this Court on 28 July 1995, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 120422 challenged the take-over, asserting: First, that it violated Section 3, Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 07 issued by the Ombudsman. The petitioners emphasized that the
enumeration in the said Section does not include the Ombudsman himself nor the Acting
Ombudsman among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. Second, that in so
doing, Villa effectively denied the petitioners the different appellate levels within the Office of the
Ombudsman. And third, that Villa's take-over and order in question prejudged the very issues
pending before the Supreme Court and was, therefore, contemptuous. Hence, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 120422 joined cause with the prayer of the petitioners in G.R. No. 120428.

On 31 July 1995, we required the respondents to comment on the motions for contempt, and in
compliance, Acting Ombudsman Villa filed his comment on 7 August 1995. He asserted that
pursuant to Peza vs. Alikpala, 3 the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari before
this Court, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not interrupt the
latter's course when no writ of injunction restraining it has been issued as in the present case.
The public respondents filed their Comment on 15 August 1995.

As to the first issue, the petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 concede that in the light of this
Court's decision in Zaldivar, 4it is the Ombudsman, and not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, which has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed against them. The petitioners plead, however, for this Court re-examine the
conclusion reached in Zaldivar, i.e., that under the 1987 Constitution, the Tanodbayan no
longer has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations except upon order of the
Ombudsman. Said conclusion, the petitioners assert, "is based on a wrong premise."

In substance, the petitioners forward two propositions in support of their plea: First, the petitioners
posit that the Ombudsman's "duty to investigate on its own or on complaint of any person" 5 is
separate and distinct from "the power to conduct preliminary investigations," 6 and maintain that
the latter "remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special Prosecutor"; and second, that based on
the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, it is erroneous to conclude that the Special
Prosecutor is a subordinate of or may be subsumed by the Ombudsman under the Constitution. 7

As to the first proposition, the petitioners refer to the Record of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 (hereinafter Commission) on the debates relative to the powers of the Ombudsman
proposed by the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. The petitioners extensively quote
the admissions of Commissioners Christian S. Monsod and Jose S. Colayco (Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the Committee) during the interpellations to the effect that it was the
intention of the Committee not to grant to the proposed Ombudsman prosecutorial powers which
would, instead, be left to the proposed Office of the Special Prosecutor. Thus:

MR. MONSOD: (sponsorship speech)

 xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan, the

Committee decided to make a distinction between the purely
prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan and the function of a
pure Ombudsman who will use the prestige and persuasive
powers of his office. To call the attention of government officials
to any impropriety, misconduct or injustice, we conceive the
Ombudsman as a champion of the citizens. . . The concept of
the Ombudsman here is admittedly a little bit different from the
1973 concept. . . 8

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

I noticed that the proposed provisions of the Ombudsman retain

the Tanodbayan, and there seems to be an overlapping in the
functions of the Tanodbayan and the Ombudsman. What is the
clear-cut dividing line between the functions of the Ombudsman
and the Tanodbayan, so that our people will know when to go to
the Tanodbayan and when to go to the Ombudsman?

MR. MONSOD:

Madam President, essentially, the difference lies in one being a

prosecutory arm and the other a champion of the citizen who is
not bound by legal technicalities of legal forms, but I would like to
ask Commissioner Nolledo to explain this in detail. 9

MR. RODRIGO:

So, the Ombudsman does not have a prosecutory function nor

punitive powers.

MR. COLAYCO:

None.

MR. RODRIGO:

All that he relies upon is his persuasive power.

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes. Persuasive power plus the ability to require that the proper
legal steps be taken to compel the officer to comply.

MR. RODRIGO:

Yes, but what is meant by "required" is that the Ombudsman

cannot compel. 10
Then Commissioner, now a highly respected Member of the Court, Florenz D. Regalado, also
remarked:

MR. REGALADO:

In connection also with that concern of Commissioner Rodrigo

regarding the Ombudsman being merely a duplication, I have
here the records of the former Ombudsman to show that one of
the reasons he could not function in his administrative or
recommendatory capacity was the number of cases for
prosecution which took almost all his time. So I believe that there
should really be an Ombudsman to take care of the
recommendatory, policy-determining, policy-suggesting or
administrative aspect of his position. The whole task of
prosecution should be left to a regular Tanodbayan. 11

The petitioners hardly persuade us on this matter. While the intention to withhold
prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, 12 the Commission did
not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such
other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. Paragraph 6, Section 12 of the
original draft of the proposed Article on Accountability of Public Officers, which the Committee
recommended for incorporation in the Constitution, reads:

Sec. 12. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) To exercise such powers and perform such functions or

duties as may be provided by Law. 13

As finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied
in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other

functions or duties as may be provided by law. (emphasis
supplied).

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by
Commissioner Rodrigo:

MR. RODRIGO:

Let us go back to the division between the powers of the

Tanodbayan and the Ombudsman which says that:
 The Tanodbayan. . . . shall continue to function end exercise its
powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the office
of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.

The powers of the Ombudsman are enumerated in Section 12.

MR. COLAYCO:

They are not exclusive.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, these powers can also be exercised by the Tanodbayan?

MR. COLAYCO:

No, I was saying that the powers enumerated here for the
Ombudsman are not exclusive.

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated

functions of the Ombudsman is:"to exercise such powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." So,
the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not?

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

MR. MONSOD:

Yes.

MR. RODRIGO:

And it is possible that pretty soon the Tanodbayan will be a

useless appendage and will lose all his powers.

MR. COLAYCO:

No. I am afraid the Gentleman has the wrong perception of the

system. We are leaving to the Tanodbayan the continuance of
his functions and the exercise of the jurisdiction given to him
pursuant to. . . .

MR. RODRIGO:

Law.

MR. COLAYCO:
No. Pursuant first to the Constitution and the law which
mandated the creation of the office.

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall

continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law."

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P. D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I

suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:

And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that
can be performed by the Ombudsman are "such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted that
the legislature later on might remove some powers from the
Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

MR. COLAYCO:

Madam President, that is correct.

MR. MONSOD:

Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit

and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is
the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We
wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance, with
prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really
function as a champion of the citizen.

However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the

future, the Assembly, as it may see fit may have to give
additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the
concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a

constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
 powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the
hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can

later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to
the legislature?

MR. MONSOD:

Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read

the committee report which recommended the approval of the 27
resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman; but
notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that report,
the implementing law the last one, P.D. No. 1630 did not
follow the main thrust; instead it created the
Tanodbayan. 14 (emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas

Ople):

May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has

looked at it in too much of an absolutist position. The
Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the
citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On
one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things.
On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the
same level as the President.

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we

would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at
the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such
powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance
with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We
do not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we
leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may
need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order
that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not

an irreversible disability.15 (emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petitioners have not borne out any distinction
between "the duty to investigate" and "the power to conduct preliminary investigations";
neither have the petitioners established that the latter remains with the Tanodbayan, now
the Special Prosecutor. Thus, this Court can only reject the petitioners' first proposition.

At bottom, the second proposition raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 is that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency to the Ombudsman and is, in
fact, separate and distinct from the Ombudsman. The petitioners call this Court's attention
to the fact that, on one hand, the former is not at all mentioned in Section 5, Article XI of
the Constitution, while Sections 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 thereof only speak of the
Ombudsman and his deputies (with the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, the petitioners note, Section 7 recognizes the
continued existence of the Tanodbayan, thereafter known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. Thus, the petitioners deduce that Section 7 does not imply that the Office of
the Special Prosecutor is absorbed by subsumed under the Office of the Ombudsman. 16

By way of elaboration, the petitioners contend further that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the President,
as shown by the following excerpts of the proceedings of the Commission:

THE PRESIDENT:

May the Chair inquire from the Chairman of the Committee what
office would have administrative supervision now over the
Tanodbayan? Is there any office that would have administrative
supervision over the Tanodbayan, as described in Section 5?

MR. ROMULO:

Madam President, as the decree now reads, no one has

jurisdiction over the Tanodbayan. He may be removed by the
President for a cause.

THE PRESIDENT:

So he is directly under the Office of the President?

MR. ROMULO:

Yes, because it is the President who may remove him for a

cause. In effect, he comes under the Office of the President. 17

For these reasons, the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 18 of
R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the
Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.

The contention is not impressed with merit. Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue
Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office
of the President. The said statement obviously referred to the Tanodbayan under P.D. No.
1630 note how specific the erstwhile Commissioner was in stating: ". . . as the decree
now reads . . . ." Further, in complete contrast to the petitioners' stand, one of the principal
reasons for the proposal to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was
precisely to remove the office from presidential control. This was explained by then
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado as follows:

MR. REGALADO:

xxx xxx xxx

In other words, Madam President, what actually spawned or

caused the failure of the justices of the Tanodbayan insofar as
monitoring and fiscalizing the government offices are concerned
was due to two reasons: First, almost all their time was taken up
by criminal cases; and second, since they were under the Office
of the President, their funds came from that office. I have a
sneaking suspicion that they were prevented from making
administrative monitoring because of the sensitivity of the then
head of that office, because if the Tanodbayan would make the
corresponding reports about failures, malfunctions or omissions
of the different ministries, then that would reflect upon the
President who wanted to claim the alleged confidence of the
people.

xxx xxx xxx

It is said here that the Tanodbayan or the Ombudsman would be

a toothless or a paper tiger. That is not necessarily so. If he is
toothless, then let us give him a little more teeth by making him
independent of the Office of the President because it is now a
constitutional creation, so that the insidious tentacles of politics,
as has always been our problem, even with PARGO, PCAPE
and so forth, will not deprive him of the opportunity to render
service to Juan dela Cruz. . . . . 19 (emphasis supplied).

In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing
Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution."
The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No.
1630 orsubsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any
of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other
powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise
such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the
powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman;
or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties
as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No.
6770.
Through the said law, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman, 20 while the Ombudsman was granted the following
powers, 21 among others:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such

authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
powers, functions, and duties herein or herein after provided.

Likewise, R.A. No. 6770 authorized the office of the Special Prosecutor, under the
supervision and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, to:

(a) [C]onduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b) [E]nter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) [P]erform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. 22 (emphasis

supplied)

In fine, this Court holds that the plea to re-examine Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan is bereft of
merit and deserves no further consideration.

II.

Before we enter into a discussion of the second principal issue raised in these cases, the
corollary issue of whether respondent Casaclang as Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation involving civilian
personnel of the Government must first be resolved.

In view of Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution 23 and the law implementing it, R.A. No.
6975, 24 the petitioners, who are officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), are civilian
personnel of the Government. 25 It is thus suggested that the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs does not have jurisdiction over them, for by the description of his office,
his authority is or must be confined to the military. At first blush, the suggestion seems
logical.

The proposal to have a separate Deputy Ombudsman for the military establishment came by way
of an amendment by Commissioner Blas Ople. This was introduced during the period of individual
amendments at the time the Commission deliberated on the proposed Article on Accountability of
Public Officers Commissioner Ople's original idea was to authorize the Ombudsman to designate
the said deputy; however, the amendment to the amendment introduced by this writer, who was
then a member of the Commission, was to authorize the President to appoint the said deputy.
Thus:
MR. OPLE:

With the indulgence of Commissioner Rodrigo and of the

Committee, may I proceed to read the amendment which is to
add a last sentence to Section 11, line 21: THE OMBUDSMAN
MAY DESIGNATE A SEPARATE DEPUTY FOR THE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, so that the entire Section 11 will now read as
follows: "The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as champions of
the people, shall act promptly on the complaints filed, in any form
or manner, against public officials or employees of the
government, including government-owned corporations,
agencies or instrumentalities, and shall notify the complainants
of the action taken and the results thereof. THE OMBUDSMAN
MAY DESIGNATE A SEPARATE DEPUTY FOR THE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT.

May I state a brief reason for this amendment, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

The Commissioner has five minutes to explain his proposed

amendment.

MR. OPLE:

Thank you.

The original Ombudsman was created in Sweden in 1810 and

has survived practically unchanged for over 170 years. The
military Ombudsman appeared for the first time in history in
Norway in 1952 and in West Germany in 1956. In Norway, the
military Ombudsman, known as Ombudsmannen for forsvaret,
was superimposed on an existing structure of enlisted
spokesmen chosen by each unit of the Norwegian Armed
Forces.

In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent

years a type of fraternal association outside the chain of
command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact,
an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank
and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank[s] and neglect
of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed
Forces Movement or RAM has kept precincts for pushing
logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of the
resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the
field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations
dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance
collectors and as mutual aid societies.

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of

the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as it
champions the common people against bureaucratic
indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help
the ordinary foot soldier get through with his grievance to higher
 authorities. This deputy will, of course, work in close cooperation
with the Minister of National Defense and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines' Chief of Staff because of the necessity to
maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary
soldiers, when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman
for their complaints, may not have to fall back on their own
informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The
Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a
major professed goal of the President and the military authorities
themselves. I seek the Committee's kind concurrence to this
proposal.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT:

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE:

I would have no objection to the proposed amendment, but it

should not be on Section 11. It should be placed on Section 6
because if we put it here, the appointing authority will no longer
be the President but the Ombudsman, and that is not, I think, the
philosophy of the provision.

So it should also be covered by the manner by which an

appointment may be extended to it. So I would propose that it be
transferred principally to Section 6.

MR. OPLE:

The Committee has no jurisdiction; personally, I have no

objection, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE:

But I would propose that the wording would be: A SEPARATE

DEPUTY FOR THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MAY BE
APPOINTED, after "Mindanao" on Section 6, line 16, page 3.

MR. OPLE:

I accept the amendment, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Commissioner Ople has accepted the amendment. How about

the Committee?

MR. MONSOD:
 We accept, Madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT:

May we have the amendment now as phrased by the

Committee.

MR. MONSOD:

May we ask Commissioner Davide to restate the amendment, as

amended.

THE PRESIDENT:

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE:

Madam President, on line 61 page 3, add a new sentence after the period (.)
following "Mindanao" to read as follows: A SEPARATE DEPUTY FOR THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MAY LIKEWISE BE APPOINTED.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT:

Those in favor of this particular amendment, as amended, please

raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

xxx xxx xxx

The results show 22 votes in favor and 11 against; the proposed

amendment, jointly submitted by Commissioners Ople and
Davide and accepted by the Committee, is approved. 26

The approved amendment is now found in Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, which
reads:

Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman to be

known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment
may likewise be appointed. (emphasis supplied).

The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive
evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties
affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional
provisions reveals otherwise.

As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or perform
such functions or duties" 27as Congress may prescribe through legislation. Therefore,
nothing can prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over
the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military establishment. 28 In this
light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:

Sec. 11. Structural Organization. The authority and responsibility for the
exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of
its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have
supervision and control of the said Office.

While Section 31 thereof declares:

Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may

utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control.

Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no
irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kuratong
Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators.

III

We will now address the second principal issue.

We do not share the petitioners' view that respondent Casaclang set the case for preliminary
investigation and required the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits without the conduct of a
preliminary evaluation of the complaint as required by the Rules, of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In the case before us, no evidence to that effect was adduced. On the contrary, as shown by the
summary of antecedent facts earlier quoted, the Panel of Investigators submitted its evaluation
report on 8 June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 that respondent Casaclang issued the
questioned order. Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), on the process and nature of
the evaluation required, reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer

shall recommend whether it may be

(a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

(b) referred to respondent for comment;

(c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction
over the case;

(d) forward to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

(e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

(f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

 It cannot be denied that the evaluation required is merely preliminary in nature and
scope, not a detailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such evaluation involves the
exercise of discretion which has not been shown to be abused in the instant case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, these two petitions and the motion to cite Acting
Ombudsman Francisco Villa in contempt of court are DENIED for want of merit. This
decision is immediately executory.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 90591. November 21, 1990.]

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL C. DOMINGO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and PC/INP/CIS , Respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; ACT OR OMISSION THAT MAY BE
INVESTIGATED, NOT REQUIRED TO BE RELATED TO, CONNECTED WITH, OR ARISE FROM, THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power,
function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and
to "investigate . . . any act or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned,"
in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]). The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission
of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission
be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the
grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are
able to penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances
and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his
tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770). The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it
was allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the
Ombudsmans investigative authority.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VESTED WITH PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER CASE COGNIZABLE BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN; MURDER CHARGE INCLUDED THEREIN. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect
on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The
murder charge against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art.
248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate it. Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a
special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the
investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would
exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in the
investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the
Ombudsman, is greatest.
 DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

By this petition for certiorari and prohibition Governor Amor D. Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop
respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, from conducting a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him of multiple murder in IBP Case No. OSP-88-01770, entitled
"PC/INP/CIS v. Governor Amor Deloso," on the grounds that: chanrob 1es virtual 1aw libr ar y

1. The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the murder charge against the petitioner for its
jurisdiction is confined to the investigation only of acts or omissions that are connected with the
performance of his duties as governor; and

2. For the same reason, the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) has no jurisdiction to prosecute the murder
case against the petitioner.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on November 7, 1989 (p. 49, Rollo).
chanrobl es.c om:c hanr obl es.c om.ph
chanrobles virtual awlibr ar y

The case began in the evening of April 22, 1988, when Governor Deloso attended a basketball victory party
in Cabangan, Zambales. From the party, he proceeded to a pre-wedding celebration in Danacbunga,
Botolan, Zambales. He left Danacbunga at 1:30 A.M., April 23, 1988, on board his service car, and
accompanied by his security force of military/police/civilian escorts on board two other motor vehicles.

While travelling on the barangay road a few kilometers from the venue of the pre-wedding celebration, the
convoy of three (3) motor vehicles, with the governors car in the middle, was allegedly ambushed.
Governor Deloso jumped out of his car and took cover behind it. During a lull in the shooting, he was
allegedly rushed home by his official staff. Later, he learned that three supposed ambushers Patrolman
Alberto Dullas, Jr., Don Dullas, and Edgar Vinco, Jr. were killed. His own group suffered no casualties.

Based, however, on the testimonies of eyewitnesses, the PC/INP/CIS investigators reported that the
Governors group was not ambushed, but was the ambusher. The report stated: jgc:chanr obl es.c om.ph

"This case was prefaced by the report of Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales that on the morning of April 23,
1988, at about 1:30 oclock in the morning, he and his escorts were ambushed by the group of Pat. Alberto Dullas,
Jr. along the Provincial Road of Danacbunga, Botolan, Zambales. However, in the course of the investigation, it
was established, through the testimonies of eyewitnesses, that it was the group of Pat. Dullas, Don Dullas and
Edgar Vinco, Jr., then riding in a Toyota Corolla car with Plate No. CAG 419, who were ambushed by the group of
Governor Deloso and his escorts, numbering more or less fifteen (15). Initial witnesses positively identified the
military/police escorts of Governor Deloso as CIC Pacifico Uy, CIC Leonito Bandala PC, Cpl Cesar Madoh PC, Cpl
Elpidio Manding PC, Pat Pedro Dolojan INP and Pat Florante Dimaguibo INP. The above-named escorts were
already charged of Multiple Murder before the Regional Staff Judge Advocate (RSJA), Regional Command
(RECOM) No. 3, on May 5, 1988, pursuant to PD 1850. Said witnesses further identified the civilian
escorts/companions of Governor Deloso at the time of the incident as Eto Epan, Dennis Reyes, Arthur Menes and
Jaime Detona, Et Al., who were, likewise, charged of the same offense before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Zambales on May 6, 1988, docketed under I.S. No. 88-100-1.

"Follow-up investigation of this case further established the identities of the other military/police escorts of
Governor Deloso who were also implicated in the said shooting incident, namely: Pat Warlito Quinto, Mario Dial,
Jr., Crisostomo Diomino, Jr., Sarito Dedicatoria, Ernesto Isidoro, Delfin Deliquina, Ramon Pangilinan, Alex de Leon
and Carlos Yabut. Consequently, these personalities had already been included as respondents in the original
complaint earlier filed with RSJA, Recom 3, on June 27, 1988.

"Relevantly, the testimonies of additional witnesses, particularly those of the spouses Honorio and Araceli Dullas
strongly inculpated Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales in the commission of the crime. On the other hand,
Governor Deloso, when invited to give his version of the incident, opted instead in submitting a nineteen (19) page
photocopy of his letter dated May 30, 1988 to Justice Secretary Sedfrey Ordonez." (pp. 63-64, Rollo.)

The military servicemen in the Governors security force were charged with murder in the Judge Advocate
Generals Office, while his civilian security men were investigated by the Provincial Fiscal of Zambales.
The Governor was charged with multiple murder before the Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, who,
without a referral from the Ombudsman, supposedly handpicked prosecutor Juan Templonuevo to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.

On February 20, 1989, Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw libr ar y

1) The Office of the Special Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;

2) The said office is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; and

3) The preliminary investigation of Governor Deloso was prohibited by law in view of the Barangay Elections
scheduled on 28 March 1989.

Albeit reluctantly, it may be imagined, Special Prosecutor Gonzales referred the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation.

On June 19, 1989, respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order
denying Governor Delosos motion to dismiss because "the Constitution empowers the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission of any public official . . . without any qualification that said act or omission
must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office." (p. 8, Rollo)

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Governor Deloso filed this petition for certiorari, reiterating the
grounds of his motion to dismiss.

After careful consideration, the Court finds the petition to be without merit.

Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provide: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof." cralaw virtu a1aw librar y

"SEC. 13. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: jgc:chanr obles.co m.ph

"(1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employees, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

"x x x"

(Emphasis supplied; pp. 9-10, Rollo.)

The petitioner admits that "the office of the Ombudsman was created under the authority of the Constitution and
was mandated to act as a champion of the citizens, the watchdog of the people, the official critic of public officials
and the government mobilizer." (p. 9, Rollo.) But he theorizes that "the framers of our Constitution . . . intended to
limit the powers of the Ombudsman to crimes related to or connected with an officials discharge of his public
functions." (p. 15, Rollo.) Hence, the lone issue presented by the petition is whether or not the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial
governor. The answer is yes.

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act
or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this
case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of
broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or
 dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was
deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints
against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are
related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly
committed by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of
the Ombudsmans investigative authority.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests in the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

"SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases." (p. 74, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D.
1606). The murder charge against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude
those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in the
investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like
the Ombudsman, is greatest. chanrobles virtual l awlibrar y

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 161098 September 13, 2007

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated June 18, 2003 and Resolution dated December 8, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66744.
The facts are:

On July 27, 2000, the City of Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity
fund for Barangay 183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received
by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.

On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B. Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo
M. Escao, Sr., all barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical malversation, violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a public officer against respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828.

The complaint alleges that (a) respondent failed to utilize the calamity fund for the purpose for
which it was allocated; (b) he leased a portion of the barangay sidewalk to Amity Food
Corporation without the conformity of the barangay kagawad; (c) Amity Food Corporation issued
checks payable to respondent, not in the name of the Barangay; (d) he did not open any bank
account for and in the name of Barangay 183, Zone 16; and (e) he collected fees for the use of
the barangay chapel without remitting any single centavo to the barangay treasurer.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint denying all the charges and
contending that the complaint was filed to harass him.

In a Decision dated May 22, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty
of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissed him from the service, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, respondent CELSO R. SANTIAGO, Barangay

Chairman of Barangay 183, Zone 16 of the Second District of Manila is hereby found GUILTY of
the administrative offenses of DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE with the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE pursuant to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The City Mayor of Manila is hereby directed to immediately implement this DECISION in
accordance with law and to inform this office of its initial action within fifteen (15) days upon
receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance
the implementation of the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman in an Order dated July 24, 2001.

Thus, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandatory Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order." Apparently,
the Court of Appeals considered this action a petition for review.

In its Decision3 dated June 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition,
thus:

However, assuming arguendo, that petitioner is administratively liable, public respondent has no
authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his
elective position of Barangay Captain. (Renato A. Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 129124, March 15, 2002)

xxx

Clearly, public respondent has the duty to investigate and prosecute only for and in its behalf,
civil, criminal, and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees
embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of R.A. 6770 (George Uy vs. the Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
354 SCRA 651). It cannot directly impose any disciplinary measure upon any erring public officer.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
portions of the Decision dated May 22, 2001 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in
Administrative Case No. OMB-0-00-0828 for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, ordering the dismissal of petitioner and directing the
City Mayor of Manila to implement said Decision are hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution4 of December 8, 2003.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman5 to the effect that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss an
erring public official or employee from the government service6 is not a controlling
doctrine.

For his part, respondent maintains that the petition should be denied for lack of merit.

The issue for our resolution is whether the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring
government officials or employees.

Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Invoking Tapiador, respondent contends that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning,
that is, that the Ombudsmans action, pursuant to the above provision, is only recommendatory.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,7 we held:

Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision.
Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative
case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely
an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

In interpreting a statute, care should be given that every part thereof be given
effect.8 Hence, the use of the word "recommend" must be read in conjunction with the
words "ensure compliance therewith" in order not to run counter to the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and complete disciplinary
authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. In fact, Section 13(3),
Article XI is complemented by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 67709 which reads:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer; x x x

Considering that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of
the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, it follows that the Ombudsmans "recommendation" is not merely advisory but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law.10

At any rate, the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has
been jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada,11 we ruled:

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given
teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we
hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66744 are REVERSED. The Decision dated May 22, 2001 of
the Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court
dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation
and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987
Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan."
In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently
to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,

effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special
Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No.
80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-
01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against
petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to
investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second
petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a
temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a
separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered
consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court
of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted
Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order
of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon
Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which
to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-

respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan
as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
 Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly,
from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent
Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No.
12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to
the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner
annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in
the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court

order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress
of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over
the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique,
lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating
a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if
they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.
 In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner
Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and
Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a
trial, he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and
that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during
election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters
who are entitled to know their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election
time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every
citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to
scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required
respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On
27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The
dispositive portion thereof read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In
his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the
following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in
his own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ...
and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "

2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass
the Court;" and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent
by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e.,
the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes
to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers
for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and
embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the
Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R.
No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under

date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to
COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to

the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to
and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly
or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to
denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to
require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the
media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the
"Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe"
and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he
had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation
by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from
investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to
be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass
the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now
form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of
Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the
annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to
comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
 4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served
on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of
said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for
Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988
Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still
available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to
sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his
pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by
him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this
Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex

Abundante Cautelam,22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-
B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May
1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and
addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's
legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending
before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also
submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has
plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of
ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner
with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before
us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish
for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and
out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also
constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority
over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority
of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission
to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is
called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party,
prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez
first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case
for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to
inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility
for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him
impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as
well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.

Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later

Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid
manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court
are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this
 instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
property and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved

parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as
much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a
duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereofas well as
the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives,
would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So
that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or
prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the
exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members
to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the
Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme
Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case,
respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did
not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his
part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to
be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his
statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he
acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially
correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered
an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued
as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme
Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and
in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some
Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its
Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez
Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and
anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the
Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This
should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of
administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision
and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial
process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to
the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront
to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of
the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayanor Ombudsman after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in
the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated
Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the
criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also
disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari
for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before
the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal
simply against respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that
they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and
friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly
deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the
handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend
otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart
some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent
that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had,
with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total
effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court
and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting
"rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and
powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and
powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction
of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the
Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme
Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or
reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture
that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and
willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that
acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the
purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith
and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2)
judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered
that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side
and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong
reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court
in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements
adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and
to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
made, among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt
and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest
prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of
the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality
of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
 (c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it
is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion
and obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely
difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process"
and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or
at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought
to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts
and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only
capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design
to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by
passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this
Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal
of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify
any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around
the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or
group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by
this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court
over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements
which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the
exercise of the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a
slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant
with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In
his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and
implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty
of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of
Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for
their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise
agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This
Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this
Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration.
After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
 I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs.
Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same,
civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the
decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a
view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to
the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination.(60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the
above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government.
It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or
reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I
have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving
to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for
his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R
was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in
turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding
and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The
intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and
the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for aid tribunals.
 It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court
of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted
with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose
to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the
courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as
counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain
certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the
mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21
September 1968 asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or
aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by
the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in
this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created
Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism'
in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
 benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion
for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of CourtSection 1, Rule
51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in
the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision
also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons

its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government,
either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held
three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer
of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this
Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is
not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced
and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He
puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be
less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause
or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
'although the process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact

and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also
asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of
this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on
the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet,this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt
of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this
Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected.
More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the
graft and corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the
case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied
in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the
move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a
party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to
effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the
epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should
not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a
standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was
"a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy,"
saying that "justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated."
Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the
"Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
 unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA
at 565566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow.
As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31
SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely
suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that
Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court,
made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this

Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation
of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the
rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways
of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again,
killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila.Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But
justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy
on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at
811-812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so
refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the
following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake
of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court.To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have
as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear:
The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice
of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to
 show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at
601-602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court
which contained the following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to
do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty.
Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the
statements made above, the Court held:

... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court
is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the
words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same
as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by
 the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-
513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a
special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and
the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and
good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's

motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated
therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should
follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client
has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating
an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public
eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as
is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot
mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he
presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now
is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis
supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this
matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or
administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made
in the cases discussed above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

 3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil.
907 (1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated

29 April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio

Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is
compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices
of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here,
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice
in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal
world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of
thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the
centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional
right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications
and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context
of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of
viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
 ... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both
are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused
with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if
persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to
diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of
the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court,
is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the
Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court'
and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the
right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen
which are worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to

the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was
carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of
the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is
concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words
and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no
apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been
shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per
curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19
May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in
general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority
of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review
of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent
through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of
injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme
Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in
time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively
stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of
such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in
this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him.
While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against
respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the
instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution
that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of
law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.