[G.R. No. 117397. November 13, 1996.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERMELINDO SEQUIO, VICENTE TUMANGAN, and
NENITO MELVIDA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Juanito M. Gabiana for accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO
COUNSEL; MUST BE AFFORDED TO A PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. After his unlawful
arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation. The custodial investigation commenced when the
police pinpointed Melvida as one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof.
This brought into operation paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing the
accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and his right to be informed of these rights. There was
no showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not
assisted by counsel during the investigation. Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these
constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an
investigator's duties prior to and during custodial interrogation laid down in Morales vs. Enrile and
reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases. cdasia

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSIONS IN THE COURSE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION MADE IN VIOLATION
THEREOF ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. While it starts with a claim that the trial court failed to
consider the non-observance by the police of the constitutional safeguards during the investigation of
the accused, it quoted the trial court's statement precisely expressing its dismay over the questionable
method used by the police in such investigation and considered it a mockery of the Constitution which
the police had sworn to honor and revere. We quote what the trial court said: The Court, however, must
express its dismay over the questionable means employed by the police in investigating the accused. The
police officers concerned mocked the Constitution, which they themselves have sworn to honor and
revere, when they did not remind the accused of their right to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel. They must be instructed by their superiors in no uncertain terms to respect the Constitution at
all times in the performance of their duties. Be that as it may, this unconstitutional act may not benefit
the cause of the accused. After all, nothing in the evidence for the prosecution was taken from the police
investigation in question no fruit, as it were, from the "poisoned tree." However, while the trial court
found a mockery of the Constitution and in fact declared that "nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution was taken from the police investigation in question no fruit, as it were, from the
'poisoned tree,' " we do find incongruous the following statement of the trial court: Undisputed is the
fact of police recovery of "partitions" of the loot (cash) not from one of the three of them in separate
"hiding" places. What was "recovered" from accused Melvida was P9,000.00 which, he admitted, was his
share of the loot. As to the difference between P22,526.00 and P9,000.00, no evidence was adduced
how and from whom it was recovered. Police officer Mariano Remulta merely declared that the
P26,526.00 was entrusted to him by the station commander who told him that the amount was
"recovered in connection with the highway robbery case." Since the "recovery" of P9,000.00 from
Melvida was due to his "admission" in the course of the custodial interrogation made in violation of
paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to paragraph (3) of the said section then the P9,000.00 cannot also be admitted in evidence as
a "fruit of the poisonous tree." The rule is settled that once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained as the admission of Melvida in this case any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it the P9,000.00 obtained from Melvida as a consequence of his
"admission" is also inadmissible. The above statement of the trial court may, however, be considered
mere surplusage since, in the final analysis, it did not take into account against the accused whatever
admission they made during police interrogation. We need to elaborate, however, why such admissions
are inadmissible in evidence. SIEHcA

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; MAY BE MADE BY AN ACTUAL RESTRAINT OF

THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED OR BY HIS SUBMISSIONS TO THE PERSON MAKING THE ARREST.
Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense,"
and it is made "by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest." Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter's "invitation" was a
submission to Luna's custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged
herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST; IMPROPER WHEN THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD NO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS INDICATING THE ACCUSED GUILTY. Since the accused was arrested
without a warrant, the inquiry must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was effected in
accordance with Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The first and last conditions enumerated
in the Rule are not applicable in this case; and under the facts herein, neither does the second condition
apply. Luna's basis for arresting Melvida was the bio-data sheet with Melvida's name on it found at the
crime scene. By no means can this indicate that Melvida committed the offense charged. It does not
even connote that Melvida was at the crime scene for the bio-data sheet could have been obtained by
anyone and left at the crime scene long before or after the crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion.
Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.

5. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, WHEN COMMITTED. To sustain a conviction for
the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the essential elements of the crime be
conclusively proved. Taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by means
of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things makes one liable for
robbery. Intimidation is present in the taking when "acts are performed which, in their own nature or by
reason of the circumstances under which they are executed, restrict or hinder the free exercise of the
will of the victim or inspire him with fear. "In this case, Tumangan, with gun in hand and while Godinez
was helplessly pinned under the motorcycle, dispossessed the latter of the money he was carrying. That
Tumangan was armed and had in fact already fired it, causing injury to Broniola which caused his death,
and that Godinez was defenseless naturally impaired the latter's free will, producing the intimidation
element in robbery. The crime becomes robbery with homicide when by reason or on occasion of a
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of person, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. The term "homicide" is understood in its generic sense, hence, it includes the commission of
murder or slight physical injuries during the robbery. Since the robbery in this case was accompanied by
the killing of Pedro Broniola, the crime becomes robbery with homicide, as the trial court correctly ruled.

6. ID.; ROBBERY; THE CULPRITS MUST RETURN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE LOOT IN THE ABSENCE
OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT A PORTION THEREOF WAS RECOVERED. Also, the trial court should
have ordered the accused-appellants to indemnify jointly and severally, the Hacienda Jose Ancajas in the
amount of P50,577.17, representing the amount withdrawn from the bank and taken by them from
Eugenio Godinez, since it was never established by admissible evidence that any portion of this amount
had been recovered.

7. ID.; CONSPIRACY; APPRECIATED WHEN THE ACCUSED HAD THE SAME PURPOSE AND WERE
UNITED IN THE EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSE. The trial court was likewise correct in finding conspiracy
in this case. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It is not required that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence; rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The agreement to
commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or
inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of intent.

8. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. In this case, the three accused were one in
blocking the motorcycle of Godinez, Serafin, and Broniola, and commanding their victims to stop. They
were also unanimous in fleeing the crime scene, taking a single route to Daang Lungsod. These
concerted acts indicate a community of criminal intent which is the essence of conspiracy. Conspiracy
having been established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed Pedro Broniola,
for that criminal act is attributable to all three accused. ICacDE

9. ID.; PENALTIES; DEATH PENALTIES UNDER RA NO. 7659; NOT IMPOSABLE IF THE OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY. Thus are the second and third assigned errors settled. The
final task is to determine the appropriate penalty against the accused. The Revised Penal Code
prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of robbery with homicide, but since
the offense in this case was committed on 24 April 1991, or while the imposition of the death penalty
had been suspended and before its reimposition under R.A. No. 7659, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

10. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY, CANNOT BE GRANTED ABSENT FACTUAL BASIS
THEREFOR. We do not, however, agree with its awards of moral and exemplary damages of
P10,000.00 each to Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, and Presentation vda. de Broniola. There is no
factual basis therefor insofar as Godinez and Serafin are concerned since they did not ask for and testify
thereon. Only Presentacion vda. de Broniola asked for moral damages of P50,000.00 for her "worries"
due to the death of her husband.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED IN CRIMINAL CASES WHEN ONE OR
MORE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. As to exemplary
damages, the law is clear that they can be recovered in criminal cases only when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, none of which was proven in this case. The
award then of P10,000.00 in favor of Presentation vda. de Broniola must be deemed as for moral
damages only. CAcIES

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

Accused-appellants Ermelindo Sequio, Vicente Tumangan and Nenito Melvida appeal from the decision
1 of 24 February 1994 (promulgated on 1 March 1994) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. CBU-22486, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as
charged in an information 2 whose accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 1991 at 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less at the Public Highway,
Sitio Lahug, Barangay Antipolo, Municipality of Medellin, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate intent and
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
payroll money in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND 17/100
(P50,577.17), Philippine Currency, belonging to Hda. Jose Ancajas Agricultural Corporation to the
damage and prejudice of said corporation in the amount aforestated, and on the occasion thereof, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking advantage of their superior number and
strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot Pedro Broniola who was backriding [sic] a
motorcycle, thereby inflicting upon him [a] gunshot wound on the head, and as a result thereof said
Pedro Broniola died thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

This information was filed in due course after receipt by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
of the record in Criminal Case No. 4739-M of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Daanbantayan-Medellin, Province of Cebu, where a complaint for highway robbery with homicide under
P.D. No. 532 was filed on 25 April 1991 against the accused-appellants. 3

In connection with the same incident, a separate information for illegal possession of firearms was filed
against accused Vicente Tumangan with the RTC of Cebu, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
22297 and assigned to Branch 15 of the said court. 4 For reasons undisclosed, the said case and this case
were not consolidated for joint trial.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-22486, the witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief
were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, police officers Elpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo and Mario Remulta,
Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna Areola, Emilio Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, and
Presentacion vda. de Broniola, while Olympio Lozano was presented as rebuttal witness.

Only the accused testified in their defense.

The People's version of the facts as testified to by its witnesses is as follows:

At around noon of 24 April 1991, Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in
Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank,
located three kilometers from the hacienda, to withdraw P50,557.17 to pay for the wages of the
hacienda workers. The bank's cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of the
bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank's motorcycles. Serafin
drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money
in a money bag which he hung over his left shoulder. 5

As the three were in sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, and nearing the hacienda, the accused,
armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered them to stop. Godinez recognized the armed men
because Nenito Melvida and Ermelindo Sequio used to work in the hacienda while Vicente Tumangans
parents were Godinez's neighbors. 6

Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the accused, he and Godinez heard a gunshot. 7
Godinez noticed that Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran
away. The motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in
hand, approached Godinez, took the money from the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused.
With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola behind. 8 Meanwhile, Serafin had
proceeded to the house of the Broniolas, which was near the crime scene, and informed Broniola's wife
of the incident. 9

SPO Elpidio Luna, who was then at the Medellin police headquarters, received a report from another
policeman about a robbery at sitio Antipolo. Together with other policemen and some "Cafgus," Luna
went to the crime scene where he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then had milled
around the site informed Luna "that the culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes were
compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a stool on it [which] was
somewhat newly delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet 10 with the name "Melvida, Nenito" and
the entry for the father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida." 11

One bystander volunteered to take Luna to Elpidio Melvida's house where, however, Elpidio told Luna
that Nenito Melvida was not there but was at his (Nenito's) brother's house. Elpidio took Luna to the
said house where Luna saw the accused Nenito Melvida playing cards with other persons. Luna asked
Melvida to go with him to the barangay captain's house. Melvida hesitated at first, but his companions
prevailed upon him to go with Luna. 12
The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was
kept at the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then,
by his fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his
supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only after the police had filed criminal charges
against him and he had posted bail. Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the police investigation,
although Luna assured the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Meddelin, who is a lawyer, was
present. While Luna claimed he asked the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted that this
request did not appear in the record of the investigation. Luna's investigation of Melvida was not
reduced into writing. 13

In the course of Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted that he kept "his share from the loot" in his
house. Melvida then was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed
inside a shoe which he delivered to the policemen. 14

During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo Mondigo, 15 Melvida admitted that his (Melvida's)
companions during the robbery were Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequio, who were staying in
the house of Juanito Hones in Daanlungsod, Medellin, Cebu. Immediately, Mondigo and policeman
Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequio on the
porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached
Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo
patted the bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with holster and four
bullets. 16 When asked if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the negative. Mondigo
and Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequio to the police station. Tumangan was then
investigated in the presence of the Municipal Mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of the
holduppers. 17

Mondigo further declared that the police recovered P22,526.00, 18 but could not explain any further
how the recovery was made and from whom. As to this amount, SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property
custodian of the Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he was entrusted with the P22,526.00
which, according to the station commander, was "recovered in connection with the highway robbery
case." 19

On the morning of 25 April 1991, the sworn statements of Eugenio Godinez 20 and Jimmy Serafin 21
were taken at the PNP Headquarters in Medellin, Cebu, by P/Cpl. Eliseo Tepait and P/Sgt. Elpidio Luna,
respectively. On the same date, the criminal complaint for highway robbery with homicide (Criminal Case
No. 4739-M was filed with the Third MCTC of Daanbantayan-Medellin, Cebu.

Paraffin tests were then conducted on the accused by Lt. Myrna Areola, forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Camp Cabahug, Cebu City. The tests yielded negative results for the presence of
gunpowder residue on both hands of Tumangan and Melvida, while Sequio's left hand tested positive
for gunpowder residue. 22

Dr. Arturo Sormillon conducted the post-mortem examination on Pedro Broniola. He found a single
gunshot wound "at the upper back of [Broniola's] head. The entrance of the bullet was at the upper back
of the nape and the bullet exited at the mouth splitting the tongue." Probing the wound, Dr. Sormillon
determined that the bullet followed an upward path from the lower nape and out of the victim's mouth,
thus, he raised the possibility that the gun used was positioned lower than the exit wound. He also
advanced that by the nature of the wound, death was instantaneous. 23

Emilio Daclan, stenographer of Branch 15 of the RTC of Cebu, authenticated the transcript of
stenographic notes of Mondigo's testimony in People vs. Tumangan, Criminal Case No. CBU-22297. 24

Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, Branch Clerk of Court of the aforesaid trial court, brought the firearm,
a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 1022560, and four live bullets, allegedly confiscated from
accused Tumangan. Through Belarmino, the prosecution also presented a certification dated 30 May
1992, issued by PNP Cebu Provincial Director Rodolfo L. Esparagoza, stating that Vicente Tumangan had
not been issued a license nor a permit to possess the firearm described above. 25 Atty. Belarmino,
however, was not the incumbent clerk of court when the said exhibits were presented in Criminal Case
No. CBU-22297. 26

According to Presentacion vda. de Broniola, her husband Pedro Broniola earned a monthly salary of
P1,200.00 from Hacienda Jose Ancajas and died at the age of 63. At the time of his death, he was already
receiving P880.00 from the Social Security System. As a consequence of his death, she suffered "worries"
which she quantified at P50,000.00. She also asked P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. 27

Rebuttal witness Olympio Lozano, "operation officer of the Forever Security and general services,"
testified to disprove accused Tumangan's claim "that on April 23, the day before the incident in 24 April
that was his day off with Forever Security Agency." 28 According to Lozano, Tumangan went on absence
without leave on 4 April 1991, as evidenced by a spot report dated 3 April 1991 which he prepared
reading as follows:

1. On or about 0700H more or less 3 April 91 at the vicinity of Asian Arts, Inc. Labangon Cebu City,
Security Guard Vicente Tumangan, an outgoing security guard failed to turned over service revolver cal.
38 w/serial number 769398, local made w/ 5rds ammo to the in-coming security guard, which
investigation disclosed that SG Tumangan hurriedly went out of the company carrying a medium size bag
presumably containing the said firearm. 29

Lozano also reported to the Cebu City Police Station 3 Tumangan's failure to return the firearm to the
security agency, which was recorded as an "Estafa Alarm" in the said station's blotter. 30

The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a frame-up for their exculpation.

Accused-appellant Nenito Melvida claims he was at his brother's house at the time of the crime, as his
sister-in-law told him to stay there while she was in Cebu City and her husband was at work. Later that
night, police officer Luna came to the house and showed Melvida the soiled bio-data which he admitted
to be his. He was asked if "we were the ones responsible for the robbery and killing" and he said "that is
not true." Melvida was brought to the police station where he was asked if he knew those persons who
just arrived in his barrio. He identified one of those persons as accused-appellant Ermelindo Sequio
whom he saw in Sequio's aunt's house as he was fetching water at around 5:00 p.m. He claims he was
acquainted only with Sequio and he just met accused-appellant Vicente Tumangan while they had been
detained. 31

Accused-appellants Tumangan and Sequio also placed themselves somewhere else at the time of the
crime. At 7:00 a.m. of 24 April 1991 Tumangan had just left his post as a security guard at the Asian Arts,
Inc., in Labangon, Cebu City, and at 1:00 p.m. he went to Medellin together with his friend, Sequio.
They were to procure Sequio's birth certificate to be used in the latter's wedding. The two arrived in
Medellin at 5:00 p.m. and they stayed in Sequio's aunt's house. They went to sleep early as they were
tired from their long trip from Cebu City. 32

At 8:00 p.m., police officers Mondigo and Artequela came and were let in by Sequio's aunt. Tumangan
and Sequio awoke to find Mondigo and Artequela pointing an armalite and a .38 caliber pistol,
respectively, at Tumangan. Other policemen searched the house, claiming they were looking for
firearms. Tumangan asked what had happened and why the police were pointing guns at him, but the
policemen did not answer. He said he had no gun, but the officers said he lied. Tumangan and Sequio
were told to go downstairs, leaving Mondigo and Artequela upstairs to continue their search. When they
came down the policemen said they had found a gun, a .38-caliber "Squires Bingham," which Tumangan
recognized because it was the same as the firearm given to me as a security guard." 33 Tumangan and
Sequio were brought to the police station that same evening. At the station, Tumangan was
interrogated by the police without the assistance of counsel, while Sequio was left in a cell. 34

The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's evidence and in its decision it found:

CLEARLY, the accused is interposing the defense of denial with traces of alibi and frame-up. So, it
behooves the Court to weigh properly the evidence both ways.

The testimonies of the accused, even collectively considered, do not inspire belief. It is not just because
they were self-serving but mostly because their assertions, despite efforts to produce the desired effect,
have come out but flimsily skirting on what should squarely be reasonable or logical and natural And
these attributes are too apparent in this Court's narration of evidence and the facts they establish, if at
all (supra).

Firstly, the Court must say that the accused's defense of alibi and frame-up is not persuasive. The
defense theory bares the badges of a concoction easy to formulate but hard to prove. Thus, as, between
the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses (direct eyewitnesses, themselves co-participants
with the homicide victim, Pedro Broniola, in the swift robbery drama Eugenio Godinez from whose
shoulder the money bag was snatched by an armed Vicente Tumangan as Godinez was pinned helpless
under the weight of the motorcycle that had fallen to wayside, and Jimmy Serafin, who drove the
motorcycle on which had ridden at his back Godinez and then Broniola they saw the three accused
apparently waiting for them as they drove to the hacienda house; they heard shouts from where the
accused were for the riders to stop the motorcycle they heard the gunfire from the accused; they
witnessed Broniola hit and dropped from the vehicle by the shooting from the vehicle; they witnessed
Serafin leave the vehicle and run away) and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves
more credence (People v. Esquerra, G.R No. 97959, 7 April 1993).

Needless to elaborate, there was homicide in the course of the robbery, and the fact of this death has
been officially recorded.

No amount of denial, or petty alibi, can shake the solid identifications of the accused by their own
robbery victims. Eugenio Godinez, in particular, was categorical in this, saying that he had long known
the three accused even before the incident (page 2, supra.). And how could he in broad daylight and
at almost high noon at all miss recognizing Vicente Tumangan whose face was hardly a foot away from
Godinez's face when Tumangan grabbed the money bag from Godinez's shoulder?

The accused themselves were one in telling the Court that they and the police officers who had followed
up this case had not had any misunderstanding or differences; they did not even know each other until
after the incident. Absent any showing that the law enforcers were moved by ill-motive or improper
reasons to falsely impute a serious charge against the accused, it is presumed that they had acted in the
regular performance of their duties. (Id.).

To repeat, the Court must grant credibility to the witnesses for the prosecution. Their testimonies, unlike
those of the accused, are not illogical, inconsistent and contrary to human experience (People v. Salazar,
et al., G.R. No. 84391, 7 April 1993). The Court did closely observe each and every witness's demeanor
while testifying, disregarding attendant and expected little inconsistencies, usually normal, and must
hold that the prosecution witnesses were definitely more trustworthy in their pronouncements in court
than those for the defense. Defense witnesses now and then betrayed their smugness when they should
rather be spontaneous. In fact, the Court was disturbed when there occurred an unexpected unison by
the defense counsel and one of the accused in wrongly surnaming a relative of the accused ("Hones"
from Diones).

The mere say so by Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequio that they left Cebu City at 1:00 in the
afternoon of 24 April 1991 and arrived in Medellin at 5:00 that same afternoon does not remove the
possibility, if not the probability, that they had actually been in Medellin earlier with their Medellin
based relative, Nenito Melvida than the time of the robbery. A few hours make a lot of difference,
dont they? After all, the frequency of the trips of hacienda payroll money from the bank had become of
public knowledge, especially among the hacienda laborers, and their relatives of counsel.

In total, alibi or denial is a weak defense and becomes weaker in the face of positive identification
of the accused by the prosecution witnesses (People v. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 92506-07, 28 April 1993).

Another point must be mentioned now.

Explicit is the evidence to prove that the three accused acted in concert, clearly pursuing the same
objective. Thus, from their conduct conspiracy may be inferred. For, as has been held, it is not essential
that there is proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime . . . From acts and circumstances may
logically be inferred the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged (People v. Buntan,
Sr., G.R. No. 90736, 12 April 1993).

Thus, with conspiracy present, the fact of shooting from the direction of the three accused and the fact
that the shooting hit Broniola who fell off the motorcycle, and killed him, are all that matter, irrespective
as to who of the three had indeed fired the fatal shot. For, after all, the liability of one is the culpability of
all in a conspiracy. The finger of probability, though, strongly point to accused Ermelindo Sequio as the
gunfiring member of the armed trio upon the forensic chemist's finding of presence of gunpowder
residue on the left hand of Ermelindo Sequio," reliable that the paraffin tests on the accused could be,
they having been administered just slightly more than 24 hours after the fatal shooting was done. Add
the following:

Undisputed is the fact of police recovery of "partitions" of the loot (cash) not from one of the three
accused but from the three of them in separate "hiding" places.

The evidence has established indubitably the following material facts:

The motorcycle riders (named, supra), who were carrying cash just withdrawn from the Medellin Rural
Bank for the salaries of employees of the Hacienda Ancajas were held up by three armed men who were
identified as the accused, about noontime on 24 April 1991 in sitio Lahug, barangay Antipolo,
municipality of Medellin, province of Cebu, and one of the hacienda trustee, before the three escaped
away. Shortly momentarily before this, and in the process of the robbery, the hacienda bookkeeper,
another hacienda trustee who was also on the motorcycle, was shot dead by the malefactors. Without
the shooting which had resulted in homicide, the culprits would not have possibly succeeded in the
robbery.

Without hesitance now the Court, considering the facts proved by the evidence, must declare that the
crime committed by the accused was robbery with homicide (robo con homicido) as provided by Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code which reads, thus.

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer.

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.

The Court entertains no doubt whatsoever that the accused did employ violence against (shooting and
killing) and intimidation of persons (which in fact compelled the robbery victims, except the killed one, to
scamper away fast from the scene of the crime) to consummate their criminal intent to take away, as
they did, for personal gain, the personal property of Hacienda Ancajas (payroll money under the
custodial trust of the hacienda overseer and paymaster). (See People v. Dela Cruz, L-1020063, 20 January
1993. 35

It then rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds ERMELINDO SEQUIO, VICENTE TUMANGAN and NENITO MELVIDA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized by Article 294
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences EACH OF THEM to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

The above-named accused are ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of killed victim Pedro
Broniola, specifically his widow, Presentacion vda. de Broniola, with the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000). They are further ordered to pay, also jointly and severally, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) each to the aforementioned widow Eugenio Godinez and Jimmy Serafin in concept of moral
and exemplary damages. Recovered sums of money, part of the total amount of money taken in the
robbery, are ordered returned to the Hacienda Ancajas, even as the same accused are ordered to pay
back, jointly and severally, to said Hacienda the balance of the total loot still unaccounted for.

Costs must likewise be paid by the three accused.

SO ORDERED. 36

Forthwith, the accused appealed to us from the judgment by filing a notice of appeal. 37

We accepted the appeal on 20 February 1995.

In their Appellant's Brief filed on 21 August 1995, the accused contend that the trial court erred in its
findings:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

. . . THAT ACCUSED . . . ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE, AND SENTENCING THEM TO SERVE THE PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO THE HEIRS OF KILLED VICTIM PEDRO BRONIOLA, SPECIFICALLY THE WIDOW,
PRESENTACION VDA. DE BRONIOLA, THE AMOUNT OF P50,000, AND FURTHER TO PAY JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF P10,000 EACH TO THE AFORENAMED WIDOW, EUGENIO GODINEZ, AND JIMMY
SERAFIN IN THE CONCEPT OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

. . . THAT ACCUSED . . . ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE LACK OF IDENTITY OF THE
PERSON WHO FIRED THE ALLEGED SHOT THAT HIT AND KILLED THE VICTIM PEDRO BRONIOLA.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

. . . THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY, THE PROSECUTION NOT HAVING PROVED OF ANY EVIDENCE
SHOWING CONSPIRACY.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

. . . WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE

INVESTIGATION WITH THE ACCUSED BY THE POLICE, AS WHEN THE COURT SAYS "THE COURT, HOWEVER,
MUST EXPRESS ITS DISMAY OVER THE QUESTIONABLE METHODS BY THE POLICE OFFICERS CONCERNED
MOCKED THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH THEY THEMSELVES HAVE SWORN TO HONOR AND REVERE, WHEN
THEY DID NOT REMIND THE ACCUSED OF THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO BE ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL.

The disposition of the first assigned error depends on whether the accused were properly found guilty of
the crime charged, hence it shall be discussed last. The second and third errors may be resolved together
as they pertain to the same issue of conspiracy.

We shall first take up the fourth assigned error as it raises a constitutional problem deserving of primary
consideration.

The fourth assigned error is self-contradictory. While it starts with a claim that the trial court failed to
consider the non-observance by the police of the constitutional safeguards during the investigation of
the accused, it quoted the trial court's statement precisely expressing its dismay over the questionable
method used by the police in such investigation and considered it a mockery of the Constitution which
the police had sworn to honor and revere. We quote what the trial court said:

The Court, however, must express its dismay over the questionable means employed by the police in
investigating the accused. The police officers concerned mocked the Constitution, which they themselves
have sworn to honor and revere, when they did not remind the accused of their right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel. They must be instructed by their superiors in no uncertain terms to
respect the Constitution at all times in the performance of their duties. Be that as it may, this
unconstitutional act may not benefit the cause of the accused. After all, nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution was taken from the police investigation in question no fruit, as it were, from the
"poisoned tree." 38

Also, in the course of his testimony, police officer Elpidio Luna was rebuked by the trial court for his
violation of the constitutional rights of accused Melvida. Thus:

Court:

So, you investigated Nenito Melvida?

A I investigated Nenito Melvida.

Court

You investigated him after you arrested him? Why did you arrest him?

A I believed that he was a suspect of that robbery.

Court:

Was your belief sufficient to arrest him?

A I only invite him for investigation. I did not arrest him.

Court:

That is the enertia [sic] of martial law. "No we did not arrest him, we only invited him."

Court to witness:

Was he assisted by a lawyer when you investigated him?

A No there was none because in our place we can seldom find lawyers.

Court:

So, since there are no lawyers you go on arresting and investigating without even sufficient
ground for such arrest?

A. We did not arrest him we only invite him.

Court:

How?

A. I told him, "Please, go with us because we have something you."

Court:

Why did you not ask him right there? Why did you have to make him go with you?

A. Because the Barangay captain was not around I should have asked him there?

Court:

You were earlier set to investigate him that is why you brought him to your headquarters?

A. Yes sir.

Court:

` Do you have the right to investigate someone whom you have not arrested?

A In our police work we can do the interrogation and investigation as long as we will not violate
the human rights.

Court:

Did you not violate the human right of Nenito Melvida?

A I did not violate Your Honor. 39

However, while the trial court found a mockery of the Constitution and in fact declared that "nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution was taken from the police investigation in question no fruit, as it
were, from the 'poisoned tree,'" we do find incongruous the following statement of the trial court:

Undisputed is the fact of police recovery of "partitions" of the loot (cash) not from one of the three of
them in separate "hiding" places. 40

What was "recovered" from the accused Melvida was P9,000.00 which, he admitted, was his share of the
loot. 41 As to the difference between P22,526.00 and P9,000.00, no evidence was adduced how and
from whom it was recovered. Police officer Mariano Remulta merely declared that the P26,526.00 was
entrusted to him by the station commander who told him that the amount was recovered in connection
with the highway robbery case." 42

Since the "recovery" of P9,000.00 from Melvida was due to his "admission" in the course of the custodial
interrogation made in violation of paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and,
therefore, inadmissible in evidence pursuant to paragraph (3) of. the said section then the P9,000.00
cannot also be admitted in evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree." The rule is settled that once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained as the admission of Melvida in
this case any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it the P9,000.00 obtained
from Melvida as a consequence of his "admission" is also inadmissible. 43

The above statement of the trial court may, however, mere surplusage since, in the final analysis, it did
not take into account against the accused whatever admission they made during police interrogation.
We need to elaborate, however, why such admissions are inadmissible in evidence.

Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense," 44
and it is made "by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest." 45 Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter's "invitation" was
a submission to Luna's custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged
herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense.

Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest
was effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first and last conditions enumerated above are not applicable in this case; and under the facts
herein, neither does the second condition apply. Luna's basis for arresting Melvida was the bio-data
sheet with Melvida's name on it found at the crime scene. By no means can this indicate that Melvida
committed the offense charged. It does not even connote that Melvida was at the crime scene for the
bio-data sheet could have been obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene long before or after the
crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had no personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida's guilt; at
best, he had an unreasonable suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.

After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation. The custodial investigation
commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the authors of the crime or had focused on
him as a suspect thereof. 46 This brought into operation paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing the accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and his right to be
informed of these rights. 47 The said paragraph provides:

SEC. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida
was not assisted by counsel during the investigation. Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted
these constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an
investigator's duties prior to and during custodial interrogation laid down in Morales vs. Enrile 48 and
reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases. 49

The next task is to determine whether the crime charged under the information was sufficiently
established. To sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the
essential elements of the crime be conclusively proved. 50 Taking, with the intent to gain, of personal
property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon things makes one liable for robbery. 51 Intimidation is present in the taking when "acts are
performed which, in their own nature or by reason of the circumstances under which they are executed,
restrict or hinder the free exercise of the will of the victim or inspire him with fear." 52

In this case, Tumangan, with gun in hand and while Godinez was helplessly pinned under the motorcycle,
dispossessed the latter of the money he was carrying. That, Tumangan was armed and had in fact
already fired it, causing injury to Broniola which caused his death, and that Godinez was defenseless
naturally impaired the latter's free will, producing the intimidation element in robbery.

The crime becomes robbery with homicide when by reason or on occasion of a robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of person, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. 53 The
term "homicide" is understood in its generic sense, hence, it includes the commission of murder or slight
physical injuries during the robbery. 54

Since the robbery in this case was accompanied by the killing of Pedro Broniola, the crime becomes
robbery with homicide, as the trial court correctly ruled.

The trial court was likewise correct in finding conspiracy in this case. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It
is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; rather, it is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its execution. The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of intent. 55

In this case, the three accused were one in blocking the motorcycle of Godinez, Serafin, and Broniola,
and commanding their victims to stop. They were also unanimous in fleeing the crime scene, taking a
single route to Daang Lungsod. These concerted acts indicate a community of criminal intent which is the
essence of conspiracy. Conspiracy having been established, it matters not who among the accused
actually shot and killed Pedro Broniola, for that criminal act is attributable to all three accused.

Thus are the second and third assigned errors settled. The final task is to determine the appropriate
penalty against the accused. The Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for the crime of robbery with homicide, 56 but since the offense in this case was committed on 24
April 1991, or while the imposition of the death penalty had been suspended 57 and before its
reimposition under RA. No. 7659, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. We
do not, however, agree with its awards of moral and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 each to Eugenio
Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, and Presentacion vda. de Broniola. There is no factual basis therefor insofar as
Godinez and Serafin are concerned since they did not ask for and testify thereon. Only Presentacion vda.
de Broniola asked for moral damages of P50,000.00 for her "worries" due to the death of her husband.
58 As to exemplary damages, the law is clear that they can be recovered in criminal cases only when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, 59 none of which was proven in this
case. The award then of P10,000.00 in favor of Presentacion vda. de Broniola must be deemed as for
moral damages only.

Also, the trial court should have ordered the accused-appellants to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Hacienda Jose Ancajas in the amount of P50,577.17, representing the amount withdrawn from the bank
and taken by them from Eugenio Godinez, since it was never established by admissible evidence that any
portion of this amount had been recovered.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 21 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City of 24 February 1994 in Criminal Case No. CBU-22486 is hereby AFFIRMED,
subject to the following modifications, viz., the award of P10,000.00 each to Eugenio Godinez and Jimmy
Serafin are deleted, while that for Presentacion vda. de Broniola shall only be considered as moral
damages, and that the accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the
Hacienda Jose Ancajas of Medellin, Cebu, the sum of Fifty Thousand Five Hundred and Seventy-Seven
Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P50,577.17), with interest thereon at the legal rate reckoned from 24
April 1991 and until it shall have been fully paid.

Costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-68955. September 4, 1986.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; RATIONALE. Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution is a
safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his
person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is
so important: "It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In what haven of refuge,
his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384
US 757 [1966], Brenna, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski
in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme court [1966]), could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.'"

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL;

ARRESTING OFFICER MUST HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT. Under Section 6(a) of rule
113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence
or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. At the time
of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither
was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at
the time of the arrest.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST ANY

UNREASONABLE SEIZURE; EXCEPTIONS; SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED; REASON. The right of a
person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
liberally construe the rule on arrest without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so
often violated and so deserving of full protection.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; ACTUAL COMMISSION OF

CRIME; ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION. In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of
the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER; REQUISITES. It cannot be presumed that there was a waiver, or that
consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin (supra): ". . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181)."

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; WAIVER THEREOF NOT PRESUMED. We apply the rule that:
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that
they are inadmissible as evidence.

8. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF

INADMISSIBLE; ADMISSIONS MADE BY ARRESTING OFFICERS CANNOT BE USED AGAINST ACCUSED. In
proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after his wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused
himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
which provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. . . ." The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation
of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.

9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RULE THAT FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TRIAL COURT GENERALLY GIVEN
GREAT RESPECT; NOT ABSOLUTE; REASON. We are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the
trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): ". . . Time and
again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor,
actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not
absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the
findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were
not properly appreciated by the trial court."

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11th Judicial Region,
Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant-appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond reasonable
doubt, of the offense charged, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6,
dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph 1 thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate sentence
law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty,
pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties,
as provided for by law.

"As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38,
Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government, to
be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda
seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law."

The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:

"That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabouts at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and without the
necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper government agencies, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm
was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one
Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent
means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection
of contributions from the members.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows: prLL

xxx xxx xxx

". . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an
intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on
May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at about
9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused.

"Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00)
per month, as his contribution to the NPA (TSN, page 5, Hearing - October 14, 1982).

"Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15)
members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at
1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock P.M., where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages
6-7, Hearing October 14, 1982).
"Right in the house of accused, the latter was called by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his
firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later,
upon question propounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to
a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing October 14,
1982).

"Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.

"After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he
allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt.
Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of
notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo, Kaisipang Mao Zedong, dated December 31,
1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang
Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.

"Accused, when confronted with the firearm, Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the same as
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of
the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of
Tienda Aplaya, Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing October 14, 1982).

"To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was presented, who
declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben
Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his
house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstairs. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their
purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of
which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing January 4, 1983).

"Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his family will
be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the
threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled out from his waistline a .
38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused,
which make him easily identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution (TSN,
pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing January 4, 1983).

"On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok,
Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar. Those present in the
seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and
one alias Jamper.
"The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his
companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the
government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and
if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.

"Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the
NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise identified the pamphlets as those marked as Exhibits "B", "C",
and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing January 4, 1983).

"Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their
own opinions about the NPA, It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be
responsible for the collection of the contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing
January 4, 1983).

"On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.

"Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented to prove that on May 19, 1982, he administered
the subscription of the extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E" for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.

"Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that
accused was not represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent
to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of his extrajudicial statement.

"Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan language, resulting
to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and
signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the allegations of his extrajudicial statement.

"Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights to remain
silent, light to counsel and right to answer any question propounded or not.

"With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal
Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside
the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos, while waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, Hearing November 15,
1982).

"Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig, in-
charge of firearms and explosives, NCO, Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was
presented and testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the
name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who applied
for the licensing of the firearm, under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
"After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits, which were
all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was accordingly
overruled."

On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as
follows:

"From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the PC
Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about
8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot identify because they
were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 141, Hearing June 15, 1983).

"The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to the subject
firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of his
refusal, accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.

"He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A",
for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was subjected to
further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth
with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his
body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly
irritating with pungent pain.

"All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission. The process of beating, mauling, pain and or
ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982, intercepted only whenever he
fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of his senses.

"Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal, he was seriously
warned, if he win still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged,
and no longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject
firearm.

"After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign his affidavit
marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the certification of the
administering officer. (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing - June 15, 1983).

"In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation and
commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and or contents of his alleged extra-judicial
statement, attributed his answers to those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and
intimidation of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by an
investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot identify and was able to obtain his admission of the subject
firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
"To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support his denial
to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46 and 47, along with his answers to those questions, involving Honorata Arellano alias Inday Arellano,
said Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in the
numbers allegedly stated in the extra-judicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA
personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on the date referred on April 28,
1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet the
accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118-121, Hearing May 18, 1983).

"She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with
subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but
said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano,
was likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was
likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in
relation to her cross-examination, Hearing May 18, 1983).

"To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Salvador Galaraga was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive
activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally
attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and
farmer thereat. (TSN, pages 128-129, Hearing May 18, 1983).

"He, however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in
his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and were not formally charged in Court
because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation
to page 136, Hearing May 18, 1983).

"Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and
who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May
10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will
leave it behind, temporarily, for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform him about said
firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN,
page 24, November 22, 1983).

"On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a
mask, she can still identify him (TSN, page 6, Hearing - November 22, 1983).

"After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case, in support of accused's
through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or in the alternative for
violation merely of simple illegal possession of firearm, under the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-
114, Hearing May 18, 1983)"
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit: cdrep

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT
VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7.

Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of
a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the
evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for
the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly
recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search
warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva v. Querubin (48
SCRA 345) why this right is so important:

"It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as
a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of a `spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47)."

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appellant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 ** of the Rules
of Court, provides the exceptions as follows: LibLex

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities
received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report
of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."

If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:

"A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense."

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. LLpr

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was
sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it
lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was
not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully
his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need
to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear.
The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search
and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest.

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

". . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181)."

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458). cdll

That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is
evident from the records:

ATTY. CALAMBA:

"Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest warrant?

"A None Sir.

"Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?

"A No Sir.

"Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?

"A But he was twenty meters away from his house.

"Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?

"A Yes Sir.

"Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?

"A Yes Sir.

"Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?

"A No Sir.

"Q What did you tell him?

"A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he denied
but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which
was wrapped with a cellophane.

"Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution
considering that he was purposely under arrest?

"A I did not.

"Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?

"A Yes Sir.

"Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?

"A It was buried down in his house.

"Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?

"A Yes Sir."(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing October 14, 1982).

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that
they are inadmissible as evidence.

There is another aspect of this case.

In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after his wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused
himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
cdphil

Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
which provides:

"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right . . ."

The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence.
The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and
third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.

The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.

With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.

We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in
People v. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):

xxx xxx xxx

". . . Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the
demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this
rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance
which were not properly appreciated by the trial court."

The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People v. Capadocia
(17 SCRA 981): cdrep

"The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how much credence
can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura
was the only witness who testified on the mimeographing incident . . .

xxx xxx xxx

". . . He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended upon how much
he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in
the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura
cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source . . ."
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.

Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982
i.e., Masamlok's father Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who
could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

As held in the case of People v. Bania (34 SCRA 347):.

"It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after
stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was made
clear: `Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one
of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v.
Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Godoy, 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74
SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80
SCRA 484; People v. Gabilan, 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People v. Ibanga, 124
SCRA 697)."

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be a
well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as
we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate
efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum in Morales v. Enrile
(121 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated: cdphil

"While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the
lawless with all the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is
taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws."
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he
has been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 69401. June 23, 1987.]

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY
ASMAD, RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI,
ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH
VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners, vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY,
COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES
GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IDC MAJOR ARNOLD
BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST
LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the
home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez Street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1

The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the feared
practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality,
arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part
is not included in the modern refinement).

The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire.
No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon
enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested,
later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of
ammunition found in the premises. 3

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from
them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. 4

The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged to
have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court,
Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he
submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based. 6

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken
without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact
admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance." 7

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in question,
provided as follows:

"Sec. 3. The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that

"Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."

The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required search warrant, sought to justify their act
on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9

"Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As
eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10
"The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse
the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There
was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein
against the petitioners.

It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they received
to take them into custody; but that is a cynical argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated
reports that they were stockpiling weapons.

The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the
time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.

Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been
any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty.
This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that,
lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from
a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him
outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.

If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law,
which it was their duty to uphold.

In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply
by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable
cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search
warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew
where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid.
If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at
all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.

Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law-enforcement
authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the
ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy
redundancy.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then
open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises
on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the
illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from
official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

"It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England may
not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 13

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about
to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree." 15 As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that cannot
profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 16 Pending determination of the legality of such
articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide. 17

The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight
comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."

The fearful days of hamleting, salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in the past,
banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done with
lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be
the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v.
De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that
there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual is
entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for
all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL
and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any
proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE BASED ON AN INFORMER'S TIP, AT A TIME WHEN
ACCUSED WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME, ILLEGAL; EVIDENCE OBTAINED, INADMISSIBLE. Where it
is not disputed that the PC officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was carrying, and that their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained was inadmissible.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO URGENCY COULD BE INVOKED IN PRESENT CASE TO DISPENSE WITH
OBTENTION OF ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANT. The present case presented no such urgency. From
the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN HE WAS
ARRESTED. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

AQUINO, J., Dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES; ARREST AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME IS LAWFUL; SEARCH LIKEWISE LAWFUL. I hold
that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment
of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of
marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he
was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules
of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was
also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high
time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida
Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who
was eventually convicted. 6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters,
he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him
with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.
12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been
carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room
of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that
he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when
he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling.
16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches
belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The
trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility
on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:

"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin
on June 25, 1984?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana
leaves on that date?

"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.

"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the
coming of Wilcon 9?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

"COURT:

"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you
also receive any report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin?

"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.

"Q What were those activities?

"A Purely marijuana trafficking.

"Q From whom did you get that information?

"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security
reason and we cannot identify the person.

"Q But you received it from your regular informer?

"A Yes, sir.

"ATTY. LLARIZA:

"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

"A Marijuana, sir.

"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received
by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?

"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days before?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that Aminnudin was coming?

"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984
that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he has already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana
stuff.

"COURT:

"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Are you sure of that?

"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

"A Only on the 23rd of June.

"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in
your intelligence report?

"A No, more.

"Q Why not?

"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search
warrant anymore?

"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan
v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by
the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more
flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption
is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is
not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court
for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use
Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think
it a less evil that some criminal should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged
on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is
so ordered.

[G.R. No. 176735. June 26, 2008.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON CATOC y
PICAYO, accused-appellants.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2006 in CA-G.R. C.R.-HC
No. 01291 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 70, in
Criminal Cases No. 12193-D and No. 12194-D, finding accused-appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and
Ramon Catoc y Picayo guilty of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as
shabu, and finding accused-appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo guilty of illegal possession of the said
prohibited drug, respectively. cHTCaI

On 10 March 2003, two Informations were filed against appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon
Catoc y Picayo before the RTC of Pasig City, for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, appellants Santos and Catoc allegedly violated Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 3 in the following manner:

On or about March 8, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not
being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO3 Carlo Luna, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to
the test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. 4
(Emphasis ours).

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12194-D, appellant Catoc was additionally charged with
violation of Section 11, Article II of the same law, 5 committed as follows: cATDIH
On or about March 8 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was
found positive to the test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law. 6 (Emphasis ours).

During their arraignment on 19 May 2003, appellants Santos and Catoc pleaded not guilty to the above-
mentioned charges. 7

On 3 June 2003, the Pre-Trial Conference of the cases was terminated without the prosecution and the
defense agreeing to any stipulation of facts. 8

On 5 August 2003, the parties, however, agreed to re-open the Pre-Trial Conference and they entered
into a stipulation of facts as to the testimony to be given by the first prosecution witness, Forensic
Chemist Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza Cejes. 9 As contained in the Pre-Trial Order dated 5 August
2003, the parties stipulated on: (1) the due execution and genuineness of the Request for Laboratory
Examination dated 8 March 2003, and the stamp showing receipt thereof by the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) the due execution, genuineness and truth of the contents of Physical
Science Report No. D-405-03E issued by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza Cejes, the finding or
conclusion appearing on the report, and the signature of the forensic chemist over her typewritten name
appearing therein; and (3) the existence of the plastic sachets, but not their source or origin, contained
in a brown envelope, the contents of which were the subject of the Request for Laboratory Examination.
10 ADScCE

Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly. 11

The prosecution presented two witnesses: (1) Police Officer (PO)3 Carlo Luna 12 and (2) Senior Police
Officer (SPO)3 Leneal Matias, 13 both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) 14 of the
Pasig City Police Station.

The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Jerry Santos y Macol; 15 (2) appellant Ramon
Catoc y Picayo; 16 (3) Maria Violeta Catoc, 17 sister of appellant Catoc; and (4) Eric Santos, 18 brother of
appellant Santos.

The People's version of the facts shows that on 8 March 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City
Police conducted a buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Rosario,
Pasig City, on the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said
locality. 19 Accompanied by a confidential informant, the police team composed of PO3 Carlo Luna,
SPO3 Leneal Matias, PO1 Michael Espares and PO1 Michael Familara, proceeded to the target area at
around 1:15 to 1:20 a.m. on the above-mentioned date. PO3 Carlo Luna was to act as the poseur-buyer,
whereas the other members of the team were to serve as his backup. 20 cdphil
Upon reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted from their vehicle, while the
rest of the team were left inside. 21 The informant then pointed to two persons standing along the
target area, one of whom was Monching Labo, later identified as appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo. 22
After approaching, the informant introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu customer to one of the persons, later
identified as appellant Jerry Santos y Macol. Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of
shabu he was buying and asked for the money. PO3 Luna gave appellant Santos the buy-bust money
consisting of a pre-marked P100.00 bill. 23 Appellant Santos handed this money to appellant Catoc, who
took out from his pocket a sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, 24
which he handed back to appellant Santos. When appellant Santos gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna,
the latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a policeman. 25

At that point, the other members of the team arrived and likewise held and arrested appellant Catoc.
SPO3 Matias then ordered appellant Catoc to empty the contents of his pockets. After having done so,
another plastic sachet containing a similar crystalline substance 26 was recovered from appellant Catoc,
together with the marked P100.00 buy-bust money. 27 Immediately thereafter, the policemen marked
the two plastic sachets. 28 The sachet handed by appellant Santos to PO3 Luna was marked with the
latter's initials "CEL", his signature, and appellant Santos's initials "JMS". 29 On the other hand, the
sachet recovered from appellant Catoc by SPO3 Matias was marked with the latter's initials "LTM", his
signature and appellant Catoc's initials "RPC". 30 The policemen then informed the appellants of their
violations and apprised them of their constitutional rights. 31 Afterwards, appellants Santos and Catoc
were brought to the Pasig City Police Station at Pariancillo Park, Pasig City, for proper investigation.
cSIADH

PO3 Luna submitted the two plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Eastern Police District in Mandaluyong City for an examination of the contents
thereof. 32 The laboratory test results as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-405-03E 33 stated the
following:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "CEL/JMS 030803 and RPC/LTM 030803"
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A and B respectively.

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave [a] POSITIVE result to the tests
for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. . . . IDSaTE

CONCLUSION:

Specimens A and B contains (sic) Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

As expected, the appellants offered a version of the facts that was diametrically opposed to that of the
prosecution. According to them, there was no buy-bust operation to speak of and that prior to their
arrests, they were literally strangers to each other.

Appellant Jerry Santos y Macol testified that on 8 March 2003, at around 12:00 midnight to 1:00 a.m.,
while he was watching television at their house at 151 Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Barangay (Brgy.)
Rosario, Pasig City, and was about to sleep, five male persons in civilian clothing suddenly entered and
handcuffed him. 34 Santos claimed that he voluntarily went with the men when they tried to arrest him
because his ailing mother, who was then awakened, was already becoming nervous. 35 Santos was
brought outside and placed in a tricycle, and the entire group left for the police station. There, Santos
was detained and questioned about the marked money, which he said he knew nothing about. Santos
was then charged with the offense of selling illegal drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. 36 It was also at that time in the police station where he first met appellant Catoc. 37
HIAESC

For his part, appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo narrated that on 8 March 2003, between the hours of 11:00
p.m. and 12:00 midnight, he awoke to a loud sound at the door of their house at 125 Dr. Sixto Antonio
Avenue, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City. 38 When Catoc opened the door, five male persons with guns entered
their house. 39 The men frisked Catoc and searched his house. After being likewise awakened, Catoc's
mother asked the men what his son's fault was. They replied that they were looking for the drugs that
Catoc was selling. 40 When their search yielded nothing, the men mauled Catoc. Afterwards, Catoc was
placed in a tricycle and the group headed for a gasoline station along J. E. Manalo Street. There, Catoc
was transferred to a parked van; inside the vehicle was appellant Jerry Santos y Macol, whom the former
saw for the first time. 41 The men took the appellants to the police station in Pariancillo Park where they
were again mauled. The policemen who arrested the appellants produced two plastic sachets of shabu
and a P100.00 bill and alleged that the same were taken from Catoc's possession. The appellants were
then charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 42

On 4 May 2005, the trial court rendered its decision, the pertinent portion of which states: STIcaE

The Court is more inclined to give credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses given the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to them by law and jurisprudence
vis--vis the self-serving disclaimers of the herein accused whose version of the incident as narrated
above hardly inspires belief.

It has been clearly established from the evidence adduced by the State that at around 1:00 in the
morning of March 8, 2003, accused Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc, in conspiracy with one another, sold
or traded and delivered, to PO3 Carlo Luna, in a buy-bust operation, one transparent plastic sachet of
shabu containing white crystalline substance (Exh. "C-1") in consideration of the amount of PHP100.00
(Exh. "D"). . . .

That there was [a] conspiracy between the two accused as alleged in the information in Criminal Case
No. 12193-D, is evident. The transaction was successfully consummated between the poseur buyer PO3
Luna, on the one hand, and the accused Ramon Catoc, together with his co-accused, Jerry Santos, on the
other, with accused Santos receiving the marked money from the poseur buyer and thereafter handing
the same to his co-accused Catoc who, thereafter, took out from his right pocket a plastic sachet of
shabu which he gave to Santos, and which the latter in turn handed to PO3 Luna. There can be no other
conclusion that can be drawn from the above concerted actions of both accused, but that they were
bound by a common purpose and community of interest, indicative of conspiracy, in committing the
offense charged against them. SCETHa

On the same occasion of the buy-bust operation, the police officers were also able to recover from the
possession of accused Ramon Catoc another sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 grams (Exh. "C-2") which is
in violation of Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of the same law, subject of Criminal
Case No. 12194-D, which penalizes the mere possession of dangerous drugs w/o (sic) being authorized
by law.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, both accused, JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON CATOC y PICAYO are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II,
Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and are hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
solidarily pay a Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 12194-D, accused RAMON CATOC y PICAYO is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal
possession of shabu) and is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years
and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP300,000.00). SITCcE

Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, [t]he immediate commitment of accused Jerry Santos
and Ramon Catoc to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City is hereby ordered.

Pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, the amount of PHP100.00 recovered from accused
Ramon Catoc representing the proceeds from the illegal sale of the transparent plastic sachet of shabu is
hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

Again, pursuant to Section 21 of the same law, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) is (sic) hereby ordered to take charge and have custody over the sachets of shabu subject
of these cases, for proper disposition. 43

In an Order dated 21 June 2005, the trial court elevated the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo. 44

On 29 November 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads: DACTSH

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that the buy-bust operation conducted by the
SDEU operatives was legitimate and regular. 45 Furthermore, the testimonies of the appellants and their
witnesses were said to have contained irreconcilable inconsistencies and that no ill motive for the
alleged frame-up was put forth by the appellants. 46

Appellants Santos and Catoc filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the appellate court's decision before the
Supreme Court. 47

In a Resolution 48 dated 4 June 2007, the Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. The parties manifested their intention not to file
their supplemental briefs anymore, as their respective Briefs already encapsulated all the matters and
arguments that support their positions. 49 aHIEcS

In pleading for their innocence, appellants assign the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF VIOLATION OF

SECTIONS 5 AND 11, ARTICLE II, OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHEN THE LATTER'S GUILT WERE NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [THAT] THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONSPIRED IN
COMMITTING ILLEGAL SELLING AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting them, as their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that the prosecution failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place
and that their arrests without warrant were not legally effected. Appellants also maintain that there was
no basis for the trial court's conclusion that a conspiracy existed between them. IDEScC

The arguments put forth by the appellants fail to persuade.

Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension
of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The
rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
50

After a careful evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, we find no error in the trial and the
appellate courts' factual findings and conclusions.

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 51 What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 52 TCAHES

In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established. The prosecution
witnesses PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias consistently testified that a buy-bust operation did indeed take
place, and the shabu subject of the sale was presented and duly identified in open court. PO3 Luna,
being the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellants Santos and Catoc as the persons who sold the
sachet containing a white crystalline substance, 53 which was later confirmed by a chemical analysis
thereof to be shabu. 54

The relevant portions of PO3 Luna's testimony that detailed the events leading to the arrests of
appellants are as follows:

Q: Do you remember having been assigned as a poseur buyer on said date, March 8, 2003?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Against whom was supposed to be the task that you are going to perform as a poseur buyer?
DEHcTI

A: Against Monching Labo, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was the basis of this planned operation against Monching Labo?

A: Because we have been receiving reports that this certain Monching Labo has been selling illegal
drugs along Dr. Sixto Avenue in Pasig, sir.

Q: Are you trying to say that March 8 was not the first time that you received information regarding
Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But it was only March 8 that you decided to conduct a buy-bust operation against Monching
Labo? aDSTIC

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were there preparations made by your office or by you regarding this plan, buy-bust operation,
to be conducted against Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir, we contacted an informant to confirm where Monching Labo sells illegal drugs.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What are you going to use in buying?

A: Marked money, sir.

Q: Did you prepare for that also?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were there other police personnel that were assigned, aside from you, to conduct this buy-bust
operation against Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir, SPO3 Leneal Matias, PO1 Michael Espares and PO1 Michael Familara. SaDICE

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What were supposed to be the role of these other police officers that were going to accompany
you particularly, Matias, Espares and Familara?

A: They will act as back-up, sir.

Q: You said you prepared for a buy-money, how much was this?

A: One Hundred (PHP100.00) Peso bill, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did you proceed, as plan, to the target area?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And where was this, mr. (sic) witness?

A: Along Dr. Sixto Antonio, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City, sir.

Q: What time did you reach that place?

A: About 1:15 to 1:20, sir.

Q: Of?

A: In the early morning of 1:15 to 1:20 a.m., sir.

Q: What else happened after you reached the place?

A: When we were ten (10) meters away from the designated area, the informant pointed to us to
two persons who were standing along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Who are these two persons, if you know?

A: According to the informant, he is Monching Labo, sir.

Q: Meaning, one of them is Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After one of them has been identified by your informant, what else did you do if any, mr. (sic)
witness? DISTcH

A: The informant and I approached them, and I was introduced by the informant, sir.

Q: How were you introduced?

A: That I was a customer for shabu, and that I wanted to buy, sir.

Q: To whom did he tell from these two persons that you were interested to buy?

A: I was introduced to Jerry Santos, sir.

Q: In other words, the other person is a certain Jerry Santos?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After you were introduced as [an] interested buyer to said Jerry Santos, what else happened
after that? STHAaD

A: He asked me how much would I buy, and he asked me for the money. And then, I told him just
PHP100.00, sir.

Q: And when Jerry Santos asked you for the money, did you give him the money?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after you gave him the money, what happened next?

A: I saw Jerry handed the money to the other person, sir.

Q: When you say other person, this is Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after Jerry Santos handed the One Hundred (PHP100.00) Peso bill to Monching Labo, what
else happened, if any?

A: Monching Labo took the PHP100.00 bill. After that, he put it inside his pocket, and then, he got
something from his pocket and handed it to Jerry, sir. AaSHED

Q: And after this something was handed to Jerry Santos, what else happened?
A: Jerry Santos gave to me what was given to him by Monching, sir.

Q: And to your personal knowledge, what is that something that was given by Monching to Jerry
Santos who, Jerry Santos in turn handed to you?

A: That was the shabu I was buying which was contained in a plastic sachet, sir.

Q: When you say contained in a plastic sachet, you mean there is only one (1)?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After you received this one alleged plastic sachet of shabu from Jerry Santos, what else did you
do, if any?

A: I held Jerry Santos and introduced myself as a police officer, sir.

Q: After that, what happened next, if any? IASTDE

A: My companions arrived and then, they also held Monching Labo sir.

Q: What else happened after that, mr. (sic) witness?

A: Police Officer Matias ordered Monching Labo to empty the contents of his pocket, sir.

Q: And did Monching Labo comply?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Would you know what Matias discovered after Monching Labo complied with his order to empty
his pocket?

A: Yes, sir, because he also recovered another plastic sachet, sir.

Q: Who recovered?

A: SPO3 Matias, sir.

Q: Which came from the pocket of Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After this, what did you do or, your team do to the two persons?

A: We brought them to our office at the Headquarters for proper investigation, sir. TSHEIc

Q: How about the two plastic sachets, the first one that was sold and the other one that was
recovered by SPO3 Matias, what was your disposition about it?

A: Right there and then at the place, we already placed the markings on the sachets, sir.
Q: After that, what else did you do with these two sachets?

A: We submitted the same to the laboratory for examination, sir.

Q: Do you remember who delivered it personally?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: I did, sir.

Q: Did you come to know later the true identity of Jerry Santos and Monching Labo to whom you
have transaction? cSTHAC

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Would Jerry Santos [be] the true name of this Jerry Santos you mentioned earlier?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about this Monching Labo, did you come to know what is his true name?

A: Yes, sir. After we have brought him to the police station, that's when we discovered his real
name, sir.

Q: And what is his real name?

A: Ramon Catoc, sir. 55

The testimony of SPO3 Matias on the conduct of the buy-bust operation corroborated the above
testimony of PO3 Luna on all material points and was equally clear and categorical. CIaHDc

Also proven from the testimonies of both PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias is the charge against appellant
Catoc in Criminal Case No. 12194-D for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal
possession of dangerous drugs). It was shown that appellant knowingly carried with him the plastic
sachet of shabu without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation.

On the other hand, the appellants' contention that no buy-bust operation took place was plainly
anchored on the testimonies of both appellants, who both gave different versions of what transpired
during the time and date in question; of Maria Violeta Catoc, sister of appellant Ramon Catoc; and of Eric
Santos, the brother of appellant Jerry Santos. Both appellants chorused a single line alibi. They
strongly insisted that they were in their respective houses during the alleged operations.

The singular reliance of the appellants on their alibis to argue their cases was misplaced. As observed by
the trial court, the self-serving disclaimers of the appellants inspired less belief than the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, who had in their favor a presumption of regularity accorded to them by law.
56 The respective alibis of appellants and their witnesses also contained irreconcilable inconsistencies
that only weakened their worth. ISCHET

We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. This presumption in favor
of PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias was not overcome. As testified to by the appellants, they did not know any
of the policemen who arrested them, and it was only during the trial in open court that they came to
know of the identities of the above-mentioned policemen. 57 Thus, there was no indication that the
police were impelled by any improper motive in making the arrests.

In appellant Jerry Santos's testimony on the events leading to his arrest, he repeatedly changed his
answer upon being asked why he voluntarily went with the five men who entered his house on the night
in question. In his direct testimony, appellant Santos testified that he went with the men so that his
mother's nervousness would not be further aggravated. 58 During his cross-examination, he then stated
that he voluntarily went with the men so as not to awaken his sleeping mother. 59 Upon being
confronted with these statements, Santos then changed his answer again and stated that his mother was
already awake at the time he went with the policemen. 60 aIETCA

More glaring than the above-mentioned inconsistencies, however, are the discrepancies in the
testimonies of appellants Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc on the manner in which they were taken to the
police station and the circumstances of their first meeting. The very premise of their defense is that they
were total strangers to each other; thus, they could not have been together at the time when they were
arrested, much less were they in conspiracy with each other in the alleged commission of the crimes
charged.

Appellant Jerry Santos testified that after he was brought out of his house, he was placed in a tricycle
and was then taken straight to the police station in Pariancillo Park, Pasig City. 61 While in detention, he
allegedly met Ramon Catoc for the first time. 62

Appellant Ramon Catoc, on the other hand, gave an entirely contradictory account of the said events.
Catoc narrated in his direct testimony that after the men took him and placed him in a tricycle, he was
taken to a gasoline station along J. E. Manalo Street and was transferred to a parked van. Aboard the
vehicle, he said, was appellant Santos, whom he claimed he saw and came to know for the first time. 63
DTCAES

Even the testimony of defense witness Eric Santos, the brother of appellant Jerry Santos, contained
some noticeable incongruity with the appellants' narration of events. As remarked upon by the Court of
Appeals, 64 Eric Santos testified that the arrest of his brother was made at 8:00 p.m. on 8 March 2003.
65 The timeline of both the prosecution and the defense, however, puts the occurrence of the events in
question between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. 66

The testimonies of Maria Violeta Catoc, sister of appellant Catoc, and Eric Santos, brother of appellant
Santos, are also suspect. Without clear and convincing evidence, no credence can be accorded them.
In all of the above instances, no satisfactory explanation was offered by appellants to resolve the
conflicting accounts. No other evidence was likewise offered to buttress these testimonies, thereby
weakening appellants' alibis, as against the candid and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.

As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission
of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its
immediate vicinity. The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence,
the reason being that it is easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given
credence. This is especially true in case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses,
which renders their alibis worthless. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. 67 SDHacT

What is quite important to note at this point is the fact that the defense failed to point out any single
mistake or inconsistency in the testimonies of either policeman. Consequently, the respective rulings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals upholding the regularity and the legitimacy of the conduct of the
buy-bust operation in this case are hereby affirmed.

The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also lacks merit. The Court notes that
nowhere in the records did we find any objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to
their arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. It is much too late
in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused
arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. 68
acHETI

Nevertheless, our ruling in People v. Cabugatan 69 provides that:

The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, which
states:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

As we have already declared the legality of the buy-bust operation that was conducted by the police, it
follows that the subsequent warrantless arrests were likewise legally effected. Furthermore, any search
resulting from the lawful warrantless arrests was also valid, because the appellants committed a crime in
flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested committed a crime in the presence of the arresting
officers. 70 HDAaIS
As for appellants' contention that the trial court erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy, the same
should also fail. Contrary to appellants' assertions, 71 the findings of the trial court that they conspired
with each other is limited only to the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs in Criminal Case No. 12193-
D, and does not pertain to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal Case No. 12194-
D.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is required to
support a finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy. 72 It
need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which
demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient. 73 As correctly held by the trial court, the
act of appellant Santos in receiving the marked money from PO3 Luna and handing the same to
appellant Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet containing shabu to appellant Santos to give the policeman,
unmistakably revealed a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a conspiracy
between the appellants. 74 SEIacA

In light of the foregoing, we rule that the guilt of appellants Santos and Catoc has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. A determination of the appropriate penalties to be imposed upon them is
now in order.

Under the law, the illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00),
regardless of the quantity and purity of the substance involved or shall act as a broker in any such
transaction. 75 On the other hand, the illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of said dangerous
drug is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00). 76

In accordance with Section 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code find limited applicability with respect to the provisions of the said Act. Section 98 reads:

Sec. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to
the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the
provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty
for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
SIaHTD

Thus, in determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be applied.
Under this article, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances. 77 Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word "shall", the non-applicability of
the Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject to exception only in case the offender is a minor.
78
In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the circumstances attendant in
the commission of the offense, are given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and
the fine as provided for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines", the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be meted out to appellant shall only
be life imprisonment and fine. 79 Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00
were properly imposed on appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc y Picayo in Criminal Case
No. 12193-D for illegal sale of shabu. aESIHT

Likewise, the conviction of appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo and the imposition of the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years imprisonment and the fine of P300,000.00 meted out by
the trial court with respect to Criminal Case No. 12194-D for illegal possession of shabu, are affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01291, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70,
in Criminal Case No. 12193-D and Criminal Case No. 12194-D, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. TaDSCA

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147782. June 25, 2008.]

JUANITA A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. TERESITA B. PAISTE, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetuated, or inferred from the acts of the accused persons themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. In this case before us, a series of
overt acts of a co-conspirator and her earlier admission of participation documented in an amicable
settlement she signed in the presence of counsel, all lead to the conclusion that the co-accused
conspired to commit estafa. ICHcaD

The Court of Appeals (CA) culled the facts this way, as established by the prosecution:

At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1991, petitioner Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta,
and another woman identified only as "Adeling", went to the house of respondent Teresita Paiste at 611
Pealosa St., Tondo, Manila. The children of respondent and petitioner were grade school classmates.
After the usual pleasantries, petitioner started to convince respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a
certain Arnold, an Igorot. After respondent was shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with
them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine. However, she told the
three that she had no money. SIcEHD
Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent the following day. The two
convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. They
reached Angeles City around 2:30 p.m. and met Arnold who showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed
her that it was worth PhP60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no money, petitioner
continued to press her that buying the gold bar would be good investment. The three left and went
home.

On March 16, 1991, petitioner, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the house of respondent. Again, they
failed to convince her to buy the gold bar.

On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent that the price was reduced to
PhP10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles City to meet Arnold once more. Arnold pretended to
refuse the PhP10,000 offer and insisted on PhP50,000. CaEIST

On petitioner's insistence, on March 18, 1991, the two went to Angeles City and bought the gold bar for
PhP50,000. 1

On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was informed that it was fake. 2
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake.
Petitioner replied that they had to see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the transaction. 3

On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in
the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would
locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta.
The amicable settlement reads: ETaSDc

In view of the acceptance of fault by MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO of the case/complaint filed by MRS.
TERESITA PAISTE before the NBI-National Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs. J. Aquino agreed to pay the
complainant half the amount swindled from the latter. Said P25,000.00 offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as
settlement for the case of Estafa will be paid by her through installment scheme in the amount of
P1,000.00 per month beginning from the month of March, 1991 until fully paid.

In witness whereof, the parties hereunto set their hands this 27th day of March 1991 at NBI-NCR, Taft
Avenue, Manila.

(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO

Respondent

(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE

Complainant

Witnesses:

1. Signed (Illegible)
2.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to counsel despite the recital of her
constitutional rights made by NBI agent Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy. ECSHAD

(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO

(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE 4

On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In the presence of Barangay
Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer, respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold
the fake gold bar. Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a demand against
Garganta alone.

Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an Information against Garganta,
petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-99911 was filed before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Information reads: CDaSAE

That on or about March 18, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with three others, whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Teresita B. Paiste in the following manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the said Teresita B. Paiste to the
effect that a certain Arnold, an Igorot is selling a gold bar for P50,000.00, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Teresita B. Paiste to buy the said gold bar and to give
and deliver to said accused the total amount of P50,000.00, the herein accused well knowing that their
manifestations and representations were all false and untrue and were made only for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P50,000.00, which once in their possession, they
thereafter willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita B.
Paiste in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency. 5 CIaDTE

Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty.

Trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonial evidence of private complainant, herein
respondent, Yolanda Pomer, and Ely Tolentino. For her defense, petitioner testified along with Barangay
Chairperson Atayde, Jose Aquino, and SPO1 Roberto Cailan. The prosecution presented as documentary
evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the
defense relied solely on its testimonial evidence.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juanita Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FIVE (5) YEARS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant, Teresita B. Paiste the sum of P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum counted from the
filing of the Information until fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit. HDITCS

SO ORDERED. 6

The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold in committing the crime of
estafa. The trial court likewise gave credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of
petitioner's guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioner brought on appeal the above RTC decision before the CA, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 22511.

After the parties filed their respective briefs, on November 10, 2000, the appellate court rendered the
assailed Decision which affirmed in toto 7 the July 16, 1998 RTC Decision. EHDCAI

In affirming the trial court's findings and conclusions of law, the CA found that from the tenor of the
amicable settlement, the investigation before the NBI did not push through as both parties came to
settle the matter amicably. Nonetheless, the CA pointed out that petitioner was assisted, although
unnecessarily, by an independent counsel, a certain Atty. Gordon S. Uy, during the proceedings. The CA
held that petitioner's mere bare allegation that she signed it under threat was insufficient for she
presented no convincing evidence to bolster her claim. Consequently, the amicable settlement was
admitted and appreciated as evidence against petitioner.

Nevertheless, the CA ruled that even if the amicable settlement was not admissible or was totally
disregarded, the RTC still did not err in convicting petitioner as it was indubitably shown by the
prosecution through convincing evidence replete in the records that respondent conspired with the
other accused through active participation in the commission of the crime of estafa. In fine, the CA found
that the prosecution had indeed established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. SDHAEC

Through the assailed April 6, 2001 Resolution, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The Issues

Hence, we have the instant petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, ascribing the
following errors, which are essentially the same ones raised before the CA:

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN
PRESCRIBED REQUIREMENTS THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INVESTIGATOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND COROLLARY THERETO, TO CONSIDER
ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE PROCURED THEREBY TO BE INADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
aTCAcI

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN
POSITIVE PARTICULARS AND STRICT COMPLIANCE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL HAD BEEN ASKED TO BE EXECUTED AND SUBSCRIBED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK AN ACTIVE PART IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE FELONY IMPUTED TO HER AND IN DECLARING HER GUILTY THEREFOR BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND HER CO-ACCUSED, ELIZABETH GARGANTA DELA CRUZ. 8 DETACa

The Court's Ruling

In gist, the instant petition proffers the twin issues on (1) whether the amicable settlement executed in
the NBI is admissible as evidence, and (2) whether conspiracy has indeed been proven to convict
petitioner of the crime of estafa.

The instant petition hinges on the issue of the assessment of evidence and their admissibility. As
consistently ruled in innumerable cases, this Court is not a trier of facts. The trial court is best equipped
to make the assessment on said issues and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on
appeal unless the courts a quo are perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted
certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered, would affect the result of the
case and warrant a reversal of the decision involved. We do not find in the instant case any such reason
to depart from this general principle. However, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall deal with
the issues raised by petitioner. EICSTa

First Core Issue: Admissibility of amicable instrument

Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and consideration to the amicable
settlement with waiver of right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation.
She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation of Sec.
12 (1) 9 of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.

We are not convinced.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only
after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate. 10
Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 11 has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 12 Specifically,
Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed . . . ."
AScHCD

It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to
be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her
rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with
one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the
custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push
through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable
settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their
signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino. cEHSIC

Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the document under
duress falls flat for the following reasons:

First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy. The presumption that
Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has not
been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be
an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it cannot
be entertained.

Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by the prosecution
and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is
the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client is privileged communication
and the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a case has
full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. We cannot second
guess the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty. Uy's testimony, more so on account of the
counsel-client privileged communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses", 13 for which she could have compelled Atty.
Uy to testify. She did not. TIESCA

Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy's appointment during the time she
was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in
People v. Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer's appointment during
the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer" 14 the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the instant
case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed
the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer
of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioner's counsel in the NBI, could be
evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided
petitioner.

Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended
to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." 15 An amicable
settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a
contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights
and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial
investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.
aTSEcA

Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner's Miranda rights were not violated, still we will not
be remiss to reiterate what we held in People v. Malimit that the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible "only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation." 16 An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, 17 while
confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein. 18

Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were
violated. Petitioner's allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare allegations.
Allegations are not proof. Pertinently, this Court ruled in People v. Calvo: aESICD

A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because defendant was told that he should tell the truth
or that it would be better for him to tell the truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it would be
better for him to speak or tell the truth does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to
render objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied. These
threats or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order to make his confession
inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or leniency. 19

In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement is not
admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other
pieces of evidence. cSATEH

Second Core Issue: Conspiracy duly proven

It is petitioner's strong contention in her last two assigned errors that conspiracy has not been proven to
convict her of estafa. She asserts that there was no strong showing of any convincing and solidly
conclusive proof that she took an active part in any phase of the transaction concerning the overt acts
constituting estafa that has been imputed to her. She argues that whatever act that might have been
imputed to her has always been through the request or insistence of either Garganta or respondent as
the transcript of stenographic notes reveals. She points out that after she introduced Garganta to
respondent in the morning of March 14, 1991, she almost immediately left them and she did not
accompany Garganta when the latter went back to respondent's house in the afternoon of March 14,
1991. And she avers that significantly, she did not remain in Pampanga after the completion of the
transaction on March 18, 1991, but came to Manila with respondent. According to her, her non-
participation in these two crucial meetings shows she was not part of any conspiracy to defraud
respondent. EIaDHS

We are not persuaded.

Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of
prior agreement to commit the crime. 20 In criminal law, where the quantum of evidence required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. 21

It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy conspirators may act separately or together, in
different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The character and effect of conspiracy
are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a
whole acts done to give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts. 22 Once proved,
the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of
the extent or degree of their participation. HcACST

To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Mere presence when the
transaction was made does not necessarily lead to an inference of concurrence with the criminal design
to commit the crime of estafa. Even knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough
to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action
is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. 23

In the instant case, the courts a quo unanimously held that conspiracy was duly proven. As aptly
observed by the CA, the records are replete with instances to show that petitioner actively participated
to defraud respondent. The following instances all point to the conclusion that petitioner conspired with
others to commit the crime:
First, petitioner was with her co-accused Garganta and Adeling when they went to respondent's house
on March 14, 1991 to tell her of the existence of a gold bar, showed her a sample, tried to convince
respondent to buy one, and went to a pawnshop in Tondo to have the sample gold bar tested. DHEACI

Second, the following day, March 15, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they went to
Angeles City to view the gold bar in the residence of Arnold, and participated in convincing respondent
to raise PhP50,000 for the purchase of the gold bar, and if respondent did not have money, to find a
buyer.

Third, on March 16, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they returned to the house of
respondent to ask if she had found a buyer. Since she had not, they again pressed her to look for one.

Fourth, on March 17, she with her co-accused again accompanied respondent to Angeles City and met
with Arnold to convince him to accept PhP10,000 as deposit, but were refused.

Fifth, on March 18, respondent again pressed respondent to buy the gold bar until the latter finally
succumbed and paid PhP50,000. Petitioner even re-counted the cash payment, wrapped it in newspaper,
and handed the money herself to Arnold. THIAaD

It is unquestionable that petitioner was not a passive observer in the five days from March 14 to 18,
1991; she was an active participant in inducing respondent to buy the gold bar. We find no cogent reason
to alter the conclusions of the CA. Indeed, the records bear out that conspiracy was duly proven by the
coordinated actions of petitioner and her companions.

Clearly, petitioner's contention that all she did was at the behest of either Garganta or respondent is
belied by the fact that she took part in all the phases of the inducement right up to the purchase by
respondent of the fake gold. If it was true that she had no part in the transaction, why would she still
accompany Garganta to visit respondent on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of March 1991? Moreover,
with trips to Pampanga made on the 15th, 17th, and 18th that take several hours, it is unfathomable that
petitioner was only doing a favor to either Garganta or respondent, or to both. DHAcET

Ineluctably, after having been introduced to respondent, Garganta could have made the visits to
respondent without tagging along petitioner. Yet, the facts clearly show that respondent could not have
been thereby induced without petitioner's active participation in encouraging respondent to buy the
gold bar. Petitioner is the lynchpin upon whom respondent's interest was stoked, and ultimately to
succumb to the lure of gaining a fat profit by buying the gold bar.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner went back on the 18th with respondent to Manila instead of staying in
Pampanga does not preclude her active participation in the conspiracy as shown by the foregoing
narration. It would have been strange to respondent if petitioner stayed in Pampanga after the
transaction. Thus, petitioner indeed took active part in the perpetration of estafa. And, petitioner has
not shown any convincing proof that she was not part of the transaction given the undisputed factual
milieu of the instant case.
Finally, it bears stressing that petitioner was the one who knows respondent. She introduced respondent
to the other accused. EDIaSH

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's November 10, 2000 Decision and April 6,
2001 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 22511 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 178039. January 19, 2011.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, defendant-appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision 1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals,
affirming the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) Judgment 2 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and
93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for
ransom. cEaTHD

Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were
charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:

In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away
and detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus
depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment
thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a
Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and
prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 3

In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away
and detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus
depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment
thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a
Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and
prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 4

In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away
and detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of
extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash
and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between
and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim. 5 cTECIA

The arraignment was held in abeyance twice. 6 Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996.
Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea. This
prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police
Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police
Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized
as follows:

At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby
Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver
Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for
Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian
Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a tomboy on board, suddenly
blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitting
the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over
it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police uniform
drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson
Kevin was sitting on the tomboy's lap. They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.
7

While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary
of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car
undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked
inside the comfort room. 8

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking him if
Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was dropped off
earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the
car when she roamed around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police
officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30
a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts.
When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to inform
them that he has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million. 9 ICcDaA

Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He
asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employer's telephone number. She feigned
ignorance of those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new employee. 10 Sarge
informed Nimfa that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa
chose to stay with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again
sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in Merville
Subdivision. 11

Jepson, through Jaime's help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President
Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen.
Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to
rescue Jepson's sons and arrest the kidnappers. 12

At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million. 13 That night, Nimfa
was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one of them as
appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer's office sometime in the first week of
December 1993. 14

On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to
negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant
because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred
times during a span of two to four years. 15

On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million
in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. 16 Appellant asked Jepson to
bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen.
Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off. 17

At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they
would be released that afternoon. 18 At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and
proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag
and put it on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put
the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his
sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He
immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. 19
DaTICE
P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other
police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the Maranao
Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off.
He took a total of 24 shots. 20 He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial
Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom. 21

P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati
on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off. He witnessed the pay-off and
identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of
Jepson. 22

P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and
one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the primary
task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves' children and helper. His group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been
waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims were
released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45
p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspect's vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their
direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in
Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked
it and immediately approached the vehicle. 23

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant.
Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue
appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was
found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to
Camp Crame for questioning. 24

At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa
went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag
containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and
Jepson was asked to identify them. 25 aHTEIA

A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag. 26 It was found out that a portion of the
ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the
possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in
Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him
under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the
house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized
property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt. 27

Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were
detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23 December 1993, it came to her
knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort room
was reversed so that it could only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she
personally caused the door knob to be installed. 28

The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr.
Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).

Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989
as the importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens
and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency
in July 1993. He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings
amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had met her five
(5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him coffee. 29

In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the
house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.

At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial
payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested
appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed.
He actively participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully
negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million. AcSCaI

On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to
the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to
accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further
instructions. Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once
instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to proceed
to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to
meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car trunk and
leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepson's car and put it inside his car trunk and
proceeded to Shell Gasoline station. 30 Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepson's
children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him. They then decided to
go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who
were cursing him because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there
were many policemen stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left
his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10)
meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica
and two other men alight from the car and were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit
him with their firearms. 31

Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who
appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw appellant arrive at the office with
Macias. 32
Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the
medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been
sustained during the scuffle. 33

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant
and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even served as guarantor of some of the
obligations of appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed
a case against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually
acquitted. 34

While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally
extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. 35

On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads: ISCaDH

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for
three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He should pay private
complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.

The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan
Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.

The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila
is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing soonest
as to when the said official took custody of the accused. 36

The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the
elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo, 37 this Court
in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
and disposition. 38

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial Region,
Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto
Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. 39
A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22
December 2006. Hence, this appeal.

On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25
October 2007, appellant's counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no
longer filing a Supplemental Brief. 40 Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorney's Office as
counsel de oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the
arguments in the appellant's brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. 41 DaEcTC

Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the
following assignment of errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE DISTURBING
WHISPERS OF DOUBT REPLETE IN THE PROSECUTION'S THEORY.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO NIMFA CELIZ' TESTIMONY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREDIBILITY OF HER STORY.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED UYBOCO.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JEPSON DICHAVEZ
NOTWITHSTANDING HIS DISPLAYED PROPENSITY FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING MOST OF THE OBJECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SINCE THEY WERE PROCURED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING OF FACT THAT THE MERVILLE PROPERTY LEASED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FROM MS. CAROLINA ALEJO WAS THE VERY SAME HOUSE WHERE NIMFA CELIZ
AND HER WARDS WERE ALLEGEDLY DETAINED.

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED UYBOCO AS HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE
ABDUCTION OF JESON KEVIN, JESON KIRBY, AND NIMFA CELIZ AS NOT A SINGLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
SUPPORTS THE SAME. IEHDAT

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING THAT ABDUCTION,
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE CRIME, WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED AGAINST HIM.

IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED MACIAS CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE WAS
FOR CONSPIRACY. 42

The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellant's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in
the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss. EICSTa
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. 43

We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the
prosecution, thus:

1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;

2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco,

referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private complainant Jepson Dichaves,
namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or "yaya"
Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The three
victims were on board Jepson's Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepson's driver Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up
was in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A
man in white t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a
son of a general working at the Presidential Security Group. Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The same
man drove the pick-up to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, where the victims
were illegally detained from December 20 to 23, 1993.

xxx xxx xxx

3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal. Their
detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private individual whose mind and
heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion for personal
gain; CAIHaE

xxx xxx xxx

5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents of
the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge amount of money, a gun, and
pieces of jewelry . . . . 44

These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecution's witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the
victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom ransom
was extorted.
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and
detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:

A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2)
children and myself, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?

A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.

Q: And then what followed next?

A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, * Jeson Kervin * and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley,
Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened? CSIDTc

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: What?

A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was a
stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.

Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?

A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.

Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?

A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side, sir.

Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?

A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?

xxx xxx xxx

A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at
Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacaang, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?

A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.

Q: Then what followed next?

A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was
the one who drove, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passenger's
side, Sir. SACHcD

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?

A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight as
to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.

Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened?

A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.

Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?

A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?

A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir. 45
Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of the
money, thus:

A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.

A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the one
continuing the conversation, Sir. IHDCcT

Q: What did you say?

A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for my
wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?

A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.

Q: What followed?

A: After some more bargaining and begins * he further reduced their demand to 1.5 million . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And after that what followed?

A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.

Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?

A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.

Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?

A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.

Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?

A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.

Q: How about the other balance?

A: My jewelry, Sir. 46 HcaDIA

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and the
bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.

Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?

A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.

Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?

A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the Magallanes Commercial
Center.

Q: Where did you place that bag?

A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What else did he tell you?

A: . . . He told me to put the ransom bag . . . inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock the car,
and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?

A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car
Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate No. NRZ-863.

Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?

A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.

Q: And then, what did you do?

A: I followed his instruction. cDTACE

Q: And what followed next?

A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store
already.

Q: And what was your answer?

A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards
the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

Q: And?

A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: Did you comply with that instruction?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do?

A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.

Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that
Colt Mirage?

A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.

Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?

A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of the
supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.

Q: And what followed thereafter? cEASTa

A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the
Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan. 47

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies,
untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.

Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated
that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00
p.m. while appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw
Macias and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the
number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and during the direct examination that
Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was
incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because
she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias and
appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her.
Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity. 48 The
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:

The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the
reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of
the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the decision
appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz'
testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed. TAIDHa

The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or
tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the crime. Besides, familiarity with
the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact
at times even facilitated its commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house
where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are
made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the
incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions.
Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar
strategies to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims. 49

Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant
owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of
downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address
appellant as "Ernie." Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost
certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant claims that
Jepson's motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against him boils down to money.
Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line of business as that of appellant, which
is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate competition and possibly procure all contracts
from the PNP and considering his brother's close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson
crafted and executed a frame up of appellant.

And the Court of Appeals had this to say:

For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to
apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves' children is, by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise, the police operatives' call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that
said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official
duties and disregard Uyboco's unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up. SaTAED

Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which
evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon the
prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the
prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had other
witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of other
witnesses cannot be taken against the same. 50

Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense
of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted. 51

We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to
the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both
witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them.
As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 52 While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the
hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses,
it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot
render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes
taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. 53

Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecution's theory, thus:

If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M . . .
as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom money using his own car
registered in his son's name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its contents?
Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his
face . . . . Why would he go back to his family residence . . . with the ransom money still intact in the
trunk of his car? aTcIAS

If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded . . .? Why were they
not tied . . .?

xxx xxx xxx

If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of
the alleged detention . . . how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his own name? . . .
Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an
established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated
checks are incriminating evidence.

. . . (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? . . . Why
is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment? Why did they not apply for a warrant of
arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the
kidnapper?

Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the
kidnappers . . . . 54

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman
negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.

If we indulge appellant's speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions
that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced due to
aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because
he could not trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the
money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did
not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant
went back to his family residence because he never thought that Jepson would recognize him as the
voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who
appeared to be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be
emboldened to escape; that appellant never thought that the police would discover the place of
detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they
apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be futile as the police then did not have
sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record of
the telephone conversations between Jepson and the kidnappers. cHSIAC

However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle
of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard evidence takes
precedence. On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that
kidnapping occurred and that appellant is the author thereof.

Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his
argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated in
the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did
not try to rescue the kidnap victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any
listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview made by a
reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of
appellant's alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped
conversations do exist.

Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of
P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped
conversations. The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the
non-production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are
not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of proof of
motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on
the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of frame-up. 55

Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a
warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: TEHDIA

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)

The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. 56

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the
crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such
knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was
expected to pass by.

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. 57 HCATEa

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent
to personal knowledge based on probable cause.

Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such
search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police
to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within
the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. 58 Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to
search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the
abduction of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted. In a related
argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore,
appellant's participation was not sufficiently established.

The Court of Appeals effectively addressed these issues, to wit:

The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the
Dichaves' children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said house at
the time when Celiz and the Dichaves' children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to
the contrary, Uyboco's presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of
the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the balance of the ransom
payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several
unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom. aTADCE

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Uyboco's claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep which
waylaid the Dichaves' vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of kidnapping for
ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the victims
were kept, is misplaced.

Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the
performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e., possession of the ransom
payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of
their nefarious plan. 59

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was
not present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained,
oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson.
The conspiracy was likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and
other John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in the
abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. 60

Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellant's conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-
132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and
the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. ATDHSC
[G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011.]

HO WAI PANG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J p:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. 1
"The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation." 2 AaCTID

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006 Decision 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused,
namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue, 5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao 6 and Kin San Ho 7 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution 9
denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13
Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong
Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco
(Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the
13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such
as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined,
she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates,
what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser
Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she
guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes
earlier discovered. STcHEI

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further
examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was
petitioner's bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of
the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sum's bag followed
and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San
Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered
from the baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the
presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white crystalline
substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. 10 The
result of his examination 11 of the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed inside
a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic
Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and
that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 12 Out of the 13
tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-
accused. DHESca

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his
co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently,
however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court granted. The
reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to
the filing of a single Amended Information 14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of
the other Informations. 15 The Amended Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country
without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also
popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 16

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the accused testified almost identically, invoking
denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal
substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency. DAaIEc

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all the accused guilty of violating Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE,
HO WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in
violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport into
the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) each as
FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering
its applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that of life
imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed
pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659
WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed
since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. HEacDA

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK
PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

SO ORDERED. 19

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were forwarded to
per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995. 20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on
separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal. 21 This Court, after being satisfied that the
withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of
their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997. 22 Per Entry of Judgment, 23 said
Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to
pursue his appeal.

Petitioner filed his Brief 24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief 25 for the respondent People of the
Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution
26 dated August 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Court's ruling in People v. Mateo. 27 EIaDHS

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that
petitioner's constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it
nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA
also rebuked petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront
the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
quoted with favor the trial court's ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the
accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 which the CA denied in its Resolution 29
dated January 16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. CSHDTE

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION. 30

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit. IcDCaT

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution

prohibits as evidence only confessions

and admissions of the accused as against

himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent
and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of
his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in
not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 31 of Article III of
the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in
Aquino v. Paiste, 32 the Court categorically ruled that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible 'only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.'
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation." CDEaAI
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-
accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the
existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 33 "[a]ny allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction."
Hence, petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court's ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming 34 to exculpate himself
from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all
fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts
in each case relied on in rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in
convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals
and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accused's act of affixing their signatures thereon as a
tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights
when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave
credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed his
duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said
examiner's testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. ASHEca

On the other hand, petitioner's conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or
admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial
court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct
evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People v.
Dela Cruz, 35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. . . .
Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the
trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction."

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there are
stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts and
applicable law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to

confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14 (2) of
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz.: SaHcAC
Section 14. ...

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified
to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an
accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or
by his own countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers
and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner's call to
hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have
manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with
petitioner's right to confront the witnesses against him. DCSTAH

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter.
Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the
important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other
witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant
may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on, 36 the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person
facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to
secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been
secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being
merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him was not impaired. HTCESI

Conspiracy among the accused was duly

established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy which was quoted
by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy. However,
just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by
circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken
together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known
each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having
known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one
who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly
to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to
accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant in Hong
Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and
Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have the capability to
enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were
contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their luggages.
The Court agrees with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense
charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy
with all the accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to ensure its
success. 37 EIAHcC

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony." 38 "[C]onspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among
the participants to a crime." 39 "It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design." 40 "The assent of the minds may be
and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole" as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr. 41
Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused's collective conduct, viewed in its totality,
that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the
crime committed.

Petitioner's guilt was proved beyond

reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it was
examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing
upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes. EcHAaS

Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did
not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner's bag. 42 Nonetheless, she clarified in
her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioner's bag when
they were still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from
petitioner's bag when they were at the ICU. 43 To us, this slight clash in Cinco's statements neither dilute
her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.

The trial court's words on this matter when it resolved petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence in its Order 44
of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus SHcDAI

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command conviction,
the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and
definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she
found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that
was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda
Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she
was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau
and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco
admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang's bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3,
1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai
Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from the personal perception of the witness
and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural. 45 IcaHCS

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in
its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only
its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In ascertaining the facts established
by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered." 46 Also, where there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the
part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here,
petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution,
Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his
guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his
culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting,
along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists
mainly of denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag
was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited
drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere
commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and
convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover,
beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the
evidence for the prosecution. "It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of
the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony." 47 ICTacD

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in
accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime
on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683. 48 The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A.
No. 7659 49 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to
"reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million". On the other hand,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty
provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved. AEDISC

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659
rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it
being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja, 50 we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law,
being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
should be accorded retroactive application, . . . .

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that
criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect", 51 the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him. prcd

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and
January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.