BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, vs. CA and RICARDO J.
the issuance of the postdated check, plaintiff invited some guests on December 8,
MARASIGAN.
The question before this Court is whether private respondent can recover moral
damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by petitioner credit card
corporation.
The facts of the case are as stated in the decision of the respondent court, 1 to wit:
The case arose from the dishonor of the credit card of the plaintiff Atty. Ricardo J.
Marasigan by Caf Adriatico, a business establishment accredited with the defendant-
appellate BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC for brevity), on December 8, 1989
when the plaintiff entertained some guests thereat.
The records of this case show that plaintiff, who is a lawyer by profession, was a
complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was
issued Credit Card No. 100-012-5534 with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with a
monthly billing every 27th of the month (Exh. N), subject to the terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract (Exh. 1-b). His membership was renewed for another year
or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5,000.00 (Exh. A). The
plaintiffs oftentimes exceeded his credit limits (Exhs. I, I-1 to I-12) but this was never
taken against him by the defendant and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in
check was tolerated. Their contractual relations went on smoothly until his statement
of account for October 1989 amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. The
plaintiff admitted having inadvertently failed to pay his account for the said month
because he was in Quezon province attending to some professional and personal
commitments. He was informed by his secretary that defendant was demanding
immediate payment of his outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check
for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was threatening to suspend
his credit card. Plaintiff issued Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 494675 in the
amount of P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was received on
November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant (Exhs. J and J-
1), who in turn gave the said check to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who handles the
account of the plaintiff. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr.
Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection department of defendant was formally
informed of the postdated check about a week later. On November 28, 2989,
defendant served plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number
in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to
avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding
account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership
will be permanently cancelled (Exh. 3). There is no showing that the plaintiff received
this letter before December 8, 1989. Confidential that he had settled his account with
1989 and entertained them at Caf Adriatico. When he presented his credit card to
Caf Adriatico for the bill amounting to P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of
his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card a
Unibankard (Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2).
In a letter addressed to the defendant dated December 12, 1989, plaintiff requested
that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the
deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had
already instructed his bank to stop the payment thereof as the defendant violated their
agreement that the plaintiff issue the check to the defendant to cover his account
amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that the defendant will not suspend the
effectivity of the card (Exh. D). A letter dated December 16, 1989 was sent by the
plaintiff to the manager of FEBTC, Ramada Branch, Manila requesting the bank to
stop the payment of the check (Exhs. E, E-1). No reply was received by plaintiff from
the defendant to his letter dated December 12, 1989. Plaintiff sent defendant another
letter dated March 12, 1990 reminding the latter that he had long rescinded and
cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with defendant and requesting for
his correct billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation
within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December
8, 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge,
otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for
the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him (Exh. F). Plaintiff alleged further
that after a few days, a certain Atty. Albano, representing himself to be working with
the office of Atty. Lopez, called him inquiring as to how the matter can be threshed
out extrajudicially but the latter said that such is a serious matter cannot be discussed
over the phone. The defendant served its final demand to the plaintiff dated March
21, 1990 requiring him to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees
and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace
the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for
violation of Bouncing Check Law (Exh. G/Exh. 13). The plaintiff in a reply letter
dated April 5, 1990 (Exh. H), demanded defendant's compliance with his request in
his first letter dated March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise the
plaintiff will file a case against them, . . . .2
Thus, on May 7, 1990 private respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 90-1174.
After trial the trial court ruled for private respondent, finding that herein petitioner
abused its right in contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Code. 3 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the
following:
1. P 100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
3. P 20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
On the other hand, plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant its outstanding obligation in
the amount of P14,439.41, amount due as of December 15, 1989. 4
The trial court's ruling was based on its findings and conclusions, to wit:
There is no question that plaintiff had been in default in the payment of his billings
for more than two months, prompting defendant to call him and reminded him of his
obligation. Unable to personally talk with him, this Court is convinced that somehow
one or another employee of defendant called him up more that once.
However, while it is true that as indicated in the terms and conditions of the
application for BPI credit card upon failure of the cardholder to pay his outstanding
obligation for more that thirty (30) days, the defendant can automatically suspend or
cancel the credit card, that reserved right should not have been abused as it was in
fact abused, in plaintiff's case. What is more peculiar here is that there have been
admitted communications between plaintiff and defendant prior to the suspension or
cancellation of plaintiff's credit card and his inclusion in the cautions list. However,
nowhere in any of these communications was there ever a hint given to plaintiff that
his card had already been suspended or cancelled. In fact, the Court observed that
while defendant was trying its best to persuade plaintiff to update its account and pay
its obligation, it had already taken steps to suspend/cancel plaintiff's card and include
him in the caution list. While the Court admires defendant's diplomacy in dealing
with its clients, it cannot help but frown upon the backhanded way defendant deal
with plaintiff's case. For despite Tess Lorenzo's denial, there is reason to believe that
plaintiff was indeed assured by defendant of the continued honoring of his credit card
so long as he pays his obligation of P15,000.00. Worst, upon receipt of the postdated
check, defendant kept the same until a few days before it became due and said check
was presented to the head of the collection department, Mr. Maniquiz, to take steps
thereon, resulting to the embarrassing situations plaintiff found himself in on
December 8, 1989. Moreover, Mr. Maniquiz himself admitted that his request for
plaintiff to replace the check with cash was not because it was a postdated check but
merely to tally the payment with the account due.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by the sweeping denials made by Tess Lorenzo
and her claim that her only participation was to receive the subject check. Her
immediate superior, Mr. Maniquiz testified that he had instructed Lorenzo to
communicate with plaintiff once or twice to request the latter to replace the
questioned check with cash, thus giving support to the testimony of plaintiff's witness,
Dolores Quizon, that it was one Tess Lorenzo whom she had talked over the phone
regarding plaintiff's account and plaintiff's own statement that it was this woman who
assured him that his card has not yet been and will not be cancelled/suspended if he
would pay defendant the sum of P15,000.00.
Now, on the issue of whether or not upon receipt of the subject check defendant had
agreed that the card shall remain effective the Court takes note of the following:
1. An employee of defendant corporation unconditionally accepted the subject check
upon its delivery despite its being a postdated one; and the amount did not tally with
plaintiff's obligation;
2. Defendant did not deny nor controvert plaintiff's claim that all of his payments
were made in checks;
3. Defendant's main witness, Mr. Maniquiz, categorically stated that the request for
plaintiff to replace his postdated check with a cash was merely for the purpose of
tallying plaintiff's outstanding obligation with his payment and not to question the
postdated check;
4. That the card was suspended almost a week after receipt of the postdated check;
5. That despite the many instances that defendant could have informed plaintiff over
the phone of the cancellation or suspension of his credit card, it did not do so, which
could have prevented the incident of December 8, 1989, the notice allegedly sent thru
ordinary mail is not only unreliable but takes a long time. Such action as suspension
of credit card must be immediately relayed to the person affected so as to avoid
embarrassing situations.
6. And that the postdated check was deposited on December 20, 1989.
In view of the foregoing observations, it is needless to say that there was indeed an
arrangement between plaintiff and the defendant, as can be inferred from the acts of
the defendant's employees, that the subject credit card is still good and could still be
used by the plaintiff as it would be honored by the duly accredited establishment of
defendant.
Not satisfied with the Regional Trial Court's decision, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which in a decision promulgated on March 9, 1995 ruled in its dispositive
portion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the defendant-appellant shall pay the
plaintiff-appellee the following: P50,000.00 as moral damages: P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, the present petition on the following assignment of errors:
I or a fraction of a month's delay. PROVIDED, that if there occurs any changes on the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS INDEED
AN AGREEMENT OR ARRANGEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WHEREIN THE DEFENDANT REQUIRED THE PLAINTIFF TO
ISSUE A POSTDATED CHECK IN ITS FAVOR IN THE AMOUNT OF
P15,000.00 AS PAYMENT FOR HIS OVERDUE ACCOUNTS, WITH THE
CONDITION THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT CARD WILL NOT BE
SUSPENDED OR CANCELLED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ARISING OUT FROM THE DISHONOR
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT CARD. 7
We find the petition meritorious.
The first issue to be resolved is whether petitioner had the right to suspend the credit
card of the private respondent.
Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by the private respondent,
any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement shall automatically be suspended, thus:
PAYMENT OF CHARGES BECC shall furnish the Cardholder a monthly
statement of account made through the use of the CARD and the Cardholder agrees
that all charges made through the use of the CARD shall be paid by the Cardholder
on or before the last day for payment, which is twenty (20) days from the date of the
said statement of account; and such payment due date may be changed to an earlier
date if the Cardholder's account is considered overdue and/or with balances in excess
of the approved credit limit; or to such other date as may be deemed proper by the
CARD issuer with notice to the Cardholder on the same monthly statement of
account. If the last day for payment falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, the last
day for payment automatically becomes the last working day prior to the said
payment date. However, notwithstanding the absence or lack of proof of service of
the statement of charges to the Cardholder, the latter shall pay any or all charges made
through the use of the CARD within thirty (30) days from the date or dates thereof.
Failure of Cardholder to pay any and all charges made through the CARD within the
payment period as stated in the statement of charges or with in thirty (30) days from
actual date or dates whichever occur earlier, shall render him in default without the
necessity of demand from BECC, which the Cardholder expressly waives. These
charges or balance thereof remaining unpaid after the payment due date indicated on
the monthly statement of account shall bear interest of 3% per month and an
additional penalty fee equivalent to another 3% of the amount due for every month
prevailing market rates BECC shall have the option to adjust the rate of interest and/or
penalty fee due on the outstanding obligation with prior notice to the Cardholder.
xxx xxx xxx
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts
unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall
automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel
any CARD any time and for whatever reason. In case of default in his obligation as
provided for in the preceding paragraph, Cardholder shall surrender his CARD to
BECC and shall in addition to the interest and penalty charges aforementioned, pay
the following liquidated damages and/or fees (a) a collection fee of 25% of the
amount due if the account is referred to a collection agency or attorney; (b) a service
fee of P100 for every dishonored check issued by the Cardholder's in payment of his
account, without prejudice; however to BECC's right of considering Cardholder's
obligation unpaid; cable cost for demanding payment or advising cancellation of
membership shall also be for Cardholder's account; and (c) a final fee equivalent to
25% of the unpaid balance, exclusive of litigation expenses and judicial costs, if the
payment of the account is enforced through court action. 8
The aforequoted provision of the card cannot be any clearer. By his own admission
private respondent, no payment within thirty days for his billing/statement dated 27
September 1989. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated
27 October 1989. Consequently, as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the
non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989, petitioner corporation could
automatically suspend his credit card.
The next issue is whether prior to the suspension of private respondent's credit card
on 28 November 1989 the parties entered into an agreement whereby the card could
still be used and would be duly honored by duly accredited establishments.
We agree with the findings of the respondent court, that there was an arrangement
between the parties, wherein the petitioner required the private respondent to issue a
check worth P15,000.00 as payment for the latter's billings. However, we find that
the private respondent was not able to comply with this obligation.
Clearly the purpose of the arrangement between the parties on November 22, 1989,
was for the immediate payment of the private respondent's outstanding account, in
order that his credit card would not be suspended.
As agreed upon by the parties, on the following day, private respondent did issue a
check for P15,000.00. However, the check was postdated 15 December 1989. Settled
is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery
of such an instrument does not, by itself operate as payment. 9 This is especially true
in the case of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was not effective
payment. It did not comply with his obligation under the arrangement with Miss
Lorenzo. Petitioner corporation was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
Finally, we find no legal and factual basis for private respondent's assertion that in
canceling the credit card of the private respondent, petitioner abused its right under
the terms and conditions of the contract.
To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the following elements must be
present (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 10
Time and again this Court has held that good faith is presumed and the burden of
proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. 11 This private respondent failed to do. In
fact, the action of the petitioner belies the existence of bad faith. As early as 28
October 1989, petitioner could have suspended private respondent's card outright.
Instead, petitioner allowed private respondent to use his card for several weeks.
Petitioner had even notified private respondent of the impending suspension of his
credit card and made special accommodations for him for setting his outstanding
account. As such, petitioner cannot be said to have capriciously and arbitrarily
canceled the private respondent's credit card.
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque
injuria. 12
In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complaints, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award
of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.
Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; 13 and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
We therefore disagree with the ruling of the respondent court that the dishonor of the
credit card of the private respondent by Caf Adriatico is attributable to petitioner for
its willful or gross neglect to inform the private respondent of the suspension of his
credit card, the unfortunate consequence of which brought social humiliation and
embarrassment to the private respondent. 14
It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his
credit card and subsequent dishonor at Caf Adriatico. He cannot now pass the blame
to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. As quoted earlier,
the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically
suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is
it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice
before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims. 15
This notwithstanding on November 28, 1989, the day of the suspension of private
respondent's card, petitioner sent a letter by ordinary mail notifying private
respondent that his card had been temporarily suspended. Under the Rules on
Evidence, there is a disputable presumption that letters duly directed and mailed were
received on the regular course of mail. 16 Aside from the private respondent's bare
denial he failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption that he received said
notice.
As it was private respondent's own negligence which was the proximate cause of his
embarrassing and humiliating experience, we find the award of damages by the
respondent court clearly unjustified. We take note of the fact that private respondent
has not yet paid his outstanding account with petitioner.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent P100,000.00 as moral damages P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, is SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is DIRECTED to pay his outstanding obligation with the petitioner in the
amount of P14,439.41.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses RENATO S. ONG and FRANCIA N. ONG, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
INLAND RAILWAYS, INC. and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISE,
INC.
Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party
litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal. Furthermore, actual and
moral damages must be proven before any award thereon can be granted.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated May 20, 1993
and the Resolution dated June 8, 1994, both promulgated by the Court of Appeals 1 in
CA-GR CV No. 33755, modifying the Decision of the trial court in an action for
damages filed by spouses Renato and Francia Ong (petitioners herein) against
Philtranco Service Enterprise, Inc. and Inland Trailways, Inc. (respondents herein,
hereafter referred to as "Philtranco" and "Inland," respectively).
The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 2 driver of the Philtranco bus, who was at fault, as shown by his flight from the situs of
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED by ordering INLAND
TRAILWAYS, INC. to pay [petitioners] P3,977.00 for actual damages, P30,000.00
as moral damages and ten (10) percent as contingent attorney's fees and to pay the
costs of the suit.
Reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution: 3
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, both motions for reconsideration
filed by [petitioners] and . . . Inland Trailways, Inc. are hereby DENIED.
The Facts
On February 9, 1987, petitioners boarded as paying passengers Bus-No. 101 with late
No. EVB-508 ("Inland bus," for convenience), which was owned and operated by
Inland Trailways under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco. It was driven by Calvin
Coronel.4 Around 3:50 in the morning of said date, when the Inland bus slowed down
to avoid a stalled cargo truck in Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped from the rear by
another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco and driven by Apolinar Miralles.
Francia sustained wounds and fractures in both of her legs and her right arm, while
Renato suffered injuries on his left chest, right knee, right arm and left eye. 5 They
were brought to the San Pablo City District Hospital for treatment and were confined
there from February 9 to 18, 1987. 6
On December 22, 1988, petitioners filed an action for damages against Philtranco and
Inland. 7 In their Complaint, they alleged that they suffered injuries, preventing
Francia from operating a sari-sari store at Las Pia's, Metro Manila, where she
derived a daily income of P200; and Renato from continuing his work as an overseas
contract worker (pipe welder) with a monthly salary of $690. Stating that they
incurred P10,000 as medical and miscellaneous expenses, they also claimed moral
damages of P500,000 each, exemplary and corrective damages of P500,000 each, and
compensatory damages of P500,000 each plus 35 percent thereof as attorney's fees.
Philtranco answered that the Inland bus with Plate No. EVB-508 (which had
transported petitioners) was registered and owned by Inland; that its driver, Calvin
Coronel, was an employee of Inland; that Philtranco was merely leasing its support
facilities, including the use of its bus tickets, to Inland; and that under their
Agreement, Inland would be solely liable for all claims and liabilities arising from
the operation of said bus. Philtranco further alleged that, with respect to its own bus
(which bumped the Inland bus), it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its drivers, and that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of either the cargo truck or the Inland bus which collided
with said cargo truck.
Inland answered that, according to the Police Report, it was Apolinar Miralles, the
the accident; that said bus was registered and owned by Philtranco; and that the driver
of the Inland bus exercised extraordinary diligence as testified to by its passengers.
Inland and Philtranco filed cross-claims against each other.
Both respondents moved to submit the case for decision without presenting further
evidence. Consequently, the trial court, in its Order dated July 5, 1989, resolved: 8
When this case was called for continuation of presentation of plaintiffs evidence, over
objections from counsels for defendants, plaintiffs counsel was allowed to recall his
first witness, Renato S. Ong, for some additional direct questions[;] and after cross-
examination by defendant Inland Trailways, Inc., adopted by defendant Philtranco
Service Enterprise, Inc., plaintiff presented his second witness, [Francia] Ong, whose
testimony on direct, cross and redirect was terminated[;] and as prayed for, counsel
for the plaintiffs shall have five (5) days from today within which to submit his formal
offer of evidence, furnishing copies thereof to defendants who shall have five (5) days
from their receipt within which to submit comments after which the same shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.
By agreement, considering the stipulations of parties made of record regarding factual
issues except as to whether or not the bus is included in the lease, counsels for the
two (2) defendants are given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to
submit simultaneous offer[s] of admission and denials not only on the above
exception but on any other relevant matter.
Considering that the documents are admitted, there is no necessity of any formal
written offer of evidence and, therefore, after all the foregoing, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision upon simultaneous memoranda of the parties and upon
submission of complete transcripts.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered its May 7, 1991 Decision, which disposed as
follows:9
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[petitioners] absolving Inland Trailways, Inc., from any liability whatsoever, and
against . . . Philtranco Service Enterprise, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the
[petitioners]
1) P10,000.00 as actual damages for medical and miscellaneous expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the [diminution] of the use of the right
arm of [petitioner]-wife;
3) P48,000.00 as unrealized profit or income;
4) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
5) 25% of the foregoing as contingent attorney's fees; and
6) the costs.
According to the trial court, the proximate cause of the accident was "the bumping
from behind by the Philtranco bus with Plate No. 259 driven by Apolinar Miralles"
based on the Police Report and the affidavits of passengers, to which Philtranco did
not object. As it failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, Philtranco was
held liable based on culpa aquiliana.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) resolved that Philtranco's liability for damages
could not be predicated upon the Police Report which had not been formally offered
in evidence. The report was merely annexed to the answer of Inland, and petitioner
did not adopt or offer it as evidence. Consequently, it had no probative value and,
thus, Philtranco should be absolved from liability.
Instead, the appellate court found that petitioners sufficiently established a claim
against Inland based on culpa contractual. As a common carrier, Inland was required
to observe extra ordinary diligence under Articles 1735 and 1750 of the Code. Its
liability arose from its failure to transport its passengers and cargo safely, and a
finding of fault or negligence was not necessary to hold it liable for damages. Inland
failed to overcome this presumption of negligence by contrary evidence; thus, it was
liable for breach of its contractual obligation to petitioners under Article 2201 of the
Civil Code.
The liability of Inland for medical and miscellaneous expenses was reduced, as the
evidence on record showed that petitioners spent only P3,977. Deemed self-serving
was Francia's testimony that the use of her right arm was diminished and that she lost
income. Thus, the award for unearned income was disallowed and the amount of
moral damages was reduced to P30,000.
Hence, this petition.10
The Issues
In their Memorandum,11 petitioners raise the following issues: 12
[I] Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
completely reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, ordering Philtranco to
indemnify petitioners and in lieu thereof, order[ing] Inland to pay petitioners for their
damages.
[II] Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the P50,000.00 awarded to petitioner, Francia Ong for the diminution of
the use of her right arm and the P48,000.00 representing unrealized income.
[III] Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
reducing the award for actual and miscellaneous expenses from P10,000.00 to
P3,977.00; the award of P50,000.00 moral damages to P30,000.00; and the 25%
contingent attorney's fees to10% thereof.
Simply stated, the main issues raised are: (1) whether the Police Report, which was
not formally offered in evidence, could be used to establish a claim against Philtranco
based on culpa aquiliana; and (2) whether the reduction in the amounts of damages
awarded was proper.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Retirement of Formal Offer of Evidence
Petitioners take exception to the rule requiring documents to be formally offered in
evidence before they can be given any probative value, arguing that the parties agreed
to submit the case for resolution based on the July 5, 1989 Order of the trial court.
Because of the agreement, petitioners assumed that all the pieces of documentary
evidence, including the Complaint and its Annexes, as well as those in the respective
Answers of the private respondents, were deemed admitted.
We disagree. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[t]he court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is
necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their judgment
solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow parties
to attach any document to their pleadings and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence, even without formal offer and admission, may draw unwarranted
consequences. Opposing parties will be deprived of their chance to examine the
document and to object to its admissibility. On the other hand, the appellate court will
have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized the court below. 13
In adhering to this rule, the appellate court cannot be faulted with reversible error, as
it held: 14
. . . [T]he burden of proof lies with the plaintiff in establishing fault or negligence on
the part of the defendant (Ong vs. Metropolitan Water). This, however, plaintiff-
appellees failed to establish. Albeit, there was a police investigation report finding
the driver of PHILTRANCO negligent which became the basis of the court a
qou [for] holding PHILTRANCO liable, this piece of evidence was merely attached
as Annex "1" of INLAND's answer, nothing more. It was not presented and even
offered as evidence by INLAND nor utilized by plaintiffs-appellees. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the same had been identified in court, it would have no
evidentiary value. Identification of documentary evidence must be distinguished from
its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document
is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as
part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to offer it if it believes this
will advance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all (People vs.
Santito, Jr., 201 SCRA 87).
In the case at bar, the defendant INLAND and plaintiffs-appellees did not identify the
said Annex "1" or the Police Investigation Report as evidence. Thus, under Section
35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. Corollary, the Police Investigation Report of
Annex "1" cannot be given any evidentiary value.
Absen[t] Annex "1" which was the basis of the trial court in finding PHILTRANCO
liable, the latter is thus exonerated from liability.
Petitioners similarly erred in presuming that said Annex was admitted in evidence by
virtue of the Order of July 5, 1989. Their presumption has no basis. The Order
required counsel for the petitioners to "submit his formal offer of evidence, furnishing
copies thereof to defendants who shall have five (5) days from their receipt within
which to submit comments after which the same shall be deemed submitted for
resolution."15 In compliance, petitioners filed a written offer of evidence on July 12,
1989.16 Such offer led the trial court, in its Order of August 2, 1989, to formally admit
in evidence Exhibits "A"-"O."17 Clearly, the Police Report was neither offered by the
petitioners nor admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, the petitioners' allegations in their Complaint did not establish a cause of
action against Philtranco. They similarly failed to make any reference to said Police
Report during the presentation of their case. This is precisely why Respondent
Philtranco opted not to present further evidence. A document or an article is valueless
unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an
opportunity to object to it and to cross-examine any witness called to present or
identify it.18 Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered
on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties their right to
rebut them. 19
There is no agreement to submit the case based on the pleading, as contended by the
petitioners. The parties had no such intention, nor did said Order evince such an
agreement.
Second Issue:
Damages Require Evidence
Petitioners aver that there was grave abuse of discretion when the amount of actual
damages awarded was reduced from P10,000 to P3,977, even if the original amount
did not even include the medical expenses that Francia continued to incur; and when
the award of P48,000 as unrealized income was deleted despite her testimony which
was given credence by the trial court.
The Court disagrees. Granting arguendo that there was an agreement to submit the
case for decision based on the pleadings, this does not necessarily imply that
petitioners are entitled to the award of damages. The fundamental principle of the law
on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract (in this case, the contract of
transportation) or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just
compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the
defendant's acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except
where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain
to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven.
To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. In no
instance may the trial judge award more than those so pleaded and proven. Damages
cannot be presumed. The award there of must be based on the evidence presented,
not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote,
speculative and nonsubstantial proof. Article 2199 of the Civil Code expressly
mandates that "[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved."
The lack of basis for such award was patent in the trial court Decision:
The records will show that from the documentary evidence, [petitioners] have jointly
spent the sum of P3,977.00. [Respondent] Philtranco has not presented any evidence
that it has advanced any amount for medicine, hospitalization and doctor's fees, but
on the contrary, [petitioners] have testified that they paid for their expenses except at
the initial stage wherein a representative of [respondent] Philtranco went to the
hospital to get the receipts of medicines only and paid (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 6).
Considering the claim of the [petitioners], as alleged in their complaint they spent
P10,000.00 representing medical and miscellaneous expenses [;] considering that
they have gone for consultation to at least two (2) different doctors, this Court may
take judicial notice of the fact that miscellaneous expenses [are] bound to be incurred
to cover transportation and food, and therefore, finds the amount of P10,000.00 as
actual damages to be reasonable.
Damages, after all, are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant. 20
Moral Damages and Diminution
of Use of Francia's Arm
Petitioners protest the deletion of the amount of P50,000 earlier awarded by the trial
court because of the diminution of the use of Francia's right arm, arguing that she
stated during direct examination that it could no longer perform its normal
functions,21 and that private respondents impliedly admitted this matter when they
failed to present controverting evidence.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is
violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or
diminution of use of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is nor
susceptible of exact monetary estimation.
Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained.
In Mayo v. People,22 the Court held that the permanent scar on the forehead and the
loss of the use of the right eye entitled the victim to moral damages. The victim, in
said case, devastated by mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock, which she
experienced as a result of her false eye and the scar on her forehead. Furthermore, the
loss of vision in her right eye hampered her professionally for the rest of her life.
In the case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francia's right arm
could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffered mental
anguish and anxiety. Thus, an increase in the amount of moral damages awarded,
from P30,000 to P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also suffered
mental anxiety and anguish from the accident. Thus, he should be separately awarded
P30,000 as moral damages.
In some instances, the Court awards the cost of medical procedures to restore the
injured person to his or her former condition. However, this award necessitates expert
testimony on the cost of possible restorative medical procedure. In Gatchalian v.
Delim, 23 the Court, reasoning that a scar resulting from the infliction of injury on the
face of a woman gave rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante,
granted P15,000 as actual damages for plastic surgery. It bears emphasis that the said
amount was based on expert testimony.24
In another case, the Court granted actual or compensatory damages in the sum of
P18,000 for the surgical intervention necessary to arrest the degeneration of the
mandible of a young boy. Again, there was an expert testimony that such medical
procedure would cost P3,000 and would have to be repeated several times to restore
him to nearly normal condition. 25
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to present evidence regarding the feasibility or
practicability and the cost of a restorative medical operation on her arm. Thus, there
is no basis to grant her P48,000 for such expense.
Unrealized Income
Protesting the deletion of the award for Francia's unrealized income, petitioners
contend that Francia's injuries and her oral testimony adequately support their claim.
The Court disagrees. Although actual damages include indemnification for profits
which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans),26 the rule
requires that said person produce the "best evidence of which his case is
susceptible. 27
The bare and unsubstantiated assertion of Francia that she usually earned P200 a day
from her market stall is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized income
for the eight-month period that her arm was in plaster cast. Her testimony that was
their lessor who filed their income tax returns and obtained business licenses for them
does not justify her failure to present more credible evidence of her income.
Furthermore, after her ten-day confinement at the San Pablo Hospital,28 she could
have returned so her work at the public market despite the plaster cast on her right
arm, since she claimed to have two nieces as helpers.29 Clearly, the appellate court
was correct in deleting the award for unrealized income, because of petitioner's utter
failure to substantiate her claim.
Attorney's Fees
Counsel for petitioner deeply laments the reduction in the award of attorney's fees.
He alleges that he had to use his own money for transportation, stenographic
transcriptions and other court expenses, and for such reason, avers that the award of
25 percent attorney's fees made by the trial court was proper.
Under the Civil Code, an award of attorney's fees is an indemnity for damages ordered
by a court to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any of the
cases authorized by law. 30 It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the
two have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation
or as part thereof. The Court has established a set standards in fixing the amount of
attorney's fees: 31
(1) [T]he amount and character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble
involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or
the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment;
(6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured, it
being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when
it is contingent than when it is not.
Counsel's performance, however, does not justify the award of 25 percent attorney's
fees. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to sound judicial discretion and
subject to judicial control. 32
We do not see any abuse thereof in the case at bar. In fact, the appellate court had
been generous to petitioners' counsel, considering that the nature of the case was not
exceptionally difficult, and he was not required to exert Herculean efforts. All told,
his handling of the case was sorely, inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow
elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Renato and Francia Ong are separately awarded moral damages in the amount of
P30,000 and P50,000, respectively. The ten percent (10%) attorney's fees shall be
based on the total modified award.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JAIME BAO alias "JIMMY,"
Jaime Bao and Virginia Bolesa were married on 12 October 1992 at Bilabila,
Sallapadan, Abra.1 Barely two months after their 4th wedding anniversary, or on 15
December 1996, Virginia was found dead, floating in a basin of water along the river
bank of Abra River at Barangay Pagala, Bucay, Abra. 2 Rumors immediately
circulated that she drowned.3
A wake for five days was held in the conjugal house of the Baos at Bucay, Abra.
After which, Virginia was brought to her hometown in Bilabila, where her mortal
remains were interred.4 It was known in both towns that Jaime did not attend the wake
and burial of his wife. He was later hospitalized for drinking Vasedine, an
insecticide.5 On 19 March 1997, after it was found upon autopsy that Virginia did not
die of drowning, Jaime was charged with parricide in an information docketed as
Criminal Case No. N-0133, which reads:
That on or about December 15, 1996, between 4:00 and 5:00 oclock in the morning
in the Municipality of Bucay, Province of Abra, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill and without
legal justification, while armed with a hard object, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and maul his legitimate wife VIRGINIA
BAO, thereby inflicting a depressed skull fracture on the left frontal area lateral to
the midline of her head, which caused her instantaneous death. 6
Jaime pleaded "not guilty" to the charge upon his arraignment.7 At the trial, the
prosecution presented evidence to establish his guilt, thus:
At around 9:00 p.m. of 14 December 1996, Kagawad Raymund Marquez of Barangay
Siblong, Bucay, Abra, saw Jaime Bao at the funeral wake of one Antonina Babida.
Jaime was very unruly while drinking liquor. He even challenged Raymund to a fight,
but the latter kept his cool and refused to be provoked. A policeman even requested
the people around to give money to Jaime to induce him to go home. As nobody did,
the policeman gave Jaime P20. Jaime went home with his mother at around 12:00
a.m. of 15 December 1996. A few minutes later, however, Jaime returned to the wake,
looking for his wife. He angrily mentioned the name of his wife, Virginia Bao, three
times, and said: "Vulva of her mother. Where is that woman? I am very angry with
her and if I will see her I will kill her." After that, Jaime walked towards the direction
of his house.8
At about the same time that Raymund was observing an unruly and drunk Jaime,
Alicia Respicio was informing Soledad Piid that Virginia had a quarrel with Jaime
that night. At Alicias house, Soledad saw Virginia crying with a reddish face, which
she interpreted as the result of Jaimes maltreatment. As Virginia was their relative,
Soledad and Alicia advised her to stay with Alicia for the night. Soledad then returned
to her house. By 11:00 p.m., however, Alicia again reported to her that Virginia
disregarded their advice and, instead, went home. However, another quarrel between
Jaime and Virginia ensued, with the former threatening the latter to kill her. Virginia
sought again the refuge of Alicias house. Soledad and Alicia pleaded with Virginia
to sleep in Alicias house. Virginia agreed.9
At about 2:00 a.m. of 15 December 1996, Alicia once more reported to Soledad that
Virginia was not in her bed and left the door open. Very much worried, Soledad and
her husband, Valentin, searched for Virginia. At around 3:00 a.m., while they were
standing about seven meters away from the Baos house, they witnessed Jaime
repeatedly box Virginia. They saw the mauling incident through the window at the
southwestern portion of the house. They even overheard Virginia remark: "Ouch,
why dont you get tired of beating me, would it not be better if you just kill me."
Upon observing, however, that the quarrel was apparently subsiding, Soledad and
Valentin left.10
Two and a half hours later, Valentin related to Soledad that while plying his tricycle,
he heard from the vegetable vendors that Virginia was found dead along the river
bank at Barangay Pagala. When Soledad went to see the body of Virginia, she saw
Jaime walking to and fro beside the cadaver, but not crying. She requested Jaime to
change the clothes of his dead wife, but he did not do or say anything. It was
Soledads companions who changed Virginias clothing.11
Dr. Rolex Gonzales, Medical Officer III of the Abra Provincial Hospital, conducted
an autopsy on Virginias cadaver. While he heard stories about the victims drowning,
his examination revealed otherwise. He observed that the victims lungs and stomach
were devoid of water, fluid, or any debris or foreign material, thus negating the theory
that she drowned. He noticed lacerations, abrasions, and hematoma on different parts
of the victims body. He opined that they were probably inflicted with the use of a
hard object on the early morning of 15 December 1996. The wound that caused a
depressed portion on the skull caused the intracerebral hemorrhage, which resulted
in the victims death.12
Melecio Bolesa and Cristeta Bolesa Maao, Virginias brother and sister,
respectively, testified having spent P30,710 relative to the death and burial of their
sister. Jaime did not share a single centavo in the expenses. 13 Melecio recalled that
Virginia would often go to Bilabila and complain that Jaime would maltreat her
whenever he was drunk and even make her dance naked.14
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence 15 with
prior leave of court on the ground that the prosecution failed to present any
eyewitness to the commission of the crime or circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In an Order of 14 May 1998, 16 the trial
court denied the demurrer to evidence. The trial then continued, with the defense,
through Jaime Bao and his mother, Linda Bao, proffering a different version of the
events.
Jaime admitted to having engaged in a drinking spree at the wake of Antonina Babida
from 9:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight of 14 December 1996. There, he met his mother,
who was selling balut. Since he was so drunk that he could no longer carry his body,
he just sat and slept beside her mother at the gate where the wake was being held. At
4:30 a.m. of the following day, his mother woke him up, and they proceeded home. 17
Jaimes house was, however, locked. He peeped through the window and called his
wife. No answer came. Jaime, therefore, opted to go to his mothers house, which
was about a hundred meters away. There, he slept only to be later awakened by his
mother with the news that his wife drowned. He proceeded to the place where the
body of his wife was found but met a police car along the way. He went inside the
police car, found and embraced the lifeless body of his wife, and cried. He did not
see any laceration, abrasion, or contusion on her body at the time. Jaime claimed that
he could not have mauled, much less killed, his wife in their house on the early
morning of 15 December 1996 because at the time he was still asleep beside his
mother at the wake. He did not attend his wifes wake and funeral at Bilabila, for his
wifes family suspected that he was responsible for his wifes death and threatened
him not to go there.18
In its decision of 3 August 2000,19 the Regional Trial Court of Abra, Branch 58,
convicted Jaime Bao of parricide for killing his legitimate wife, Virginia Bolesa
Bao, anchored on circumstantial evidence, thus:
It is clear from the facts established that on the night of December 14, 1996 the
accused JAIME BAO was heavily drunk; that he maltreated his wife, and acted
violently against her, prompting his wife Virginia to seek refuge in the house of Alicia
Respicio; that after midnight of December 14, 1996, Jaime Bao was angrily looking
for his wife Virginia, that he threatened to kill his wife when he finds her, even in
public which caught the attention of Raymond Marquez, Barangay Kagawad; that he
was unruly, provoking and making trouble; that he denied his wife suffered physical
violence as shown in the physical injuries of the cadaver, like lacerations, abrasions
and hematoma on her face, a fractured skull; that he tried to poison and kill himself
and commit suicide by drinking insecticide, and that he never attended the burial of
his wife at Bilabila, Sallapadan, Abra, for her final wake. This chain of events taken
together points to no other than the accused JAIME BAO as the one who killed his
wife Virginia Bao sometime after midnight of December 14, 1996. 20
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Jaime to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of Virginia Bao in the amounts of P100,000
as "civil indemnity for moral damages"; P40,000 for actual expenses; and the costs
of the proceedings. Hence, this petition ascribing to the trial court grave error in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
In support of his lone assigned error, Jaime avers that the prosecution failed to prove
the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient basis for conviction. He
claims that the inferences were drawn not from facts established by direct evidence,
but from other inferences. Only the circumstance that he regularly drinks liquor was
proved, and the rest are mere presumptions. The fact that Virginias death was caused
by intracerebral hemorrhage does not in any way evince that he inflicted the fatal
wound. Neither his failure to attend the wake and burial of his wife at Bilabila nor his
attempted suicide could be considered as indicia of his guilt. Instead, the first
circumstance should be accepted as a normal reaction to a threat directed at his person
by his wifes family, while the second should be deemed as the normal deportment
of a grieving husband who loved his wife dearly. Additionally, the fact that Virginia
returned to their house from Alicias house on the eve of her death proves that he did
not maltreat her. His wife would not have sought the refuge of their conjugal home
if, indeed, her life was threatened there. And even granting that he beat up his wife,
such would not lead to a logical conclusion that he killed her.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with the trial court that
the guilt of Jaime Bao was established through circumstantial evidence. The
circumstances that lead to Virginias death constitute an unbroken chain of events
pointing to Jaime as the author of her death. It recommends, however, the reduction
of the award for actual damages from P40,000 to P30,710, in line with settled
jurisprudence that only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been
actually incurred shall be allowed as actual damages.
We affirm the conviction of appellant Jaime Bao for the crime of parricide. While
there was no eyewitness to the killing of Virginia, the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence have indubitably established that he was responsible for her
brutal demise.
1. Virginia would often go to her hometown to complain to her family about the
beatings she had been receiving from Jaime whenever he was inebriated. Even
Kagawad Raymund Marquez, a barangay official and a long-time resident of Bucay,
confirmed the regularity of the beatings whenever Jaime was drunk.
2. On the night of 14 December 1996, Virginia sought refuge in the house of her
relative and tearfully related her quarrel with Jaime that night. Afterwards, she came
back and reported that her husband threatened to kill her.
3. On that same night, Jaime was unruly and violent while drinking liquor at the
funeral wake of one Antonina Babida.
4. Jaime and his mother left the wake at 12:00 midnight. A few minutes later, he
returned to the wake alone and very angry. He was looking for his wife and
badmouthing her: "Vulva of her mother. Where is that woman? I am very angry with
her and if I will see her I will kill her." Not finding his wife, he left the wake and
headed home, which the appellant estimated to be 200 meters away.
5. By 3:00 a.m. of the following day, Soledad and Valentin saw, through the window
of the Baos house, that Jaime was mauling Virginia. They also overheard Virginia
utter: "Ouch, why dont you get tired of beating me, would it not be better if you just
kill me."
6. Barely two hours after Soledad and Valentin left this brutal scenario, or at about
5:30 a.m., Virginia was found dead along Abra River.
7. The autopsy findings indicate that the lacerations, abrasions, and hematoma on
Virginias dead body were about two to three hours old, consistent with the physical
abuse she received from Jaimes cruel hands at around 3:00 a.m.
Also notable is Jaimes disturbing behavior after the death of his wife. He was not
seen grieving. He neither attended the wake and funeral rites at Bilabila nor shared in
the expenses relative thereto. He attempted to end his life by drinking a form of
insecticide. His deportment could not possibly be that of a sincerely bereaving
husband. Restricted within the confines of the case, there is merit in the trial courts
observation that Jaimes attempt at suicide by poisoning himself with insecticide was
a form of "escapism" equivalent to flight, which is an indication of guilt.
Contrary, therefore, to Jaimes assertions, the following requisites for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction are present in the case at bar: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.21
A review of Jaimes arguments in support of his lone assigned error discloses that
they have no factual bases. His contention that the cause of Virginias death,
intracerebral hemorrhage, does not necessarily mean that he inflicted the wound that
produced such hemorrhage might appear at first glance to be plausible. But it loses
persuasive value in face of the overall evidentiary strength of the circumstances
proven and the logical consistency of one circumstance to the other, as well as the
inferences deduced from them.
Verily, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
when the circumstances established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as being the author of the
crime.22 Stated in another way, the chain of events, perhaps insignificant when taken
separately and independently, nevertheless, produces the effect of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt when considered cumulatively. Indeed, it is the quality of the
circumstances, rather than the quantity, that draws the line on whether the
circumstances presented consist of an unbroken chain that fulfills the standard of
moral certainty to sustain a conviction.23
We also uphold the trial courts rejection of the defenses of alibi and denial. For alibi
to prosper, an accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period
of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time of
the commission of the crime.24 Virginia died between 3:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. of 15
December 1996. Jaimes claim that he was asleep beside his mother from 2:00 a.m.
to 4:30 a.m. of that tragic day at the gate where the wake was held was belied by
Kagawad Raymund Marquez. The latter testified that a few minutes after 12:00 a.m.,
after looking for his wife and threatening to kill her, Jaime left the wake and treaded
back to his house, which was only about 200 meters away. Jaimes alibi was also
negated by Soledads testimony that she saw him brutally hitting his wife at around
3:00 a.m. of that fateful day.
Truly, the incriminating testimonies of prosecution witnesses Soledad Piid and
Kagawad Raymund Marquez remain firm and unchallenged. There being no evidence
of undue bias or ill motive that would have impelled them to falsely testify against
Jaime and implicate him in so despicable a deed as parricide, we conclude that none
existed and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 25 Jaimes
unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi, being negative and self-serving, deserve
no weight in law and cannot, therefore, be given evidentiary value over the
testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 26
Nonetheless, in the absence of substantiated and proven expenses relative to the wake
and burial of the victim, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 shall be
awarded to the heirs of the victims, since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.34
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of 3 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Abra, Branch 58, in Criminal Case No. N-0133 convicting appellant JAIME
BAO of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Virginia Bolesa Bao the sums
of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as temperate
damages.

A fortiori, Jaime should be held guilty of parricide, which is defined under Article SO ORDERED.
246 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
PEOPLE v. EFREN DEGOMA and MARINO TABORADA,
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to Efren Degoma and Marino D. Taborada were charged with the crime of robbery with
death. homicide. They were arraigned and after trial, were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court
The elements of parricide are (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the read as follows:
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate ascendant, descendant, or spouse of the accused. 27 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, on the part of Criminal Case No. 5384, the
Court hereby finds both accused EFREN DEGOMA alias BOY and MARINO
Linda Bao, Jaimes legitimate spouse,28 was shown by circumstantial evidence to TABORADA y DECENA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
have been killed by appellant Jaime Bao himself. There being neither aggravating ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, and accordingly sentenced them to the penalty
nor mitigating circumstances, he should be meted the penalty of reclusion of reclusion perpetua, and for both accused to jointly and severally indemnify the
perpetua, which is the lower of the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. owners of Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar the sum of P200.00 and the equivalent
Now, on Jaimes civil liability. The victims heirs should be awarded civil indemnity exchange rate prevailing for US$300.00, indemnify the heirs of the late Alexander
of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the Parilla in the sum of P36,000.00 for his death, P200,000.00 for moral damages,
culpability of the accused for the death. Likewise, moral damages in the sum P87,947.94 for actual expenses, P5,000.00 for attorneys fees for counsel of Parilla,
of P50,000 should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the and to pay costs, and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." 1
emotional suffering by the victims relatives conformably with People v.
Carillo,29 People v. Panela,30 and People v. Panado.31 Only Marino Taborada appealed from the judgment of conviction. In his brief,
appellant Taborada assigned the following errors:
We, however, delete the award of actual damages, it appearing that it is supported by
a mere list of expenses and not by official receipts.32 A list of expenses cannot replace "The lower court erred in finding that accused-appellant Marino Taborada is a co-
receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business conspirator in the crime of robbery with homicide.
transactions. Neither can the mere testimonies of the victims siblings, Melecio
Bolesa and Cristeta Bolesa Maao, on the amount they spent suffice. It is necessary The lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of robbery with
for a party seeking an award for actual damages to produce competent proof or the homicide and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua." 2
best evidence obtainable to justify such award.33
In its decision, the trial court summarized the facts which it found to have been
established in the following manner:

". . . [O]n April 12, 1988, at about 6:30 in the evening, the peace and quiet of the City
of Tagbilaran was disturbed by the reported robbery with homicide in one of the big
business establishments, the Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar. In the course of the
commission of the crime, an off-duty but much dedicated policeman in the person of
Pat. Verlito Magallanes was able to collar one of the suspects. Because of the
energetic, publicity-shy, well-trained and equally dedicated Station Commander in
the person of P/Lt. Cecilio Quevedo, the second suspect fell into the custody of the
police in the matter of about two hours.
There is no question as to how accused Marino Taborada was taken into police
custody. He was the first who was collared by Pat. Magallanes since Taborada was
still grappling with the driver of the store, Ciriaco Baculi. When he was whisked to
the police headquarters, he was immediately interrogated and without offering any
hard resistance, Taborada told the police that his companion in robbing the store was
a PC soldier, Efren Degoma. This fact, therefore, answers the query as to how accuse
Efren Degoma was brought into police custody. With such information from
Taborada himself, Station Commander Quevedo then formed a group to track down
Degoma. They sealed all possible exit points and, true enough, the police was also
able to bring Degoma into the hands of the law. Whatever transpired immediately
before, during and after the alleged commission of the crime were well-ventilated by
the contending parties as discussed above.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The following facts were conclusively established during the hearings, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar located along Carlos P. Garcia Avenue, City of
Tagbilaran was a victim of robbery on the evening of April 12, 1988, in the sums of
US$300 and P200;
2. During such robbery, the security guard of the store, in the person of Alexander
Parilla was shot and killed with the use of a firearm by one of the robbers;
3. Accused Taborada was apprehended by the police while still grappling with
Ciriaco Baculi, the driver of the store;
4. The police was led to accused Efren Degoma on account of the statements made
by accused Taborada." 3 robbery. both appellant Taborada and co-accuse Degoma entered the premises of the
Appellant Taborada presented a different view of the facts. He testified the he had
known his co-accused Efren Degoma for about a month before the shooting of
Alexander Parilla, when Degoma was still a member of the Philippine Constabulary
Unit quartered in Camp Lapu-Lapu near Taboradas house in Cebu City. On 11 April
1988, Degoma invited appellant Taborada to Tagbilaran City, Bohol, at the formers
expense. Taborada accepted the invitation and stayed with Degomas family while in
Tagbilaran.
On 12 April 1988, appellant Taborada, while still at Tagbilaran City, asked Degoma
to help him raise money to pay for his return trip to Cebu City. In the late afternoon
of that same day, Degoma and appellant Taborada had a few drinks in a place near
the Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar. Later, on the way to Degomas home, they passed by
the Friendly Bazaar. Degoma instructed appellant Taborada to wait for the former by
the door of the Bazaar. While waiting for Degoma, appellant Taborada was,
according to him, suddenly apprehended by the security guard of the Bazaar. Acting
on instinct, Taborada continued, he tried to resist but in the ensuing commotion, a
third person intervened with the result that appellant Taborada was thrown out on the
road. While the security guard and the third person were trying to overpower
appellant Taborada, Degoma suddenly shot the security guard, without warning.
Appellant Taborada was arrested, but Degoma escaped. At the Tagbilaran Police
Station, Taborada identified Degoma as his companion at the vicinity of the crime
and stoutly maintained that he did not know that his companion, Degoma, would rob
the Friendly Bazaar and much less that he would kill the security guard. Thus,
appellant Taborada insists that there was no conspiracy himself and Degoma and that
the prosecution had not adequately proved such conspiracy.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
It is, of course, true that the element of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind
of proof proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary to establish the physical acts
constituting the crime itself. However, the existence of conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence; not is it necessary to prove prior agreement between
the accused to commit the crime charged. Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved
by direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit the crime. Thus, the rule is
well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows
community of criminal purpose or design. 4
In the case at bar, the evidence of conspiracy between Degoma and Taborada was
consistent and clear. Appellant Taborada was penniless at the time of the robbery and
needed some transportation money to go back to Cebu City. Taborada personally
knew his co-accused Degoma and both were seen together immediately prior to the
Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar at the same time, on the pretext that Degoma would
purchase some item in the Bazaar. Appellant Taborada stayed at or near the door of
the Bazaar while his co-accused Degoma went straight to where the cashier of the
Bazaar was. Appellant Taborada grappled with the security guard to wrest possession
of the service revolver of the guard and to keep him preoccupied while his co-accused
Degoma divested the Bazaars cashier of money at gun-point. We consider that these
circumstances are entirely adequate to show that appellant Taborada acted in unison
with Degoma in implementation of a common design to rob the Tagbilaran Friendly
Bazaar.
The pretension of appellant Taborada that he had merely stood by idly at the entrance
of the Bazaar, does not persuade. The prosecution presented three (3) eye-witnesses
all of whom testified consistently that Taborada had grappled with the slain security
guard and had tried to wrestle away the service revolver of the latter. Like the trial
court, we find no reason not to accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
eye-witnesses. The defense did not even try to show that those witnesses were moved
by some evil motive falsely to testify against Degoma and Taborada.
Appellant Taborada then argues that, granting arguendo that conspiracy had been
adequately shown, he should not be held accountable for the slaying of the security
guard because he (Taborada) had no prior knowledge that his co-accused Degoma
would shoot and kill the security guard.
The firmly established rule is that where conspiracy is shown, the act of one
conspirator becomes the act of all the other conspirators and that the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of the conspirators in the crime becomes secondary.
In People v. Roel Punzalan, 5 the Court said:
". . . One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent.
A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot
with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry
and that the offended party may resist or third persons may get killed in the course of
implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such criminal liability,
the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent
commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from
the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. (People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-
582 [1988]; People v. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988]; People v. Escober, 157
SCRA 541, 567 [1988]; People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160 [1967])"
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus, we believe and so hold that appellant Taborada cannot exculpate himself from
the killing of security guard Parilla which took place by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery of the Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar by simply disclaiming any knowledge
that the co-conspirator would go to the extent of shooting and killing the Bazaars
security guard. The phrases "on the occasion" and "by reason" of the robbery used by
Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, refer to a homicide committed
in the course of the robbery, without regard to the robbers precise intention or alleged
lack of intention to kill another, since it is the result rather than the detailed
circumstances, specific cause or modes of intervention of particular persons in the
commission of the crime that is taken into account in characterizing the crime as
robbery with homicide.
Appellant Taborada argues next that while he may have been a co-conspirator, he
should have been found guilty only as an accomplice because his participation in the
crime did not directly aid in the consummation of that crime. This argument will not
detain us for long. In the first place, as already noted, the precise legal effect of a
finding of conspiracy is that each co-conspirator becomes liable for the acts of the
other conspirator(s). Taborada did not try to prevent either the robbery or the
homicide. He did not dissociated or attempt to dissociated himself from the robbery
with homicide. Taborada was simply caught and collared by the police before he
could escape from the scene of the crime. Accordingly, he must be held guilty of
robbery with homicide although it was Degoma who had shot security guard
Alexander Parilla in the head and although it was Degoma who had physically
spirited away the dollars and pesos he had extracted at gunpoint from the Bazaars
cashier. Secondly, appellant Taborada had cooperated with Degoma in the execution
of the crime by a simultaneous act which was material to and indispensable for the
consummation of a crime. Appellant Taborada had engaged the attention of the
security guard by grappling with him and seeking to pin him down, to prevent the
security guard from coming to the aid of the Bazaars cashier as Degoma at gun-point
took away the Bazaars money. Accordingly, Taborada was not merely an
accomplice; he was rather a principal by cooperation. 7 We agree with the position
taken by the Solicitor General on this point:
"The act of [accused] appellant [Taborada] in holding on to the security guard of the
said store [Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar], the victim Alex Parilla, and grappling with
the latter for the possession of his gun is not an isolated act but a deliberated and
planned course of action designed to both accused to enable accused Efren Degoma
to commit the robbery at the cash counter of the store, unhampered by the possible
intervention of the security guard. In fact, [accused] appellants aforesaid
participation is an integral part of their plan without which the robbery could not have
been consummated. Accused Efren Degomas act of robbing money at the cash
counter of the said store by holding the manager, Danny Merchandani, at gunpoint
could not have been made possible were it not for [accused] appellants act of
neutralizing the security guard of the sore, so to speak, by grappling with the latter
for the possession of the gun." (Emphasis supplied)
Turning to the civil aspect of the case, the court a quo had overlooked certain
evidentiary facts in its award of damages. In delict, the defendant is liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. 8 To seek recovery for actual damages, it is necessary to prove with
a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss. 9 Courts cannot
simply assume that damages were sustained by the injured party, nor can it rely on
speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
The court a quos award of actual damages in the amount of P87,947.94 is not
sustained by a review of the evidence of record. Of the expenses allegedly incurred,
the Court can only give credence to those supported by a receipt and which appear to
have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the
victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred
before the date of the slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse
of time from the burial of the victim and which do not have any relation to the death,
wake or burial of the victim; those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes,
such as the lining with marble of the tomb of the victim; those which appear to have
been modified to show an increase in the amount of expenditure, such as by adding a
number to increase the purchase value from tens to hundreds; those expenditures
which could not be reasonably itemized or determined to have been incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim; those which would
nonetheless have been incurred despite the death, wake or burial of the victim, the
death, wake or burial being merely incidental; and those which were not in fact
shouldered by the immediate heirs of the victim, such as plane trips by relatives or
in-laws. Having these as guidelines, the Court puts the gross expenses proved by the
immediate heirs of the victim at P10,175.85. 10
The Court off-sets the amount of P6,400.00, representing the alms received by the
heirs of the victim, 11 against the above amount of P10,175.85, representing the
expenses proved, leaving the amount of P3,775.85 as the actual amount of loss
sustained by immediate heirs of the victim.
The moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 awarded by the court a quo are
unexplained and unsupported in the courts decision. While moral damages are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court, under the circumstances attending the
loss, considers it proper to reduce the amount of the award for moral damages to
P10,000.00. The Court, however, hereby increases the amount of indemnity for the
death of Alexander Parilla to P50,000.00 in line with present jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Branch 2 in Criminal Case No. 5384 dated 26 December 1988, is hereby MODIFIED
to the extent that both accused shall be solidarily liable only for the amounts of: (a)
P3,775.85 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of Alexander Parilla. In all other respects, the decision of
the trial court is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST
INTERNATIONAL BANK), vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
FRANKLIN VIVES.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated June 25, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 11791 and of its Resolution2 dated May 5,
1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by petitioner
Producers Bank of the Philippines.
Sometime in 1979, private respondent Franklin Vives was asked by his neighbor and
friend Angeles Sanchez to help her friend and townmate, Col. Arturo Doronilla, in
incorporating his business, the Sterela Marketing and Services ("Sterela" for brevity).
Specifically, Sanchez asked private respondent to deposit in a bank a certain amount
of money in the bank account of Sterela for purposes of its incorporation. She assured
private respondent that he could withdraw his money from said account within a
months time. Private respondent asked Sanchez to bring Doronilla to their house so
that they could discuss Sanchezs request.3
On May 9, 1979, private respondent, Sanchez, Doronilla and a certain Estrella
Dumagpi, Doronillas private secretary, met and discussed the matter. Thereafter,
relying on the assurances and representations of Sanchez and Doronilla, private
respondent issued a check in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(200,000.00) in favor of Sterela. Private respondent instructed his wife, Mrs.
Inocencia Vives, to accompany Doronilla and Sanchez in opening a savings account
in the name of Sterela in the Buendia, Makati branch of Producers Bank of the
Philippines. However, only Sanchez, Mrs. Vives and Dumagpi went to the bank to
deposit the check. They had with them an authorization letter from Doronilla
authorizing Sanchez and her companions, "in coordination with Mr. Rufo Atienza,"
to open an account for Sterela Marketing Services in the amount of 200,000.00. In
opening the account, the authorized signatories were Inocencia Vives and/or Angeles
Sanchez. A passbook for Savings Account No. 10-1567 was thereafter issued to Mrs.
Vives.4
Subsequently, private respondent learned that Sterela was no longer holding office in
the address previously given to him. Alarmed, he and his wife went to the Bank to
verify if their money was still intact. The bank manager referred them to Mr. Rufo
Atienza, the assistant manager, who informed them that part of the money in Savings
Account No. 10-1567 had been withdrawn by Doronilla, and that only 90,000.00
remained therein. He likewise told them that Mrs. Vives could not withdraw said
remaining amount because it had to answer for some postdated checks issued by
Doronilla. According to Atienza, after Mrs. Vives and Sanchez opened Savings
Account No. 10-1567, Doronilla opened Current Account No. 10-0320 for Sterela
and authorized the Bank to debit Savings Account No. 10-1567 for the amounts
necessary to cover overdrawings in Current Account No. 10-0320. In opening said
current account, Sterela, through Doronilla, obtained a loan of 175,000.00 from the
Bank. To cover payment thereof, Doronilla issued three postdated checks, all of
which were dishonored. Atienza also said that Doronilla could assign or withdraw the
money in Savings Account No. 10-1567 because he was the sole proprietor of
Sterela.5
Private respondent tried to get in touch with Doronilla through Sanchez. On June 29,
1979, he received a letter from Doronilla, assuring him that his money was intact and
would be returned to him. On August 13, 1979, Doronilla issued a postdated check
for Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Pesos (212,000.00) in favor of private
respondent. However, upon presentment thereof by private respondent to the drawee
bank, the check was dishonored. Doronilla requested private respondent to present
the same check on September 15, 1979 but when the latter presented the check, it was
again dishonored.6
Private respondent referred the matter to a lawyer, who made a written demand upon
Doronilla for the return of his clients money. Doronilla issued another check for
212,000.00 in private respondents favor but the check was again dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.7
Private respondent instituted an action for recovery of sum of money in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig, Metro Manila against Doronilla, Sanchez, Dumagpi and
petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 44485. He also filed criminal
actions against Doronilla, Sanchez and Dumagpi in the RTC. However, Sanchez
passed away on March 16, 1985 while the case was pending before the trial court. On
October 3, 1995, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 157, promulgated its Decision in Civil
Case No. 44485, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing
defendants Arturo J. Doronila, Estrella Dumagpi and Producers Bank of the
Philippines to pay plaintiff Franklin Vives jointly and severally
(a) the amount of 200,000.00, representing the money deposited, with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid;
(b) the sum of 50,000.00 for moral damages and a similar amount for exemplary
damages;
(c) the amount of 40,000.00 for attorneys fees; and
(d) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision
dated June 25, 1991, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. 9 It
likewise denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
dated May 5, 1994.10
On June 30, 1994, petitioner filed the present petition, arguing that
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT THE
TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT DORONILLA AND
RESPONDENT VIVES WAS ONE OF SIMPLE LOAN AND NOT
ACCOMMODATION;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS BANK MANAGER, MR. RUFO ATIENZA, CONNIVED WITH
THE OTHER DEFENDANTS IN DEFRAUDING PETITIONER (Sic. Should be
PRIVATE RESPONDENT) AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE PETITIONER
SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL
JUSTICE;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE ENTIRE
RECORDS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM, AS THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT WERE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CITED DECISION IN SALUDARES VS. MARTINEZ, 29 SCRA 745,
UPHOLDING THE LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER FOR ACTS COMMITTED
BY AN EMPLOYEE IS APPLICABLE;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT HEREIN PETITIONER BANK IS
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANTS FOR
THE AMOUNT OF P200,000.00 REPRESENTING THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT
DEPOSIT, P50,000.00 FOR MORAL DAMAGES, P50,000.00 FOR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, P40,000.00 FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE COSTS OF SUIT.11
Private respondent filed his Comment on September 23, 1994. Petitioner filed its
Reply thereto on September 25, 1995. The Court then required private respondent to
submit a rejoinder to the reply. However, said rejoinder was filed only on April 21,
1997, due to petitioners delay in furnishing private respondent with copy of the
reply12 and several substitutions of counsel on the part of private respondent. 13 On
January 17, 2001, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.14 Petitioner filed its memorandum
on April 16, 2001 while private respondent submitted his memorandum on March 22,
2001.
Petitioner contends that the transaction between private respondent and Doronilla is
a simple loan (mutuum) since all the elements of a mutuum are present: first, what
was delivered by private respondent to Doronilla was money, a consumable thing;
and second, the transaction was onerous as Doronilla was obliged to pay interest, as
evidenced by the check issued by Doronilla in the amount of 212,000.00, or 12,000
more than what private respondent deposited in Sterelas bank account. 15 Moreover,
the fact that private respondent sued his good friend Sanchez for his failure to recover
his money from Doronilla shows that the transaction was not merely gratuitous but
"had a business angle" to it. Hence, petitioner argues that it cannot be held liable for
the return of private respondents 200,000.00 because it is not privy to the
transaction between the latter and Doronilla.16
It argues further that petitioners Assistant Manager, Mr. Rufo Atienza, could not be
faulted for allowing Doronilla to withdraw from the savings account of Sterela since
the latter was the sole proprietor of said company. Petitioner asserts that Doronillas
May 8, 1979 letter addressed to the bank, authorizing Mrs. Vives and Sanchez to open
a savings account for Sterela, did not contain any authorization for these two to
withdraw from said account. Hence, the authority to withdraw therefrom remained
exclusively with Doronilla, who was the sole proprietor of Sterela, and who alone
had legal title to the savings account.17 Petitioner points out that no evidence other
than the testimonies of private respondent and Mrs. Vives was presented during trial
to prove that private respondent deposited his 200,000.00 in Sterelas account for
purposes of its incorporation.18 Hence, petitioner should not be held liable for
allowing Doronilla to withdraw from Sterelas savings account.1a\^/phi1.net
Petitioner also asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision since the findings of fact therein were not accord with the evidence presented
by petitioner during trial to prove that the transaction between private respondent and
Doronilla was a mutuum, and that it committed no wrong in allowing Doronilla to
withdraw from Sterelas savings account.19
Finally, petitioner claims that since there is no wrongful act or omission on its part,
it is not liable for the actual damages suffered by private respondent, and neither may
it be held liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. 20
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the transaction between him and
Doronilla is not a mutuum but an accommodation,21 since he did not actually part
with the ownership of his 200,000.00 and in fact asked his wife to deposit said
amount in the account of Sterela so that a certification can be issued to the effect that
Sterela had sufficient funds for purposes of its incorporation but at the same time, he
retained some degree of control over his money through his wife who was made a
signatory to the savings account and in whose possession the savings account
passbook was given.22
He likewise asserts that the trial court did not err in finding that petitioner, Atienzas
employer, is liable for the return of his money. He insists that Atienza, petitioners
assistant manager, connived with Doronilla in defrauding private respondent since it
was Atienza who facilitated the opening of Sterelas current account three days after
Mrs. Vives and Sanchez opened a savings account with petitioner for said company,
as well as the approval of the authority to debit Sterelas savings account to cover any
overdrawings in its current account.23
There is no merit in the petition.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review filed with this Court. The Court has repeatedly held that it is not
its function to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence presented by the parties
during trial.24 The Courts jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of
law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. 25 Moreover, factual
findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final
and conclusive on this Court unless these findings are not supported by the evidence
on record.26 There is no showing of any misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Court of Appeals in the case at bar that would require this Court to review and
overturn the factual findings of that court, especially since the conclusions of fact of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are not only consistent but are also amply
supported by the evidence on record.
No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the transaction
between private respondent and Doronilla was a commodatum and not a mutuum. A
circumspect examination of the records reveals that the transaction between them was
a commodatum. Article 1933 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two kinds
of loans in this wise:
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either something not
consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in
which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other consumable
thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be
paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum, the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while in simple
loan, ownership passes to the borrower.
The foregoing provision seems to imply that if the subject of the contract is a
consumable thing, such as money, the contract would be a mutuum. However, there
are some instances where a commodatum may have for its object a consumable thing.
Article 1936 of the Civil Code provides:
Consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if the purpose of the contract
is not the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of exhibition, or when the
intention of the parties is to lend consumable goods and to have the very same goods
returned at the end of the period agreed upon, the loan is a commodatum and not a
mutuum.
The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall be accorded primordial
consideration in determining the actual character of a contract.27 In case of doubt, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties shall be considered in such
determination.28
As correctly pointed out by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the evidence
shows that private respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings account of
Sterela specifically for the purpose of making it appear "that said firm had sufficient
capitalization for incorporation, with the promise that the amount shall be returned
within thirty (30) days." 29 Private respondent merely "accommodated" Doronilla by
lending his money without consideration, as a favor to his good friend Sanchez. It
was however clear to the parties to the transaction that the money would not be
removed from Sterelas savings account and would be returned to private respondent
after thirty (30) days.
Doronillas attempts to return to private respondent the amount of 200,000.00 which
the latter deposited in Sterelas account together with an additional 12,000.00,
allegedly representing interest on the mutuum, did not convert the transaction from a
commodatum into a mutuum because such was not the intent of the parties and
because the additional 12,000.00 corresponds to the fruits of the lending of the
200,000.00. Article 1935 of the Civil Code expressly states that "[t]he bailee in
commodatum acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits." Hence, it was
only proper for Doronilla to remit to private respondent the interest accruing to the
latters money deposited with petitioner.
Neither does the Court agree with petitioners contention that it is not solidarily liable
for the return of private respondents money because it was not privy to the
transaction between Doronilla and private respondent. The nature of said transaction,
that is, whether it is a mutuum or a commodatum, has no bearing on the question of
petitioners liability for the return of private respondents money because the factual
circumstances of the case clearly show that petitioner, through its employee Mr.
Atienza, was partly responsible for the loss of private respondents money and is
liable for its restitution.
Petitioners rules for savings deposits written on the passbook it issued Mrs. Vives
on behalf of Sterela for Savings Account No. 10-1567 expressly states that
"2. Deposits and withdrawals must be made by the depositor personally or upon his
written authority duly authenticated, and neither a deposit nor a withdrawal will be
permitted except upon the production of the depositor savings bank book in which
will be entered by the Bank the amount deposited or withdrawn." 30
Said rule notwithstanding, Doronilla was permitted by petitioner, through Atienza,
the Assistant Branch Manager for the Buendia Branch of petitioner, to withdraw
therefrom even without presenting the passbook (which Atienza very well knew was
in the possession of Mrs. Vives), not just once, but several times. Both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court found that Atienza allowed said withdrawals because he
was party to Doronillas "scheme" of defrauding private respondent:
XXX
But the scheme could not have been executed successfully without the knowledge,
help and cooperation of Rufo Atienza, assistant manager and cashier of the Makati
(Buendia) branch of the defendant bank. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Atienza
had not only facilitated the commission of the fraud but he likewise helped in devising
the means by which it can be done in such manner as to make it appear that the
transaction was in accordance with banking procedure.
To begin with, the deposit was made in defendants Buendia branch precisely because
Atienza was a key officer therein. The records show that plaintiff had suggested that
the 200,000.00 be deposited in his bank, the Manila Banking Corporation, but
Doronilla and Dumagpi insisted that it must be in defendants branch in Makati for
"it will be easier for them to get a certification". In fact before he was introduced to
plaintiff, Doronilla had already prepared a letter addressed to the Buendia branch
manager authorizing Angeles B. Sanchez and company to open a savings account for
Sterela in the amount of 200,000.00, as "per coordination with Mr. Rufo Atienza,
Assistant Manager of the Bank x x x" (Exh. 1). This is a clear manifestation that the
other defendants had been in consultation with Atienza from the inception of the
scheme. Significantly, there were testimonies and admission that Atienza is the
brother-in-law of a certain Romeo Mirasol, a friend and business associate of
Doronilla.
Then there is the matter of the ownership of the fund. Because of the "coordination"
between Doronilla and Atienza, the latter knew before hand that the money deposited
did not belong to Doronilla nor to Sterela. Aside from such foreknowledge, he was
explicitly told by Inocencia Vives that the money belonged to her and her husband
and the deposit was merely to accommodate Doronilla. Atienza even declared that
the money came from Mrs. Vives.
Although the savings account was in the name of Sterela, the bank records disclose
that the only ones empowered to withdraw the same were Inocencia Vives and
Angeles B. Sanchez. In the signature card pertaining to this account (Exh. J), the
authorized signatories were Inocencia Vives &/or Angeles B. Sanchez. Atienza stated
that it is the usual banking procedure that withdrawals of savings deposits could only
be made by persons whose authorized signatures are in the signature cards on file
with the bank. He, however, said that this procedure was not followed here because
Sterela was owned by Doronilla. He explained that Doronilla had the full authority
to withdraw by virtue of such ownership. The Court is not inclined to agree with
Atienza. In the first place, he was all the time aware that the money came from Vives
and did not belong to Sterela. He was also told by Mrs. Vives that they were only
accommodating Doronilla so that a certification can be issued to the effect that Sterela
had a deposit of so much amount to be sued in the incorporation of the firm. In the
second place, the signature of Doronilla was not authorized in so far as that account
is concerned inasmuch as he had not signed the signature card provided by the bank
whenever a deposit is opened. In the third place, neither Mrs. Vives nor Sanchez had
given Doronilla the authority to withdraw.
Moreover, the transfer of fund was done without the passbook having been presented.
It is an accepted practice that whenever a withdrawal is made in a savings deposit,
the bank requires the presentation of the passbook. In this case, such recognized
practice was dispensed with. The transfer from the savings account to the current
account was without the submission of the passbook which Atienza had given to Mrs.
Vives. Instead, it was made to appear in a certification signed by Estrella Dumagpi
that a duplicate passbook was issued to Sterela because the original passbook had
been surrendered to the Makati branch in view of a loan accommodation assigning
the savings account (Exh. C). Atienza, who undoubtedly had a hand in the execution
of this certification, was aware that the contents of the same are not true. He knew
that the passbook was in the hands of Mrs. Vives for he was the one who gave it to
her. Besides, as assistant manager of the branch and the bank official servicing the
savings and current accounts in question, he also was aware that the original passbook
was never surrendered. He was also cognizant that Estrella Dumagpi was not among
those authorized to withdraw so her certification had no effect whatsoever.
The circumstance surrounding the opening of the current account also demonstrate
that Atienzas active participation in the perpetration of the fraud and deception that
caused the loss. The records indicate that this account was opened three days later
after the 200,000.00 was deposited. In spite of his disclaimer, the Court believes
that Atienza was mindful and posted regarding the opening of the current account
considering that Doronilla was all the while in "coordination" with him. That it was
he who facilitated the approval of the authority to debit the savings account to cover
any overdrawings in the current account (Exh. 2) is not hard to comprehend.
Clearly Atienza had committed wrongful acts that had resulted to the loss subject of
this case. x x x.31
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers shall be held primarily and
solidarily liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks. To hold the employer liable under this provision, it must be
shown that an employer-employee relationship exists, and that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the act complained of was
committed.32 Case law in the United States of America has it that a corporation that
entrusts a general duty to its employee is responsible to the injured party for damages
flowing from the employees wrongful act done in the course of his general authority,
even though in doing such act, the employee may have failed in its duty to the
employer and disobeyed the latters instructions.33
There is no dispute that Atienza was an employee of petitioner. Furthermore,
petitioner did not deny that Atienza was acting within the scope of his authority as
Assistant Branch Manager when he assisted Doronilla in withdrawing funds from
Sterelas Savings Account No. 10-1567, in which account private respondents
money was deposited, and in transferring the money withdrawn to Sterelas Current
Account with petitioner. Atienzas acts of helping Doronilla, a customer of the
petitioner, were obviously done in furtherance of petitioners interests 34 even though
in the process, Atienza violated some of petitioners rules such as those stipulated in
its savings account passbook.35 It was established that the transfer of funds from
Sterelas savings account to its current account could not have been accomplished by
Doronilla without the invaluable assistance of Atienza, and that it was their
connivance which was the cause of private respondents loss.
The foregoing shows that the Court of Appeals correctly held that under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, petitioner is liable for private respondents loss and is solidarily
liable with Doronilla and Dumagpi for the return of the 200,000.00 since it is clear
that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent the
unauthorized withdrawals from Sterelas savings account, and that it was not
negligent in the selection and supervision of Atienza. Accordingly, no error was
committed by the appellate court in the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit to private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L.
SUELTO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V.
VALDELLON.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 16739 affirming the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-93-42629 and Civil Case No.
Q-93-16051, where Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting
in damages to property.
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No.
31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation
(MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849.
Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus. 2
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned
passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the
terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning
Road.3 Upon Valdellons request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior
Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect the damaged
terrace. Pontiveros submitted a report enumerating and describing the damages:
(1) The front exterior and the right side concrete columns of the covered
terrace were vertically displaced from its original position causing exposure
of the vertical reinforcement.
(2) The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls are found with cracks
on top of the displaced columns.
(3) The 6 CHB walls at [the] right side of the covered terrace were found
with cracks caused by this accident.
(4) The front iron grills and concrete balusters were found totally damaged
and the later [sic] beyond repair.4
He recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had been
displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and
to insure the safety and stability of the building." 5
Photographs6 of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon commissioned Engr.
Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of repairs, inclusive of labor and painting, and
the latter pegged the cost at P171,088.46.7
In a letter dated October 19, 1992 addressed to the bus company and Suelto,
Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof,
to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. 8 The bus company and Suelto offered
a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.9
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property against Suelto. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information
was filed with the RTC of Quezon City. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus
bearing Plate No. NVC-849, did then and there unlawfully, and feloniously drive,
manage, and operate the same along Kamias Road, in said City, in a careless, reckless,
negligent, and imprudent manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a
speed greater than was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary precaution
to avoid accident to person/s and damage to property, and considering the condition
of the traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of his said
carelessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of precaution, the said vehicle so
driven, managed and operated by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bump a
commercial apartment belonging to ERLINDA V. VALDELLON located at No. 31
Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing damages to said apartment in the total
amount of P171,088.46, Philippine Currency, to her damage and prejudice in the total
amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company
for damages. She prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her
favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to issue a writ of
preliminary attachment against the defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and
after trial on the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the expenses for the repair of
the damaged apartment of plaintiff, with interests to be charged thereon at
the legal rate from the date of the formal demand until the whole obligation
is fully paid;
 b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as compensatory and exemplary
damages;
c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum of P1,000.00 for
each appearance of plaintiffs counsel; and costs of suit;
PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the
premises.11
A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court. 12
The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the damaged terrace, where
defendants offered to have it repaired and restored to its original state. Valdellon,
however, disagreed because she wanted the building demolished to give way for the
construction of a new one.13
During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the terrace of her
apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in evidence a receipt for P35,000.00,
dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator for
"carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical [work]." 14
Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that there was a need to change
the column of the terrace, but that the building should also be demolished because "if
concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot have it restored to its original position."15
Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction, declared that he
inspected the terrace and estimated the cost of repairs, including labor,
at P171,088.46.
Suelto testified that at 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, he was driving the bus on its
way to Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. When he reached the corner of K-H
Street at Kamias Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly crossed from
EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied by the bus. Suelto had to
swerve the bus to the right upon which it hit the side front of the terrace of Valdellons
two-door apartment.16 Based on his estimate, the cost to the damage on the terrace of
the apartment amounted to P40,000.00.17 On cross-examination, Suelto declared that
he saw the passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from the bus. Before then,
he had seen some passenger jeepneys on the right trying to overtake one another. 18
Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair of the damaged terrace
amounted to P55,000.00.19
On April 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, and ordered
MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way
of actual and compensatory damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y LIWAG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.
With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Erlinda Valdellon and against defendant Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation
and accused Freddie Suelto, where both are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff:
a. the sum of P150,000.00, as reasonable compensation sustained by
plaintiff for her damaged apartment;
b. the sum of P20,000.00, as compensatory and exemplary damages;
c. the sum of P20,000.00, as attorneys fees; and,
d. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20
MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that
the prosecution failed to prove Sueltos guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred
that the prosecution merely relied on Valdellon, who testified only on the damage
caused to the terrace of her apartment which appellants also alleged was excessive.
Appellant Suelto further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal case for
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintained
that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Even if the appellate court
affirmed his conviction, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him by the trial
court is contrary to law.
In its Brief for the People of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submitted that the appealed decision should be affirmed with modification. On
Sueltos claim that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, the OSG contended that, applying the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, the prosecution was able to prove that he drove the bus
with negligence and recklessness. The OSG averred that the prosecution was able to
prove that Sueltos act of swerving the bus to the right was the cause of damage to
the terrace of Valdellons apartment, and in the absence of an explanation to the
contrary, the accident was evidently due to appellants want of care. Consequently,
the OSG posited, the burden was on the appellant to prove that, in swerving the bus
to the right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to discharge this burden. However,
the OSG averred that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a straight penalty
of one year, and recommended a penalty of fine.
On June 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court,
but the award for actual damages was reduced to P100,000.00. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 28, 1994, rendered by
the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as
compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment be
reduced to P100,000.00 without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same. 22
MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition reiterating its
submissions in the CA: (a) the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against
petitioner Suelto; (b) the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that
respondent suffered actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and (c) the trial
court erred in sentencing petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.
On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was mandated to prove that
petitioner Suelto acted with recklessness in swerving the bus to the right thereby
hitting the terrace of private respondents apartment. However, the prosecution failed
to discharge its burden. On the other hand, petitioner Suelto was able to prove that he
acted in an emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA towards the
direction of the bus overtook another vehicle and, in the process, intruded into the
lane of the bus.
On the second issue, petitioners insist that private respondent was able to prove only
the amount of P35,000.00 by way of actual damages; hence, the award
of P100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.
On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight penalty of imprisonment
recommended by the trial court, and affirmed by the CA, is contrary to Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code.
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent People of the Philippines
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to
the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private
respondents apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it
happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial court.
Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to
hit the column of the terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove
that the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner
Suelto.
We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court and
the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency
caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was
driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he
acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding
with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this
Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate
vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different course of action is
required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or
because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person
operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the
right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left
in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right
of the center of the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a
highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than
is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway,
and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any
motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and
property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle
to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead (emphasis supplied).
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his
own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the
property of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos defense, in light of his
contradictory testimony vis--vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I)
that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by
the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said damages
were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at
the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to
avoid the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the
Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that
"physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after
the incident. The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had
the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a
full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have
avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would
have been less severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-
affidavit and his testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he
swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front
of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to
avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his
lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the
witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between
testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency
results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence
and diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have
resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused
was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to
swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could
not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. 24
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the
owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for
the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
On the second issue, we agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents
failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted
to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages
claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damage made by
Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing
cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed
to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court
awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the
factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal
portion of its decision that the "sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation
sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court, for its part,
failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page
decision. Thus, the appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no
urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question considering the
nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants
continue, the award of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-
appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not disputed.
Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result of the accident, the
reasonable, and adequate compensation due is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.25
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the
loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente) and the other, for the failure
to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As
expostulated by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:26
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They
proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has
been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In
actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of
actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses
(dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would
have pertained to him (lucro cesante).27
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be
presented on either side. The burden is to establish ones case by a preponderance of
evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior
to that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out.
Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures.
As the Court declared:
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. The
burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be
presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence
which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of
the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an
award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.28
The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is,
normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical
or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use
during the period before replacement.29
While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for damages
should not be discarded altogether, however, the same should be admitted with
extreme caution. Their testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants self-
interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such assertion should be
buttressed by independent evidence. In the language of the Court:
For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent incurred losses in the
total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering
that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence.
Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever
testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and
cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes
loaded on the vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto.
However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment,
cargo, and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore,
examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosarios claim as
regards the amount of losses.30
An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary
loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but
must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific
facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
Private respondents merely sustained an estimated amount needed for the repair of
the roof of their subject building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were
caused only by petitioners alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school
building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential
question that remains indeterminable.31
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view, the cost of
the damage to the terrace of private respondent would amount
to P55,000.00.32 Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00 actual
damages.
We also agree with petitioner Sueltos contention that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty of one (1) year. This is so because under
the third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be
sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act shall have only resulted in
damage to property. The said provision reads in full:
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed;
if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would, otherwise, constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner Sueltos act was to the
terrace of private respondents apartment, costing P55,000.00. Consequently,
petitioners contention that the CA erred in awarding P100,000.00 by way of actual
damages to private respondent is correct. We agree that private respondent is entitled
to exemplary damages, and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed
by the CA, is reasonable. Considering the attendant circumstances, we rule that
private respondent Valdellon is entitled to only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH
THE MODIFICATION that petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners are ORDERED to
pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount of P55,000.00 by
way of actual damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL
y MALECDAN, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT,
EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA
CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat
represented by Inocencia Cudiamat.
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against
petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which
occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others,
it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving
a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent
manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons
and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of
bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith
and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto
Hospital where he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not
absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was
the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident,
hence they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of damages in
their favor by way of a counterclaim.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of
petitioners, with this decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito
Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death.
Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Pedrito
Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the amount defendants initially
offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
in a decision 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside
the decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents:
1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for
death of the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;
3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as
actual and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated October 4, 1990, 5 hence this petition with the central issue herein
being whether respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and
in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule
are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject
to settled exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court, in which case a reexamination of the facts and
evidence may be undertaken.
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as
to who between the petitioners and the victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we
have had to conduct an evaluation of the evidence in this case for the prope calibration
of their conflicting factual findings and legal conclusions
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following
findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a
moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And, without
having given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to board the
bus. But defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this
connection, it is safe to assume that when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board
defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was open instead of being closed. This should be
so, for it is hard to believe that one would even attempt to board a vehicle (i)n motion
if the door of said vehicle is closed. Here lies the defendant's lack of diligence. Under
such circumstances, equity demands that there must be something given to the heirs
of the victim to assuage their feelings. This, also considering that initially, defendant
common carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It did offer a certain
monetary consideration to the victim's heirs. 7
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees'own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is
evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat
boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja
alighted from the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the victim
did indicate his intention to board the bus as can be seen from the testimony of the
said witness when he declared that Pedrito Cudiamat was no longer walking and made
a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him. It was at the
instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the platform of the bus
when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to
accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver
in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first
secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus
was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The defendants-appellees
utterly failed to observe their duty and obligation as common carrier to the end that
they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to the circumstances of
each case (Article 1733, New Civil Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the
above holding of the Court of Appeals. Its aforesaid findings are supported by the
testimony of petitioners' own witnesses.
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where
one of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded
the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the
platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the
rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was
thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it
cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that
the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in
motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his
intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous
offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every
time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a
passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of
the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by
railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of
time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are
liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting
up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the
same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained
in the testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had
"just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded
and was on its platform. 13
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or
streetcar which is moving slowly. 14 An ordinarily prudent person would have made
the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances.
The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of
common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been
unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such
a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported
by the according to all the circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. 17
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the
court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier
in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract
of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to
his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring
the gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can
even be stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the
accident the bus could have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital,
but its driver instead opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight
and to deliver a refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the victim. The vacuous
reason given by petitioners that it was the wife of the deceased who caused the delay
was tersely and correctly confuted by respondent court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they had to
wait for about twenty minutes for Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed deserves scant
consideration. It is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife whose husband is at
the verge of dying to have the luxury of dressing herself up for about twenty minutes
before attending to help her distressed and helpless husband. 19
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to
Bunk 70 was to inform the victim's family of the mishap, since it was not said bus
driver nor the conductor but the companion of the victim who informed his family
thereof.
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by
respondent Court of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross
income of the victim. The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim
of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the
earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and
other incidental expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased
may fairly and reasonably be fixed at P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In
adjudicating the actual or compensatory damages, respondent court found that the
deceased was 48 years old, in good health with a remaining productive life
expectancy of 12 years, and then earning P24,000.00 a year. Using the gross annual
income as the basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it accordingly awarded
P288,000. Applying the aforestated rule on computation based on the net earnings,
said award must be, as it hereby is, rectified and reduced to P216,000.00. However,
in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the death indemnity is hereby increased
to P50,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FEDERICO
BALANAG alias "Pedring," TITO BALAWAG alias "Andres," (at large) and
ROBERTO BALANAG alias "Berto," (at large) accused.
Accused-appellant Federico Balanag and father and son Roberto and Tito Balanag
were charged with Robbery with Homicide. 1 The Information against them, dated
March 14, 1986, reads:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1985, in the Municipality of
Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with
one Serafin Dacanay y Ordonio who is now deceased, and helping one another,
and being then armed with handguns and bladed and/or sharp-pointed weapons,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to gain and
 by means of force, violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of
nighttime, enter the dwelling of one Dr. Guillermo Lopez y Ferrer and once
inside, take, steal, and carry away a shoulder bag containing a diamond ring and
earrings worth P3,000.00, a United States fifty dollar bill (US $50.00),
Philippine currency in the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), as well as
a mini-stereo cassette valued at Two Thousand Pesos (2,000.00) belonging to
Genoveva L. Obra, a daughter of the aforenamed Dr. Guillermo Lopez y Ferrer,
and with intent to kill, by reason or on occasion of the afore-described robbery,
treacherously and taking advantage of their superior strength shoot with the said
handguns and stab with the said bladed and/or sharp-pointed weapons the
aforenamed Dr. Guillermo Lopez y Ferrer, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Dr. Guillermo
Lopez y Ferrer.
That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances
were present: (1) the above-named accused took advantage of nighttime, to
facilitate the commission of the offense, (2) the offense was committed in the
dwelling of the offended parties (3) the killing of the victim Dr. Guillermo
Lopez y Ferrer was committed with an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Tito and Federico were arraigned on April 17, 1986. They pleaded not guilty 2 and
underwent trial. Roberto Balanag, on the other hand, has remained at large. Before
the prosecution could finish cross-examining Tito Balanag, he absconded. 3 He was
thus tried in absentia.
The essential facts came mainly from the testimonies of eyewitnesses Iluminada
Lopez and Genoveva Lopez y Obra.
On November 24, 1985, at about 7:30 P.M., GUILLERMO LOPEZ, SR., a dentist,
was talking to his wife, ILUMINADA LOPEZ, in the living room of their house,
situated in Sitio Salapac, Aringay, La Union, while their daughter, GENOVEVA
LOPEZ y OBRA, was in the kitchen, brushing her teeth. Suddenly, three (3) men
barged into the front door of Dr. Lopez' house. Iluminada and Genoveva recognized
two (2) of them as their neighbors TITO BALANAG (a.k.a. Andres) and FEDERICO
BALANAG (a.k.a. Pedring). The third man, whom the Lopezes had seen for the first
time, was later identified as SERAFIN DACANAY, a "compadre" of Federico.
Serafin immediately announced a "hold-up." He poked a gun at the head of
Iluminada, held her arm and then led her towards Genoveva's room on the second
floor of the house. Serafin demanded money and other valuables from Iluminada. She
then summoned Genoveva to give her the keys to the cabinet. Her daughter followed.
Upon seeing Genoveva upstairs, Serafin also poked the gun at her head. Genoveva
thus obediently proceeded towards the cabinet, near the door of her room, and she
was about to open the cabinet when her father, Dr. Lopez, rushed upstairs. As Dr.
Lopez was ascending the stairs, Serafin yelled at him saying: "Okinam nga lakay sica
ti ngangidarum quen Berto Balanag (Vulva of your mother, you are (sic) the one
(who) filed a case against Berto Balanag." 4 He shot Dr. Lopez who fell down the
stairs which had no railings. Downstairs, the victim was met by accused Tito Balanag
who stabbed him (the victim) with a dagger. Serafin then went downstairs and,
likewise, stabbed the victim. Seeing the helpless condition of her father, Genoveva
screamed. She and her mother also rushed downstairs. Iluminada thought of asking
for help from their neighbors. Thus, she ran past her husband and proceeded outside
their house thru the backdoor. Genoveva, on the other hand, went to her father's aid
as Serafin continued assaulting her father. During the commotion, Tito and Federico
fled, taking with them Genoveva's shoulder bag containing a diamond ring and
earrings worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00); fifty dollars
(US $50.00) cash; two hundred pesos (P200.00) cash; and a mini-stereo cassette,
valued at P2,000.00.
Iluminada had barely stepped out of the house when she was blocked by "Berto"
(Roberto) Balanag, Tito's father, who aimed his gun at her. Iluminada quickly
retreated to the house and closed the backdoor. She stood behind the door and locked
it as Berto tried to force his way in.
In the meantime, Genoveva and Serafin grappled for the bolo of the latter. Irked, he
lunged at her, but she bravely parried the thrust with her arm. Her left forefinger was
cut in the process. Serafin also fired at her but missed. By stroke of luck, Genoveva
managed to get a bolo and attacked Serafin in self defense. Serafin died. So did the
wounded Dr. Lopez. Several neighbors of the Lopezes who heard the commotion
arrived at the scene. One of them, a certain Jose Dulay, reported the incident to the
authorities.
That evening, police authorities, namely: Station Commander P/Sgt. Alejandro
Basallo, Pfc. Benjamin Rulloda, Pat. Simeon Madarang, and Pat. Wilson Argame
inspected the locus criminis. They found the bloodied bodies of Dr. Guillermo Lopez
and Serafin Dacanay, sprawled on the floor. They also recovered the following: a
Ruby Magnum, Cal. 22, with serial no. 05522; two (2) bolos soiled with blood; a
double bladed dagger; six (6) empty shells; and one live ammunition found inside the
gun's chamber.
Dr. Armando Avena, Medical Officer of the Rural Health Unit of Doa Gregoria
Memorial District Hospital in Aringay, La Union, conducted the postmortem
examination on the victim's body. Based on his examination, Dr. Lopez sustained
abrasion wound, two (2) stab wounds, and multiple gunshot wounds (on the right
breast upper outer quadrant, right zygomatic area and right upper lip). 5 Dr. Avena
also treated Genoveva Lopez Obra who sustained lacerated wound on the 3rd left
forefinger. 6
According to the widow, Iluminada, her dentist husband used to earn P10,000.00
monthly. At the time of her husband's death, they had three (3) children in college.
She suffered mental anguish and could hardly sleep or eat upon her husband's death.
During the two weeks wake for her deceased husband, she spent, more or less,
P25,000.00.
Federico Balanag interposed the defense of alibi. In the morning of November 24,
1985, he was allegedly in a farm in Salapac, Aringay, La Union, together with his
brother Renato and mother-in-law, Florencia Hidalgo. At about 5:00 P.M., after a
day's work of threshing palay, they proceeded towards Federico's house. They arrived
home at 5:30 P.M., and dined together thirty minutes later. Thereafter, Federico slept
in the room with his youngest son Ronald. His wife, Teresita and the rest of the family
went to bed at 8:00 P.M.
According to Teresita, her husband was sound asleep when she woke up at around
11:00 P.M. to urinate. She then nursed her eight-month old baby and stayed awake
until midnight. At around 2:00 A.M. the following day, the policemen came and took
her husband with them. She learned later that Dr. Lopez had been killed. She and her
daughter Gina visited Federico in Jail. On their way to the municipal building, they
passed by the house of the victim. There were several persons in the vicinity but she
did not inquire what happened.
At the police station, Teresita noticed that her husband had bruises. He then told her
he was manhandled by Station Commander Alejandro Basallo.
Gina Balanag corroborated the testimonies of her parents pertaining to the
whereabouts of her father, the accused-appellant. She averred that on November 24,
1985, she went to school at about 6:30 A.M. She returned home from school at 4:30
P.M. She saw her father an hour later. Her father slept at 7:30 P.M. after dinner.
She claimed further that, at about 6:30 A.M., the morning following the incident, she
was on her way to school. As she was nearing the house of Dr. Lopez, Genoveva and
the latter's sister who was then carrying a wooden stick ("malo"), were waiting for
her (Gina) and her companions ("Agharang da amin"). She decided to skip school.
The Balanags described their dwelling as a one room house that it would not be
possible for them to leave without being seen or noticed by the other members of the
family. Prior to the robbery and killing, the Balanags were in good terms with the
Lopezes. Federico denied he was in the company of his cousin Tito Balanag and
Serafin Dacanay that fateful evening of November 24, 1985. He admitted, however,
that Serafin was the godfather of one of his children.
After trial, the court a quo found Federico Balanag and his co-accused Tito Balanag
guilty of Robbery with Homicide. 7 They were meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The court a quo also ordered accused-appellant and Tito Balanag, to
indemnify, solidarily, the heirs of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Lopez, the following
amounts:
a) P50,000.00 for the death of Guillermo Lopez;
b) P48,110.00 as actual damages;
c) P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
d) P172,000.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Both accused appealed. 8 However, Tito Balanag, who has remained at large, did not
file the required Appellant's Brief. His appeal was considered abandoned for failure
to prosecute his appeal and, more importantly, for his refusal to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the authorities. 9
Accused-appellant Federico Balanag now contends:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSSED,
FEDERICO BALANAG, OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE AND/OR IN NOT EXONERATING HIM OF THE
OFFENSE.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Prefatorily, the defense assails the validity of the Criminal Complaint, dated
November 27, 1985, 10 and the amended Criminal Complaint, dated December 2,
1985, 11 filed by investigating officer P/Sgt. Alejandro Basallo, on the ground that the
owner of the stolen items Genoveva Lopez y Obra, was not identified. She was
merely referred to as the "offended party." Accused-appellant avers that a valid
complaint for robbery, must specify the owner of the stolen property, considering that
the phrase "personal property belonging to another," as an essential element of the
crime of robbery, should be clearly established. 12 He claims, further that he could be
convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide since the victim of the robbery,
Genoveva Lopez y Obra, did not file any complaint for robbery, and the person killed,
Dr. Guillermo Lopez, was not robbed of his personal belongings. The argument lacks
merit.
We need not delve lengthily on the cited defect in the Criminal Complaint and
Amended Criminal Complaint since the said error was corrected in the Information,
dated March 14, 1986. 13 Said information alleged that the stolen items belong to
Genoveva Lopez y Obra, daughter of Dr. Guillermo Lopez.
We have also ruled that in this kind of a complex crime, the victim of the robbery
need not necessarily be the victim of homicide. 14 Thus, in People vs. Disimban, 15 we
affirmed the conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide although the
robbery victim was different from the homicide victim. There is robo con
homicido even if the victim killed was an innocent
bystander. 16 Or that death supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide
was produced by reason or on the occasion of robbery, inasmuch as it is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken
into consideration. 17 In the recent case of People vs. Pamintuan, 18 the accused
prisoners were held liable for robbery with homicide although the items robbed, i.e.,
five (5) shotguns and three (3) guns, Ruby Cal. 22, belong to the armory of the
Provincial Jail of San Fernando, Pampanga, and not the personal properties of the
homicide victims, the provincial jail guards.
We now come to the more important issues of whether the guilt of accused-appellant
was established beyond reasonable doubt. We rule in the affirmative.
At least two credible witnesses, Iluminada and Genoveva, positively identified
accused-appellant Federico Balanag as among those who barged into their house that
tragic evening. Genoveva even saw accused-appellant when he fled from the scene,
taking with him a mini-stereo cassette. These eyewitnesses could not have been
mistaken as they knew Federico and Tito even before the incident. The records reveal
that the Lopezes and the Balanags were neighbors since birth. 19
It was also not improbable for the eyewitnesses to recognized the faces of the culprits.
According to Genoveva, the accused were not wearing masks, albeit Serafin was
wearing a hat. At that time, too, the place of incident was well lighted as 50 watts
electric bulbs, installed along the porch, in the living room and the kitchen, were on. 20
The credibility of these eyewitnesses is further enhanced by the fact that Iluminada
and Genoveva had no ill feelings against Federico prior to the incident. Accused-
appellant himself confirmed this lack of ill motive. 21 Thus, we see no reason to depart
from the well established rule that when there is no evidence to show that the
prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, their identification of the
accused should be given full faith and
credit. 22
Nonetheless, accused-appellant stresses that nobody testified on his participation to
the killing. He points out that, since there was no proof of conspiracy, he could not
be held responsible for the death of Dr. Lopez. We hold otherwise.
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime. It could be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime, showing that the accused had acted in unison with each
other, evincing a common purpose or design. 23 The circumstances in field show the
existence of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his cohorts. Federico, Serafin
and Tito simultaneously barged thru the front door of Dr. Lopez' residence. To further
secure the area, Roberto Balanag stood on guard at the back portion of the house.
Serafin then led Iluminada upstairs, while Tito and Federico stayed downstairs. Their
plan was almost perfect and would have been successful if Dr. Lopez did not attempt
to rescue his wife and daughter from Serafin. Dr. Lopez' unexpected resistance, albeit
futile in the hands of the armed robbers, aborted the well-planned robbery. Thus, Tito
and Federico hastily got Genoveva's shoulder bag and the mini-stereo cassette. They
fled together, leaving behind Serafin who was still grappling with Genoveva. Without
a doubt, accused-appellant acted in unison and cooperated with his companions in
committing the robbery.
It is settled that when homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be liable as
principals of the special crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not
actually take part in the homicide. The exception to the rule is when it is clearly shown
that they endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. 24 In this case, there is no
evidence that accused-appellant tried to prevent the killing of Dr. Lopez. His claim
of innocence is believe by the fact that, after Dr. Lopez was shot and stabbed by his
cohorts, he carried away the mini-stereo cassette of the Lopezes. Accused-appellant
was, therefore, correctly found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
Accused-appellant's defense of alibi cannot succeed because of circumstances
pointing to its contrived nature and his positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses. 25 The records show that accused-appellant's house was about 120 meters
from the house of the Dr, Lopez, thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime and to commit the crime. 26
The testimonies given by accused-appellant's wife and daughter vis-a-vis that of
eyewitnesses Iluminada and Genoveva, do not inspire belief. For one, Gina lied when
she testified she attended school on November 24, 1985. When confronted that it was
a Sunday, she got confused and said she went to school on November 22, 1985 or
January 22, 1985. Gina also denied knowing Dr. Lopez, only to admit later that she
knew him as he was their neighbor. 27 She also claimed that Genoveva and her sister
waited for them after the incident, prompting her not to proceed to school. On cross-
examination, however, Gina admitted that she was not sure if they were really waiting
for them.
The testimony of Teresita appears to be more consistent in contrast to her daughter's
story. However, the trial court gave greater credence on the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. It is settled that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering
that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial,
unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 28
Robbery with Homicide is punishable with reclusion perpetua, notwithstanding the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, 29 since at the time
of the commission of the offense, Congress had yet to restore the imposition of death
penalty.
In connection with the civil liability of accused-appellant, the award of P48,110.00,
for actual or compensatory damages, is not fully supported by evidence. The records
show that the total amount incurred for burial/funeral expenses was P19,482.00, not
P23,110.00. 30
Anent Mrs. Lopez' additional claim of P25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during
the two weeks wake for the victim, we find the said claim reasonable considering the
social standing of the Lopezes in the community. The Lopezes are prominent in their
place, not to mention they belong to a big family. (Mr. and Mrs. Lopez sired 13
children, most of whom are professionals and gainfully employed). The total award
for actual damages should then be P44,482.00, and not P48,110.00.
With respect to the claim for loss of earning capacity of the victim, we note that the
victim was already 69 years old at the time he was killed on November 24, 1985. His
income as a dentist was P10,000.00 per month, or P120,000.00 per annum. After
deducting therefrom the necessary and incidental expenses which the victim would
have incurred if he were alive, the court a quo, declared that the victim's annual net
income would be P24,000.00. The trial court multiplied his net annual income by his
life expectancy of seven (7) years and two (2) months, 31hence, P172,000.00 was
awarded for loss of the earning capacity of the victim.
In computing the loss of the earning capacity of the victim, several factors are
considered besides the mathematical computation of annual income times life
expectancy. Allowances are made for circumstances which could reduce the
computed life expectancy of the victim, e.g., nature of work of the victim, 32 his
lifestyle, age, and state of health prior to his death. 33 In addition, we have to consider
the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the victim. 34 In this case, albeit there was no
evidence on the state of health of the victim, considering his advanced age, we find
it reasonable and fair to assume that he would not be able work and earn, as a dentist,
until he reaches the final moment of his life. 35 Thus, we reduce the award for loss of
the earning capacity of the deceased to P144,000.00, which is the approximate
amount he would have earned until his 75th birthday. 36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the
assailed Decision, dated September 5, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
XXXIII) of Bauang, La Union, in Criminal Case No. A-1540. Accordingly, the
indeminification granted in favor of the heirs of DR. GUILLERMO LOPEZ, are
modified as follows:
a) P50,000.00, for the death of Dr. Lopez;
b) P20,000.00, for moral damages;
c) P44,482.00, for actual expenses; and
d) P144,000.00, for loss of the earning capacity.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
The issues, albeit not completely novel, are: (a) whether or not a claim for damage
sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of
the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the
payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed from the
time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered;
and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent
(12%) or six percent (6%).
The findings of the court a quo, adopted by the Court of Appeals, on the antecedent
and undisputed facts that have led to the controversy are hereunder reproduced:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-
forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by
the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama,
Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern
Shipping Lines under Bill of Lading
No. YMA-8 (Exh. B). The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance
Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38.
Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged
unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment
from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per
"Request for Bad Order Survey." Exh. D).
On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries
of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which
contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake (per "Bad
Order Waybill" No. 10649, Exh. E).
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the
consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of
defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to pay
the same (Exhs. H, I, J, K, L).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the
consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it
became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants
(per "Form of Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check, Exhs. M, N, and O).
(pp. 85-86, Rollo.)
There were, to be sure, other factual issues that confronted both courts. Here, the
appellate court said:
Defendants filed their respective answers, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint contending that: As for defendant Eastern Shipping it alleged that the
shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody of Metro
Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was incurred after
the shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability (p. 17, Record);
Metroport averred that although subject shipment was discharged unto its custody,
portion of the same was already in bad order (p. 11, Record); Allied Brokerage
alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not having negligent or at fault
for the shipment was already in damage and bad order condition when received by it,
but nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary care and diligence in the
handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in the same condition shipment was
received by it.
From the evidence the court found the following:
The issues are:
1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages;
2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the custody of
defendants (in whose respective custody, if determinable);
3. Whether or not defendant(s) should be held liable for the losses/damages (see
plaintiff's pre-Trial Brief, Records, p. 34; Allied's pre-Trial Brief, adopting plaintiff's
Records, p. 38).
As to the first issue, there can be no doubt that the shipment sustained losses/damages.
The two drums were shipped in good order and condition, as clearly shown by the
Bill of Lading and Commercial Invoice which do not indicate any damages drum that
was shipped (Exhs. B and C). But when on December 12, 1981 the shipment was
delivered to defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., it excepted to one drum in bad order.
Correspondingly, as to the second issue, it follows that the losses/damages were
sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and possession of
defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied
Brokerage). This becomes evident when the Marine Cargo Survey Report (Exh. G),
with its "Additional Survey Notes", are considered. In the latter notes, it is stated that
when the shipment was "landed on vessel" to dock of Pier # 15, South Harbor, Manila
on December 12, 1981, it was observed that "one (1) fiber drum (was) in damaged
condition, covered by the vessel's Agent's Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 86427." The
report further states that when defendant Allied Brokerage withdrew the shipment
from defendant arrastre operator's custody on January 7, 1982, one drum was found
opened without seal, cello bag partly torn but contents intact. Net unrecovered
spillages was
15 kgs. The report went on to state that when the drums reached the consignee, one
drum was found with adulterated/faked contents. It is obvious, therefore, that these
losses/damages occurred before the shipment reached the consignee while under the
successive custodies of defendants. Under Art. 1737 of the New Civil Code, the
common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance of goods
remains in full force and effect even if the goods are temporarily unloaded and stored
in transit in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee
has been advised and has had reasonable opportunity to remove or dispose of the
goods (Art. 1738, NCC). Defendant Eastern Shipping's own exhibit, the "Turn-Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargoes" (Exhs. 3-Eastern) states that on December 12, 1981
one drum was found "open".
and thus held:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:
1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of 12% per annum from
October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid (the liability of
defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed US$500 per case or the CIF value
of the loss, whichever is lesser, while the liability of defendant Metro Port Service,
Inc. shall be to the extent of the actual invoice value of each package, crate box or
container in no case to exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section 6.01 of the
Management Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
3. Costs.
B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of defendant/cross-claimant Allied
Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED. (p. 207, Record).
Dissatisfied, defendant's recourse to US.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. We find that the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct. As there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained
damage while in the successive possession of appellants, and therefore they are liable
to the appellee, as subrogee for the amount it paid to the consignee. (pp. 87-89, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto the judgment of the court
a quo.
In this petition, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the common carrier, attributes error and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when
I. IT HELD PETITIONER CARRIER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE ARRASTRE OPERATOR AND CUSTOMS BROKER FOR THE
CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS GRANTED IN THE QUESTIONED
DECISION;
II. IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF INTEREST ON THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF
THE COMPLAINT AT THE RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT PER
ANNUM INSTEAD OF FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND ONLY AT THE RATE OF SIX PERCENT PER ANNUM, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM BEING INDISPUTABLY UNLIQUIDATED.
The petition is, in part, granted.
In this decision, we have begun by saying that the questions raised by petitioner
carrier are not all that novel. Indeed, we do have a fairly good number of previous
decisions this Court can merely tack to.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods
lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until
the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive
them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646;
Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are
lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its
failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code; Philippine National Railways vs.
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA
365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is not
observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 1 of the Civil Code, are
exclusive, not one of which can be applied to this case.
The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the obligation
of properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the
Court. In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455), we
have explained, in holding the carrier and the arrastre operator liable in solidum, thus:
The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that
of a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5
[1967]. The relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar to
that of the consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line,
et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care
of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the
consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the
ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver
the goods in good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator
and the customs broker are themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with
the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case may not vary the
rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by Eastern Shipping Lines, which,
being the carrier and not having been able to rebut the presumption of fault, is, in any
event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of both the court a
quo and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is sufficient evidence that the
shipment sustained damage while in the successive possession of appellants" (the
herein petitioner among them). Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of
whether there are others solidarily liable with it.
It is over the issue of legal interest adjudged by the appellate court that deserves more
than just a passing remark.
Let us first see a chronological recitation of the major rulings of this Court:
The early case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Manila Port
Service,2 decided3 on 15 May 1969, involved a suit for recovery of money arising out
of short deliveries and pilferage of goods. In this case, appellee Malayan Insurance
(the plaintiff in the lower court) averred in its complaint that the total amount of its
claim for the value of the undelivered goods amounted to P3,947.20. This demand,
however, was neither established in its totality nor definitely ascertained. In the
stipulation of facts later entered into by the parties, in lieu of proof, the amount of
P1,447.51 was agreed upon. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the appellants
(defendants) Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company to pay appellee
Malayan Insurance the sum of P1,447.51 with legal interest thereon from the date the
complaint was filed on 28 December 1962 until full payment thereof. The appellants
then assailed, inter alia, the award of legal interest. In sustaining the appellants, this
Court ruled:
Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a
stipulation, is the legal rate. Such interest normally is allowable from the date of
demand, judicial or extrajudicial. The trial court opted for judicial demand as the
starting point.
But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty." And as was held by this Court in Rivera
vs. Perez,4 L-6998, February 29, 1956, if the suit were for damages, "unliquidated
and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts
after proof (Montilla c. Corporacion de P.P. Agustinos, 25 Phil. 447; Lichauco
v. Guzman,
38 Phil. 302)," then, interest "should be from the date of the decision." (Emphasis
supplied)
The case of Reformina vs. Tomol,5 rendered on 11 October 1985, was for "Recovery
of Damages for Injury to Person and Loss of Property." After trial, the lower court
decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and third party
defendants and against the defendants and third party plaintiffs as follows:
Ordering defendants and third party plaintiffs Shell and Michael, Incorporated to pay
jointly and severally the following persons:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Plaintiffs Pacita F. Reformina and Francisco Reformina the sum of P131,084.00
which is the value of the boat F B Pacita III together with its accessories, fishing gear
and equipment minus P80,000.00 which is the value of the insurance recovered and
the amount of P10,000.00 a month as the estimated monthly loss suffered by them as
a result of the fire of May 6, 1969 up to the time they are actually paid or already the
total sum of P370,000.00 as of June 4, 1972 with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until paid and to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 with costs against
defendants and third party plaintiffs. (Emphasis supplied.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the amount of damages
awarded but sustained the trial court in adjudging legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid. When the appellate court's decision became final, the case
was remanded to the lower court for execution, and this was when the trial court
issued its assailed resolution which applied the 6% interest per annum prescribed in
Article 2209 of the Civil Code. In their petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioners contended that Central Bank Circular
No. 416, providing thus
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended,
Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that
the rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and
the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of
interest, shall be twelve (12%) percent per annum. This Circular shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis found in the text)
should have, instead, been applied. This Court6 ruled:
The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment
which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods
or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is not within the
ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one rendered
in an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and does not
involve any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or credits. As correctly
argued by the private respondents, the law applicable to the said case is Article 2209
of the New Civil Code which reads
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per annum.
The above rule was reiterated in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,
v. Cruz,7 promulgated on 28 July 1986. The case was for damages occasioned by an
injury to person and loss of property. The trial court awarded private respondent
Pedro Manabat actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P72,500.00
with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Relying
on the Reformina v. Tomol case, this Court8 modified the interest award from 12% to
6% interest per annum but sustained the time computation thereof, i.e., from the filing
of the complaint until fully paid.
In Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals,9 the trial court, in an action for the recovery
of damages arising from the collapse of a building, ordered,
inter alia, the "defendant United Construction Co., Inc. (one of the petitioners)
. . . to pay the plaintiff, . . . , the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate
from November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment . .
. ." Save from the modification of the amount granted by the lower court, the Court
of Appeals sustained the trial court's decision. When taken to this Court for review,
the case, on 03 October 1986, was decided, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering
the special and environmental circumstances of this case, we deem it reasonable to
render a decision imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the
third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723,
Civil Code, Supra.
p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception to attorney's fees)
occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) and
an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for
attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of this decision. Upon
failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be
imposed upon aforementioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against
the defendant and third-party defendants (Except Roman Ozaeta). (Emphasis
supplied)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by United Construction, contending that "the
interest of twelve (12%) per cent per annum imposed on the total amount of the
monetary award was in contravention of law." The Court10 ruled out the applicability
of the Reformina and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines cases and, in its resolution of 15
April 1988, it explained:
There should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to Central
Bank Circular No. 416 . . . is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2)
forbearance of any money, goods or credit; and
(3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
Inc. v. Cruz, 143 SCRA 160-161 [1986]; Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260
[1985]). It is true that in the instant case, there is neither a loan or a forbearance,
but then no interest is actually imposed provided the sums referred to in the judgment
are paid upon the finality of the judgment. It is delay in the payment of such final
judgment, that will cause the imposition of the interest.
It will be noted that in the cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is imposed on
the total sum, from the filing of the complaint until paid; in other words, as part of
the judgment for damages. Clearly, they are not applicable to the instant case.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The subsequent case of American Express International, Inc., vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court11 was a petition for review on certiorari from the decision, dated 27
February 1985, of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reducing the amount of
moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, to P240,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, and its resolution, dated 29 April 1985, restoring the
amount of damages awarded by the trial court, i.e., P2,000,000.00 as moral damages
and P400,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest thereon at 12% per annum from
notice of judgment, plus costs of suit. In a decision of 09 November 1988, this Court,
while recognizing the right of the private respondent to recover damages, held the
award, however, for moral damages by the trial court, later sustained by the IAC, to
be inconceivably large. The Court12 thus set aside the decision of the appellate court
and rendered a new one, "ordering the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum
of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with
six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this decision until
paid. (Emphasis supplied)
Reformina came into fore again in the 21 February 1989 case of Florendo
v. Ruiz13 which arose from a breach of employment contract. For having been
illegally dismissed, the petitioner was awarded by the trial court moral and exemplary
damages without, however, providing any legal interest thereon. When the decision
was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held:
WHEREFORE, except as modified hereinabove the decision of the CFI of Negros
Oriental dated October 31, 1972 is affirmed in all respects, with the modification that
defendants-appellants, except defendant-appellant Merton Munn, are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the amounts stated in the dispositive portion of the decision,
including the sum of P1,400.00 in concept of compensatory damages, with interest
at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid(Emphasis
supplied.)
The petition for review to this Court was denied. The records were thereupon
transmitted to the trial court, and an entry of judgment was made. The writ of
execution issued by the trial court directed that only compensatory damages should
earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. Ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, a petition
for certiorari assailed the said order. This Court said:
. . . , it is to be noted that the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of interest "at the
legal rate" from the time of the filing of the complaint. . . Said circular [Central Bank
Circular No. 416] does not apply to actions based on a breach of employment contract
like the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated that the 6% interest per annum on the damages should be
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid.
Quite recently, the Court had another occasion to rule on the matter. National Power
Corporation vs. Angas,14decided on 08 May 1992, involved the expropriation of
certain parcels of land. After conducting a hearing on the complaints for eminent
domain, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents certain
sums of money as just compensation for their lands so expropriated "with legal
interest thereon . . . until fully paid." Again, in applying the 6% legal interest per
annum under the Civil Code, the Court15 declared:
. . . , (T)he transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the
payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged
by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required
to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.
Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court
sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of
earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in the above holdings. The cases can
perhaps be classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues involved
and the corresponding rulings rendered by the court. The "first group" would consist
of the cases of Reformina v. Tomol (1985), Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
v. Cruz(1986), Florendo v. Ruiz (1989)
and National Power Corporation v. Angas (1992). In the "second group" would
be Malayan Insurance Company v.Manila Port Service (1969), Nakpil and Sons
v. Court of Appeals (1988), and American Express International v.Intermediate
Appellate Court (1988).
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the 6% (under
the Civil Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum. It is
easily discernible in these cases that there has been a consistent holding that the
Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans or
forbearance16 of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan
or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the Civil
Code governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the
concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common time frame in the
computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e., from the time the
complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6%
or 12% interest per annum,17depending on whether or not the amount involved is a
loan or forbearance, on the one hand, or one of indemnity for damage, on the other
hand. Unlike, however, the "first group" which remained consistent in holding that
the running of the legal interest should be from the time of the filing of the complaint
until fully paid, the "second group" varied on the commencement of the running of
the legal interest.
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of the
decision of the court a quo,explaining that "if the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated
and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts
after proof,' then, interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'" American Express
International v. IAC, introduced a different time frame for reckoning the 6% interest
by ordering it to be "computed from the finality of (the) decision until paid." The
Nakpil and Sons case ruled that 12% interest per annum should be imposed from the
finality of the decision until the judgment amount is paid.
The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have
called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with
discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest.
Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of clarification and reconciliation, to
suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts18 is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for
damages.19 The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern
in determining the measure of recoverable damages.20
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed,
as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing.21 Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.22 In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
116923 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court24 at the rate of 6% per annum.25 No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.26 Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin
to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX
PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed from the decision, dated
03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu
of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this
decision until the payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.