Er-Ee Rel To Jurisdiction of LA

LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
San Beda College of Law | Atty. Joyrich Golangco

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Test to Determine Existence of E-E Rel.
LABOR Doctrine:There are instances when, aside from the employers power to control the
RELATIONS employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished,
economic realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the
true classification of the individual. The proper standard of economic dependence is whether
the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of
business.
Title: Francisco v. NLRC August 21, 2006 GR No. 170087
Date: August 31, 2006
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioner: Angelina Francisco Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission,

Kasei Corporation, Seiichiro Takahashi, Timoteo Acedo,
Delfin Liza, Irene Ballesteros, Trinidad Liza And Ramon
Escueta
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
In 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to
handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati
to secure business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial operation of the company.
In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager. She was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and
perform management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies,
especially with the BIR, SSS, and in the city government of Makati. For five years, petitioner performed the duties
of Acting Manager. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing allowance and a
10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation.
In January 2001, petitioner was replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager but she was assured that she would still
be connected with Kasei Corporation. Timoteo Acedo, the designated Treasurer, convened a meeting of all
employees of Kasei Corporation and announced that nothing had changed and that petitioner was still connected
with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant to Seiji Kamura and in charge of all BIR matters.
Thereafter, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary by P2,500.00 a month beginning January up to September 2001
for a total reduction of P22,500.00 as of September 2001. Petitioner was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly
because the company was not earning well. On October 2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the
company. She made repeated follow-ups with the company cashier but she was advised that the company was not
earning well.
Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive
dismissal before the labor arbiter. Private respondents averred that petitioner is not an employee of Kasei
Corporation.
LA Ruling: The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
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CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent Kasei
Corporation.
HELD:
Yes. There are instances when, aside from the employers power to control the employee with respect to the
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, economic realities of the employment relations help
provide a comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the individual, whether as employee, independent
contractor, corporate officer or some other capacity.
The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employers power to
control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the
underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship.
Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of
the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the
employers business; (2) the extent of the workers investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and
degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the workers opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of
initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the
permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of
dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business.
The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his
continued employment in that line of business.
By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was
under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant. She reported for
work regularly and served in various capacities with substantially the same job functions.
Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent
corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers
indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social
Security contributions from August 1, 1999 to December 18, 2000. It is therefore apparent that petitioner is
economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latters line of business.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing
RELATIONS an employee from an independent
contractor. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker.
The greater the
supervision and control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is deemed an
employee, and the less
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control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent
contractor.
Title: Sonza v. ABS CBN, June 10, 2004 GR No. 138051
Date: June 10, 2004
Ponente
Petitioner Jose Y. Sonza Respondent ABS CBN
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Respondent ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management Development Corporation where
the latter agreed to provide petitioner Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television.
Sonza agreed to provide his services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. On the other hand,
ABS CBN agreed to pay Sonzas services a monthly fee of P310,000 for the first year and 317,000 for the second
and third year of the agreement.
Later, Sonza tendered a letter rescinding their agreement and filed a complaint before the DOLE for payment of his
labor standard benefits. SONZA complained that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under the Employees
Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN contends on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties. The Labor Arbiter found for respondent citing that Sonza as a talent cannot be considered an
employee of petitioner.
LA Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.
NLRC Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.
CA Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.
HELD:
NO, there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power
to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-
called control test, is the most important element.
As to the selection and engagement of the employee: ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs services to co-host its
television and radio programs because of SONZAs peculiar skills, talent and celebrity status. Independent
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contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary
employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not
possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual
relationship.
As to payment of wages: All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to
the Agreement. If SONZA were ABS-CBNs employee, there would be no need for the parties to stipulate on
benefits such as SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th month pay which the law automatically incorporates into every
employer-employee contract. Whatever benefits SONZA enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an
employer-employee relationship.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
RELATIONS his or her right thereto. Hence, a person who claims to be an employee must establish
such claim.
Title:Javier v. Flyace Corp. Feb 15, 2012 GR No. 192558
Date: February 15, 2012
Ponente J. Mendoza
Petitioner Bitoy Javier Respondent Fly Ace Corporation
Nature of the case: ER-EE relationship
FACTS:
Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He
alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at the respondents
warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in
instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante; that he
reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that
during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company; that thereafter,
Javier was terminated from his employment without notice; and that he was neither given the opportunity to refute
the cause/s of his dismissal from work. For its part, Fly Ace denied that Javier is its employee and averred that it
was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries. Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr.
Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever
the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available.
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LA Ruling: Petitioner is not an employee of Fly Ace Corporation. It ruled that Javier has no employee ID showing
his employment with the Respondent nor any document showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular
employees of the Respondents. Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and
sales of groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to Respondents claim
that complainant was contracted on pakiao basis.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA skirted the argument of Javier and
immediately concluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed to present proof. It was of the
view that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship. Payment
by result x x x is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a mere method of
computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship.
CA Ruling: :The CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former employee of Fly Ace and
reinstated the dismissal of Javiers complaint as ordered by the LA.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner is a an employee of Fly Ace Corporation.
HELD:
NO, petitioner is not an employee of Fly Ace Corporation. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the
existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship
may be admitted. The rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such
claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto x x x. Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of
relief. In this case, the LA and the CA both concluded that Javier failed to establish his employment with Fly Ace.
By way of evidence on this point, all that Javier presented were his self-serving statements purportedly showing his
activities as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier failed to pass the substantiality requirement to support his
claim. Hence, the Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the CA.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: SMCEU v. Judge Bersamira GR No.
Date:
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Ponente
Petitioner Respondent
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: The power of control, in this case, has been explained as the right to control not
RELATIONS only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. With the
conclusion that respondent directed petitioners to remain at their posts and continue with their
duties, it is clear that respondent exercised the power of control over them; thus, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Title: Locsin et. al. v. PLDT GR No. 185251
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Date: October 2, 2009
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
On November 1, 1990, respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) and the Security and
Safety Corporation of the Philippines (SSCP) entered into a Security Services Agreement (Agreement) whereby
SSCP would provide armed security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices. Pursuant to such
agreement, petitioners Raul Locsin and Eddie Tomaquin, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT
office.
On August 30, 2001, respondent issued a Letter dated August 30, 2001 terminating the Agreement effective
October 1, 2001. Despite the termination of the Agreement, however, petitioners continued to secure the premises
of their assigned office. They were allegedly directed to remain at their post by representatives of respondent. In
support of their contention, petitioners provided the Labor Arbiter with copies of petitioner Locsins pay slips for the
period of January to September 2002.
Then, on September 30, 2002, petitioners services were terminated. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims such as overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance, and moral and
exemplary damages against PLDT.
LA Ruling: Petitioners were found to be employees of PLDT and not of SSCP. Such conclusion was arrived at
with the factual finding that petitioners continued to serve as guards of PLDTs offices. As such employees,
petitioners were entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination of employment. The Labor
Arbiter held that respondent failed to observe such due process requirements.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA
CA Ruling: The CA reversed the decision of LA and NLRC. The CA applied the fourfold test in order to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties but did not find such relationship. It
determined that SSCP was not a labor-only contractor and was an independent contractor having substantial
capital to operate and conduct its own business. The CA further bolstered its decision by citing the Agreement
whereby it was stipulated that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the security guards and
PLDT.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and PLDT.
HELD:
YES, there is employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and PLDT. From the foregoing
circumstances, reason dictates that we conclude that petitioners remained at their post under the instructions of
respondent. We can further conclude that respondent dictated upon petitioners that the latter perform their regular
duties to secure the premises during operating hours. This, to our mind and under the circumstances, is sufficient
to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
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To reiterate, while respondent and SSCP no longer had any legal relationship with the termination of the
Agreement, petitioners remained at their post securing the premises of respondent while receiving their salaries,
allegedly from SSCP. Clearly, such a situation makes no sense, and the denials proffered by respondent do not
shed any light to the situation. It is but reasonable to conclude that, with the behest and, presumably, directive of
respondent, petitioners continued with their services. Evidently, such are indicia of control that respondent
exercised over petitioners.
Such power of control has been explained as the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the
means to be used in reaching such end. With the conclusion that respondent directed petitioners to remain at their
posts and continue with their duties, it is clear that respondent exercised the power of control over them; thus, the
Evidently, respondent having the power of control over petitioners must be considered as petitioners employer
from the termination of the Agreement on wards as this was the only time that any evidence of control was
exhibited by respondent over petitioners.
Thus, as aptly declared by the NLRC, petitioners were entitled to the rights and benefits of employees of
respondent, including due process requirements in the termination of their services.
Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC found that respondent did not observe such due process requirements. Having
failed to do so, respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE...
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LABOR Doctrine: Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is
RELATIONS fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial
review, not review by the NLRC.
Title: Peoples Broadcasting Service v. Sec of Labor, March 6, 2012 GR No. 179652
Date: March 6, 2012
Ponente VELASCO, JR., J.
Petitioner: PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO Respondent: THE SECRETARY OF THE

RADYO PHILS., INC.) DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN
Nature of the case: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
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FACTS:
Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against Peoples Broadcasting Service (Bombo) with the DOLE Regional Office
No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, among others.
After the conduct of summary investigations, and after the parties submitted their position papers, the DOLE
Regional Director found that Juezan was an employee of Bombo, and was entitled to his money claims. Bombo
sought reconsideration of the Directors Order, but failed.
The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed Bombos appeal. When the matter was brought before the CA, where
Bombo claimed that it had been denied due process, it was held that Bombo was accorded due process as it had
been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter, as the
jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the power of the DOLE Secretary under Art.
128(b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic Act No. (RA) 7730.
SC reversed the CA Decision and the complaint against Bombo was dismissed. The Court found that there was no
employer-employee relationship between Bombo and Juezan. It was held that while the DOLE may make a
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with
the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The
NLRC was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of
Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered
as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The SC revisits
its former conclusion.
ISSUE/S:
Whether DOLE can make a determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
YES. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that
the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-
employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power
to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to
issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to
follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment
relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to
the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of
inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The
expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the
alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral
of the matter to the NLRC. If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it
takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the
employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-
employee relationship existed in the first place.
If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or
other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship,
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the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of
the Labor Code. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship,
the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE...
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 7. Ymbong v. ABS-CBN, March 7, 2012 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
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HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-
RELATIONS physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital.
Title: 8. Professional Services v. CA, February 11, 2008 GR No. 126297
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Petitioner: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. Respondent: THE COURT OF APPEALS and

NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Natividad Agana was admitted at Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City, performed surgery upon her. During the surgery, he found
that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions
of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of
Natividads husband, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform another operation.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain
in her anal region. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgical operation performed
upon her.
Natividad and her husband went to the United States to seek further treatment of her cancerous nodes. After 4
months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told that she was free of cancer.
Still suffering from pains. 2 weeks after returning to the Philippines, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was immediately informed. He proceeded to Natividads house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. Dr. Ampil then assured Natividad that
the pains would soon
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vanish.
Despite that, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at another hospital. While confined
thereat, Dr. Gutierrez detected the presence of a foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring
1.5 inches in width. The gauze had badly infected her
vaginal vault, which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
Natividad and her husband filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
Pending the outcome of the above case, Natividad died. She was duly substituted by her children (the Aganas).
RTC: PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes jointly and severally liable.
CA: affirmed the RTC judgment but dismissed the complaint against Dr. Fuentes.
PSI, Dr. Ampil and the Aganas filed with SC separate petitions for review on certiorari.
SC (First Division): PSI is jointly and severally liable with Dr. Ampil for the following reasons:
1. There is an employer-employee relationship between Medical City and Dr. Ampil.
2. PSIs act of publicly displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the names and specializations of its accredited
physicians, including Dr. Ampil, estopped it from denying the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between them under the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel
3. PSIs failed to supervise Dr. Ampil to take an active step in order to remedy their negligence rendered it directly
liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence.
PSIs contention: 1) there is no employer-employee relationship between it and its consultant, Dr. Ampil. 2) the
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel cannot apply because spouses Agana failed to establish that
Natividad relied on the representation of the hospital in engaging the services of Dr. 3) PSI maintains that the
doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the proximate cause of Natividads injury was Dr. Ampils
negligence
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there exists an employee-employer relationship, thus making PSI jointly and severally liable
HELD:
Yes An employer-employee relationship "in effect" exists between the Medical City and Dr. Ampil. Consequently,
both are jointly and severally liable to the Agana.
In the SC decision in Ramos vs. CA

Hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within
the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of
completion of residency, their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate
board, evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by
members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject
the application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is still normally required to
accomplish more tasks. Further, physicians performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
committee. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals hire fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant"
staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the rights to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180
of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical City, but an independent contractor, still the said
hospital is liable to the Aganas.
In Nograles, et al. v. Capitol Medical Center, et al., the Court HELD:

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however,
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an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent
contractor-physician.
o First factor focuses on the hospitals manifestationswhether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of
the hospital
o Second factor focuses on the patients reliancewhether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
Atty. Agana categorically testified that one of the reasons why he chose Dr. Ampil was that he knew him to be a
staff member of Medical City, a prominent and known hospital.
Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act of displaying his name and those of
the other physicians in the public directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public that it
offers quality medical service through the listed
physicians.
Lastly, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an immediate investigation on the reported missing
gauzes to the great prejudice and agony of its patient. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under
Article 2176.
WHEREFORE, we DENY PSIs motion for reconsideration with finality.
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LABOR Doctrine: Payroll not conclusive proof of existence or absence of Employer-Employee

RELATIONS relationship.
Title: 9. South East International Rattan Inc. v. Coming, March 12, GR No. 126297
2014
Date: 11 February 2008
Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J
Petitioner: South East International Rattan, Inc. Respondent: Jesus J. Coming
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Respondent Jesus J. Coming filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, with prayer for reinstatement, back wages, damages
and attorneys fees against South East International Rattan Inc (SEIRI). He alleged that he was hired by petitioners
as Sizing Machine Operator on March 17, 1984. His work schedule is from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Initially, his
compensation was on basis but sometime in June 1984, it was fixed at P150.00 per day which was paid weekly. In
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1990, he was told not to work for two months for no reason. After two months, he reported back to work only to be
later on terminated because the company is not doing well financially and that he would be called back to work
only if they need his services again. Respondent waited for almost a year but petitioners did not call him back to
work. Hence, he filed a complaint before the regional arbitration branch. To bolster his claim, respondent submitted
an affidavit signed by five former co-workers stating that respondent was one of the pioneer employees who
worked in SEIRI for almost twenty years.
In their defense, petitioners denied having hired respondent. They stressed that respondent was not included in the
list of employees submitted to the Social Security System (SSS). Theres also an affidavit of Comingss brother
attesting that he worked for another employer.
LA Ruling:
Respondent is a regular employee of SEIRI and that the termination of his employment was illegal. Labor Arbiter
Carreon found that respondents work as sizing machine operator is usually necessary and desirable to the rattan
furniture business of petitioners and their failure to include respondent in the employment report to SSS is not
conclusive proof that respondent is not their employee.
NLRC Ruling:
Set aside the decision of LA ruling that, complainant failed to present a single payslip, voucher or a copy of a
company payroll showing that he rendered service during the period indicated therein. The appeal to (NLRC)-Cebu
City submitted the following additional evidence:
(1) copies of SEIRIs payrolls and individual pay records of employees;
(2) affidavit15 of SEIRIs Treasurer, Angelina Agbay; and
(3) second affidavit16 of Vicente Coming.
CA Ruling:
Reinstated the decision of LA. The CA gave more credence to the declarations of the five former employees of
petitioners that respondent was their co-worker in SEIRI. As to the absence of respondents name in the payroll
and SSS employment report, the CA observed that the payrolls submitted were only from January 1, 1999 to
December 29, 2000 and not the entire period of eighteen years when respondent claimed he worked for SEIRI. It
further noted that the names of the five affiants, whom petitioners admitted to be their former employees, likewise
do not appear in the aforesaid documents. According to the CA, it is apparent that petitioners maintained a
separate payroll for certain employees or willfully retained a portion of the payroll.
As to the control test, records show that:

(1) they required him to work within the company premises;
(2) they obliged petitioner to report every day of the week and tasked him to usually perform the same job;
(3) they enforced the observance of definite hours of work from 8 oclock in the morning to 5 oclock in the
afternoon;
(4) the mode of payment of petitioners salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on pakiao basis and
thereafter, on
daily basis;
(5) they implemented company rules and regulations;
(6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid petitioners salaries and controlled all aspects of his employment and
(7) petitioner rendered work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists.
HELD:
Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA.

To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship jurisprudence has invariably adhered
to the four-fold test, to wit:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
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(3) the power of dismissal; and

(4) the power to control the employees conduct, or the so-called "control test."
In resolving the issue of whether such relationship exists in a given case, substantial evidence that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is
sufficient. Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of the relationship, and any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists
must nonetheless rest on substantial evidence.
As to the SSS or payroll list:

The Court reiterated that in Tan v. Lagrama, the fact that a worker was not reported as an employee to the SSS is
not conclusive proof of the absence of employer-employee relationship. Otherwise, an employer would be
rewarded for his failure or even neglect to perform his obligation. For a payroll to be utilized to disprove the
employment of a person, it must contain a true and complete list of the employee. In this case, the exhibits offered
by petitioners before the NLRC consisting of copies of payrolls and pay earnings records are only for the years
1999 and 2000; they do not cover the entire 18-year period during
which respondent supposedly worked for SEIRI.
As to the certifications issued by Mayol and Apondar asserting that respondent worked for them and not for SEIRI:
The Court ruled that the certifications did not prove any fact that respondent was not an employee of SEIRI. The
certifications only claimed that (1) respondent worked under Mayor on his own discretion and (2) under Apondar as
his sideline but only after regular working hours and off and on basis. Even assuming the truth of the foregoing
statements, these do not foreclose respondents regular or full-time employment with SEIRI.
As to the affidavit of former co-workers submitted by respondent:

The petitioner claimed that the affiants were employees of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar. However, they did
not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their
burden of proving their own affirmative allegation. Hence, respondent Coming was a regular employee and
unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE...Decision regarding BACKWAGES and reinstatement

Respondent, whose employment was terminated without valid cause by petitioners, is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, back wages shall be
computed from the time of the illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Separation pay equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service should likewise be awarded as an alternative in case reinstatement in not
possible.
Notes:
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine: In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship, the

RELATIONS Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to wit: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d)
the employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work
is accomplished. The last element, the so-called control test, is the most important element.
Title: 10. Tenazas et. al. v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, April 2, 2014. GR No. 192998
Date: 2 April 2014
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Ponente: J. Reyes
Petitioners: Bernard Tenazas, Jaime Francisco, and Respondents: R. Villegas Taxi Transport and
Isidro Endraca Romualdo Villegas
Nature of the case: Employer-employee relationship
FACTS:
1. Tenazas et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents and alleged that they were hired
on a boundary system but was later on fired by respondents.
a. Petitioners contention: Tenazas alleged that the taxi unit assigned to him was sideswiped by
another vehicle causing a dent on the same near the drivers seat. When he reported the
incident to respondents, he was scolded instead and was told that he is already fired. Despite
the warning, Tenazas reported for work on the following day but was told that he can no longer
drive any of the companys units as he is already fired.
Francisco, on the other hand, alleged that his dismissal was brought about by the companys
suspicion that he was organizing a labor union; thus, he was immediately terminated. Endraca,
for his part, alleged that his dismissal was instigated by an occasion when he fell short of the
required boundary for his taxi unit. He related that before he was dismissed, he brought his taxi
unit to an auto shop for an urgent repair. He was charged the amount of 700.00 for the repair
services and the replacement parts. As a result, he was not able to meet his boundary for the
day. He further averred that he was no longer allowed to drive any of the taxi units.
Thereafter, the petitioners, by registered mail, filed a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence. They
alleged that after diligent efforts, they were able to discover new pieces of evidence that will
substantiate the allegations in their position paper. Attached with the motion are the following: (a)
Joint Affidavit of the petitioners; (2) Affidavit of Good Faith of Aloney Rivera, a co-driver; (3)
pictures of the petitioners wearing company shirts; and (4) Tenazas Certification/Record of
Social Security System (SSS) contributions.
b. Respondents contention: They admitted that Tenazas and Endraca were employees of the
company, the former being a regular driver and the latter a spare driver. The respondents,
however, denied that Francisco was an employee of the company or that he was able to drive
one of the companys units at any point in time.
LA Ruling: As to Francisco, he failed to present evidence of regular employment available to all regular
employees, such as an employment contract, company ID, SSS, withholding tax certificates, SSS membership and
the like.
In the case of Endraca, the LA gave credence to respondents testimony that he was only an extra driver who
stopped working for work.
While in the case of Tenazas, he did not report for work and was even offered for reinstatement which offer he
refused.
For failure to establish the employer-employee relationship there could be no illegal dismissal.
NLRC Ruling: Reversed the ruling of the LA and found that among the additional pieces of evidence submitted by
the complainants are the following: (1) joint affidavit of the three complainants; (2) affidavit of Aloney Rivera y Aldo;
and (3) three pictures referred to by the complainant in their joint affidavit showing them wearing t-shirts bearing
the name and logo of the respondents company.
CA Ruling: Agreed with the ruling of the NLRC as regards Tenazas and Endraca; that they were employees of
respondent. However, it ruled that Francisco was not an employee of respondent for his failure to prove the
relationship.
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ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
1. As to Francisco, none. In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship, the

Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee on the
means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called control test, is the most
important element.
There is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforesaid elements. Any competent and relevant evidence
to prove the relationship may be admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security registration,
appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts, and personnel lists, serve as evidence
of employee status.
In this case, however, Francisco failed to present any proof substantial enough to establish his relationship with the
respondents. He failed to present documentary evidence like attendance logbook, payroll, SSS record or any
personnel file that could somehow depict his status as an employee. Anent his claim that he was not issued with
employment records, he could have, at least, produced his social security records which state his contributions,
name and address of his employer, as his co-petitioner Tenazas did.
As to Tenazas and Endraca, yes and reinstated the ruling of the CA that they were illegally dismissed; thus,
entitled to reinstatement instead of the payment of the backwages.
WHEREFORE The petition for review on certiorari is denied.
Notes:
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 11. Begino v. Abs-cbn, April 20, 2015. GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
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FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Engagement in a pakyaw or task basis does not negate the existence of
RELATIONS employer-employee relationship.
Title: 12. David v. Macasio, July 4, 2014 GR No. 195466
Date: July 2, 2014
Ponente: J. Brion
Petitioner: Ariel L. David Respondent: John G. Macasio
Nature of the case: Petition For Review On Certiorari
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FACTS:
Respondent Macasio had been working as a butcher for petitioner David since January 6, 1995. Macasio claimed
that David exercised effective control and supervision over his work, pointing out that David: (1) set the work day,
reporting time and hogs to be chopped, as well as the manner by which he was to perform his work; (2) daily paid
his salary of 700.00; and (3) approved and disapproved his leaves. Macasio added that David owned the hogs
delivered for chopping, as well as the work tools and implements; the latter also rented the workplace. Macasio
further claimed that David employs about twenty-five (25) butchers and delivery drivers.
David alleged that he hired Macasio as a butcher or chopper on "pakyaw" or task basis who is, therefore, not
entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the Labor Code. David pointed out that Macasio: (1) usually starts his work at 10:00 p.m. and
ends at 2:00 a.m. of the following day or earlier, depending on the volume of the delivered hogs; (2) received the
fixed amount of 700.00 per engagement, regardless of the actual number of hours that he spent chopping the
delivered hogs; and (3) was not engaged to report for work and, accordingly, did not receive any fee when no hogs
were delivered, therefore, not his employee.
In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint against petitioner David, doing business under the name
and style "Yiels Hog Dealer," for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave (SIL), as well as payment for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. espondent Macasio had
been working as a butcher for petitioner David since January 6, 1995. Macasio claimed that David exercised
effective control and supervision over his work, pointing out that David: (1) set the work day, reporting time and
hogs to be chopped, as well as the manner by which he was to perform his work; (2) daily paid his salary of
700.00; and (3) approved and disapproved his leaves. Macasio added that David owned the hogs delivered for
chopping, as well as the work tools and implements; the latter also rented the workplace. Macasio further claimed
that David employs about twenty-five (25) butchers and delivery drivers.
David alleged that he hired Macasio as a butcher or chopper on "pakyaw" or task basis who is, therefore, not
entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the Labor Code. David pointed out that Macasio: (1) usually starts his work at 10:00 p.m. and
ends at 2:00 a.m. of the following day or earlier, depending on the volume of the delivered hogs; (2) received the
fixed amount of 700.00 per engagement, regardless of the actual number of hours that he spent chopping the
delivered hogs; and (3) was not engaged to report for work and, accordingly, did not receive any fee when no hogs
were delivered, therefore, not his employee.
In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint against petitioner David, doing business under the name
and style "Yiels Hog Dealer," for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave (SIL), as well as payment for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
LA Ruling: The LA dismissed Macasios complaint for lack of merit, giving credence to Davids claim that he
engaged the latter on a pakyaw or task basis since Macasio (1) received the fixed amount of 700.00 for every
work done, regardless of the number of hours that he spent in completing the task and of the volume or number of
hogs that he had to chop per engagement; (2) Macasio usually worked for only four hours, beginning from 10:00
p.m. up to 2:00 a.m. of the following day; and (3) the 700.00 fixed wage far exceeds the then prevailing daily
minimum wage of 382.00. As such, the LA concluded that being engaged on pakyaw or task basis, he is not
entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA. Since Macasio was paid by result and not in terms of the
time that he spent in the workplace, then he is not covered by the Labor Standards laws on overtime, SIL and
holiday pay, and 13th month pay under the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 13th month pay law.
CA Ruling: The CA partly granted Macasios certiorari petition and reversed the NLRCs ruling for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. While the CA agreed with the LA and the NLRC that Macasio was a
pakyaw or task basis employee, it nevertheless found Macasio entitled to his monetary claims. The CA explained
that as a task basis employee, Macasio is excluded from the coverage of holiday, SIL and 13th month pay only if
he is likewise a "field personnel." As defined by the Labor Code, a "field personnel" is one who performs the work
away from the office or place of work and whose regular work hours cannot be determined with reasonable
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certainty. In Macasios case, the elements that characterize a "field personnel" are evidently lacking as he had
been working as a butcher at Davids "Yiels Hog Dealer" business in Sta. Mesa, Manila under Davids supervision
and control, and for a fixed working schedule that starts at 10:00 p.m. The CA awarded Macasios claim for
holiday, SIL and 13th month pay for three years, with 10% attorneys fees on the total monetary award. The CA,
however, denied Macasios claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis.
Petitioner David then elevated this case to the Supreme Court, maintaining that Macasios engagement was on a
"pakyaw" or task basis, hence, no employer-employee relationship exists between them. David reiterates that he
never had any control over the manner by which Macasio performed his work and he simply looked on to the "end-
result." He also contends that he never compelled Macasio to report for work and that under their arrangement,
Macasio was at liberty to choose whether to report for work or not as other butchers could carry out his tasks.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not engagement on pakyaw or task basis negates the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties.
HELD:
No. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four elements generally need to be
considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-
called "four-fold" test of employment relationship. Macasios relationship with David satisfies this test.
First, David engaged the services of Macasio, thus satisfying the element of "selection and engagement of the
employee. Second, David paid Macasios wages. Third, David had been setting the day and time when Macasio
should report for work. By having the power to control Macasios work schedule, David could regulate Macasios
work and could even refuse to give him any assignment, thereby effectively dismissing him. And fourth, David had
the right and power to control and supervise Macasios work as to the means and methods of performing it. In sum,
the totality of the surrounding circumstances of the present case sufficiently points to an employer-employee
relationship existing between David and Macasio.
In sum, the existence of employment relationship between the parties is determined by applying the "four-fold" test.
Engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not determine the parties relationship as it is simply a method of pay
computation. Accordingly, Macasio is Davids employee, albeit engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis.
As to the claims sought, Macasio is entitled to holiday pay and SIL. In determining whether workers engaged on
"pakyaw" or task basis" is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as
regards the workers time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis,
then the general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions
specifically provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the
worker engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of "field personnel" under the law, then he is
not entitled to these monetary benefits. Macasio does not fall under the classification of "field personnel". However,
Macasio is not entitled to 13th month pay because Under Section 3(e), "employers of those who are paid on xxx
task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof" are exempted.
WHEREFORE. The SC partially grant the petition insofar as the payment of 13th month pay to respondent is
concerned, and affirm the decision of the CA in all other aspects.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 13. Chevron Phils. v. Galit, October 7, 2015 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: The Principal shall be deemed an employee where there is labor-only contracting.
RELATIONS
Title: 14. Manila Memorial Park v. Lluz, (2016 case) GR No. 208451
Ponente Carpio, J.
Petitioner MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, Respondent EZARD D. LLUZ, NORMAN CORRAL,
INC ERWIN FUGABAN, VALDIMAR BALISI, EMILIO
FABON, JOHN MARK APLICADOR, MICHAEL
CURIOSO, JUNLIN ESPARES, GAVINO FARINAS,
AND WARD TRADING AND SERVICES
Nature of the case: A petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 21 January 2013 and the
Resolution dated 17 July 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119237.
FACTS:
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. entered into a Contract of Services with Ward Trading and Services (Ward
Trading). The Contract of Services provided that Ward Trading, as an independent contractor, will render interment
and exhumation services and other related work to Manila Memorial in order to supplement operations at Manila
Memorial Park, Paranaque City. Respondents filed a Complaint for regularization, Collective Bargaining
Agreement benefits, illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13th month pay, and payment of attorney's fees.
Respondents alleged that they asked Manila Memorial to consider them as regular workers within the appropriate
bargaining unit. The MMP Union, on behalf of respondents, sought their regularization which Manila Memorial
again declined. Respondents then filed the complaint. Subsequently, respondents were dismissed by Manila
Memorial.
Meanwhile, Manila Memorial sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since there was no
employer-employee relationship. Manila Memorial argued that respondents were the employees of Ward Trading.
Manila Memorial contends that Ward Trading sufficient capitalization to qualify as a legitimate independent
contractor. Manila Memorial insists that nowhere is it provided in the Contract of Services that Manila Memorial
controls the manner and means by which respondents accomplish the results of their work.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that they are regular employees of Manila Memorial since Ward Trading
cannot qualify as an independent contractor but should be treated as a mere labor-only contractor. Respondents
state that (1) there is enough proof that Ward Trading does not have substantial capital, investment, tools and the
like; (2) the workers recruited and placed by the alleged contractors performed activities that were related to Manila
Memorial's business; and (3) Ward Trading does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of
the contractual employees.
LA Ruling: the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for failing to prove the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.
NLRC Ruling: the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's findings. The NLRC ruled that Ward Trading was a labor-
only contractor and an agent of Manila Memorial. Respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is ordered to
pay wage differentials to complainants.
CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. The CA found the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between Manila Memorial and respondents.
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ISSUE/S:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between Manila Memorial and respondents for the latter
to be entitled to their claim for wages and other benefits.
HELD:
YES, as a regular employee of Manila Memorial the respondents are entitled to their claim for wages and other
benefits. Art. 106 of the Labor Code states that xxx There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying
workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the
same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
Manila Memorial entered into a Contract of Services with Ward Trading. A closer look at the Contract of Services
reveals that Ward Trading does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machinery, work premises and other materials since it is Manila Memorial which owns the equipment used in the
performance of work needed for interment and exhumation services. The pertinent provision in the Contract of
Services which shows that Manila Memorial owns the equipment states the Company shall sell to the contactor the
Company owned equipment. However, MMPCI failed to present any "CONTRACTOR'S billing" wherein the
purported monthly installment of P58,335.00 had been deducted, to prove that Ward truly paid the same as they
fell due. Further, the Contact or Service provides a clear proof that Ward does not have an absolute right to use or
enjoy subject equipment, considering that its right to do so is subject to respondent MMPCI's use thereof at any
time the latter requires it.
Further, the records show that Manila Memorial admitted that respondents performed various interment services at
its Sucat, Paranaque branch. Manila Memorial even retained the right to control the performance of the work of the
employees concerned. A perusal of the Service Contract would reveal that respondent Ward is still subject to
petitioner's control as it specifically provides that although Ward shall be in charge of the supervision over
individual respondents, the exercise of its supervisory function is heavily dependent upon the needs of petitioner
Memorial Park.
It was also found that while Ward has a Certificate of Business Name Registration issued by the Department of
Trade and Industry on the same expressly states that it is not a license to engage in any kind of business, and that
it is valid only at the place indicated therein, which is Las Pias City. Hence, the same is not valid in Paranaque
City. The Registration of contractors and subcontractors shall be necessary for purposes of establishing an
effective labor market information and monitoring. Failure to register shall give rise to the presumption that the
contractor is engaged in labor-only contracting. Manila Memorial failed to adduce evidence to prove that Ward
Trading had any substantial capital, investment or assets to perform the work contracted for. Thus, the
presumption that Ward Trading is a labor-only contractor stands. Consequently, Manila Memorial is deemed the
employer of respondents. As regular employees of Manila Memorial, respondents are entitled to their claims for
wages and other benefits as awarded by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE...
Notes: Labor-only contracting exists when the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places
workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present:
1)The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or
service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
2)The contractor does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
3G 2017-2018
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24
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LABOR Doctrine:The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and

RELATIONS being such, it cannot be made the subject of agreement.
Title: 15. Diamond Farms v. Southern Federation of Labor Workers, GR No.173254-55 & 173263
January 13, 2016 (also applicable to Certification Elections)
Date:January 13, 2016
Ponente: JARDELEZA, J
Petitioner: DIAMOND FARMS, INC. Respondent : SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL)-WORKERS
SOLIDARITY OF DARBMUPCO/DIAMOND-SPFL,
DIAMOND FARMS AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(DARBMUPCO), VOLTER LOPEZ, RUEL ROMERO,
PATRICK) CAPRECHO, REY DIMACALI, ELESIO
EMANEL, VICTOR SINGSON, NILDA DIMACALI,
PREMITIVO* DIAZ, RUDY VISTAL, ROGER
MONTERO, JOSISIMO GOMEZ AND MANUEL
MOSQUERA
Nature of the case:DFI challenges the March 31, 2006 Decision3 and May 30, 2006 Resolution4 of the Court
Appeals, Special Twenty-Second Division, Cagayan De Oro City for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
Decision dismissed DFI's Petition for Certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP Nos. 53806 and 61607 and granted
DARBMUPCO's Petition for Certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59958.
FACTS:
DFI owns an 800-hectare banana plantation in Alejal, Carmen, Davao. Pursuant to Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 ("CARL"), commercial farms shall be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution, thus
the original plantation was covered by the law. However, DAR granted DFI a deferment privilege to continue
agricultural operations until 1998. Due to adverse marketing problems and observance of the so-called "lay-follow"
DFI closed some areas of operation in the original plantation and laid off its employees. These employees
petitioned the DAR for the cancellation of DFI's deferment privilege. The DAR Regional Director recalled DFI's
deferment privilege resulting in the original plantation's automatic compulsory acquisition and distribution under the
CARL.
DFI offered to give up its rights and interest over the original plantation in favor of the government by way of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell. The DAR accepted DFI's offer to sell which the DAR accepted but only as to 689.88
hectares. The managed area is subject to the outcome of the appeal on the cancellation of the deferment privilege
before the DAR Secretary.
The awarded plantation was turned over to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries ("ARBs") under the CARL.
These ARBs are the same farmers who were working in the original plantation. They subsequently organized
themselves into a multi-purpose cooperative named "DARBMUPCO," which is one of the respondents in this case.
DARBMUPCO and its members as owners of the awarded plantation, agreed to grow and cultivate only high grade
quality exportable bananas to be sold exclusively to DPI.17 The BPPA is effective for 10 years. DARBMUPCO and
DFI executed a "Supplemental to Memorandum Agreement" ("SMA"). 19 The SMA stated that DFI shall take care of
the labor cost.
To assist DARBMUPCO in meeting its production obligations under the BPPA, DFI engaged the services of the
respondent-contractors, who in turn recruited the respondent-workers.
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) filed a petition for certification of election in the Office of Med-
Arbiter on behalf of some 400 workers jointly employed by DFI and DARBMUPCO.
MED-ARBITER RULING:
It granted the petition. It directed the conduct of the certification election and declared that DARBMUPCO was the
employer of the workers. What is material is that they were hired purposely to work on the plantation now owned
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and operated by DARBMUPCO.

SOLE RULING:
It modified the decision and held that DFI supervised and directed the performance of the work of the respondent
contractors and declared that DFI is the employer of the said workers.
LA Ruling:
LA held that respondent contractors are labor only contractors. DFI is deemed as the statutory employer of all the
respondent-workers.
NLRC Ruling:
NLRC Fifth Division modified and declared that DARBMUPCO and DFI are the statutory employers of the workers
rendering services. It adjudged DFI and DARBMUPCO as solidarily liable with the respondent-contractors for the
monetary claims of the workers, in proportion to their net planted area.
CA Ruling:
CA agreed with the ruling of the SOLE that DFI is the statutory employer. It noted that DFI hired the respondent-
contractors, who in turn procured their own men to work in the land owned by DARBMUPCO. DFI admitted that
respondent-contractors worked under the direction and supervision of DFIs managers and personnel. It also paid
for the respondent-contractors services. Ownership of the land is not one of the 4 elements generally considered
to establish employer-employee relationship. Further, absent an injunction from the CA, the pendency of a petition
for certiorari does not stay the holding of the certification election.
ISSUE/S:
Who among DFI, DARBMUPCO and the respondent-contractors is the employer of the respondent-workers
HELD:
DFI is the principal. This Court has constantly adhered to the "four-fold test" to determine whether there exists an
employer-employee relationship between the parties. The four elements of an employment relationship are: (a) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
power to control the employee's conduct.
Of these four elements, it is the power to control which is the most crucial and most determinative factor,
so important, in fact, that, the other elements may even be disregarded.
In labor-only contracting, it is the law which creates an employer-employee relationship between the principal and
the workers of the labor-only contractor.
Inasmuch as it is the law that forms the employment ties, the stipulation in the BPPA that respondent-workers are
not employees of DFI is not controlling, as the proven facts show otherwise. The law prevails over the stipulations
of the parties.
The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it cannot be made
the subject of agreement.
Clearly, DFI is the true employer of the respondent-workers; respondent-contractors are only agents of DFI. Under
Article 106 of the Labor Code, DFI shall be solidarily liable with the respondent-contractors for the rightful claims of
the respondent-workers, to the same manner and extent, as if the latter are directly employed by DFI.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 31, 2006 Decision and the May 30, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP Nos. 53806, 61607 and 59958 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
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Title: 16. Lu v. Enopia et al., March 6, 2017 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: The alleged "appointment" of officer instead of "election" as provided by the by-laws
RELATIONS neither convert the president of university as a mere employee, nor amend its nature as a corporate
officer.
Title: 17. Weslayan University Phil v. Maglaya Sr. Jan. 23, 2017 GR No.212774
(also related to Article 229, new numbering)
Date: Jan 23, 2017
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Petitioner: Weslayan University-Philippines Respondent: Guillermo T. Maglaya Sr.
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) assailing
the Resolution of Court of Appeals (CA) which denied its petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
WUP is a non-stock, non-profit, non-sectarian educational corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws.
Respondent Atty. Guillenno T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a corporate member on January 1, 2004, and was
elected as a member of the Board of Trustees (Board) on January 9, 2004 both for a period of five (5) years. On May 25,
2005, he was elected as President of the University for a five-year term. He was re-elected as a trustee on May 25, 2007.
In a Memorandum dated November 28, 2008, the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church (Bishops) apprised all
the corporate members of the expiration of their terms on December 31, 2008, unless renewed by the former. The said
members, including Maglaya, sought the renewal of their membership in the WUP's Board, and signified their willingness to
serve the corporation.
On March 25, 2009, Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the efficient and orderly
turnover of the administration of the WUP and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming corporate members and
trustees.
On April 24, 2009, the Bishops, through a formal notice to all the officers, deans, staff, and employees of WUP, introduced
the new corporate members, trustees, and officers. In the said notice, it was indicated that the new Board met, organized,
and elected the new set of officers on April 20, 2009. Manuel Palomo (Palomo), the new Chairman of the Board, informed
Maglaya of the termination of his services and authority as the President of the University on April 27, 2009.
Thereafter, Maglaya and other former members of the Board filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages before RTC. RTC
Dismissed the case declaring the same as a nuisance or harassment suit prohibited under the Interim Rules for Intra-
Corporate Controversies. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA held that their status as corporate members of WUP which
expired on December 31, 2008 was undisputed. The CA agreed with the RTC that the plaintiffs had no legal standing to
question the Bishops' alleged irregular appointment of the new members. SC affirmed the decision of CA.
Thereafter, Maglaya filed an illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter against WUP, the Bishops and Palomo. Maglaya
claimed that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, reckless, oppressive. Bishop Tangonan and Soriano acted in
evident bad faith when they disregarded his five-year term of office and delegated their protege Palomo as the new
university president.
WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of Maglaya, being a corporate officer and not a regular
employee, is a corporate act or intra-corporate controversy under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
LA Ruling: Maglaya is a corporate officer and the case involves intra-corporate dispute which was definitely beyond the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.
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NLRC Ruling: Maglaya is an employee of WUP. Although the position of the President of the University is a corporate office,
the manner of Maglaya's appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his being an employee and
subordinate. The control test is the most important indicator of the presence of employer-employee relationship. Such was
present in the instant case as Maglaya had the duty to report to the Board, and it was the Board which terminated or
dismissed him even before his term ends.
CA Ruling: Denied the Petition of WUP. NLRC Ruling is final and executory after the lapse of 10 days without appealing the
said decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer of WUP
HELD:
It is apparent from the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of the corporation, and was an honorary
member of the Board. He was appointed by the Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation. We held that one
who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a
mere employee.
The alleged "appointment" of Maglaya instead of "election" as provided by the by-laws neither convert the president of
university as a mere employee, nor amend its nature as a corporate officer. With the office specifically mentioned in the by-
laws, the NLRC erred in taking cognizance of the case, and in concluding that Maglaya was a mere employee and subordinate
official because of the manner of his appointment, his duties and responsibilities, salaries and allowances, and considering
the Identification Card, the Administration and Personnel Policy Manual which specified the retirement of the university
president, and the check disbursement as pieces of evidence supporting such finding.
A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra--corporate controversy which arises between a
stockholder and a corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may
have in taking such action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate officer, not a mere employee, is not a
simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
WHEREFORE
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 18. Nestle Phil. v. Pineda et al., Jan. 30, 2017 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 19. Fallarma et al. v. San Juan De Dios, Sept. 14. 2016 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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Art. 212
Definition of Labor Dispute
LABOR Doctrine: Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee
RELATIONS relationship existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security
service contractor.
Title: 1. Citibank v. CA, November 27, 1998 GR No. G.R. No. 108961
Date: Nov. 27, 1998
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Petitioner: Citibank N.A Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division),

and CITI-BANK INTEGRATED GUARDS LABOR
ALLIANCE (CIGLA) SEGA-TUPAS/FSM LOCAL
CHAPTER No. 1394
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
In 1983, Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. (hereafter El Toro) entered into a contract for the
latter to provide security and protective services to safeguard and protect the bank's premises in
Paseo de Roxas, Makati against theft, robbery or any other unlawful acts committed by any person or
persons.
EL Toro also assumed responsibility for losses and/or damages that may be incurred by Citibank due
to or as a result of the negligence of El Toro or any of its assigned personnel.
On April 22, 1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro expired.
respondent Citibank Integrated Guards Labor Alliance-SEGA-TUPAS/FSM (hereafter CIGLA) filed

with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a request for preventive mediation for the
following issues: a) Unfair labor practice; b) Dismissal of union officers/members; and c) Union bust.
Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the bank would not renew anymore the service
agreement with the latter. Simultaneously, Citibank hired another security agency, the Golden
Pyramid Security Agency, to render security services.
CIGLA filed a manifestation with the NCMB that it was converting its request for preventive mediation
into a notice of strike for failure of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues
security guards of El Toro who were replaced by guards of the Golden Pyramid Security Agency
considered the non-renewal of El Toro's service agreement with Citibank as constituting a lockout
and/or a mass dismissal. They threatened to go on strike against Citibank and picket its premises.
CIGLA filed a notice of strike directed at the premises of the Citibank main office.
Citibank filed with the RTC Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages.
CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that: a) The Court had no
jurisdiction, this being labor dispute; and b) The guards were employees of the bank.
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RTC denied CIGLAs Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration
CIGLA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
CA Ruling: CA ruled in favor of CIGLA, declaring the challenged orders null and void and enjoining the judge
from taking any further action in the case.
CITIBANK filed a Motion for Recon, CA denied. Hence this recourse to SC.
Citibank contends that there is no employer-employee relationship between Citibank and the security
guards represented by respondent CIGLA and that there is no "labor dispute" in the subject
controversy. The security guards were employees of El Toro security agency, not of Citibank. Its
service contract with Citibank had expired and not renewed.
ISSUE/S:
whether it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
filed by Citibank with the trial court.
HELD:
Supreme Court sustains the petitioner's contention. This Court has held in many cases that "in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered: 1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the employer's
power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished".
It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee
relationship existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security service contractor. In
this case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work.
It was the security agency that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards.
Article 212, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy
or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
The dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one regarding the termination or non-renewal of the
contract of services. This is a civil dispute. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer-employee
relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union in the security agency who
were assigned to secure the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to
strike against the bank.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration in CA-G. R. SP No. 25584, and
REMAND the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court, Makati, for further proceedings in line with the ruling
herein that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-1612, is vested therein.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 2. PAL v. NLRC, March 20, 1998 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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Managerial Employee
LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 1. Penaranda v. Bagong Plywood Corp, May 3, 2006 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 2. SMCC v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, GR No.
2011
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Breach of Trust and Confidence is a just cause for the termination of Services.
RELATIONS
Title: 3. Jumuad v. Hi-Flyer Food Inc., September 7, 2011 GR No. 187887
Date:September 7, 2011
Ponente Mendoza J.
Petitioner Pamela Jumuad Respondent Hi-flyer food Inc.,

and/or Jesus R. Montemayor
FACTS:
Pamela Florentina Jumuad was employed as Management Trainee and received several promotions till she
became an Area Manager for Visayas and Mindanao which is composed of Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo and Davao
branches of KFC restaurant. (Hi-Flyer, Inc.,)
Aside from being responsible in monitoring her subordinates, Jumuad was tasked to:
1) be highly visible in the restaurants under her jurisdiction;
2) monitor and support day-to-day operations; and
3)ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced.
In her first year, She gained distinction and was awarded for her excellent performance.
Later on, the company discovered lapses on the part of Jumuad in doing her job. Audit revealed of rodent
infestation, use of defective chiller and cash shortages, delay in deposits in the branches that she was handling.
Jumuad was given the opportunity to explain the reason these. Jumuad was asked to explain and after submitting
her written explanation on the incidents, an administrative hearing was conducted. Nonetheless, the company still
terminated her employment on the, ground of neglect of duty and breach of trust and confidence. This prompted
Jumuad to file a complaint against Hi-Flyer for illegal dismissal.
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LA Ruling: Jumuad was illegally dismissed. The dismissal was too harsh considering the circumstances,
finding that no serious cause of termination existed.
NLRC Ruling: Affirmed LA ruling.

There were e-mails presented as proof that Jumuad was denied due process considering thatn o matter how she
would refute the charges hurled against her, the decision of Hi-Flyer to terminate her would not change.
CA Ruling: NLRC decision Reversed.

On the issue of loss of trust and confidence, the CA considered the deplorable sanitary conditions and the cash
shortages uncovered at three of the seven KFC branches supervised by Jumuad as enough basis for Hi-Flyer to
lose its trust and confidence in her.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Petitioner was illegally terminated.
HELD:
No, Pamela Jumuad is not Illegally Terminated.
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 282. Termination by Employer
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Jumuad was terminated for neglect of duty and breach of trust and confidence. Breach of trust and confidence, as
a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position
of trust and confidence, where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is
correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized. Jumuad being a managerial employee, the mere existence of the grounds for the loss of trust and
confidence justifies petitioners dismissal.
WHEREFORE : The Petition is Denied. Petitioner is not Illegally terminated.

The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of
the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. On the other hand, the law
also recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work
and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty.The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such
persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to its interests.
Notes:
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Art. 217
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter
LABOR Doctrine: Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully
RELATIONS empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review,
not review by the NLRC.
Title: 1. Peoples Broadcasting Service v. Sec of Labor, March 6, GR No. 179652

2012 (DOLE can determine existence of EE Rel and summary on
128, 129 and 217)
Date: March 12, 2012
Ponente: Velasco, Jr. J.
Petitioner: People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Respondent: The Secretary Of The Department Of
Phils., Inc.) Labor And Employment, The Regional Director, Dole
Region Vii, And Jandeleon Juezan
Nature of the case: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
FACTS:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of
wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth.
After the conduct of summary investigations, and after the parties submitted their position papers, the DOLE
Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money
claims. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Directors Order, but failed. The Acting DOLE Secretary
dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that petitioner submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit
instead of posting a cash or surety bond. When the matter was brought before the CA, it was held that petitioner
was accorded due process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had
jurisdiction over the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the power of
the DOLE Secretary under Art. 128(b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic Act No. (RA) 7730.
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In the Decision of this Court (May 8, 2009), the CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the complaint
against petitioner was dismissed. The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and private respondent. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement
power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists" in Art. 128(b).
The Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO
sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive
with the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE sought clarification as
well, as to the extent of its visitorial and enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended. The Court treated
the Motion for Clarification as a second motion for reconsideration, granting said motion and reinstating the
petition.
ISSUE/S:
May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, to
what extent?
HELD:
Yes. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that
the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-
employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power
to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to
issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The
expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the
alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral
of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of
an employer-employee relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will
be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the
matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee
relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship
existed in the first place.
The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the rationale that such limitation would eliminate the prospect of
competing conclusions between the DOLE and the NLRC.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a
determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
There is a view that despite Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, there is still a threshold
amount set by Arts. 129 and 217 of the Labor Code when money claims are involved, i.e., that if it is for PhP 5,000
and below, the jurisdiction is with the regional director of the DOLE, under Art. 129, and if the amount involved
exceeds PhP 5,000, the jurisdiction is with the labor arbiter, under Art. 217. The view states that despite the
wording of Art. 128(b), this would only apply in the course of regular inspections undertaken by the DOLE, as
differentiated from cases under Arts. 129 and 217, which originate from complaints. There are several cases,
however, where the Court has ruled that Art. 128(b) has been amended to expand the powers of the DOLE
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Secretary and his duly authorized representatives by RA 7730. In these cases, the Court resolved that the DOLE
had the jurisdiction, despite the amount of the money claims involved. Furthermore, in these cases, the inspection
held by the DOLE regional director was prompted specifically by a complaint. Therefore, the initiation of a case
through a complaint does not divest the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representative of jurisdiction under
Art. 128(b).
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the
Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-
employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is
no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE,
and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art.
217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those
cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied
by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an employer-employee relationship
has been subjected to review by this Court, with the finding being that there was no employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent
presented self-serving allegations as well as self-defeating evidence.10 The findings of the Regional Director were
not based on substantial evidence, and private respondent failed to prove the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as there was no employer-employee relationship
present. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 179652 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
in the exercise of the DOLEs visitorial and enforcement power, the Labor Secretary or the latters authorized
representative shall have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, to the
exclusion of the NLRC.
Notes: Complainant was a drama talent hired on a per drama participation basis" (May 8, 2009 Decision).
Article 217 is now Article 224.
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS While it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the LA has
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each
employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the
visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives. Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the
Labor Code.
Title: 2. Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency v. Sec. Laguesma, GR No. 152396

November 20, 2007
Date: Nov. 20, 2007
Ponente Justice Carpio
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Petitioner Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. Respondent Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
The private respondent are the employees of EBVSAI were assigned to the National Power Corporation at
Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant in Benguet. They instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI
before the Regional Office of the DOLE. Thereafter, the RO conducted a complaint inspection of the plant where it
noted several labor violations. On the same day, the RO issued a notice of hearing requiring EBVSAI and private
respondents to attend. After the hearing, the Regional Director (RD) ordered EBVSAI to pay Php 763,927.85 to the
affected employees.
EBVSAI contends that under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter, not the Regional
Director, has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case because the individual monetary claim of private
respondents exceeds P5,000. RD denied the motion stating that, pursuant
to RA 7730, the limitations under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code no longer apply to the Secretary of
Labor's visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128(b). The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives are now empowered to hear and decide, in a summary proceeding, any matter involving the
recovery of any amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of employer-employee relations at the time
of the inspection.
DOLE SECRETARY RULING: It affirmed the Directors decision on the ground that pursuant to RA 7730, the
Court's decision in the Servando case is no longer controlling insofar as the restrictive effect of Article 129 on the
visitorial and enforcement power of the Secretary of Labor is concerned.
CA RULING: affirmed DOLE Secretary ruling
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money
claims of private respondents which exceed P5,000?
HELD:
Yes. while it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the LA has jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not
contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives. Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by
R.A. No. 7730) thus: (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article[s] 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and
in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to [the labor
standards provisions of this Code and other] labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and
enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.
In order to divest the RD or his representatives of jurisdiction, the following elements must be present: (a) that the
employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon; (b) that in order to resolve
such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection. The rules also provide that the employer shall raise such objections during the
hearing of the case or at any time after receipt of the notice of inspection results (Exception under Art. 128 of the
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Labor Code).
In this case, the RD validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims
exceeded P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and
the case does not fall under the exception clause. EBVSAI did not contest the findings of the labor regulations
officer during the hearing or after receipt of the notice of inspection results.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter
RELATIONS or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship
with Nissan. A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-
corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation so that
RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on Section 5(c) of PD 902-A.
Title: 3. Locsin v. Nissan Lease Philippines October 20, 2010 GR No. 185567
(Intracorporate dispute)
Date: October 20, 2010
Ponente BRION, J.:
Petitioner ARSENIO LOCSIN Respondent NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC.

(NCLPI) and LUIS BANSON
Nature of the case: Intra Corporate Dispute
FACTS:
Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for
13 years until he was nominated and elected Chairman. A few months thereafter, an election was held and Locsin
was neither re-elected Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer. Locsin filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI. NCLPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves
an intra-corporate dispute. Locsin maintained that he is an employee of NCPI.
LA Ruling: LA denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that its office-acquired jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide
the instant complaint finding extant in the case an employer-employee relationship. Article 280 of the Labor Code,
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the receipt of salaries by Locsin, SSS deductions on that salary, and the element of control in the performance of
work duties were used by LA to conclude that Locsin was a regular employee.
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling: NCLPI elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. CA ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer; hence the issue of his removal as EVP/Treasurer is an
intracorporate dispute under the RTCs jurisdiction. The fact that the position of EVP/Treasurer is specifically
enumerated as an office in the corporations by-laws makes him a corporate officer.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Locsins position as EVP/Treasurer makes him a corporate officer thereby excluding him from the
coverage of the Labor Code?
HELD:
YES. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board
pursuant to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. Section 25 of the Corporation Code
provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided
for in the by-laws. Even as EVP/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because such position is
provided for in Nissans By-Laws. An office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by
the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is
employed by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such
employee. Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the Amended By-Laws of the corporation.
Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear
the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate
act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation so that RTC should
exercise jurisdiction based on Section 5(c) of PD 902-A.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 4. Reyes v. RTC Makati Branch 42, August 11, 2008 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
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Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: SC held that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-
RELATIONS corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of
remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor
problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is
a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
Title: Okol v. Slimmers World GR No.160146
Date:December 11, 2009
Ponente: Carpio, J
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Petitioner: LESLIE OKOL Respondent: SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL,

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATIONS, INC., and RONALD
JOSEPH MOY
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 18 October 2002 and Resolution
dated 22 September 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69893, which set aside the Resolutions
dated 29 May 2001 and 21 December 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
FACTS:
Respondent Slimmers World International operating under the name Behavior Modifications, Inc. (Slimmers World)
employed petitioner Leslie Okol (Okol) as a management trainee. Okol was promoted as Head Office Manager and
then Director and Vice President.
Prior to Okols dismissal, Slimmers World preventively suspended Okol. The suspension arose from the seizure by
the Bureau of Customs of machines and treadmills to or consigned to Slimmers World but the shipment of the
equipment was placed under the name of Okol. Okol received a memorandum that her suspension had been
extended pending the outcome of the investigation on the Precor equipment importation. Okol received another
memorandum from Slimmers World requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her
in connection with the equipment seized by the Bureau of Customs. Okol filed her written explanation. However,
Slimmers World found Okols explanation to be unsatisfactory.Through a letter dated 22 September 1999 signed by
its president Ronald Joseph Moy (Moy), Slimmers World terminated Okols employment.
Okol filed an illegal dismissal complaint with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC. Respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss asserting that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
Okol argued that even as vice-president, the work that she performed conforms to that of an employee rather than
a corporate officer. Mere title or designation in a corporation will not, by itself, determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. It is the four-fold test, namely (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3)
the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control, which must be applied. Petitioner enumerated the instances that
she was under the power and control of Moy, Slimmers Worlds president:
(1) petitioner received salary evidenced by pay slips,
(2) Moy deducted Medicare and SSS benefits from petitioners salary, and
(3) petitioner was dismissed from employment not through a board resolution but by virtue of a letter from Moy.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that petitioner was a corporate officer at the time of her dismissal from
Slimmers World as supported by the General Information Sheet and Directors Affidavit attesting that petitioner was
an officer. Also, the factors cited by petitioner that she was a mere employee do not prove that she was not an
officer of Slimmers World. Even the alleged absence of any resolution of the Board of Directors approving
petitioners termination does not constitute proof that petitioner was not an officer. Respondents assert that
petitioner was not only an officer but also a stockholder and director; which facts provide further basis that
petitioners separation from Slimmers World does not come under the NLRCs jurisdiction.
LA Ruling: LA granted the motion to dismiss ruling that Okol was the vice-president of Slimmers World at the time
of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside
the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.
NLRC Ruling: It reversed the LA decision
CA RULING: It affirmed LAs ruling holding that being an intra-corporate dispute, the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not NLRC have jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner
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HELD:
NO. Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers
World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and back wages
imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes.
Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, secretary, treasurer and such
other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. An office is created by the charter of the corporation and the
officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and
generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation
who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
The Amended By-Laws of Slimmers World which enumerate the power of the board of directors as well as the
officers of the corporation clearly shows that Okol was a director and officer of Slimmers World. In a number of
cases, SC held that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy
which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of remuneration involving a stockholder and
officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate
affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the
corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have
jurisdiction over the present case.
WHEREFORE...we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 18 October 2002 Decision and 22 September 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69893. This Decision is without prejudice to petitioner
Leslie Okols taking recourse to and seeking relief through the appropriate remedy in the proper forum.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS 1. While respondent was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also
its Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations. A
corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform services under a circumstance which
would make them employees. The Labor Arbiter has thus jurisdiction over respondents
complaint.
2. All that is required to perfect the appeal is the posting of a bond to ensure that the award is
eventually paid should the appeal be dismissed. Petitioners should thus have posted a bond,
even if it were only partial, but they did not.
Title: 6. Rural Bank of Coron v. Cortes, December 6, 2006 GR No. 164888
Date: December 6, 2006
Ponente CARPIO MORALES, J.
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Petitioner: RURAL BANK OF CORON (PALAWAN), Respondent ANNALISA CORTES

INC., EMPIRE COLD STORAGE AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, CITIZENS DEVELOPMENT
INCOPRORATED (CDI), CARIDAD B. GARCIA,
SANDRA G.
ESCAT, LORNA GARCIA, and OLGA G. ESCAT
Nature of the case: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
Respondent Anita Cortes assumed the position of Vice President of petitioner Citizens Development Incorporated
(CDI) and practically controlled the financial operations of almost all of the other corporations.
Respondent was also the Financial Assistant, Personnel Officer and Corporate Secretary of The Rural Bank of
Coron, Personnel Officer of CDI, and Personnel Officer and Disbursing Officer of The Empire Cold Storage
Development Corporation (ECSDC). She simultaneously received salaries from these corporations. On
examination of the financial books of the corporations, it was discovered that respondent was involved in several
anomalies, drawing petitioners to terminate respondents services.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits before the LA.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that the case
was an intra-corporate controversy involving the removal of a corporate officer, respondent being the Corporate
Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, Inc., hence, cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
(now RTC) pursuant to Section 5 of PD 902-A.
LA RULING: LA assumed jurisdiction ruling that aside from her being Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Coron,
complainant was likewise appointed as Financial Assistant & Personnel Officer, which is not a corporate officer of
petitioners. LA ordered petitioners to pay respondent P1,168,090.00.
NLRC RULING: On the tenth or last day of the period of appeal, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for
Reduction of Bond to which they attached a Memorandum on Appeal. In their Motion for Reduction of Bond,
petitioners alleged that the corporations were under financial distress and the Rural Bank of Coron was under
receivership. NLRC, while noting that petitioners timely filed the appeal, held that the same was not accompanied
by an appeal bond, a mandatory requirement under Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the
NLRC New Rules of Procedure. It also noted that the Motion for Reduction of Bond was "premised on self-serving
allegations." It accordingly dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether LA has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether petitioners appeal before NLRC was perfected?
HELD:
1. YES. While respondent was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial
Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations. Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v.
Movilla instructs that a corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform services under a circumstance
which would make them employees. The Labor Arbiter has thus jurisdiction over respondents complaint.
2. NO. All that is required to perfect the appeal is the posting of a bond to ensure that the award is eventually paid
should the appeal be dismissed. Petitioners should thus have posted a bond, even if it were only partial, but they
did not. In the case at bar, petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period, thus, no
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appeal was perfected from the decision of the LA. For this reason, the decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC
had become final and executory and therefore immutable. No relaxation of the Rule may thus be considered.
Clearly then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the LA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 7. Halguena v. PAL October 2, 2009 GR No. 172013
Date: 02 October 2009
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Petitioner: Halaguea, et al. Respondent: PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

INCORPORATED
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different
dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association
of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.
On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating
the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005. Section 144, Part A of the PAL-
FASAP CBA, provides that for Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996, compulsory retirement
shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males.
In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned
CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal
treatment with their male counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners addressed to
respondent demanding the removal of gender discrimination provisions in the coming re-negotiations of
the PAL-FASAP CBA.
Thereafter, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals and
manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations between the
management and the association, at the soonest possible time. Then, petitioners filed a Special Civil
Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Makati City against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144.
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RTC Ruling:
RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present case and issued a TRO. RTC held that
the allegations in the petition do not make out a labor dispute arising from employer-employee
relationship as none is shown to exist. This case is not directed specifically against respondent arising
from any act of the latter, nor does it involve a claim against the respondent. Rather, this case seeks a
declaration of the nullity of the questioned provision of the CBA, which is within the Courts competence,
with the allegations in the Petition constituting the bases for such relief sought
CA Ruling:
CA ruled otherwise declaring that the dispute is a labor dispute.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners cause of action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners cause
of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. Petitioners primary relief is
the annulment of Section 144 which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight
attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the
RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil
action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application
of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is
within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely
incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and
CEDAW.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-
RELATIONS employee relationships as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act).
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Title: 8. Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management , July 10, 2007 GR No. 162419
Date: July 10, 2007
Ponente: TINGA, J.
Petitioner: PAUL V. SANTIAGO Respondent: CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT,

VELASCO, JR., JJ. INC.
Nature of the case: Petition for review
FACTS:
Petitioner Santiago had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about 5
years. He had signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months. Sais
contract was approved by the POEA. Petitioner was to be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread" which was
scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998. However, a week before the scheduled
date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondents Vice President, sent a facsimile message to the captain
of "MSV Seaspread," from the wife of Santiago asking him not to send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore.
He was also informed anonymously that Santiago, if allowed to depart will jump ship in Canada like his brother
Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S. Thus, the captain cancelled plans for Santiagos
departure. Petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he
might be considered for deployment at some future date. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages,
and attorney's fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. The case was
raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and regulations
governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages
representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee.
On appeal by respondent, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent because under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers
on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment contract shall commence upon actual
departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the
absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual
damages, and attorneys fees should be dismissed. On the other hand, the NLRC found respondents decision not
to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision but his motion was denied for lack of merit. He
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari. The CA noted that there is an ambiguity
in the NLRCs Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiters Decision, because by the very
modification introduced by the Commission (vacating the award of actual damages and attorneys fees), there is
nothing more left in the labor arbiters Decision to affirm. According to the appellate court, petitioner is not entitled
to actual damages because damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within
the period prescribed in the POEA Rules. It agreed with the NLRCs finding that petitioners non-deployment was a
valid exercise of respondents management prerogative. It added that since petitioner had not departed from the
Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against
the so called employer could have no leg to stand on.
ISSUE/S:
WON the seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid
reason but whose POEA-approved employment contract provides that the employer-employee relationship shall
commence only upon the seafarers actual departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to relief?
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HELD:
Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it failed to deploy
him within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason. In doing so, it had unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented
the consummation of the POEA- approved contract. Since it prevented his deployment without valid basis, said
deployment being a condition to the consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed consummated,
and therefore he should be awarded actual damages, consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay.
Petitioner adds that since the contract is deemed consummated, he should be considered an employee for all
intents and purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of his claims.
Petitioner additionally claims that he should be considered a regular employee, having worked for five (5) years on
board the same vessel owned by the same principal and manned by the same local agent. He argues that
respondents act of not deploying him was a scheme designed to prevent him from attaining the status of a regular
employee. Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the employment
contract, as it merely relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed callers in arriving at the
conclusion that he would jump ship like his brother.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioners monetary
claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was withheld for a valid
reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain adjudication of petitioners case much
less award damages to him. The controversy involves a breach of contractual obligations and as such is
cognizable by civil courts.
There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998, whereby petitioner
was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV Seaspread" for the consideration of US$515.00
per month for nine (9) months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of
Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire,
the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the
parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship.
The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when
petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions
therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place
had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and
obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had
happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning agent nor
the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason. Respondents act of
preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of
contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its
obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered. Despite the absence
of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from
employer-employee relationships as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act). Since the
present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims
are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement
RELATIONS stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to
voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of
the employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
Title: 9. Atlas Farms Inc. v. NLRC November 18, 2002 GR No. 142244
Date:18 November 2001
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
Petitioner: Atlas Farms, Inc. Respondent: NLRC, Jaime O. Dela Pea & Marcial I.
Abion
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Private respondent Jaime O. dela Pea was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner. He was among several
employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989, he was re-hired by petitioner and given the additional job of
feedmill operator. He was instructed to train selected workers to operate the feedmill.
In 1993, Pea was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose.
The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain within 24 hours why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. Pea refused, however, to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to
explain. Thus, a notice of termination with payment of his monetary benefits was sent to him.
Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose employment by petitioner.
Allegedly, he caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several hundred thousand
pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut grass and other waste materials into the ponds drainage system.
Petitioner sent a written notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action
would be taken against him. He refused to receive the notice and give an explanation, according to petitioner.
Consequently, the company terminated his services. He acknowledged receipt of a written notice of dismissal, with
his separation pay.
Pea and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both claimed that their
termination from service was due to petitioners suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union to
compete and replace the existing management-dominated union.
LA Ruling:
The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance machinery in the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of the grievance process,
but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in Region IV. They alleged lack of sympathy on petitioners part to
engage in conciliation proceedings.
NLRC Ruling:
NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision.
CA Ruling:
The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution with some modifications, thus:
1) The private respondents cannot be reinstated, due to their acceptance of the separation pay offered by the
petitioner;
2) The private respondents are entitled to their full back wages; and,
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3) The amount of the separation pay received by private respondents from petitioner shall not be deducted from
their full back wages.
ISSUE/S:
Does the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES. Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of
a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that:
(1) the employee was accorded due process, and
(2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid causes provided for by law.
No evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents
who were subsequently dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of
the grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively removed from
the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the
dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance
machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination,
with alleged violation of the employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
WHEREFORE...
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LABOR Doctrine: Where the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and
RELATIONS termination of employment, it is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter under Art. 217 of the LC.
Title: 10. Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Faburada, GR No. 121948
October 8, 2001
Date: 8 October 2001
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
Petitioner: PHCCI Respondents: Benedicto Faburada, Sisinita Villar,

Imelda Tamayo, Harold Catipay, and the NLRC
Nature of the case: Jurisdiction of the LA
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FACTS:
1. In 1990, Faburada et al. filed a complaint, among others, for illegal dismissal, payment of holidays and
rest days, separation pay, and wage differential against petitioner PHCCI.
a. Petitioners contentions: There is no employer-employee relationship between them as private
respondents are all members and co-owners of the cooperative.
Furthermore, private respondents have not exhausted the remedies provided in the cooperative
by-laws; wherein under Article 121 of R.A. No. 6939, otherwise known as the Cooperative
Development Authority Law which took effect on March 26, 1990, it requires conciliation or
mediation within the cooperative before a resort to judicial proceeding.
Also, they aver that respondents are its members and are working for it as volunteers. Not being
regular employees, they cannot sue petitioner.
LA Ruling: The case is impressed with employer-employee relationship; therefore, respondents were illegally
dismissed and directed [petitioners] to pay [respondents] backwages, separation pay, etc.
NLRC Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the LA.
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship

2. If yes, did the LA properly take cognizance of the case.
HELD:
1. Yes. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire; (2) the power to dismiss;
(3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the
latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. No particular form of proof is required to prove the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may show the
relationship.
The above elements are present here. Petitioner PHCCI hired private respondents to work for it. They
worked regularly on regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were paid regular wages and
made to accomplish daily time records just like any other regular employee. They worked under the
supervision of the cooperative manager. But unfortunately, they were dismissed.
2. Yes. The dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and termination of employment.
Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter.
As stated by the SolGen in his comment, P.D. 175 does not provide for a grievance machinery where a
dispute or claim may first be submitted. LOI 23 refers to instructions to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to implement immediately the recommendation of the Postmaster General for the
dismissal of some employees of the Bureau of Post. Obviously, this LOI has no relevance to the instant
case.
Article 121 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) provides the procedure how
cooperative disputes are to be resolved, thus:
ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes.- Disputes among members, officers, directors, and
committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable, be settled
amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms embodied in the bylaws
of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
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Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939 (Cooperative Development Authority Law)
which reads:
SEC. 8 Mediation and Conciliation.- Upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall
mediate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives: Provided, That if
no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate
of non-resolution shall be issued by the Commission prior to the filing of appropriate action
before the proper courts.
The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the cooperative involved in disputes
within a cooperative or between cooperatives.
Since respondents are the employees, and not officers, of the cooperative; the LA had jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED, with modification
in the sense that the backwages due private respondents shall be paid in full, computed from the time they were
illegally dismissed up to the time of the finality of this Decision.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is
RELATIONS comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its
coverage.The active participation of a party against whom the action was brought, coupled
with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action
is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys
jurisdiction.
Title: 11. Austria v. NLRC, August 16, 1999 (priest) GR No.
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
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Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) is a
religious corporation.
Petitioner, on the other hand, was a Pastor of the SDA until 31 October 1991, when his services were
terminated.petitioner received several communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros
Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his
wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros
Mission.
Petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon
Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to
do the collecting at that time.
On 16 October 1991,Petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission. During said
call, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the
dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo and
petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from Pastor
Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the latters motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada. Due to the
assistance of petitioner in collecting Pastor Rodrigos debt, the latter harbored ill-feelings against petitioner. When
news reached petitioner that Pastor Rodrigo was about to file a complaint against him with the Negros Mission, he
immediately proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat on the date abovementioned and asked the latter to convene
the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner since some committee members were out
of town and there was no quorum. Thereafter, the two exchanged heated arguments. A fact-finding committee was
created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of
denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
commission of an offense against the person of employers duly authorized representative, as grounds for the
termination of his services.
Reacting against the adverse decision of the SDA, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and
exemplary damages and other labor law benefits.Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of church and state, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed
by petitioner. Since the matter at bar allegedly involves the discipline of a religious minister, it is to be considered a
purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State has no right to interfere.
LA RULING: The Labor Arbiter RENDERED DECISION IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
NLRC RULING: sustained the argument posed by private respondents and, accordingly, dismissed
The complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not LA has jurisdiction
HELD:
YES. Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is comprehensive enough to
include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-
employment states that the provisions of this Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for
profit or not. Obviously, the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is
made more evident by the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book
VI on the Termination of Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage
of the law, to wit:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings, whether operated for
profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable and religious institutions and organizations, in
cases of regular employment with the exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
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With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the doctrine of separation of
church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the Labor Code.Finally, as correctly pointed out
by petitioner, private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish. The
Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action was brought, coupled with
his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount
to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction. Thus, the active participation of private respondents in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE...
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LABOR Doctrine: An international organization, such as the ADB, is covered with immunity from local
RELATIONS jurisdiction.
Title:12. Department of Foreign Affairs v. NLRC September 18, 1996 GR No. 113191
Date: September 18, 1996
Ponente: J. Vitug
Petitioner: Department of Foreign Affairs Respondent: NLRC, LA Nieves de Castro, and Jose
Magnayi
Nature of the case: Petition for Review On Certiorari
FACTS:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent
directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from
legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of
the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of
the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters
(the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunity from suit.
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LA Ruling: The LA declared Magnayi as a regular employee of ADB, and the termination of his services as illegal.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC, seeking formal vacation
of the void judgment and the investigation of LA de Castro.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC Chairman ruled that the request for the "investigation" of LA Nieves de Castro, by the
NLRC, has been erroneously premised on Art. 218(c) of the Labor Code, considering that the provision deals with
"a question, matter or controversy within its (the Commission) jurisdiction" obviously referring to a labor dispute
within the ambit of Art. 217 (on jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission over labor cases).The procedure,
in the adjudication of labor cases, including raising of defenses, is prescribed by law. The defense of immunity
could have been raised before the Labor Arbiter by a special appearance which, naturally, may not be considered
as a waiver of the very defense being raised. Except where an appeal is seasonably and properly made, neither
the Commission nor the NLRC may review, or even question, any decision by a Labor Arbiter. The NLRC added
that while it exercises administrative supervision over the Commission and its regional branches and all its
personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters, he does not have the competence to
investigate or review any decision of a Labor Arbiter. The NLRC furthered that if the DFA feels that the action of LA
de Castro constitutes misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, it is suggested that an appropriate complaint be
lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman.
OSG Comment: The OSG it became convinced that ADB was correct in invoking its immunity from suit under the
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the ADB is covered by immunity from suit, rendering the NLRC without jurisdiction.
HELD:
Yes, the ADB is covered by immunity from suit. The Headquarters Agreement provides that The Bank shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of, or in connection with, the exercise of its
powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities and All
Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing missions for the
Bank shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
Being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the
municipal law.
The Court cited the opinion of the Minister of Justice in the case of Southeast Asian Fisheries vs Acosta: One of
the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from
the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is
that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body
to discharge its responsibilities impartially behalf of its member-states.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter is VACATED, for being
NULL AND VOID.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 13. PNB v. Cabansag , June 21, 2005 (differentiate it with GR No.
Manila Hotel v. NLRC, October 13, 2000
Date:
Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: By the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article
RELATIONS 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its
dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected
with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal
case.
This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different
source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages,
claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the
claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in
enforcement of a prior employment contract.
Title: 14. Banez v. Valdevilla, May 9, 2000 (claims of employers) GR No. 128024
Date: May 9, 2000
Ponente Gonzaga - Reyes, J.
Petitioner Bebiano Baez Respondent Hon. Downey Valdevilla and Oro

Marketing
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Bebiano Baez was the sales operations manager of Oro Marketing in its branch in Iligan City Oro "indefinitely
suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC.
Baez alleged a modus operandi used by Oro Marketing. herein: Defendant canvassed customers personally or
through salesmen of plaintiff which were hired or recruited by him. If said customer decided to buy items from
plaintiff on installment basis, defendant, without the knowledge of said customer and plaintiff, would buy the items
on cash basis at ex-factory price, a privilege not given to customers, and thereafter required the customer to sign
promissory notes and other documents using the name and property of plaintiff, purporting that said customer
purchased the items from plaintiff on installment basis. Thereafter, defendant collected the installment payments
either personally or through Venus Lozano, a Group Sales Manager of plaintiff but also utilized by him as secretary
in his own business for collecting and receiving of installments, purportedly for the plaintiff but in reality on his own
account or business. The collection and receipt of payments were made inside the Iligan City branch using
plaintiffs facilities, property and manpower. That accordingly plaintiffs sales decreased and reduced to a
considerable extent the profits which it would have earned.
LA Ruling: Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.
NLRC Ruling: dismissed the same for having been filed out of time.
Elevated by petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds; and
that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition were met, it would still be dismissed for
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
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Oro filed a complaint for damages before RTC Misamis Oriental which prayed for the payment of loss of profit
and/or unearned income and expenses of litigation.
Baez filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages,
having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
NLRC. He accused Oro Marketing of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have included
the instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. He also pointed out that the civil action
of private respondent is an act of forum-shopping.
RTC Ruling: A perusal of the complaint which is for damages does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code.
The Court believes such cause of action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts.
ISSUE/S:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
NO. Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
The above provisions are a result of the amendment by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, which put to rest the earlier
confusion as to who between Labor Arbiters and regular courts had jurisdiction over claims for damages as
between employers and employees.
By the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article 217 should apply with equal force
to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim
arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the
illegal dismissal case.
In the case before us, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior
employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's
"doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee.
Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action for damages would be
to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the
dissipation of private respondent's property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal dismissal
case. The Labor Arbiter, however, found to the contrary ---that no business losses may be attributed to petitioner
as in fact, it was by reason of petitioner's installment plan that the sales of the Iligan branch reached its highest
record level.
Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause
of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.
This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee relationship is
merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of
regular courts was upheld where the damages, claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of
contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in
enforcement of a prior employment contract.
Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also
damages governed by the Civil Code.
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WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:For the retirement benefits to be exempt from the withholding tax, the taxpayer is
RELATIONS burdened to prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) a reasonable private benefit
plan is maintained by the employer; (2) the retiring official or employee has been in the
service of the same employer for at least ten (10) years; (3) the retiring official or employee is
not less than fifty (50) years of age at the time of his retirement; and (4) the benefit had been
availed of only once.
Title: 15. Santos v. Servier Philippines Inc. November 28, 2008 (Tax GR No. 166377
deduction)
Date:November 28, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petitioner: MA. ISABEL T. SANTOS, represented by Respondent: SERVIER PHILIPPINES, INC. and
ANTONIO P. SANTOS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Nature of the case:Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision, dated August 12, 2004 and its Resolution dated
December 17, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75706.
FACTS:
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On March 29, 1998, petitioner, together with her husband Antonio P. Santos, her son, and some friends,
had dinner at Leon des Bruxelles. While having dinner, petitioner complained of stomach pain, then
vomited. Eventually, she was brought to the hospital where she fell into coma for 21 days; and later stayed
at the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) for 52 days. The hospital found that the probable cause of her sudden
attack was "alimentary allergy," as she had recently ingested a meal of mussels which resulted in a
concomitant uticarial eruption.
During the time that petitioner was confined at the hospital, her husband and son stayed with her in Paris.
Petitioners hospitalization expenses, as well as those of her husband and son, were paid by respondent.
In June 1998, petitioners attending physicians gave a prognosis of the formers condition; and, with the
consent of her family, allowed her to go back to the Philippines for the continuation of her medical
treatment. During the period of petitioners rehabilitation, respondent continued to pay the formers
salaries; and to assist her in paying her hospital bills.
In a letter dated May 14, 1999, respondent informed the petitioner that the former had requested the
latters physician to conduct a thorough physical and psychological evaluation of her condition, to
determine her fitness to resume her work at the company. Petitioners physician concluded that the former
had not fully recovered mentally and physically. Hence, respondent was constrained to terminate
petitioners services.
Of the promised retirement benefits amounting to P1,063,841.76, only P701,454.89 was released to
petitioners husband, the balance thereof was withheld allegedly for taxation purposes.
Petitioner, represented by her husband, instituted the instant case for unpaid salaries; unpaid separation
pay; unpaid balance of retirement package plus interest; insurance pension for permanent disability;
educational assistance for her son; medical assistance; reimbursement of medical and rehabilitation
expenses; moral, exemplary, and actual damages, plus attorneys fees.
LA Ruling:
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners complaint. In denying petitioners claim for
separation pay, the Labor Arbiter ratiocinated that the same had already been integrated in the retirement
plan established by respondent. Thus, petitioner could no longer collect separation pay over and above her
retirement benefits. The arbiter refused to rule on the legality of the deductions made by respondent from
petitioners total retirement benefits for taxation purposes, as the issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the
NLRC. On the matter of educational assistance, the Labor Arbiter found that the same may be granted
only upon the submission of a certificate of enrollment. Lastly, as to petitioners claim for damages and
attorneys fees, the Labor Arbiter denied the same as the formers dismissal was not tainted with bad faith.
NLRC Ruling:
The tribunal set aside the Labor Arbiters decision. The NLRC emphasized that petitioner was not retired
from the service pursuant to law, collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or other employment contract;
rather, she was dismissed from employment due to a disease/disability. In view of her non-entitlement to
retirement benefits, the amounts received by petitioner should then be treated as her separation pay.
Though not legally obliged to give the other benefits, respondent volunteered to grant them, for
humanitarian consideration. The NLRC therefore ordered the payment of the other benefits promised by
the respondent. Lastly, it sustained the denial of petitioners claim for damages for the latters failure to
substantiate the same.
CA Ruling :
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Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the retirement benefits are taxable
HELD:
Yes. Section 32 (B) (6) (a) of the New National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provides for the exclusion of
retirement benefits from gross income. For the retirement benefits to be exempt from the withholding tax,
the taxpayer is burdened to prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) a reasonable private
benefit plan is maintained by the employer; (2) the retiring official or employee has been in the service of
the same employer for at least ten (10) years; (3) the retiring official or employee is not less than fifty (50)
years of age at the time of his retirement; and (4) the benefit had been availed of only once.
As discussed, petitioner was qualified for disability retirement. At the time of such retirement, petitioner was only 41
years of age; and had been in the service for more or less eight (8) years. As such, the above provision is not
applicable for failure to comply with the age and length of service requirements. Therefore, respondent cannot be
faulted for deducting from petitioners total retirement benefits the amount of P362,386.87, for taxation purposes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 12, 2004 and
its Resolution dated December 17, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75706 are AFFIRMED.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: Not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only
RELATIONS by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between
the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of
Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of
justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Title: 16. Pepsi Cola Distributor Phils v. Galang, September 24, GR No. 89621
1991
Date:September 24, 1991
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Petitioner: PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE Respondent: HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG,

PHILIPPINES, INC., represented by its Plant General SALVADOR NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO OLIVA,
Manager ANTHONY B. SIAN, ELEAZAR LIMBAB, WILFREDO CABAAS & FULGENCIO LEGO
IRENEO BALTAZAR & JORGE HERAYA
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Nature of the case:
FACTS:
The private respondents were employees of the Pepsi who were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition
of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. Pepsi filed a criminal complaint for theft against them but this was later withdrawn and
substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary investigation, the
complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were dismissed by the petitioner
company As a result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC in Tacloban City.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case because it involved employee-employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The
motion was granted. However, the respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the
complaint, saying it was "distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts." The
petitioners then came to this Court for relief.
Pepsi invoke Article 217 of the Labor Code and a number of decisions of this Court to support their position that
the private respondents civil complaint for damages falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the
labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and
employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint
will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.
In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, two employees filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a civil complaint for
damages against their employer for slanderous remarks made against them by the company president. On the
order dismissing the case because it came under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters, Justice Vicente Abad Santos
said for the Court:
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple
action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing
statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong
premise.
In Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Pao, where the plaintiff was suing for damages for alleged violation by the defendant
of an "Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited," the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Rizal over the case was questioned. The Court, citing the earlier case of
Quisaba v. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer and Plywood, Inc., declared through Justice Herrera:
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor
Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other
items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor
disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are
the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
In Molave Sales, Inc. v. Laron, the same Justice held for the Court that the claim of the plaintiff against its sales
manager for payment of certain accounts pertaining to his purchase of vehicles and automotive parts, repairs of
such vehicles, and cash advances from the corporation was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of
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Dagupan City and not the labor arbiter, because "although a controversy is between an employer and an
employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved."
The latest ruling on this issue is found in San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where the above cases are cited and
the changes in Article 217 are recounted. That case involved a claim of an employee for a P60,000.00 prize for a
proposal made by him which he alleged had been accepted and implemented by the defendant corporation in the
processing of one of its beer products. The claim was filed with the labor arbiter, who dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction but was reversed by the NLRC on appeal. In setting aside the appealed decision and dismissing the
complaint, the Court observed through Justice Feliciano:
It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential, in this connection. Where such
principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case
should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages
might be asserted as an incident to such claim.
Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other
labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction
over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a
"reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and
employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an
employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What
the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which
the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was
affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the
respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has
no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code
WHEREFORE...RTC ruling is AFFIRMED
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine: VA has jurisdiction to rule on labor disputes not raised in the submission
RELATIONS agreement in order to resolve those issues raised in the said agreements.
Title: 17. 7K Corp. v. Albarico, GR No. 182295
Date: June 26, 2013
Ponente: Sereno, C.J.
Petitioner: 7K Corporation Respondent: Eddie Albarico
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, asking the
Court to determine whether a voluntary arbitrator in a labor dispute exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding issues not
specified in the submission agreement of the parties.
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FACTS:
Respondent Eddie Albarico (Albarico) was a regular employee of petitioner 7K Corporation, a company selling
water purifiers. He started working for the company in 1990 as a salesman. Because of his good performance, he
became a regular employee and was promoted several times, to senior sales representative and then to acting
team field supervisor. He was awarded the Presidents Trophy for being one of the companys top water purifier
specialist distributors.
In 1993, the CEO of petitioner 7K Corporation terminated Albaricos employment allegedly for his poor sales
performance. Respondent had to stop reporting for work, and he subsequently submitted his money claims against
petitioner for arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The issue for voluntary
arbitration before the NCMB, according to the parties Submission Agreement was whether respondent Albarico
was entitled to the payment of separation pay and the sales commission reserved for him by the corporation.
While the NCMB arbitration case was pending, Albarico filed a Complaint against 7K with the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal with money claims for overtime pay, holiday
compensation, commission, and food and travelling allowances. The Complaint was decided by the
LA Ruling: Favored Albarico, awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages and attorneys fees.
NLRC Ruling: Vacated LAs ruling for forum shopping on the part of Albarico because the NCMB arbitration case
was still pending. Dismissal was without prejudice to the pending NCMB arbitration case, which became final after
no appeal was taken.
NCMB (Voluntary Arbitrators) Ruling: Albarico was illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay.
Almost 12 years after the filing of the NCMB case, both parties appeared in a hearing before the NCMB. VA
explained that the promotions, increases in salary, and awards received by respondent belied the claim that the
latter was performing poorly. Albarico could not have abandoned his job, as the abandonment should have been
clearly shown. Mere absence was not sufficient, according to the arbitrator, but must have been accompanied by
overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee did not want to work anymore. The immediate filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the employer, with a prayer for reinstatement, showed that the employee was not
abandoning his work. VA also found that Albarico was dismissed from his work without due process.
Reinstatement was no longer possible because of the strained relationship of the parties, VA ordered the
corporation to pay separation pay for two years at P4,456 for each year, or a total amount of P8,912.
CA Ruling: Affirmed VAs decision but eliminated the award of attorneys fees for having been made without
factual, legal or equitable justification. Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied as well.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the VA properly assumed jurisdiction to decide the issue of legality of dismissal of Albarico as well
as the latters backwages.
HELD: YES
It is clear that voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties, assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute
such as the present case.
Petitioner asserts that under Article 262 of the Labor Code, the jurisdiction of VA is strictly limited to the issues that
the parties agree to submit which is about the separation pay and sales commission. Thus, it contends that VA
exceeded his jurisdiction when he resolved the issues of the legality of the dismissal of respondent and the latters
entitlement to backwages on the basis of a finding of illegal dismissal.
SC rule that the instant case lead to no other conclusion than that the claim of Albarico for separation pay was
premised on his allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus, VA properly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of the legality
of his dismissal. The issue of separation pay emanates solely from respondents allegation of illegal dismissal. In
fact, petitioner itself acknowledged the issue of illegal dismissal in its position paper submitted to the NCMB.
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Also, there has to be a reason for deciding the issue of respondents entitlement to separation pay. To think
otherwise would lead to absurdity, because the VA would then be deciding that issue in a vacuum. The arbitrator
would have no basis whatsoever for saying that Albarico was entitled to separation pay or not if the issue of the
legality of respondents dismissal was not resolve first.
Hence, the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed that the core issue behind the issue of separation pay is the
legality of the dismissal of respondent.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 18. Kawachi et. al. v. Del Quero, March 27, 2007 (reasonable GR No. 163768
causal connection)
Date: March 27, 2007
Ponente Tinga J.
Petitioner: Virgilio Kawach Respondent: Del Quero
Nature of the case: LA Jurisdiction over claims from damages (in connection with EER)
FACTS:
Kawachi hired Del Quero as a clerk of A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc located in Quezon City from May 27, 2002 to
August 10, 2002.
On August 10, 2002, Defendants Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi accused Del Quero of having committed an
act which she had not done and was scolded in a loud voice in front of many employees and customers in their
office and was instantly dismissed from her job without due process. The incident happened in front of many
people which caused the Plaintiff to suffer serious embarrassment and shame so that she could not do anything
but cry because of the shameless way by which she was terminated from the service
Del Quero charged Virgilio Kawachi, Julius Kawachi and A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., with illegal dismissal,
non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of minimum wage law, and non-payment of overtime pay.
Complaint was filed with NLRC.
A few months after, Del Quero filed an action for damages against Virgilio and Julius Kawachi before the MeTC of
Quezon City.
Del Quero claimed that the August 10, 2002 incident had caused her to suffer serious embarrassment and shame
so that she could not do anything but cry because of the shameless way by which she was terminated from the
service.
The Kawachis then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum
shopping or splitting causes of action.
MeTC Ruling: DENIED the Motion for Dismissal

It ruled that no causal connection appeared between Del Queros cause of action and the employer-employee
relations between the parties.
The Kawachis filed a petition for certiorari.
RTC Ruling: AFFIRMED the MeTC

It upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Del Queros complaint for damages. The employees action for damages
based on slanderous remarks uttered by the employer was within the regular courts jurisdiction since the complaint
did not allege any unfair labor practice on the part of the employer.
ISSUE/S:
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Do the regular courts have jurisdiction over the claim for damages?
HELD:
NO. The NLRC has jurisdiction over Del Queros complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom.
She cannot be allowed to file separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a
reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the
MeTC must be dismissed.
Jurisprudence has developed the reasonable causal connection rule. Under this rule, if there is a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the
jurisdiction of the labor courts; in the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
t is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the
manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the
remedy available as
regards the first the employees separation from employment it does not at all deal with the second the
manner of that separation which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the
Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain
and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal
dismissal from employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than
those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issueof whether or not moral or other damages were
suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the
circumstancesis determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not
meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the
Labor Arbiters jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the allegations of Del Quero in her complaint for damages show that her injury was the offshoot
of Kawachis immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superior to the supposedly sloppy manner by which
she had discharged her duties. The allegations in Del Queros complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her
alleged illegal dismissal.
The Court further notes that for a single cause of action, the dismissed employee cannot be allowed to sue in two
forums: one, before the labor arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages; and two, before a court of
justice for recovery of damages. Suing in the manner described is known as splitting a cause of action, a practice
engendering multiplicity of actions.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: 19. Lunzaga v. Albar Shipping April 18, 2012. GR No.
Date:
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Ponente
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LA Ruling:
NLRC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Doctrine:
RELATIONS
Title: GR No. G.R. Nos. 178382-83

20. / 22. Continental Microline v. Basso, September 23, 2015.
Ponente: JARDELEZA, J.
Petitioner: CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Respondent: JOSEPH BASSO
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America (US), licensed to do business in the Philippines. Basso, a US citizen,
resided in the Philippines prior to his death.
Joseph Basso accepted the offer for the position of General Manager of the Philippine Branch of Continental. On
November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso retaining his position as
General Manager.
On December 20, 1995, Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who was then CMI's Vice
President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that Basso has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an "as
needed basis" and that will not receive any monetary compensation but will continue being covered by the
insurance and will enjoy travel privileges; and payment for housing lease for 12 months.
Basso wrote a counter-proposal but it was denied but Basso was informed that he could be terminated at will upon
a thirty-day notice. This notice was allegedly the letter Basso received from Mr. Schulz on December 20, 1995.
Basso was reminded of the company's decision to relieve him as General Manager. Basso, instead, was offered
the position of consultant to CMI. Basso was terminated and was offered severance pay.
Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary Damages against CMI.
CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of
the controversy.
Labor Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter held that
the terms and provisions of the employment contract show that the parties did not intend to apply our Labor Code
(Presidential Decree No. 442). The Labor Arbiter also held that no employer-employee relationship existed
between Basso and the branch office of CMI in the Philippines, but between Basso and the foreign corporation
itself.
On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of certain facts to settle the
issue on jurisdiction. NLRC ruled that the issue on whether the principle of lex loci contractusor lex loci
celebrationis should apply has to be further threshed out.
LA Ruling:
Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan dismissed the case for lack of merit and jurisdiction since employment contract
was executed in the US , "the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance was returned
there."Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply and the parties did not intend to apply
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Philippine laws.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Basso was terminated for a valid cause based on the allegations of CMI that
Basso committed a series of acts that constitute breach of trust and loss of confidence.
NLRC Ruling:
The NLRC did not agree with the Labor Arbiter that his office has no jurisdiction over the controversy. It ruled that
the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office's jurisdiction by
presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits
of the case. 5e
NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just and valid causes on the ground of breach of
trust and loss of confidence.
CA Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and over the parties.
On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals declared that CMI illegally dismissed Basso. The Court of Appeals
found that CMI's allegations of loss of trust and confidence were not established.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY
THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASE.
II. WAS BASSO VALIDLY DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST OR CONFIDENCE.
HELD:
I. The labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case.
This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217, clearly vests original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Labor Arbiter acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of service of
summons. We note that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared
and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business
in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign
corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the
jurisdiction of our courts.
Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum, this being an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
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II. Basso was illegally dismissed.
It is of no moment that Basso was a managerial employee. The right of the management to dismiss must be
balanced against the managerial employee's right to security of tenure.
An employer to validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 (c) of
the Labor Code, the employer must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence should not be
simulated; 2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; 3) it may not
be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a willful breach of trust
and founded on clearly established facts.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of Basso was not founded on clearly established facts and
evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from employment. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to
establish loss of trust and confidence, substantial evidence is required and on the employer rests the burden to
establish it. There must be
some basis for the loss of trust, or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for misconduct, which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
We find that CMI failed to discharge its burden to prove the above acts. CMI merely submitted affidavits of its
officers, without any other corroborating evidence. Basso, on the other hand, had adequately explained his side.
CMI violated procedural due process in terminating Basso. There must be:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the
employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2)
present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written
notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been
considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.
Here, Mr. Schulz's and Ms. Woodward's letters with an offer to make him consultan was inconsistent of CMI to
declare Basso as unworthy of its trust and confidence and, in the same breath, offer him the position of consultant.
Basso is entitled to separation pay and full backwages.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of eniority rights and other privileges, and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of
backwages.91 In the case of Basso, reinstatement is no longer possible since he has already passed away. Thus,
Basso's separation pay with full backwages shall be paid to his heirs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2006 and Resolution
dated June 19, 2007 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 are
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the award of backwages. Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. is hereby
ordered to pay Respondent Joseph Basso's heirs: 1) separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year
of service, and 2) full backwages from January 31, 1996, the date of his illegal dismissal, to October 2, 2002, the
date of his compulsory retirement age.
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Notes: In Hasegawa v. Kitamura,40 we stated that in the judicial resolution of conflict-of-laws problems, three
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. In
resolving the conflicts problem, courts should ask the following questions:
1. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this case?
2. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light of the facts?
3. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular problem?
4. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been properly pleaded and proved by the one invoking
it?
5. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the forum one of the basic exceptions to the
application of foreign law? In short, is there any strong policy or vital interest of the forum that is at stake in this
case and which should preclude the application of foreign law? 41
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the material allegations in the complaint,
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 42 It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence
of the court.43 That the employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it originated
from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to
hear and try this case.
----
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if
it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 46 All
these requisites are present here.
The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following important questions: (1) What legal
system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2)
to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. These questions are entirely different from
the question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer whether the courts of a state where the case is initiated have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment. As such, the power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law.
Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law the applicable law. Basso, though a US citizen,
was a resident here from he time he was hired by CMI until his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while
a foreign corporation, has a license to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso
was hired to work. The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A purely consensual contract, it
was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso accepted the terms and conditions of his employment as offered
by CMI. The place of performance relative to Biasso's contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged
prohibited acts of Basso that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.
Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem. Thus, we hold that CMI
and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding some references made to US laws and the fact that
this intention was not expressly stated in the contract.
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LABOR Doctrine: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the claims of an employee arising from
RELATIONS their employee-employer relationship against the employer.
Title: GR No. 211588

21. Worlds Best Gas Inc. v. Vital, September 9, 2015 (applicable to
EE rel).
Ponente Perlas-Bernabe
Petitioner: Worlds Best Gas, Inc Respondent: Henry Vital
Nature of the case: Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter
FACTS:
Private respondent, Henry Vital was a incorporator of petitioner, Worlds Best Gas, Inc. (WBGI) holding P500,000
worth of shares of stocks. He also owns a separate business with his wife called ERJ Enterprises which sourced
LPG from WBGI and distributes the same through ERJ wherein they incurred an outstanding balance of
P923,843.59 for the unpaid LPG based on their latest statement of account.
Thereafter, Vital was appointed as Internal Auditor and Personnel Manager for 4 years by WGBIs President/CEO.
It continued until his mandatory retirement in 2003. Upon his retirement, WGBIs BOD computed Vitals retirement
benefits. WGBI also agreed to acquire Vitals P500,000 shares of stock at par value. The said amount was offset
against the outstanding balance of ERJ Enterprises to WBGI.
Vital now claims his unpaid salaries and separation pay amounting to P845,000 and P250,000 respectively. WGBI
rejected his claim and claims that it is Vital who actually owes then P369,156.
Vital then filed before the NLRC-RAB for non-payment of separation and retirement benefits, underpayment of
salaries/wages and 13th month pa, illegal reduction of salary and benefits and damages. WBGI, on the other hand,
contends that the LA had no jurisdiction over the case as Vital is not an employee but an incorporator and
stockholder of WGBI.
The LA ruled that the nature of the suit arises from an intra-corporate issue. Hence, the case was dismissed due to
lack of jurisdiction.
Vital thereafter filed the RTC - special commercial court, which rendered that Vital was an employee of
WBGI since his position as Internal Auditor and Personnel Mgr were not provided for by WBGIs by-laws. It
upheld his claim for unpaid salaries and separation pay. The RTC ruled that the main action is intra-
corporate controversy together with question of damages and employment benefits.
WBGI then appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the case and agreed with the decision of the RTC but claims
that the award of employment benefit was, although improper, it would still rule on the matter reasoning
that it has the eventual authority to review labor courts decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling on Vitals claim in unpaid salaries and separation pay.
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HELD:
YES. The SC ruled that considering that the RTC has no jurisdiction to rule on VItals claim for unpaid salaries and
separation pay as he is considered as an employee of WBGI since his positions were not provided for by WBGIs
by-laws. Thus, SC ruled that CAs rationale that it has the eventual authority to review labor courts decision is
direly infirm. Vital, however, may re-file the case for unpaid salaries and separation pay before the labor tribunal.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
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LABOR Title: MENDOZA VS OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU)

RELATIONS
Doctrine: G.R. No. 201595

Petitioner's charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Date: January 25, 2016
Labor Code. In addition, Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the
civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,
attorney's fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiters.
ALLAN M. MENDOZA OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION
(MWEU)
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Petitioner Allan Mendoza was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), a Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE)-registered labor organization consisting of rank and-file employees within Manila Water
Company (MWC) while the respondents were MWEU officers. In an April 11, 2007 letter, MWEU informed petitioner
that the union was unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of the required
December 2006 checkoff authorization from him. Petitioner was warned that his failure to pay the union dues would
result in sanctions upon him and that such failure to pay the union dues, petitioner and several others violated
Section l(g), Article IX of the MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws. In turn, Borela (an officer) referred the charge to the
MWEU grievance committee for investigation. On May 21, 2007, a notice of hearing was sent to petitioner, who
attended the scheduled hearing. The MWEU grievance committee recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30
days. In a letter, Borela informed petitioner and his correspondents of the MWEU Executive Board's "unanimous
approval" of the grievance committee's recommendation and imposition upon them of a penalty of 30 days
suspension, effective June 25, 2007. Mendoza took exception to the imposition and indicated the intention to appeal
the same to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with the union's Constitution and By-Laws, which
grants them the right to appeal any arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board to the
General Membership Assembly. The appeal was denied.
Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers on September 14, 2007. Petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for Vice-President, but he was disqualified for not being a member in good standing on account of his
suspension. In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with MWC, petitioner joined another union, the Workers Association for Transparency, Empowerment and Reform,
All-Filipino Workers Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was elected union President. Other MWEU members were
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inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened that they would not get benefits from the new
CBA.
The MWEU leadership submitted a proposed CBA which contained provisions to the effect that in the event of
retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU
members shall receive a signing bonus. On October 13,2008, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents for
unfair labor practices, damages, and attorney's fees and accused the respondents of illegal termination from MWEU
in connection with the events relative to his non-payment of union dues; unlawful interference, coercion, and violation
of the rights of MWC employees to self-organization - in connection with the proposed CBA submitted by MWEU
leadership, which petitioner claims contained provisions that discriminated against non-MWEU members.
LA Ruling:
Filing of the instant case is still premature. Parties shall exhaust first all the administrative remedies before resorting
to compulsory arbitration. Thus, instant case is referred back to the Union for the General Assembly to act or
deliberate complainant's appeal on the decision of the Executive Board.
NLRC Ruling:
Dismissed LA decision for being null and void because of lack of jurisdiction.
CA Ruling:
Affirmed the decision of NLRC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is true that some of petitioner's causes of action constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR under Article
226 of the Labor Code. An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over
any provision of the union's constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following
circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes. However, petitioner's charge of unfair labor practices falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In addition, Article
247 of the same Code provides that "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney's fees and other affirmative relief, shall be
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters." Petitioner contends that respondents committed acts constituting unfair
labor practices - which charge was particularly laid out in his pleadings, but that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the
CA ignored it and simply dismissed his complaint on the ground that his causes of action were intra- or inter-union in
nature. Specifically, petitioner claims that he was suspended and expelled from MWEU illegally as a result of the
denial of his right to appeal his case to the general membership assembly in accordance with the union's constitution
and bylaws. On the other hand, respondents counter that such charge is intra-union in nature, and that petitioner lost
his right to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of 30%
of the union membership in good standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws
or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing under Article VI, Section 3.
The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of the Labor Code, which states: Article 247.
Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor
and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of
freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations. "In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission' of acts that transgress the
workers' right to organize."50 "[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the
workers' right to self-organization."51 "[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the
Labor Code which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization."52
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Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the 'right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations
of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.' This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine: The decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding,
RELATIONS does not foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence
of an employer-employee relationship between them.
Title: 24. Hijo Resources v. Mejares, January 13, 2016 GR No. 208986
Date: January 13, 2016
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Petitioner Hijo resources Corp Respondent Mijares et al, Represented by

NAMABDJERA-HRC Union
FACTS:
Mejares et al, were among the complainants represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC Union alleges that HRC,
formerly Hijo Plantation Inc., (HPI) is the owner of agricultural lands in Tagum, Davao which were primarily planted
with Cavendish bananas. Its application for the conversion of its land from Agricultural to agri-industrial use has
been approved. The machineries and equipment formerly used by HPI continued to be iutilized by HRC.
Complainants were hired as farm workers in HPI and was absorbed in HRC but they were under 3 contractor
growers. Complainants asserted that these contractor-growers received compensation from HRC and were under
the control of HRC. They further alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization, farm
machineries, and equipment.complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC, which was later registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 24 August 2007, NAMABDJERA-HRC filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE.
When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed with the DOLE a notice of
cessation of business operations. In September 2007, complainants were terminated from their employment on the
ground of cessation of business operations by the contractor-growers of HRC.complainants, represented by
NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions with prayer for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC.
DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order, dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for certification election on the
ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between complainants and HRC. Complainants did not
appeal the Order of Med-Arbiter but pursued the illegal dismissal case they filed in NLRC.
HRC moved to dismiss the complaint for illegal dismissal due to:
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(1) Lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res judicata; and

(2) The Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were not employees of HRC, which complainants did
not appeal, had become final and executory.
LA Ruling: Denied
Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss. Labor Arbiter held that res judicata does not apply. Citing
the cases of Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. IAC and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. Pepito, the Labor Arbiter
ruled that the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature of that proceedings, does
not foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of employer-employee
relationship between them. Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter hat no employment relationship exists between HRC
and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the same issue. The
non-litigious nature of the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does not prevent the Labor Arbiter from hearing and
deciding the case.
NLRC Ruling: Reversed LA Ruling
The NLRC granted the petition, holding that Labor Arbiter gravely abused her discretion in denying HRC's motion
to dismiss. The NLRC held that the Med-Arbiter Order dismissing the certification election case on the ground of
lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and complainants (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC)
constitutes res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, and thus, warrants the dismissal of the
case. The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter exercises quasi-judicial power and the Med-Arbiter's decisions and
orders have, upon their finality, the force and effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata.
CA Ruling: Reversed NLRC Ruling, LA Ruling reinstated.
The Court of Appeals held that the certification proceedings before the Med-Arbiter are non-adversarial and merely
investigative. On the other hand, under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases. Although the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter are also described as non-litigious, the Court of Appeals noted that the Labor Arbiter is given wide
latitude in ascertaining the existence of employment relationship. Thus, unlike the Med-Artbiter, the Labor Arbiter
may conduct clarificatory hearings and even avail of ocular inspection to
ascertain facts speedily.
Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification election case does not foreclose further
dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between HRC and the
complainants.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding
the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election
case.
HELD:
The Court rules in the negative. As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts in this case are very similar to those in
the Sandoval case, which also involved the issue of whether the ruling in a certification election case on the
existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship operates as res judicata in the illegal dismissal
case filed before the NLRC.
In Sandoval, the DOLE Undersecretary reversed the finding of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case and
ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the members of the petitioner union and
Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI), since the former were employees of the subcontractors. Subsequently, several
illegal dismissal cases were filed by some members of the petitioner union against SSI. Both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties, citing the resolution of the
DOLE Undersecretary in the certification election case. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC ruling and held
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that the members of the petitioner union were employees of SSI. On appeal, this Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision and ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in relying on the pronouncement of the DOLE
Undersecretary that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties. The Court cited the ruling
in the Manila Golf11 case that the decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding,
does not foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-
employee relationship between them.
Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), of which the med-arbiter
is an officer, has the following jurisdiction -
ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative
or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-
agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement
of the parties."
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide all disputes, grievances
or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-
agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has
the authority, original and exclusive, to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties.
Once there is a determination as to the existence of such a relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the
certification election case. As the authority to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and
indispensable in the exercise of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and
reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides -
ART. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. - Any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the
election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that
the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of
the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar days.
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 August 2012 Decision and the 13
August 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Notes: 2 cases were filed, one in Dole for the certification election and another in NLRC for illegal dismissal.
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine: As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to the
RELATIONS labor issue raised and must arise from an employer-employee relationship for the labor
tribunals to have jurisdiction.
Title: 25. Milan v. NLRC, February 4, 2015 GR No. 202961
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3G 2017-2018
Ponente: Leonen, J.
Petitioner: Emer Milan, Randy Masangkay, Wilfredo Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission,
Javier, Ronaldo David, Bonifacio Matundan, Nora Solid Mills, Inc., And/Or Philip Ang
Mendoza, et al.
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc.' s (Solid Mills) employees. They are represented by the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective bargaining agent.
As Solid Mills employees, petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by
Solid Mills. According to Solid Mills, this was "[o]ut of liberality and for the convenience of its employees . . . [and]
on the condition that the employees . . . would vacate the premises anytime the Company deems fit."
In 2003, Solid Mills ceased its operations due to serious business losses. NAFLU recognized Solid Mills closure
due to serious business losses in the memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003. The memorandum of
agreement provided for Solid Mills grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits,
vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the employees.
Solid Mills filed its Department of Labor and Employment termination report and sent to petitioners individual
notices to vacate SMI Village. Employees were required to sign a memorandum of agreement and those who
signed it were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the constructed houses
inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits and separation pay. Petitioners refused to sign the
documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay.
Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation pay, accrued
sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay. They argued that their possession of Solid Mills property is not an
accountability that is subject to clearance procedures. They had already turned over to Solid Mills their uniforms
and equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations. Solid Mills argued that petitioners complaint was premature
because they had not vacated its property.
LA Ruling: Solid Mills illegally withheld petitioners benefits and separation pay. Petitioners right to the payment of
their benefits and separation pay was vested by law and contract. Petitioners possession should not be construed
as petitioners "accountabilities" that must be cleared first before the release of benefits.Their possession "is not by
virtue of any employer-employee relationship." It is a civil issue, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
NLRC Ruling: It ruled that because of petitioners failure to vacate Solid Mills property, Solid Mills was justified in
withholding their benefits and separation pay. The termination of Solid Mills and petitioners employer-employee
relationship made it incumbent upon petitioners to turn over the property to Solid Mills.
CA Ruling: It dismissed petitioners' petition. As a consequence of Solid Mills closure and the resulting termination
of petitioners, the employer-employee relationship between them ceased to exist. There was no more reason for
them to stay in Solid Mills property.
Petitioners also point out that the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to declare that petitioners act of withholding possession of respondent Solid Mills property is illegal.
The regular courts have jurisdiction over this issue. It is independent from the issue of payment of petitioners
monetary benefits.
ISSUE/S:
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Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties rights over a
property, when it is necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship.
Petitioners claim that they have the right to the immediate release of their benefits as employees separated from
respondent Solid Mills is a question arising from the employer-employee relationship between the parties. Claims
arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by an employee. Employers may also
have claims against the employee, which arise from the same relationship.
As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to the labor issue raised and must
arise from an employer-employee relationship for the labor tribunals to have jurisdiction.
In this case, respondent Solid Mills claims that its properties are in petitioners possession by virtue of their status
as its employees. Respondent Solid Mills allowed petitioners to use its property as an act of liberality. Put in other
words, it would not have allowed petitioners to use its property had they not been its employees. The return of its
properties in petitioners possession by virtue of their status as employees is an issue that must be resolved to
determine whether benefits can be released immediately. The issue raised by the employer is, therefore,
connected to petitioners claim for benefits and is sufficiently intertwined with the parties employer-employee
relationship. Thus, it is properly within the labor tribunals jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision is AFFIRMED.
Notes: As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. However, our law
supports the employers institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages.
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine: A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other
RELATIONS conclusion than that Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As
such, Saudia may be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
tribunals.
Title: 26. Saudia Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, January 14, 2015 GR No. 198587
Date: Jan. 14, 2015
Ponente Justice Leonen
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines and Brenda Betia Respondent Ma. Jopette Rebesencio, et. al.
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the issuance of a TRO
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FACTS:
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired
by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Respondents later became permanent flight attendants. Respondents continued their
employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. Respondents contended
that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because
they were pregnant. Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same.
The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the
employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or
totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters. In Montassah's and Rouen
Ruth's cases, their resignations were executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These
letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portions of their headings when these
were handed to respondents.
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal and for
underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits,
illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Saudia
assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed that all the determining points of contact referred to
foreign law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. It added
that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned voluntarily.
Furthermore, Saudia, however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission had no
jurisdiction over it because summons were never served on it but on "Saudia Manila."
LA Ruling: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
NLRC Ruling: reversed LA. It explained that "[considering that complainants-appellants are
OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide their
complaint for illegal termination."
CA Ruling: affirmed NLRCs decision with modification as to the damages.
ISSUE/S:
Wheher the LA and the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over Saudia Arabian Airlines
Whether respondents voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated
HELD:
1. Yes. By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine office.
Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides the
following:The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or
branches; . . . and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization.
A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other conclusion than that Saudia is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the Philippines and is
86
3G 2017-2018
subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.
Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" the latter being
nothing more than Saudia's local office service of summons to Saudia's office in Manila sufficed to vest
jurisdiction over Saudia's person in Philippine tribunals.
2. They were illegally terminated. In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, this court defined voluntary resignation as
"the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the
office accompanied by the act of relinquishment." Thus, essential to the act of resignation is voluntariness. It must
be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will. On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been
defined as "cessation of work because 'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as
an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits."
The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on
account of child delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of Appeals, pregnancy is a time when they need
employment to sustain their families. Indeed, it goes against normal and reasonable human behavior to abandon
one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.
It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. Each of them repeatedly filed
appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio) asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum
that they resign or be terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of them even went to Saudia's
office to personally seek reconsideration.
As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, this court noted that "[i]f
(a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or illegal."
Respondents executed their quitclaims after having been unfairly given an ultimatum to resign or be terminated
(and forfeit their benefits).
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
3G 2017-2018
LABOR Doctrine: LRTA, for having conducted business through a private

RELATIONS corporation, must submit itself to the provisions governing private
corporations, including the Labor Code, falls under the jurisdiction of LA
and NLRC. Hence, LRTA can be made liable by the labor tribunals for
private respondents' money claims despite absence of ER-EE
relationship.
Title: 27. LRTA v. Alvarez, Nov. 28, 2016 GR No.
Date:
Ponente
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Petitioner: LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY Respondent: BIENVENIDO R. ALVAREZ, et al
Nature of the case:
FACTS:
LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation and private respondents Bienvenido R.

Alvarez, et al. are former employees of Meralco Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO).
On June 8, 1984, METRO and LRTA entered into an agreement called "Agreement for the
Management and Operation of the Light Rail Transit System" (AMO-LRTS) for the operation and
management of the light rail transit system. LRTA shouldered and provided for all the operating
expenses of METRO. Also, METRO signed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with its
employees.
However, on April 7, 1989, the Commission on Audit (COA) nullified and voided the AMO-LRTS. To
resolve the issue, LRTA decided to acquire METRO by purchasing all of its shares of stocks and
METRO, thus, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of LRTA. LRTA and METRO declared and continued
the implementation of the AMO-LRTS and the non-interruption of employment relations of the
employees of METRO. They likewise continued the establishment and funding of the Metro, Inc.
Employees Retirement Plan which covers the past services of all METRO regular employees from the
date of their employment. They confirmed that all CBAs remained in force and effect.
On November 17, 1997, the METRO general manager (who was appointed by LRTA) announced in a
memorandum that its board of directors approved the severance/resignation benefit of METRO
employees at one and a half (1 1/2) months salaries for every year of service.
On July 25, 2000, the union of rank and file employees of METRO declared a strike over a
retirement fund dispute. By virtue of its ownership of METRO, LRTA assumed the obligation to
update the Metro, Inc. Employees Retirement Fund with the Bureau of Treasury.
A few months later LRTA stopped the operation of METRO. On April 5, 2001, METRO's Board of
Directors approved the release and payment of the first fifty percent (50%) of the severance pay to
the displaced METRO employees, including private respondents, who were issued certifications of
eligibility for severance pay along with the memoranda to receive the same.
Private respondents repeatedly and formally asked LRTA, being the principal owner of METRO, to
pay the balance of their severance pay, but to no avail. Thus, they filed a complaint before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for the payment of 13th month pay, separation pay, and refund of
salary deductions, against LRTA and METRO.
LA Ruling: Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents. The LA ordered respondents LRTA and
METRO to jointly and severally pay the balance of the severance pay of the complainants.
NLRC Ruling: NLRC dismissed METRO's appeal for failure to file the required appeal bond: Therefore,
the NLRC ruled that the appealed Decision of the LA (as regards METRO) is declared final and
executory.
CA Ruling: The CA denied LRTA's petition. First, the CA ruled that since LRTA failed to comply with
the mandatory appeal bond, it lost its right to appeal. Consequently, the LA's ruling already became
final and executory.
ISSUE/S:
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Whether The LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction over private respondents' money claims.
HELD:
Yes. The proceedings a quo is not for an illegal dismissal case, but for the monetary claims of
respondents against METRO and LRTA. This case does not involve the issue of respondents'
employment with METRO or LRTA. In Mendoza, this Court held, "[a]s we see it, the jurisdictional
issue should not have been brought up in the first place because the respondents' claim does not
involve their employment with LRTA. There is no dispute on this aspect of the case. The
respondents were hired by METRO and, were, therefore its employees."
The only issue, therefore, as in Mendoza, is whether LRTA can be made liable by the labor tribunals
for private respondents' money claim despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship,
and though LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation.
In this case, the NLRC accordingly declared, "[LRTA's] contractual commitments with [METRO] and
its employees arose out of its business relations with [METRO] which is private in nature. Such
private relation was not changed notwithstanding the subsequent acquisition by [LRTA] of full
ownership of [METRO] and take-over of its business operations at LRT."
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the CA did not err when it upheld the jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals over private respondents' money claims against LRTA.
WHEREFORE...
Notes:
3G 2017-2018
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LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS

San Beda College of Law | Atty. Joyrich Golangco

Test to Determine Existence of E-E Rel.

Title: Francisco v. NLRC August 21, 2006 GR No. 170087

Date: August 31, 2006

Petitioner: Angelina Francisco Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission,

CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Title: Sonza v. ABS CBN, June 10, 2004 GR No. 138051

Date: June 10, 2004

Petitioner Jose Y. Sonza Respondent ABS CBN

Nature of the case:

LA Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

NLRC Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

CA Ruling: There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

NO, there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and ABS-CBN.

Title:Javier v. Flyace Corp. Feb 15, 2012 GR No. 192558

Date: February 15, 2012

Petitioner Bitoy Javier Respondent Fly Ace Corporation

Nature of the case: ER-EE relationship

Whether or not the petitioner is a an employee of Fly Ace Corporation.

Title: SMCEU v. Judge Bersamira GR No.

Nature of the case:

Title: Locsin et. al. v. PLDT GR No. 185251

Date: October 2, 2009

Nature of the case:

NLRC Ruling: The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA

Date: March 6, 2012

Ponente VELASCO, JR., J.

Petitioner: PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO Respondent: THE SECRETARY OF THE

Nature of the case: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

Whether DOLE can make a determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship.

Title: 7. Ymbong v. ABS-CBN, March 7, 2012 GR No.

Nature of the case:

Title: 8. Professional Services v. CA, February 11, 2008 GR No. 126297

Date: February 11, 2008

Petitioner: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. Respondent: THE COURT OF APPEALS and

Nature of the case:

In the SC decision in Ramos vs. CA

In Nograles, et al. v. Capitol Medical Center, et al., the Court HELD:

WHEREFORE, we DENY PSIs motion for reconsideration with finality.

LABOR Doctrine: Payroll not conclusive proof of existence or absence of Employer-Employee

Date: 11 February 2008

Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J

Petitioner: South East International Rattan, Inc. Respondent: Jesus J. Coming

Nature of the case:

As to the control test, records show that:

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists.

Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA.

(3) the power of dismissal; and

As to the SSS or payroll list:

As to the affidavit of former co-workers submitted by respondent:

WHEREFORE...Decision regarding BACKWAGES and reinstatement

LABOR Doctrine: In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship, the

Date: 2 April 2014

Nature of the case: Employer-employee relationship

1. Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship.

1. As to Francisco, none. In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship, the

WHEREFORE The petition for review on certiorari is denied.

Title: 11. Begino v. Abs-cbn, April 20, 2015. GR No.

Nature of the case:

Title: 12. David v. Macasio, July 4, 2014 GR No. 195466