CORTES vs.
Court of Appeals Held:
494 SCRA 570 (Art. 1169)
Facts:
For the purchase price of 3.7M, Villa Esperanza
Development Corporation (vendee) and Antonio Cortes
(vendor) entered into a contract of sale over the lots
located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila. The
Corporation advanced to Cortes the total sum of
P1,213,000.00. In September 1983, the parties executed
a deed of absolute sale on the following terms:
The Corporation shall advance 2.2 M as downpayment,
and Cortes shall likewise deliver the TCT for the 3 lots.
The balance of 1.5M shall be payable within a year from
the date of the execution.
The Corporation filed the instant case for specific
performance seeking to compel Cortes to deliver the
TCTs and the original copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. According to the Corporation, despite its readiness
and ability to pay the purchase price, Cortes refused
delivery of the sought documents. It prayed for
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Cortes
claimed that the owners duplicate copy of the three
TCTs were surrendered to the Corporation and it is the
latter which refused to pay in full the agreed down
payment.
RTC rendered a decision rescinding the sale and
directed Cortes to return to the Corporation the amount
of P1,213,000.00, plus interest. CA reversed the
decision and directed Cortes to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying the properties and to deliver
the same to the Corporation together with the TCTs,
simultaneous with the Corporations payment of the
balance of the purchase price of P2,487,000.00.
Issue:
WON Cortes delivered the TCTs and the original Deed
to the Corporation? NO.
WON there is delay in the performance of the parties
obligation that would justify the rescission of the contract
of sale? THERE IS DELAY IN BOTH PARTIES
(compensation morae)
Cortes avers that he delivered the TCTs through the
brokers son. He further avers that the brokers son
delivered it to the broker, who in turn delivered them to
the Corporation.
Marcosa Sanchezs unrebutted testimony is that, she did
not receive the TCTs. She also denied knowledge of
delivery thereof to her son, Manny.
What further strengthened the findings of the Court of
Appeals that Cortes did not surrender the subject
documents was the offer of Cortes counsel at the pre-
trial to deliver the TCTs and the Deed of Absolute Sale if
the Corporation will pay the balance of the down
payment. Indeed, if the said documents were already in
the hands of the Corporation, there was no need for
Cortes counsel to make such offer.
Considering that their obligation was reciprocal,
performance thereof must be simultaneous. The mutual
inaction of Cortes and the Corporation therefore gave
rise to a compensation morae or default on the part of
both parties because neither has completed their part in
their reciprocal obligation. Cortes is yet to deliver the
original copy of the notarized Deed and the TCTs, while
the Corporation is yet to pay in full the agreed down
payment of P2,200,000.00. This mutual delay of the
parties cancels out the effects of default, such that it is
as if no one is guilty of delay.
Under Article 1169 of the Civil Code, from the moment
one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
begins. Since Cortes did not perform his part, the
provision of the contract requiring the Corporation to pay
in full the down payment never acquired obligatory force.
Spouses Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora,
Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants
Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino,
all surnamed JOAQUIN.
The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by
their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and
void ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels
of land executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in
favor of their co-defendant children and the
corresponding certificates of title issued in their names.
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties
in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed
to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the
properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the
properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate
court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties
is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free
to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to
safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not
affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of
the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate.
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS.
MIGUEL LU and PACITA ZAVALLA LU, respondents
G.R. No. 124242 January 21, 2005
FACTS
On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly
sold two parcels of land to respondent Pablo
Babasanta, for the price of fifteen pesos
(P15.00) per square meter. Babasanta made a
downpayment of (P50,000.00) as evidenced by
a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of
the same date.
Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand
the execution of a final deed of sale in his favor
so that he could effect full payment of the
purchase price. In response, Pacita Lu wrote a
letter to Babasanta wherein she reminded
Babasanta that when the balance of the
purchase price became due, he requested for a
reduction of the price and when she refused,
Babasanta backed out of the sale
herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development
Corporation (SLDC) filed a Motion for
Intervention. SLDC alleged that it had legal
interest in the subject matter under litigation
because on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land
involved had been sold to it in a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it
was a buyer in good faith and for value and
therefore it had a better right over the property in
litigation
Respondent Babasanta, however, argued that
SLDC could not have acquired ownership of the
property because it failed to comply with the
requirement of registration of the sale in good
faith. He emphasized that at the time SLDC
registered the sale in its favor on 30 June 1990,
there was already a notice of lis pendens
annotated on the titles of the property made as
early as 2 June 1989. Hence, petitioners
registration of the sale did not confer upon it any
right.
ISSUE:
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the
notice of lis pendens obliterate the effects of delivery and
possession in good faith which admittedly had occurred
prior to SLDCs knowledge of the transaction in favor of
Babasanta?
HELD:NO
 It must be stressed that as early as 11 February
1989, the Spouses Lu executed the Option to
Buy in favor of SLDC upon receiving
P316,160.00 as option money from SLDC. After
SLDC had paid more than one half of the agreed
purchase price, the Spouses Lu subsequently
executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time both deeds
were executed, SLDC had no knowledge of the
prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with
Babasanta. Simply stated, from the time of
execution of the first deed up to the moment of
transfer and delivery of possession of the lands
to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the
subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no
effect at all on the consummated sale between
SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such
property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property.
We rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good
faith since there is no evidence extant in the
records that it had knowledge of the prior
transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of
the sale of the property to SLDC, the vendors
were still the registered owners of the property
and were in fact in possession of the lands.
In assailing knowledge of the transaction
between him and the Spouses Lu, Babasanta
apparently relies on the principle of constructive
notice incorporated in Section 52 of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which
reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing, or
entering.
However, the constructive notice operates as
such by the express wording of Section 52 from
the time of the registration of the notice of lis
pendens which in this case was effected only on
2 June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of
SLDC had long been consummated insofar as
the obligation of the Spouses Lu to transfer
ownership over the property to SLDC is
concerned.
Alfonso Quijada vs CA, Regalado Mondejar
(299 SCRA 695)
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of the late Trinidad Quijada.
Trinidad inherited a 2 hectare land. April 5,1956,
Trininad along with her siblings, executed a DEED OF
DONATION in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon,
with condition that the land shall be used exclusively as
part of the campus of the PROPOSED Provincial High
School in Talacogon.
Despite the donation, Trininad still has possession of the
land and sold 1 hectare to Regalado. Subsequently,
Trinidad sold the remaining 1 hectare to Regalado but
this time verbally, no Deed of Sale but it evidenced by
receipts of payment.
Regalado sold portions of the land to respondents.
The Municipality was not able to finish the school thus
returning the ownership of the property to the donors.
July 5,1988. Petitioners (heirs) filed against the
respondents stating that their late mother did sell the
property. If it was true that she (Trinidad) sold the
property, it would be null and void since it was already
donated to the Municipality thus the ownership is with
the Municipality.
RTC ruled in favor of the heirs, ruling that Trinidad had
no capacity to sell because the ownership of the land
was already with the Municipality. CA reversed.
Issue: W/ON the sale is valid
Held: Yes. When the property was donated to the
Municipality, the ownership was transferred to them but
wait theres more, there was a condition. A
RESOLUTORY CONDITION, tho it was not stated in the
condition on how long the condition was, it was evident
that the Municipality had intended to build the school.
Again, tho not stated how long, the Municipality still gave
back the property to the donors thus the ownership was
transferred. Making the sale valid since ownership was
returned