BERSAMIN DECIDED

CASES IN REMEDIAL LAW

By:
DEAN FERDINAND A. TAN, L.l.M
civil procedure
 Q: What is the doctrine of operative fact?
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of
the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produce
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act
but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general
rule that a void or unconstitutional statute produces no effect. But
its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection,
and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or
executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair
play.
 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances
exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application. (Maria Carolina
P. Araullo, Chairperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan; Judy M.
Taguiwalo, Professor, University Of The Philippines Diliman, Co-
Chairperson, Pagbbago; Henri Kahn, Concerned Citizens
Movement; Rep. Luz Ilagan, Gabriela Womens Party
Representative; Rep. Carlos Isagani Zarate, Bayan Muna Party-
List Representative; Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Secretary General Of
Bayan; Manuel K. Dayrit, Chairman, Ang Lapatiran Party;
Vencer Mari E. Crisostomo, Chairperson, Anakbayan; Victor
Villanueva, Convenor, Youth Act Now, vs. Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III, President Of The Republic Of The Philippines;
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Executive Secretary; And Florencio B.
Abad, Secretary Of The Department Of Budget And
Management, G.R. 209287, July 1, 2014,Bersamin, J.)
 Douglas Cagas vs. Commission on Elections and Claude Bautista
G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012
The petitioner and respondent contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local
elections. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest. The
petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make
the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of. COMELEC First Division
issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order,
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that
the first order was contrary to law. Hence the filing of a petition for certiorari.
 ISSUE

Whether the Court can take cognizance of the

petition for certiorari.

RULING

No. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the

1987 Constitution. This provision, although it confers on
the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling
of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
the COMELEC.
 Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review
on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. There is
no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the
denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is
for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division
to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with
the other errors committed by the Division upon the
merits.
 Priscilla Alma Jose vs. Ramon Javellana et al
G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012

Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of

conditional sale two parcels of land located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They
agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of
P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System ( the registration
being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose, and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole
surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the
properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels
of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply,
Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction,
and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court.
 ISSUE

Whether or not CA erred in not outrightly

dismissing Javellanas appeal because the June
21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable;
 DOCTRINE
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a
final order and appealable

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order

granting the defending partys motion to dismiss is not
an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end
to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely
the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for
the trial court to do other than to execute the order.
Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15
days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial
 RULING

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration

left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order,
not an interlocutory one. And, secondly, whether an order is final
or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final
judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable; but
the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari
 Rolando Sofio and Rufio Sofio vs. Alberto Valenzuela et al
G.R. No. 157810, February 15, 2012

Respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land Negros

Occidental. In 1985, respondent learned for the first time that Rolando had been
permitted by her mother to cultivate the .80 hectare portion without paying any
rentals; and that the petitioners had actually expanded their Cultivation. After
the petitioners refused her demand for the return of the 1.8 hectares, she lodged
a complaint against Rolando with the Barangay Chairman of Ayungon,
Valladolid, Negros Occidental, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer. The parties did not reach an amicable settlement. The writ of
execution was issued on January 23, 2002. The petitioners, represented by
new counsel, filed in the PARAD a motion for relief from judgment,
motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 27, 2001, and
motion to recall writ of execution dated January 23, 2002.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the petition must be denied.

RULING:
The Court finds no cause to disturb the decision of the
PARAD and cannot undo the decision upon the grounds
cited by the petitioners, especially as the decision had long
become final and executory.

The Court will not override the finality and immutability

of a judgment based only on the negligence of a partys
counsel in timely taking all the proper recourses from the
judgment. To justify an override, the counsels negligence
must not only be gross but must also be shown to have
deprived the party the right to due process.
 Nerwin Industries Corp. vs. PNOC-Energy Development Corp.
G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

The National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-

qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80. Private respondent
emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. However, NEAs
Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for
IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, and with the loan closing
date of October 2001 fast approaching. Private respondent protested the said 50% reduction.
Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila alleging that Requisition No. FGJ
30904R1 (an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar
Rural Electrification Project) was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by
IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents
proposed bidding for the wooden poles. RTC issued preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R.
Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding.
Respondents commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from
the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in
blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing

the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975
prohibiting the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions,
except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects.
 RULING:
Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions
or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under
the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the
right-of way, site or location of any National Government project; (b)
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c)
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or
project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory
prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or
project acts contrary to law.
 Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. and
PhilcomSat vs. Victor Africa, G.R. No. 184622, July 3, 2013

The ownership structure of POTC, PHILCOMSTAT and PHC implies

that whoever had control of POTC necessarily held 100% control of
PHILCOMSAT. Records reveal that POTC has been owned by seven families
through their individual members or their corporations. Atty. Ilusorio, the
patriarch of the Ilusorio Family claimed that he had incurred the ire of Mrs.
Marcos during the regime of Pres. Marcos, leading to Mrs. Marcoss
grabbing from him the POTC shares of stock through threats and
intimidation and without any valuable consideration and placing such
shares under the names of their alter egos: Independent Realty
Corporation; MidPasig Land Development; and in the name of Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr. In 1986 PCGG was created. The PCGG obtained three out of the
seven seats in the POTC Board of Directors. At the time, Nieto Jr. was the
Pres. of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
To keep control of the POTC and PHILCOMSAT, Nieto Jr. aligned with the PCGG to
enable him to wrest 4 out of 7 seats in the POTC Board of Directors and 5 out of the 9
seats in the PHILCOMSAT Board of Directors. Government, by the PCGG, filed in
the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for re-conveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against Mr. Africa, et. al. The Complaint, docketed as
SB Civil Case, alleged that the defendants acted in collaboration with each
other as dummies, nominees and/or agents of defendants Pres. Marcos, et. al. in
several corporations. A decade of litigation, the Republic, IRC and Mid-Pasig, and
the PCGG entered into a compromise agreement with Atty. Ilusorio, whereby he
recognized the ownership of POTC shares of undertook to dismiss Civil Case as
against him. Pres. Ramos approved the compromise agreement, and directed its
submission to the Sandiganbayan for approval Mid-Pasig, represented by Salonga,
filed in the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case-a Motion to Vacate. Following the
enactment of R.A No. 8799, SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 was transferred to the RTC
in Makati City, which re-docketed it as Civil Case No. 01-840 and raffled it to Branch
138. The Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution in SB Civil Case denying IRC and
Mid-Pasigs motions to vacate the order approving the compromise agreement.
 ISSUE

1) Whether RTC or Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the case.
2) What is the remedy of the aggrieved party?
RULING:

In intra-corporate dispute involving a corporation

under sequestration of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not the Sandiganbayan.
Proper mode of appeal in intra-corporate cases is by petition
for review under Rule 43

The rule providing that a petition for review under Rule 43

of the Rules of Court is the proper mode of appeal in intra-
corporate controversies, as embodied in A. M. No. 04-9-07-SC,
has been in effect since October 15, 2004. Hence, the filing by
POTC and PHC (Nieto Group) of the petition for certiorari on
March 21, 2007 (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 98399) was inexcusably
improper and ineffectual. By virtue of its being an extraordinary
remedy, certiorari could neither replace nor substitute an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, like appeal in due course.
Indeed, the appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court would
have been adequate to review and correct even the grave abuse
of discretion imputed to the RTC.
 Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Tomas Cuenca, Marcelina Cuenca et al
G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013

Maraon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the collection of a sum of money
and damages. His complaint included an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
the RTC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment conditioned
upon the posting of a bond of 1Million executed in favor of the Cuencas. Maraon amended the
complaint to implead Tayactac as a defendant. Maraon posted SICI Bond No. 68427 JCL (4) No. 02370
in the amount of 1Million issued by Stronghold Insurance. 2 Days later, the RTC issued the writ of
preliminary attachment. The sheriff served the writ, the summons and a copy of the complaint on the
Cuencas on the same day. The sheriff levied upon the equipment and other personal property
belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office-cum-commissary or
kitchen of the corporation. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, stating that the action, being one for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, was
within its jurisdiction. CA remanded to the RTC for hearing and resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactacs
claim for the damages sustained from the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment. Cuencas and
Tayactac filed a Motion to Require Sheriff to Deliver Attached Properties. RTC commanded Maraon to
surrender all the attached properties to the RTC within 10 days from notice. RTC rendered its judgment
on 2003, holding Maraon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the
Cuencas and Tayactac.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents are real parties in interest

RULING:

The personality of a corporation (Arc Cusuine Inc.) is

distinct and separate from the personalities of its
stockholders (Cuencas & Tayactac). Hence, its stockholders
are not themselves the real parties in interest to claim and
recover compensation for the damages arising from the
wrongful attachment of its assets. Only the corporation is
the real party in interest for that purpose.
 Given the separate and distinct legal personality of Arc
Cuisine, Inc., the Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal
personality to claim the damages sustained from the levy of the
formers properties. According to Asset Privatization Trust v. Court
of Appeals, even when the foreclosure on the assets of the
corporation was wrongful and done in bad faith the stockholders
had no standing to recover for themselves moral damages;
otherwise, they would be appropriating and distributing part of the
corporations assets prior to the dissolution of the corporation and
the liquidation of its debts and liabilities.
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval
G. R. No. 169677, February 18, 2013

The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos and other defendants. The action was to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of the action were
two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City, registered in the names of
Mr. and Mrs. Andres V. Genito, Jr. Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order
to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It
appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as registered owner. Asian Bank
was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued by the RTC in Quezon
City. When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original
defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian Bank sought the deferment
of any action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and
documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and
contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it.
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against
Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original
defendants.
 ISSUE

Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that the

Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian
Bank?
RULING:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid

prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim,
crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues. But a separate trial may be denied if a party is
thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an issue
dealt with and determined in the main trial.
 Allen Macasaet et al vs. Francisco Co, Jr.
G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

Respondent, a retired police officer assigned in Manila, sued AbanteTonite, a tabloid of general
circulation; its Publisher; its Managing Director; its Circulation Manager; its Editors Ms. Bay, Mr. Galang
and Mr. Hagos; and its Reporter Lily Reyes, claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article
petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of AbanteTonite. The suit was raffled to Branch 51 of the
RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including AbanteTonite, at their
business address. RTC Sheriff Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of
the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were
futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned of that day to
make a 2nd attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the
office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriffs
return. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsels special appearance in their
behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted
service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons
personally on each of them in accordance with Sec 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further
moved to drop AbanteTonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that
could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the summons was properly served by

substituted service of summons?
RULING:

To warrant the substituted service of the summons and

copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person.
Only after the attempt at personal service has become
futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the
officer resort to substituted service.
 There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the
summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as
the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times,
considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should
he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard,
what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While
we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead.
It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs. In reality,
petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer was
demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served
through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the
RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a
pre-trial brief ad cautelam.
 Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde Palicte
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013

Filemon Sottos children: Marcelo, Pascuala, Miguel, & Matilde. In June

1967, Pilar Teves & other heirs of Carmen Rallos, the deceased wife of Filemon,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate
of Sotto seeking to recover properties that Filemon had inherited from
Carmen. The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of
Carmen. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was
effected against 6 parcels of land and 2 residential houses belonging to the Estate
of Sotto. Later on, Matilde redeemed 4 of the parcels of land in her own name
while her sister Pascuala redeemed 1 of the 2 houses. On 1980, the Deputy
Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of redemption in favor of Matilde.
Matilde filed in a motion to transfer to her name the title to the 4 properties. The
CFI denied her motion and declared the deed of redemption null and void.
Matilde, declared as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a
successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the 4 properties. She appealed
the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review and on 1987, the
Court, reversing the CFIs ruling, granted the petition for review but allowed
her co-heirs the opportunity to join her as co-redemptioners for a period of 6
months before the probate court would grant her motion to transfer the title
to her name. On 1999, the heirs of Marcelo and Miguel, instituted the
present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, The
Estate of Sotto, moved in the probate court to require Matilde to account for
and turn over the 4 properties that allegedly belonged to the estate,
presenting documentary evidence showing that Matilde had effected the
redemption of the 4 properties with the funds of the estate in accordance
with the express authorization of Marcelo. The probate court granted the
motion, but reversed itself upon Matildes motion for reconsideration.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the judgment was barred by res judicata.

RULING:

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be

dismissed and the other action these elements are present, namely;
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent
actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
 The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in
G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the decision of the Court in G.R. No.
131722 (the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No.
154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the
fourth case) all of which dealt with Matildes right to the four
properties had upheld Matildes right to the four properties and
had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the exercise
of the respective courts jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
 Simplicia Abrigo and Demetrio Abrigo vs. Jimmy Flores et al
G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013

A lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in Alaminos, Laguna inherited by both
Francisco and Gaudencia Faylona from their deceased parents. The lot is declared for taxation
purposes which Gaudencia managed to secure in her name alone to the exclusion of Francisco and the
latters widow and children. It appears that after Franciscos death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into
an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to Franciscos heirs
while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was no actual ground partition of the lot up to and
after Gaudencias death. It result that both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in common the
land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by Gaudencia herself during her lifetime. In the case
of the petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage and poultry pens extended to the
western half. Such was the state of things when, on 1988, in the RTC San Pablo City, the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Francisco, among whom are the private respondents, desiring to terminate
their co-ownership with the heirs of Gaudencia, filed their complaint for judicial partition in this
case, which complaint was docketed a quo. In a decision, the trial court rendered judgment ordering
the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the
heirs of Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia. With no further appellate
proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their other co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment was
issued by this Court on June 3, 1996.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of

his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square
meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered
the execution of the final judgment against petitioners
inequitable.
DOCTRINE:

Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by

virtue of its finality, its execution should follow as a matter
of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or
stop the execution, must alter or modify the situation of the
parties under the decision as to render the execution
inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event
cannot rest on unproved or uncertain facts.
 To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and
immutable judgment in order to further partition the western
portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-
interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the
portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores.

Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of
the property in litis their demand for the segregration of the share
of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to
initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the
western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy
Flores.
 Segundina Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013

A parcel of land located in Leyte, which used to be owned by

Spouses Eustacio & Segundina Galvez. They separated and cohabited
with other partners. On 1981, Eustacio sold the property to their
daughter Jovita without the consent of Segundina. After the sale, Jovita
constituted a mortgage on the property on 1981 to secure her loan from
PNB. Jovita failed to pay her obligation. PNB had the property
extrajudicially foreclosed. In the ensuing foreclosure sale, PNB was
the highest bidder. The property became PNBs acquired asset. On
1992, respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montao purchased
the property from PNB. The Montaos tried to get the actual
possession of the property, but Segundina refused to vacate.
Montaos sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and
possession, and damages in the MTC of Babatngon, Leyte.
Segundina countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita & to PNB
& Montaos was null and void for having been done without her consent and the
Montaos were also buyers in bad faith. MTC ruled in favor of the Montaos,
holding that the sale by Eustacio to Jovita was merely voidable, not null and
void; that because Segundina had not brought an action for the annulment of the
sale within 10 years from the date of the transaction, the sale remained valid; that
Segundina did not establish that the foreclosure proceedings, auction sale, and
the acquisition of the property by the Montaos were void; and in view of the
valid acquisition of the property by PNB during the foreclosure sale, the
subsequent sale to the Montaos was also valid. Segundina appealed to the CA
by petition for review, which was dismissed. CA ruled that a cursory perusal
of the instant petition for review shows that no copies of pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were
attached as annexes in violation of Sec 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
 ISSUE

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the

complaint?
RULING:

The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and

other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal
of a petition for review. The allegations of the petition
must be examined to determine the sufficiency of the
attachments appended thereto.
YES.
The dismissal of Segundinas petition for review upon the
ground stated in the assailed resolutions was based on Section 3,
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is settled that the
petitioners failure to append the pleadings and pertinent
documents to the petition can be rectified by the subsequent
filing of a motion for reconsideration to which is attached the
omitted pleadings and documents as required by the CA. The
foregoing rulings show that the mere failure to attach copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition for review is not
necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course
when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct
by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the
petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations.
 Roberto Bordomeo, Jayme Sarmiento and Gregorio Barredo vs. Court of
Appeals,G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013

IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union, representing the

workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the IPI management. This
deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI ordering a
lockout. After assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary
Torres rendered a decision dismissing the Unions complaint against the
Company for unfair labor practice through refusal to bargain. Resolving
the parties ensuing respective motions for reconsideration or
clarification, Secretary Torres rendered another ruling ordering the IPI to
reinstate to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from 8
December 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits the affected workers. IPI assailed the issuances of
Secretary Torres directly in this Court through a petition for
certiorari, but the Court dismissed its petition on the ground that no
grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed
decision.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner availed of the proper

remedy?

DOCTRINE:

As an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace

or supplant an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, like an appeal in due course. It is the inadequacy
of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that
determines whether certiorari can be a proper
alternative remedy.
NO.

An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, to be taken to this Court within 15
days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only
questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the
petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari was
improper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its
discretion did not warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari,
unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course
under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of
its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or
substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an
appeal in due course. It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary
course of law that determines whether a special civil action for
certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.
 Special People, Inc. Foundation vs. Nestor Canda et al
G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013

The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in

Barangay Jimilia-an in Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from
the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and 6 other
municipalities. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage with the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Region 7, seeking to be
exempt from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Upon evaluating the
nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then
Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings that Initial Environmental Examination is
required. RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to enable the EMB to
determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area or not. The petitioner failed
to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau to the
effect that the project area was not located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope because
RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise to render such finding. According to PHIVOLCS,
the project site was approxima. RD Lipayons letter declared that the project was within an
environmentally critical area,tely 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault and that the petitioner
was not entitled to the CNC. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the RTC in
Loay, Bohol.
 ISSUE

(1) Whether the appeal directly to this Court from the

RTC was proper;
(2) Whether the petition for mandamus was the correct
recourse.

DOCTRINE

The peremptory writ of mandamus is an

extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is
powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
one who has a clear legal right to the performance of
the act to be compelled.
 We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed
to exhaust the available administrative remedies, and because it
failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the
performance of the act by the respondents. It is axiomatic, to
begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law
upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the
remedies afforded by administrative processes.

Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the
petitioner did not establish that the grant of its application for
the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD
Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
Petitioners appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court

This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of

Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires that the petition shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Yet,
the petitioner hereby raises a question of fact whose resolution
is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or
not the petitioner established that its project was not located in
an environmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court is
constrained to deny due course to the petition for review.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Manila Electric Company
G.R. No. 201715, December 11, 2013

MERALCO and NAPOCOR had entered into the contract for the sale
of electricity on November 21, 1994. The CSE would be effective for 10
years starting from January 1, 1995. Under the CSE, NAPOCOR was
obliged to supply and MERALCO was obliged to purchase a minimum
volume of electric power and energy from 1995 until 2004 at the rates
approved by the Energy Regulatory. A provision of the CSE required
MERALCO to pay minimum monthly charges even if the actual volume of
the power and energy drawn from NAPOCOR fell below the stated minimum
quantities. MERALCO drew from NAPOCOR electric power and energy less
than the minimum quantities stipulated in the CSE. MERALCO did not
pay the minimum monthly charges but only the charges for the
electric power and energy actually taken. Thus, NAPOCOR served on
MERALCO a claim for the contracted but undrawn electric power and
energy starting the billing month of January 2002. MERALCO objected
to the claim of NAPOCOR, and served its notice of termination of the CSE.
MERALCO and NAPOCOR agreed to submit their dispute to mediation. The
mediation resulted in the execution on 2003 of a settlement covered the charges being
imposed by NAPOCOR and the National Transmission Corporation all of the CSE.
MERALCO therein agreed to pay to NAPOCOR and reciprocated by agreeing to give
credit for the delayed completion of the transmission facilities. Two years after the case
was submitted, the OSG, representing herein petitioner, filed in the ERC a motion
for leave to intervene with motion to admit its attached opposition. This prompted
MERALCO to initiate on 2009 in the RTC in Pasig an action for declaratory relief. On
2010, the pre-trial was held, but the Presiding Judge of the RTC ultimately reset it through
the second assailed order due to the non-appearance of the representative of the OSG.
Petitioner brought in the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with an
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, alleging
that respondent RTC Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the decision has been moot and

academic and whether or not RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion
DOCTRINE:

The intervening rendition by the trial court of a

decision on the merits of the case renders moot and
academic the resolution of any issue raised on
certiorari against interlocutory orders setting the pre-
trial and declaring the petitioner to have waived its
right to present its evidence. The resolution of the
issue, having been preempted by the decision in the
main action, ceased to have any practical value.
 Teodoro Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi
G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013

Petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation

represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi, executed a deed of conditional
sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A.
The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested
the restructuring of his obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated
checks with nine post, dated checks that would include interest rate. Reyes issued and delivered the
following nine post-dated checks in drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank. Two of the
checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes instructions to stop their payment, while the third
was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract
and damages in the RTC, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale rescinded and
of no further force and effect, and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the down payment.
Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks. Reyes argued
that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the
pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial
question as to the criminal proceedings.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the civil action for rescission of the

contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that required
the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 RULING:
RULING
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial
question that will warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer
issued in connection with the sale.
 Rafael Consing Jr. vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

Petitioner negotiated and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various
loans from Unicapital Inc. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property. Payment was effected by
off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and paying, The
other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc., a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the
property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the
property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz and Consing. The title held by De la Cruz
appeared to be spurious. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. On July
1999, Consing filed Civil Case in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to
enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the money on the ground that
he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz in
the Makati City Prosecutors Office.
 ISSUE

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question between the two

cases?
RULING:

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the

defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a
criminal case.
 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Judge Agaputo Hontanosas Jr,
G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014

Respondents commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 against petitioner

alleging that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had
executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the
sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted
real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and
that they had been made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel
mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero. The respondents obligation to the
petitioner had reached 17million, but they had only been able to pay 13million
because they had been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in
1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan
under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses
and counterclaim, as well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. Also on June 6, 2001 the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss reiterating its affirmative defenses. The RTC denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious, but granted the respondents
application for preliminary injunction. Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed
the orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA rendered
the adverse decision under review affirming the decision
rendered by the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
 ISSUES

1. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary

injunction against the petitioner, its agents and
representatives, was in order?

DOCTRINE:

Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing

that the applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and
that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such
right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the
merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a
preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice
until the rights of the parties can be settled.
 Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde Palicte
G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014

For the ground to be effective, the insufficiency of the

complaint must appear on the face of the complaint, and
nowhere else. It will be unfair to the plaintiff, indeed, to
determine the sufficiency of his cause of action from
facts outside of those pleaded in the complaint.
 Herminia Acbang vs. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr,
G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014

Respondent Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner,

her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean in the MTC of Alcala. The
defendants did not file an answer; hence, the MTC rendered its decision on in favor
of Spouses Lopez. The petitioner appealed to the RTC. Spouses Lopez moved
for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the
defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs
opposed the motion insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for the
execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution.
Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution. The opposition of
spouses Lopez on the appeal taken by the Acbangs is hereby denied because under
the rules the losing party may appeal the case even if they did not post their
supercedeas bond.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. The
petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this Court,
submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed grave error in granting the
motion for immediate execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing the
supersedeas bond as prayed for by the Acbangs. It appears that the RTC
rendered its decision in Civil Case on 2004, finding that the petitioner had not
received the summons, that the non-service of the summons on her resulted in
the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and that the MTCs decision in
Civil Case No. 64 dated January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was concerned.
The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and served the summons to
Herminia Acbang and conduct the proceedings without any delay. In the
petition, the petitioner insists that the Spouses Lopezs motion for execution
pending appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond.
 ISSUE

Whether or not under the circumstances, the writ of

execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.

RULING:

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment

in an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an
appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically
deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of
execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
 Isabelita Vinuya et al vs. Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo et al
G.R. No. 162230, August 12, 2014

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant
their petition for certiorari. Petitioners argue that our constitutional and jurisprudential
histories have rejected the Courts ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the
Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence & constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief
Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read
the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the
constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights; that the
foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian
law as incorporated into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause.
The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of
international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the
Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms part
of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy
See, v. Rosario, Jr. and U.S. v. Guinto the Court has said that international law is deemed part
of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that by virtue of the Incorporation
Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus
cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the
imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed
under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogens
norms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus
cogens norms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that
the Courts invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the
Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims
of the comfort women system in the Philippines.
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the
rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina
comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international
law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the
waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are
entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents. Petitioners
also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to
espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation and
other forms of reparation from Japan. In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners stress that it was highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift
commentaries from at least three sources without proper attribution an article published in
2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge
University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western Reserve Journal of
International Law and make it appear that such commentaries supported its arguments for
dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour
of petitioners claims.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration and

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration should be
granted?
RULING:
NO .
The right to file a special civil action of certiorari is
neither a natural right nor an essential element of due
process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except
in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks
a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner
and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules.
 Petitioners were required to show in their petition
or certiorari that the assailed act was either judicial or
quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires such showing.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of

the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners did
not make such a showing.
 Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethen
Foundation Inc. vs. Hon. Teodoro Riel
G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015

Petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that

the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost
in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in
the late 80s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to
the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed
the petition for reconstitution through the first assailed
order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any
cogent or justifiable ground to reconsider. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion

amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in
dismissing its petition for reconstitution on the basis of
the recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of
the Republic and the UP despite having initially given
due course to the petition for reconstitution
DOCTRINE:

A petition for the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens

title falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and must strictly comply with the
requirements prescribed in Republic Act No. 26;
otherwise, the petition should be dismissed.
 Under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the
judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as
the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title.

As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner

was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within
15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal to elapse without
taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to
certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like
certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon and Court of Appeals
G.R. No.165354, January 12, 2015

NAPOCOR entered a property located in Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project.
Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property which was registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas. NAPOCOR
filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC Batangas City seeking the acquisition of an
easement of right of way over a portion of the property alleging that it had negotiated with the
respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach any agreement;
and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of P9,790.00 representing the
assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession upon deposit to enable it to enter and take possession and control of the affected
portion of the property; to demolish all improvements existing thereon; and to commence
construction of the transmission line project. It likewise prayed for the appointment of three
commissioners to determine the just compensation to be paid.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss averred that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent in the process, they
tendered no objection to NAPOCORs entry provided it would pay just compensation not only
for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project. In the pre-trial conference, the RTC directed the
parties to submit the names of their nominees to sit in the panel of commissioners within 10 days
from the date of the pre-trial. The RTC constituted the panel of three commissioners. The parties
then submitted their respective objections to the reports. The RTC adopted the recommendation
contained in the joint report and ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents just compensation
for the whole area. The CA AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that NAPOCOR shall pay
only for the occupied 6,326 square meters of the subject real property at the rate of P550.00 per
square meter and to pay legal interest therefrom until fully paid. Hence, appeal by NAPOCOR to
the SC. During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
stating that negotiations between the parties were going on with a view to the amicable
settlement of the case. On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an
amicable agreement and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the expropriation proceedings may be

discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

DOCTRINE/RULING:

The expropriator who has taken possession of the

property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay
reasonable compensation to the landowner for the
period of such possession although the proceedings
had been discontinued on the ground that the public
purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased.
 The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the
instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.

Therefore, it is essential that the element of public use of the

property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. The expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it
is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will
 Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc. vs. Commission on Audit
January 27, 2015 | G.R. No. 213525

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique and the petitioner executed a

memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified
barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for
the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement
voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for
lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the petitioner
filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA
issued its decision denying the petition. The petitioner received a copy of the COA
decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January
14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014.
 ISSUE

Whether or not Fresh period under Neypes applies to

petition for certiorari under Rule 64
DOCTRINE

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64

are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed
15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the
latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed.
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes will not apply to the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies

because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review
brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably
with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition
should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial. The
petitioners position cannot be sustained. There is no parity
between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
 Berlinda Oribello vs. Court of Appeals and Remedios Oribello
August 5, 2015 | G.R. No. 163504

Before RTC of La Union was an action for partition and damages involving
twelve parcels of land. Eight was in the name of Toribio Oribello, two in the names of
Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, one in the names of Toribio and and Berlinda Padilla
Oribello, and one in the names of Toribio and Ma. Emilia Oribello. Toribio was twice
married. His first wife was Emilia. Toribio's marriage to Emilia was dissolved pursuant to
the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, U.S.A. Toribio
married appellee before the municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. He died intestate on
August 18, 1993. Instituted on May 27, 1997 by Remedios Oribello, represented by
her natural father Alfredo Selga, against appellee, the action was anchored on the
theory that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio. Denying that appellant is an
adopted daughter of Toribio, appellee averred in her answer that the decree of adoption
was fraudulently secured by Alfredo. RTC rendered its Judgment after trial. CA vacated
and remanded the case to the lower court.
 ISSUE

Whether or not respondent was able to prove that she

was entitled to partition
DOCTRINE:

To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial

partition, there are two stages defined under Rule 69
of the Rules of Court. The first relates to the
determination of the rights of the parties to the
property held in common. The second concerns the
physical segregation of each party's just share in the
property held in common. The second stage need not
be gone into should the parties agree on the physical
partition.
 The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the
plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition.

RTC correctly ruled against the right of respondent Remedios

Oribello to demand the partition of the real property belonging to
the late Tomas Oribello on the ground that she had not
substantiated her right to the partition by preponderance of
evidence. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a
judicial controversy between persons who, being co-owners or
coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition
thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part
corresponding to him. The object of partition is to enable those who
own property as joint tenants, or co-owners, or tenants in common to
put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in
specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements.
 The City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Mayor Jerry Treas vs. Hon. Judge Rene
Honrado, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 29 Iloilo City and JPV Motor Vehicle
Emission Testing and Car Care Center, G.R. No. 160399, December 9, 2015

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued Department

Order No. 2002-31 with the subject "AUTHORIZATION OF PRIVATE EMISSION
TESTING CENTERS". Item No. 2 of Department Order No. 2002-31 stated that To ensure
that "cut throat" or "ruinous" competition, that may result to the degradation of level of
service of the project is avoided, authorization of PETC should strictly be rationalized taking
into consideration the vehicle population expected to be serviced in the area. As basis, 1
PETC lane shall be authorized for every 15,000 registered vehicles in an LTO Registering
District JPV Motor Vehicle Emission Testing and Car Care Center (JPV), a partnership
authorized to operate a PETC in Iloilo City, was granted a capacity of four lanes that could
cater to 15,000 motor vehicles per lane for the total capacity of 60,000 motor vehicles. At
the time JPV filed the complaint to prevent the petitioner from acting on the pending
application for the operation of another Private Emission Testing Center in Iloilo City.
Accordingly, JPV averred in its complaint that there was no need for another
PETC because it already had the capability to serve all the registered motor
vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002-31. Through
its answer, the petitioner contested the injunctive relief being sought by JPV,
insisting that such relief, if issued, would result into a monopoly on the part
of JPV in the operation of a PETC; that the writ of injunction would prevent
the exercise by the City Mayor of his discretionary power to issue or not to
issue business permits; and that JPV did not establish the existence of its
right in esse to be protected by the writ of injunction. Grahar Emission
Testing Center , another PETC operator with a pending application for a
business/mayor's permit to operate its own PETC in Iloilo City, sought leave
of court to intervene. Although it allowed the intervention of Grahar on June
24, 2003, the RTC nonetheless issued the assailed order granting the
application of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction.
 ISSUE

Whether or not RTC erred in granting the application

of the writ of preliminary injunction
DOCTRINE:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of

an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative
of the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of
the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to
guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the
merits.
 The granting amounted to the prejudgment of the merits of the
case, something the RTC could not validly do. It apparently forgot that
the function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not to determine
the merits of the case, or to decide controverted tacts, because an
interlocutory injunction was but a preliminary and preparatory order
that still looked to a future final hearing, and, although contemplating
what the result of that hearing would be, it should not settle what the
result should be.

Thus, the RTC did not exercise its broad discretion soundly because
it blatantly violated the right to be heard of the petitioner, whose
right to substantiate its defense of the power to regulate businesses
within its territorial jurisdiction should be fully recognized. It also
violated the right to be heard of the intervenor Grahar, whose intervention
in the suit was granted only on the same date of June 24, 2003. To stress
yet again, the main relief could not be resolved without receiving the
evidence of all the parties that would settle the contested facts.
 Heirs of Arturo Garcia I vs. Municipality of Iba, Zambales
G. R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015

The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land
located in Poblacion, Iba, Zambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in
the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming that in
1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a substantial
portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the
Municipality of Iba to vacate the property had remained unheeded. After due
proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Hence, the Municipality of Iba filed its
notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the
Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales to assail the
denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which ultimately
granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno
upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for
certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners
appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
 ISSUE

Whether the dismissal is proper for being not the

proper mode of appeal

DOCTRINE

An appeal brings up for review any error of

judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over
the subject of the suit and over the persons of the
parties, or any error committed by the court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing
more than an error of judgment.
 Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which
states that xxx the appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
xxx in conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 41, the
petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the
period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and
within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The
filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by the Rules
sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is
deemed perfected.
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the
petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence, the CA did
not err in denying due course to the petition for review.
 Bpi Family Savings Bank vs. Sps. Benedicto & Teresita Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015

City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five
parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita
Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261331 and TCT
No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Manila RTC rendered its
judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became
final and executory on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment. The
petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to
Defendants Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of
time. Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two
parcels of land subject of the respondents loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded
the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00. Claiming a deficiency
amounting to P18,522.155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the
Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on
several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no
cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.
 ISSUE

Whether or not CA erred when it ruled the case

filed by BPI should be dismissed on the ground of
improper venue

DOCTRINE

An action to recover the deficiency after

extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is
a personal action because it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
 Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought the case in
the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main
office of the petitioner was located.

Moreover the Court agreed with the RTC that it would be

improper to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue,
assuming that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that
the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to
Dismiss. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant
if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly
stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
 Grace Insigne et al vs. Abra Valley Colleges Inc.
G.R. No. 204089, July 29, 2015

Petitioners Grace Borgoa Insigne et. al. are siblings of the full blood. Respondent
Francis Borgoa is their older half-blood brother. The petitioners are the children of the
late Pedro Borgoa by his second wife, Teresita Valeros, while Francis was Pedros son
by his first wife, Humvelina Avila. In his lifetime, Pedro was the founder, president and
majority stockholder of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. a stock corporation.
After Pedros death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra Valley. On March
26, 2002, the petitioners, along with their brother Romulo Borgoa and Elmer
Reyes, filed a complaint (with application for preliminary injunction) and
damages in the RTC against Abra Valley praying, among others, that the RTC
direct Abra Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records, and
the minutes of meetings, and to provide them with its financial statements. Due to
Abra Valleys failure to file its responsive pleading within the reglementary period
provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
 ISSUE

Whether the Court is correct when it ruled that the burden of

proving the stock ownership lies with the petitioners?
Whether the lower court properly dismissed the case on the
ground of the petitioners failure to comply with the order
issued by the RTC to produce stock certificates?

DOCTRINE

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must

establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, the
party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of an issue bears the onus to prove his assertion in
order to obtain a favorable judgment. From the plaintiff the
burden to prove his positive assertions never parts.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the case on the basis
that "the documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly
announced by the plaintiffs counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to
comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010" was
unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court expressly empowers the trial court to dismiss the
complaint motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant if, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the
court, the power to dismiss is not to wielded indiscriminately, but
only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of
an order of consequence to the action. As we have seen, however,
the dismissal of the case by virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court should be undone because the petitioners production of the
stock certificates was rendered superfluous by their submission of
other competent means of establishing their shareholdings in
Abra Valley.
 Nilo Chiongian vs. Victoria Benitez-Lirio et al
G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015

The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner's sister. Isabel had
predeceased Vicente, who died on November 13, 1989. The couple had no offspring. On July 20,
1982, after the death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate of
Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to the petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the
same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of
Isabel. Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor
Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Vicente in RTC. RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicentes estate and issued the letters
of administration to Feodor. The petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP-797. Feodor
countered with the request that he be allowed to continue to administer all the properties left by
Vicente, including the paraphernal properties of Isabel. Petitioner specifically moved for the
exclusion of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicentes estate. However, he withdrew the
motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his appeal

DOCTRINE:

Pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41, the proper mode of

appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is
by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under Section 3 of
Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final
order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal
because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a
record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial
court with notice to the adverse party. The period of appeal
shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
 Rogelio Baronda vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015

Respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. employed the petitioner as a mud press truck
driver with a daily salary of P281.00. He hit HIDECOs transmission lines while operating a
dump truck, causing a total factory blackout from 9:00 pm until 2:00 am of the next day.
Power was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO damages. Following the
incident, HIDECO served a notice of offense requiring him to explain the incident within
three days from notice. He complied. The management conducted its investigation, and,
finding him guilty of negligence, recommended his dismissal. Resident manager served a
termination letter and informed him of the decision to terminate his employment effective at
the close of office hours of that day. Hence, HIDECO no longer allowed him to report to
work on the next day. Petitioner, along with another employee also dismissed by
HIDECO, filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board in Tacloban City a complaint for illegal dismissal against
HIDECO. Voluntary Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. handled the case and eventually rendered
his decision by finding the petitioners dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement.
Petitioner filed his manifestation with motion for the issuance of the writ
of execution in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator, praying for the
execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to backwages
and other benefits. HIDECO opposed the petitioners motion for
execution and simultaneously presented its own motion for execution to
enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator directing the petitioner to
pay the actual damages. The Voluntary Arbitrator dismissed petitioners
motion and granted HIDECOs motion for execution. Petitioner filed
another motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring
HIDECO to pay to him unpaid waged, 13th month pay and bonuses;
which was granted by the Voluntary Arbitrator. HIDECO instituted a
special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals averring that the
Voluntary Arbitrator had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, the filing of petition for
certiorari.
 ISSUE

Whether or not petition for certiorari was the proper

remedy.

DOCTRINE

The reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary

Arbitrator's award or decision is immediately
executory from its receipt by the parties.
 HIDECOs proper recourse was to appeal by petition for
review and not petition for certiorari. Even if the error sought
to be reviewed concerned grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was an appeal in due course
by filing the petition for review within 10 days from notice of the
award or decision. This is because certiorari, as an extraordinary
remedy, was available only when there was no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary, course of law.
The justification for HIDECOs resort to the extraordinary
equitable remedy of certiorari did not exist due to the availability
of appeal, or other ordinary remedies in law to which HIDECO as
the aggrieved party could resort.
 National Housing Authority vs. Ernesto Roxas
G.R. No. 171953, October 21, 2015

The NHA is charged, among others, with the development of the Dagat-dagatan
Development Project in Navotas, Manila. Roxas applied for commercial lots in the
said project for the use of his business of buying and selling gravel, sand and
cement products. The NHA approved his application and issued the order or
payment respecting the lots. Later on, NHA issued the notice of award for the lots
in favor of Roxas. The latter completed his payment for the subject lots on 1991.
NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey, causing the increase in the area
of the subject lots. The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in the area of the
subject lots, and approved the award of additional area to him. Although Roxas
desired to purchase the increased area, the purchase must be in accordance with the
terms and conditions contained in the order of payment and notice of award issued
to him.
After NHA rejected his appeal, Roxas commenced an action for specific
performance and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. He amended the complaint to compel the NHA to
comply with the terms and conditions of the order of payment and the notice
of award. NHA countered that Roxas prayer to include in the original contract
the increase in lot measurement was contrary to its existing rules and
regulation and at the very least, his right in the additional area was limited
only to first refusal. The RTC ruled against NHA. Roxas filed his motion
for the issuance of the writ of execution which was granted by the RTC.
NHA filed its petition for certiorari. It contends that the money judgment
awarded to Roxas could not be covered by motion for execution but
should have been first filed in the COA. The CA dismissed NHAs petition
and ruled that NHA was a government owned and controlled corporation
whose funds were not exempt from garnishment or execution; and ruled that
Roxas did not need to first file his claim in the COA.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the money judgment awarded in favor

of Roxas should be first filed before the COA.

DOCTRINE:

The National Housing Authority, a government-

owned and controlled corporation created and existing
under Presidential Decree No. 757,1 may sue and be
sued. However, no court should issue a writ of
execution upon any monetary judgment rendered
against the NHA unless such monetary judgment is
first submitted to and passed upon by the Commission
on Audit.
 Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines
G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016

The petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and

supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondents hospital. The respondent paid only P67,357,683.23 of its total
obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.
However, on 2009, the petitioner and the respondent, respectively represented by
Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr., entered into an agreement,
whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed
the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.
Respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their
contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic
prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February
11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees.
 The audit jurisdiction of the CIA extends to all government-
owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries and other self-
governing boards, commission or agencies of the Government, as
well as to all non-governmental entities subsidized by the
Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or
required to pay levies or government share, or for which the
Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those of partly
funded by the Government.
Government funds and property may not be seized
pursuant to writs of execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy
judgments of the court. The functions and public services of the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public fund from their legitimate and specific objects,
and as appropriated by law. The disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
 Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. vs. Wesleyan University
Philippines, G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

The petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and

supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondents hospital.Tthe respondent paid only P67,357,683.23 of its total
obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.
However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent, respectively
represented by Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr., entered into an
agreement, whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00,
and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36
months. Respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had
reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due
to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to
recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its
Board of Trustees
 Due to the respondents failure to pay as demanded, the
petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC. The
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following
grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum
shopping, which was denied. Petitioner filed its Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent
had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus
did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent
opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing
that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the
complaint. RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner. CA affirmed.
 ISSUE

Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTCs

denial of the petitioners motion for judgment on the
pleadings?
DOCTRINE:

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings

upon motion of the claiming party when the defending
party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For
that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action
are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the
motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending
party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue
of fact.
 The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the
complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged
transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past
officers of defendant Wesleyan University Philippines. Was the
manner of denial effective as a specific denial? No. It is settled that
denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly
known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have
easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or
sham denials. Lastly, we should emphasize that in order to
resolve the petitioners Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for
ascertaining whether the complaints material allegations were
admitted or properly denied.
 Tung Hui Chung and Tong Hong Chung vs. Shih Chi Huang
G.R. No. 170679, March 9, 2016

On September 6, 2001, the petitioners, both Australian citizens, filed in RTC Manila an amended complain
to recover from the respondent a sum of money and damages with writ of attachment. The suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-101260, involved the contract to sell the respondent, as the vendor, undertook to deliver to
the petitioners, as the vendees, shares of stock in Island Information and Technology, Inc. a publicly listed
corporation. The petitioners alleged that under the provisions of the contract to sell, the equivalent shares of
stock in the corporation should be their value as of February 22, 2001, the date corresponding to the five-day
period prior to the end of the fourth month after October 30, 2000, the date of the signing of the contract to sell;
that according to the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc, the shares of the corporation, which stood for the open,
high, low and closing prices on February 22, 2001, had the equivalent of 177,925,320 shares of stock; and that
the respondent failed to deliver the shares of stock corresponding to the agreed amount on the date fixed by the
contract. RTC issued an amended order granting the petitioners application for the writ of preliminary
attachment. The parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise Agreement which was signed by
the respondent and by Eduard Alcordo, as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, with the assistance of their
respective counsels, stipulating that the parties agreed to settle their respective claims and counterclaims, and
acknowledged therein his obligation, was filed and granted by the Court. But the respondent did not pay the
second installment despite demand. Instead, he filed in the CA a petition for annulment of judgment thereby
seeking to nullify the amended order granting the application for the writ of attachment, and the order
approving the compromise agreement.
 ISSUE

Whether or not judicial compromise agreement could

no longer be assailed through certiorari

DOCTRINE:

A compromise agreement has the effect and authority

of res judicata between the parties, and is immediately
final and executory, unless rescinded upon grounds that
vitiated consent. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur,
it is more than a mere contract between the parties. Any
effort to annul the judgment based on compromise on the
ground of extrinsic fraud must proceed in accordance with
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
 Andrew Fyfe et al vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc
G.R . NO. 160071, June 6, 2016

In 1998, the respondent underwent rehabilitation proceedings in the Securities and

Exchange Commission which issued an order dated July 1, 1998 decreeing, among others,
the suspension of all claims for payment against the respondent. To convince its creditors to
approve the rehabilitation plan, the respondent decided to hire technical advisers. This led the
respondent through its then Director Virata to consult with people in the industry, and in due
course came to meet Peter W. Foster, formerly of Cathay Pacific Airlines. Foster, along with
Michael R. Scantlebury, negotiated with the respondent on the details of a proposed technical
services agreement. Foster and Scantlebury subsequently organized Regent Star Services Ltd.
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Petitioner and respondent entered into Technical
Service Agreement wherein under its terms, penalties shall be payable by the terminating
party. Respondent sent notice to petitioner terminating the TSA for lack of confidence and
wants to offset the penalty from its advance payment. Petitioner denied the refund and claim
for offset and proposed to submit the issue to arbitration pursuant to their TSA.
The Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. rendered judgment
in favor to the petitioner. Respondent filed an Application to Vacate
Arbitral Award in RTC Makati in view of the SEC Order that
respondent is under a state of suspension of payment. The petitioner
filed MTD on the ground that (a) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
the petitioners due to the improper service of summons; (b) the
application did not state a cause of action; and (c) the application was an
improper remedy because the respondent should have filed an appeal in
the CA pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. RTC granted the
application to vacate arbitral award. Petitioner appealed to CA by notice
of appeal. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
Sec. 29 of arbitration law limited appeals to a review on certiorari upon
questions of law. CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Hence
this appeal by the petitioners.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review should be dismissed for

containing a defective verification/certification; (2) whether or
not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners
for being an inappropriate remedy.

DOCTRINE
There was sufficient compliance with the rule on verification
and certification against forum shopping. The SPAs individually
signed by the petitioners vested in their counsel the authority,
among others, "to do and perform on my behalf any act and
deed relating to the case, which it could legally do and perform,
including any appeals or further legal proceedings."
criminal procedure
 Jose Sanico vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
Petitioner Sanican and Batiquin were convicted for Violation of Section 103
of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995. The two were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals
before the MTC-CarmenSogod- Cebu. However, the accused were declared not
guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Consequently, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the
MCTC. Then, RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal.
Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the appeal on the
ground of failure to file a memorandum on appeal with prejudice. Atty.
Caete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a MR vis--vis the dismissal of
the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal
because he had been beset with problems due to his wifes debilitating illness,
as well as his first counsel, Atty. Barings own medical condition which
caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal
counsel hereof.
 ISSUE
Whether CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the
RTCs order dismissing the appeal for failure to file a
memorandum?

DOCTRINE:

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for

the RTC to dismiss the appeal ONLY in civil cases. The same rule
does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) Rule 122,
imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal on the basis of
the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as
may have been filed upon the submission of the appellate
memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file
the same.
RTC denied the MR. CA: Affirmed. In the meantime,
respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of
Judgment, which the RTC authorized the issuance.
Sanico filed an omnibus motion to recall the order
and to quash the entry of judgment, but the RTC
denied. The entry of judgment was issued; the writ
of execution; and that execution sales covering
several personal properties of the petitioner were
made, and the certificates of sale were issued in
favor of Tenio.
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Antonino Tobias III
G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012

Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam

Merchandising, his frozen meat business. METROBANK next proceeded to
appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral. His loan was restructured
to 5-years upon his request. He defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.
METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti- Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) to investigate. PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751
and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF
recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public documents. The City Prosecutor of Malabon
still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being
charged. Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Then Acting Secretary of Justice issued a resolution
directing the withdrawal of the information filed
against Tobias. CA promulgated its decision, dismissing
METROBANKs petition for certiorari by holding that
the presumption of authorship might be disputed
through a satisfactory explanation
 Sps. Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao
G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013

Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G.
Delos Angeles Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City. Secretary of Justice issued DOJ Order No. 182
directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ
Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners
have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing
to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim
that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the
laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive
effect.
 ISSUES

(1) Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?

(2) Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of

discretion in issuing DO No. 182?

(3) Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
violate petitioners constitutionally guaranteed
rights?
Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts
by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to
justify the direct filing of the petition. We emphasize that
the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse. Hence, every litigant who
brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts.
 For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners
to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the
requisites.
Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not
exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates efficiency
and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases
involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive
or administrative.
 Anna Patula vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

Petitioner was charged with estafa in the RTC Dumaguete City. The said accused,
being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., having collected and
received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under
the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a
reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and she failed to deliver
the said collection to the said company but instead, misappropriated the proceeds of
the sale to her own use and benefit. Go had requested the store auditor to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts
but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for them. She discovered
in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts
in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the failure of the information for

estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate
receipts issued by petitioner to her customers
violated petitioners right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation;
DOCTRINE:

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that

is not clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be
violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.
 Datu Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Sec. Leila de Lima
G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

On November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Municipality of

Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor
of the Municipality of Datu Unsay. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner. DOJ
resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue
subpoena to several persons. 41 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner.
Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer
of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either
in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court granted the request for
the transfer of venue. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. QC
RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution
witnesses. petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations.
 ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner may compel the respondents
through mandamus to prosecute Dalandag?

RULING:

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and

discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be
exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be
compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a
motion to include a person in the information, but may not be
compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
 Failure of information to allege falsification did not violate
petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation

The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a

crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in
effect when the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following
provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the
accusation in the information. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.
 Ray Vivo vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013

Petitioner was employed by respondent PAGCOR on 1986, and was PAGCORs

Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office. On
February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of
PAGCORs HR Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross
misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of
trust and confidence; that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he
was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension. On 2002, the petitioners
counsel, replying to Elas letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as
well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 2002, the
petitioner received the summons for him to attend an admin inquiry, instructing him to appear
before PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit on March 15, 2002.8 At the petitioners
request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. He was also
furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated
the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
The memorandum of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR
personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. when
his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR
rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the
sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him
during the administrative inquiry. The petitioner was then allowed to submit
his answer on March 26, 2002. The petitioner received the letter dated May
15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of
Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being
dismissed from the service. After the petitioners motion for reconsideration
vis--vis the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissing him
from the service was denied, he appealed his dismissal to the CSC. CSC ruled
that PAGCOR violated his right to due process.
 ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process

DOCTRINE

The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as

applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are
not strictly applied.
 Marie Callo-Claridad vs. Philip Esteban and Teodora Esteban
G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013

The petitioner is the mother of the late Chase Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied
body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport
of a residential house located at Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last
seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban less than an hour before the discovery of his
lifeless body. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. The
OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to
charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link
Philip to the crime; that several possibilities would discount Philips presence at the time of the
crime, including the possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of
Chase; that Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends
attested that the two had no ill-feelings towards each other; that no sufficient evidence existed to
charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory; and that the
allegation that Teodora could have been the female person engaged in a discussion with a male
person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was unreliable being mere hearsay. Secretary of Justice
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the

decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no
probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the
killing of Chase.

DOCTRINE

The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or

information in court is exclusively within the competence of the
Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts
cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Sec. Hernando Perez
G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. then represented by Atty. Orendain as
its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque. The transactions were embodied in
three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering purchased under the third deed of sale,
executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price were not delivered to
San Miguel Properties. On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its
rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by
FBO Network Management, Inc. on 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to
deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in
the OCP of Las Pias City chargin respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-
delivery of titles in violation of Sec 25, in relation to Sec 39, both of PD No. 957. At the same time,
San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case
No. REM-082400-11183), praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
 ISSUE

Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the

delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on
the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of PD No. 957
on the ground of a prejudicial question.

DOCTRINE:

The pendency of an administrative ease for specific performance

brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory .Board (IILURH) to compel the seller to deliver
the transfer certificate of title (TCTs) of the fully paid Jots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of
Sectio11 25 of Presidential Decree NL). 9571 on the ground of a
prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical
antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.
 People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Gonzales
G.R. No. 182417 April 3, 2013

An informant reported to the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group based in

Camp General Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan, that Gonzales was engaging in
illegal drug pushing. On June 13, 2003, Police Chief Inspector Morales
planned to mount a buy bust operation against Gonzales, and designated PO1
Dimla, Jr. to act as the poseur buyer and PO2 Chan to serve as the
backup/arresting officer. PO1 Dimla marked with his own initials ED each
of the two P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded
the marked bills in the police blotter. At noontime of that same day, PO1
Dimla and PO2 Chan met with the informant at San Rafael, Bulacan, and the
three of them proceeded to Banca-Banca, San Rafael, Bulacan, where the
house of Gonzales was located.
After PO2 Chan posted himself beyond possible view of the suspect, PO1
Dimla and the informant approached Gonzales, with the informant
introducing PO1 Dimla to Gonzales as a buyer of shabu worth P200.00.
Gonzales handed to PO1 Dimla a plastic sachet containing white
substances, and in turn PO1 Dimla handed the two marked P100.00 bills to
Gonzales. At that point, PO1 Dimla removed his cap, the pre-arranged
signal, in reaction to which PO2 Chan then rushed forward and arrested
Gonzales. PO1 Dimla then immediately marked the plastic sachet with his
initials ED. The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified
that the contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu. RTC
convicted Gonzales of the crime charged.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the Prosecution was able to prove his

guilt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

DOCTRINE

The State, and no other party, has the responsibility

to explain the lapses in the procedures taken to
preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.
Without the explanation by the State, the evidence of
the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the
accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has
not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
 People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Tapere
G.R No. 178065, February 20, 2013

Arnold P. Tapere was charged with, tried for and found guilty of illegally selling shabu in
violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
by the RTC which sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency arrested Tapere for selling shabu to a poseur buyer during a buy-bust
operation conducted against him in Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. Prior to the buy-bust
operation, Tapere was already included in the PDEAs drug watch list as a drug pusher. In
order to determine the veracity of the report of Salgado, PDEA agents conducted an
investigation and surveillance of the activities of Tapere on August 30, 31, and September 1,
2002, during which a test buy confirmed the veracity of the report. With the positive result of
the test buy, the agents decided to conduct a buy-bust operation against Tapere on September
2, 2002. Consonant with their standard procedure, the agents first secured a certification from
the OCP regarding the buy-bust money to be used during the buy-bust operation.
The team posted themselves within view of the target place. With each
agent being strategically posted, Salgado was signaled to approach
Tapere according to the plan. Salgado went towards Tapere. The agents
saw two conversing for a brief while before Salgado handed money to
Tapere. In turn, Tapere took a small heatsealed plastic sachet from his
pocket and gave it to Salgado. After accepting the sachet, Salgado made
the prearranged signal of scratching his head to signify the
consummation of the transaction. The agents rushed towards Tapere,
introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and placed him in custody. They
searched him and recovered the P100.00 bill from his right pocket. At
that point, he voluntarily produced three more sachets of shabu from his
pocket and handed them to SPO2 Bastatas. RTC rendered judgment
convicting Tapere as charged.
 ISSUE

Whether or not his apprehension was the product of

an instigation, not entrapment; and that he should
consequently be acquitted because instigation was
an absolutory cause.
DOCTRINE

An accused arrested during a valid entrapment

operation is not entitled to an acquittal on the ground
that his arrest resulted from instigation.
 People of the Philippines vs. Noel Bartolome
G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013

On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Unit in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. During the pre-operation briefing, the buybust team designated PO1
Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials
BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify
him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the
transaction with the suspect had been consummated. Paras went towards the suspect and said to
him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba
kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which
he handed the marked 100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic sachet
containing white substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras
scratched his head to signal the consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team
were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime of illegal
sale of methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Sec 5, Art II of R.A. No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
 ISSUE

Whether or not the accused must be acquitted

DOCTRINE

A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this

jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the
culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in that the accused
who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is
enticed or lured or talked into committing the crime. While
entrapment is legal, instigation is not.
 People of the Philippines vs. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez
G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the RTC IN Quezon City. On
January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each
victim actual damages, civil indemnity, and moral damages. The CA upheld the RTC, subject
to the modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim civil indemnity,
moral damages, temperate damages, and exemplary damages, plus costs of suit. The two
accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a
motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed
and terminated. Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Valdez, finding him
guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for
each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a
letter, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on the
ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the judgment promulgated may be granted to

Edwin.

DOCTRINE

Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the

downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties)
despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his
withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would
definitely be favorable to him.Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the
benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair,
considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in
concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal
liability under the principle of conspiracy.
 Herminio Disini vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials,
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and with a violation of Sec 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 also known as the
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging
that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the 63
informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed
the motion to quash. Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to
obtain the Sandiganbayans favorable action on his motion for permission to
travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its assailed resolution denying the
motion to quash.
 ISSUE

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the case.

DOCTRINE

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction

over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding
that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family,
subordinates and close associates.
 People of the Philippines vs. Rudy Nuyok
G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015

AAA, having been born on May 5, 1992 to the Spouses ABC and DEF as
evidenced by her certificate of live birth, was 13 years old when the accused
committed the rapes in June, July, August and September of 2005. At the time,
she resided in the house of her grandmother, BBB, in Malalag, Davao del Sur.
The accused, her paternal uncle, also lived in the same house. At 9:00 oclock in
the evening of June 25, 2005, as AAA was about to sleep, the accused laid down
beside her. Sensing fear, she tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair,
slapped her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon
regaining consciousness, she noticed that her sando was already raised up to her
neck, and her panties had blood. She felt pain in her vagina. She saw the accused
putting on his pants.
He warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to kill
her and her family if she did so. Despite her fear she related the
incident to BBB and her elder sister CCC, but her report fell on deaf
ears. He raped her again in July 2005. He overpowered her and
succeeded in gratifying his lust. The accused committed the third rape
in August 2005. AAA again told BBB and CCC about the rape
immediately afterwards, but BBB and CCC did not do anything
except to promise to AAA that they would be more wary of him from
then on. On her part, AAA just waited for them to help her, but that
help never came. The fourth rape took place one evening in
September 2005. The accused roused AAA from sleep and threatened
her with a scythe. He removed her shorts and panties, and had carnal
knowledge of her.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the first rape.

DOCTRINE

Rape can be committed in a cramped dwelling

despite the probable presence of other occupants
because seclusion is not an element of the crime. Its
commission can be established by circumstantial
evidence even if the victim, being the sole witness,
was rendered unconscious during its commission.
 Bernardo Mesina vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015

An information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with

qualified theft. Upon his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On
September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed charging him instead with malversation of
public funds. RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation. CA affirmed the RTCs decision,
with modification as to the amount of fine imposed.
 ISSUE

Whether or not both RTC and CA is correct in

not making the accused liable for the
restitution of the misappropriated amount.

DOCTRINE

Under the law, the civil liability of the

petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of
the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
 People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Esugon
G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015

The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide. Carl or Muymoy, 5-
year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister
Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw
appellant, whom he calls Nonoy, enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while
he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was
light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood
come out of his mothers lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl
positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who
stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his
fathers pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because
there was no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no
light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their
second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the identification of the

appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent.

DOCTRINE

Every child is presumed qualified to be a

witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of
substantiating his challenge.
 Horacio Salvador vs. Lisa Chua
G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015

The petitioner and his wife Marine! Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa penalized under Art
315 (a) of the RPC docketed as Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR.3. On March 30, 2011, the date
scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. RTC then issued a warrant
for the petitioners arrest. He was apprehended on April 7, 2011, or eight days from the promulgation of
the judgment finding him guilty. The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated
April 13, 2011, and attached thereto the medical certificate dated March 30, 2011 purportedly issued by Dr.
David, certifying that the petitioner had submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal Medical
Center on March 30, 2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension. In his order dated July 1,
2011, RTC Judge Dela Cruz initially denied the petitioners Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on
the ground of non-compliance with Sec 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the
respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR, filed her Motion for
Execution dated July 29, 2011 for the issuance of the writ of execution on the civil aspect. The petitioner
opposed it and that he be allowed to post bail pending appeal. Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Judge
Mendiola. In his order, Judge Mendiola denied the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed
bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner. Consequently, the respondent commenced a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the order giving due course to the petitioner's which was granted.
 ISSUE

Whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for

his failure to appear at the promulgation of his
conviction?
DOCTRINE

The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of

the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available
under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically:
(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration
(Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122).
 Charlie Te vs. Hon. Augusto Breva
G.R. No. 164974, August 5, 2015

It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the petitioner
upon the application of respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of the Saranggani
District Office of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of his finding of probable
cause for a violation of Sec 2(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by PD No. 1865,
for hoarding large quantities of LPG in steel cylinders belonging to respondent Pryce Gases,
Inc. . The application for the search warrant was filed at the instance of Pryce Gases through
its letter dated September 28, 2003 to the NBI SARDO complaining about the collection and
hoarding by the petitioner of embossed or name-plated Pryce Gases LPG cylinders in
violation of Secs. 155, 156, 168 and 169 of R.A. No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines). On October 14, 2003, the petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash
Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising therein the
lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single offense committed, illegality of the
nighttime search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and inclusion of other
offenses, which was denied.
 ISSUE

Whether the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as respondents in the

petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals to annul and set aside the order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying the petitioner's motion to quash the search
warrant issued against him.

DOCTRINE

As provided under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the petition

shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
respondents and the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. Also, under Section 1, Rule 126, a search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
 Mayor Anwar Berua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015

Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 177600 and G.R. No.
178684. G.R. No. 177600 involves the appeal by petition for review on
certiorari of Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Cota, Mayor Amer
Balindong, and Ali Balindong to assail the Decision promulgated on April 24,
2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121.1 G.R. No. 178684
relates to the Petition (To Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court) brought by Zenaida M. Limbona, the private complainant
in the criminal cases instituted against Balindong, et al., charging Presiding
Judge Balut of the RTC Branch 76, in Quezon City with contempt of court for
issuing the order suspending the proceedings in the criminal cases involving
Balindong, et al. out of judicial courtesy.
 ISSUE

Whether or not judicial determination of probable

cause is proper
DOCTRINE

The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon

filing of the information and supporting papers implies the
determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then
superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of
probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and
proceed independently of the executive determination of probable
cause to charge the proper offense.
special proceedings
 Anita Mangila vs. Judge Heriberto Pangilinan
G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

On June 2003, 7 criminal complaints charging petitioner Mangila and 4

others with syndicated estafa in violation of Art 315 of the RPC, in relation to
PD No. 1689, and with violations of Sec 7(b) of RA No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the MTC in Cities in Puerto
Princesa City. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of
employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without
lawful authority from the POEA. Judge Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints.
After examining Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued
a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next
day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were
transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further
proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at
the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the NBI. Claiming that Judge
Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet
completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior
finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is proper

DOCTRINE

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court

process cannot be inquired into through habeas
corpus.
evidence
 People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Salafranca
G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the
fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony
by the RTC Branch 18, in Manila. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,
citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his
assailant, and Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. It
stressed that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his
unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment,
constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt. Salafranca has come to
the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who had incriminated him.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the testimony of the witnesses is

admissible to prove the accused guilt

DOCTRINE

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder,

homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration
or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
 Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013

In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon,
the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo
S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the property during
their lifetime; that upon their parents deaths, they had continued the possession of
the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not
locate the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT
No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original
copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by
Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did
not exist.
Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages. Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr.had executed on 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the
deed had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the
title. During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files
of the Register of Deeds of Manila. RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable
the plaintiffs contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not
exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence
in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in
accordance with Sec 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its
execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad
faith. Itfound that the defendant had established the execution and existence of
the deed.
 ISSUE

Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of

secondary evidence had been complied with.

DOCTRINE

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a

written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for
quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with
right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and
the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other
than the original document.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Luz Reyes Bakunawa et al
G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013

Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, et. al. for having allegedly
acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property in unlawful
concert with one another and in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment. The complaint alleged that
respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa had served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos
administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa
and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and
manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; and that Luz Bakunawa, by
herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses,
for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets
illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems. The Republic prayed for
reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property acquired by respondents abuse of rights and
powers.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents acquisition of ill-gotten wealth was

proved.

DOCTRINE

Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be

shown to have originated from the Government itself, and should have been
taken by former President Marcos, the members of his immediate family,
relatives, close subordinates and close associates by illegal means. That
one served as a government official or employee during the Marcos
administration did not immediately make her a close subordinate or close
associate of former President Marcos.
 Romeo Caluzor vs. Deogracias Llanillo and Heirs of Lorenzo Llanillo
G.R. No. 155580, July 1, 2015

Petitioners Ruben Manalang, et. al. were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area
of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-
004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents Lot No. 4235 covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and
verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the
respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A
preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands Management Section of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources confirmed the result on the
encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to
surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this
action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua and the case was
assigned to Branch 2 of that court.
On September 17, 1998, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of
jurisdiction based on its finding that the action involved an essentially boundary
dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal,
however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for
further proceedings, holding that because there was an apparent withholding of
possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such
withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1, ultimately dismissed
the complaint and counterclaim for lack of merit through the decision rendered
on August 31, 2000. Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. At that
point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine
their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor.
On September 19, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and
set aside the MTCs decision of August 31, 2000.
 ISSUE

Whether the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on

appeal in an ejectment case

DOCTRINE

Agricultural tenancy is not presumed. It is established only by adducing

evidence showing that all the essential requisites of the tenancy
relationship concur, namely: (a) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; ( c) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; ( d) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; ( e) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
 Alejandra Arado Heirs vs. Anacleto Alcoran and Elenette Sunjaco
G .R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015

Lorenzo Llanillo owned the parcel of land known as Lot 4196 and situated in
Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan. The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 25864 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The petitioner averred that Lorenzo
took him into the land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch that indicated the
boundaries of the portion he would be cultivating. To effectively till the land, the
petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift shanty thereon. Even after
the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to the
family of Lorenzo through Ricardo Martin, Lorenzos overseer. In 1990, respondent
Deogracias Lanillo, the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner
P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to
Deogracias. In the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, on August 5,
1994, Deogracias and persons acting under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner
and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a bulldozer.
The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council to conciliate
failed; hence, the authority to file a case was issued to the petitioner.
The petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Malolos, Bulacan,
demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He amended
his complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation as an additional
defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered the land to
develop it into a residential subdivision. He prayed for the restoration
of his possession of the tilled land, and the payment of disturbance
compensation. Meanwhile, on April 12, 1995, the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform granted the application for the
conversion of the land from agricultural to residential and commercial
uses filed by Deogarcias, through Moldex as his attorney-in-fact.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner resorted to the wrong

remedy of a special civil action for certiorari and
should be dismissed
DOCTRINE

The burden of proof to establish the averments of the

complaint by preponderance of evidence pertained to the
petitioners as the plaintiffs. "Preponderance of evidence" is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence."
 thank you and
god bless to your
up coming bar
examination