Joraina Dragon Talosig vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc.

G.R. No. 198388 July 28, 2014

Respondents claims for benefits are based on Section 20(A) of the

1996 POEA-SEC, which provided:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his

contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US
dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21)
but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.

xxxx

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a

result of injury or illness during the term of employment are as
follows:

a. The employer shall pay the deceaseds beneficiary all

outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.

b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal

effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employers expense
except if the death occurred in a port where local government
laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such
remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the
remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the
masters best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master
shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for
disposition of seafarers remains.

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the

Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One
Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the
exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
C.F. Sharp Crew Management v. Legal Heirs Of The Late
Godofredo Repiso

February 10, 2016 G.R. No. 190534

For a seafarers death to be compensable under the 1996 POEA-

SEC, the Court explicitly ruled in Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. v.
Candava that:

The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the
illness leading to the eventual death of seafarer need not be
shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but
must be proven to have been contracted during the term of
the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to arise "in the
course of employment" when it takes place within the period
of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may
be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, herein respondents are entitled to the

benefits they are claiming as it can be logically and reasonably
concluded from the particular circumstances in the case at bar that
Godofredo contracted the illness which eventually caused his death
during the term of his contract or in the course of his employment.

G.R. No. 198408 November 12, 2014

Conchita J. Racelis vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc.

In the recent case of Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime

Corporation (Canuel), the Court clarified that the term "work-
related death" refers to the seafarers death resulting from a work-
related injury or illness.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, the terms "work-related injury" and

"work-related illness" are, in turn, defined as follows:

Definition of Terms:

For purposes of this contract, the following terms are defined as

follows:

xxxx
11. Work-Related Injury injury(ies) resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment.

12. Work-Related Illness any sickness resulting to disability or

death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section
32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.

Case law explains that "[t]he words arising out of refer to the origin
or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words in the course of refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of
general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise in the
course of employment when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and
while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something
incidental thereto."

While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is

not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the
2000 POEASEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides
that "[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-
related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as
follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are
disputably presumed as work related." In other words, the 2000
POEA-SEC "has created a disputable presumption in favor of
compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32
are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if
the illness is not listed under Section 32-Aof the POEA-SEC as an
occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-
related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the
presumption." This presumption should be overturned only when
the employers refutation is found to be supported by substantial
evidence, which, as traditionally defined is "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion." As held in the case of Magsaysay Maritime Services v.
Laurel:

Anent the issue as to who has the burden to prove entitlement to

disability benefits, the petitioners argue that the burden is placed
upon Laurel to prove his claim that his illness was work-related and
compensable. Their posture does not persuade the Court.

True, hyperthyroidism is not listed as an occupational disease

under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Nonetheless, Section 20
(B), paragraph (4) of the said POEA-SECstates that "those illnesses
not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
workrelated." The said provision explicitly establishes a
presumption of compensability although disputable by substantial
evidence. The presumption operates in favor of Laurel as the
burden rests upon the employer to overcome the statutory
presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the
seafarers employer/s, this disputable presumption stands. In the
case at bench, other than the alleged declaration of the attending
physician that Laurels illness was not work-related, the petitioners
failed to discharge their burden. In fact, they even conceded that
hyperthyroidism may be caused by environmental factor.

Similarly in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Babol:

The Principle of Work-relation

The 2000 POEA-SEC contract governs the claims for disability

benefits by respondent as he was employed by the petitioners in
September of 2006.

Pursuant to the said contract, the injury or illness must be work

related and must have existed during the term of the seafarers
employment in order for compensability to arise. Work-relation
must, therefore, be established.

As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the

disease in question must be one of those listed as an occupational
disease under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Nevertheless, should it
be not classified as occupational in nature, Section 20 (B)
paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC provides that such diseases are
disputed are disputably presumed as work-related.

In this case, it is undisputed that NPC afflicted respondent while on

board the petitioners vessel. As a non-occupational disease, it has
the disputable presumption of being work-related. This
presumption obviously works in the seafarers favor. Hence, unless
contrary evidence is presented by the employers, the work-
relatedness of the disease must be sustained.

And in Fil-Star Maritime Corporation v. Rosete:

Although Central Retinal Vein Occlusion is not listed as one of the

occupational diseases under Section 32-A of the 2000 Amended
Terms of POEA-SEC, the resulting disability which is loss of sight of
one eye, is specifically mentioned in Section 32 thereof (Schedule of
Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases
Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted). More
importantly, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those
illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably
presumed as work-related."
The disputable presumption that a particular injury or illness that
results in disability, or in some cases death, is work-related stands
in the absence of contrary evidence. In the case at bench, the said
presumption was not overturned by the petitioners. Although, the
employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes
them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.

II. The Seafarers Death Occurred During the Term of Employment.

Accordingly, the phrase "work-related death of the seafarer, during

the term of his employment contract" under Part A (1) of the said
provision should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that
the seafarers work-related death should have precisely occurred
during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the
seafarers work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his
death should have occurred during the term of his employment.

Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is by this
method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his
heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be
championed.

For if the laborers death was brought about (whether fully or

partially) by the work he had harbored for his masters profit, then
it is but proper that his demise be compensated. Here, since it has
been established that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a
work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment, (b)
his injury or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and
(c) it was later determined that the injury or illness for which he
was medically repatriated was the proximate cause of his actual
death although the same occurred after the term of his
employment, the above-mentioned rule should squarely apply.
Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should be granted.

III. Amount of Death Benefits.

With the compensability of Rodolfos death now traversed, a

corollary matter to determine is the amount of benefits due
petitioner.

Records show that respondents do not deny and therefore admit

the late Rodolfos membership in the AMOSUP that had entered into
a collective bargaining agreement with HAL, or the ITWF-CBA. Its
provisions therefore must prevail over the standard terms and
benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment
Contract. Hence, the NLRCs award of US$60,000.00as
compensation for the death of Rodolfo in accordance with Article
21.2.1 of the ITWF-CBA was in order. The same holds true for the
award of burial assistance in the amount of US$1,000.00which is
provided under Section 20 (A) (4) (c) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Moreover, conformably with existing case law, the NLRCs grant of
attorneys fees in the amount of US$6,100.00was called for since
petitioner was forced to litigate to protect her valid claim. Where an
employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right
and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorneys fees equivalent
to 10% of the award.

All in all, the NLRCs award of US$67,100.00 which, as the

records bear, had already been paid by respondents is hereby
sustained.

April 13, 2016 G.R. No. 184933

Violeta Balba vs. Tiwala Human Resources

Also, in Southeastern Shipping, et al. v. Navarra, Jr., the Court

declared that in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the
employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment
contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment
makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation
benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the
effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.

In the more recent case of Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., the
Court again reiterated that the death of a seafarer must have
occurred during the term of his contract of employment for it to be
compensable.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Rogelio succumbed to

cancer on July 4, 2000 or almost ten (10) months after the
expiration of his contract and almost nine (9) months after his
repatriation. Thus, on the basis of Section 20(A) and the above-cited
jurisprudence explaining the provision, Rogelio's beneficiaries, the
petitioners, are precluded from receiving death benefits.

Moreover, even if the Court considers the possibility of

compensation for the death of a seafarer occurring after the
termination of the employment contract on account of a work-
related illness under Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC, the claimant
must still fulfill all the requisites for compensability, to wit:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks;
 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer.

G.R. No. 191034 October 1, 2014

Agile Maritime Resources Inc. vs. Apolinario N. Siador

b. Burden of proof in death benefits cases; burden of evidence

In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support

the NLRCs finding that Dennis committed suicide, we find it
necessary to discuss the burden of proof and the corresponding
shift in the burden of evidence in death benefits casesunder the
POEA-SEC. The relevant provision of the POEA-SEC pertinently
reads:

D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,

incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his
willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided
however, that the employer can provethat such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the

facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. As a claimant for death
benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarers
death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened during the term of the
employment contract. Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this
burden of proof.

In the usual course, such proof would have rendered the petitioners
automatically liable, except that the same provision of the POEA-
SEC allows an exemption from liability for death benefits if the
employer can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful
act. That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act is a
matter of defense that the employer has to prove. In legal parlance,
the employer carries the burden of proof to establish its claim that
it should not be held liable.

Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof

necessary to discharge their respective burdens is substantial
evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Based on these facts and the legal presumption of sanity, we
conclude that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
affirmed the LAs dismissal of the complaint; we hold that the
seafarers death was due to his willful act, as the employer posited
and proved.

Two analogous cases may be cited in support of this conclusion. In

Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Leonila Surigao, the
seafarer was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room
with a belt tied around his neck. In denying the claim for death
benefits, the Court ruled that substantial evidence suffices for the
employer to show that the seafarer committed suicide even if there
was no eyewitness to its commission and the possibility of a
contrary conclusion existed. In Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering, the
seafarer, who had already previously jumped in the open sea,
jumped again, resulting in his death due to drowning. In holding
that it was a case of suicide, the Court ruled that the employer "was
able to substantially prove that [the seafarers] death was
attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into
the sea."

With the companys discharge of the burden to prove its defense,

the burden of evidence shifted to Apolinario to rebut the petitioners
case. In other words, Apolinario has to prove by substantial
evidence that Dennis may be insane at the time he took his life.

G.R. No. 191740 February 11, 2013

Susana R. Sy vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.

Clearly, to be entitled for death compensation benefits from the

employer, the death of the seafarer (1) must be work-related; and (2)
must happen during the term of the employment contract. Under
the Amended POEA Contract, work-relatedness is now an important
requirement. The qualification that death must be work-related has
made it necessary to show a causal connection between a seafarers
work and his death to be compensable.

Under the 2000 POEA Amended Employment Contract, work-related

injury is defined as an injury(ies) resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment. Thus, there is a
need to show that the injury resulting to disability or death must
arise (1) out of employment, and (2) in the course of employment.
In Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, we explained the phrase "arising out of and in the
course of employment" in this wise:

x x x The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of"

and "in the course of employment" are said to be separate tests
which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be
forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is
unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-
connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an
independent application of each of the two portions of the test can,
in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words
"arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer
to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to

arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably
may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.

AB Sy was hired as a seaman on board M/V Chekiang on June 23,

2005 and was found dead on October 1, 2005, with drowning as the
cause of death. Notably, at the time of the accident, AB Sy was on
shore leave and there was no showing that he was doing an act in
relation to his duty as a seaman or engaged in the performance of
any act incidental thereto. It was not also established that, at the
time of the accident, he was doing work which was ordered by his
superior ship officers to be done for the advancement of his
employer's interest. On the contrary, it was established that he was
on shore leave when he drowned and because of the 20% alcohol
found in his urine upon autopsy of his body, it can be safely
presumed that he just came from a personal social function which
was not related at all to his job as a seaman. Consequently, his
death could not be considered work-related to be compensable.

While AB Sy's employment relationship with respondents did not

stop but continues to be in force even when he was on shore leave,
their contract clearly provides that it is not enough that death
occurred during the term of the employment contract, but must be
work-related to be compensable. There is a need to show the
connection of AB Sy's death with the performance of his duty as a
seaman. As we found, AB Sy was not in the performance of his duty
as a seaman, but was doing an act for his own personal benefit at
the time of the accident. The cause of AB Sys death at the time he
was on shore leave which was drowning, was not brought about by
a risk which was only peculiar to his employment as a seaman. In
fact, he was in no different circumstance with other people walking
along the riverside who might also drown if no due care to ones
safety is exercised. Petitioner failed to establish by substantial
evidence her right to the entitlement of the benefits provided by law.

Petitioners claim that AB Sys death was by accident, thus not

willfully done which would negate compensability, has no relevance
in this case based on our aforementioned disquisition.

While we commiserate with petitioner, we cannot grant her claim for

death compensation benefits in the absence of substantial evidence
to prove her entitlement thereto, since to do so will cause an
injustice to the employer.

G.R. No. 188595 August 28, 2013

Sea Power Shipping Enterprise v. Nenita P. Salazar

Unlike Section 20(A), Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers

the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer
occurring after the termination of the employment contract on
account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this
provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks describe herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's

exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and

under such other factors necessary to contract it;

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

neither the LA nor the NLRC made a factual determination of

Armandos actual work as an Able Seaman.

for respondents to be entitled to death benefits under Section 32-A

of the POEA Contract, the CA must further find that the alleged
work- related illness of Armando caused his death.