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WILL MEDD
This paper is concerned with two related methodological problems. First, presented with a
complex social scenario of a meeting between the representatives of different social welfare
agencies, how should we make sense of this meeting? Second, in the context of the potential
insights that the complexity sciences offer for understanding the social world, how can we
translate those models to make sense of complex social dynamics? The example of the
meeting, taken from an ethnographic study of collaboration in social welfare, is used to
situate debates about the use of complexity science in knowing the social world. Drawing
upon the work of Luhmann, I argue that we need to re-think the insights complexity
sciences in order to situate the problem of complexity in the social world itself. Doing so
locates the problem of knowing the social world in the social world itself, and highlights the
necessary role of ignorance both in social life itself, and in knowing the social world.
Introduction
While we might want to argue that complexity has been central to debates
about ‘knowing the social world’, it was in systems theory that the problem
of complexity first became formulated as being specifically deserving of
attention (Munch 1987). Systems theory, however, fell out of mainstream
sociology for its alleged dependence on an underlying teleology, organi-
cism, emphasis on stability and inability to explain adequately the
mechanisms of social change (Johnson et al. 1984, Waters 1994, Mouzelis
1995). Recently, though, there has been a revival of systems theory inspired
by the work of ‘complexity science’, a term that refers to different schools
of thought in the natural sciences which share in common an emphasis on
nonlinear processes, system self-organization, and ‘far-from-equilibrium
processes’ which bring together order and chaos in evolutionary dynamics
(Khalil and Boulding 1996, Eve et al. 1997, Byrne 1998, Cilliers 1998).
Interestingly this revival of systems theory has coincided with the
development of post-structural and post-foundational theory, which
similarly emphasizes the nonlinear, contingent and unstable, both in social
theory and in social life (Lyotard 1984, Hayles 1991, Dillon 2000). Where
post-structuralism and post-foundationalism tend to identify discontinu-
ities in social life, complexity science promises, by contrast, a focus on both
Will Medd, Institute of Public Health Research and Policy, Humphrey Booth House, Hulme Place,
University of Salford, Salford, M5 4QA, UK; e-mail: w.medd@salford.ac.uk
issue is what claims we make about the metaphors. For example, drawing
upon biological use of metaphor, Khalil (1996: 4–7) notes that we might use
models from complexity science as similes (superficial metaphor) or as
metaphors which indicate systems characteristics which emerge from
similar contexts (homologous metaphor), similar analytical functions
(heterologous or analogous), or similarities which arise from the same
governing laws of the systems (unificational). Whatever form of metaphor
we use, the models from complexity science are concerned with systems,
and a central question that we must ask is, what is a social system? This
question implies further questions, for example: what are the boundaries of
social systems? What are the components of social systems? What are the
dynamics of social systems? These questions are important, even for
developing superficial metaphors; the answers to them have implications
for both theoretical and empirical investigation. And yet these questions
have hitherto been neglected.
To illustrate the need examine the question of the relationship between
the models of complexity science and the social world, I want to highlight a
problem one faces when developing a model of the social world based on
complexity science. Although there are different methods involved in the
complexity sciences, there is a basic distinction is between mathematical
models, which popularized Chaos Theory (e.g. see Glieck 1987), and
simulation techniques, which popularized Complexity Theory (e.g. see
Lewin 1993). The problems of applicability to the social world apply to
both and the key here is the a priori assumptions one would need to make
about social relationships. In the case of mathematical models, this involves
structuring the relationships between the various variables into the
nonlinear equations. The structure of these equations are entirely
deterministic, and while their reiteration has proved interesting—the
outcomes of patterns of relationships are not predictable—their application
to the social world would imply that social dynamics could be characterized
by such deterministic structures. In the case of simulation models, the
concern is more with interacting relationships. These models do involve
emergent patterns of interrelationships but the underlying dynamics which
lead to these emergent interrelationships are predetermined in setting up
the model. This occurs even where claims are made that the models can
‘learn’ and be ‘trained’ (see e.g. Cilliers 1998), because the way in which
learning or training takes place is already predetermined by the modeller.
These issues are exacerbated when there is a need to locate parameters
within which the interactions take place. These problems raise questions
about the characteristics of the models used in the complexity sciences and
also demonstrate the difficulty of making simplistic claims about the
relevance of these models for knowing the social world, particularly because
of the implied assumptions about what a social system is, what are its
boundaries, its components, its underlying dynamics etc.
Within the social science literature, two approaches are emerging in
applying complexity science to the social world. On the one hand, there are
those who analyse the social world in terms of complex social orders (e.g.
Richards 1990, Brown 1994, Byrne 1998), and on the other hand, there are
those who analyse the social world through models of complex social
74 WILL MEDD
orderings (e.g. Gilbert and Conte 1995, Cilliers 1998). Those studying
complex social orders are concerned with analysing social dynamics
through the emergent patterns represented by variables, thus involving
ex post observations of the underlying social dynamics. Byrne’s work
(1997, 1998) addresses the weakness of importing the nonlinear methods
into the social world, and develops methods using quantitative data to
describe the emergent dynamics of complex social orders. By contrast,
those concerned with complex social orderings are concerned with
simulating the underlying interactive dynamics which involves making ex
ante assumptions about those dynamics. Understanding complex social
orderings requires assumptions about the underlying social relationships.
This brings attention more directly to the problem of what constitutes
social relationships, and in what sense they are part of social systems.
My concern is with complex social orderings which is motivated by the
way in which simulation techniques are based on assumptions of
interacting agents through which social processes emerge. However, one
of the most crucial insights from the complexity sciences, that of
emergence, is not taken far enough in these models. For example, while
Cilliers (1998) offers an interesting account of connectionist simulation, his
approach to social systems leads him to claim, for example, that the
economic system is composed of interacting individuals, where banks, for
example, are nothing more than an aggregate of individuals. This gives no
consideration of hierarchy, how banks may be social actors themselves, and
how banks may appear very differently to different people. What is the
social system in this case? What makes the economic system different from
other social systems, for example, the legal system? If we take emergence
seriously, what could the ‘emergence of social systems’ refer to?
To address these issues, there is value in drawing upon the work of
Luhmann (1990, 1995) who draws upon ideas from cybernetics, function-
alism, phenomenology and autopoiesis in developing a theory of social
systems. Central to his theory has been the role of complexity, emergence
and self-reference as central to understanding system dynamics. For
Luhmann, complexity refers to the impossibility of complete observation
and representation of phenomena that would require connecting each
element with every other element. For example, the operations of a social
welfare organization involve selecting particular relationships from a range
of possibilities about a clients situation. A complete representation of a
client would be impossible. However, this problem is not just a problem of
external observation, it is also a problem within a system itself. Indeed,
Luhmann argues, it is through selections that system formation takes place;
for example, it is the particular relationships between agents (which could
have been otherwise) of a social welfare organization that constitute that
organizations as a particular system (of social welfare) and not something
else (of arms production). Emergence through this approach refers to the
differentiation of selected relationships from their environment, where the
system is formed through a system/environment difference constituted
through the selections. The emergence of a social welfare organization
refers then to the relationships through which it is differentiated from its
environment, the relationships which constitute a system environment
COMPLEXITY AND THE SO CIAL WORLD 75
the recipient rather than by the intent of the actor (as in the voluntaristic
tradition and bottom up emergence). This top down and reversed approach
raises questions about how to theorise complex social dynamics, but it also
offers important directions for empirical research (although this is not
Luhmann’s concern). From the starting point of complexity the problems
of observation are not just a problem for theory, but for the social world in
general. The implication is that our method should be one of observing the
observations of the social world, and exploring how those observations deal
with, and reproduce, the complexity of the social world.
They also told the managers of Interface that they would have to increase
the monitoring and representation of their work to show that they met the
criteria of the funding contract. This was all for one year of funding, after
which the future would need to be negotiated. The meeting came to an end
with an agreement that a draft contract would be drawn up by social
services.
The question I want to ask is how should we make sense of this
meeting? One of the central themes of complexity science is with
‘emergence’. But there are two problems which immediately confront us.
First, what are the interactions we are interested in? How are they
constituted? Is it the interpersonal dynamics? Is it the non-verbal body
language? Is it the discourses drawn upon? Is it the manner of
argumentation? Is it the role of materials in co-ordinating those dynamics?
Is it the role of power? All of these are of possible interest to social
scientists, and this is not exhaustive. The second problem is what is the
‘emergent’ phenomena we are interested in? How is this constituted? Is it
the result of different arguments? Is it the individuals well psychological
being? Is it notes from the meeting? Is it the implications for Interface? For
the funders? All of these are of possible interest, and again this is not
exhaustive. A complex scenario like a meeting offers any number of
possible ‘events’ which we might want to explain. What is clear is that the
complexity of a social situation like this is such that many perspectives are
possible. Indeed, the perspectives of the managers and mine all contribute
different meanings to the meetings, just as yours does now. Clearly this is
problematic for building models from complexity science.
I want to explore the implications of Luhmann’s methodology for
understanding a scenario such as this meeting. This methodology refers to
observing the observations constituted in communications, communica-
tions which constitute the social world. At one level then, we could use this
method to explore the communications of the meeting itself, as an
interaction system (Luhmann 1995: 412–413). Doing so would involve
exploring the ways those communications attributed particular action to
the different actors involve. This would be one way to understand the
meeting. However, another possibility is to explore the effects of the
meeting outside of the meeting itself. Now, noting that communications are
constituted back to front, the question is how was utterance and
information attributed to the meetings? In other words, for example, what
is the meaning of the meetings for the different agencies as systems of
communication?
One point to make here is that while the meetings themselves constitute
particular interaction systems, they do not constitute communication of the
different systems in which each manager is a representative. The meetings
are not communications of Interface. The managers of Interface clearly
communicate in the meetings, but these communications do not constitute
communications of the project itself. These are not operations of the system
Interface. Similarly, the different managers of the funding agencies
communicate in the meetings, but these are not communications of those
agencies. They are not operations within those systems. The actual
processes of these meetings do not form, in themselves, meanings for the
78 WILL MEDD
are autonomous and determined by each system. And the funding systems
dominate, because they specify the criteria through which funding is
secured, funding which provides the resources for the project to continue.
Acknowledgements
Note
References