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Lerma v.

CA , L-33352, 20 December 1974

LERMA v. CA

No. L-33352 Dec 20, 1974

Petitioner: Teodoro Lerma

Respondents: CA and Concepcion Diaz

Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari of a

resolution of CA

Ponente: Makalintal, CJ

FACTS:

1) Lerma and Diaz married on May 19 1951

2) August 22, 1969: petitione filed a complaint for adultery

against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez

3) Nov 18, 1969: respondent filed with the lower court a

complaint against petitioner for legal separation and or

separation of properties, custody of their children and

support with an urgent petition for support pendent elite for

her and their youngest son Gregory

4) The respondents complaint for legal separation is based on

two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life

5) Petitioner filed his opposition to the respondents application

for support: defense: adultery charge he had filed against

respondent

CFI: granted the respondents application for support pendent

elite amended: amount from 2,250 to 1,820

6) petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and

prohibition w/ preliminary injunction to annul the

aforementioned ordersgrave abuse of discretion

CA: issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano

from enforcing said orders


7) respondent court then set aside the assailed orders and

granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence

before the lower court (oct 8)

8) respondent moved to reconsider decision on the ground that

petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present

evidence in the lower court

9) respondent court set a side oct 8 decision, dismissed the

petitionnow subject of instant proceeding for review (jan

20, 1971)

10) petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or restraining order

11) court resolved to issue a TRO effective immediately and until

further orders from the Court- addressed to judge luciano

and reps

12) respondent filed opposition w/ a prayer for immediate lifting

of the TRO issued ex parte: grounds of motion;

a) an order granting support pendent elite, although

interlocutory is immediately executory even if appealed

unless enjoined

b) dismissal of petition by CA rendered functus oficio the writ of

preliminary injunction it had previously issued

c) under Art 292 of the NCC: during the proceedings for legal

sep or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children

shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property

such support is mandatory even if there be showing that the

wife is guilty of adultery

Note: CFI of Rizal decided the adultery case and found her guilty

together with her co-accused, teodoro Ramirez, sentencing them

to a term of imprisonment
- second adultery case with Jose Gochangco

ISSUE: Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondents

claim for support pendente lite

DECISION OF SC: Resolution of respondent CA (jan 21, 1971) and the

orders of the respondent court (JDRC) are all SET ASIDE and their

enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be

rendered in the pending action for legal sep between the parties

RATIO:

1) adultery is a good defense (Art 292)

2) it is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an

action for personal support. That is support of the wife by the

husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when

support is taken from the conjugal partnership property

3) during the pendency of the of the legal sep proceeding

(support is taken from the conjugal partnership) it does not

preclude the loss of such right in certain cases

4) the said article contemplates the pendency of the court

action and inferentially at least a prima facie showing that

action will prosper

5) ART 100 of CC: legal sep may be claimed only by innocent

spouse. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal sep

cannot be claimed by either of them

6) Probable failure of the respondents suit for legal sep can be

foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been

convicted of adultery by the CFI

7) The right to separate support or maintenance even from the

conjugal partnership property presupposes the existence of

a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live

separately
8) Art 104 of the CC: after the filing of petition for legal sep the

spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other

9) A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is

himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground

for legal sep at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be

considered as within the intendment of the law granting

separate support

10) Art 303: obligation to give support shall cease when the

recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some

act which gives rise to his disinheritance

11) Art 921: one act is when a spouse gave cause for legal

separationthe loss of the substantive right to support in

such situation is incompatible with any claim for support

pendente lite

Santero v. CFI, L-61700, 14 September 1987

SANTERO v. CFI OF CAVITE

G.R. 61700-03

Sept. 14, 1987

Facts:

1. Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero (Petitioners) are children of the
late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel Santero
(Respondents) are 4 of the 7 children by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the
natural children of the late Pablo since neither of their mothers was married to their father. Pablo was
the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

2. The issue in this case springs from the Motion for Allowance filed by Respondents through their
guardian, Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground cited was for support which included educational
expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted. Again, Respondents filed a Motion for
Allowance in 1982, citing the same grounds. Petitioners opposed and contended that the wards for
whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no
longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to
cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute
funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from
which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo.

3. In the Reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she admitted that some of her children are of
age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are
given the requested allowances. She cited Art. 290 of the Civil Code and Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court.

4. CFI granted the allowance to the Respondents (2k each).

5. While the case was pending in the SC, Respondents filed another Motion for Allowance to
include Juanita, Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of Pablo with Anselma praying that an order be
granted directing the administrator to deliver 6k to each of the 7 children as their allowance. CFI granted
again but Petitioners asked the CFI to reconsider. An Amended Order was issued directing Anselma to
submit her clarification or explanation as to the additional 3 children included. Anselma stated that in
her previous motions, only the last 4 minor children were included and her first 3 who were then of age
should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment
of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the NCC.

6. CFI issued another Order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the 3
additional recipients or children of Anselma.

7. Petitioners argue that Respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already
attained majority, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the
ROC. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for
allowance for tuition fees, book and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school
term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship

Issue:

1. W/N CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance to Respondents despite the
fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of Miguel?

Held:

1. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts. 290 and 188 of the NCC. The fact
that Respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the ROC limit the
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the NCC gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, Respondents are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the provisions
of the NCC, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support
during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 which is a
procedural rule. (Spouse however must be legitimate spouse)
2. It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted without hearing. It contains a Notice of
Hearing addressed to the lawyers for Petitioners. It was duly received because lawyer filed an
Opposition.

Lim v. Lim, GR 163209, 30 October 2009

FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards. Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors),
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his
grandmother in what the trial court described a very compromising situation. Cheryl, for herself and her
children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente lite.

In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000
monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of
P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning
their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak
were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support
respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its
effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family
under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).

In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: YES.
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in
Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension
during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following
the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental
inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the
void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the
trial court for this limited purpose.

Lam v. Chua, GR 131286, 18 March 2004

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