Case 2:09-cv-02095-MMB Document 132 Filed 08/19/10 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STUDENT DOE 1, et al., : CIVIL ACTION

:
v. :
:
LOWER MERION SCHOOL DISTRICT : NO. 09-2095

ORDER

On July 22, 2010, following a nine-day non-jury trial, detailed findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and the entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Lower Merion School

District (“Defendant” or the “District”), Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New Trial (ECF No.

127), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.1 In sum, Plaintiffs contend that the Court

“improperly found” as a matter of law that Lower Merion “satisfied its burden of proof to

establish” (1) “a compelling state interest for its actions in redistricting . . . after the Court

properly concluded that race was a factor in such actions”; (2) “that its actions were narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling state interest in . . . redistricting”; and (3) “that adoption of Plan

3R was inevitable despite its use of race in the redistricting process.” (Pls.’ New Trial Mot. 1.)

The District responds, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have not met their “extraordinarily heavy

burden” of demonstrating that a new trial is necessary. (Def.’s Resp. 3.) In particular, the

District avers that the Court did not find that strict scrutiny must be applied to this case, and

that ample record evidence supports the Court’s conclusions that the District demonstrated

compelling state interests, that race was only considered to achieve such interests, and thus,

1
The audio recordings of the trial proceedings are available at ECF Nos. 89–94, 97–104.
The Court’s factual findings are available at Doe v. Lower Merion School District, No. 09-2095,
2010 WL 1956585 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2010) (“Doe II”), and legal conclusions are available at
Doe v. Lower Merion School District, No. 09-2095, 2010 WL 2595278 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 24, 2010)
(“Doe III”).
 Case 2:09-cv-02095-MMB Document 132 Filed 08/19/10 Page 2 of 4

that the redistricting plan at issue was narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests.

(Def.’s Resp. 4-14.)

Under Rule 59, “[a] district court . . . may grant a new trial if required to prevent

injustice or to correct a verdict that was against the weight of the evidence.” Am. Bearing Co.

V. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 948 (3d Cir. 1984). “In non-jury cases, the grant of a new

trial is usually reserved for instances in which the trial was infected with manifest errors of law

or fact.” P.R. Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 553 (3d Cir.

1988). In determining whether to grant a new trial, a district court must “view[] the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-movant and giv[e] it the advantage of every fair and

reasonable inference.” Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369 F.3d 227, 230 (3d Cir.2004)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiffs’ pending Motion falls far short of demonstrating that “manifest errors of law

or fact” infected this case. Plaintiffs do nothing more than attempt to challenge factual and

legal conclusions that this Court previously reached, and are, in short, nothing more than an

effort to relitigate their claims.

Turning first to Plaintiffs’ argument that the District failed to demonstrate compelling

state interests, Plaintiffs’ Motion only argues that the District purportedly denied that race was

a factor in decisionmaking, and thus, was “precluded . . . from identifying a compelling state

interest related to its use of race in the redistricting process.” (Pls.’ New Trial Mot. 5.)

Plaintiffs, however, failed to cite to any cases that support this conclusion, and have not

articulated why equalizing the population of the two high schools, minimizing travel and

transportation costs, fostering educational continuity, and fostering student walkability, are not

compelling educational interests, as the record amply demonstrates. See Doe III, 2010 WL
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2595278, at *11-15.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to identify precedent for the proposition that an interest

that has not been expressly identified in a previous Supreme Court case as “compelling” per se

falls short of being compelling in a given case. Were this the law, district courts would be

foreclosed from evaluating novel constitutional claims or from considering the nuances of a

case’s particular facts. Thus, absent any such instruction from the Supreme Court or Third

Circuit, this Court has not committed a “manifest” error of law in determining, after careful

consideration of all the evidence presented during the nine-day trial, that various educational

goals were compelling state interests for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of the

redistricting plan in question.

Finally, concerning narrow tailoring, again Plaintiffs have not supplemented their

argument with support from binding precedent. As the Court explained in detail, not only does

the redistricting plan that the District adopted achieve meet all of the compelling educational

interests, but also, no conceivable alternative plan is able to do so, nor have Plaintiffs ever

identified any such alternative plan. See id. at *11, 16.2

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that a new trial is “required to prevent

injustice” in this case, Am. Bearing, 729 F.2d at 948, and thus, their Motion for a New Trial is

2
In addition, Plaintiffs disagree with this Court’s conclusion that “application of strict
scrutiny is not required by a number of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (Pls.’ New Trial Mot. 4.) Plaintiffs, however, mischaracterize the Court’s legal
conclusions. Although the Memorandum on Conclusions of Law states that various Supreme
Court cases did “not necessarily require[]” strict scrutiny to be applied to the present case, the
Court also determined that other precedent indicates that “strict scrutiny is appropriate if race was
a motivating factor in the decisionmaking in question,” and thus, applied strict scrutiny to the
present case. Doe III, 2010 WL 2595278, at *5, 10.
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DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

Date: August 19 , 2010 /s Michael M. Baylson

Michael M. Baylson, U.S.D.J.

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