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Case No.

16

Avera vs. Garcia

Doctrine:

A will cannot be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting
witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two witnesses.

The will in question is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of
the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left
margin.

Facts:

Eutiquia Avera instituted a court proceeding for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia. It was contested
by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and
Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the
three attesting witnesses who testified with details not necessary to be here specified that the will
was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full
possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who
wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was
their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.

When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony
tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so
debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. After the cause had been submitted for
determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the
making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed.
He accordingly admitted the will to probate. From this judgment, an appeal was taken in behalf of the
persons contesting the will.

Issues:

1. Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single
attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two.
2. Whether the will in question is invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and
of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead
of the left margin.

Held:

1. No. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting
witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the
petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set
for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for
the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the
probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting
witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case
to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all
the attesting witnesses. Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were
not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case
above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be
compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved
by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses. It appears, however, that this point was not raised
by the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for determination in
that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted
for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court. We believe
this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must be declared not be well taken. This
exact question has been decided by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention
of the appellant, and we see no reason why the same rule of practice should not be observed by
us.

2. No. The instrument contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of
deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin
instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is
authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have
been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be
exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the
signatures in one margin or the other. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant
upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial
to invalidate the instrument.
Case No. 27

Labrador vs. CA

Doctrine:

A holographic will is still considered dated even when the date is not located in its usual place.

Facts:

Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving
behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the
following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita,
all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.

Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had
already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March
17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the fact that
the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

The trial court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic
will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988
modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for
being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement.

Issue:

Whether or not the holographic will is still considered dated even when the date is not located in its usual
place.

Held:

Yes. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will. Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will
was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of
execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the
beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a
failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death." Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by
petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that
what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature
of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control
the disposition of his estate.
Case No. 40

Sanchez vs. CA

Doctrine:

In a probate proceeding, judicial approval is not necessary for a compromise agreement to take effect.

Facts:

Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Rolando, Florida Mierly,
Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Following the
death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru
counsel, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father,
Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility.

Rosalia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of
the real and personal estate of her late mother. Before the administration proceedings Special in
Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, Rosalia's father, died on
October 21, 1968.

As heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan
C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia. However Rosalia and
herein petitioners assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they
agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez. Petitioner Rosalia was
appointed by the trial court, and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.
Petitioners filed a motion to require administratrix, herein private respondent Rosalia, to deliver
deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement. Under date of April 13, 1970, herein
private respondent Rosalia and herein petitioners entered into and executed a memorandum of
agreement which modified the compromise agreement. Nine years later, herein petitioners filed, thru
counsel, a motion to require herein private respondent Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render
an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likewise filed a motion
to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the annulment of the
compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.

Issue:

Whether or not judicial approval is necessary for a compromise agreement to take effect, in probate
proceeding.

Held:

No. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a
consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not
required for its perfection.
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise
agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and
provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by
the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft
on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30,
1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the
parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there
can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound
thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed
upon in good faith by the parties thereto.

Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil
cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a
civil case to agree upon some fair compromise." In opposing the validity and enforcement of the
compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is necessary in compromises entered
into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. However, we observe that although
denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition,
pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."

For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the
following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts
left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means
of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. The SC find that all the foregoing
requisites are present in this case. The SC therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise
agreement/partition in this case.

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