Politicallaw Jimenez 2016

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C I. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sAND STATE POLICIES
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A. Compliance with Principles of International Law
A taxpayer can n
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avail itself of the preferential tax rates inr
a with a regulation requiring filing an B a for tax relief. The obligation
a tax treaty even if the taxpayer
ChLimited
did not comply application
vs. Commissioner of InternalsRevenue, G. R. No. 193407, January 14,

to comply with a tax treaty prevails over the objective of the regulation. (CBK Power
Company
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2015).
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B. Protection of Family
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Petitions were filed questioning nthe constitutionality of the Responsiblea rParenthood and
Reproductive Health Act, h Section 7 of the law provided that minors B will not be allowed
C of family planning without writtenesconsent from their parents
access to modern methods
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or guardians except when the minor is a parent or has a miscarriage.
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HELD: This is an affront to the constitutional mandate o
Rof the youthmandate
to protect and strengthen the family
n for civic efficiency and r

as an inviolable institution. It disregards the constitutional that the natural and
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primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
B a the
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development of moral character should receive the support of the Government
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There is no constitutional objectionC eminor under
the exception that will enable her to take care of her body and that of thelunborn child. In
to the acquisition of information by the
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life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures, b the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse R should not be put at a
grave risk simply for lack of consent.
a n a r
The second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(3i) shouldh B
requirement of parental consent to elective surgical C procedures, it denies parents theire
be struck down. By limiting the
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right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are non-surgical procedures.
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not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. (Imbong vs. Ochoa,
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Save in the case of the two exceptions and in the case of an abused child, the parents should
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721 SCRA 146)
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C. Protection of Life of Mother
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Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
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Reproductive Health Act. Section 23 (a) (3) of the law provides that a health care service
provider who objects because of religious convictions to render health care services shall
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be excused from such obligations, provided the person seeking such service is not in an
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emergency condition or serious case.
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h HELD: An exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the performance
s
C (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRAe146)
of emergency procedures. The right to life of the mother should be given preference.
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D. Protection of Life of Unborn
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Petitions were n filed questioning the constitutionality of r
Reproductivea a
the Responsible Parenthood and
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Health Act, because Section 4(a) allows the use of contraceptives.
HELD:C The Constitution affords protection to s

e the unborn from conception. Conception
lpermissible.
o
the sperm and the ovum is constitutionallyb
means fertilization of the ovum by the sperm. Contraceptives which prevent the union of
(Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.721 SCRA
146)
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E. Protection of Right to Health a r
B Parenthood and
Petitions were filed C
h s
Reproduction Health Act. The petitioners claimed that it e
questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible
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because it required the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
l violated the right to health,
intrauterine devices and
injectibles in the National Drug Formulatory and the o
Rand that the use of contraceptive pills
risk of breast and cervical cancer is
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increased in women who use oral contraceptives
a
increases the risk of thromboembolism and stroke.
a
B only
HELD: Republic Act No. 4729 places h s
C available to the public. Contraceptivese can only be
adequate safeguards to ensure that
contraceptives that are safe are made
dispensed in duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies
b l and with the
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prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
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II. BILL OF RIGHTS
a n a r
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A. Due Process
C e s
Substantive Due Process
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a) Police Power
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Remman Enterprises, Inc and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
a nAssociation
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questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
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violation of due process because it is unduly oppressive and infringes the constitutional
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prohibition against deprivation of property without due process. They stressed that the law
e
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requires real estate developers to employ real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of
their properties and real estate developers will have less control in managing their
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business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
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n estate professionals in the sale andar
HELD: The contention has no basis. The requirement of engaging the services of licensed
areal B
marketing of their properties is an unavoidable
h consequence
C trade
of a reasonable
sexercise of police power, particularly, when its conduct
regulatory measure. The proper regulation of a business or
e
is a legitimate subject of the
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liberty curtailed affected b
affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions and public welfare. Where the
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much wider. The legislature
properly rights, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of
n Inc. vs. Professional RegulatoryaBoard r of Real Estate Service, 715

real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards.
a
(Remman Enterprises,
SCRA 293)
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C e s of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproduction Health Act. The petitioners b l argued that it violated the constitutional
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality
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prohibition against involuntary servitude
to provide 48 hours of pro bono reproductive
because it required health care service providers
health services.
r and a duty of
anis imbued with public interest. It isBaapower
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the state to regulate and hto promote the public welfare. Thesprovision only encourages
HELD: The practice of medicine
l
government reproductive health care service providers to render eThisprois notbonoan service. Other
o b state interest. (Imbong v.

than non-accreditation with Philhealth, no penalty is imposed.
burden but a necessary incentive in furtherance of a legitimate
unreasonable
Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146)

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a n a rof
B fence
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at the right side
an exit of the North Luzon Expressway.h
s
The parcel of land was bounded by an access
along the North Luzon Expressway. C Hermano Oil Manufacturing
requested to be granted on easement of right of way, because the access l
& Sugar
e had barred
fence
Corporation
the request. Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation filed ao

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its entry into and exit from the North Luzon Expressway. The Toll Regulatory Board denied
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for the grant of an
and just compensation and was denied equal protection.

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easement of right of way. It argued that it was denied of its property due process
a r
h of police power. It did not partake s
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of a compensable taking. The property was not taken and devoted to public use. Instead, it e
HELD: The putting up of the fence was a valid exercises
was subjected to a certain restraint to secure the general safety of the motorists using the
b l
North Luzon Expressway. (Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporationo v. Toll
Regulatory Board, 742 SCRA 397) R
a n
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B. Vagueness and Overbreath
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i. Presence of Violation
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Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes law enforcement authorities, with
due cause, to collect or record by terminal or electronic means traffic data in real-time
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associated with specific communications transmitted by a computer system. Traffic data
refer to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of
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underlying service, but not content nor identities. The petitioners argued that this violates
the right to privacy.
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HELD: When seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled and
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analyzed, they record patterns of activity which can be used to create profiles of the person
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under surveillance. The phrase with due course does not even relate the collection of data
to the probable cause of a particular crime. The authority it gives law enforcement agencies
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is too sweeping. The power is virtually limitless. It threaten the right to privacy. Section 12
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cannot be stricken due for vagueness or overbreadth. It does not regulate or punish any
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type of speech. It should be narrowly drawn to prevent abuses. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
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ii. Absence of Violation bl
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Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners argued that it violated due process because of
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vagueness, since Section 23(a)(1), which penalizes knowingly withholding information and
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providing incorrect information, does not define health care provider and incorrect
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information.
b
o necessarily includes exemption
HELD: Section 4(m) of the law defines a public health service provider. The exemption
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from the obligation to render reproductive health services
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from being obligated to give reproductive health information. The word incorrect means
a a rv.
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failing to coincide with the truth. The word knowingly means intentionally. (Imbong
Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
C h s
C. Procedural Due Process l e
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i. Absence of Violation
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The issuance of a temporary protection order without noticen r
a and hearing to the defendant
B a
Mangrobang, 714 SCRA 248)
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is valid because of the necessity to protect women and children from violence. (Tua v.
s
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Ray Shu filed a complaint against Jaime Dee, Enriqueto Magpantay, Ramon Miranda, Larry
Macillan, and Edwin So with the National Bureau of Investigation for falsifying two o
b
deeds of
real estate mortgages submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Rthem
After an
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investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint againstn for
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falsification of public documents with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
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The respondents argued that they were denied due process during the investigation by the
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National Bureau of Investigation, because they and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
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Company were not required to submit standard sample signatures of Ray Shu for
comparison.
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HELD: The functions of the National Bureau of Investigation were merely investigatory. It
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has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers. No denial of due process could have taken place.
(Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512)
B a
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C Jinggoy Estrada for plunder. Heesclaimed that he was denied due process, because he was
The Ombudsman issued a resolution directing the filing of a criminal case against Senator
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not furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of the other respondents.
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HELD: There is no law
o
or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
anJanuary 21, 2015) a r v. Office of the Ombudsman,

copies of the counter-affidavits of co-respondents. (Estrada
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G.R. No. 212140,
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ii. TheC
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Commission on Elections approved Resolution s No. 4615, which fixed the airtime
b ladvertisements
limitation in Section 6 of the Fair Election Act for advertisements of candidates and political
parties to 120 minutes of television
o and 180 minutes of radio
of television advertisements and R

advertisements for candidates and political parties for national candidates and 60 minutes
a n
and political parties on aggregate basis rather than per station. Radioa r and television
90 minutes of radio advertisements for local candidates
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networks questioned validity of Resolution No. 4615 for being contrary B to the purpose of
the law. C e s
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HELD: The law does not justify the conclusion that the maximum
l allowable airtime should
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be based on the totality of broadcasts in all television o and radio station. Resolution 9615
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goes against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech, and of the
a
press. It unduly restricts the ability of candidates
a
and political parties to communicate their
the new rule on aggregate airtime h regulation is not valid. (GMA Network,BInc. v.
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. For absence of a prior hearing
Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA C e s

88)
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found in the area, Apo Cement Corporation submitted a mineral R o production sharing
For failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive use the mineral properties
a n
agreement for the area held off by Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corporation. The Regional Office
a r
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
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declared the mining claims
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appealed. Mingson Mining Industries Corporation assailed C
abandoned and open for location to other parties. Luzvimin
the
Cebu Mining Corporation
declarations on the ground
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that they overlapped with its own mining claims.
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The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources decreed
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because they encroached on its claims. Apo Cement Corporation filedn
portions of the mining claims be awarded to Mingson Mining Industries Corporation
a a motion for
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reconsideration. The Regional Office recommended that the mining claims be awarded to
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Apo Cement Corporation subject to the outcome of the appeal of Luzvimin Cebu Mining
B
Corporation. The Panel of Arbitrators affirmed the orders without requiring the parties to
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file any pleading or setting the matter for hearing.
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HELD: The right of Mingson Mining Industries Corporation to due process was violated,
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thereby rendering the decision null and void. (Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson Mining
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Corporation, 740 SCRA 383)
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B. Equal Protection
e s
1. Absence of Violation
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Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
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violation of equal protection, because it exempted from its coverage natural juridical
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persons dealing with their own properties and receivers, trustees and assignees in
insolvency proceedings.
e s
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HELD: The Real estate developers constitutela sectordue
that employees the largest number of
o
brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants to the number of products they
Rdevelopers sell lots, houses and condominium units in

advertise and sell nationwide. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions
a n (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional

over their own property, real estate
the ordinary course of business. a r Regulatory
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Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293) B
C s
e sought reimbursement of
The officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses. They submitted b l certifications attesting that
they incurred the expenses. The Commission on Audit o
Rofficialsevidencing
disallowed the claims, because they
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were not supported by receipts and other documents the disbursements, as
required by COA Circular No. 2006-01.The
a a
of the Local Water Utilities
h to claim reimbursements on theB

Administration claimed that the circular violated equal protection, because officials of
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national government agencies were permitted
e s basis of
certifications.
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emergency and financial miscellaneous expenses. The exclusionR
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HELD: National Government Officials are empowered by law to use appropriated funds for
of COA Circular No. 2006-
01 is a control measure to regulate the incurrence of then expenditures and to ensure r
prevention of irregular expenses. The government-ownedaor controlled corporations and a
government financial institutions appropriate throughh B
C
resolution funds for extraordinary
s
ise
and miscellaneous expenses. The extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses for national
government agencies is provided by law. There is a reasonable classification which l
germane to the purpose of COA Circular No. 2006-01. (Espinas v. Commission on Audit,b
Ro
720
SCRA 302)
a n and
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood
h
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners claimed that it violated equal protection, because
C
a r
it targeted the poor B for promotion of the use of contraceptives and it excluded private
e s
schools from the mandatory reproductive health education program.
HELD: To b
l
provide that the poor are to be given priority in the reproductive health care
R
program o is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution. It provides that there
n public and private schools because r of the academic freedom of private schools,
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged. There is a substantial distinction
abetween a
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especially with respect to religious instruction. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
C Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime e sPrevention Act penalizes the acquisition of domain name
over the internet in bad faithlto profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others
o b
from registering it, if the domain name is:
Ror confusingly similar to an existing registered trademark;
an a r
(i) Similar, identical,
h or similar with the name of any personB

Cname; and
(ii) Identical
personal
e s other than the registrant, in case of a
l
b property interest in it.
o
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual
R equal protection, because it will case a user using

his real name to suffer the samea nfate as those who use aliases or takeathername of another
The petitioners argued that this violated
h
in satire, spoof, or any other literacy name. B
C s
e the domain name in bad
faith. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237) b l
HELD: The challenge is baseless. The law is penalizing acquiring
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n the internet a qualifying circumstancer
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act makes the commission of crimes penalized by
the Revised Penal Code and special laws through
a B a by
making the penalty one degree higher.
h
C between crimes committed through s
e the use of
information and communication technology and similar crimes using otherlmeans. In every
HELD: There is a substantial distinction
o
cybercrime, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach b more victims or
cause greater harm. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
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a n a r
2. Presence of Violation
h B
Section 5.24 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations C of the Reproductive Health Act
e s
provides that public health officers cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
b l
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HELD: This violates the equal protection clause. The protection accorded to conscientiouso
an
objectors should apply equally to all medical practitioners. Freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
C h
a r
B
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Reproductive Health s Act. Section 23(a)(3) provides that a conscientious objector because
Section 5.24b l
of religious convictions
of the
can refuse to extend health care services to a person seeking care.
Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that provincial, city, or
health o
R as conscientious objectors.
officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurses, and supervising midwives cannot be
n
considered
aHELD: a r
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This is violative of the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction
s without distinction, whether they belong to the
C should apply to all medical practitioners
why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The exemption
e
b l v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
public or private sector. (Imbong
R
The accused was charged
o with marital rape His counsel argued that marital rape should be
rules of proof.a
n from non-marital rape in terms ofatherelements of the crime and the
treated differently
h B
HELD:C To treat marital rape cases differentlysfrom non-marital rape in terms of the
l ethe rules of proof infringes on the equal
elements that constitute the crime and in
o
protection clause. (People v. Jumauan, 722 bSCRA 108)
R grandfather. John Colcol was employed on board a
vessel. He died in an accident.a nHis mother, Bernardina Bartolome, filed
John Colcol was adopted by his great
a ra claim for death
h
benefits with the Social Security System. Her claim was denied on theB ground that she was
no longer consideredCas the legitimate parent of John Colcolsbecause of his objection.
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HELD: There is no reasonable basis to discriminate b against illegitimate parents. The
classification is not germane to the law. There is no o
Rsecure
pressing government interest that
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requires classification. The policy of the law is to adequate benefits to employees
a
and their dependents in the event of work-connected
a
death. (Bartolome v. Social Security
B
System, 740 SCRA 78)
C h s
D. Searches and Seizures
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1. Probable Cause
o b
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i. Presence
a n a r
and an office at the Probest International TradingC
The National Bureau of Investigation obtained two search h warrants to search a warehouse B
allegedly owned by Michael Tan for s
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counterfeit Unilever shampoo products intended to be disposed of in relation of Section
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168, in relation to Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code. In the course of their b
search, the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation seized sachets containing
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counterfeit hair conditioner and shampoo. The National Bureau of Investigation filed a case
for unfair competition.
C h
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The respondent claimed that he was Paul Tan and not Michael Tan, that his business was
B
selling leather goods and materials for leather products, that his business was named
e s
Probest International Trading, that he was not selling counterfeit Unilever shampoo
b l
products, that he did not own or operate the warehouse, and the sachets of Unilever
shampoo products contained genuine shampoo products used for his personal
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consumption.
n The pieces of evidence were sufficient

aHELD: a r to form a reasonable ground to believe that
h B
Paul Tan committed unfair competition. First, the huge volume and the location of the
C products for personal consumption s are ordinarily found inside the house. Second,
shampoo products belie the claim that they are for personal consumption. Shampoo
e
ownership of the warehouses
b l is not crucial to a finding of probable cause. Third, the
sachets support the R o
striking similarities between the genuine Unilever shampoo products and the counterfeit
belief that Paul Tan is distributing counterfeit Unilever shampoo
an Inc. v. Tan, 715 SCRA 36) Bar

products. Finally, Paul Tan resumed his operations involving counterfeit Unilever products.
ChCorporation owned all rights, including

(Unilever Philippines,
Microsoft
e s copyrights relating to all versions and
b land manuals
editions of Microsoft software and the users and the registered owner in the
R o and editions of Adobe Software. They were

Philippines of the trademarks Microsoft
rights, including copyrights to all versions
MS DOS. Adobe Systems, Inc. owned all
a
versions of their software. They r
nhired Orion Support, Inc. to verify theainformation.
informed that New Field (Asia Pacific), Inc. was illegally reproducing and using unlicensed
Orion
Support, Inc. asked two h market researchers, Norma Serrano B
and Michael Morado to
confirm the tip. C e s
b
The two companies also filed a complaint with the Philippine
l National Police. A police
able to use two computers owned by New FieldsR
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officer, Ernesto Padilla, was assigned to the case. Using business pretext, the three were
n r
(Asia Pacific), Inc. They discovered that
a
the two computers were using the same Microsoft
a
and Adobe software, because they were
B for
h
using the same identification numbers. Since a softwares can be used in one computer only,
Cgranted. However, later on, the Regional
this indicated that the software being used
s
was illegally copied. Ernesto Padilla applied
granted the motion to quash the search warrants on the ground that the l
search warrants. The application was e Trial Court
personal knowledge.
o b witnesses had no
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HELD: The three witnesses were able to personally verify
a n the tip of their informant.
a r
(Microsoft Corporation v. Farajallah 735 SCRA 34)
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b. Absence C e s
The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company applied for search warrants for b
l
against Abigail Razon Alvarez and Vermon Alvarez. Prepaid cards were beingo
theft
Rreceived
sold to
Filipinos abroad. The prepaid cards could be used to make calls which would be
a n
by the telephone of Abigail Razon Alvarez and Vermon Alvarez, which was equipped to
h
reflect that the telephone calls originated from a telephone in Metropolitan Manila. The
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Regional Trial Court issued two search warrants for theft in violation of Article 308 and
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309 of the Revised Penal Code and two search warrants for installation of telephone
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connections without the authority of Philippine Long Distance Company in violation of
l
Presidential Decree No. 401.
b
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HELD: The fact that the printers and scanners may be connected to illegal conversions to
an r
the telephone laws does not make them the subject of the offense, the fruits of the offense,
a
and the means of committing the offense. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company did
B
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not show that the installation of printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if
s
connected with a telephone line, requires its prior authorization. (Philippine Long Distance
e
l
Telephone Company v. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 94)
b
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Ariel Escobedo was picked up by unknown persons believed to be police officers for selling
drugs. Later on, Jaime dela Cruz demanded money in exchange for his release. A complaint
an a r
was filed with the National Bureau of Investigation. Jaime dela Cruz was nabbed while
B
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receiving the marked money. He was required to submit to a urine test for drug testing. As
Dangerous Drugs Act.

e s
the test yielded a positive result, he was charged with violation of the Comprehensive
b l
R o de la Cruz was arrested for extortion. His urine
HELD: A drug test does not cover persons
acts under Republic Act No. 9165. Jaime
arrested for unlawful acts but only for unlawful
violated his right to privacy.a n Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655) ar

sample was the only evidence used to convict him for the use of illegal drugs. The drug test
(Dela
h B
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2. Particularity of Description
e s
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas applied for b
l
warrants to search the offices of
Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet o
R amounted to theft and violation of
Corporation, because they were
n r
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which
Presidential Decree No. 401.
a a
h Long Distance Telephone Company,B
C
Jose Enrico Rivera, an employee of Philippine
s testified
e telephone
that a legitimate long distance call should pass through the public switch
b l
network and on to the toll center of the international gateway facilities in the Philippines.
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toll center would meter the call and pass through the public switch
o
The call was then transmitted to the other country through voice destination
telephone
country. The
network of
the called number to complete circuit. The two companies that
provide international long distance call services by using a
nwere searched were able to a r
h
the telephone lines of Philippine
B
C
Long Distance Telephone Company by bypassing its international gateway facilities.
e s
that a telephone number serviced by it and registered to Worldwide Web Corporationb
Raymond Gali, another employee of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, testified l
used to provide Global Talk, an internet-based international call service, whicho
was
availed of by prepaid or post-paid accounts. The international call using Global R

can be
bypass the international gateway facilities of Philippine Long Distance

a n Talk would
Telephone
Company.
C h
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The Regional Trial Court granted the application for search warrants. Over a hundred items
B
were seized. The two companies moved to quash the search warrants for lack of probable
cause.
e s
b l
HELD: Toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls. It deprives Philippine
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Long Distance Telephone Company of the compensation to which it is entitled had the call
an r
has been routed through its network. Toll bypass operation constitutes theft.
B a
h Toll bypass operations cannot be accomplished without the installation of
C Telephone Company. This is violations of Presidential Decree No. 401. (Worldwide Web
telecommunications equipment to the telephone lines of Philippine Long Distance
Corporation v. People of the l

e
b Philippines, 713 SCRA 18)
oissued for the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation for
A search warrant wasR
an of Presidential Decree No. 401. BBothar
theft. Another search warrant for the office premises of Planet Internet Corporation was
Distance h
issued for violation were issued with Philippine Long
resultC s two companied argued that the search

Telephone Company as the offended party. Over a hundred items were seized as a
e
of the issuance of the search warrants. The
warrants were general warrants.
b l
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HELD: A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the
a nthe warrant is being issued. The Philippine

relation to the offense for which a r Long Distance
things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
Telephone Company wash able to establish the connection between B the items to be searched
C and the crime of theft of the telephone
as identified in the warrants
e s services and business.
(Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, 713
b l SCRA 18)
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Mo-a, Davao City,R

Judge William Simon Peralta issued a search warrant o to search three caves in the Land
n It was argued that the search warrant r

where the remains of victims summarily
executed by the Davao Death Squad were buried.
a B a did
h
not particularly describe the things to be seized.
C described the place to be searched, the s
HELD: The search warrant particularly
l e three caves
killed and buried in the premises. (Laud v. People of the Philippines, 741bSCRA 239)
inside the Land Compound, and the things to be seized, the remains of six victims who were
R o
3. Warrantless Search and Seizure
a n a r
h B
a. Incident of Arrest
C e s
with which he had a traffic dispute fired their guns at him. The police officers acted onbthe
A driver of a towing truck asked for police assistance, because the passengers of a taxicab l
complaint and found the taxicab. The two armed men alighted, fired at them, and ran
R oaway.
his possession a black bag. They found marijuana fruiting tops in then
The police officers chased them and subdued them. One of them, Medario Calantiao had in
a bag. Madorio
h
Colantiao claimed the warrantless seizure was unconstitutional, because it was not in plain
C
view. ar
B
e s
HELD: The search and seizure was valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest. (People
l
v. Colantiao, 727 SCRA 20)
b
R o
A female informant went with four police officers to conduct an entrapment operation.
an r
When Oliver Edao arrived riding in a wagon, the informant approached and talked to him
a
inside the wagon. Afterwards, the informant waved to one of the police officers, but this
B
Ch
was not a signal that the sale of drugs had been consummated. When the police officer
s
approached, Oliver Edao ran away. The police officers chased him. One of them grabbed
e
b l
Oliver Edao and got a plastic bag from his hand. The plastic bag contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride. He was arrested and charged with violation of the
o
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
R
an a r
HELD: There was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise to arouse the suspicion
B
Ch
that Oliver Edao had just committed, was committing or was attempting to commit a
e s
crime. Oliver Edao and the informant were just talking when he was apprehended. The
plastic bag containing white crystalline substance is inadmissible in evidence, as it came
bl
from an invalid search and seizure. (People v. Edao, 729 SCRA 255)
b. Plain view of Prohibited Object

Ro
a
Acting on an information, forestnrangers went to the house of Ma. Mimie a rCresencio. They
saw forest lawless lyingh under her house and at the shoreline twoB meters away from the
C admitted ownership of the lumber.could
the premises without a search warrant. Ma. Mimie Cresencio e
house. Ma. Mimie Cresencio sThenotforest rangers entered
for the purchase of the forest products. She was charged b lwith illegal possession of them.
present any receipt
R o
an741 SCRA 319) r
HELD: The lumber was plainly in sight. The seizure of the lumber falls within the purview
of the plain view doctrine. (Cresencio v. People,
a
B for
h s
prosecution for illegal possession ofC
Unlicensed firearms seized while enforcing a search warrant may be the basis
firearms even if they were not includedein the search
warrant if they were found in plain view. (Castro v. People, G.R. No. 212260,
b l November 26,
2014)
R o
c. Invalid Search and Seizure
a n a r
One of the arresting police officers testified that he C
Rizaldy Sanchez was charged with illegal possession of hmethamphetamine hydrochloride. B
and his companion were conducting an s
l e
b
operation because of information that tricycle drivers were buying drugs in a certain
and caught up with it, they requested Rizaldy Sanchez to alight, he was holding ao
house, that a tricycle driver with a passenger entered the house, they chased the tricycle
R match
Rizaldy Sanchez brought to the police station, and a chemist found out thatn
box, Rizaldy Sanchez agreed to show its contents, and it contained a regulated drug, that
a the substance
examined was methamphetamine hydrochloride.
C h
a r
HELD: Neither the in B flagrante arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle is applicable to justify
e s
the warrantless search and seizure. For the arrest to be lawful, it must precede the search.
b
frisk search.
l
In this case, the search preceded the arrest. The circumstances do not justify a stop-and-
Coming out from the house of the pusher and boarding a tricycle, were
Rohad methamphetamine hydrochloride in his possession.

innocuous movements and they themselves could not give rise to any belief that Rizaldy
n
Sanchez
aThe a r
h B
seizure could not be considered as seizure in plain view. The methamphetamine
s 741 SCRA 294)
C inside a match box. (Sanchez v.ePeople,
hydrochloride was not inadvertently discovered. It was not plainly exposed to sight. It was
b l
R o data found to be in violation of the law. The petitioners argued
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes the Secretary of Justice to restrict
or block access to computer
an
the right against unreasonable searches r
a
that this violates and seizures.
h 19 precludes judicial intervention. ItB

Cof restrictions on speech. It violates ethesconstitutional guarantees to freedom of
HELD: Section disregards guidelines to determine the
validity
b
expression and against unreasonable searches l and seizures. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice,
716 SCRA 237)
R o
4. Warrantless Arrest
a n a r
a. Void Warrantless Arresth B
C s
e transporting marijuana, the
Because of a text message that a certain Marvin Buya would be
l
b arrived at the checkpoint, the
police officers set up a checkpoint. When a passenger jeepney
driver disembarked and signaled that the two maleo
The police officer questioned the two passengers,R
passengers were carrying marijuana.
n r
Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao about
the contents of the bags. They answered that
a they did not know, because they were
B a
h
transporting the bags as a favor for Marvin. When the bags were opened, marijuana bricks
s
CSantiago Dayao was dismissed, becausee he was only
were found inside. Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao were charged with illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. The case against
14 years old.
b l
HELD: Victor Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bagR
o
and travelling aboard a
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious about this. The assessment
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It a
n of suspicion was not a r
observe facts that would lead to a reasonable suspicionh
is the police officer who should
B
SCRA 427) C
of a person. (People v. Cogaed, 731
e s
b l
The police officers manning a checkpoint observed that the motor vehicle which Edmund
Sydeco was driving was swerving. They flagged down the vehicle asked him to alight
R ofrom
an
the vehicle. Because of an altercation, the police officers arrested Edmund Sydeco and
charged him with driving under the influence of liquor.
C h
ar
B
HELD: Swerving does not necessarily constitute reckless driving. A willful and reckless
s
disregard of the consequences is required. When he was flagged down, Edmund Sydeco had
e
b l
not committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of
criminal activity. (Sydeco v. People of the Philippines, 740 SCRA 288)
R o
b. Valid Warrantless Arrest
n Moreno Generoso called a police station
aAtty. a r to report an altercation between him and five
h persons. The desk officer dispatchedB
C Together e s and an airman, he arrived at the scene of the crime
with another police officer
a police officer to proceed to the scene of the crime.
l
bas the ones who mauled him. Two police officers brought them
less than an hour after the altercation. They saw Atty. Moreno Generoso badly beaten. He
to the police station. o

pointed to the five persons
R
a n of Section 5(b), Rule 113 aofrthe Revised Rules of Criminal
HELD: The phraseology
h
Procedure requires for warrantless arrest probable Bcause, immediacy of the arrest, and
C s
it. The warrantless arrest took place less thanean hour from the time of the commission of
personal knowledge of the facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed
b l the bruises of Atty. Moreno Generoso. He

the crime. The police officers personally observed
positively identified the persons whoo mauled him, and the two of them admitted that Atty.
Moreno Generoso suffered bruises,
arrest of the perpetrators was n
Ralthough they invoked self-defense. The warrantless
a a
proper. (Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337)r
h B
c. Private Parties
C e s
The constitutional guaranty against illegal searches and l
private parties. (Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRAb
seizures does not apply against
R o 107)
d. Absence of Search and Seizure

a n a r
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Preventionh Act provides that when a search warrant B
s
has been
C
properly issued, law enforcement authorities shall have the power:
e
(i) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium; b
l
Ro
(ii) To make and retain a copy of the computer data;
a n a r
h
(iii) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
B
C e s
(iv) To conduct forensic examination of the computer data storage medium; and
b l
(v) To render inaccessible or remove the computer data in the accessed computer
computer and communications network. R o or
a n
h
The petitioners argued that this supplants the search and seizure procedure.
C
ar
HELD: Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of the enforcement authorities to insure
B
the proper collection, preservation, and use of the computer system or data. It does not
e s
supersede search and seizure rules but merely supplements them. (Disini v. Secretary of
l
Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
b
R o
D. Freedom of Speech and of the Press
aa.nScope of Protection B a r
h
C electronic communication withethes use of a computer system to advertise, sell or offer for
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prohibits the transmission of commercial
b l
sale products and services unless:
(i) There was priorR

o
affirmative consent from the recipient; or
a a r announcements from the

nintent is for service and/or administrative
sender toh
(ii) The primary
B
C
the users, subscribers or customers;
e s
(iii) The following conditions are present: l
o b
the recipient to reject receipt of R
(a) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid and reliable way for
source; a n a r
further commercial electronic messages from the same
h Bdisguise the source of

(b) The commercial C
e
electronic communication does not purposelys
the electronic message; and
b l
(c) The commercial electronic communication does
R o not purposely include misleading
n r
information to induce the recipients to read the message.
a a
service process, reduces the efficiencyh of commerce and technology; interferes B
The Solicitor General argued that spams waste the storage and natural capacities internet
C s with the
e amount to
peaceful enjoyment by the owner of his property; and transmitting spams
violation of privacy.
b l
R o
HELD: Even before the arrival of the age of computers, people have been receiving
unsolicited ads by mail. The recipients always have the option
a n to delete or not read them.
a r
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads will violate
h
the right to read emails, even
B
716 SCRA 237) C
unsolicited ads. Commercial speech is entitle to protection. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice,
e s
b l
Ro
Bishop Vicente Navarra posted in the compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral a
tarpaulin which listed the names of the legislators who voted against the Reproductive
of the Commission on Elections ordered it removed, because it exceeded the n

Health Law and the names of the legislators who voted in favor of it. The Law Department
a size of election
propaganda allowed by the Commission on Election.
C h
ar
B
HELD: Speech is not limited to vocal communication, Freedom of information applies to the
s
entire continuum of speech.
e
b l
The form of expression is just important as the information it conveys. A larger tarpaulin
R o the importance of the message. Larger spaces allow for more messages. Large
allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages. The size of the tarpaulin may
underscore
n r
tarpaulins are not analogous to time and place.
aFreedom a
h of expression relates to theB
C interest s of good government demand a full discussion of
right of the people to participate in public affairs. The
eencouraged
of society and the maintenance
public affairs. Speech shouldlbe
b
under the concept of a market place of ideas.
o
Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
R for group identity. Free speech must be protected as a vehicle to

find those who n have similar values and ideas. Free speechr
Expression is a marker
a a is intended to protect minorities
B safety ofvalve
C h
against majority abuses perpetrated through the framework
s
democratic government.
e of violence. To prevent people from

Lastly, free speech must be protected under the theory. Non-violent
b l
manifestation of dissent reduces the likelihood
resorting to violence there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent.
R o consequences enjoy a high degree of protection.

Every citizens expression with political
The petitioners invoke their n r
a constitutional right to communicate their
a openness about
Bfavor. Political speech

voted against the RH billh
issues and candidates. The tarpaulin was their statement of approval of public officials who
C and received as a contribution to public s

and their criticism of those who voted in its
eexpression
l
refers to speech intended deliberation about some
b
issues, fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation. The resulting from the
consideration from any candidate, political party oro

content of the tarpaulin is political speech. The tarpaulin was not posted in return for
R party-list group. Speech with political
an r
consequences is not the core of freedom of expression. The regulation involved in the case
is content-based.
B ofa
C h s
Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin
speech.
is not regulation unrelated to
l e
suppression
b
Ro or protected by
The tarpaulin remains private property. Their right to use their property
the Constitution.
a n a r
h
The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law does not suffice to quality it as
that it is a speech of political s
B
C
consequences. (Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, e
religious speech. The enumeration of the candidates shows
2015)
b l
2. Overbreadth Doctrine Ro
an
h
a. Presence
C
ar
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes abetting or aiding in the commission
B
of any offense enumerated in the law or attempting to commit any offense enumerated in
e s
the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The petitioners argued that Section 5 is overbroad.
b l
HELD: Penalizing, aiding or abetting wrongdoings on line threatens the popular and
R o
unchallenged dogmas or cyberspace use. Two of the more popular social networking sites
an r
are Facebook and Twitter.
B a
h A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook. If the post is made available
s or views. Share makes it visible to his friends.
C enables him to post on line his efeelings
to the public, anyone can react by clicking Like to specify he likes the posting. Comment
b l
enables users to R
o
On the other hand, Twitter is an internet social networking and microblogging service that
send and read short text-based messages. These are Tweets.
Microbloggingn r toAhistwitter
a
a only to his Followers, those who subscribed
is the posting of small pieces of digital content. user can make his
public. h
tweets available
B posts, or to the general
C e s
b
Except for the original author of the assailed l statement, the rest are knee-jerk sentiments
R o and culture of cyberspace, such a law will

of readers who may think little or haphazardly
law takes to account the unique circumstances
of their response to the posting. Unless the
violation of their freedom ofa n

expression. a r
create a chilling effect in the millions that use this new medium of communication in
The term aiding or C

h
abetting constitutes a broad sweep that s
B
those who express themselves through cyberspace. Sectione
generates chilling effect on
abetting libel on the cyberspace is void. b l 5 which punishes aiding or
o
Rfacilitates the dissemination of child
pornography, does this make Google andn r
In regard to child pornography, when Google
a the users, aiders and abettors in child

a
republishes it. Does this make him ah willing accomplice to the distribution B
pornography crimes? When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he
C s of child
e of(Disini
prosecution. Section 4(c)(2) on child pornography cannot stand scrutiny.
b l
pornography? The legislature should address this clearly to relieve users of fear criminal
v.
Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
R o
b. Absence
a n a r
h B
C
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
the intentional or reckless-
data, electronic documents, or
e s
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of virus.
b l
The petitioners claimed that this is overbroad.
R o
There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems andn
HELD: It does not encroach on freedom of speech. It simply penalizes a form of vandalism.
a their private
documents. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
C h
ar
B
Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes access to the whole or any part
s
of a computer system without right. The petitioners argued that it failed to meet the strict
e
l
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with fundamental rights.
b
R o
HELD: No fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing a universally
condemned act accessing the computer system of another without right.
n The charge of invalidity becausear
aHELD: B
of overbreadth is baseless, since the penalized
h conducts do not intrude into
s of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
freedom
C data of another. (Disini v. Secretary
of speech. There is no right to acquire the personal
l e
o b
c. Absence of Prior Restraint
R
a n private communication of sexualarcharacter between spouses or
Section 4(c)(1) penalizes cybersex. The petitioners claim that this violates freedom of
expression, because
h
consenting adults, would become a crime. B
C s
HELD: The element of engaging in a business isenecessary to constitute illegal cybersex. The
law seeks to punish cyber prostitution, b l white slave trade, and pornography for
R o
consideration. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
Section 5 penalizes any personn rbeingor overbroad.

a a
who willfully abets or aids in the commission
B
attempt to
h
commit a cybercrime. The petitioners assailed its constitutionality from
s
HELD: The crime of C aiding or abetting the commission of aecybercrime under Section 5
b
should be punishable to offenses that do not involve freedom l of expression, under Section
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,o
4(a)(1) on illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on illegal Interference, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
R Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices.
4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section a n

Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section
4(b)(3) on computer-related Identity a
r
Theft,
hsame reason, the crime of willfully attemptingB to
s
and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. For the
commit any of these offenses is not C
237) l e
objectionable. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA
b
o or coalition and
candidates are granted the right to reply to the charges againstR
Resolution No. 9615, required that all political parties, party-list groups
radio stations argued that this constituted a prior restraint. n r

them. The television and
a B a
HELD: The Constitution itself provides for a righth to reply. (GMA Network, Inc. v. s
C e
Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA 88)
b l
To enable the Commission on Elections to ensure that political parties and candidates
afforded equal opportunities, the television and radio stations were requiredR
o are
to give it
prior notice of advertisements. The television and radio stations argued
a n that this
h
constituted prior restraint.
C
ar
HELD: The requirement is a reasonable means to ensure that political parties and
B
candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their candidacy. It cannot be
e s
characterized as prior restraint. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA
88)
b l
R o
5. Valid Limitation
aa.nLibel B a r
h s
C Revised Penal Code on libel. Theepetitioners
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act incorporated the provisions of the
b l argue that violated freedom of expression.
obligation to protectR o
HELD: Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and the government has an
private individuals from defamation. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice,
716 SCRA 237) n r
a B a
C h
b. Equality of Political Opportunity
s
e
l as candidate for governor was filed on the
ground that he exceeded the maximumb
A petition to disqualify Emilio Ramon Ejercito
R o argued that the inclusion in the computation

governor can render. Emilio Ramon Ejercito
allowable election expenses that a candidate for
n
of the contributions of his donors violated their freedom of speech.
a a r
HELD: As a content-neutral h regulation, the concern of the law is notBto curtail the content of
the advertisements C
candidates. Any restrictions in speech merely incidental e
promoting a particular candidate but to s ensure equality among
governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity b l in political advertisement. It
to the achievements of the
bears a reasonable connection with the objectives seto

R
out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4,
n r
Article IX-C, and Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. (Ejercito v. Commission on
Elections, 742 SCRA 210)
a B a
E. Freedom of Religion
C h s
l e
1. Prohibition against Establishment of Religion
b
a. Presence of Violation
Ro
a nResponsible Parenthood and a r
B
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Act, Section 10 of the law required
C h the Department of Health to
s
procure and distribute to local government units family planning supplies. The petitioners
l e
b
argued that the expenditures of taxes on contraceptives violates religious freedom, because
Rosects
the use of contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.
cannot cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policyn

HELD: Because of the prohibition against the establishment of religion, religious
a for everyone.
h
Petitioners are erroneous in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
C
ar
control program through the promotion of the use of contraceptives, because it is contrary
B
to their religious beliefs. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
e s
l
b. Absence of Violation
b
R o
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen went to Sta. Rosa Catholic Church to get married. As they
an r
did not have a marriage license, the priest refused to solemnize their marriage. The couple
a
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, an Aglipayan Church. They
B
Ch
requested Rene Romulo to perform a ceremony. He agreed although he was informed that
s
the couple had no marriage license. Rene Romulo was charged with violation of Article 352
e
b l
of the Revised Penal Code for performing an illegal marriage. He argued that he merely
blessed the couple and that because of the separation of church and state, the state could
o
not interfere in ecclesiastical affairs and convert the blessing into a marriage ceremony.
R
an a r
HELD: Article 6 of the Family Code provides that no particular form for the solemnization
B
Ch
of marriage is required. Article 3(3) of the Family Code defines a marriage ceremony as
e s
that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
bl
wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. The prosecution proved these
Ro
requirements. The principle of separation of church and state does not preclude the state
from qualifying the blessing as a marriage ceremony. This principle was preserved when
an r
Article 6 of the Family Code provided that no prescribed form for the solemnization of
marriage is required. (Romulo v. People, 728 SCRA 675)
B a
Ch
2. Free Exercise of Religious Freedom
e s
a. Absence of Violation bl
R o
an r
a
Reproductive Health Act. Section 15 of the law provides that no marriage license shall be
B
Ch
issued unless the applicants present a certificate from the Family Planning Office stating
s
that they had received adequate information on family planning. Petitioners denied that the
e
bl
requirement violates the freedom of religion of individuals by forcing them to participate in
the implementation of the law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.
Ro
HELD: Those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
an r
seminars are not compelled to accept the information and retain the freedom to reject the
information. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
B a
C h s
b. Presence of Violation
l e
o b
R
Reproduction Health Act. Section 23(a)(3) of the law provides that if a health care service
a n
provider objects because of religious convictions to render reproductive health procedures,
he shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care
service provider.
C h
ar
HELD: The obligation to refer imposed by the law violates the religious belief and
B
convictions of the conscientious objectors. In case of conflict between the religious beliefs
e s
and moral convictions of individuals and the interest of the State to provide access to
b l
reproductive health services, the religious freedom of the health care provider should be
accorded primacy. There is no more compelling State interest which can limit the freedom
R o
of religion of the conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health
an r
of the person seeking such services. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
B a
C h The petitioners claimed that the promotion by the Reproductive Health Act of the use of
s
contraceptives violates their religious freedom, because it is against their religious belief.
e
l cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as
HELD: The petitioners cannot
o b
policy for everyone, because the promotion of the use of contraceptives is contrary to their
establish a staten
R
religious beliefs. To do so will cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and
a
religion.
a r
Sections h7, 23 and 24 of the Reproductive HealthB
C to refer a person seeking healthecare
practitioner s andActservices
requires a hospital or a medical
under the law to another
l
The obligation violates the religious beliefbof a conscientious objector.
accessible health care provider in case of conscientious objections based on religious belief.
R o
an This includes the right to be silent. r
The guarantee of religious freedom is intertwined with the right of free speech, it being an
externalization of ones conscience.
B a
C h s
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
e
specialty
operated by a religious group or health care service providers.
l
hospitals and hospitals
o b
R warrants an exemption unless the
In case the free exercise of religious freedom is burdened by government legislation, the
n compelling state interest. The plea of r

claim of a conscientious objector to religious freedom
government succeeds in demonstrating a more
a a the
h of religion of the conscientious B

conscientious objector for exemption deserves strict scrutiny. There is no more compelling
C
state interest which would limit the freedom
s
There is no immediate danger to life or health. A couple who plans theebirth of their
objector.
children refers to a future event and that is contingent. The burden

b l placed on the
conscientious objector is immediate.
R o
An exception must be made in life-threatening cases thatn require the performance of r
emergency procedures. The right to life of the mother should a given preference.
be
B a
Requiring receipt of instructions and information C
h
on responsible parenthood, and family s
l e
planning as a condition for the issuance of a marriage is a reasonable exercise of police
power. No religious freedom is violated. Those who receive the information are free
o v.b to
R
reject the information and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life. (Imbong
a n
F. Prohibition against Impairment of Obligation of Contract
C h
ar
Pryce Corporation filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. The Regional Trial Court
B
gave due course to the petition. The rehabilitation receiver submitted an amended
e s
rehabilitation plan. The Regional Trial Court approved it. It also identified the assets to be
b l
held and disposed by Pryce Corporation and the manner by which the liabilities would be
paid. The Order provided that the indebtedness to China Banking Corporation would be
R o
paid by dacion en pago of developed real estate assets of Pryce Corporation. China Banking
an r
Corporation contended that the approval without its consent impaired the obligation of
contract.
B a
h s clause may not be invoked. The non-impairment
C the contract. Thus, the non-impairment
HELD: This case does not involve a law or executive issuance declaring the modification of
e
l power of the State. Successful rehabilitation of a distressed
o b
clause must yield to the police
corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees and the economy in general.
(Pryce CorporationR v. China Banking Corporation, 716 SCRA 207)
This ruling a
n a rPlans, Inc. , G.R. No. 193108,
h B
was reiterates in Victorio-Aquino v. Pacific
C
December 10, 2014)
e s
G. Rights During Investigation
b l
1. Applicability
Ro
Mark Jason Chavez was chargeda nwith robbery with homicide. He voluntarily
a r surrendered to
the police station. He wash B
investigated without the presence of counsel in connection with
C to have committed.
the offense he was suspected
e s
HELD: Even those who voluntarily surrendered to a police b lofficer are covered by the right
homicide and not robbery with homicide. (PeopleR
to counsel. However, the evidence sufficiently proves o that Mark Jason Chavez is guilty of
n r
v. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728)
a B a
2. Inapplicability
h s
CBill of Rights are not applicable to eadministrative
investigations. (Anonymous Complaint against Lyn Maceda, 720 SCRA 27;l
The rights under Section 12 of the
o b Luspo v. People,
739 SCRA 133; De Castro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015.
R
H. Right of the Accused
a n a r
h B
1. Right to be Informed
C e s
Venancio Sevilla, a city councilor, was charged with falsification of public documents,
b l
R o
because he stated in his personal data sheet that they had no pending criminal case when
in fact he had a pending criminal case for assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
a n that his
The Sandiganbayan convicted him of falsification of a public document, through reckless
imprudence, because he did not act with malicious intent. Venancio Sevilla argued
conviction violated his right to be informed.
C h
ar
HELD: Reckless imprudence resulting the falsification of public document is included in
B
willful falsification of public documents, because the latter is a greater offense. (Sevilla v.
e s
People, 732 SCRA 687)
b l
Police officers found Chi Chan Liu and Lui Lao Cheng on board a speed boat with plastic
R o
bags containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. They were charged with illegal
an r
importation of the methamphetamine hydrochloride.
B a
h HELD: In the absence of proof that it was imported from a foreign port, the accused cannot
C not free from criminal liability eforsillegal possession of it is an element of and is necessarily
be convicted of illegal importation of methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, they are
b l Convicting the accused of illegal possession does not

included in its illegal importation.
(People v. Chi ChanR

o
violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015)
anTrial B a r
h
2. Right to Speedy
ThreeC cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

e s 22 was filed against William Co. It was
b
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 becauselcounsel
of the absence of the complainant and the
o
private counsel. On July 2, 2004, the private filed a motion for revival of the cases.
Co for his inhibition, the case wasR

The motion was granted. Because the judge trying the case granted the motion of William
dismissal of the case be made n arto a speedy trial.

re-raffled. On July 13, 2006, William Co moved that the
apermanent because of violation of hisBright
HELD: The argumentC
h sin the
with malice or that it was without good cause. The issues raised
l e
is untenable. William Co failed to show that the delay was attended
motion were earlier
raised before the Supreme Court and were resolved by itb with finality. (Co v. New Property
Plastic Products, 727 SCRA 503)
R o
a n Erwin Yerro, Enrico Yerro, and Ritchie
Segundo Bonsubre, Inc, filed a criminal case against
a r
h B to file
Yerro. The private prosecutor informed the court of the on-going negotiation for settlement
C a compromise agreement on the civil
and undertook to file the necessary motion. The court gave the prosecution ten days
s
e motion.
the motion. Although the parties reached
b
prosecution did not furnish the court a copy of it and did not file the promised l aspect, the
The
of the prosecution to comply with the order of the court to submit R othe necessary motion
court dismissed the case for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial for failure
even when Erwin Yerro, Enrico Yerro, and Ritchel Yerro failed
installments, Segundo Bonsubre, Jr. failed to prosecute a
n to pay all the 36 monthly a r
unjustified delay violated their right to speedy trial.h
the case. Such inordinate and
B
205952, February 11, 2015) C
(Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro, G.R. No.
e s
b l
3. Right Against Self-Incrimination
R o
incrimination, because their right applies only to testimonial compulsion.
a n (People v.
Subjecting the hands of the accused to a paraffin test does not violate his right against self-
Fieldad, 737 SCRA 455)

C h
ar
I. Right Against Disproportionate Penalty
B
e s
Lito Corpus offered to sell on commission basis the pieces of jewelry worth P98,000.00
b l
which Danilo Tangcog was selling. He agreed. They agreed that Lito Corpus would remit the
proceeds of the sale within 60 days or return the unsold items. As Lito Corpus did not remit
R o
the proceeds of the sale or return the pieces of jewelry. Danilo Tangcog filed a criminal
an r
complaint against him for estafa.
B a
h The Regional Trial Court convicted Lito Corpus and imposed a penalty of 14 years and 8
C minimum. He appealed. The Court s of Appeals affirmed his conviction but reduced the
months of reclusion temporal and four years and two months of prision correccional as
e
penalty to 8 years of prisionlmayor plus 1 year for each additional P10,000 as maximum
o b
and four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum. There seemed to be an
injustice because theR penalties for crimes against property are based on the value of
an a r
property in 1932.
h B of penalties, because that would

C judicial legislation. Dean Jose ManuelesDiokno, an amicus curiao, argued that the
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot modify the range
constitute
incremental penalty provided under Articlel315 of the Revised Penal Code violates equal
protection. The incremental penalty does
o bnot rest on substantial distinctions, as P10,000
Rpenalty as someone who steals hundred of millions of
might have been substantial in the past but it is not so today. A person who steals
P142,000.00 would receive the same
pesos. The propositions poses a nmore questions than answers. What then a ris the penalty in
h
case the amount of the subject B
matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00. (Corpuz v. People,
724 SCRA 1) C e s
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes b l child pornography. The
R
petitioners claimed that this merely expanded the scope o of the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
HELD: The definition of child pornography n r

a a
in the Anti-Child Pornography Act already
B
h
includes the use of electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. The
C prerogative and there is a rational
law makes the penalty higher by one degree
s
when the crime is committed in Cyberspace.
The duration of the penalty is a legislative
l epornography
basis for a
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)

o b
higher penalty because of a potential for uncontrolled proliferation of child
R
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prescribed severe
a n penalties for deterious
a r
cybercrimes.
h B
HELD: The fixing of penalties for a crime is C a legislative prerogative. They are
e s
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA
b l
237)
R o
J. Prohibition against Double Jeopardy
a n
1. Lack of Jurisdiction
C h
ar
B
Two informations were filed against Bonificio Sumbilla and Aderito Yujuico for violation of
s
Section 74 of the Corporation Code. They filed a motion to dismiss the cases on the ground
e
b l
that their refusal to turn over the stock and transfer books was not a criminal offense. The
Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion. The accused filed a petition for certiorari in
R o
the Regional Trial Court. It ordered the dismissal of the case. The complainant appealed to
the Supreme Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the case because of the order of
an r
the Regional Trial Court. Upon learning that the order of the Regional Trial Court was
Ba
appealed to the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan Trial Court recalled the dismissal of the
Ch s
case. The accused claimed double jeopardy.
l e
b
HELD: From the moment the issue of probable cause was elevated to the Supreme Court,
R o
the Metropolitan Trial Court had no authority to act on the issue. It acted without
jurisdiction when it issued the order of dismissal. (Quiambao v. People, 735 SCRA 345)
an
2. Identity of Offenses
B a r
Ch e s
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that prosecution under it shall be
bl
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code of
special laws. It is claimed that this violates the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Ro
HELD: A single set of facts may be penalized simultaneously under a special law and the
an ar
Revised Penal Code. This does not apply to libel and child pornography. In Article 353 of
B
Ch
the Revised Penal Code and Section 4(c) (4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the elements
s
of the offenses are the same. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as
e
l
another means of publication. The same is true with child pornography. The offenses of
o b
child pornography in the Anti-Child Pornography Act already covers, the use of electronic,
mechanical, digital, optional, magnetic or any other means. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice,
716 SCRA 237)
R
a n a r
h told the court that there was anIn B
Atty. Segundo Bonsubre, Jr. filed a criminal case for estafa against Erwin Yerro, Enrico
that they would file the necessary motion.s

Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro. The private prosecutor on-going
settlement between the parties and C
e an order
l corresponding
issued on September 1,2 2000, the court gave the parties ten days to file the
the private prosecutor did not furnish the court a copy of it and dido
b
motion. Although a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of the parties was reached,
R not file the necessary
a
with the earlier order and to prosecute the case. On June 15, n2004, a new lawyer filed a
motion. On September 18, 2001, the court issued an order directing the parties to comply
a r
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case.
h B
C
HELD: The dismissal was grounded on violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial e
s
b l
for failure to prosecute. The dismissal has the effect of the acquittal and will bar further
Ro
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. (Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro, G.R. No. 205952,
February 11, 2015)
an
h
3. Review of Acquittal
C
ar
a. Prohibition
B
e s
b l
The acquittal of the accused cannot be questioned by filing a petition for review on the
ground of grave error in the evaluation of the evidence. (Villareal v. Aliga, 713 SCRA 52)
R o
b. Allowance
n Orient Commercial Banking Corporation
aThe a r appeared to have granted loans to Timmys,
h Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. TheB
s deposited in the savings account of Jose Go with Orient
proceeds of the loan were released in the form of
C managers e
checks. The checks were
Commercial Banking Corporation l
b through falsification of commercial documents were filed
and were automatically transferred to his current
o
account. Two cases of estafa
against him.
R
a n rested its cases, Jose Go filed a a
After the prosecution r to evidence. The Regional
demurrer
h
Trial Court granted it. The prosecution questioned Bthe acquittal of Jose Go by filing a
C
petition for certiorari.
e s
HELD: The managers checks were deposited b l in the savings account of Jose Go at Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation although
to fund his seven personal checks.R
o he was not the payee, and the money was used
Jose Go misappropriated the funds for his own use. In a
prosecution for estafa, demand
an is not necessary where Bthere aris evidence of
Ch and counterfeiting the signatures
misappropriation.
e sof the payees constitute

falsification of commercial documents. The evidence showslthat Jose Ong had a direct hand
Simulating loan documents
o b of the trial court was so patent

in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The act
R
and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty. (People v. Go, 732 SCRA 216)
The complainant told her father that she woulda n a r

attend a graduation party with her friends.
h B ofwent
s
After eating, one of then suggested that they go to the nearby Alsons Palace. They
C
inside and engaged in a drinking spree. The Regional Trial Court convicted
e three the
accused of rape. One appeal, the Court of Appeals acquitted the accused on
b lthe ground that
Roacquittal by filing a
the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse and was aware of what the accused
were doing. The private counsel of the complainant questioned the
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
a n a r
evidence presented by the defense and the narrationh
HELD: The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion. It merely relied on the
of facts was simply lifted from the s
B
C
testimonies of the accused as though they were the established facts of the case, thee
decision utterly disregarded the evidence of the prosecution. The blatant disregard l
material prosecution evidence and outward bias in the favor of the evidence of theo
b of
defense
R had theto
constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of the right of the complainant
burden to prove their defense. They failed to discharge the burden. The a
due process. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the accused n
h
complainant was
C
ar
seriously intoxicated and could not have given a valid consent. (People v. Court of Appeals,
B
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015).
e s
l
K. Prohibition against Ex-Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
b
R o
1. Ex-Post Facto Law
n
aPresidential Commission on Good Government
a r vs. Ombudsman, 740 SCRA 368 ruled that
h B
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which extended the prescriptive period for violation of the Anti-
C committed before the effectivity.es
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to 15 years, cannot be applied retroactively to crimes
b l
R
provisions of Chapter
oIV regarding orders from law enforcement authorities should be
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provided the failure to comply with the
aisna bill of attainder. a r No. 1829. The petitioners

punished as obstruction of justice under Presidential Decree
h
allege that this
B
HELD:C There will be a judicial determination of
e s guilt. The provision is valid. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice 716 SCRA 237)
b l
L. Writ of Amparo
Ro
Edita Burgos, the mother of a n Joseph Burgos, filed a petition forara writ of amparo
Jonas
h
because of the disappearance of her son. B
C
HELD: In view of the final ruling of the Court of Appeals toe
s
that confirmed the validity of the writ of amparo andb
l which the case was referred,
the determination of the entities
denied. (Burgos vs. Esperon, Jr. , 715 Scra 208) R

responsible for the enforced disappearance of Joseph o Jonas Burgos, the petition should be
a n a r
to the Department of Social Welfare andh Development. Later on, she decided to getB
Maria Cristina Yusay Caram gave birth to a child out of wedlock. She surrendered the baby
C s back the
efiledbabya petition
baby. The Department of Social Welfare and Development declared the
available for adoption. To stop the adoption, Maria Christina Yusay Caram
b l legally
for a writ of amparo.

R o
HELD: The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings andn enforced disappearances or r
threats of them. There was no enforced disapperance of a a
h
the baby. (Caram vs. Segui, 732
B
SCRA 86).
C e s
M. Writ of Habeas Data
b l
Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, both minor students of St. Theresaso
R College,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their brassieres while changing
a n
swimsuits for a beach party. Angela Tan uploaded the pictures on her Facebook profile.
into
h
When a teacher learned of the pictures, her students logged in to their Facebook accounts
C
ar
B
and shared her photographs of Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara. Their parents
s
filed a petition for a writ of habeas data. They asked that St. Theresas College be ordered to
e
b l
surrender all copies of the digital images of their children and declare that they were
illegally obtained in violation of the right to privacy of their children.
R o
HELD: The applicability of the writ of habeas data is not limited to extralegal killings and
n rdata is a protection against unlawful acts or
enforced disappearances. It can be availed of as a remedy to enforce the right to
ainformational a
B individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
privacy. The writ of habeas
h saggrieved party, his correspondences, or his family. It is
omissions of public officials and private
C collecting e
or storing data about the
l
b
not necessary that the activity be done in pursuit of a business.
Having an expectation o
R activities, including those that occur in online social network.
of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with
Before one can n r social network, the user must

engaging in cyberspace
a a
have an expectation of privacy in his online
Bof proofthethat
C h
manifest the intention to keep certain posts private through
s
use of measures to prevent
e cannot invoke the protection attached to

access to it or to limit the visibility. In the absence the children positively
limited the disclosure of the photographs, they
b l
informational privacy. (Vivares vs. St. Theresas College, 727 SCRA 92).
Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee once R olived in a common-law relationship. Once Neri Ilagan
visited Joy Margate Lee in hern rnoticed that his
digital camera was missing.aJoy Margate Lee confronted Neri Ilagan a
office. When he returned to his office, he
h she discovered from the camera. She B

about a sex video
involving another woman
C she filed against Neri Ilagan. es used it as evidence in
l
various criminal complaints
b
oto life, liberty, security and privacy.
Neri Ilagan filed a petition for a writ of habeas data. He claimed that the reproduction of the
R
video and its uploading to the internet violated his right
nwas not engaged in gathering, collecting,
Joy Margate Lee contended that the petition was merely filed to suppress the evidence
a a ror
B
against him in the cases he filed and that she
storing data regarding Neri Ilagan.
C h s
HELD: The petition for a writ of habeas data should allege how the right l eto privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty b
Roprivacy
or security of the
aggrieved party. Neri Ilagan did not sufficiently allege that his right to in life, liberty
an r
or security would be violated through the production and dissemination of the video. (Lee
v. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59)
B a
Sandra Cam alleged that from April 30, 2014 to May 3,h 2014, motor vehicles without plate s
C
numbers conducted surveillance around Nazareth Institute of Alfonso, a school she e
managed and where she lived. Alex Almario, an Assistant Secretary in the Department l
b of
Rodata.
Agrarian Reform, requested to talk to her about an alleged list of cabinet officials and
legislators involved in the pork barrel scam. Sandra Cam filed a petition for habeas
aninadequate to
h
HELD: The petition should be dismissed. The allegations of surveillance are
C
a r
merit the issuance ofB the writ of habeas data, which is reserved for serious and credible
threats to the rightsto privacy in relation to the right to life, liberty or security.
l e
person.o
b
First, Sandra Cam did not establish that Alex Almario was behind the surveillance over her
R
Second, the right of Alex Almario to meet with Sandra Cam does not involve a
n engaged in collecting or storingadata r regarding the person, family, or home and

threat to her right to privacy. Third, the writ of habeas data is a remedy against a person or
aentity
h B
correspondence of the aggrieved party. The functions of Alex Almario do not involve this.
C was it alleged that Alex Almario swas in charge, in possession or in control of the data.
The information allegedly being gathered does not concern Sandra Cam. Fourth, nowhere
e
Finally, the allegation that l
b the right of the person to information regarding the list of
o212174, October 14, 2014)
officials involved in the pork barrel scam is outside the ambit of the writ of habeas data.
(Cam v. Almario, G.R.RNo.
an B a r
h
N. Writ of Kalikasan
C Bay Metropolitan Authority enteredeinto

The Subic s a contract for the construction of a coal-
fired power plant in Subic. The Secretary oflEnvironment and Natural Resources issued an
o
environment compliance certificate for the bproject. The oppositors filed a petition for a writ
R
of kalikasan against the project on the ground that it would cause environmental damages
and pollution.
a n a r
HELD: To avail of the writ h of kalikasan, the following requisites must B be present: (1) there
C violation of the constitutional rightunlawful
ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from ane
is an actual or threatened sto a balanced and healthful
public official or employee, or private individual and b lentity; and (3) the actual or
act or omission of a
o
R in two or more cities or provinces.
threatened violation involved or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude
n r
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
a B a
h
The reliefs that may be granted include the following:
s
1) Permanently ceasing and C desisting from acts or neglecting a dutye
environmental laws resulting in environmental damage;
b l in violation of
o
2) Directing protection, preservation, rehabilitationRor restoration of the
environment;
a n a r
h B
C
3) Directing monitoring of strict compliance with the court decision or order;
e s
4) Directing periodic reports on execution of the final judgment; and
b l
5) Other reliefs relating to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
R o or
an
protection, preservation or restoration of the environment, except award of
damages.
C h
ar
If no causal link was proven between defects in issuance of the environment compliance
B
certificate and actual or threatened violation of right to balanced and healthful ecology of
e s
the contemplated magnitude, the petition should be dismissed.
b l
Lack of approval by concerned sanggunians and the lack of certification of absence of
R o
overlapping with environmental damage, without connection to environmental damages,
an r
would result in writ of kalikasan but resort to remedies from proper administrative bodies.
B a
h The signing of the Statement of Accountability is a significant component of the
s
C proponent to the EnvironmenteCompliance
Environmental Implementation Accountability Process. The purpose is to bind the project
b l
project will not cause significant
Certificate conditions, which will ensure the
negative environmental impact by the implementation of
representative of R
o
specified measures to comply with environmental regulation. The signature of the
the project proposed is necessary for validity of the Environment
a n
Compliance Certificate.
a r
h B for projects that may affect the
qualityCof the environment. It involves predicting
The Environment
s the likely impact of the project on the
Impact Assessment process is mandatory
e
b
environment, designing preventive, mitigating l and enhancement measures.
R
When a new Environment Impact Assessmento was required because of amendments to the
n
Environment Compliance Certificate, the amendments are valid.
a a r
The Environment Complianceh B
Certificate does not of itself authorize the implementation of
C to provide guidance to government eagencies
a project. It is intended s which have the final
authority to grant permits.
b l
Even if an indigenous community does not reside ino
R implementation of a project which
a proposed lease site, a Certificate of
may impair the rights of indigenous people to n r

No Overlap with ancestral domain is required to prevent
a a
their ancestral domains. It is not inapplicable
B
inapplicable to the planned lease.
C h
before the issuance of the Environment Clearance Certificate. It may be obviously
s
Prior approval of the concerned sanggunian is not required, before l
e
Environment Compliance Certificate, because its issuance does notb
the issuance of
R o by itself result in
implementation of the project. The law provides that local government units do not release
that basic autonomy in matters falling under the power ofn the Subic Bay Metropolitan r
Authority. The power to approve projects is one such power. a (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No.
B a
20757, February 3, 2015)
C h s
l e
b
III. CITIZENSHIP
Renato David migrated to Canada and became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.

R oUpon
land in Oriental Mindoro and constructed a house on it. When he discoveredn
his retirement, he and his wife returned to the Philippines. On 2004, he bought a parcel of
a that the parcel
h
of land was public land, on April 12, 2007 he applied to lease it from the Department of
C
ar
Environment and Natural Resources. He stated in his application that he was a Canadian
B
citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that he was a Canadian citizen.
e s
She also filed a case against him for falsification of public documents. On October 11, 2007,
b l
he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause to file a case against
R o
Renato David for falsification of a public document. The application of Renato David was
an r
rejected on the ground that his re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his application.
B a
h
C naturalization in a foreign country s before the effectivity of the law, shall re-acquire their
HELD: Under Republic Act No. 9225, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
Philippine citizenship upon l

e
b taking of an oath of allegiance. Natural-born Filipino citizens
ocitizenship upon taking the same oath. Since Renato David became a
who became citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225
R
retain their Philippine
an when he took his oath of allegiance. a r of the law, he re-acquired his

naturalized citizen of a foreign country before the effectivity
statementh in a public document when he stated thatB

Filipino citizenship Renato David made an untruthful
C(David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March

its filing.
e s he was a Filipino citizen at the time of
18, 2015)
b l
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
R o
n
A. Delegation of Rule-Making Power
a a r
Sections 24 and 26(a)h of the Cybercrime Prevention Law created
Center for policy coordination s
B the Cybercrime
C
and for the formulation of a national cyber security plan andeextend immediate assistance
Investigation and Coordinating among concerned agencies
in case of commission of cybercrimes through a computer b lemergency response team. The

R o
petitioners contended that this was an invalid delegation of power to the Cybercrime
n r
Investigation and Coordinating Center.
a a
B with
h
HELD: The law is complete when it directed the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
s
C offenses by facilitating the detection,einvestigation,
Center to formulate and implement a national cyber security plan. This is consistent
and prosecution and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable l

the policy to prevent and combat cyber
b operations. This
Ro
policy is adopted in the interest of law and order. That has been considered a sufficient
standard. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
a n a r
The petitioners claimed that the power delegated to the
h
Food and Drug Authority to
B
determine whether or not a supply or of product should
C
Law constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
be included in the Essential Drug
e s
b l
R o Jr.,
HELD: From the declared policy, Congress intends that the public be given only medicines
that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
an
721 SCRA 146)
C h
B. Title of Bill ar
B
e s
Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, is entitled An Act Regulating the
b l
Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
R o
Purposes. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
an r
Association claimed that Republic Act No. 9646 is unconstitutional, because the
a
requirement that partnerships and corporations engaged in the marketing or selling of real
B
Ch
estate development projects in the regular course of business are required to be handled
s
by full-time, registered and licensed real estate brokers and this is not reflected in the title.
e
HELD: Republic Act No. 9646
b ldoes not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
developing a corpsR
o
scheme. The inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the primary goal of the law of
of technically competent, responsible and respected real state service
the growth a
n standards of procedure shall be globally r competitive and will promote
of the real estate industry. Since theamarketing aspect of real estate
practitioners whose
h Bacts and transactions defined as real

estateC
development projects entails the performance of the
practices under Section 3(g) of Republic Act
e s No. 9696, it is logically covered by the
b
regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire lEstaterealService,
estate sector. (Remman Enterprises
o
Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real 715 SCRA 293)
Rconstitutionality of the Reproductive Health Act on the
a n
Petitions were filed questioning the
ground that it violated the constitutional requirement that a bill should a rcontain only one
h
subject which must be expressed in its title. B
C
HELD: The objective of the law is to reduce the number of e
s
portion of the law covers the dissemination of information b l births in the country. A large
and provisions on access to
medically safe, non-safe reproductive health care services, o
Rand quality reproductive health care
methods, devices and medically
services, nullified devices and supplies whichn r

safe, non-abortifacient, effective legal, affordable,
a are all intended to prevent pregnancy. The

B a
and management of reproductive tracth
other provisions, such as those on skilled birth attendance, maternal care and prevention
Carta for Women. (Imbong v. Ochoa, C

s
infections are already provided for in the Magna
e
Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
b l
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners contested that it violated R o Parenthood and
the constitutional
requirement that a bill should have only one subject.
a n a r
h B
HELD: Reproductive Health and responsible parenthood
the objective to control the population growth. (Imbong C v.
are inter-related and germane to
e s
b l
C. Augmentation of Appropriation
R o
unreleased appropriations, unreleased appropriations from slow-movingn
The Department of Budget and Management pooled unprogrammed funds, savings from
a projects and
h
discontinued projects; and withdrawal of unobligated allotments released for slow-moving
C
a r
programs and projects
support various s
B and used them for the Disbursement Acceleration Program to
e projects. Petitions were filed questioning the Constitutionality of the
DisbursementlAcceleration Program.
HELD: o
b
Rthe following requisites must concur.
Under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, for the transfer of funds to be
an 1. There is a law authorizing the r

valid,
a
B President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
C h s
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to transferefunds within their respective offices;
b l
Rooffices; and
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective
3. Thea
n r
purpose of the transfer is to augment anaitem in the general appropriations
h B
C
law for their respective offices.
e s
b
In the 2011 and the 2012 General Appropriation l in theAct,General
the empowering provisions allowed
o
the transfer of funds to augment any item Appropriation Act even if it
cannot be used to transfer funds toR

belonged to an office outside the Executive. They contravened the Constitution. They
a n r
another branch or to a constitutional commission.
a
h
The funds used in the Disbursement B
Acceleration Program, the unreleased appropriation
C allotments, were not savings. es
and withdrawn unobligated
The savings should be actual. They should exist presently b l in fact and not merely be
theoretical, possible, potential, or hypothetical. Theo
R appropriation
power to augment is to be used only
n are not savings. r

when the purpose for which the funds were allocated was already satisfied or the need for
a
the funds had ceased to exist. Unreleased or unalloted
B a
Unobligated allotments are portions orh
C s as savings
balances of any programmed appropriation free
e
unless (1) they are still available after completion or final abandonment oflthe purpose; (ii)
from any obligation or encumbrance. Unobligated allotments cannot be declared
o b
they are balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (iii) balancesR resulting from improved
systems and efficiencies enabled agencies to deliver the required
a n services at a lesser cost.
a r
h B
National Budget Circular No. 541 targeted the withdrawal
agencies with low levels of obligations. The fact that C they can
of unobligated allotments,
be reissued for the original
e s
projects show that the original projects had not been abandoned.
b l
National Budget Circular No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released
R o
an
allotments in the 2011 General Appropriation Act although they were available for two
years.
C h
ar
The 2012 General Appropriation Act provided for availability of the funds for one year. Yet,
B
the Secretary of Budget and Management consolidated the unused balances on a quarterly
basis.
e s
b l
Under Section 28, Chapter IV, Book Vi of the Administrative Code, the balances of
R o
appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the year are reverted to the
an r
General Fund.
Ba
Ch
This cannot be circumvented, by declaring them as savings before the end of the year.
e s
b l
For a transfer of funds to be valid, it must first be determined that an appropriation for a
project is efficient. The Disbursement Appropriation Program supported projects that had
o
not been covered with appropriation.
R
an a r
Funds appropriated for one office cannot be transferred to another office even in the guise
B
Ch
of augmentation of deficient items. Funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000.00
s
were transferred to the Commission on Audit and the House of Representatives.
e
funds. The Solicitor General stressed thatb
Funding under the Disbursement Acceleration l Program was sourced from unprogrammed
R
sources of funds and were not subject oto restrictions under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
they were not brought as savings but as separate
a
revenue collections must exceednrevenue targets and such conditionawasrmet. (Araullo v.
Constitution. One condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the
Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1) h B

C s
efrom all expense category or
allotment class. There is no requirement in the b
l
An item as specified in Section 25(5) of Constitution is distinct
Constitution or in the General
Appropriation Act that the object of augmentation o
R General Appropriation Act for which
should be an expense categorically or
n funds, savings may be transferred to itr

allotment class. So long as there is an item in the
a
Congress set aside a specified amount of public
B a for
augmentation purposes.
h
C collections and targets are made available s
Since information on actual revenue
l e every
quarter or at such time as the Department of Budget and Management
actual revenue surplus may be determined accordingly and released from
o b may prescribe,
unprogrammed
funds may take place even before the end of the year.
R
a n a r
Public officers enjoy the presumption of good faith. The doctrine
h
of operative fact applies in
B
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015) C
their favor. The doctrine should apply to the projects funded by DAP. (Araullo v. Aquino, III,
e s
b l
D. Appropriation
o
The General Appropriation Acts for 2004 to 2007 authorized the paymentR
officials of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority whon
of certain
a were listed in
h
the provision and the maximum amounts of the extraordinary expenses. The Technological
C
ar
Education and Skills Development Authority granted payment for miscellaneous expenses
B
in excess of what was provided in the law and aid to officials not authorized by the law. The
e s
Commission on Audit disallowed the expenses. The Technical Education and Skills
b l
Development Authority argued that the laws did not prohibit its officers from receiving
additional emergency expenses from another fund.
o
R The Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
n
HELD:
apursuance of an appropriation made r
a by law. The Technical Education and Skills
h B
Development Authority failed to point out any law specifically authorizing it to grant
C v. Commission on Audit, 718 SCRA s462)
additional extraordinary expenses. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
e
b l
V. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
R o
a n
A. Political Agency
a r
h BCommunications of a franchise which
C to be approved by the President is evalid
The approval
is required s under the political agency doctrine.
by the Secretary of Transportation and
b l
B. Conduct of Foreign Relations
R o
1. Executive Agreement
a n a r
h
The Land Bank of the Philippines entered into a loan agreementB with the International
Bank for ReconstructionC and Development for local development e sto finance
and investment projects.
and expansion of its water supply system. b l

The Land Bank of the Philippines granted a loan to Iligan City the development
o
RAct No. 9184
n r
Atlantic Industries, Inc. , who was going to participate in the bidding, claimed that the
a
bidding documents did not comply with Republic
a
and its Implementing Rules
B
h
and Regulations. The Bids and Awards Committee answered that the bidding was
C and the City of Iligan City was subordinate
exempted from the application of Republic
s
Act No. 9184, because the loan agreement
between the Land Bank of the Philippines
l e which to the
was an executive agreement.

o b
loan agreement with the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development,
R
HELD: The Loan Agreement between the International Bank
a n for Reconstruction and
a r
Development and the Land Bank of the Philippines is an executive
Republic Act No. 9184 provides that any treaty or h
agreement. Section 4 of
B
C
Philippine Government is a signatory shall be observed.
executive agreement to which the
The terms and conditions of the
e s
loan agreement with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were
b l
incorporated in the loan agreement between Land Bank of the Philippines and the City
R
Iligan. The loan agreement provides that the procurement of goods to be financed from o the of
be in accordance with its guidelines and the provisions of Section 4 andn

proceeds of the loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall
a that the loan
h
agreement between the Development Bank of the Philippines and the City of Iligan merely
C
ar
follows its terms and conditions. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Atlantic Industries, Inc. ,
729 SCRA 12) B
e s
l
C. Claims against Foreign State
b
R o
Petitioners, who were victims of sexual slavery during the Second World War, filed a
an r
petition asking the Executive Department to espouse their claims for reparations from
Japan.
B a
h s and judgment of the Executive Department. The
C is left to the exclusive determination
HELD: Whether or not to espouse the claim of petitioners against the Government of Japan
e
l with the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the
o b
Supreme Court cannot interfere
Executive Department. (Vinuya. Romulo, 732 SCRA 595)
R
an a r
D. Executive Clemency
h B Estrada of plunder. The penalty

imposedC upon him included perpetual absolute
The Sandiganbayan
s disqualification to hold public office.
convicted former President Joseph
e
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyolpardoned him. The pardon state that he was
o b
being restored to his civil and political rights.
Former President Joseph EstradaR

a n
filed a petition for his disqualification, because the penalty imposed a r him sentenced
ran for mayor of the City of Manila. Alicia-Resos-Vidal
upon
him to perpetual absolute h disqualification. B
C
HELD: President Joseph Estrada was granted absolute pardone
s
b
and political rights. This includes the right to seek public
l that fully restored all his civil
election officials. (Resos-Vidal v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 266066, January 21,
R o 2015)
VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

an B a r
A. Scope
C h s
l e Personal
Care Phils. , Inc. , Jollimart Philippine Corporation, Surplus Marketing
o b
The City of Manila assessed the SM Mart, Inc. , SM Prime Holdings, Inc. , Watsons
Corporation, and
R
Signature Lines for additional taxes under Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of
Manila in addition to the taxes imposed under its Section 14,n
a
15, 16, and 17. The business
a r
establishments paid under protest so that their business permits
for refund in the Regional Trial Court. They applied for h
would be issued and sued
B
Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The CityC of Manila assailed the order by filing a s
a writ of preliminary injunction. The
l e
b
petition for certiorari in t the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the petition
RoCourt
should be filed with the Court of Tax Appeals.
and in the lower courts established by laws. Judicial power includes n

HELD: Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme
a the power to
h
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
C
ar
instrumentality of the Government. The judicial power of the Court of Tax Appeals includes
B
the determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
e s
Regional Trial Court in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within its exclusive
b l
appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases.
For R
o
n
awhen by law,
authority
a r6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that
any appellate courts to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
to issue writs of certiorari. Section
h B
jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other
C Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182) es
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by it. (City of Manila v. Grecia-
b l
B. Expansion
R o
an a r
1. Facial Challenge
Petitionsh B of the Responsible Parenthood and

C Health Act. The Solicitor Generaleargued s that since the law had not yet been
were filed questioning the constitutionality
Reproductive
enforced and applied to the petitioners, thelfacial challenge to its constitutionality cannot
o
prosper, since it is not a speech regulatingbmeasure.
HELD: Since the petitions alleged R
and other fundamental rights a n
have been violated by the law, and sincea rConstitution has
that constitutional human rights to life, speech, religion,
the
h
expanded the scope of judicial B
power, the Supreme Court has authority to take cognizance
C v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146) es
of the petitions. (Imbong
2. Comprehensiveness b l
R oassailing the constitutionality of the
n r
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed
Disbursement Appropriation Program, National
a a
Budget Circular No. 541, and other related
Bof the
prohibition are not proper action for h
issuances. The Solicitor General argued that the special civil actions for certiorari and
C s
questioning the constitutionality of any act
e
Government.
b l
HELD: The Constitution has expanded the concept of judicial power and
R
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
o included the duty
amounting to lack
n With respect to the
of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government.
Supreme Court, the remedies of certiorari and prohibitiona a r
and may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction of h
are necessarily broader in scope
B
C
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
s
ore
functions and also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion by any
branch of the government, and even if it does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, l
ministerial functions. (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
o b
R
C. Judicial Review
a n
1. Locus Standi
C h
ar
B
s
The petitioner has no standing to question the validity of a proposed bill. The petitioner has
e
b
into law. l
not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed
R o
A mere invocation of transcendental importance is not enough. It must be supported by the
n r
proper allegations. (In re Save the Supreme Court Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
aMovement, a
B
UDK-15143 January 21, 2015.
h
C Presidential s the Philippine National Construction Corporation a
e
Decree No. 1113 granted
l
b executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement with the
franchise to maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. Later
o
on, the Toll Regulatory Board
R
Philippine National Construction Corporation as operator. The operation and maintenance
wholly owned n r
of the project roads became the exclusive privilege of the PNCC Skyway Corporation, a
a a
subsidiary of the Philippine National Construction
Bto Operation
Corporation, which
C h
undertook its obligation under the Supplemental Toll
s
Agreement. Later on, the
Agreement. Under it the Skyway O & MeCorporation replaced the PNCC Skyway
Toll Regulatory Board entered the Amendment the Supplemental Toll Operation
Corporation. b l
Legislators and labor unions filedR
o
a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
franchise of the Philippinea

replacement of the PNCC Skyway n Corporation, because it breachedthere
National Construction Corporation, as a
rthewastermsno ofpublic
the
h O & M Corporation was not qualified to B

C
bidding and that Skyway
The petitioners who were legislators alleged that the e s operate the toil facility.
l
Amended Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement encroached upon the constitutional
franchises for public utilities.
o b power of Congress to grant
R
n
HELD: Unless there is a law which requires a legislative franchise for the operation of a
public utility, agencies in the Executive a a rthe
B a real
Department may issue authorization for
h The rule in private litigation thatsonly
operation of certain classes of public utilities.
party in interest has standing shouldC be applied.
l e
The labor unions have standing to file the case. With the transfer ofbthe toll operation,
comes the separation of all employees of PNCC Skyway Corporation.o
v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015) R
(Hontiveros-Baraquel
a n a r
h
Dennis Funa filed a petition to compel the Commission on Audit to audit the accounts of the
B
Manila Economic and Cultural Office.
C e s
HELD: The petition raises issues of transcendental importance as they involve the
b l
performance of a constitutional duty allegedly neglected by the Commission on Audit.
concerned citizen, Dennis Funa has legal standing to file the petition. (FunaRv. Manila
o As a
an
Economic and Cultural Office, 715 SCRA 247)
C h
ar
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Act. The
B
Solicitor General argued that the petitioners had no legal standing to question its
e s
constitutionality as it has not yet been applied against them.
b l
HELD: The rule on legal standing is merely procedural and can be relaxed when the matter
R o
is of transcendental importance. The law drastically affects the right to life and health,
an r
freedom of religion, and other constitutional rights. The petitions raise issues of
a
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,
B
Ch
721 SCRA 146)
e s
2. Actual Controversy
b l
R o
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program adopted by the Secretary of Budget and Management to support various projects.
a n a r
The Solicitor General argued that the petitioners lacked standing to sue.
h petitioners invoked their capacities asBtaxpayers who by alleging that the

C and implementation of the Distribution
HELD: The
issuance
e s Acceleration Program involved the
b
disbursements of public funds, have an interest lissues inthatpreventing the further dissipation of
(Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1) o

public funds. In addition, the cases pose are of transcendental importance.
R
Petitions were filed questioninga nthe constitutionality of the Responsible a rParenthood and
Reproductive Health Act.h Section 14 of the law required the teaching B of reproductive health
C The petitioners argued that thiseviolated
education to adolescents. s academic freedom.
HELD: The attack was premature, because the Department b lof Education, Culture and Sports
has yet to formulate a curriculum on the reproductive o
Rv. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
health education. One can only
n r
speculate if it will violate religious beliefs. (Imbong
a a
B Fund
independence and fiscal autonomy. Billsh
A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Supreme Court to exercise its judicial
and to replace it with the Judiciary C

proposed to abolish Judiciary Development
Support Fund, whose collection would e
s
the National Treaty and Congress would determine how the funds would
b l be remitted to
be spent.
HELD: One of the requirements for the exercise of the powerR

o
of judicial review is the
existence of an actual controversy. A proposed bill creates no
a n right and imposes no duty.
a r
The Supreme Court has no power to declare a proposed bill
the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal h
unconstitutional. (In re Save
B
January 21, 2015. C
Autonomy Movement, UDK-15143,
e s
b l
Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Acts provided for the licensing of real estate
service practitioners and placed them under the supervision of the Professional Regulation
R o
Commission through a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service. The Remman
Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association questioned
a n the
constitutionality of the law.
C h
ar
HELD: The petitioners are real estate developers and are directly affected by the
B
prohibition against the performance of acts constituting practice of real estate service
e s
without complying with the registration and licensing requirements. They assert that the
b l
prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of their properties. A
justiciable controversy calls for immediate resolution. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v.
R o
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293)
n of Interior and Local Government

aSecretary a rJesse Robredo issued the following regulations:
h B
C sbids and public biddings;
1. Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, which required the full disclosure of local
e
l
budgets and finances, and
b
Roallotment of local government units should not be used; and
2. Memorandum Circular No. 2010-138, which listed the expenses for which the
internal revenue
a n Circular No. 2011-08, which required a r strict adherence to Section

90h
3. Memorandum
Bpublication or posting in three public
Cplaces of the income and expenditureseand s the invitation to bid, notice of award,
of the General Appropriation Acts requiring
b l contracts.
notice to proceed, and approved procurement
Governor Luis Raymund Villafuerte,

R o Jr. questioned the constitutionality of the
anonactual controversy. r
memorandum circulars. The Solicitor General argued that the case was not ripe for judicial
review, because there was yet a
B Villafuerte, Jr.
C h s
HELD: An actual controversy already exists. Governor
received a memorandum requiring him to comment on the findings
l e of the audit teams that
Luis Raymund
the transactions and documents required by Memorandum

o b Circular No. 2010-83 had not
Rhousing the San Sebastian Cathedral a

been posted. (Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo, G.R. No. 95390, December 10, 2014)
Bishop Vicente Navarra posted in the compound

a n a r
h
tarpaulin which listed the names of the legislations who vote against the Reproductive
B
C the removal of the tarpaulin, because
Health Law and the names of the legislators
s
who voted in favor of it. The Law Department
eElections.
of the Commission on Elections ordered
the allotted size for election propaganda allowed by the Commission on
b l it exceeded
The
R o
Diocese of Bacolod and Bishop Vicente Navarra filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Commission on
Elections argued that the petition was not the proper remedy,
a n because the order was not a
a r
final ruling of the Commission on Elections en banc.
h B
HELD: The subject matter of the case is the alleged C violation of the freedom of speech.
e s
65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy against grave abuse of discretion.b
Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed to avoid the chilling effect of the order. Rule l
constitutionality of the notice is within the power of review of the Supreme Court. o
The
R A direct
must be addressed immediately. Second, the issues involved are of n

resort to the Supreme Court is allowed, because there are issues of constitutionality which
a transcendental
h
importance. Third, this is a case of first impression. Fourth, it is the Supreme Court that can
C
ar
rule with finality on whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of
B
discretion. Fifth, the fact that future cases may be filed necessitate urgency. Sixth, the
e s
petition involves review of the act of a constitutional agency. Seventh, the petitioners have
b l
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Eighth, the petition involves questions that
must be resolved because of the broader interest of justice. This case involves the right to
R o
free speech. It does not involve a political question.
n case falls within the exceptions atorthe doctrines of exhaustion of administrative

aThis
h B
remedies. First, the issue involved is a purely legal question. Judicial intervention is urgent
C because of the upcoming elections.
e s
b l Neither do they belong to any party. The Commission
The petitioners are not candidates.
R
under the enumeration
oof the acts that may be penalized under Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of
on Elections does not have authority to regulate their enjoyment of freedom of expression
a n
the Constitution. The provision applies to candidates only.r
a
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act
parties. h
and Section 17
B
of the Comelec Resolution No. 9615 apply only to candidates and political
C e s
Commission on Elections, Article III, b
While this case does not involve a law but l an opinion of the Law Department of the
R
governmental acts. (Diocese of Bacolod o vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
Section 4 of the Constitution applies even to
January 21, 2015)

a n a r
The Reproductive Healthh Act provided access and information on the B full range of modern
C and required health service providers
family planning methods,
e stotoprovide information on
the full range of family planning methods and required schools
b l
health education. Petitions were filed to declare it unconstitutional.
provide reproductive
The Solicitor General argued that there was noR

o
charged with violation of the law and that non right of the petitioners had been affectedr
actual controversy, as no one has been
a B a by
protected speech.
C h
its operation and that a facial challenge is allowed only to assail statute concerning
s
l ealready taken
HELD: An actual case exists, because the law and its implementing rules have
o
effect and budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed,b and medical
R
practitioners are in danger of criminal prosecution for violations of the law.
a n a r
hhas expanded the jurisdiction of B
The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the facial challenge to cover religious
the Supreme Court to settle actual controversies to C determine if there has been grave abuse s
freedom and other fundamental rights. The Constitution
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Imbong l v.e
Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
o b
R
unreleased appropriations, unreleased appropriations of slow movingn
The Department of Budget and Management pooled unprogrammed funds; savings from
a projects and
h
discontinued projects, and withdrawal of unobligated allotments released for slow-moving
C
ar
programs and projects and used them for the Disbursement Acceleration Program to
B
support various projects. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed questioning the
e s
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program.
b l
The Solicitor General argued that there was no actual controversy that was rise for
R o
adjudication.
n The fact that public funds have been

aHELD: a rallocated, disbursed or utilized by reason of the
h B
challenged executive acts gave rise to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication.
C (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
e s
3. Lis Mota
b l
Dennis Funa filed aR
o
petition for mandamus to compel the Commission on Audit to audit the
accounts of then Manila Economic and Cultural Office. Itr
Office Order aNo. 2011-698, it had already conceded itsa
claimed that since it had issued
h B jurisdiction over the accounts of the
C
Manila Economic and Cultural Office.
e s
HELD: The Supreme Court should refrainlfrom dismissing the case. First, the petition
alleges that the Commission on Audit hadb
o been remiss in its constitutional duty to audit the
R Third, there is paramount public interest in resolving
accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. Second, there is a paramount public
n of the Manila Economic and Cultural
interest in the resolution of this issue.
the issue regarding the legalastatus a rOffice, a novelty.
h
The case is capable of being repeated yet evades review. (Funa v. B Manila Economic and
C 247).
Cultural Office, 715 SCRA
e s
l
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality ofbthe Responsible Parenthood and
o
Rlaw has yet to be enforced and applied
Reproductive Health Act. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners had no
n r
standing to question its constitutionality, since the
against the petitioners.
a a
h and weight as precedents, the issuesB
C
HELD: In view of the seriousness, novelty
resolved for the guidance of all. The law affects the constitutional provisionse
s must be
b l on the right to
life and health, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and other constitutional rights.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
R o
a n
Despite the conversion of the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement of three corporations,
a r
controlled by a Canadian corporation, with Financial or Technical
h
Assistance Agreements,
B
C
the validity of the previous agreements should still be decided since it involves a grave
s
ofe
violation of the Constitution, the scheme used involves paramount public interest, the issue
requires formulation of principles to be applied in similar cases, and the case is capable l
b
Ro
repetition. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated
Mines Corporation, 722 SCRA 382)
Petitioners filed cases questioning the constitutionality of the Disbursement

a nAcceleration
h
Program adopted by the Secretary of Budget and Management to support various projects.
C
ar
B
s
The Solicitor General argued that since the program had been discontinued, the cases had
e
become moot.
b l
R o
HELD: The Supreme Court has exercised its power of judicial review even if the case has
been rendered moot: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution, (2) when the
an r
case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount interest; (3) when
Ba
the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide
Ch s
the bench, the bar, and the public, and (4) when the case is capable of repetition and yet
e
evades review. These cases come under all the exceptions. (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA
l
b
1)
R o
D. Basis for Judicial Review
an a r
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of the Responsible Parenthood and
B
C h
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners argued that it violated natural law.
snatural law as a legal basis for natural
HELD: The Supreme Court does not recognize e
lSupreme Court is the Constitution. Natural law
o
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
b
invalidating law. The only guide post of the
body. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
E. Effect of Annulment of Law n

R
a a r
h Agency, Inc. deployed Joy Cabiles B
C
Sameer Overseas Employment
s for work in Taiwan on
June 26, 1997. On July 14, 1997, she was terminated. Sheefiled a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The National Labor Relations Commission ruledl
b that she was dismissed illegally
Ro
but awarded her back wages for three months only in accordance with Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10027.
a n a r10
BIt was
HELD: In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Service, Inc. the Supreme Court ruled that Section
h the award of back wages for threesmonths
of the Republic Act No. 8042, which limited
every year of the unexpired term,Cwhichever was less, was unconstitutional.
for
reinstated by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022. l e

b
Rothe
HELD: When a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with Constitution, the
an r
nullity cannot be cured by reenactment of the same law. (Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. v. Joy Cabiles, 732 SCRA 531)
B a
F. Inapplicability of Judicial Review
C h s
l e
The petitioners received notices of eviction and demolition from the mayors where the
parcels of land they were occupying were located to give way to the construction o b of
infrastructure projects. They claimed that their eviction without a court order R violated
an
their right to due process.
C h
ar
B
HELD: It has already been ruled that demolitions and evictions can be carried without a
s
court order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
e
l
be implemented. (Katipunan v. Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322)
b
o
VIII. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
R
nruled upon. The Maritime Industry Authority r failed to prove its existence. It presented a
The validity of the allowances allegedly granted to the Maritime Industry Authority cannot
abemere a
h photocopy of it. No copy of it isB
s
in the Malacanang Records Office.
C The benefits and allowances disallowed
e
given when the officials b
l by the Commission on Audit were deemed already
o and employees received their basic salary. Their receipt of the
Industry AuthorityR
disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double compensation. (Maritime
a n r
in Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
a
Janet Nacion was assigned by the Commission onB
C h s
Audit as auditor to the Metropolitan
e loan. As a result, an administrative charge

Waterworks Sewerage System. She received benefits and bonuses from it. She also awaited
was filed against her. b l

herself of its housing projects and obtained a car
HELD: The acts of Janet Nacion R

o
are prohibited. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6788,
prohibited the officials of then on Audit from receiving r
a Commission B a bonuses or other
C
Commission on Audit. Her havailment of the benefits of the car and
emoluments from any government entity except compensation paid
s
directly by the
housing programs led to
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015)l

the same results that the prohibition on additional compensation e sought to avoid. (Nacion
o b
IX. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
R
n
A petition for the recall of Mayor LuciloaBayron of Puerto Princesa were filed.aThe
r
h B ofalla
s
Commission on Elections found it sufficient in form and substance but suspended
further procedures because of the lack C of appropriation in its budget for
e
the conduct
recall election.
b l
HELD: THE Constitution grants the Commission on Election powero
Rautonomy.
to administer the laws
a n
relative to the conduct of a recall. It also guaranteed its fiscal
Appropriation Act authorized the Chairman of the Commission on Election to augment
The General
a r
h
items in its appropriation from savings. The General Appropriation Act expressly provided
This is a line item which can be s
B
C
for an appropriation for the conduct of recall election.
augmented from savings. The conduct of recall elections required only operating expenses, e
not capital outlays. (Go vs. Bayron, 742 SCRA 303).
b l
X. COMMISSION ON AUDIT Ro
an
h
A. Scope of Power
C
a r
BEconomic
Dennis Funa filed a petition for mandamus to compel the commission on Audit to audit the
e s
accounts of the Manila and Cultural Office.
HELD: Theb
l
Manila Economic and Cultural Office is not a government-owned or controlled
o ofIt was
RNone
corporation. organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under the Corporation
n of the Filipino people in a foreign

Code.
ainterest rland. It performs functions which partake of the
its money is distributable as dividends. It seeks to promote the general
a
h B
nature of government function. Its functions are of the kind that would otherwise be
C are officers of the Manila Economic s and Cultural Office are government officials. It is not a
performed by the diplomatic and consular offices of the Philippines. None of the members
e
government instrumentality.lIt is sui generis.
o b
The Manila Economic R and Cultural Office collects verification fees from Taiwanese
a n of the Department of Labor and Employment.

employers on behalf
a r The accounts
It is mandated to remit a
hfees are subject to the audit jurisdiction

portion of the
B
verification fees to the National Government. pertaining to the
ManilaCEconomic
verification
e s
and Cultural office also collects
of the Commission on Audit. The
consular fees. The consular fees may be
audited by the Commission on Audit. (Funa
b l vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715
SCRA 241)
o
A private law office retained by a R
both the Government Corporatea n Counsel and the written concurrence a rthe Commission
government corporation without the written conformity
of
h
on Audit is not entitled to compensation because the hiring of the lawB firm is unauthorized.
(Law Firms of Laguesma, s
C Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. eCommission on Audit, G.R. No.
185544, January 13, 2015)
b l
Antique and Fortune Life and General Insurance R
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement between o the Provincial Government of
n r
Company, Inc. , the latter provided group
a
insurance coverage to barangay secretaries, treasurers,
a
and tanod. When Fortune Life and
B Code,
h
General Insurance Company, Inc. filed its claim for payment, the Commission on Audit
Care authorized to secure group insurance
denied it on the ground that under Sections 447 and 458 of the Local Government
s
only municipal and city governments
l eof publication
coverage
for barangay workers and there was no compliance with the requirement
under Section 21 of the Government Procurement Reform Act. Fortune
o b Life and General
Insurance Company, Inc. questioned the decision of the Commission R on Audit on the
ground that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
a n a r
Insurance Company, Inc. , vs. Commission on audit, C
HELD: The Commission on Audit acted within its authority h in denying the claim. (Fortune s B
G.R. No. 213629, January 27, 2015)
l e
On appeal by the Maritime Industry Authority from the disallowance of the benefitsb
o and
the disallowance. The Maritime Industry Authority argued that this amounted R
allowances by the auditor, the Commission on Audit relied upon other grounds to affirm
due process.
a n to denial of
C h
ar
B
HELD: In consonance with the general audit power, the Commission on Audit is not
s
restricted to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the
e
b l
government concerned and may make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowance
disbursement. To hold otherwise will render its power unduly limited, useless and
R o
ineffective. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812,
January13, 2015)
aB.nAppeal to Supreme Court Ba r

Ch e s
The Commission on Audit denied the claim of Fortune Life and General Insurance
b l
Company, Inc. for payment of the premium for the group insurance coverage it granted to
o
barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod in accordance with an agreement with the
R
Province of Antique. Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, Inc. questioned the
n r
decision of the Commission on Audit by filing a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
a a
h
HELD: Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, B onInc.January
received the decision on
C s
e If filed its petition in the Supreme Court
December 14, 2012. It filed a motion for reconsideration 14, 2013. It received
on August 13, 2014. b l

the notice of denial of its motion on July 14, 2014.
HELD: The petition was filed late. R o

Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the
petition should be filed within n from notice of the decision. Ther
period to file the petition. If the a
a thirtythedays filing of a motion
Bbe less than five days,

h
for reconsideration will interrupt
s
motion is denied, the
counted from notice C

petition may be filed within the remaining period but which shall not
l e was
of the denial. The motion for reconsideration filed on January 14,
the denial of the motion for reconsideration was received

o bon July 14, 2014. The petition for
2013, which is 31 days after receipt of the decision on December 14, 2012. The notice of
R
certiorari was filed late on August 13, 2014. Contrary to the claim of Fortune Life and
n
General Insurance Company, Inc. there is no fresh period to file the petition. (Fortune Life
a a r27,
B
and General Insurance Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, January
2015)
C h s
XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT l e
b
A. Local Autonomy
Ro
a
The petitioners argued that the Reproductive Health Law violated n the autonomy of local a r
governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
h B
C
HELD: Section 17(c) of the Local Government Code exempts from the devolution of powers e
s
cases involving nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services. This applies
b l
equally to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Except for the express ando implied
limitation imposed by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted in the exercise R Jr. ,of721its
an
plenary power to legislate on all matters of common interest. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
h
SCRA 146)
C
ar
B. Presidential Power of Supervision
B
e s
Governor Luis Raymund Villafuerte, Jr., questioned the constitutionality of the
b l
Memorandum Circular Nos. 2010-83, 2010-138 and 2011-08 on the ground that they
violated the local and fiscal autonomy granted by the Constitution to local government
R o
units.
n Memorandum Circular No. 2010-38

aHELD: a ris a merely reiteration of Section 287 of the
h B
Local Government Code. Despite the local fiscal autonomy of local government units, they
C is not antithetical to investigation sand imposition of sanctions.
are still under the supervision of the President. This power of supervision of the President
e
b l
o
Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83 and Memorandum Circular No. 2011-09 are merely
implementations ofRthe requirements of Section 352 of its Local Government Code and
Robledo, G.R.a
Sections 3(a) and n 3 (e) of the Government Procurement a rReform Act. (Villafuerte, Jr. v.
h
No. 195390, December 10, 2014)
B
C. TermCLimitation e s
Angel Naval was elected as member b
l
Camarines Sur. Republic Act No. 9716
R o reapportioned the legislative districts into five
of the Sanggunian from the second district of
two remaining municipalities a nwere retained in the second district and a rmerged with five
districts. Eight of the ten municipalities of the second district formed the third district. The
municipalities which were h B

transferred from the first district. At the immediately following
election, Angel NavalC was elected member of the Sanggunian from
e sSanggunian
the third district. At the
next election, Angel Naval was re-elected as member of the
district. b l from the third
o
R from the third district claimed thatas
Angel Naval was disqualified, because he hadn fully served for three consecutive termsr
Nelson Julio, a candidate for member of the Sanggunian
a elected in different districts. AngelBaNaval

argued that the voters from the thirdh
member of the Sanggunian although he was
C s
district were different from the voters from the
e
second district.
b l
third district was to be renamed. The lawmakers intended theR
o
HELD: Republic Act No. 9716 stated that a new second district was to be created, but the
old second district to be
renamed merely as the new third district. The district which
a n elected Angel Naval for the
a r
third and the fourth time is the same which elected him during
h
his first two terms. Hence,
B
C
he is ineligible. (Naval v. Commission on Audit, 729 SCRA 299)
e s
D. Plebiscites
b l
Pursuant to Section 453 of the Local Government Code, which authorized the President
R o to
declared a city as highly urbanized if its meets the minimum requirements, upon
ratification in a plebiscite, the President proclaimed the City of Cabanatuan
a n as a highly
h
urbanized city, subject to ratification in a plebiscite. The Commission on Elections ordered
C
a r
a plebiscite among the B residents of City of Cabanatuan. Aurelio Umali, the governor of
e
Nueva Ecija, argued s that the voters of the province should be included in the plebiscite,
b l
because it would affect the province.
HELD: o
R X of the Constitution, it is a substantial alteration of boundaries. The word
While conversion to a highly urbanized city is not explicitly provided in Section 10,
n
Article
aboundaries a r but also to the political boundaries. Article
should not be limited to physical
h B
12(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code provides
C independent of the province. This s will result in reduction of the revenue allotted to the
that the conversion of a component city to a highly urbanized city shall make it
e
province. The province willllose its share in taxes imposed by the City of Cabanatuan.
o b
(Umali v. Commission on Elections, 723 SCRA 170)
R
a n
XII. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
a r
h B
C
A. Intervention in Appeal
e s
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas found
b landPrudencio Quimbo guilty of oppression in
R
penalty. He filed a Petition for Review o in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
the administrative case filed against him imposed suspension for six months as
anthe motion on the ground of B r legal standing.

reversed the ruling. The Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals denied lackaof
HELD: The Office of C

h
the Ombudsman may intervene because s
subject matter as guardian of public trust and accountability.e
of its legal interest in the
Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015) b l (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Ro
n r
B. Disciplinary Authority
a B a
authority over Deputy Ombudsmen.
C h
Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 conferred upon, the President the disciplinary
s
HELD: The alter egos of the President and the officials of the Executivel
e
subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The Deputy b
Department are
R
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. Subjecting
o Ombudsman act as
them to the power
to discipline and removal by the President will seriously place nat risk the independence of
the Ombudsman. Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770ashould be declared void. The a r
removal of other public officers must be consistentC
h the manner and the cause of B
with the principle of independence of s
authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide
l e
the Ombudsman. However, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 is valid insofar as the
b
Ro
Special Prosecutor is concerned, because, he is not within the Office of the Ombudsman.
(Gonzales III v. Office of the President, 714 SCRA 611)
XIII. NATIONAL PATRIMONY

an
C h
ar
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. was issued a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement and
B
Exploration Permit. These were transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation and then to
e s
MacArthur Mining, Inc.
b l
Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining and
R o
Development Corporation were issued Mineral Production Sharing Agreements. These
an r
were assigned to Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation.
B a
C h Sara Marie Mining, Inc. was issued a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. It conveyed its
s
rights over the agreement to Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc.
e
Redmont Consolidated MineslCorporation filed a petition for the denial of the application of
o b
the three corporations on the ground that since at least 60 per cent of their capital stocks
were owned by MBMI R Resources, Inc. , a corporation wholly owned by Canadians, they
a
were disqualifiednto engage in mining. a r
The threeh companies claimed that since at least 60 B
them C
e s
was owned by Filipino citizens, under Section
percent of the capital stocks of each of
3(9) of the Philippine Mining Act of
b l
1995, they were qualified to engage in mining.
HELD: Corporate layering is allowed

R oby the Foreign Investment Act, but if it used to
a
framers of the Constitution to apply r layering
n the grandfather rule in cases whereacorporate
circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, it becomes illegal. It is the intention of the
is present. This case h presents a situation which exhibits a B scheme employed by

C the law. This makes the corporations
and thus disqualified to participate in the exploration of oure
stockholders to circumvent s non-Filipino corporation
corporations are not Filipino, since MBM Resources, b lInc, a 100 percent Canadian
natural resources. The three
corporation, owns 60 percent or more of their equity,o

RConsolidated Mines Corporation, 722
directly and indirectly. (Narra Nickel
n r
Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont
SCRA 382)
a B a
XIV. EDUCATION
C h s
l eprovider from
performing any legal and medically safe reproductive health procedure
o b
Section 23(1)(2)(i) of the Reproductive Health Act prohibits any health care
on any person of
R
legal age on the ground of lack of consent of the spouse in case of married spouses and in
case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing n
a
the procedure shall prevail.
a r
h B
C
HELD: The reproductive health procedure should require
XV of the Constitution provides the State shall defend the
mutual consent. Section 3, Article
right of spouses to found a family
e s
and the right to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
b l
that affect them is shared by both spouses. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
R o
late for a lesson examination. He explained that the instructor dismissed then
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy came two minutes
a class late. The
h
instructor denied it. As a result, Aldrin Jeff Cudia was penalized with 11 demerits of 13
C
ar
touring hours. He appealed and reiterated his explanation. Because it was established that
B
the class was not dismissed late, the penalty was sustained. He was charged with violation
e s
of the Honor Code by lying. Aldrin Jeff Cudia was found guilty and dismissed. He questioned
the decision.
b l
R o
HELD: The power of schools to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their
an r
academic freedom. The right includes the power to dismiss students who violate
a
disciplinary rules. As the primary educational institution of the Armed Forces of the
B
Ch
Philippines, the Philippine Military Academy has the right to invoke academic freedom in
s
the enforcement of its rules and regulations. The Honor Code is justified as the primary
e
b l
means of achieving character development. Assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement in administrative hearings. (Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military
o
Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
R
XV. FAMILY
a n a r
Petitions h B of the Responsible Parenthood and
C Health Act. The petitioners argued sthat Section 23(6)(2)(ii) of the law, which
were filed questioning the constitutionality
Reproductive
e
b l maritala reproductive
requires a married person who wishes to undergo health procedure should
Ro
obtain the consent of the spouse, violates privacy and autonomy and fosters
animosity rather than solidarity.
HELD: Reproductive healtha n like tubal ligation and vasectomy,

procedures a r by their very
h
nature, should require mutual consent, as they affect issues relatedB to the founding of a
C Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
family. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
e s
XVI. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT b l
Ro
n r
A. Governmental Functions
a a
B to
h
Diosdado Mendoza was the winning bidder for the construction of a road in Benguet, the
s
proceed. Diosdado Mendoza claimedC
quarters of the engineers, and the laboratory. On March 3, 1989 he received a notice
l
that he discovered that there was no right e of allowed
way for
passing. Diosdado Mendoza alleged that it was made to appear that he b

the project, and it was only on November 29, 1989 that the affected landowners
R o incurred a negative
slippage of 29%, a rebidding was recommended, and he was blacklisted from participating
in any bidding for one year. Diosdado Mendoza filed a case forn specific performance against r
the Department of Public Works and Highways and asked a a
h
that the rebidding be restrained.
B
HELD: The State will be deemed to have impliedly C waived its immunity from suit if it
e s
governmental capacity, no waiver may be implied. The Department of Public Worksb
entered into a contract in its proprietary capacity. When the contract involves its l
o and
personality and enjoys immunity from suit. It performs governmental functions, R

Highways is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
the power to undertake public works projects. (Heirs of Diosdado Mendoza n

since it has
a v. Department
of Public Works and Highways, 729 SCRA 654)
C h
a
B. Execution of Judgmentr
B
e s
A road encroached upon the parcels of land owned by the Star Special Watchman and
b l
Detective Agency, Inc. , Celso Fernandez, and Manuel Fernandez. They sued Puerto Princesa
City for just compensation. They obtained a favorable judgment from the Regional Trial
R o
Court. Upon its finality, a writ of execution was issued. Celso Fernandez claimed that after
an r
they received a partial payment, there were no more payments and that there was an
a
unpaid balance. Celso Fernandez requested the Commission on Audit to order Puerto
B
Ch
Princesa City to pay, but it answered that it had no jurisdiction over the matter. The Star
s
Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. , Celso Fernandez and Manuel Fernandez filed
e
l
a petition for mandamus to compel it to pay the amount awarded by the judgment.
b
R o
HELD: The remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard forms of remedy are still
available. The legal remedy is to seek relief from the Commission on Audit pursuant to
an a r
Administrative Circular 10-2000, which provides that all money claims must first be filed
B
Ch
with the Commission on Audit. Under Section 49 of the Government Auditing Code, it has
e s
power to settle all claims due from the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. (Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa,
722 SCRA 66)
bl
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Ro
I. Recall an B ar
Ch e s
A petition to recall Governor Wilhelmina Sy-Alvarado of Bulacan was filed with the
bl
Commission on Elections. The Provincial Election Supervisor found that petition was
sufficient in form and substance. The Deputy Director for Operations reviewed the
R o
recommendation. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution affirming the
an r
recommendation. Governor Wilhelmina Sy-Alvarado insisted that the petition was not
sufficient in form and substance as the signatures had not been authenticated.
a
h in the petition were registered B
C
HELD: The determination whether the signatories
s voters of
esufficiency
the local government unit and were registered as such during the election
b l
officials sought to be recalled is not done during the determination of the
of the local
or
R
the names, signatures or thumbmarks of the petitioners. (Sy-Alvarado
o v. Commission on
insufficiency in form and substance of the petition but rather during the determination of
Elections, G.R. No. 216457, February 17, 2015)

a n a r
h B
II. Legal Officer
C e s
The former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran filed a petition for mandamus
b l
Section 5 of Civil Service Commission. Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1998o
to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay their unpaid terminal leave benefits under
R and 14,
a
Regional Trial Court directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include in the n budget the
Series of 1999. The Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer filed an answer. The
payment of the terminal leave benefits.

C h
a r
The Municipality of B Saguiran appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
e
required the Offices of the Solicitor General to file a memorandum for the Municipality of
Saguiran.
b l
HELD: o
R government to appoint a legal officer. It is the duty of the legal officer to
Section 481 of the Local Government Code provides that it is optional for a
n the local government unit in aallrcivil actions and special proceedings in which it
municipal
arepresent
h B
is a party. Section 481 of the Local Government Code restricts the lawyer who may
C the issue of representation inecourt, s the Local Government Code must prevail over the
represent a local government unit as counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on
b
provision in Section 35, Book l IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
of the government R
o
which provides that the Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the instrumentalities
in any litigation in the Court of Appeals. (Office of the Solicitor General v.
a
Court of Appeals,n725 SCRA 469) a r
h by Barangay Officials against Abuse B
C
III. Protection
e s
Rossana Honrado-Fua filed a petition in l
children for a temporary protection order
o b the Regional Trial Court for herself and her
pursuant to the Anti-Violence against Women
R Ralph Fua claimed that the issuance of the order
and their Children against her husband, Ralph Fua. The Regional Trial Court issued a
a
violated his right to due process nand the grant of the power to the Regional
temporary protection order ex-parte,
a r Trial Court and
h
to barangay officials to issue temporary protection orders constituted B an invalid delegation
of legislative power. C
e s
HELD: The law entrusting to the courts the issuance of the b ltemporary protection order is in
o
R barangay to maintain public order in
pursuant of their authority to settle justiciable disputes. The issuance of a barangay
n r
protective order is pursuant to the duty of the punong
the barangay. (Fua v. Mangrobang, 714 SCRA 428)
a B a
IV. Separation Benefits for Employees h
C e s
Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009 so provided that employees of Generall
o
were below 60 years of age but not less than fifty years of age and sickly b Santos City who
employees below
R
50 years of age but not less than 40 years of age could avail themselves of early retirement
and receive a cash of P50,000.00 for sickly employees, lifetime
a n free medical consultation,
a r
annual aid with maximum amount of P5,000.00, if admitted
h
at the General Santos City
B
Hospital, and a gold ring.
C e s
The Commission on Audit held that Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009 was a supplementary
b l
System. Ordinance No. 8, Series of 2009 was amended to exclude the paymento
retirement benefit plan prohibited by the law creating the Government Service Insurance
R by the
passed on to the employer to ensure that no employee would be paid twice. n

Government Service Insurance System and the Home Development Mutual Fund which are
a
C h
ar
HELD: Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that any provision on a
B
power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor. Section 5,
e s
paragraph (c) provides that the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code
b l
shall be liberally interpreted. The prohibition in Section 28, paragraph (b) of the law
creating the Government Service Insurance System against the creation of any other
R o
insurance or retirement plan was intended to prevent the proliferation of retirement plans.
an r
Under Section 2 of Circular No. 008, Series of 2009, even employees other than those
a
unproductive due to health reasons could apply. The benefits provided served to induce
B
Ch
employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to retire early. The benefits were
s
given only to a select few. This negates the position that the benefits provide for
e
SCRA 77)
bl
supplementary retirement benefits. (City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit, 723
ADMINISTRATIVER
o
LAW
anRules and Regulations B a r

h
I. Administrative
A. VoidCRegulations e s
b l
o
Rand injectibles which are abortifacients.
Reproductive Health Act on the ground it would authorize the purchase of hormonal
n
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices
a a r
HELD: Section 9 of theh law provides that any product or supplyBto be included in the
emergency drugs listC must be certified by the Food and DrugsAuthority that it is made
l e
available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient. However, Section
301(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides
o b that abortifacients refer to any
R planning method, device, or healthor

drug or device that primarily induces abortion. Section 3(01) (j) of the Implementing Rules
product that prevents pregnancy but does n not primarily destroy a fertilized ovumr
and Regulations defines contraceptives as any family
amother. Because of the insertion of the B aword

primarily, Section 3(01)(a) and (j) of h
prevent its implantation in the womb of the
C s if its
the Implementing Rules and Regulations should be
e
sole known effect is abortion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 721 SCRA 146)
b l
declared invalid. It means that a contraceptive will be considered as an abortifacient
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio, who were both married, R omaintained an illicit
relationship and begot two children named Andre Lewis andn Gerard Patrick. They became r
estranged and Grace Grande left for the United States a a
h
with the two children. Patricio
B
Antonio filed a petition in which he asked the court
C
children and the change of the surnames of his children
to approve his recognized of his
to his own surname.
e s
b l
HELD: Republic 9255 amended Section 176 of the Family Code to provide that illegitimate
R o by
children may use the surname of their father if their filiations was expressly recognized
illegitimate children shall use the surname of the father if a public documentn
their father. Rule 7 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that the
a is executed by
h
the father. A regulation cannot amend a legislative act. (Grande v. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698)
C
a r
B
B. Inexistence of Regulation
Section 26(a)lof
s Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act authorized the Secretary of Health to
ethe
issued o
b
issue the rules and regulations to implement its provisions. In 1989, the Secretary of Health
R
Administrative Order No. 67, which required drug manufacturers to register certain
amarket a r
n and required a satisfactory bio-availability/bio-guidance
drugs and medicines with the Food and Drug Administration before selling them to the
list. The implementation
h B
was deferred because of lack of local facilities for testing. With the establishment of testing
C implemented the testing required, sand Circular No. 8, which provided additional details for
facilities in 1997, the Food and Drug Administration issued Circular No. 1, which
e
the testing requirements. l
o b
The Drugmakers R Laboratories, Inc. , and Terramedic, Inc. questioned the validity of
Circular Nos. 1 n rDrugof Health
a a
and 8 on the ground that it was the Secretary who was authorized
there wash
to issue implementing
B
rules and regulations for the Food, and Cosmetics Act and that
C
no prior policy.
e s
b l in consonance
HELD: Administrative Order No. 67, which introduced the regulations, is an administrative
o
regulation issued by the Secretary of Health with the express authority
R the implementation of Administrative Order No. 67.
granted to him by the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. The only purpose of Circular Nos. 1
The Food and Drug Authority a n

and 8 is to administer and supervise
has sufficient authority to issue them and a rno prior hearing,
h
consultation and publication are needed for their validity, as theyB are not administrative
regulations. (Republic Cv. Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc. 718 SCRA
e s 153)
II. Interpretation of Law b l
R o manufacturers excise taxes for the
n The cigarette manufacturers claimed r
The Commission on Internal Revenue assessed cigarette
a
purchase and importation of stemmed leaf tobacco.
B a
C
practice was the correct interpretation ofh
that since for a long the purchase and importations were not subjected to excise taxes, the
the law.
s
l ean erroneous
HELD: Prolonged practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue cannot validate
application of the law. The government is not estopped from collecting b
o legitimate taxes
because of the error committed by its agents. (La Suerte CigarR and Cigarette Factory v.
Court of Appeals, 739 SCRA 489)
a n a r
h B
III. Issuance of Subpoenas
C e s
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that upon securing a court warrant,
b l
law enforcement authorities shall order any person or service provider to disclose
R o 72
subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his possession or control within
order is like a subpoena and the issuance of a subpoena is a judicial form. n

hours from receipt of the order in relation to an investigation. The petitioners claimed the
a
C h
a r
HELD: The power toBissue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have thes
l e
Section 14 merely
power to issue a subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
enforces the court warrant. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
o bof Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

R
IV. Doctrine
aA.nApplicability of Doctrine B a r
h
C Henry Merto instead was appointed. s She protested his appointment, but the Civil Service
When the Provincial Agriculturist retired, Marichu Ejera applied for the position. Beau
Commission dismissed the l

e
o b protest. Beau Henry Merto issued an order reassigning her.
When she refused to obey, he asked her to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against her. R Instead, she filed in the Regional Trial Court an action to enjoin her
reassignment. n r
a a
B and not a transfer. A transfer is a
h
C from one position to another of equivalent
HELD: The
s rank. Reassignment is the movement
subject of the order was a reassignment
movement
of an employee from one organizational l
e
o b unit to another in the same department. The
Superior of Beau Henry Merto was the Provincial Governor. She could have challenged her
R 714 SCRA 397)
reassignment before the Provincial Governor. Her immediate resort to the Regional Trial
n
Court was premature. (Ejera v. Merto,
a a r
The Land Bank of theh Philippines obtained a loan from the B International Bank for
C
Reconstruction and Development
e s the projects.
for local development and investment The Land
expansion of its water supply system. The City Government b l conducted a public bidding.
Bank of the Philippines granted a loan to Iligan City to finance development and
Atlanta Industries, Inc. participated in the bidding. o

R
a
The bidding was declared a failure, because the n a
International Bank for Reconstruction and r
h and Awards Committee that theB
Development did not concur with the bid evaluation report. A new bidding was scheduled.
C
Atlanta Industries, Inc. wrote the bidding
s bidding
e Rules and
Regulations. The Bidding and Awards Committee declared that the projectl
documents did not comply with the Republic Act No. 9184 and its Implementing
by Republic Act No. 9184 and that it would proceed. Atlanta Industries,b
was not covered
for prohibition to stop the bidding. R o Inc. filed a petition
a n a r
HELD: The case should be dismissed outright for failure
h
of Atlanta Industries, Inc. to
B
Awards Committee in all stages of procurement C
exhaust administrative remedies. Under Republic Act No. 9184, the decision of the Bids and
s
procuring entity. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Atlanta Industries, Inc. 729 SCRA 12) le
may be protested to the head of the
b
B. Exception to Applicability of Doctrine
Ro
1. Purely Legal Question
an
C h
ar
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to cases involving
B
the validity of regulations. (Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robledo, G.R. No.195390, December 10, 2014)
e s
l
2. Urgency and Futility
b
R o
The Bureau of Treasury issued ten-year zero-coupon treasury bonds. Upon the query of the
an r
Secretary of Finance, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370-2011
a
which declared that they were deposit substitutes and subject to a twenty per cent final tax.
B
Ch
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul the
s
ruling. The Republic of the Philippines and its officers argued that petitioner failed to
e
Secretary of Finance. l
exhaust administrative remedies first, because the ruling was subject to review by the
b
HELD: There are R
o
applicable exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. First,n r and whether
a twenty pera a
whether the bonds were deposit substitutes, the imposition of
h B legal questions. Second, judicial

cent final tax on the bonds violated the constitutional prohibition against the
C was urgent because of the impending

impairment
intervention s maturity of the bonds. Besides, an
of contracts and due process are purely
e
appeal to the Secretary of Finance would belfutile, because it was upon his request that the
o b of the Commissioner of Customs as his own.

ruling was issued and he adopted the opinion
R
(Banco de Oro v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015)
LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS an B a r

C h s
I. Appointment
l e
A. Nepotism
o b
R theElegio
n r
The Commission on Human Rights en banc approved appointment as information
a
officer of Maricelle-Cortes, the daughter of Commissioner
a
Mallari. Commissioner
B
appointment as invalid, because it was h
Elegio Mallari abstained from voting. The Civil Service Commission declared the
C authority was the Commission s
covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Maricelle Cortes argued that the appointing
l e on Human
Rights en banc and not the individual Commissioner.
b
o and not to its
HELD: To rule that the prohibition applies only to the CommissionerR
a n
members will render the prohibition meaningless. The Commission, a body created by law,
a r
can never have relatives. It is absurd to declare that the
appointments made by a group of individuals acting ash
prohibition does not include
B
Cortes, 723 SCRA 609) C
a body. (Civil Service Commission v.
e s
b l
B. Qualification
o
Herminio Dela Cruz was appointed City Assessor. The City Assessor was given R
a
Department Head III. The Sangguniang Panlungsod concurred in the appointment. n Angel
the item of
h
Abad, the Local Assessment Operations Officer V. , protested the appointment on the
C
ar
B
ground that the position corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine grades higher than that of
s
his former position, Salary Grade 18. According to him, promotions to a position more than
e
b l
three salary grades higher were prohibited. Angel Abad argued that as the employee next-
in-rank rule is merely a rule of preference, it does not give the next-in-rank employee a
R o
vested right to the next higher position in case of vacancy. So long as the appointee
possesses the required qualification, the appointment is valid.
n three-salary-grade rule is subject toaexceptions
aThe r
B
in case of very meritorious cases. Out
h of 9 candidates, Herminio dela
C G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015) s
Cruz ranked first with a grade of 90.67. (Abad v. Dela Cruz,
l e
II. De Facto Officers
o b
R
a n of agrarian reform. The Secretary
two lots from coverage
a rof Agrarian Reform granted it.
Lutgarda del Rosario applied with the Department of Agrarian Reform for exemption of her
h
The farmers filed a motion for reconsideration. The BthenewOffice
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
C
2009, Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel e
granted the motion. Lutgarda del Rosario appealed s to of the President. On May 7,
b l
Lutgarda del Rosario claimed that the decision
Gaite denied the appeal for lack of merit.
was void, because he had been appointed to
the Securities and Exchange Commission o on March 16, 2009.
Rof Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite became
HELD: Even if the appointment
ahencould be considered a de facto officer,B a r
Ch2009. His decision was valid. (Espiritu
effective on March 16, 2009, when he rendered
the decision dated May 7,
e s v. Del Rosario, 738 SCRA
l
4641)
Judge William Simon Peralta issued a search warrant b

Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where
R o to search three caves in the Land
the remains of victims summarily
nadministrative penalties were imposed
executed by the Davao Death Squad could be found. The validity of the search warrant was
a a ron
B to act
questioned on the ground that since several
h
Judge William Simon Peralta by the Supreme
C s
Court, he was divested of his authority
on the application for a search warrant.
l e
Judge did not result in the invalidity of the search warrant. He mayo
HELD: The divestment of the authority of Judge William Simon Peralta b as Vice Executive
R (Land
be considered to have
made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts remained valid.
Philippines, 741 SCRA 239)
a n v. People of the
a r
Francisco Duque III was appointed Chairman of the h Civil Service Commission. Later on, s
B
C
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864, which made him a e
member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, the
b l
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the Employees Compensation Commission
the Home Development Mutual Fund. Dennis Funa questioned the constitutionality
o and
RV of theof
an
Executive Order No. 864, and of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book
h
Administrative Code.
C
ar
B
HELD: Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code provides that the
s
membership of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in a governing body is
e
b l
dependent on the condition that the functions must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
R o
The Government Service Insurance System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
the Employees Compensation Commission, the Health Development Mutual Fund also
an r
perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel related. When the
Ba
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission sits as a member of their governing bodies, he
Ch s
may exercise the powers and functions, which are not derived from his position as
e
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Francisco Duque III entitled him to receive per
l
b
diems, which is disallowed by the concept of an ex-officio position. This situation must be
R o
held unconstitutional. The members of the governing boards of the Government Service
Insurance System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the Employees
an r
Compensation Commission, and the Home Development Mutual Fund are under the control
a
of the President. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission cannot be a member of a
B
Ch
government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the
independence of the Civil Service Commission.
e s
Francisco Duque III was a de facto officerb l his tenure as their director. All his official
during
R o
actions are presumed valid. (Funa v. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166)
III. Termination
an a r
B it with the Civil
h
Cthe Philippines. The employees of the
Republic Act No. 9497 abolished
s
the Air Transportation Office and replaced
Aviation Authority of
l e Air Transportation Office
questioned is constitutionality.
o b
R
HELD: The power to create includes the power to destroy. Except where the office was
n rits
created by the Constitution, it may be abolished by the legislature which created it. For the
a a
Bin the
security of tenure of the employees of the Air Transportation Office to be impaired,
abolition must be done in bad faith. Theh
s
purpose of the abolition of the Air Transportation
C
Office is to provide safe and efficient air transport and regulatory
eOffice should
services
l
Philippines. The proposition that all the employees of the Air Transportation
be automatically absorbed cannot be accepted. There is no absolute b
Ro v. Civil Aviation
right to hold public
office. (Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Employees Union
Authority of the Philippines, 739 SCRA 570)
a n a r
IV. Administrative Cases
h B
C e s
A. Complaint
b l
the employee. (Nacias v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015)R
o
A written complaint need not be required to be under oath if it was filed by the superior of
an
h
B. Effect of Retirement
C
ar
The pending administrative case against a public officer can continue even if he has retired,
B
because the penalties of cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification for
e s
reemployment in the government service can still attach. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
l
Mallari, G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014)
b
R o
C. Effects of Exoneration on Preventive Suspension
ngovernment employee who was placed

aApayment a runder preventive suspension is not entitled to
h B
of back wages in case of exoneration. (Barcelona v. Lim, 743 SCRA 587)
C D. Right to Appeal e s
b l
case. She appealed R
o
The Light Rail Transit Authority dismissed Aurora Soldao as a result of an administrative
to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission found her
guilty of simplen r for six months. The Light
a appealed. a
dishonesty and reduced the penalty to suspension
h
Rail Transit Authority
B
HELD:C Section 49(1) of the Administrative Codes
e provides that the party adversely affected
loffice prosecuting
purposes of appeal provided that it is the
o b
by the decision has the right to appeal. A government party is a party adversely affected for
the case. (Light Rail Transit
Authority v. Soldao, 726 SCRA 141)
R
V. Fringe Benefits an B a r
C h s
A. Cost of Living Allowance
l e
Pursuant to the Salary Standardization Law, the cost ofb living allowance has been deemed
integrated into the standard salaries. (Land Bank of
R o the Philippines v. Naval, 720 SCRA
n r
796)
a B a
B. Refund in Case of Disallowance
C h s
It is within the authority of the constitutional
l enecessary
bodies granted fiscal autonomy provide
additional allowances and benefits to its officials and employees deemed
b and
Ro
relevant in the performance of their duties. Nonetheless, the expenditures were still
audited by the Commission.
a n may keep them if there is a r

General officers who received allowances which were disallowed
h B
no finding of bad faith. However, officers who approved
required to refund the awards received when they are C in bad
the disallowed allowances are
faith or grossly negligent.
e s
The amount given to Erlinda Baltazar is exorbitant. She and the approving officersbare
l
solidarity liable to refund the amount disallowed by the Commission on Audit.
Ro
The officers and employees who received the disallowed benefits are presumed
a n to have
h
acted in good faith. The Commission on Audit failed to show bad faith on the part of the
C
ar
approving officers. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812,
January 13, 2015) B
e s
b l
The Commission on Audit disallowed the grant by the management of the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority of a healthcare maintenance allowance to all
R o
officers and employees and ordered the responsible officers to pay for the disallowed
an r
amount.
Ba
Ch
HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 33 issued by the Civil Service Commission provided for
s
hospitalization services and annual mental medical-physical examination. The giving of
e
b l
health care maintenance allowance was not included. The personnel who received the
allowance in good faith need not reimburse them. The officials who granted the allowance
R o
in good faith need not reimburse the government. (Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 96418, February 10, 2015)
an B a r
Ch
ELECTION LAW
I. Disqualification
e s
b l as candidate for governor was filed on the
R
ground that he distributed Orange Cards,o which could be used in any public hospital in
A petition to disqualify Emilio Ramon Ejercito
a
he exceeded the allowable maximum n election expenses that a candidatear
the province for medical services, because they were intended to influence voters, and that
for governor could
h
incur. Emilio Ramon Ejercito argued that the petition was B
moot, because he had been
proclaimed elected. C
e s
HELD: The purpose of a disqualification case is to prevent b la candidate from running or, if
Commission on Elections, as required by the FairR
elected, from serving. The reports and logo submitted o by broadcast stations to the
n r
Election Act, showed that Emilio Ramon
Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure
a a
limit, this is a ground for disqualification
Bby his
h
under Section 68 and an offense under Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
s
contributors, supporters and donors.C
law regulates not only the expenses of the candidate but also those contributed
l
(Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 742e SCRA 210)
b
o Her certificate
Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed a certificate of candidacy for city councilor.
of candidacy stated that she would be 20 years old on electionR day. The Commission on
Election summoned her for a hearing regarding her age. Kimberly
to withdraw her certificate of candidacy as a substitutea
n Da Silva Cerafica decided a r
h
candidate. The Commission on
B
her substitution by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica. C
Elections cancelled the certificates of candidacy of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica and denied
e s
b l
certificates of candidacy filed in due form. Since Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica was ano
HELD: It is the ministerial duty of the Commission on Elections to give due course to
R official
a n to her
candidate, she was validly substituted. She validly withdrew here certificate of candidacy
after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Olivia Da Silva Cerafica belonged
h
political party and filed her certificate of candidacy not later than mid-day of election day. If
C
ar
B
Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica made a misrepresentation as to her age, her eligibility may be
s
questioned only through a petition to deny due course or to cancel her certificate of
e
l
candidacy. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, 743 SCRA 426)
b
o
II. Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
R
an r
A. Absence of Basis
a
Bwere opposing candidates for governor of Camarines
h s certificate of candidacy that his nickname was L-Ray Jr.
Luis Villafuerte and Miguel Villafuerte
C -Migz. Luis Villafuerte filedlaepetition to cancel his certificate of candidacy because of
Sur. Miguel Villafuerte stated in his
o
material misrepresentation. b
R to cancel a certificate of candidacy, the material misrepresentation
must involve hisn rwhich he seeks election, such as
HELD: For the petition
a a
eligibility or qualifications for the office to
B on Elections,
C h
residence, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification.
s
The nickname is not a
e
qualification for public office. (Villafuerte v. Commission 717 SCRA 312)
John Henry Osmea filed his certificate b of lcandidacy for the position of mayor of Toledo
City. A petition to deny due courseo and to cancel his certificate of candidacy and to
R
disqualify him was filed. It was alleged that he falsely declared under oath that he had been
an years before the election. Bar

a resident of Toledo City for fifteen
C
HELD: John Henry Osmea hsufficiently established his residencesin Toledo City. In April 24,
2006, he applied for the transfer of his voters registration
l e record to Toledo City. He
served as his residence since 2004. He acquired another

o b parcel of land in Toledo City in
purchased a parcel of land in Toledo City in 1995 and constructed an improvement, which
R
December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Toledo City in 2011. (Jalover v.
Osmea. 730 SCRA 267)
a n a r
h B
s
B. Existence of Basis
C e Tawi-Tawi.
Gamal Hayudini filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of South Ubian,
b l
the ground of false representation, because he was actually residingo
Mustapha Omar filed a petition to deny due course or cancel his certificate of candidacy on
R in Zamboanga City.
Gamal Hayudini filed a petition for inclusion in the list ofn r
a voters in South Ubian. The
B a
C
dismissed the petition of Mustapha Omar for insufficiency h
Municipal Circuit Trial Court granted it. On the same day, the Commission on Elections
of evidence. s
l e
The decision ordering the exclusion of the name of Gamal Hayudini from the list of voters
was appealed to the Regional Trial Court and reversed. Mustapha Omar filedo
b
in the
Commission on Elections a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Gamal R Hayudini.
Meanwhile, he appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court
a n of Appeals.
h
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
C
ar
B
e s
b
Gamal Hayudinil was proclaimed elected as mayor. The Commission on Elections issued a
Ro but it was denied.
resolution cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Gamal Hayudini. He filed a motion for
reconsideration,
n By virtue of the finality of the decision
aHELD: a r deleting the name of Gamal Hayudini from
h B to run for public office. Since he was never a
candidate, the votes cast forshim are stray. Salmo Omar, who got the highest number
the list of voters, he was rendered ineligible
C valid ecandidates, was properly proclaimed as the duly elected
of votes among the qualified l
b on Elections, 723 SCRA 223)
o
mayor. (Hayudini v. Commission
R
n
III. Transfer of Employees
a a r
On May 28, 2010, Mayor Hernando Biron issued anB
C h s
order detailing Elsie Causing, the civil
e Code because he transferred or detailed

registrar, at his office. Elsie Causing filed a complaint against Mayor Hernando Biron for
her to another office during the election l

violation of Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Election
b period without the authorization from the
Commission on Elections.
R o
HELD: Transfer and detail have
anbeen a
defined as movement from one agency
B
r Her tooffice
another.
transferred physically ah
The movement of Elsie Cansing did not involve a transfer or detail. was
C s her salaries as municipal

few steps away from her old office. There was a mere change of
e
l
office location. She continued performing her tasks and receiving
b
registrar. (Causing v. Commission on Election, 734 SCRA 495)
oInsurance Corporation, reassigned
Rey Aquino, the president of the Philippine Health
R
Commission on Elections. The Commission a
n
several officers and employees during the election period without the prior consent of the
a r
on Election filed a case against him for violation
h B
s
of Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Elections Code.
C
HELD: Transfer includes reassignment, because the terms transfer l e detail are
and
Aquino completed the cast of causing the reassignment of theo

modified by the terms whatever. The term whatever means anything b at all. Rey
employees before the start of the election period. He cannot be R

affected officers and
a
Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Election Code. (Aquino v. Commissionn on Elections, G.R. No.
held liable for violation of
a r
211789, March 12, 2015)
h B
C e s
b l
Ro
an
C h

Politicallaw Jimenez 2016

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

vs. Commissioner of InternalsRevenue, G. R. No. 193407, January 14,

n for civic efficiency and r

HELD:C The Constitution affords protection to s

n Inc. vs. Professional RegulatoryaBoard r of Real Estate Service, 715

o b state interest. (Imbong v.

Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146)

the request. Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation filed ao

and just compensation and was denied equal protection.

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of television advertisements and R

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ChCorporation owned all rights, including

R o and editions of Adobe Software. They were

Dangerous Drugs Act.

violated his right to privacy.a n Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655) ar

availed of by prepaid or post-paid accounts. The international call using Global R

bypass the international gateway facilities of Philippine Long Distance

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Rohad methamphetamine hydrochloride in his possession.

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R for group identity. Free speech must be protected as a vehicle to

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R o and culture of cyberspace, such a law will

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radio stations argued that this constituted a prior restraint. n r

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n compelling state interest. The plea of r

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children refers to a future event and that is contingent. The burden

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