Republic of the Philippines go ahead.
go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision
rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. 248
and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the
offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the
offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48,
rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar
Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing
the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the
boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in
the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and
rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time,
appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being
chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on,
appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So
he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if
possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is
appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed,
hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun
on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza
I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer
and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant
manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos.
28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of
the following antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and
settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established
his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President
Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation
totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros
Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later
abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the
survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According to the
survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales
Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be distributed
among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for
disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August 14,
1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the
corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands
to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable
settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the
settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved the same and ordered the
formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then
consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The
settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated as resulting
from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of the
company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16,
1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966,
from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who,
to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred
to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house is not far from the site
of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion
thereof. He also transferred his store from his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the
store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the
rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other leaders
filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or
annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case,
appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease
an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of
Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although
the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could
be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was
considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in
which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February 21,
1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr.
Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no
alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher
pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on
December 31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month period,
the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting
bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the concrete
drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just
adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have the effect of shutting
off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to
the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four
strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was
awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the
window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a
crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was
commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The rest of the incident
is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with
him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-
appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them from
the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however,
that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal
liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11,
par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words:
"Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when
he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This
was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled. The verbal exchange
took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house
looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction
in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr.
Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant
testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr.
Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the
jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take that
firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however, that
the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they did the
fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons,
consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed
strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such
as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not
disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there
was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his
walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being done to his house,
compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is
finished. He therefore appealed to hiscompadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk
things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed
with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in
the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house
and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is no question, therefore, that
there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in
the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested
property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of
award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could
not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was
dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of
Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, between the same
parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent
repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the
dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul
the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that
the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was premised on the
ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-
plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No.
755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to
avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because
even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid
trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known
who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear up and determine
who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to
vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time,
instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right
to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's
house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things
over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated
by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and
imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist,
pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or
defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his
shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on
his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their
laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at
all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be
credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held
earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the
assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where
the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Caete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently
established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibaez, 37
years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which may be
summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn
near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South
Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to help
them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their
house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that
you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be
the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to believe as
they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n.,
Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to
kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42
SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung
to their (his) premeditated act; and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the
execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102
SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibaez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes
his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that
the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the
presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and
destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to
find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed.
Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of
access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was dismantled,
thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost
momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.
Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-
called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle
crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for
any man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any
qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of
the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e.,
to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree,
i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways (43
SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of
defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack
by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the community, being
married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him and
destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these
two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the killings. She was
dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim.
Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its
extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the
resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land
accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take
advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners,
were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency
as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional or arrests
mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment
at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on
April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage
caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act
5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant
to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES,
MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY
TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF
FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF
FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW
SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO
COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin Vasquez and Relova,
JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Plana, J., in the result.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property
Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429,
Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable
element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be invoked
when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of
property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must be
coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less made upon
the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression
which entitles appellant to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide
but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides, mitigated by the two
generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating
circumstance, maximum the sentence the appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the
indemnification to each group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years now since August 22,
1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property
Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429,
Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable
element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be invoked
when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of
property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must be
coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less made upon
the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression
which entitles appellant to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide
but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides, mitigated by the two
generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating
circumstance, maximum the sentence the appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the
indemnification to each group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years now since August 22,
1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice
mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if
they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant
and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher
and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and
to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his
person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed
a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the
courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30
of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership
of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is
accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be
respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to
the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since
he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to
kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.
249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the
offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering
that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect
pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has
already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person
defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013
SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the
August 2 7, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case No. 16946,
finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its
November 29, 2007 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the
Sandiganbayan which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a public
officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in the performance of his
official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting
upon him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of the visitors (Duran); Gerry
Avenido(Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and Dr. Ruben Escueta, the physician
who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus Avenido (Jesus).
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companion-members of the
Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo; and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad,
resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital.
The Version of the Prosecution
On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie
de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus. They
started drinking at 8:30 oclock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors only at around 11:00 oclock
after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular
accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an
M-16 armalite rifle.4
Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the terrace. After
glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace, Duran focused his attention back to the
table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the table. Right after the shooting, he
looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was no longer in sight.5
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter, Duran,
Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and children.
Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him.6
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took place, anxiously
waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then attending to his problem
regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation with his father, who later
joined their visitors at the terrace.7
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some members of the
CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his father talking to each other from a
distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right shoulder. Flores
continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt to have
lost his father.8
Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when she saw Flores,
from their window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the terrace, her husband was already
lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she and her children rushed him to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.9
As a consequence of her husbands untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified that Jesus had an
average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) before he died at the age of forty-one (41).
He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual damages consisting of lawyers fees
in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for every hearing,
and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00) for the funeral expenses.10
Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of
Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought to him.11
Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the different parts
of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the
left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the
tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim died of massive
intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.
The Version of the Defense
To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.
Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU and Civil
Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo Alquizar, upon the
instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, conducted a ronda in Barangay San Roque which
was celebrating the eve of its fiesta.13
At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them for
some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house. Flores asked the
group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the shooting practice for the fiesta
celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the house, he was stopped by Latayan and
handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the weapon
over his right shoulder, with its barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores that such
posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus.14
Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with four others.
In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as it was already
late at night and to save their shots for the following days fiesta procession. Flores claimed that despite his
polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay chairman, a person
in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who
appeared drunk, immediately stood up and approached
him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked it
directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus right hand, which
was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder.15
With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was able to instinctively
take hold of Jesus right hand, which was holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting
Flores left hand.16
Twice hit by bullets from Jesus magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores, with his life
and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling on his right shoulder
towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he
immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut groves, bleeding and utterly bewildered
over the unfortunate incident that just transpired between him and his cousin Jesus, he heard more gunshots.
Thus, he continued running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow. He proceeded to the
Mayors house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had happened. There, he found
his rondagroupmates.17
The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.
Decision of the Sandiganbayan
On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed decision18 finding Flores
guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores claim that the shooting was justified for
failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which resulted in his death. According to the Sandiganbayan,
there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have no ill motive to
falsely testify against Flores. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the accused Simon A. Flores
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day
ofprision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido, another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00) as actual or compensatory damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration."20
In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap of
paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is considered pro
forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this Court has
becomeFINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the Sandiganbayan committed
reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores
raises the following
ISSUES
(I)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONERS
CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
(II)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING
AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
(III)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED22
The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere
technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and executory the
assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the
evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case as
the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate selfdefense on his part.
Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule 121 of
the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact, admitted
receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion which is the
intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is not necessary
as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. The motion shall be made in
writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the
adverse party.
xxxx
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in
writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should
be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be
set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the
rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time
and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the
requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a
motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for
the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."24
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was a
worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other members of the First Division who rendered the
assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying as they were not
present during the trial.25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that led to
wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction.
His contention is likewise devoid of merit.
"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took
over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the factual findings reached by him."26
"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three Justices each, is
a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the
concurrence of the required majority vote."27
In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or misinterpretation of
the material facts nor was the defense able to adduce evidence to establish that the factual findings were
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayans conclusion that Flores
shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on the ground.
Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense. According to
him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the entrance of Jesus terrace merely
advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the fiesta when Jesus approached him, drew a
magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was sudden, unexpected and instantaneous. The intent to
kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun directly at him. As he tried to parry Jesus hand, which was
holding the gun, the latter kept firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use the baby armalite he was
carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part as he merely
requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their shooting for the following day as it was already late at
night and the neighbors were already asleep.
In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of self-defense
interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses instead.
His argument deserves scant consideration.
The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In appeals to this Court,
only questions of law may be raised and not issues of fact. The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are, thus,
binding upon this Court.28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Sandiganbayan
that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of self-defense.
Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent." If the accused, however, admits killing the victim,
but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To escape liability, it now
becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of that
justifying circumstance.29
In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16
armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in
effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was legally
justified under the circumstances.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of
self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights
does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing
the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent dangernot
merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to ones life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense."32
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative value
of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility, to wit:
First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from a
distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting any
hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accuseds shoulder. On
the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried to make it appear
later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones located in that area
of his shoulder.
Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention anything
about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder at the time he
executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the preliminary investigation when it was crucial
to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for trial before finally
divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply stretches credulity.
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder, the
accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital. Such
valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during the
preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter lack of
interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate
against the veracity of his version of the incident.
Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such as a
bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area around
the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 oclock midnight when he was
allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were treated, the blood
would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even definitively shown to be
human blood.
Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at 11:00 oclock in the
evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very
possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses
themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused. Moreover, the
victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a policeman.1wphi1 In
addition, the latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore
finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot the accused at such close range if,
indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We find it much less acceptable to believe how
the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly
having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the armalite rifle
(M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience handling, while his right shoulder
was wounded and he was grappling with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted)
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores credibility and reliability, his story being contrary to
ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the
value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge
and is consistent with the experience of mankind."34
The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove that Flores was
shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan:
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the same is in the nature
of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbads testimony was a mere re-statement of what appeared as entries in the
hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he admitted to possess no personal knowledge. The photocopy of the
logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value since it was not established by the defense that such
evidence falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130, which pertain to the rules on the
admissibility of evidence.35 x x x
Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the same ceased to
exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the perceived threat to
Flores life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus abdomen and
buttocks.
Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim of self-
defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the different parts of his
body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left
hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip
of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta,
who performed the autopsy on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to
laceration of the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores claim that he merely acted in self-defense, his first
shot on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to
repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number
of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend
himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this regard that the location and presence of several
wounds on the body of the victim provide physical evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of self-
defense."37
"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original
aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original
aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed
when the aggressor was injured by the accused.39
The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about two to three
inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could not have taken place when accused and his
victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered through the medial portion of the victim's
buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the left hypogastric region
and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen. The respective trajectory of these wounds are
consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused
shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the ground. Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the
first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making him fall to the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that
unlawful aggression initially existed, the same had effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to
the ground. There was no more reason for the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and
continue shooting at the victim.40 (Emphasis in the original)
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of
the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.41 In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot wounds were not
necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter was already lying
flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
self-defense; elements. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the
concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts
in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances
concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.The most important among all the
elements is unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. Simon A. Flores v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
Self-defense; elements; burden of evidence is shifted to the accused. Generally, the burden lies upon the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he
was in fact innocent. If the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense,the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the
killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-
defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was
incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was legally justified under the circumstances. Simon A. Flores v.
People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
Self-Defense; elements; number of gunshot wounds on victim negative unlawful aggression. In this case, Flores
failed to discharge his burden. The Supreme Court agreed with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative value of evidence on record. As noted by the Sandiganbayan, the
defense evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as
to its credibility. Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged
by Jesus, the same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that
point, the perceived threat to Flores life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more
bullets on Jesus abdomen and buttocks. Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon
Jesus further negate the claim of self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4)
gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy
on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver. If there was
any truth to Flores claim that he merely acted in self-defense, his first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already
caused the latter to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the
latter. But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim, the Supreme Court found it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own
life. Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109614-15. March 29, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRONICO GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO, defendants-
appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The instant appeal seeks the reversal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 43, rendered on April 20, 1992, in Criminal Cases Nos. 428 and 6307 finding both appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The facts of the case as established by the evidence for the prosecution are faithfully summarized in the
Peoples brief, to wit:
Around 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his fifteen year old son Romeo
Catorse arrived at the house (the house is composed of two storeys) of appellant Adronico Gregorio at Sitio
Bug-as, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the wake of the latters grandson (TSN March
24, 1987, pp. 3-4).
When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake. Jovito Nicavera, Marcelo Lo
and Adronico were conversing downstairs while upstairs, some were playing pusoy (russian poker), among
them were Jerry Nicavera, Renato Calabas, Tunggak, (son of Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio (brother and co-
appellant of Adronico). Kibitzing and at times betting in the game were John Villarosa, Remolito Calabas,
Carmelo Alubaga and Crispin Calalas (I.D., pp. 5;TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 12-13).
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their
possession for safekeeping so as to avoid trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos Catorse handed over his
samurai, John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to Adronico (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 16-
19; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 22-23).
Around 1:00 oclock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the game of pusoy was still in progress, appellant
Ricardo, in a very loud voice, reprimanded Tunggak from (sic) peeping at the cards of other players. In
response, Tunggak stood up and also in a very loud voice ordered the game stopped (TSN, May 30, 1989,
pp. 25-27; TSN, November 14, 1987, pp. 45-50).
Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered Tunggak downstairs and right there and then Adronico scolded
and boxed him (Tunggak) several times (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 27-30; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 51-55).
While Adronico was severely beating Tunggak, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from further
hurting his son so as not to put him to shame before the crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying the matter
between the father and son when suddenly appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind with a
samurai (the same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and thereafter hacked and stabbed him several
times more in different parts of his body: Right after Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico, for his part, repeatedly
hacked the victim with a bolo. (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 30-31; November 14, 1989, pp. 57-65).
Terrified, Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house. Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out of
the house but Adronico hacked him instead with a bolo hitting his left shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to help his
uncle Jovito but Ricardo, with the same samurai used against Carlos hacked him on his forearm. Adronico
immediately followed and using a bolo hacked Marcelo on the nape. Although wounded, Marcelo was able to
run out of the house but Adronico ran after and overtook him. Adronico then hacked him again. When Ricardo
followed the two, the visitors attending the wake scampered out of the house (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 44-56;
TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 66-77).
Later, Romeo Catorse together with his sister and younger brother returned to the house of Adronico where
they found their father lying prostrate and dead. Nobody was around. Later on, the family of Jovito Nicavera
arrived and brought the latter to a hospital in Bacolod (TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 8-10).
Around 9:00 oclock of the same morning of May 8, 1987, police authorities arrived at Adronicos place to
investigate the killing incident. The bodies of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo were found inside the house and
at the yard of Adronico, respectively (TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 76-78). The investigation revealed that
appellants Adronico and Ricardo fled to Sitio Anangge, Barangay Buenavista, Murcia, Negros Occidental, about
4 kilometers away from the situs of the crime. The authorities pursued and succeeded in apprehending the
appellants. Appellants were thereafter brought and investigated at Murcia Police Headquarters (TSN, April 5,
1991, pp. 9-10).
The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims reveals that Carlos Catorse sustained twelve hack
and four stab wounds while Marcelo Lo sustained six hack wounds. Both victims died of cardio respiratory
arrest due to multiple wounds (Exhibits A, B, C & D).[1]
Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed against Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo
Gregorio before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch LXII, Bago City. The indictment, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 428, reads:
That on or about the 8th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
samurai and a bolo, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and hack one, CARLOS CATORSE y APELYEDO, thereby inflicting multiple stab and hack wounds upon the
body of the latter, which caused the death of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty.[3]
Another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo was instituted against Adronico Gregorio, this time,
before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 43, Bacolod City. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
6307, the accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one MARCELO LO Y NICA VERA, thereby inflicting multiple
injuries upon the body of the latter which caused the death of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, Adronico Gregorio entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.[5]
Later, the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 43.
On April 20, 1992 as aforestated, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds the two (2) accused Adronico Gregorio and
Ricardo Gregorio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of having committed the crime of Murder in
Crim. Case No. 428 and hereby sentences each to life imprisonment and to solidarily indemnify the heirs of
Carlos Catorse the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In Crim. Case No. 6307 (2292) (sic) the Court finds the same Adronico Gregorio GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of having committed Murder and hereby sentences him to another life imprisonment and to indemnify
the heirs of Marcelo Lo the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Further, the two (2) accused shall be credited with the full term of their preventive confinement.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
In their brief, appellants raised the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION
AND IN DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE CASE
AT BAR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER.[7]
However, before the Office of the Solicitor General could file its Appellees Brief, appellant Ricardo Gregorio
died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon is
extinguished.[8] Evidently, this appeal will proceed only with respect to appellant Adronico Gregorio.
After a careful perusal and evaluation of the case, this court is not inclined to disturb the findings and
conclusion of the court below, there being no cogent reason therefor. For, aside from the well-settled rule that
the factual findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
assess their credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect,[9] there appears to be no strong reason to
depart from the said doctrine since the decision is fully supported by the evidence on record.
Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability. However,
the trial court, skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same, reasoning that appellant failed to establish self-defense
by clear and convincing evidence. We agree. In numerous cases decided by this Court, the guiding jurisprudential
principle has always been that when an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden
of proof is shifted to him to prove the elements of that claim; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction
is inescapable.[10] Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
the prosecution.[11] Having admitted the killing, appellant has to justify his taking of a life by the exacting
standards of the law.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[12]
In the case at bench, appellants claim of self-defense must fail. For one, the physical evidence tells us a
different story. Dr. Emmanuel Boado, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of
Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo, submitted the following post-mortem reports and attested to the veracity and
authenticity of the same, thus:
Cadaver of Carlos Catorse:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Hack wound 5 inches bong, left temporal going backward with chip fractured (sic) of the skull.
2. Hack wound 8 inches long, from the base of the left Nose, going backward below the left ear.
3. Hack wound 7 inches long, neck left side going backward with complete chip fractured (sic) of the
fourth vertebrae cutting blood vessels.
4. Stab wound 2 inches wide, 4 inches deep anterior abdomen, below the 10th rib, left side.
5. Stab wound 1 1/2 inches wide, 4 inches deep at the side of the navel left.
6. Hack wound, base of the palm, 3 inches bong posterior side, cutting bones.
7. Hack wound, cutting left small finger.
8. Hack wound, 3 inches bong upper 3rd right forearm running anteroposteriorly, chip fracture of
bones.
9. Hack wound left shoulder back 4 inches bong going downward with chip fracture of the shoulder
joint.
10. Hack wound 5 inches long posteriorly left joint with chip fracture of the bones.
 11. Hack wound 3 inches long posteriorly forearm below the elbow joint chip fracture of the bones.
12. Hack wound 3 inches long middle 3rd forearm, posterior surface, with chip fracture of the bones.
13. Stab wound 4 inches wide left back level of the 11th embracio rib, back side through and through
of the level of 12th rib right.
14. Hack wound 2 1/2 inches bong with chip fracture of the 11th lobar vertebrae.
15. Hack wound middle right arm posterior side 4 inches long with chip fracture of bone.
16. Stab wound 1 inch wide hitting the vertebral bones, 5th thoracic vertebrae.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound, liver, large intestine, small intestine
2. Massive abdominal bleeding.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to Multiple hack and Stab wounds.[13]
Cadaver of Marcelo Lo:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Hack wound 6 inches long left temporal area going occiput, chip fracture skull.
2. Hack wound, left face going back ward base of the skull, brain tissue coming out, with chip fracture
of the skull.
3. Hack wound, right 4 inches long right back cutting the scapular bones.
4. Hack wound 6 inches long, with chip fracture of the Vertebrae bones.
5. Hack wound 4 inches long cutting the 1st thoracic rib; scapular bones.
6. Hack wound 4 inches long, below the left scapular bones, cutting ribs.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Cerebral Hemorrhage, Massive
2. Thoracic Hemorrhage, Massive
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to multiple hack wounds.[14]
If Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo merely to defend themselves,
it certainly defies reason why they had to inflict sixteen stab wounds on Carlos and six on Marcelo. The location,
number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victims belie the appellants contention that they acted in self-
defense.[15] The rube is settled that the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on a victim negate an accuseds
claim of self-defense.[16]
The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of accused Ricardo Gregorio and
appellant Adronico Gregorio. Ricardo Gregorio testified that at around 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 7, 1986,
Carlos Catorse suddenly kicked, from the outside, the front door of the house of Adronico, then ran towards
Eduardo (nephew of Ricardo) and boxed the latter; that he intervened to pacify Carlos but the latter drew his
samurai and attempted to attack him and Eduardo; that he grappled for possession of the samurai and was able
to turn its point back to Carlos who was hit in the stomach and then fell on the ground; and thereafter he left
the victim, then went home.[17]
On his part, appellant Adronico Gregorio declared that at the same time his son, Eduardo, and brother,
Ricardo, were being attacked by Carlos, he was in the kitchen preparing food for the people attending the wake
of his grandson; that suddenly Marcelo Lo and Jovito Nicavera destroyed the bamboo walls of his kitchen,
entered threat and assaulted him; that Marcelo attacked him with a bob but he was able to parry the latters
hand and the bolo instead landed and struck the wooden rail of the kitchen sink; that Jovito in turn pointed a
gun at him but without wasting time, he dislodged the bolo from the wooden rail of the sink and slashed Jovitos
hand; that because of the injury sustained, Jovito dropped the gun and ran out of the house; that he turned to
Marcelo and struck him with a bolo until the latter fell outside of the kitchen; and that he never knew what
happened next to Marcelo until the following morning when he learned that the latter died.[18]
Not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are innately false and fatuous.
By making said allegations, appellant and deceased accused would want to impress upon this Court that
both were able to inflict only a single stab wound on deceased Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo. Curiously,
however, none of their empty claims could explain the physical evidence and findings of the autopsy reports that
Carlos Catorse sustained a total of 16 hack and stab wounds while Marcelo Lo, 6 mortal hack
wounds.[19]Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were unanimous in their declaration that it was the appellant
and his brother Ricardo who started the skirmish. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Carlos Catorse
who only wanted to help pacify Adronico nor on Marcelo Los part, who was only trying to flee from the melee
when he was attacked and hacked to death. Likewise extant from the records is the absence of any act on the
part of the victims giving sufficient provocation for the attack.
Likewise telling is the fact that appellant and his brother fled from their homes soon after the incident
instead of reporting the matter to the police. Their flight negates self-defense and indicates guilt.[20] As we have
repeatedly held, flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience; the same strongly indicates a guilty mind and
betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.[21]
Appellant also challenges the court a quos finding that there was conspiracy between him and his brother
Ricardo. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.[22] However, direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy,[23] as it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused.[24] Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and regardless of the
fact, the perpetrators will be liable as principals.[25]
In the case at bench, although there is no proof as to a previous agreement by the assailants to commit
the crime charged, conspiracy is evident from the manner of its perpetration.[26] After Ricardo lunged at Carlos
with a samurai from behind several times, Adronico attacked him in turn with a bolo. Likewise, appellants
successively hacked Marcelo using the weapons they used against Carlos. The incident happened in split seconds,
so to speak. Under the circumstances, it is evident that Adronico and Ricardo acted in unison and cooperated
with each other towards the accomplishment of a common felonious objective. In People v. Regalario[27] cited
inPeople v. Lopez,[28] we held:
An indicium of conspiracy is when the acts of the accused are aimed at the same object, one performing
one part and another performing another part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same
object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The evidence need not
establish the actual agreement which shows the pre-conceived plan, motive, interest, or purpose in the
commission of the crime; conspiracy is shown by the coordinated acts of the assailants.[29]
Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Adronico and Ricardo, and it was not necessary to prove
a previous agreement to commit the crime since from their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in concert in
the pursuit of their unlawful design or common goal which was to kill the victims.[30]
 We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may be appreciated As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones, and in the concurring opinion of
against the appellants. Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua, is not the
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[31] In this case, it was expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.[33]
clearly established that Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind, and repeatedly hacked him in different Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court and pursuant to People v. Sison,[34] the civil
parts of his body, with a samurai. As Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico followed suit, repeatedly hacking the indemnity for the death of a victim is increased to P50,000.00. Consequently, the heirs of Carlos Catorse and
victim with a bolo. Though the assault upon Marcelo was preceded by appellants assault upon Carlos and Jovito, Marcelo Lo are entitled to P50,000.00 each.
the incident happened in a span of seconds only. Terrified by what he witnessed, Jovito Nicavera tried to run out WHEREFORE, except for the modification that appellant Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty
of the house but Adronico hacked him instead. Instinctively, Marcelo Lo came to help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000.00 each,
followed by Adronico hacked him using the same samurai and bob they used against Carlos.Defenseless and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. As aforestated, the death of Ricardo Gregorio
severely wounded Marcelo tried to run but Adronico finished him off by more mortal hacks. From all indications, extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising from said crime.
the mode of attack adopted by the appellant and his brother qualifies the killing to murder as the same rendered
the victims who were unarmed at that time defenseless and helpless, without any opportunity to defend SO ORDERED.
themselves from their assailants unreasonable and unexpected assault. The attack was sudden and was specially Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
employed by the assailants to insure the execution of the said crime without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the victims might make.
Indeed, the use against Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo of the samurai and bolo, both deadly weapons, the
People vs Gregorio
traitorous manner in which they were assaulted, and the number of wounds inflicted on them, all demonstrate
G.R. Nos. 109614-15
a deliberate, determined assault with intent to kill. Appellant is guilty of murder.
March 29, 1996
Some last notes. The fallo of the assailed decision sentences the appellant to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P30.000.00 each. The
Facts:
correct penalty, however, should be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. As we have held time and again, life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are different and distinct from
On the eve of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his 15-year old son Romeo Catorse, arrived at the
each other. In People v. Ruelan,[32] we outlined the distinction thusly:
two-storey house of appellant Adronico Gregorio, at Sitio Bug-as, Brgy. Sta. Cruz in Murcia, Negros Occidental,
As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of life
to attend the wake of the latters grandson.
imprisonment for the crime of murder. Evidently, the said court failed to appreciate the substantial difference
between Reclusion Perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and Life Imprisonment when imposed as a penalty
When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake. Downstairs, Adronico
by special law. These two penalties are different and distinct from each other. Hence, we would like to reiterate
Gregorio, et. al. were conversing, while upstairs, Tunggak (son of Adronico), Ricardo Gregorio (brother of
our admonition in the case of People v. Penillos, likewise quoted under Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92
Adronico), et. al. were playing pusoy (Russian poker).
amending Administrative Circular No. 6-92 dated October 12, 1992 re: the correct application of the penalties
of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty
possession for safekeeping to avoid any trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos handed over his samurai while
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Evidently, it considered the batter as the English translation of the
John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, surrendered their knives, to Adronico.
former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People v. Baguio, this
Court held:
However, around 1:00 a.m. of May 8, 1986, while playing the Russian poker, appellant Ricardo Gregorio in a
very loud voice, reprimanded Tunggak from peeping at the cards of other players, but the son of Adronico,
The Code does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that shouted also in a very loud voice and wanted the game be stopped. When his father overheard it, he
penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special summoned his son and boxed him several times.
laws. Reclusion perpetuaentails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is In order to pacify the father and son from further aggravation, Carlos Catorse intervened and begged Adronico
not the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for to stop hurting his son and not to put him into shame before the crowd. When suddenly, co-appellant Ricardo
another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration. stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind using the latters own samurai and thereafter hacked and stabbed him
several times more in different parts of his body. Right after the deceased fell to the ground, Adronico for his
part, repeatedly hacked the victim with bolo.
Romeo Catorse, son of the deceased, terrified of what he saw and ran out of the house. Later, when Romeo
returned to the house of Adronico Gregorio, he was joined by his sister and younger brothers, together they
found their father lying prostrate and dead. When the police authorities arrived to the scene of the crime, to
investigate, the appellants already fled to another Sitio, but authorities pursued and succeeded in
apprehending them.
Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty for murdering Carlos Catorse. Hence,
another criminal case was instituted against Adronico Gregorio for the murder of Marcelo Lo.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not appellants can invoke self-defense in their criminal liabilities?
Held:
Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability, however, the
trial court skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same. The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in
the testimonies of accused Ricardo Gregorio and co-appellant brother. Ricardos testimony affirmed that it was
Carlos Catorse who aggravated them initially, supported by Adronicos claim, that the deceased first attacked
his son and brother. The court held that not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but
are innately false and fatuous.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable;
and (3) that there was luck of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The trial court agree that such aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may be appreciated against the
appellants. Treachery exist when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risks to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Hence, before the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could file its Appellees Brief, appellant Ricardo
Gregorio died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely
thereon is extinguished. However, Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000 each, the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed in all respects. As aforestated, the death of Ricardo Gregorio extinguished both his criminal
and civil liability arising from said crime.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fil C. Veloso counsel de oficio for Luis B. Toring.
Joel P. Alino for Berdon and Berdin.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The appellants herein seek the reversal of the October 28, 1980 decision of the Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu
City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2170, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Luis B. Toring guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER by direct participation as principal; Diosdado Berdon as accomplice thereto; and Carmelo Berdin as
accessory after the fact.
Appreciating in favor of the accused Luis B. Toring the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the said
circumstance having been offset by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the accused Luis Toring should
be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of law.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances on the part of the accused Diosdado Berdon, the
said accused should as he is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law.
Appreciating in favor of the accused Carmelo Berdin, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
said accused being only 17 years of age, the accused Carmelo Berdin should be, as he is, sentenced to the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law.
The defendants shall jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased Samuel Augusto for actual and
compensatory damages in the sum of P15,000.00 and for moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The instrument of the crime, the knife, Exhibit "B", is confiscated in favor of the government.
Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED. 1
According to the prosecution, the antecedent facts are as follows:
In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last
canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As one of the
candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members of his family attended the affair.
Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like way of dancing
and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble. Its president, called the "alas" king, was Luis
Toring. The group was then outside the dancing area which was ringed by benches.
At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks having
been served the parents of the candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel Association which took charge of
the affair, Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's proclamation, he stepped out of the dancing area to
answer the call of nature.
At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon proceed to
a dark area while whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to Luis Toring, 2 who then
approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed
with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. 3 Upon seeing Felix running towards them, Luis Toring
pulled out the knife and, together with Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon, ran towards the dark. Felix tried
to chase the three but he was not able to catch them. He returned to where Samuel had slumped and helped
others in taking Samuel to the hospital.
According to Maria Catalina Sorono, who was six (6) meters away from Samuel and Luis when the assault
occurred, Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin were poised to deliver fist blows on Samuel just before Luis
Toring stabbed him. Diosdado gave the knife to Luis Toring. 4
As soon as she saw the stabbing of Samuel, Maria Catalina shouted for help. The three assailants ran towards
the direction of the fields. Jacinto Lobas and Mario Andog responded to her shouts and brought Samuel to the
Opon Emergency Hospital where he died on arrival. According to the necropsy report, 5 Samuel, who was
thirty years old, died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the abdomen. Said wound is
described in the report as follows:
Stab wound, with herniation of omental issues; elliptical, 3.5 cms. long, running vertically downward, edges
clean-cut, superior extremity rounded, inferior extremity sharp, located at the abdominal region, right anterior
aspect, 7.5 cms. to the right of anterior median line and 107.0 cms. above right heel, directed backward,
upward and medially, involving skin and the underlying soft tissues, penetrating right peritoneal cavity, incising
inferior vena cava, attaining an approximate depth of 15.0 cms.
The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle, was recovered from
the house of Luis Toring. According to Patrolman Pantaleon P. Amodia, the police found out during the
investigation that Luis Toring had left the weapon with "Camilo" Berdin. When the police confronted Berdin,
the latter led them to the house of Toring which Berdin entered. When he emerged from the house, Berdin
handed the weapon to the police. 6
An information for murder was filed against Toring. Subsequently, however, the information was amended to
include Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin as defendants. The three were charged therein with conspiracy
in killing Samuel Augusto in a treacherous manner. Berdon, it was alleged, "conveniently supplied the death
weapon" which Toring used in stabbing Samuel while Berdin allegedly concealed the weapon to prevent its
discovery by the police. 7 The crime was purportedly committed with the attendance of the generic
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime.
All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. At the trial, Luis Toring, alias "Lowe," testified that
he was not the president of the kwaknit gang. He went to the benefit dance in the company of Venir Ybaez,
Joel Escobia, Ely Amion, Abel Pongase, Abe Berdon, Genio Berdin and Alex Augusta. Toring and his group were
standing outside the dancing area when, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Samuel, a known tough guy
("maldito"), approached them and held Venir Ybanez by his collar. Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun
on the chin of Joel Escobia, 8 proceeded to another group who were also gangmates of Toring, and again, with
the barrel of his shotgun, hit Eli Amion's chest several times. 9
Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached Samuel from
the latter's right side and stabbed him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel. Toring then ran towards the
dark portion of the area and went home. There, he left the knife and proceeded to the hut by the fishpond of
one Roman. 10
Toring was sleeping in the hut with his older brother, Arsenio, when, at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning of
May 26, 1980, Edgar Augusto, the younger brother of Samuel, shot them. Arsenio was hit on the left leg and he
stayed two months in the hospital for the treatment of his wound. 11
At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, 1980, Toring surrendered to two Philippine Constabulary soldiers.
12 They brought him to the police of Lapu-lapu City on May 28, 1980. 13 When the police asked him about the
knife he used in stabbing Samuel, Toring told them to go to Carmelo Berdin because he was the only person
who knew where Toring hid it. 14 Asserting that he was the one who returned the knife to his own house,
Toring testified that Carmelo Berdin used to see him hide his weapons upstairs because Berdin was a frequent
visitor of his. 15
For his part, Carmelo, a 5 feet tall, asthmatic 17-year-old whom the court described as "lilliputian," admitted
that he witnessed the stabbing incident but he ran away with his group immediately after because he was
afraid he might be shot by Samuel. He was with Toring when the latter hid the still bloodied knife under a trunk
in Toring's house. He was familiar with the hiding place of the knife because Toring showed it to him and there
were times when he would get the knife there upon Toring's request. Carmelo corroborated Toring's testimony
that on that fateful night, Toring carried the knife tucked at the back of his waistline. 16
In court, Toring testified that he never saw Diosdado at the dance. 17 However, in his sworn statement dated
May 28, 1980 and marked as Exhibit D, Toring stated that he took the knife from Diosdado to stab Samuel.
Confronted with said statement, Diosdado said that when he asked Toring why he implicated him, Toring
allegedly replied that he "included" Diosdado because of the case the barangay brigade had filed against
Toring. 18
According to Diosdado, he did not attend the May 25 dance because of the trouble which erupted during the
dance the night before. He did not have anything to do with the stabbing of Samuel. He admitted, however,
that a week after the incident, his family went to barrio Andaliw Ronda, Cebu, for their yearly visit to his father-
in-law. He stayed there for fifteen days and would have stayed longer had not his mother informed him of the
subpoena addressed to him. 19
On October 28, 1980, a day after the last day of hearing, the lower court 20 rendered a decision discrediting
Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger pursuant to
Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court found that Toring was the "aggressor acting in
retaliation or revenge by reason of a running feud or long-standing grudge" between the kwaknit gang and the
group of Samuel, who, being the son of the barangay captain, was a "power to be reckoned with." It mentioned
the fact that a year before the incident in question, Toring was shot by Edgar Augusto (Samuel's brother) and
hence, in his desire to avenge himself, Toring, "needed but a little excuse to do away with the object of his
hatred. 21
The lower court could not believe that Samuel brought along his shotgun to the dance because he was "not
reputed to be a public official or functionary entitled to possess a firearm." Otherwise, the police and the
barangay tanod would have arrested him. The court surmised that if Samuel really carried a shotgun, he
certainly must have had a permit or license to possess the same.
It noted that while Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion),
prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of
his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in appreciating the justifying
circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the identity of the stranger
defended by the accused." 22
The lower court, however, ruled out the existence of conspiracy among the three accused on the ground that
there was no proof on what they were whispering about when Felix saw them. Accordingly, it held that the
accused have individual or separate liabilities for the killing of Samuel: Toring, as a principal, Diosdado Berdon
as an accomplice by his act of giving Toring the knife, and Carmelo Berdin as an accessory for concealing the
weapon. It considered treachery as the qualifying circumstance to the killing, found no proof as to allegation of
evident premeditation but appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. It meted the accused the
penalties mentioned above.
All three accused appealed.
Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in
defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia. Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides that no criminal
liability is incurred by anyone "who acts in defense of ... his relatives ... by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are
present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one
making defense had no part therein." The first and second requisites referred to are enumerated in paragraph
(b) in the same article on selfdefense as: (a) unlawful aggression, and (b) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Joel Escobia, whose chin was hit with the butt of Samuel's shotgun, is the first cousin of Toring their fathers
being brothers, 23 although no explanation appears on record why they have different surnames. At any rate,
this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in this case on the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of Toring that Samuel was, at
the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group must be proven.
Understandably, no prosecution witness attested that they saw Samuel with a firearm. The prosecution even
recalled to the witness stand Samuel's widow who asserted that her husband did not own any firearm. 24
Going along with the prosecution's evidence, the lower court arrived at the rather gratuitous conjecture that
Samuel could not have had a shotgun with him because no one without a permit would carry a firearm without
risking arrest by the police or the barangay tanod. At the same time, however, the lower court described
Samuel as the son of the barangay captain who "had the run of the place and had his compelling presence felt
by all and " sundry." 25
While matters dealing with the credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the lower
court's province, this Court has the power to determine whether in the performance of its functions, the lower
court overlooked certain matters which may have a substantial effect in the resolution of a case. 26 Defense
witness Joel Escobia was, besides Toring, the only witness whose sworn statement was taken by the police on
May 26, 1980, the day after the fatal assault on Samuel.
In his sworn statement, 27 Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him,
pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia and asked him, "Do you
like this, Dong?" to which Escobia replied, "No, Noy I do not like that." Samuel then placed the bullet in the
shotgun and was thus pointing it at Escobia when Toring came from behind Samuel and stabbed the latter.
Even on cross-examination at the trial, Escobia did not depart from his statement. In fact he added that Samuel
pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet. 28
There is no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression inasmuch as his sworn
statement 29 and testimony in court had not been successfully discredited by the prosecution which also failed
to prove that Joel had reason to prevaricate to favor Toring.
The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part
of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring
himself admitted in court 30 as well as in his sworn statement 31 that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber
revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was
impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on
his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive 32 because of a "running feud"
between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of the
instant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta
appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under the
circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness.
The lower court correctly considered the killing as murder in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The suddenness of the assault rendered Samuel helpless even to use his shotgun.
We also agree with the lower court that conspiracy and evident premeditation were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, nighttime cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There is no
proof that it was purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or prevent its discovery. 33 However,
Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion temporal maximum to
death, the imposable penalty is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium in view of the presence
of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of relative and voluntary surrender (Art. 64 [5]).
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be meted on Toring is prision correctional
maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as maximum penalty.
On the culpability of Diosdado Berdon, the Court holds that his defense of alibi cannot be sustained in the
absence of proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. 34 His house was only a kilometer away from the place where he supplied the knife to Toring. 35
That distance does not preclude the possibility that Diosdado aided Toring in the perpetration of the crime as it
could be negotiated in just a few minutes by merely walking. 36 Moreover, his alibi was uncorroborated as it
was founded only on his own testimony and what appears as a self-exonerating affidavit. 37
But what pins culpability on Diosdado were the testimonies of at least two prosecution witnesses who
positively identified him as the one who gave Toring the knife. Motive, therefore, has become immaterial in the
face of such positive identification 38 and hence, even if it were true that he was not a member of the kwaknit
gang, his participation in the killing has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Added to this is the fact that
Toring himself in his sworn statement before the police pointed to him as the source of the knife. 39 Verily,
Toting could not have implicated him because of the incomprehensible reason that a case had been filed
against Toring before the barangay brigade.
Pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as an accomplice by his previous act of supplying Toring the
death weapon, Diosdado Berdon should be meted the penalty of prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium which is the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal maximum to death, the
penalty prescribed for murder by Article 248 (Article 6 [3]). There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be in its medium period or reclusion temporal minimum (Article 64 [1]).
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from prision mayor minimum
while the maximum penalty should be within the period of reclusion temporal minimum.
With regards to Carmelo Berdin, his culpability as an accessory to the murder has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The fact that he knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that he concealed it to
prevent its discovery (Article 19 [2]). There simply is no proof to that effect. On the contrary, Luis Toring in his
sworn statement and testimony during the trial testified that after stabbing the victim, he ran away and went
to his house to hide the murder weapon. Being a close friend of Toring and a frequent visitor to the latter's
house, it is not impossible for Carmelo Berdin to know where Toring hid his knives. Significantly, Carmelo
readily acceded to the request of police officers to lead them to the place where Toring kept the knife. He
willingly retrieved it and surrendered it to the police, a behavior we find inconsistent with guilt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as principal in
the murder of Samuel Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
The lower court's decision is modified as follows:
(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional
maximum as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum as maximum;
(b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum;
(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of Samuel Augusto, and
(d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay the heirs of Samuel Augusto an
indemnity of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). Costs against appellants Toring and Berdon.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
https://api-qa.scribd.com/document/86277068/People-vs-Toring
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60159 November 6, 1989
P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Eugenio E. Mendoza and Wenceslao G. Laureta for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner, Fausto Andal, a member of the Batangas Integrated National Police, has appealed to this Court
the decision * of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2521 which found him guilty of the crime of Homicide
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P20,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
In his petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his plea of self-
defense, on the ground that the initial unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased after the petitioner
had disarmed him.
We find no merit in the petition for it raises only factual issues. The record of this case shows that the herein
petitioner, Fausto Andal, then a corporal in the Batangas Integrated National Police, whose duty shift was from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 12:00 o'clock midnight, was on patrol aboard a tricycle driven by Police Pfc.
Casiano Quinio in the evening of 25 September 1980. At about 7:00 o'clock that night, he went to the pier
located at Sta. Clara, Batangas City, to check on one of his men, Pfc. Maximo Macaraig, who was stationed
there, because the said Macaraig had failed to report to police headquarters for briefing.
Upon reaching the police checkpoint at the pier, and upon seeing Macaraig, petitioner asked Macaraig why he
did not pass by police headquarters for briefing before proceeding to his post. Macaraig replied that he did not
have to report to police headquarters since he already had his orders. Sensing trouble, Quinio drove away his
tricycle. Macaraig, however, followed them and told the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka." Petitioner kept
his cool and did not say anything. But, Quinio went to Macaraig to pacify him. Thereafter, petitioner and Quinio
went back to the poblacion of Batangas City.
At about 11:00 o'clock that night, petitioner and Quinio parked their vehicle in front of the Philbanking Building
at P. Burgos Street, Batangas City. Quinio alighted from the tricycle and joined Pat. Andres Perez and Pat. Pedro
Banaag who were seated on a bench. The petitioner also alighted from the tricycle and stood at the sidewalk
near the bench. After a few minutes, Macaraig arrived and went straight to the petitioner. He was furious this
time and demanded why the petitioner had embarrassed him in front of so many people. The petitioner denied
the charge and called Quinio to clear up matters with Macaraig. Quinio told Macaraig that the petitioner did
not utter defamatory words against him and asked him to forget the incident. ("Pasensiyahan na kayo, hindi
kayo magkakaiba.") Macaraig did not say anything. But, he returned to the petitioner and challenged him.
Quinio again tried to pacify Macaraig and brought him across the street. Still, Macaraig refused to be pacified
and went to the petitioner with a drawn gun in his hand.
Pointing the gun menacingly at the petitioner, Macaraig said: "Bumunot ka bumunot ka." Petitioner, however,
refused to fight, saying: "I cannot fight you because we are both policemen" Macaraig, nevertheless, fired his
gun pointblank at the petitioner, hitting the latter in the middle aspect, lower right knee. Petitioner then
lunged at Macaraig and they grappled for possession of the gun. Petitioner was able to wrest the gun from
Macaraig. Thereafter, two (2) successive shots were fired and Macaraig fell to the ground. He was brought to
the hospital but he was dead on arrival.
The factual issue hinges on what transpired after the petitioner had wrested the gun from the deceased until
the two (2) shots were fired, which caused the death of Macaraig. The findings of respondent court on this
factual issue are to this effect:
The pivotal question is: Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first aggression, i.e. when deceased
shot accused on his knee and the time accused resorted to force by way of firing the two shots at the
deceased? The facts unfolded indicate that there was. This is what happened after accused had grabbed the
gun: (1) He asked deceased, "Why did you fire at me?" (2) He even turned bis head towards his son and
instructed him just to stay in the jeep. (3) His son, Domingo Andal, challenged deceased to a fight "Sportsman
like." (4) Deceased moved backward 2 meters away from accused. (5) Pfc. Quinio even thought the trouble
was over as he started to get his tricycle. 1
The petitioner contends that after he had taken possession of' the gun from Macaraig, the latter tried to grab
the gun back and, in the scuffle, the gun went off twice, hitting the deceased. But, this claim was not given
credence by the respondent court which said:
The theory of the defense that the two shots were fired while accused and deceased were grappling for the
possession of the gun, is fictitious. When Pat. Perez heard the two shots, deceased was "more or less" two
meters from the accused (p 38, TSN sess. i.d.) This jibes with the testimony of Pat. Quinio that after accused
had wrested the gun from deceased, the latter "somewhat backout" (p. 76, TSN sess. i.d.) More important,
immediately after the two shots, accused was holding the gun with his right hand and as demonstrated in
Court, said "right hand stretched downward" (. p. 77, TSN sess. i.d.). This demonstration is given credence by
corroborative physical evidence. According to Dr. Luis Aclan who examined the body of deceased, the
trajectory of the bullet was downward (see Exh. "B-l") with the right armpit (No. 3) as the point of entrance and
the back of the body the point of exit (No. 5). The other slug had its point of entrance at No. 2 in Exhibit "B-l." 2
In its resolution, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision, the respondent court also
said:
It cannot be correctly held, to quote the words of accused in his motion, that 'it was precisely when the two
protagonists were grappling for the possession of the gun that the two shots were suddenly fired resulting to
the fatal wounding of the deceased'. This would be contrary to the testimony of Pat. Perez, a witness whose
credibility the defense does not impugn. According to Pat. Perez, deceased was 'more or less' two meters from
the accused when he heard two gun shots. Immediately after they were fired, this witness looked at the
direction where they came from. He saw accused holding a gun with his right hand stretched downward. Under
such scenario with a distance of two meters apart and the hand of accused holding the gun stretched
downward it is clear that deceased and accused were not grappling for the possession of the gun at the time
the two shots were fired . 3
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 7 of P.D. 1610 creating the
Sandiganbayan, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions of
law may be raised in the Supreme Court. 4
Moreover, well settled is the rule that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed, unless it has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which, if considered, mights affect the result of the case. Herein petitioner failed
to demonstrate that his case falls under the exception which would justify this Court to overturn the findings of
fact of the trial court, as heretofore cited and summarized thus
Stated briefly, the initial illegal aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he was disarmed by accused.
By then, accused a taller and bigger man than deceased had the upperhand. He was in possession of the gun of
deceased while the latter was unarmed. In fact, it was probably because of this circumstance that deceased
moved backward. Aside from accused, his son who dared to fight deceased was there, not to say Pat. Perez
and Quinio all under his supervision. Patently, there was no further threat to the life and limb of accused.
Absent the element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense complete (Art. II, par. 1) or incomplete
(Art. 13, par. 1, RPC). 5
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised. The primordial
requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real
danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case, there was no imminent and real danger to the life or limb
of the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had already been disarmed. As former Chief
Justice Aquino states in his book on Criminal Law:
In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the attack upon defendant be simultaneous with the killing,
or preceded the latter without an appreciable interval of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),
xxx xxx xxx
The harm caused by one person to another who offended or caused him injury, sometime after he suffered
such offense or such injury, does not constitute an act of self-defense, but an act of revenge. (Banzuela 31 Phil.
564). 6
In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (11) year of prision correccional, the respondent Court
held (which we here affirm):
In People vs. Oanis and Galanta (74 Phil. 257), the court set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty
and exercise of a right 7 may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acting [sic]
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or
office. If one is absent, accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right or office. 8
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident that accused was acting in the performance of his duty as supervisor of deceased and policemen
when the events that led to the shooting occurred. His attempt to discipline his men was resented by deceased
who was one of them. Such attitude did not diminish with the passage of hours; instead, deceased's rage
heightened to violence. He not merely uttered verbal insults to his superior but actually drew his gun and shot
him. Fortunately, the latter overpowered deceased. Unfortunately, accused did not stop at that point. He used
unnecessary violence against the defenseless person of the deceased. Thus, he exceeded the limits of his
authority. 9
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion to [sic] the court in lowering the penalty either by one or
two degrees whenever incomplete justifying circumstance exists in a given case like the case at bar. The
laudable patience of accused in not retaliating despite repeated insults by a subordinate, his length of service
in the government (since 1957), and most important, his obsession to inculcate discipline in his men, to OUR
mind, entitle accused to a two-degree reduction of the penalty prescribed by law. Our attitude is a signal to the
men in uniform that while WE condemn felonious violence WE support efforts to maintain discipline in the
service. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., concurs in the result.
https://www.scribd.com/document/103688887/Andal-v-Sandiganbayan
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No.
15993, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing
Checks Law.
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a
townhouse unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks,
each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the
townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the
effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans
and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14
unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was
ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal
of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its
possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated
checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying
bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of
petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against
petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910 reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and
issue in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a check 813514 drawn against Citibank, a duly established domestic
banking institution in the amount of P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990 in
payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that she/he did not have any funds in the
drawee bank of (sic) the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for
payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. did
not have any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails
and refused (sic) to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Francel Realty
Corporation in the amount aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded under the provisions
of the Civil Code.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-
91-25910, except for the dates, and check numbers[2] were consolidated and jointly tried.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial then proceeded.
The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:
"The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24, 1989, at the office of the private
complainant Francel Realty Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business) at
822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private complainant
Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among a number of other checks), each for P9,304.00
and drawn pay to the order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 with Citibank, to wit: Check No.
813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh. C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check No.
813518 dated February 28,1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516 dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No.
813517 dated January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30, 1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial
payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the house and lot subject of the written contract
executed and entered into by and between FRC as seller and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24,
1989 (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the house and lot was P451,700.00, of which
Francisco paid FRC in the sum of P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committing
himself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum already
includes interest on successive monthly balance) effective September 30, 1989 and on the 30th day of each
month thereafter until the stipulated purchase price is paid in full. The said six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H,
as earlier indicated were drawn, issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and in partial payment of
the said 48 equal monthly installments under their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September
1989, the Building Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject house -a residential townhouse -was issued
(Exh. N) and Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy of the subject house and lot.
"When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to the Citibank for payment on their respective
due dates, they were all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason: account closed as indicated in
the drawee bank's stamped notations on the face and back of each check; in fact, as indicated in the
corresponding record of Francisco's account no. 815515 with Citibank, said account already had a zero balance
as early as September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that FRC, first thru its executive vice
president and project manager and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and in writing, of
the checks' dishonor and demanded from him the payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not payor
make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K)..."[3]
The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as
follows:
"The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking possession and starting in the use and
occupancy of the subject townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various construction defects; that he
called the attention of FRC, thru its project manager, requesting that appropriate measures be forthwith
instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco
thus mailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum giving notice that effective June 1990, he
will cease and desist 'from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR
(P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of Unit No. 14 of FRC
Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction,
renovation and/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above and that should FRC 'persist in ignoring
my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) days from your receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the
[HLURB] for Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief from my obligation to pay my
monthly amortization to your good Office and allow me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB] pending
your completion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question'; that Francisco thru counsel wrote FRC, its president, and
its counsel notices/letters in sum to the effect that Francisco and all other complainants in the [HLURB] case
against FRC shall cease and desist from paying their monthly amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily
completes the construction of their units in accordance with the plans and specifications thereof as approved
by the [HLURB] and as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the dishonor of the subject checks was
a natural consequence of such suspension of payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or deposit all
other postdated checks issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3
thru 5); that Francisco and the other complainants filed the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision
was handed down therein and the same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8);
that as of the time of presentation of the subject checks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at
least P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco closed his account no.
845515 with Citibank conformably with the bank's customer service officer's advice to close his said account
instead of making a stop-payment order for each of his more than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's
possession at the time, so as to avoid the P600.00-penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject of a
stop-payment order."[4]
On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six
cases, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914
and Q-91-25915, the Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer
imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended
party, Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total sum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred
twenty four pesos (P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of commencement of these
actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until full payment thereof.
"SO ORDERED."[5]
Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
15993. But on February 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled:
"On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold that appellant has no basis to rely on the
provision of PD 957 to justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his checking account and the
notices sent by him to private complainant that he will stop paying his monthly amortizations."[6]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was denied per Resolution dated April
22, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
I
"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE
PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE
PROJECT.
III
"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS
UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV
"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT."[7]
The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
considering that he had cause to stop payment of the checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under
P.D. No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization payments, should the
subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project in accordance with duly-
approved plans and specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private
complainant's townhouse project were incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspend
payments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the
intent and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a worthless check are immaterial.[8] The gravamen of
the offense charged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. In his view, P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense against the charges against
him.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22),[9] an offense is committed when the following
elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[10]
In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's
issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment.
B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present.[11] But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or
contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports.[12] As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds."[13] But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to
the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption.
Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a
rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated
on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then.[14]
The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find
from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit
or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment.[15] On the contrary,
there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or
credit with Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not
for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank
charges each time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated checks in
private respondent's possession.[16] Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time said checks were issued on
August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficient when the
checks would be presented for encashment. He could not have foreseen that he would be advised by his own
bank in the future, to close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that came with each "stop
payment" order issued to prevent private respondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its possession.
What the prosecution has established is the closure of petitioner's checking account. But this does not suffice
to prove the second element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence of
knowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue
the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must
come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.[17]
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system,[18] it is difficult to see how
conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection
must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957.[19] A statute must be construed in
relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the legislature.[20]
Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and
when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.[21] More so, when it will mean the
contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such time as
the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer.[22] This exercise of a statutory right to
suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22
that petitioner is charged with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other units of
the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause
to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequent dishonor of the check...
without valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried
to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, in the
presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating the third element of the crime.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code,
but the Code is supplementary to such a law.[23] We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would
prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5)[24] of the Revised Penal Code,
petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges
against him.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges
against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sycip vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 12059
March 17, 2000
Facts:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation
(FRC), a townhouse unit in the latters project at Bacoor, Cavite. Upon execution of the contract to sell, as
required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48
monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained, to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the
townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notorial notices to the
effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans
and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and twelve (12)
out of fourteen (14) unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the
defect, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip
appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycips postdated checks in its
possession. Sycip sent stop payment orders to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated
checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying
bank charges every time he made a stop payment order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of
petitioners checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a complaint against
petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the accused is criminally liable of the B.P. Blg. 22?
(b) Whether or not the trial court erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law?
Held:
The trial court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced ordered to pay the offended party, FRC, as
and for actual damages with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of commencement of these actions,
until full payment thereof.
Dissastied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court erred in affirming the
decision of the lower court finding that the accused-appellant did not have any justifiable cause to stop or
otherwise prevent the payment of the subject checks by the drawee bank. The CA also erred that the accused-
appellant did not have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover the subject checks upon resentment for
payment thereof.
However, while B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system. It is difficult to see
how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financial system.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioners and other units of
the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner had a
valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. Hence, it said that offenses punished by a special law, like the
Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code, the Code is supplementary to such law. The
petitioner, Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is acquitted of the charges against him under B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 105002 July 17, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIARANGAN DANSAL, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Appellant claims that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Because he admits in effect the
commission of a punishable act, he must prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
Statement of the Case
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 1990 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 2 2 in Criminal Case No. 3141 convicting Appellant Diarangan Dansal of the crime of murder.
A complaint against appellant was filed on March 28, 1990 by INP 3 Station Commander Cabsaran C. Azis of
Matungao, Lanao del Norte. After preliminary investigation, Provincial Prosecutor IV Felix Fajardo charged
appellant with murder on September 7, 1990 in an Information which reads: 4
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1990, at Matungao, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another with 4 John Does, who are still at large and whose case is still pending in the lower court, with
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then &
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Abubacar Pagalamatan with a Garand
rifle thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter.
Upon arraignment, appellant with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded nor guilty. In due course, the trial
court rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 5
WHEREFORE, finding accused DIARANGAN DANSAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and he is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Abubakar Alamat, also known as Abubakar Pagalamatan the amount of P30,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Accused is entitled in full for the period of his detention.
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution sought to establish that on March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon, Matungao, Lanao del Norte,
appellant, armed with a Garand rifle like his four (4) other companions, fired the fatal shots which caused the
death of Abubakar Alamat, also known as "Abubakar Pangalamatan."
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Cosain Dowa, Dr. Marilyn Rico, Amina Oticol, Panda Antalo
and Timal Mosa. Their testimonies may be synthesized as follows:
Panda Antalo testified that at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 2, 1990 in Matungao, Lanao del Norte,
he and Timal Mosa were walking through a barrio road on their way to see Mayor Asis. 6 They saw Abubakar
Alamat, the victim, conversing with five (5) persons, one of whom was appellant. However, Antalo did not
recognize appellant's companions. When he and Mosa were five (5) meters away from the group, he heard
gunshots. He turned his head and noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's rifle and empty shells were
falling therefrom. The Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were pointed at the victim who was lying
on the ground face upwards. Seven (7) shots were fired. At that time Antalo was "immobile as he was
frightened." Thus, he was unable to run and take cover. After appellant and his companions ran towards the
coffee plantation, Antalo approached the victim and discovered that the latter had sustained seven (7) wounds.
7
Timal Mosa corroborated Antalo's account. He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were
on their way to Mayor Asis' house in Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other
persons talking to one another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When he turned to look, he noticed that
smoke was coming out of appellant's gun and that empty shells were dropping from it as appellant continued
to fire at the victim. Appellant's rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the ground. He heard seven
(7) gunshots. Appellant's companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not fired
because he did not notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take cover, as
he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim, appellant together with his four
companions fled towards Mayor Asis' coffee plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim, whom they
found already dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victim's wife. 8
Cosain Dowa, a Rural Sanitarium Inspector of the Health Office of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, testified that on
March 5, 1990 he prepared the victim's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A"). Although his main duty was to inspect
food establishments, construct barangay toilets, and assist in watershed constructions in the municipality, he
also helped the health officer in the preparation of death certificates. 9 When the body of the victim was
brought in, he observed gunshot wounds on his right foot, right thigh and right breast. The right knee was
distorted. There was a bullet hole at the victim's back which he believed was the entry point leading to the
gaping wound on the breast. 10
Dr. Marilyn Rico testified that she was the Rural Health Officer of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She signed
Abubakar Alamat's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A-2") 11 which was prepared by Dowa.
Amina Oticol, the widow of the victim, testified that, around 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, she was at their
house in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. Antalo and Mosa came and informed her that appellant killed
her husband. She had her husband's corpse brought to their house. Her husband was buried in Panta-on,
Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She incurred expenses for the burial in the amount of P15,000.00, but she asked
for P100,000.00 as compensation therefor. 12
Version of the Defense
Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March 1, 1990, he went to Tagolo-an,
Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister Saramina Dansal. At his sister's house, Mimbalawang Dorado, together
with his sons Macod, Talente and Talente's son Usop, all surnamed Dorado, seized appellant and brought him
to their house at Tongkol, Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte for reasons undisclosed to him. 13
The next day, March 2, 1990 at 7:00 a.m., they all left Tagolo-an for Matungao and arrived there at 11:00 a.m.
He was given a Garand rifle that was not serviceable. They proceeded to the victim's house at Panta-on,
Matungao, Lanao del Norte. They asked the victim to come out and then they fired their guns at him as soon as
he appeared. Appellant said that the Dorados killed the victim to avenge the killing of one of Mimbalawag's
sons named Ali by a certain "Salonga," the victim's paternal cousin.
After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns appellant and told him to run away. As he
was also related to the victim, the latter's mother being his paternal aunt, appellant wanted to shoot the
Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled with the Dorados. Thereafter, they rode a truck to
Karomatan. They left their guns at the house of Mimbalawag's sister in Bangko, near Matungao. 14 He went
home and afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an that the Dorados killed his cousin. He was subsequently
summoned and detained by the mayor of Panta-on. 15
Ruling of the Trial Court
As stated earlier, the court a quo convicted appellant of murder. It gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It disbelieved appellant in view of the absence of any improper motive on the
witnesses' part to testify wrongly against him.
The trial court noted that appellant and the four (4) Dorados were all armed with Garand rifles; that they
immediately fired their guns at the victim as he came out of his house; and that the victim was not in a position
to defend himself. From these facts, it concluded that the offenders consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by them to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose
with impunity. Thus, treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation were appreciated in the
conviction of the appellant.
Hence, this appeal.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant through the Public Attorney's Office ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
I
The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant's presence in the crime scene was under a
compulsion of an irresistable (sic) force.
II
The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.
16
In a nutshell, appellant invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion under an irresistible force under
paragraph 5, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Further, he argues that, if at all, he should be convicted only
of homicide because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and/or abuse of superior strength.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Preliminary Issue: Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Without specifically raising it as an error, appellant nonetheless laced his brief with attacks on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. Hence, we shall dispose of this matter.
Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses. 17 Such findings are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing
that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. 18 We have carefully scrutinized the records of this
case and the arguments of appellant, and we have found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court.
The two prosecution eyewitnesses positively and clearly identified appellant as the assailant who alone fired
his rifle at the victim. Their testimonies corroborated each other. Antalo testified thus: 19
PROSECUTOR BADELLES: a There was, sir.

q Now, in the afternoon of March 2, 1990, around 3:00 o'clock more or less, did (sic) you remember q What was that unusual thing that happened?
where were you?
a I heard a shound (sic) of gun burst sir.
a I can remember, sir.
q What did you do when you heard that gun burst?
q Where were you?
a I glanced at them and I noticed that the gun of Diarangan Dansal the tip of his gun has smoke and I
a I was on my way to see Mayor Asis that day, sir. also noticed empty shells falling down.

q While on your way to Mayor Asis, were you walking, riding or what? q Now how far were you when you saw Diarangan Dansal with the tip of his gun having smoke and the
empty shells falling down from his gun?
a I am walking with Timal, sir.
a About 5 meters, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q Now, how many burst all in all that you heard?
q While on your way to the house of Mayor Asis in that afternoon of March 2, 1990, with Timal, did
you notice anything along the road? a Seven burst, sir.

a Yes, there was. q Now you said that you saw empty shells falling down from the gun of Diarangan. Dansal, how many
empty shells that you saw that fell down from the gund (sic) of Diarangan Dansal?
PROSECUTOR BADELLES:
a I have not seen the others sir.
q What was that you noticed?
q By the way what was gun of Diarangan Dansal hold that time? (sic)
a While we are on our way to the Mayor's house, we saw Abubacar Alamat that he had 5 companions
and I recognized one of them. (Witness pointing to the accused Abubacar Pagalamatan [sic]). a Garand, sir.

q Now what were they doing when you saw them? q When you saw Dirangan (sic) Dansal holding a Garand and when you saw that tip of his gun smoking,
to was direct (sic) that his gun pointing?
a They were having conversation, sir.
a Pointing to Abubacar Pagalamatan, sir.
q Now, you said you saw them, now how far were you [from] the groups?
q Now how about Abubacar Pagalamatan at the time when you saw him holding a gun which was
a About 5 meters far, sir. pointed to Abubacar Pagalamatan with smoke coming out from the tip of the gun and the empty shells falling
down, what was the relative position of Abubacar Pangalamatan to Diarangan Dansal?
q Were they in front of you or at the back of you when you saw them first?
a Abubacar Pangalamat was lying down, his face upward, sir.
a At my back, sir.
q Now, after you heard those 7 burst of a gun, what did you do next?
q And then after that was there any unusual [event] that happened?
a I was immovilized (sic) sir.
 A They are at my back.
q How about Diarangan Dansal and his companions, what did he do after the 7 burst you heard?
Q Now, when you were about ten (10) meters from them, this ten (10) meter at your back were there
a They were running toward the coffee trees, sir. anything happened unusual (sic)?

Mosa corroborated Antalo's account in this wise: 20 xxx xxx xxx

PROS. BADELLES: A I heard gun shot and then I looked back.

Q On or about March 2, 1990 at 3:00 in the afternoon, can you remember where were you? Q Towards what direction after hearing the shot?

xxx xxx xxx A I looked back at them.

A We were then going to the house of Asis at Pasayano, Matungao. Q Who was (')them(') that you are referring to?

Q You used the word (')we(') who was your companion at that time? A Abubakar Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal.

A Panda Andalo. Q And when you look back at them what did you see?

Q While on your way to the house of Asis at Pasayano Matungao, along the way did you see any A I saw firearm of iarangan (sic) Dansal and the firearm was smoking and the empty shells were coming
person? out from the rifle.

xxx xxx xxx Q Towards what direction was the firearm (sic) of Diarangan Dansal pointed to when see him at that
time?
A I saw Diarangan Dansal and Abubakar Pangalamatan.
A The firearm was pointed to at Abubakar Pangalamatan.
Q They have compnaion (sic) if any at that time?
Q When you look back at them and saw Diarangan Dansal pointed his firearm to Abubakar
A Yes, sir, I did not recognize him. Pangalamatan what was then the position of Abubakar Pangalamatan?

Q How many of them? A When the firearm exploded, Abubakar Pangalamatan fell down.

A Four (4). xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx Q By the way how many shots that you hear (sic)?

Q Now waht (sic) was the position of these persons in relation to your position at the time you saw A Seven shots.
them?
Q The first shots that you hear was immediately, was prior to the looking back where Abubakar
A I was ten (10) meters from them and they are talking to each other. Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal were located (sic)?

Q Were they in front of you or back of you? A Yes, sir.

Q How about the second shots, when did you hear it?
A As I look back.
Q Did you see who fire (sic) the shot?
A Diarangan Dansal.
Q How did you know that it was Diarangan Dansal who fired the (sic) second shot?
A Because there was a smoke coming from his gun and the empty shells coming from his rifle.
Q In the second shot, was shooting (sic) by Diarangan Dansal to what direction was the firearm of
Diarangan Dansal point to? (sic)
A It was he who was still pointing his gun to Pangalamatan.
Q How about the third shot, when did you hear it?
A Well, I suspect that it was still at the gun of Diarangan Dansal and I heard that the same gunshot
coming from the guaran (sic) of Diarangan Dansal.
Q How did you know that the same shot was coming from the same barrel of Diarangan Dansal?
A Because smoke was coming out from the barrel of his gun.
Q And the 4th the 5th, the 6th and the seven (7) shots you hear it when?
A Still from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal.
Q How do you know that it was coming from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal?
A Because the smoke was still coming out from his gun and the empty shell coming from his gun.
Q How about the companion of Diarangan Dansal was they arm (sic) at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What firearm?
A Garand.
Q All the while when you hear the gunshots and all these six (6) successive gun shots and saw
Diarangan Dansal shot what did the companion of Diarangan Dansal do?
A They were around Diarangan Daniel holding their gun.
Q Did you notice if they fired their gun?
A No, sir.
Q How did you know that they did not shot their firearm?
A Because there was no smoke coming from their firearm.
Q After the 7th shot, do you know what the group of Drainage Daniel (sic) did?
A They Fled (sic).
Q Towards what direction?
A Towards the coffee plantation.
Both testimonies are straightforward, clear and consistent and they point categorically to appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
Furthermore, appellant has not alleged, much less proven, ill motive on the part of said witnesses to accuse
appellant of such a grave offense. In his brief, appellant admits that he cannot discern any reason for Antalo
and Mosa to testify falsely against him. 21 In this light, we cannot fault the court a quo for holding that: 22
The court is constrained to believe that the testimonies of witnesses Panda Antalo and Timal Mosa are credible
for failure by the defense to show that said witnesses were prejudiced against the accused or that said
witnesses had an existing improper motive in imputing to the accused the crime for which he is charged. When
there is no evidence showing that the witnesses are prejudiced against the accused, the witnesses would not
have imputed to the accused the commission of such a grave offense as that of murder if it was not true that
he was really guilty thereof (People vs. Ali, 29 SCRA 756). The absence of evidence as to an improper motive
actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that such
improper motive did not exist, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit (People vs. Saroah,
5 SCRA 385; People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910).
The defense assails the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Antalo and Mosa because their conduct during
the commission of the crime was allegedly contrary to common experience. Appellant finds it unlikely for said
eyewitnesses to keep on "standing despite the burst of gunfire as if . . . watching a movie in the making" and to
remain unmoved by the violent shooting incident. Ordinarily, a man in a similar situation would either take
cover or run for safety. Because the eyewitnesses did not so conduct themselves, appellant concludes that
their testimonies were preposterous and untrue.
We disagree. Antalo said that he was so scared of what was happening that he could not move, while Mosa
admitted that he "was afraid" but he did not take cover, as he knew both the appellant and the victim. Their
reactions, although the exact opposite of each other, are valid and probable. Taking cover or running away is
not the only natural reaction possible under the circumstances. There is no standard form of human behavioral
response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime
must react. 23
First Issue: Exempting Circumstance Insufficiently Proved
Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. He allegedly joined the armed
Dorados against his will because of fear for his own safety. He claims in his brief that the Dorados were
guarding him so closely that "escape was risky and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was, at the
moment, out of reach." 24
We cannot sustain such defense. A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. 25 He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will. 26
The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to
escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. 27 A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, 28 even fear of future injury, 29
is insufficient.
In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that the Dorados
physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any attempt to resist. He simply took
for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not allow them. No evidence was presented to establish
how, if at all, he was compelled to join the Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to
prove that the Dorados made a real and imminent threat on his life or climb sufficient to overcome his free
will.
Indeed, the Court finds no acceptable basis for appellant's assertion that he was compelled and intimidated by
the Dorados. Even without him, the Dorados could have easily carried out the crime, if such was their
intention. If we believe appellant's story, there was no need for the Dorados to mortally threaten appellant to
join them. Besides, forcing appellant, a relative of the victim, to join them complicated rather than facilitated
their criminal endeavor. With the appellant present among them, they would have had to guard themselves
from possible resistance and double cross in case he did not consent to their plan. Furthermore, it would have
been highly illogical for the Dorados to force appellant to take part in their crime, only to give him an
unserviceable rifle. 30
Moreover, his story does not inspire belief for reasons other than the obvious one that it is uncorroborated.
According to appellant, he was taken against his will from his sister's house in Tagolo-an the day before the
commission of the crime. It is strange why his sister was not presented as witness to corroborate his account.
Even the mayor of Tagolo-an, to whom he reported that he had been forced to participate in a killing, could
have testified in his favor. But said official, who could have injected credence to his defense, was not presented
to corroborate his testimony. The non-presentation of these witnesses tends to show that they would not have
corroborated appellant's allegations had they testified.
Second Issue: Qualifying Circumstances
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength.
The evidence of the prosecution, however, adequately established only treachery. Treachery is appreciated
when a frontal attack is directed at an unarmed victim who is totally unaware of and unprepared for said
assault. 31 There is treachery where the attack on an unarmed victim, who has not given the slightest
provocation, is sudden, unexpected and without warning. 32 According to Prosecution Witness Mosa, the
victim, the appellant and his companions were talking to one another prior to the shooting. It would have been
impossible to hide Garand rifles from someone who was so close. Thus, it is safe to assume that the victim
knew that appellant and his companions were carrying them. If the victim suspected that they would use those
rifles to commit the crime, then he would have avoided them. But instead, the victim stayed and spoke with
them. The victim, therefore, had no idea that he was going to be shot by appellant who, after all, was his
relative. Even if he eventually did come to know that appellant intended to shoot him, he being alone and
unarmed could not have defended himself against all five of them.
Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand, was not established, as there was no testimony to the effect
that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength in order to kill the victim. 33
Witness Mosa even said that only appellant fired at the victim. Mere superiority in number after all is not
necessarily indicative of this aggravating circumstance.
The prosecution also failed to establish evident premeditation. For this qualifying circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be a lapse of sufficient time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection
that would allow the conscience of the actor to attempt to overcome the resolution of his will. 34 But the
prosecution was unable to establish this time element as its evidence dealt merely with the circumstances of
the actual shooting itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as regards the
civil indemnity which is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current
jurisprudence. 35
SO ORDERED. away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta
guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin, Cornelio
Republic of the Philippines Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by. Thereupon, appellant
SUPREME COURT and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.
Manila
Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete, Samuel
SECOND DIVISION Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by saying, "Upon ako dira."
("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and appellant accosted and
G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990 pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?"). Longno then faced appellant and
said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant. and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while
the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after which both appellant and Altejos
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. ran away.

Benjamin P. Sorongon for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz,
Iloilo City, herein accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were
charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated October 18,
1983. 2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since Cornelio Altejos was not
apprehended and has since remained at large.
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto." ("Father, I was
shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters before he fell. His father, Julio
Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the ground. Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo
Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of death was hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound.
Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-defense. He
claims that on September 17, 1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00 o'clock P.M. with his
cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver repaired and appellant was taking
the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant saw Longno from a distance. Upon his
approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a
lesson." 4

After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills, expenses for
the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth as
synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and amplified by us
from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by
appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his companions were
engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo
Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the same. He,
therefore, parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later amputated. It was
then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant and Longno afterwards
grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he was brushed aside by the
latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and
Altejos ran away. 5
Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in complete self-defense.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not established by competent evidence the existence of
conspiracy and the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. 6 A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.

Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self- Q Did you not pick up the gun?
defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense
of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For, A No, sir. 9
even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted
the killing. 7 On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)
unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless
the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. 8 Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was Gerardo
Sazon doing?
In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to establish
the primary element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for the
defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of their inherent inconsistency and conflict with A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun and the gun fired.
each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:
Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what hand was he
Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a shot at you? holding that gun when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?

A One (1) meter. WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what kind of a gun was that allegedly A His right hand.
used by Inday Longno?
ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)
A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the body of the gun.
Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was being pointed to him, what hand did
Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver? Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in brushing that gun?

A Yes, sir. A His left hand.

Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or a revolver? Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what else if any did he do?

A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you want to learn a lesson he immediately A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,
drew his gun and I was able to parry.
COURT: (To the witness)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What hand?
Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the elbow, was he still holding that
gun he used in shooting you hitting you at the left palm? A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.
xxx xxx xxx Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is sustained
by the evidence:
ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)
The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only because he admitted that
Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and who was brushed aside? he was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the
truth when he testified that the deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA: come out just below the right breast of the deceased. The physical evidence in this case showed that there was
no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on any part of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the
Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic). deceased was only on his left forearm. Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there
during the incident except the accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the overwhelming weight of
COURT: (To the witness) evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the incident (this) showed that this witness had small
regard for the truth. 11
Q And, what happened next?
Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after Altejos
Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday. stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating on direct
examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination that he only walked a short
Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon? distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded. 13 The latter statement is
itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same proceeding that he was brought by a policeman
A Yes, sir. to the hospital. 14 This irresolution on the part of the appellant was obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt
against him arising from his flight. 15
ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)
At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence in the
Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday, what was Gerardo Sazon and case. Again, we quote the trial court with approval:
Wilfredo Longno doing if they were doing anything.?
The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a gun and fired at him is not
A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon. borne out by the physical evidence in this case. The paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased
showed that the hands of the deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a
Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that time? gun during the incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen bore strong traces of
gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable
A Inday's weapon. 10 doubt that there was only one gun during the incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the
accused Gerardo Sazon. That a part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close range, according to Dr. Ely
The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and the Canja strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit his finger when he and the deceased grappled for the
victim supposedly grappled. While appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the ground, witness possession of the gun. 16
Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter's gun. The latter statement is itself
difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly holding with his right hand the In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the
gun which he used in shooting Longno. presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or has not fired a
gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness Zenaida Sinfuego a forensic chemist
It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the homogeneity of whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this verification:
the answers to the inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only a single gun. Had this
prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered the defense theory that the victim Atty. E. Original:
himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus establish the element of unlawful
aggression contrived by the defense. Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the person of Wilfredo Longno?
COURT: A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

Q On the cadaver? Q When was this examination conducted?

Atty. E. Original: A Last September 18,1983.

Q On the cadaver? Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding the
paraffin test conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states, positive for
A Yes, Sir. gunpowder residues, what is the implication?

Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination? A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.

A Yes, Sir. Q Within what time-span?

Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-83, result of the paraffin test on the A Within three days.
cadaver of Wilfredo Longno, please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your possession
whether it is the same? Q Within three days?

A The same. A Within three days.

xxx xxx xxx Q From the examination?

Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts taken from the left and right hands of A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.
the cadaver of one Wilfredo Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same subject and
one piece paraffin last taken from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of laboratory examination: to Q And when was the examination conducted?
determine the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned specimens. Findings, cast
from hands-negative for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). Cast from forearm-positive for the A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2 in, 3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side
of the abdomen-positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in the 1 and 2 in Q September?
radius. In the layman's language Mrs. Sinfuego, will you please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1,
2 and 3? A Nineteen.

A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder residues that means that, no blue
specks were found in the hands of the cadaver.
COURT:
Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?
Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?
A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.
Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the powder burns, was it possible that
he fired a gun on September 17?

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun. A Yes, Your Honor. 17

Q Within what time-span? On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:


Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be (sic) positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In what instance?
A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible that it was carried by the wind.
Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person who has not fired a gun?
A Also from the fertilizer.
Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from contaminance (sic) for the nitrates
will take effect between two to three minutes.
COURT:
Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by
gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you determine where did it (sic)
come from?
A Gunpowder residues. 18
Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in evidence to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the quarrelsome nature of
the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression. Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking
to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution during
the trial belying such aggression. These observations find application in the instant case where the defense
presented and now argue on character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving minor offenses which
had been filed against the deceased, but not one of which resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed
except for one case which was sent to the archives. 20
Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in the
absence of any showing that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during
the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, lies for this
Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did not act in self-defense. 21
The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not murder. The
trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however, ruled that there was
evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely wanting in evidence to support the
latter conclusion.
The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the deceased
passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter followed the former and
inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. 22
In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident of
September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under the
circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to kill the victim. A homicidal
premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly
announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.
Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim passed by
cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the victim. No
evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the deceased. Nor was there any
showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to warrant and explain appellant's waiting
for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a remote
possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim
when confronted by appellant near the public faucet that precipitated assault.
Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was the
result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the
killing to murder. 23 The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and
incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense. 24 Thus, for
the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this
case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was deliberate
intent to take advantage of it. 25 In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to
use their superior strength to their advantage in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court
cannot be sustained.
Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment, since the
existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant and Altejos
of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter reveal a concordance and unity of
thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the accused shot the victim in the
forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death,
indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the
victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely essential to establish a
conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective,
27 as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.

It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this does not
negate the existence of a conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident premeditation, but this
circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense for the accused to meditate and
reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time element is not an indispensable requirement for
a conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that there was a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos
although, for lack of conclusive showing, we cannot consider evident premeditation against appellant.

The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to
sustain a conviction. 29 The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused. Insofar as
Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him and he can neither
be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are, therefore, obiter and with no
binding effect on him. 30

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is declared GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal.

The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of the
deceased is hereby MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis, and increasing the
death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the Court en banc on August 30,1990.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.