Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456

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Computers in Human Behavior

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/comphumbeh

Studying the coevolution of social distance, ofine- and online contacts

Azi Lev-On , Sabina Lissitsa
School of Communication, Ariel University, Israel

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: We inquire about the correlations between contact and perceived social distance: Whether in line with
Available online 23 February 2015 the contact theory, online as well as ofine contacts that Israeli Jews have with Arabs affect their
perceived social distances from Arabs, or rather whether Israeli Jews who feel closer to Arabs maintain
Keywords: more ofine and online contacts with Arabs, according to the social homophily approach.
Social media We found that social distance, online contact and ofine contact were mutually supportive, whereas
Homophily the background variables included in the regression analysis (age, gender, religiosity, place of residence,
Social distance
education and income) had no effect on either of them. While the three are mutually supportive,
Contact theory
Online contact
perceived social distance and ofine contacts had greater explanatory value than online contacts.
Ofine contact 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction (Bourdieu, 1990; Karakayali, 2009). In this study, we investigate

Online environments create novel opportunities for interactions
between like-minded people, as well as communication across
cleavages between people from different ethnic, religious, cultural
and socio-economic backgrounds, overcoming limitations of time
and place. In this study we inquire about the correlations between
perceived social distance, ofine contact as well as online contacts,
and ask: do people primarily associate online with people like
themselves, and what are the frequencies of cross-cleavage inter-
actions? Do online and ofine interactions reduce social distances
between people from groups in conict, and what are the possible
implications of such contact?
2. Contact and social distance
The concept of social distance represents a degree of individual
willingness to accept people with various ethnic backgrounds into
ones own personal relationships (Park, 1924; Sakuragi, 2008). This
broad concept includes affective distance, i.e., the extent of sympa-
thy and affection of group members toward members of other
social groups (Bogardus, 1925); normative distance, i.e., the deni-
tion of insider and outsider and the determination of distinc-
tions between us and them; and cultural and habitual
distances, i.e., the degree of imitation that exists between groups
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: azilevon@gmail.com (A. Lev-On), sabinal@bezeqint.net
(S. Lissitsa).
the affective social distance (hereinafter social distance), and the
mutual relations between social distance, ofine contacts and
online contacts. This is the rst study that compares the
effects of both online and ofine contact on social distance (see
Fig. 1).
The contact theory is one of the leading theories dealing with
reduction of intergroup conicts. Introduced by Allport (1954),
the contact theory maintains that by assembling people without
regard for race, color, religion, or national origin, we can [. . .]
destroy stereotypes and develop friendly attitudes (p. 261).
According to the contact theory, a two-step attitude change
process typically occurs when a member of a majority group
meets a member of a minority group. The preliminary result is a
target-specic change in attitudes towards individuals. The initial
suppositions regarding the other, based on negative stereotypes
connected with the group he or she belongs to, may be replaced
with a more positive opinion about the specic individual. A
secondary result will involve positive attitude change extended
to the individuals group as a whole. It is important to note,
however, that this generalization of positive intergroup contact
usually occurs when the contact is made with members who are
seen as a reliable representative of their particular group (Miller,
2002).
The contact theory suggests that through getting to know the
other, individuals may be able not only to decompose their
stereotypes of the specic individual they encounter, but also to
reduce their stereotyping of the entire group to which the
individual belongs (Allport, 1954). Research has shown that con-
tact can inuence perceptions, attitudes and values in ways that

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.009
0747-5632/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456
minimize antagonism and prejudice (Fisher, 1990; Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2000).
Still, contact is not a magic bullet against intergroup hostility
and hatred. The conditions of contact matter. Conditions to
capitalize on the benets of contact may involve equal group
status, common goals, intergroup cooperation and social norms
supporting intergroup contact (Allport, 1954), voluntary participa-
tion and intimate contact (Amir, 1969), and absence of anxiety and
threat (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Pettigrew and Tropp (2000,
2011), in their meta-analysis of contact studies, have found that
it is not necessary for all of Allports (1954) conditions to exist
simultaneously for bias to be reduced. Indeed, mere contact can
be a sufcient condition for lasting bias reduction that generalizes
beyond individuals to their larger group. Importantly, however,
each of Allports conditions further enhances the bias-reducing
effects of mere contact and, thus, the more supportive the condi-
tions, the more likely that a successful and lasting outcome will
be achieved.
3. Contact through online social media
Online social media is an important tool in creating social con-
tacts between members of various groups. Studies demonstrate
that people often use the Internet, and particularly social media,
to maintain contact with those whom they have preexisting rela-
tionships with, as well as to develop new relationships online,
receive support when necessary; and even become exposed to a
variety of people and views (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell,
2011; Rainie, Lenhart, & Smith, 2012; Rainie et al., 2012). The
possibilities of interacting anonymously, hiding ones physical
appearance, controlling the interaction to a great extent and easily
nding like-minded or similarly-situated others are especially
valuable to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups
(Amichai-Hamburger, McKenna, & Samuel-Azran, 2008; McKenna
& Bargh, 2000).
Israel is among the world leaders in both Internet connectivity
and social media use: A 2011 ComScore study (quoted in Yaron,
2011) demonstrates that Israelis lead the world in social media
usage with 11.1 h per month almost double the global average
of 5.7 h per month. Ninety-four percent of Internet users in Israel
are members of social networks, primarily Facebook. Thus, consid-
erable time spent on social media sites for a variety of purposes has
become a part of Israelis daily life.
Studies of online discussion groups in Israel also demonstrate
their signicance for users in a variety of contexts; for example,
for gay adolescents interested in coming out of the closet
(Marciano, 2009), for evacuees from the Gaza settlements of Gush
Katif who wish to maintain social ties and obtaining relevant
information (Lev-On, 2012), and for empowering ultra-Orthodox
women who browse closed, designated forums (Lev-On &
Neriya-Ben Shahar, 2011). Studies conducted worldwide further
support the notion that discussion groups may be important
sources of information, support and a sense of belonging
(Wellman, Quan, Witte, & Hampton, 2001), and that Facebook in
particular has become a broadly popular forum for online socializ-
ing (Hughes, Rowe, Batey, & Lee, 2012).
Face-to-face intergroup contact is often complicated by logisti-
cal and nancial obstacles, and can even be dangerous when the
inter-group hostility is extreme. Thus, the Internets facilitation
of communication beyond geographical boundaries, where discus-
sants have more control over the conversation, where the conver-
sation can be asynchronous at the discussants own time and
pace and with reduced social presence seems to set preferable
conditions for increased intergroup contact (Amichai-Hamburger
& McKenna, 2006; Walther, 2009).
449
Still, the few studies of the dynamics and outcome of Facebook
inter-group interaction generate mixed ndings. Schumann, van
der Linden, and Klein (2012), who examined nine identity-based
Facebook groups, demonstrate that members expression of preju-
dices decreased while that of mutual acceptance increased over
time, both regarding in- and outgroup members of the Facebook
groups.1 However, Ruesch (2011), in the only published study to
date on the manifestations of the IsraeliPalestinian conict on
Facebook, found a highly fragmentized, polarized virtual sphere with
little intergroup interaction. She argues that while online spaces bear
a considerable potential for intergroup communication and conict
resolution, conicting groups only make use of this potential to a
limited extent. Of all the Facebook groups that focus on the
IsraeliPalestinian conict, she found only 14.4% to be peace
groups dedicated to peacemaking through dialog, while the large
majority of groups were devoted to intra-group mobilization and
expression of support. Ganaem, Asaad, and Tibi (2011) found that
64.7% of Israeli Arab youth report having no Jewish friends on online
social networks.
Considering the rapid growth in Internet usage, the Internet can
be expected to play some role in conicts be it positive or nega-
tive. Therefore, a better understanding of the online dynamics of
intergroup conict and communication is crucial to improve
strategies of conict resolution and inter-group understanding.
4. Social distance and preferential attachment
The literature discussed above has demonstrated that online
contact bears potential to reduce social distance. Let us now turn
to the opposite direction and ask if self-perceived social distance
can generate more, or less, online contact.
As stated before, the vast penetration and many uses of the
Internet open new perspectives for analyzing social cleavages. On
the one hand, the vast online space allows individuals who are dif-
ferent from one another in terms of positions, beliefs, values and
socio-demographic factors to become exposed to one another,
communicate and possibly participate in a dialog. Such exposure
can take place even unintentionally. As a result, some see in the
Internet a platform for the creation of a new public discourse
more participatory and deliberative at once. This trait stands in
contrast to the one-dimensionality and asymmetry of information
control and processing that is characteristic of traditional mass
media (Barlow, 1996; Gilmor, 2004).
But studies call to question the actual functioning of the Inter-
net as an instrument for exposure to diverse views and delib-
eration between individuals and groups with opposing views
(Lev-On & Manin, 2009). Although people state in public opinion
polls that exposure to political discussions that include diverse
and opposing views is important, they tend to avoid such discus-
sions in actual practice (Mutz, 2006). When choice is viable, peo-
ple often demonstrate preferential attachment to interact with
and obtain information from like-minded others a phenomena
known as homophily (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, & Cook 2001). When multiplicity and diversity of
views exist alongside freedom of association and the ability to
locate like-minded people and views and screen out everything
else, as can arguably happen online, the conditions may in fact
facilitate the creation of homogenous groups that include people
who think similarly and lack exposure to information and opin-
ions that are considered non-conformist. The social pressures
1
The authors analyzed the content of nine Facebook groups that referred to social
identities relating to the three categories: nationality, religion, and gender. For each
category, three Facebook groups were sampled.
450 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456
and informational biases that can exist in such an environment
can generate polarization and extremisms and enhance the social
distance between opposing social groups (Sunstein, 2001). Such
concerns are supported by many studies that demonstrate, for
example, homophilious link structures between similarly-minded
sites and bloggers, and high percentages of communication in
social groups between people who agree with one another
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Kim, 2009; Lauw, Shafer, Agrawal, &
Ntoulas, 2010; Lawrence, Sides, & Farrell, 2010; Lee, Kwak, &
Campbell, 2013; Lev-On & Manin, 2009; Wojcieszak & Mutz,
2009).
Still, other online discursive arenas seem more promising in
terms of exposing the participants to diverse and even opposing
views such as environments that attract many people with
different views. For example, non-political discussion groups (for
example, groups focusing on professional issues, hobbies or
support) attract people with diverse political opinions much more
than political discussion groups (Graham, 2012; Munson &
Resnick, 2011; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). Large news sites that
enable user comments, or highly central, mainstream social
media sites like Wikipedia, can attract many people from across
the political spectrum and bear potential to exposure users to
opposing views.
5. Jews and Arabs in Israel: contact and social distance
Despite the prevalence of the melting pot conception in the
State of Israels early years, gradually, Israeli society has arrived
at the realization that it has been and will continue in the foresee-
able future to be composed of multiple cleavages. The cleavages in
the Israeli society exist, for example, along national, religious and
ethnic lines, with the cleavage between Israeli Jews and Arabs per-
ceived to be the deepest and more persistent (Hermann, Atmor,
Heller, & Lebel, 2012; Horowitz & Lissak, 1990; Kimmerling,
2001; Peres & Ben-Rafael, 2006).
Israels population comprises around eight million people; of
these, approximately 75% are Jewish, while some 20% are Arabs
(Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS], 2011a). The Jewish majority is
composed mostly of immigrants and descendants of immigrants,
as Israel is committed to the successful absorption of Jewish immi-
grants. Under the Law of Return (1950) and the Law of Nationality
(1952), every Jew has the right to settle in Israel; consequently,
Jewish immigrants can be awarded Israeli citizenship on arrival.
Thus, Israel may be viewed as an immigrant-settler society based
on an ethno-nationalist structure, dened both ideologically and
institutionally (Smooha, 1990).
The Arab minority was granted Israeli citizenship with the
establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, but until 1966 their
rights were suspended in practice as they were ruled by a military
administration justied as a security measure against a potentially
hostile population (Shar & Peled, 2002). Most of the Arab popula-
tion (58%) lives in Israels northern periphery, while 29% reside in
the center (including Jerusalem) and 13% in the south (CBS,
2011a). By contrast, the Jewish population is concentrated in the
center of Israel (some 65%), with 21% in the north and 14% in the
south (CBS, 2011a).
Perhaps the largest gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel are
economic and educational. For example, the average household
income within the Jewish sector is near 13,000 NIS ($3746, based
on the March 2014 exchange rate) compared to slightly less than
8000 NIS ($2305) within the Arabic sector (CBS, 2011a). Within
the Jewish sector, 29% of adults have an academic degree,
compared to only 12% of Arab adults (CBS, 2011b). About 80% of
the Arab communities are rated among the four lowest socio-
economic deciles of the Central Bureau of Statistics, and no Arab
communities are ranked among the four upper deciles. Hardly
any Arabs work in the hi-tech industry, the key engine of economic
growth in Israel; between 2000 and 2005, Arabs share in the
high-tech employment market was approximately 4% (Abraham
Fund., 2013). Though the labor force participation rate amongst
Jewish and Arabic men is almost identical, Arab women work
three times less than Jewish women (Abraham Fund, 2013; CBS,
2011a).
Moreover, young Israeli Jews and Arabs very rarely meet
socially, and the two populations live in nearly complete geo-
graphic isolation, with a near fully self-segregated school system.
As noted above, 64.7% of Arab youth report having no Jewish
friends on online social networks (Ganaem et al., 2011). When
they do learn about one another through the mass media, the
framing is often one of conict and violence (Aburaiya,
Avraham, & Wolfsfeld, 1998; Ashuri, 2010; Wolfsfeld, 1997).
Recent opinion polls demonstrate hostility, which is expressed,
for example, in large percentages of Arab respondents claiming
that they would not have a Jewish friend (28.7% in 2009) or a
Jewish neighbor (43% in 2009), or Jewish respondents claiming
that they would not have an Arab neighbor (50.7% in 2009) or
an Arab supervisor at work (57.7% in 2009), and avoid entering
into Arab residential areas (65.6%) (Hermann et al., 2012; see also
Abraham Fund, 2013).
In the current study, we investigate the potential of ofine
and online contact to reduce social distance between members
of groups in conict, and the potential of social distance to
generate ofine as well as online contact between members of
both groups.
6. Research objectives
The study examines whether online and ofine social contacts
among Jews and Arabs correlate with self-perceived social dis-
tances, and identies the direction of this correlation, i.e. whether
contact between Jews and Arabs affects the self-perceived social
distances Jews feel towards Arabs, or alternatively, whether Jews
who feel closer to Arabs in the rst place have a greater tendency
to engage in contacts with Arabs.
On the basis of these research questions, the following alterna-
tive hypotheses are formulated:
1. Online and ofine contacts affect social distances: online and
ofine contacts between Israeli Jews and Arabs lead Jews to a
reduced self-perceived social distances from Arabs.
2. Social distances affect online and ofine contacts: Israeli Jews
who maintain low levels of self-perceived social distance from
Arabs (i.e. greater contact) tend to engage in more frequent
online and ofine contacts with Arabs.
On basis of these hypotheses, the following research model was
constructed:
The model analyzes the connections between the frequency
of online contact, the frequency of ofine contact and the
self-perceived social distance, controlling for the socio-
demographic variables (gender, age, religiosity, education and
income), that according to the literature inuence social media
usage (Bachmann, Correa, & Gil de Ziga, 2012; Hargittai, 2002;
Hargittai, 2010; Kennedy, Wellman, & Klement, 2003; Lissitsa &
Lev-On, 2014; Losh, 2010; Robinson, DiMaggio, & Hargittai, 2003)
and the social distance between Jews and Arabs (Peres &
Ben-Rafael, 2006).
 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456
Fig. 1. The research model.
7. Methodology
7.1. Procedure
The study is based on an online survey of a representative sam-
ple of 837 Israeli Jews who were born in Israel or immigrated
before 1989, who use the Internet at least three times a week.
The rationale in choosing the study population was our intention
to reach a population that is condent in Internet usage and uses
it regularly, have had opportunities to encounter Arabs while
online, and also have established positions about the Israeli
Palestinian conict. The invitation to take the survey explained
that the study is based on a questionnaire about internet usage
habits, while is lled anonymously. About 70% of those who
opened the survey link completed the questionnaire. In order to
maintain the anonymity promised to interviewees, the data base
did not include their email address, telephone number and other
identifying details.
To ensure the representativeness of the sample, quotas of
gender, age and area of residence were maintained according to
the distribution of these three variables among Internet users
according to the social survey of the Israeli CBS (Central Bureau
of Statistics) (2011a). The distribution of the socio-demographic
variables of the total sample appears on Appendix A.1. Social media
users were selected from the total sample (those which used daily
social networks, discussion groups, forums, chats, Skype). The nal
sample included 586 social media users. The respondents who use
social media daily were younger, less religious and with lower
income, compared to those who used social media less frequently
or not at all.
The questionnaire included 70 questions and inquired about
Internet usage, social media usage, frequency of online and ofine
contact with members of a variety of social groups, and the
social distance perceived by subjects towards these groups. The
question that measured self-perceived social distances was based
on the questionnaire used in the study of multiculturalism and
cleavages in the Israeli society carried out by Peres and
Ben-Rafael (2006).
451
The study was preceded by 45 in-depth interviews and a pilot
survey taken by 10 subjects (both with emphasis on heterogeneity
in terms of gender, age, religiosity and place of residence). The goals
of the in-depth interviews were to clarify the context,
circumstances and possible contents of online interactions between
Jews and Arabs and to describe the possible consequences of these
contacts. The respondents were recruited by snowball sampling
method. The interviews were conducted in the respondents homes
and continued between 60 and 90 min. The interviews were record-
ed and transcribed and served as a basis for the questionnaire. In
turn, the questionnaire was validated in the pilot study, whose goal
was to understand whether the questions were clear, whether
respondents nd a proper answer to each closed question and
whether the order of questions produced biases. There was no over-
lap between the participants in the in-depth interviews, the pilot
study and ultimately the online survey.
7.2. Dependent variables
Frequency of online contact with Israeli Arabs was measured by
the following question: In your use of online forums, discussion
groups or social networks, how frequently are you in contact with
Israeli Arabs? The answer scale ranges between 1 (not at all), and
5 (very frequently).
Frequency of ofine contact with Israeli Arabs was measured by
the following question: In your everyday life, how frequently are
you in contact with Israeli Arabs? The answer scale ranges
between 1 (not at all), and 5 (very frequently).
Self-perceived social distance toward Israeli Arabs was measured
by the following question: To what extent do you feel closeness
to or remoteness from Israeli Arabs? The answer scale ranges
between 1 (very remote) and 5 (very close).
7.3. Independent Variables
 Age (in years)
 Gender (1 = male)
452 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456

 Religiosity (composed of two dummy variables for traditional 8.2. Multivariate analysis
and religious. The seculars were a comparison group).
 Locality (1 = center, 0 = Periphery) In order to examine the correlations between our dependent
 Educational level (1 less than secondary, 2 secondary, 3 variables, controlling the background variables, the six models of
post-secondary, 4 BA, 5 MA/PhD) hierarchical linear regressions were applied in four blocks accord-
 Personal income was measured by the categories: 1 does not ing to the description in Table 3:
work, 2 less than 4000 NIS (1150$); 3 40006000 NIS
(1150$-1700$); 4 60008000 NIS; (1700$2300$); 5
800010,000 NIS (2300$2850$); 6 10,00015,000 NIS Table 1
Frequency of ofine and online contacts between Jews and Arabs.
(2850$4300$);7 15,00020,000 NIS (4300$5700$); 8
20,000 NIS (5700$) and above. Ofine contact Online contact t value
No contact whatsoever 41% 60%
Low frequency 34% 27%
8. Findings Medium frequency 17% 9%
High frequency 5% 3%
8.1. Overview Very high frequency 3% 2%
Mean 1.96 1.60 8.1**
(SD) (1.03) (0.88)
In Table 1, we display descriptive statistics of the frequency of
**
online and ofine contact the Israeli Jews surveyed maintain with p < 0.01.
Arabs, and respondents self-perceived social distances from Arabs.
Table 1 demonstrates that the populations hardly meet ofine
and online, i.e., that the typical frequency of Israeli Jews contact
Table 2
with Arabs is very low. Only a small minority reported high or very
Self-perceived social distances from Arabs.
high frequency of ofine and online contact with Arabs (8% and 5%
respectively). The frequency of ofine contact with Arabs was Social distance from Arabs
higher, compared the frequency of online contact (t(585) = 8.1, Very far 46%
sig. < .001). Far 29%
Not so far, but not so close 19%
Next, Table 2 demonstrates that Israeli Jews perceive a sig-
Close 4%
nicant social distance from Arabs: some three quarters of those Like one of them 2%
surveyed reported that they feel remote or very remote from Mean, scale 15, 1 very far, 5 like one of them 1.88
Arabs. Only 6% of the Jewish respondents reported that they feel (SD) (0.98)
close to Arabs.

Table 3
The description of hierarchical regression models.

Model Dependent variable Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4

1 Social distances Background variables Frequency of ofine contacts Frequency of online contacts Interaction effect
2 Social distances Background variables Frequency of online contacts Frequency of ofine contacts Interaction effect
3 Frequency of ofine contacts Background variables Social distances Frequency of online contacts Interaction effect
4 Frequency of ofine contacts Background Variables Frequency of online contacts Social distances Interaction effect
5 Frequency of online contacts Background variables Social distances Frequency of ofine contacts Interaction effect
6 Frequency of online contacts Background variables Frequency of ofine contacts Social distances Interaction effect

Table 4
Predicting social distances, ndings of linear regression analysis.

Coefcients from block 4 Model 1 Model 2

B Beta B Beta
Constant 0.29 Constant 0.29
Block 1 Gender (male = 1) 0.00 0.00 Gender (male = 1) 0.00 0.00
Age 0.01* 0.10 Age 0.01* 0.10
Religiosity 0.02 0.02 Religiosity 0.02 0.02
Education 0.07* 0.07 Education 0.07* 0.07
Income 0.01 0.06 Income 0.01 0.06
Locality (center = 1) 0.19** 0.09 Locality (center = 1) 0.19 0.09
Block 2 Frequency of ofine contacts 0.51** 0.53 Frequency of online contacts 0.42** 0.38
Block 3 Frequency of online contacts 0.42** 0.38 Frequency of ofine contacts 0.51** 0.53
Block 4 Interaction effect between online and ofine contacts 0.05 0.17 Interaction effect between online and ofine contacts 0.05 0.17
R Square change
Block 1 0.04** 0.04**
Block 2 0.32** 0.22**
Block 3 0.06** 0.15**
Block 4 0.00 0.00
R Square 0.41 0.41
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456 453

Table 5
Predicting frequency of ofine contacts, ndings of linear regression analysis.

Coefcients from block 4 Model 3 Model 4

B Beta B Beta
Constant 0.58 Constant 0.58
Block 1 Gender (male = 1) 0.08 0.04 Gender (male = 1) 0.08 0.04
Age 0.00 0.00 Age 0.00 0.00
Religiosity 0.05 0.05 Religiosity 0.05 0.05
Education 0.03 0.03 Education 0.03 0.03
Income 0.01 0.06 Income 0.01 0.06
Locality (center = 1) 0.11 0.05 Locality (center = 1) 0.11 0.05
Block 2 Social distances 0.49** 0.47 Frequency of online contacts 0.28** 0.24
Block 3 Frequency of online contacts 0.28** 0.24 Social distances 0.49** 0.47
Block 4 Interaction effect between online and ofine contacts 0.00 0.01 Interaction effect between online and ofine contacts 0.00 0.01
R Square change
Block 1 0.03** 0.03**
Block 2 0.31** 0.20**
Block 3 0.04** 0.15**
Block 4 0.00 0.00
R Square 0.38 0.38

p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01.

Table 6
Predicting frequency of online contacts, ndings of linear regression analysis.

Coefcients from block Model 5 Model 6

4
B Beta B Beta
Block 1 Constant 0.81 Constant 0.81
Gender (male = 1) 0.03 0.02 Gender (male = 1) 0.03 0.02
Age 0.00 0.06 Age 0.00 0.06
Religiosity 0.00 0.00 Religiosity 0.00 0.00
Education 0.00 0.00 Education 0.00 0.00
Income 0.00 0.00 Income 0.00 0.00
Locality (center = 1) 0.02 0.01 Locality (center = 1) 0.02 0.01
Block 2 Social distances 0.28** 0.31 Frequency of ofine contacts 0.22** 0.26
Block 3 Frequency of ofine contacts 0.22** 0.26 Social distances 0.28** 0.31
Block 4 Interaction effect between social distances and ofine 0.01 0.03 Interaction effect between social distances and ofine 0.01 0.03
contacts contacts
R Square change R Square change
Block 1 0.01** Block 1 0.01**
Block 2 0.22** Block 2 0.20**
Block 3 0.05** Block 3 0.07**
Block 4 0.00 Block 4 0.00
R Square 0.28 R Square 0.28

p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.

The comparison between R square values and R square change
between the variables in the second and third regression block
enable us to conclude what regression model was the optimal, or
in other words, what dependent variable was explained better than
others.
The regression ndings (forth block coefcients, model t, R2
change) are presented in Tables 46.
The results presented in both models in Table 4 strongly sup-
port our rst hypothesis, that online and ofine contacts affect
self-perceived social distances. According to our ndings, online
contacts between Jews and Arabs minimize the social distances
that Israeli Jews maintain toward Arabs (b = .38, p < .001). In addi-
tion, ofine contacts between Jews and Arabs minimize the social
distances that Israeli Jews maintain toward Arabs (b = .53,
p < .001). The effect of ofine contacts on social distances was
stronger, compared to effect of online contacts. The stronger
impact of ofine contacts, compared to the impact of online
contact on social distances reected also in the R Square change
(in model 1, the online contacts added 6% to the explained variance
beyond the impact of ofine contacts, whereas in Model 2 the off-
line contacts added 15% to the explained variance beyond the
impact of online contacts). The interaction effect between online
and ofine contacts was insignicant.
The effect of ofine and online contacts with Arabs on perceived
social distance from them was much greater than the effects of other
independent variables.
The results presented in both models in Table 5 strongly sup-
port our second hypothesis, that those who feels closer to Arabs
more likely to interact with them in everyday life (b = .47,
p < .001). In addition there is a positive correlation between the
frequency of online contacts and frequency if interactions in every-
day life (b = .24, p < .001) In other words, Jews which contact with
Arabs in social media are more likely to interact with them in
everyday life. According to R Square change the impact of social
distances on ofine contacts was higher, compared to the impact
of online contact.
454 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456

Table 7
Model Comparison.

Model Dependent variable Block 2 Block 3 R2

1 Social distances Frequency of ofine contacts Frequency of online contacts
R2 change 32% 6% 41%
2 Social distances Frequency of online contacts Frequency of ofine contacts
R2 change 22% 15% 41%
3 Frequency of ofine contacts Social distances Frequency of online contacts
R2 change 31% 4% 38%
4 Frequency of ofine contacts Frequency of online contacts Social distances
R2 change 20% 15% 38%
5 Frequency of online contacts Social distances Frequency of ofine contacts
R2 change 22% 5% 28%
6 Frequency of online contacts Frequency of ofine contacts Social distances
R2 change 20% 7% 28%

The interaction effect between online contacts and social dis-
tances was insignicant. The impacts of socio-demographic vari-
ables were also insignicant.
The results presented in both models in Table 6 strongly sup-
port our second hypothesis, that those who feels closer to Arabs
more likely to interact with them in social media (b = .31,
p < .001). In addition there is a positive correlation between the
frequency of online contacts and frequency if interactions in every-
day life (b = .26, p < .001) In other words, Jews which meet Arabs in
everyday life are more likely to interact with them online. Accord-
ing to R Square change the impact of social distances on online
contacts was higher, compared to the impact of ofine contact.
The interaction effect between ofine contacts and social dis-
tances was insignicant. The impacts of socio-demographic vari-
ables were also insignicant.
According to the model comparison presented in Table 7 the
highest explained variance was found in models 1 and 2, predicting
social distances. The effect of ofine contacts on social distances
was higher, compared to effect of online contacts. The lowest
explained variance was found in models 5 and 6 predicting online
contacts by social distances and ofine contacts.
9. Discussion and conclusions
The study analyzes the correlation between the frequency of
online contact Israeli Jews maintain with Arabs, and the perceived
social distance of Israeli Jews towards Arabs. According to Allports
(1954) Contact Theory, contact can produce opinion change by
means of a two-phased process: rst it improves the disposition
toward an individual who belongs to the out-group with whom
the subject came into contact, and later it improves the subjects
position towards the group to which the individual from the out-
group belongs. But not every contact between members of groups
in conict is effective in improving their mutual relations. The con-
ditions set by Allport (1954), such as equal group status, common
goals, intimate contact, social norms that support the contact, and
absence of anxiety and threat, are difcult to achieve and maintain
in the case of groups in conict. The Israeli reality which is char-
acterized by high residential, education and employment segrega-
tion between Jews and Arabs produces experiences that are very
different from Allports ideal conditions. But the online realm,
which offers an ability to overcome limitations of time and dis-
tance, reduced social presence of the other side and extended abil-
ities to control the interaction, produces more hospitable
conditions that may facilitate improved relations.
The ndings point at a signicant self-perceived social distance
of Israeli Jews towards Arabs, which can probably be explained by
the social and cultural differences between the groups; the social,
economic and political conicts of interests; and the segregation
between the groups in the various spheres. Based on these
ndings, it seems that without investing the proper efforts and
resources to manage the conict online as well as ofine the
cleavage between Israeli Jews and Arabs may grow wider in the
future.
Another signicant nding is that most social media users sam-
pled report that they do not interact with Arabs at all ofine, as
well as while using online social media. Only a quarter of the Jew-
ish population seems to maintain contact in more than low fre-
quency ofine, and 13% maintain contact in more than low
frequency online (in line with the similar ndings found among
Arab youth by Ganaem et al. (2011)). Note that the frequency of
ofine contact with Arabs was higher than the frequency of online
contact.
The study tested six complementary models about the direction
of inuence between ofine contact frequency, online contact fre-
quency and self-perceived social distances. The results indicate
that co-evolution of the three variables: social distance, ofine
contact and online contact. While the three are mutually support-
ive; perceived social distance and ofine contacts had greater
explanatory value than online contacts. The effect of the three vari-
ables in all the models which were tested were much greater than
the effects of all independent variables.
The highest explained variance was found in models 1 and 2,
predicting social distances. The effect of ofine contacts on social
distances was higher, compared to effect of online contacts. The
lowest explained variance was found in models 5 and 6 predicting
online contacts by social distances and ofine contacts.
Thus, the contact of Israeli Jews with Arabs reduces the per-
ceived social distance of Jews towards Arabs. Also, the closer Jews
feel towards Arabs, the more they tend to meet them online as well
as ofine.
It is quite likely that the perceived social distance of Israeli Jews
towards Arabs was reduced as a result of online contact because
online contacts (for example on social networks or web-based for-
ums) are frequently based on common interests. In such scenarios,
at least some of the conditions set by Allport (1954) may exist,
such as equal status of participants, common goals, intimate con-
tact, absence of anxiety and more. Potentially, meeting in such
online communities of interest minimizes the perceived social dis-
tance more than does ofine contact between Jews and Arabs, in
which conversation partners often cannot be selected and the
overall situation is less hospitable for reduction of social distances
in terms of Allports (1954) conditions. Hence, it is likely that
online contact can be more effective to improve mutual relations
between Jews and Arabs than ofine contact (see Walther, 2009).
In spite of such ndings, our study demonstrates that ofine con-
tact seems more effective in reducing social distance. Further
empirical studies should continue to study the effectiveness of var-
ious kinds of contact on reducing social distances, and the reasons
behind their differential effectiveness.
 A. Lev-On, S. Lissitsa / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 448456 455

Appendix A.1 Acknowledgements

Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample.

Variables Categories of variables % of Respondents The authors thank Yasmin Alkalay for her assistance in naliz-
Age 1824 16% ing the manuscript.
2529 15%
3034 16%
3539 14% Appendix A
4044 11%
4549 8% See Appendix A.1.
5054 7%
5560 6%
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