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Department of Justice
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Cynthia L. Crosby
Deputy Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Guendelsberger, John
Smi!hl-\1
Userteam: Docket
Cite as: Ariel Jonathan Diaz Vargas, A044 480 297 (BIA Sept. 29, 2017)
U.18. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Executive Office for Immigration Review
.
APPEAL
The Department of Homeland Security appeals from the Immigration Judge's order of July 27,
2016, in which the Immigration Judge denied the DHS's motion to reconsider a prior decision
terminating proceedings and to reopen removal proceedings in the alternative. The respondent has
filed a brief in opposition to the appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
The OHS contends it did not waive an argwnent that the respondent is removable based on a
conviction under New York Penal Law 220.31, as an alien convicted of a controlled substance
offense and an alien convicted for an aggravated felony as defined in 10l (a)(43)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. l 10l (a)(43)(B). See sections 237(a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(A)(iii). The OHS also argues the
Immigration Judge erred in not reopening proceedings to permit OHS to lodge an additional charge
wider section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act.
We need not address whether the OHS waived argwnents regarding the respondent's
removability. Since the time of the Immigration Judge's decision in this case the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, has concluded that
the New York statute at issue is overbroad as an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense. See
Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017). Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that
the statute is indivisible and not subject to a modified categorical approach, as New York
criminalizes the sale of substances which are not federally controlled substances and the various
substances constitute means by which the New York statutes can be violated rather than specific
and separate elements of the offense. See also Matter ofChairez, 26 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 2016).
The same legal reasoning fatally undermines any assertion that the respondent's conviction
constitutes a controlled substance offense within the meaning of section 237(a)(2)(B) of the Act.
Therefore, the appeal from the denial of the DHS's reconsideration request will be dismissed.
We agree with the Immigration Judge that OHS did not establish that reopening was warranted.
A motion to reopen requires the party seeking reopening present new or previously unavailable,
material evidence. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(l ). The OHS did not present any additional evidence in
company of the motion, instead relying exclusively on documents previously in the record. While
the regulations provide OHS with broad ability to lodge additional charges "at any time during a
Cite as: Ariel Jonathan Diaz Vargas, A044 480 297 (BIA Sept. 29, 2017)
... .
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A044 480 297
hearing," proceedings in this case had ended by the time OHS sought to lodge the charge. See
8 C.F.R. 1240.48(d). As DHS's motion did not meet the basic requirements for a motion to
reopen, we likewise will dismiss the appeal of the denial of the motion to reopen.
Cite as: Ariel Jonathan Diaz Vargas, A044 480 297 (BIA Sept. 29, 2017)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
In the Matter of
)
ARIEL JONATHAN DIAZ VARGAS ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
)
RESPONDENT )
Dominican Republic. He entered the United States on March 5th, 1994 at San Juan,
Puerto Rico as a lawful permanent resident (Exhibits 1; 2, tab A). He pied guilty to
Cite as: Ariel Jonathan Diaz Vargas, A044 480 297 (BIA Sept. 29, 2017)
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in violation of New
York Penal Law Section 220.03 on May 11th, 2007. (Exhibit 2, tab B). At the time of
sentencing on June 8th, 2007, he was adjudicated a youthful offender in the Supreme
convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of New
substance violation of law (Exhibit 1). To support the allegation related to the New York
Penal Law Section 220.03 offense, OHS submitted a misdemeanor complaint and a
certificate of disposition which indicated that he had been convicted of Penal Law
the government failed to meet its burden of establishing removability. The court denied
this motion on July 13th, 2015. See decision and order dated July 13th, 2015. The
court found that OHS had established removability under Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
(controlled substance) based on the evidence regarding the conviction for Penal Law
Section 220.03. However, the court did not sustain the aggravated felony charge.
Based on this decision and statements by prior counsel that the respondent did not
intend to file any applications for relief, the court ordered him removed to the Dominican
which dismissed the appeal and denied his motion to re-open. The Board also found
that OHS did not properly raise the issue of contesting the finding that respondent was
on April 1st, 2016, the BIA granted his motion to re-open and remanded these
from June 8th, 2007 (Exhibit C, tab 0), and made an oral motion to terminate these
proceedings. The government argued that he was still removable and that he was also
ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court took testimony from the respondent and
deferred a ruling on his motion to terminate and the application for relief.
After consideration of the entire record of proceedings, the court will now
grant the respondent's motion to terminate. Based upon the recently filed evidence
regarding his Penal Law Section 220.03 youthful offender adjudication, the court finds
Motion to Terminate.
and convincing evidence. INA Section 240(c)(3)(A). See also Matter of Guevara, 20
l&N Dec. 238, 242 (BIA 1991). In Guevara, the Board cites would be the INS 385 U.S.
276 (1966) in which the court stated, "Any alien who at any time after admission has
[indiscernible] is deportable."
Section 237(a)(2)(8)(i). As the court did not sustain the aggravated felony charge
previously, it now declines to disturb that determination here and notes that OHS waived
Although OHS does not dispute that the Section 220.03 offense is no
longer a conviction for immigration purposes, it contends that he is still removable under
Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) because of his conviction under Penal Law Section 220.31.
Nevertheless, the court finds that OHS has not met its burden of proving removability as
charged.
2007. Exhibit 2, tab C. That certificate also indicates that he was convicted of this
offense and sentenced by Judge Alvarado [phonetic] on June 8th, 2007. It was based
on this certificate and the criminal complaint which indicated that the substance involved
was heroine, that the court sustained the controlled substance ground of removability
because it found that the offense involved the federally controlled substance. See July
13th, 2015 decision. Neither party disputed this finding in the ensuing litigation.
However, at the respondent's June 2nd, 2016 hearing, evidence that was
not previously submitted was submitted by new counsel, i.e. a copy of the sentencing
minutes (Exhibit C, tab 0). That transcript shows clearly that on June 8th, 2007, he was
substance in the seventh degree. That document further demonstrates that Judge
Alvarado "set aside" the conviction and "afforded youthful offender treatment with
respect to each of the cases." Further, Judge Alvarado imposed "a straight conditional
court finds that the sentencing minutes conclusively establish that the respondent was
same for the certificate, the complaint, and sentencing minutes. Th sentencing date
and name of the judge are consistent with the certificate and sentencing minutes, and
both the certificate and sentencing minutes state that he received a conditional
conviction for a crime for purposes of immigration law and accordingly this offense
cannot support a charge of removability. Matter Devison, 22 l&N Dec. 1362, 1373 (BIA
2000).
fifth degree on December 10th, 2008. In its prior decision, the court found this to be a
divisible statute, which, utilizing the modified categorical approach, permits the court to
consult the record of conviction to determine what substance was involved. The court
found that OHS failed to establish the particular substance involved because the only
evidence indicating a substance, namely the indictment, was outside the record of
conviction. Niihawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (indicating that the court should
consult the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of the
factual basis for the plea). Consequently, the court did not sustain the aggravated
felony charge. Court applies the same analysis with regard to the controlled substance
offense removability charge. Model jury instructions for the statute of conviction make
clear that the substance involved is an element, not a means, of the offense. See
Criminal Jury Instructions 2nd, New York, Section 220.31. As OHS failed to submit the
removable offense.
In conclusion, the court finds that the new evidence establishes that the
youthful offender. Thus this offense simply does not render him removable.
Accordingly, OHS has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the
evidence, the court does not need to adjudicate his application for cancellation of
removal. Court believes that this ruling is consistent with the tenor of the BIA decision.
Accordingly, after careful review of the record, the following order will be
entered.
granted.
THOMAS J. MULLIGAN
Immigration Judge
A044-480-297
was held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of
a.t.r
GABRIELLE ALTMAN (Transcriber)
(Completion Date)