Persons and Family Relations Digest Compilation
Silverio v Republic
FACTS: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is
a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner
lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to
Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in
his birth certificate.
RULING: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA
9048 Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in
the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
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In Re: Petition For Change Of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of
Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang also Known as
Julian Lin Wang, to be Amended/Corrected as Julian Lin Wang, Julian
Lin Wang, Duly Represented by His Mother Anna Lisa Wang v. Cebu
City Civil Registrar, Duly Represented by the Registrar Oscar B. Molo
Case Doctrines:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in
his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
one's registered complete name.
FACTS: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to
each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study
together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file
a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and
have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of
name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when
he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a
person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State
has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering
that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then
decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the
RTC.
ISSUES: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
HELD: Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may
have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate
child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he
then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
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Persons and Family Relations Digest Compilation
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a
middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given
him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient
is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter
of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting
of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our
laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30
2005, 454 SCRA 2155).
Republic Of The Philippines Vs Cipriano Orbecido III
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur,
Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking
par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were
married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son
and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was
living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after
obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to
remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him
to remarry.
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The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of
that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
HELD: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the
Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26
should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice.
Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may
therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirits or intent.
Manuel vs Republic
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio
City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy.
The petitioner married Rubylus Gaa on July 28, 1975 in Makati. On the
same year, Gaa was charged with estafa. The petitioner visited her in jail
after three months and never saw her again.
In January 1996, petitioner, then 39 years old met complainant Tina B.
Gandalera, 21 years old, in Dagupan City. Petitioner visited her several
times in Baguio City, at one time he brought his parents whom assured the
complainant and her parents that the petitioner is single. On April 22, 1996,
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they had a civil marriage in Baguio, settling at Irisan, Baguio. In their
marriage contract, petitioner wrote that he was "single".
After three years of marriage, complainant allege that petitioner was home
only twice or thrice a year and that whenever complainant asks for
sustenance, the petitioner would slap her. On January 2001, the petitioner
finally left and did not return. Petitioner allege that the reason he left was
that her wife has a lover evidenced by the "love-bite" he saw on her neck.
The RTC of Baguio ruled against the petitioner, sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty from six years to ten month as minimum and ten
years as maximum, and indemnity in the amount of Php 200,000.00 by way
of moral damages. After appealing with the Court of Appeals, the sentence
was reduced to two years, four months and one day minimum and ten years
maximum.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
when it ruled that petitioner's first wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
when it affirmed the award of Php 200,000.00 as moral damages as it has
no basis in fact and in law.
RULING:
1. No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law. The Family
Code, having a retroactive effect, amended Article 390 of the Civil Code,
wherefore adding the third rule in the requirements for a subsequent
bigamous marriage to be considered valid, which are: (1) the prior spouse
have been absent for four consecutive years, (2) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, and (3) a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (Armas vs Calisterio
330 SCRA 201), the third rule of which is designed to harmonize with
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and penalizes bigamy.
2. No, there is no error of law committed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioner is liable for moral damages in accordance to Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code. Article 19 contends that a person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duty, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith; Article 20: every
person who, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter the same; and Article 21: any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another, in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage, by his and his parents' assurance that he is single, were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the complainant. Also, the
petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution,and against good morals, and the interest and
general welfare of society. Therefore, the award of Php 200,000. 00 cost for
moral damages is just and reasonable.
In The Matter Of The Adoption Of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle
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name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate
child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now
known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any
confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father)
is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC
merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat v. Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat
FACTS:
Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat
were married on September 16, 1965.
During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties,
including a 700 sq. m. parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought on November 17,
1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.
One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis
Tambuyat, who signed therein as Rosario Tambuyat. All this
time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.
When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made
under the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis.
When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a
Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she
was the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was
erroneously registered and made in the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis. That per annexed
marriage contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda
prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new certificate of title be
made out in Adrianos name, with her as the spouse indicated, and
that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.
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On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were
married on Sept. 2, 1988, and thereafter lived together as married
couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a
summary proceeding considering that a thorough determination
will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or
exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose
rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case.
The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of
Meycauayan to cancel the TCT of Banguis and in lieu thereof to
issue a new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Wenifreda Winnie Balcom Tambuyat. RTC justified
its decision by using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: court
authorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of the title.
The CA sustained the trial courts decision, noting that Banguis
name was included in the TCT by error or mistake. It held that the
evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda and not Banguis is
the lawful wife of Adriano that there is a valid and subsisting
marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to
such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court
and that Banguiss opposition to Wenifredas petition for
cancellation of TCT is not real and genuine as to place the latters
title to the subject property in doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted
by the court.
HELD: YES
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure,
alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to
in seven instances, included are (1) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. The
present case falls under the two instances because the RD of
Bulacan committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the
name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis
when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda and not Banguis
is Adrianos lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the appellate
court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be
said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each
other it cannot even be said that they have a common law
relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man
and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally married
in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is
true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
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Persons and Family Relations Digest Compilation
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a spouse
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Virginia D. Calimag Vs. Hiers of Silvertra N. Macapaz, represented by
Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr.
SEE ORIGINAL. 2016 CASE
Raquel G. Kho Vs. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Veronica B. Kho
SEE ORIGINAL. 2016 CASE
Soledad L. Lavadia, v Heirs Of Juan Luces Luna, Represented By
Gregorio Z. Luna And Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947.
Their marriage begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades
of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband
and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their
conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the
same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers.
The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which
they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the condominium
title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares.
When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still
registered in the names of the owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at
25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After
Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law
books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first
marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty.
Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty.
Luna. According to him, the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her
during their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property
became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty.
Luna from the first marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were
ordered turned over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
modified the RTC judgment by awarding all the properties, including the
law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
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Persons and Family Relations Digest Compilation
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in holding that the Agreement For Separation and
Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is
ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
RULING: In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of
determining whether the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
was valid, which will decide who among the contending parties were
entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10,
1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not
been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment
of the marriage.
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property
regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any
marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very
beginning, hence, their property relations is governed by the rules on co-
ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being
void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during
the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
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Persons and Family Relations Digest Compilation
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of
proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name
of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-
ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the
properties subject of the case, the subject properties were awarded in favour
of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
Petition denied.
Noveras v Noveras
FACTS: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena.
Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live
with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where
he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in
the Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance
of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were
awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the
petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for
liquidation of property since the spouses marriage has already been
dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community
because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage
ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit
any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the childrens legitimes.
Upon Leticias appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties
be divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their
children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the
California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that
allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper
HELD:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed
the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the
record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be
authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule
states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct
copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a
valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the
following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property: xxxx (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision because,
the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
community of properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence
that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not
been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately
since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was
once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife
of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly,
they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community
of property should be granted.
Norma A. Del Socorro, For And In Behalf Of Her Minor Child
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem v Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
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to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No.
9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he
being an alien.
ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law?
RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing,
even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to
support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter
is entitled thereto.
Villagracia v Fifth (5th) Shari' A District Court
FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-
meterparcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, from one
Ceres Caete. On March 3, 1996, a TCT No. T-15633 covering the parcel
of land was issued in Roldans name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio
B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land
Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. It was
only on October 30, 2006, when Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed,
found out that Vivencio occupied the said parcel of land. Failing to settle
with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the
possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Sharia District
Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Sharia District
Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess
the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to
Roldan, and pay damages as well as attorneys fees. A notice of writ of
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execution was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the
notice to comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio filed a petition for
relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction. He cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines and argued that Sharia District Courts
may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, hence the respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldans action for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land. However, respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court denied Vivencios petition for relief from judgment
for lack of merit. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ of
execution issued against Vivencio. Roldan argued that since respondent
Fifth Sharia District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery
of possession, he argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed
to file his answer, he effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings [before the Fifth Sharia District Court] and he cannot argue
that his rights were prejudiced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over a real
action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Sharia District
Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Vivencio.
RULING:
1. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts is the Code
of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the
Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction
with existing civil courts over real actions not arising from customary
contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims.
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the
right to possess and enjoy it. If the owner is dispossessed of his or her
property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession from the
dispossessor. When the property involved is real, such as land, the action to
recover it is a real action; otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such
actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Sharia District Courts to
validly take cognizance of them. In this case, the allegations in Roldans
petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim.
When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not
a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim. When it became apparent that
Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the
court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the law to
decide Roldans action because not all of the parties involved in the action
are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldans action for recovery
of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-
200 are void.
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2. In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio
to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his property, and pay
damages for the unauthorized use of his property. Thus, Roldans action for
recovery of possession is an action in personam. This action being in
personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent
Fifth Sharia District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencios person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a
Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Sharia District
Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
Republic vs. Cagandahan,
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan
and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan
is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower
court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead
the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender
and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the
petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil
registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not
without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent
furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish
on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course
of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a
persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this
case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in
this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate
the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that
respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings
who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male
nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological
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characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law
and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that
evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
Republic v Albios
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006,
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-
trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the
parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00
because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship.
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the
bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married.This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered
into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a
life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It
must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case
of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely
givenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
Balogbog vs. CA
FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and
accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and
accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of
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Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino,
their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas
and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not
aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to
question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police
investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is
the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their
parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he
knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned
during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at
the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local
Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record
of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina
should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil
Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged
marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889
should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil
Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or
unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such
as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and
wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court
of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus
entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of
Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General
of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this
country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case
was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must
be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed
the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested
rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption
is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married.
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Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other
evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos
family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Nancy Go and Alex Go vs Court of Appeals
FACTS: In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy
Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed
inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready.
She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon.
The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer
produce the said wedding video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go,
was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and
awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her
defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because
as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their
wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses
neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after
two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses
Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after
their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be
done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy
Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and
the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is
a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer
be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the
Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured
feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which
under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217
and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit,
this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may
exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy
Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she
(Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
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