Course Syllabus

PSCI 7372: Game Theory for Political Scientists

Fall 2010 - Tuesdays 1:00-3:45pm in GR 3.604

Instructor: Clint Peinhardt

Contact: clint.peinhardt@utdallas.edu
Office: Green Hall 3.524 (phone: 972-883-4955)
Hours: Wednesdays 10-11:30 am & by appointment

Course Pre-requisites, Co-requisites, and/or Other Restrictions

Students in this course should be enrolled in a graduate program in political science or have
instructor permission for enrolling.

Course Description
This course will introduce students to rational choice models, including their basic elements as well
as the most common solution concepts in game theory. The course will pay particular attention to
applications in political science, rather than the foundational models in economics.

Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes

Students will become critical consumers of the rational choice literature – in other words, you will be
able to read new game theoretic work, understand it, and provide a knowledgeable critique of the
modeler’s choices. Additionally, you will have a better understanding of the early and influential
formal models across political science. Those who want to compose their own formal models will
have the basic skills to do so and will be prepared to pursue further graduate studies.

Required Textbooks and Materials

Given the vastly different types of game theory books, there is no required text for this course.
Instead, I will recommend one of two sources as primary, along with the pursuit of multiple
supplemental texts. My own experience suggests that different students will like different
approaches to the topic, and so I recommend that you find one book that suits your needs and also
try to read others in any given week. The two books I recommend are:

• McCarty, Nolan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory New York: Cambridge
University Press.
• Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.

The first is more advanced and uses more complex notation, but is also more up-to-date and will be
a better reference book over time. The second is more accessible and is available used for cheap,
but its value to you will decline over time.

I encourage you also to purchase another book that you like and read the relevant parts of that one
each week as well – please bring particularly useful material to the entire class’s attention.

Course Syllabus Page 1

Suggested Course Materials
In addition to these two texts, I encourage you to engage in active searches for useful material on
the topic of the week, and when you find it, to post that online via our class website
elearning.utdallas.edu. As such, I expect that we will compile a helpful reading list as a class by the
end of the term.

Assignments & Academic Calendar – Readings from Electronic Reserves unless noted

Aug. 24 Introductions

Aug. 31 Preferences, Utility, Strategies, and Rationality

Morrow: Chapters 1-2, Appendix One (if you need it)
McCarty & Meirowitz (M&M): Ch. 2

Sept. 7 Normal Form Games

Morrow: pp. 73-111
M&M: Ch. 5

Sept.14 Extensive Form Games

Morrow: Ch. 5, but skip the bargaining model
M&M: Ch. 7 (pp. 174-end)
Clinton 1994

Sept. 21 Repeated Games

Morrow: end of Ch. 8 (“Intro to Restrictions on Beliefs”) & Ch. 9
M&M: Ch. 9
Bianco, Ordeshook and Tsebelis 1990

Sept. 28 Complete Information Games: Examples

Geddes, Barbara. 1991.
Vanberg, Georg. 1998.

Oct. 5 Bayesian Games

Morrow: Ch. 6
M&M: Ch. 6

Oct. 12 Perfect & Sequential Equilibrium Concepts

Morrow: Ch. 7
M&M: Ch. 8 (esp. pp. 204-214)

Oct. 19 Signaling Games

Morrow: Ch. 8
M&M: Ch. 8 (esp. pp. 214-219 & applications)
Sartori 2002

Oct. 26 Incomplete Information Games: Examples

Fearon. 2004.
Epstein and Zemsky. 1995.

Course Syllabus Page 2

 Nov. 2 Social Choice
* Riker 1982, pp. 1-19, 115-136
Morrow Ch. 5, on “Sophisticated Voting” and “Agenda Control”
M&M: Ch. 4

Nov. 9 Spatial Voting

Morrow: Ch. 4, on “Candidate Competition” and Ch. 5 on “Legislative Rules”
* Strom 1990
Cox 1990

Nov. 16 Electoral Competition

* Downs 1957, pp. 114-141
* Person & Tabellini 2000, pp. 47-68

Nov. 23 No class

Nov. 30 Bargaining
Morrow: Ch. 5, on “Rubinstein Bargaining Model” and Ch. 8, on “Bargaining
under Incomplete Information”
M&M: Ch. 10
Baron & Ferejohn 1989

Full Citations of Readings - those marked with asterisk (*) are available via electronic
reserves, The URL for this page is:
http://utdallas.docutek.com/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=905
and the password is “redistribute”.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science
Review 83 (4):1181-206.

Bianco, William T., Peter C. Ordeshook, and George Tsebelis. 1990. Crime and Punishment: Are One-
Shot, Two-Person Games Enough? American Political Science Review 84 (2):569-86.

Clinton, Robert Lowry. 1994. Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A
Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison. American Journal of Political Science 38 (2):285-302.

Cox, Gary C. 1990. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of
Political Science 34 (4):903-35.

* Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.

Epstein, David, and Peter Zemsky. 1995. Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in
Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review 89 (2):295-308.

Fearon, James D. 2004. Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others? Journal of
Peace Research 41 (3):275-301.

Geddes, Barbara. 1991. A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies.
American Political Science Review 85 (2):371-92.

Course Syllabus Page 3

* Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

* Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

* Strom, Gerald S. 1990. The Logic of Lawmaking. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Vanberg, Georg. 1998. Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 10 (3):299-326.

Grading Policy
Enrollment for this class will allow for substantially class participation; don’t be afraid to raise your
hand and ask questions during the lectures! Students who participate in class discussions will show
their effort in the course and will receive (on average) higher participation grades. Additionally,
students will write at least three short papers (2-4 pages, double-spaced 10-12 point font, 1 inch
margins) and one more substantial book review (6-8 pages of same format). A midterm exam will
cover the introductory and trade sections of the course, while a final exam will cover the finance and
special topics sections. For both exams, students will receive a study guide to help focus on the right
course material.

Grades will be tabulated as follows:

Class Attendance & Participation 20%

Weekly Problem Sets 40%
Research Paper 40%

Course & Instructor Policies

With the small class size, students should inform the professor of any necessary absences. All
students are expected to take the exams when offered, unless prior arrangements are made with the
professor. Late papers will be penalized 1 letter grade (A to A-, A- to B+, etc.) for each day overdue.

All the University’s policies and procedures regarding courses also apply to this course – those may
be found at http://provost.utdallas.edu/home/syllabus-policies-and-procedures-text.

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.

Course Syllabus Page 4