Is Lucas liable to Wideman in the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress when a) W invited family friend Lucas to view his new house over a friendly family dinner and she tweeted and geotagged a congratulatory statement about his win in the Lucas v. Smith case; b) after W had informed L he was having some anxiety about threats relating to his prosecution in that case; W is now seeking therapy for anxiety and taking lexapro? II. SHORT ANSWER [ZY] No, Lucas is not liable. The decision in Vance. V. Vance provides the controlling law in establishing a four prong test for establishing intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wideman made no attempt to discourage Lucas from posting any of the photos to the internet, relieving her of any prior knowledge claim. The simplistic nature of posting a photo is indicative to the fact that Lucass behavior was neither extreme or outrageous. In addition, Mr. Wideman displayed symptoms prior to Ms. Lucass actions making it difficult to make a case of causality. Finally, Mr. Widemans alleged injuries are consistent with such a line of work and would be inappropriate to consider as severe. III. STATEMENT OF FACTS [ZY] On June 13th 2016, Mr. Wideman invited Ms. Lucas into his home for a cordial visit and dinner. In the weeks prior, Mr. Wideman had enjoyed some success in his work as an attorney successfully securing a 35 year prison sentence for the somewhat notorious Lucious Smith Case. Following dinner, the two families celebrated the time with some pictures. One of which included Mr. Wideman and his family that they willingly and knowingly posed for, without explicit instruction not to post such a photo online. Lucas decided to post this photo with an endearing caption congratulating Mr. Wideman on his work with the Smith case to Twitter, including with the picture a GEO tag. Since this event, Mr. Wideman has expressed how unnerving this post has made him, especially being the center of attention for a notorious case. While Mr. Wideman has not experienced any threats directly related to the information given in the tweet, he fears for his and his familys safety in light of the information going public. Mr. Wideman has even expressed he is seeing a psychiatrist and taking medication to deal with the symptoms resulting from the stress he has sustained. Mr. Wideman is intending to seek damages from what he interprets as reckless behavior on the part of Ms. Lucas, which he claims has severely impacted his day to day life. IV. DISCUSSION SOLOMON WIDEMAN LIKELY DOES NOT HAVE A CLAIM AGAINST LAUREN LUCAS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. Maryland courts first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 46 (1965), Harris identified four elements necessary in order to succeed on a claim of IIED. These elements include the following: 1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be severe. 380 A.2d at 614. Because all four elements can be met on the facts here, Wideman is unlikely to succeed on an IIED claim against Lauren Lucas. The specific analysis of, and factual application to, each of these elements is discussed in detail below. A. Whether Lucas conduct was reckless? [ZY] In determining what the court should consider to be reckless in reference to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maryland has several relevant cases that help establish the controlling law for this case. The most important case for establishing precedence in Maryland for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977), this case set forth that in order for an action to be considered reckless there must be prior knowledge that the action being taken has a high probability of inducing distress. Another detrimental case in establishing controlling law for the first prong is Green v. TA Shoemaker & Co. 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 - 1909. This case is vital to our argument as it establishes an important precedence in the state of Maryland, in the absence of injury there cannot be recovery from emotional distress. The last case we look to for guidance on this type of tort in Maryland is Vance v. Vance, 408 A. 2d 728 - Md: Court of Appeals 1979, which found that for an action to be considered extreme, that action must be so outrageous as to go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered utterly intolerable by society. It is with these precedents established hereto that we can begin to apply these rules to the current case. In regards to applying the controlling cases to the case at hand, we can begin with establishing relevance of Harris v. Jones and the idea of prior knowledge. In this case Ms. Lucas did have prior knowledge of the case, and was even quick to congratulate Mr. Wideman on his success. However, Ms. Lucas could not have foreseen her tweet causing Mr. Wideman emotional distress. Ms. Lucas only thought that she was merely sharing her excitement for her friend with her Twitter followers, which is essentially the entire point of social media. Next, we can apply to the controlling law of Green v. TA Shoemaker & Co, which established that there cannot be a claim for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury. In this case, Mr. Wideman began seeing a psychiatrist for symptoms he claims manifested after Ms. Lucas tweet. While this is in line with what is considered viable for reckless behavior according to Green, we can debunk this potential counterargument with reference to the third prong of causality in the counterargument subsection. Lastly, we apply the ruling of Vance v. Vance to the facts of this case. Vance v. Vance helped set the ground rules for what can be considered reckless behavior, the definition being, So outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." In this case, the action of tweeting clearly does not satisfy the established definition. Tweeting a picture, and even with the inclusion of a location, is in no means aligned with the definition as it is a normal practice that all of society partakes in. Social media has become so intertwined with our everyday lives, and to consider using these platforms as a reckless action would establish a dangerous precedence where all social media use could be interpreted as reckless. Thus, in this case the court is highly unlikely to consider that Ms. Lucas actions were indeed reckless. With the base connections established between the controlling cases and the case of Lucas v. Wideman, we can begin to analyze the similarities between the cases that ensure the courts likelihood to rule in favor of Ms. Lucas. In Harris v. Jones, the plaintiff had been suffering from a speech impediment which he was extremely sensitive about. Despite this, the defendant continued to ridicule the plaintiff to the point where the speech impediment worsened. Subsequently, the plaintiff made an unsuccessful claim against the defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Similarly, Ms. Lucas was aware of the death threats that Mr. Wideman was receiving that were already causing him emotional distress. However, similarly to Harris, Ms. Lucas actions were not intended to contribute to the cause of the original emotional distress. Ms. Lucas actions in no way shape or form intended to promote the kind of threats that Mr. Wideman was already receiving. It follows then as in Harris v. Jones that Ms. Lucas actions cannot be considered reckless even though she had prior knowledge of the situation rather than prior knowledge of the consequences of her actions. In reference to Green v. TA Shoemaker and CO., the defendant was conducting construction near the plaintiff's house. The constant presence of loud noise from the ensuing explosions left the plaintiff in constant fear for her life, which lead to her experiencing emotional stress and filing suit. In this case, Mr. Wideman was in constant fear for his life from the death threats he was experiencing from his successful trial. However in Green v. TA Shoemaker and CO. the court ruled that there could not be a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff did not have any physical symptoms manifest from the emotional distress. On the contrary, in the current case there was indeed a development of physical symptoms. Yet the major differences in this case lies in when the emotional distress began. In the controlling case the distress began immediately following the start of the construction work, and in the current case the distress began before Ms. Lucas action. We will go into more detail on this in the counterargument subsection that follows this one. In Vance v. Vance, the plaintiff sued the defendant for emotional distress over the fact that there marriage was technically never valid. In the controlling case, the court found in favor of the defendant due to the fact that he could have never predicted that his actions could have resulted in the emotional distress of the plaintiff, because the defendant could not have predicted that the revelation of their invalid marriage would cause the plaintiff emotional distress. Similarly, in Wideman v. Lucas, the defendant could not have predicted that her action would have caused her friend so much emotional distress. The actions taken by Ms. Lucas were without intention of causing emotional distress to Mr. Wideman, and without anticipation of causing emotional distress. Thus, because Ms. Lucas could not have reasonably anticipated the emotional distress resulting from her actions, she cannot be held liable in this instance To conclude the first prong, it is important to revisit the potential counterargument established in the Green v. TA Shoemaker and Co. case. As previously mentioned, this case established the necessity for a physical symptom in order to justify a claim for emotional distress, such symptoms were experienced by Mr. Wideman. However, unlike the controlling case, Mr. Wideman was experiencing symptoms before Ms. Lucas ever tweeted the picture. It then follows, according to the third prong of causality, that Mr. Wideman cannot use this in his case for emotional distress. This would be the biggest threat to the first prong, yet when we compare the facts across all prongs we see that this claim will prove ineffective to establish emotional distress. B. Whether Lucas conduct was extreme and outrageous? [DB] In regards to the second prong Extreme and Outrageous conduct, Lucas conduct was well within the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior in this day and age. The test for extreme and outrageous conduct is set out in Harris v. Jones. There the court stated that extreme and outrageous conduct can only be found when the conduct goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Here, Lucas conduct of tweeting and geotagging a picture of Wideman and his family, cannot be constituted as outside the bounds of decency because Twitter is a modern day social media service that people across the majority of society, have come to embrace and use. So much so that most cell phones come with the capability to use twitter. As stated in Kentucky Fried Chicken Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663 (1992), the conduct must be exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. If these capabilities are built into every phone built today, and people use these features frequently, then the mere use of these abilities cannot be extreme and outrageous. In Kentucky Fried Chicken Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663 (1992). Even in this instance, with points of similarity, the court did not find the defendants actions as extreme and outrageous. Another previous instance is in Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical, 106 Md. App. 470 (1995), where the conduct in question was Peninsula Regional Medical Centers firing of Bagwell after hitting of a patient in reaction to claiming to being bit. The bar for extreme and outrageous is set high by court in Harris v. Jones, as a means to avoid claims of IIED for mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. If extreme and outrageous conduct wasnt found in these two cases, then the conduct in the case at hand has to be deemed trivial in comparison them. The conduct is still not extreme and outrageous, even if one were to argue that it was due to her knowledge of Widemans worries regarding his work, referencing BN v. KK, 312 Md. 135 (1988). In BN v. KK, Dr. Ks knowledge and non-disclosure of his genital herpes to his at the time sexual partner, Ms. N. This still does not constitute as extreme and outrageous conduct as the court stated in Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co, 66 Md. App. 46 (1986) though the conduct was unquestionably rude, insensitive, callous, and in poor taste. It was not, however, extreme and outrageous. Another route of argument to counter this notion is that Wideman gave Lucas passive consent when he was made aware of the phones capabilities and still decided to take the photo, review it, and allow Lucas to carry on. Overall, the prong of extreme and outrageous conduct is unlikely to be satisfied.
C. Whether Widemans injuries were causally related to the conduct? [DB]
In order for the fourth tort causal connection to be met the facts need to show a causal connection between the conduct of Lucas and the emotional distress Wideman claims to experience. Harris v. Jones is the controlling case law as it establishes that causal connection can not be found where there is a preexisting condition. Specifically in Harris v. Jones, William R. Harris was an employee of General Motors Corporation that had a speech impediment that caused him to stutter, which he was insecure about. In spite of having knowledge of Harris insecurities regarding his disability, his supervisor, Robert Jones, ridiculed him consistently. Harris alleged this lead to nervousness, worsening of his speech impediment, and injuring his self-esteem. The court ultimately did not find in favor of Harris. Here the same should be found as the true cause of Widemans distress did not stem from Lucas tweet but from his career choice. At the dinner Wideman told Lucas that the Lucas v. Smith case he was working on was extremely stressful because he was receiving death threats. So much so that he was ready to change careers after the case was over. Two weeks later he is still in the same career field and working back in the courtroom, where he states that he froze up. The emotional distress that Wideman experienced predated the Lucass tweet, therefore making the condition preexisting and not causally related. Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490 (1979) displays an additional way in which a causal connection cannot be found here. In Vance v. Vance, Arnold Vance (Dr. Vance) and Muriel Vance (Muriel) took part in a religious marriage ceremony. After living with one another as husband and wife for eighteen years and having two children, Dr. Vance left Muriel for another woman. Muriel sought alimony and child support but Dr. Vance fought this decree by stating that their marriage was void as he never divorced his first wife. Upon learning of this, Muriel alleged that she became severely distressed, which lead her to seek damages on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Though the lower courts found in favor of Muriel, that decision was reversed based on insufficient evidence of a causal connection. The courts reasoning behind this decision was that the eighteen years of Dr. Vances misrepresentation of his marital status was not in of itself the cause of Muriels distress. The court stated that there must have been a subsequent revelation under circumstances such as deterioration of the marriage which would prevent the situation from being remedied. Here, the circumstances are the same. For two weeks Wideman did not have knowledge of Lucas tweet. Despite this lack of knowledge, Wideman should have known that Lucas would tweet the picture they took together and geotag it, as she told him of her new smartphones capabilities. The events at the dinner should have gave Wideman a warning of the conduct to come similar to Muriel Vance, so causation cannot be found here. Even if the court should find that in spite of the time between the conduct and distress there was a causal connection using precedence set in Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503 (1987) where the court stated that it was not a requirement for the distress to immediately follow the conduct alleged of inciting it. This would be irrelevant as the true cause of Widemans distress did not stem from Lucas tweet but from his career choice, and Wideman should have know from the events at the dinner party that Lucas would tweet the photo. Therefore, a causal connection can not be established, which means that Wideman will not succeed in proving this element of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. D. Whether WIdemans injuries were severe? [ZY] The controlling cases for the prong of establishing severity begins with Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Harris v. Jones established that in order for injuries resulting from emotional distress to constitute as severe, that no reasonable man can be expected to endure it. Another case that provides precedence for what constitutes severity is Leese v. Baltimore County, 497 A. 2d 159 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 1985. According to this case, injuries can only be considered severe if they are severely disabling. According to these established definitions for severity, Mr. Widemans injuries would not hold up in court as being considered severe. Harris v. Jones is applicable to this case in that Mr. Wideman claims that the emotional distress resulting from Ms. Lucas actions impacted his life. Yet the stress from Ms Lucas actions has not kept Mr. Lucas from working or participating in his day to day life. The only change we see from this stress is his participation of therapy and the addition of medication in his daily routine. Clearly, Mr. Wideman has been able to function normally in society, and his new found condition is far from unbearable. In reference to Leese v. Baltimore County, we see a similar pattern emerge. Mr. Wideman has not experienced a drastic shift in lifestyle that would constitute his emotional distress as severely disabling. When we apply the definitions from the controlling cases to the facts of Wideman v. Lucas, neither definitions would define Mr. Widemans condition as being severe. It is likely then, that the court would not be able to fulfill the fourth prong of severity for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and would likely find in favor of Ms. Lucas. When we compare the specifics of Harris v. Jones to Wideman v. Lucas, we confirm that Mr. Widemans condition is not sufficient to constitute a label of severe. As we mentioned in earlier prongs, the plaintiff in Harris v. Jones suffered from a speech impediment. The plaintiff in this case claimed that the actions of the defendant caused this condition to worsen, and filed suit for emotional distress. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, citing that the worsening of a preexisting condition was not enough to constitute severity. Similarly in Wideman v. Lucas, the plaintiff was suffering from a preexisting condition resulting from the death threats that he was receiving as a result of his recent success as a prosecutor. Ms. Lucas was not the cause of these death threats and therefore the stress induced from them. Following the same logic of the controlling case, Ms. Lucas cannot be liable if her actions merely worsened the stress Mr. Wideman was already experiencing. Leese v. Baltimore County also shares some similarities with Wideman. v. Lucas. In this controlling case, the plaintiff claimed they were wrongly terminated from their job filing many infractions including a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the court found that the plaintiffs suit of this tort failed to meet the fourth prong for the test of severity. A large part of the courts reasoning for this was that the plaintiff was still able to participate in day to day life in the form of looking for a new job. In this case, Mr. Wideman was still able to complete similar day to day activities despite claiming severe injury from the emotional distress caused by Ms. Lucas tweet. It should then follow that the court will rule that Mr. Widemans injuries could not be considered severe if they follow the same logic of the court in the controlling case. The only possible counterargument that could be made is that the emotional distress has lead to Mr. Wideman considering leaving his job and moving his family. Luckily for our interests, the court cannot make rulings based on intentions or inclinations and is unlikely to rule for Mr. Wideman. Instead, the court will base its rulings off the facts that already exist including the fact that Mr. Wideman has not been disabled so severely that he cannot participate in his day to day life. Therefore, it is safe to say that the court will likely favor Ms. Lucas in its ruling. E. Conclusion [ZY] In conclusion, the court is likely to rule in favor of the defendant in the case of Wideman v. Lucas. As we dissect each of the four prongs necessary to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, we find significant holes in each prong. If all four prongs are necessary to constitute a valid suit, it is likely for the court to see the requirements for all prongs are absent. This leads us to confidently believe that the court is likely to favor Ms. Lucas, with little chance of the plaintiff being able to validate all four prongs of the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress.