Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTHESUPREMECOURTOFINDIA
CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION
CRIMINALAPPEALNOS.12171219OF2017
[ArisingoutofS.L.P.(Crl.)Nos.26402642of2016]
Ms.Eera
ThroughDr.ManjulaKrippendorf...Appellant(s)
Versus
State(Govt.ofNCTofDelhi)&Anr.Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
DipakMisra,J.
Leavegranted.
2. Thepivotalissuethatemanatesforconsiderationin
theseappeals,byspecialleave,pertainstointerpretation
ofSection2(d)oftheProtectionofChildrenfromSexual
OffencesAct,2012(forshort,thePOCSOAct),andthe
defineschildtomeananypersonbelowtheageof18
2
extremelyintellectuallychallengedpersonwhoevenhas
withintheholisticconceptionofthetermchild.
Bhati,learnedcounselfortheappellant,thesupporting
chosenottoenterappearance,fewfactsareessentialto
benoted.Theappellantisrepresentedbyhermotheron
thefoundationthatsheissufferingfromCerebralPalasy
wouldunroll,themotheroftheappellanthadlodgedFIR
No.197of2014atPoliceStationDefenceColony,New
DelhiagainsttherespondentNo.2allegingthathehad
committedrapeonhermentallyretardeddaughterand
onthebasisoftheFIR,investigationwascarriedonand
Court,Saket,NewDelhifortrial.Manyafacthasbeen
enumeratedwhichneednotbestatedindetail.Sufficeit
variousaspectssuchascameratrial,videographyofthe
trial,absenceofcongenialatmosphereandmanyother
issuesemerged.Asthemotheroftheappellantfeltthat
the trial court was not able to address the same, the
victimthroughhermother,filedapetitionunderSection
482oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure(CrPC)beforethe
HighCourtofDelhipraying, interalia,thatthematter
4
hardlyaround6to8yearsandthereisnecessityfortrial
prosecutrixmainlycommunicatesthroughgestures.The
orderpassedinthatregardreadasfollows:
Videorderdated15th September,2014,
the learned ASJ, Special Fast Track Court,
Sakethaddirectedthattheprosecutrixwhois
a physically and mentally challenged girl
sufferingfromcerebralpalsywillbeprovideda
special educator/interpreter and necessary
arrangements be made for videographing the
incameratrialatthetimeofrecordingofthe
statement of the prosecutrix. When the
evidence ofthe prosecutrixwassoughttobe
recordedon15thMay,2015thelearnedJudge
noted that the concerned officer of the
vulnerable witness Court complex submitted
that the videographing of the proceedings is
not permissible. The learned Additional
Sessions Judge has sought necessary
directions regarding videography from the
learnedSessionsJudge(South)inthisregard
andhaslistedthematterfor27thMay,2015.It
is also informed by the learned APP on
instructionsfromtheinvestigatingofficerthat
5
twodoctorsofAIIMShavebeencontactedwho
willbepresentonthedatewhentheevidence
oftheprosecutrixhastoberecorded.
Learnedcounselforthepetitionerstates
that the prosecutrix is terrified by the
presence of males and it would be thus
appropriate if femaledoctors/interpretersare
available at the time of the evidence of the
prosecutrix. Learned APP will file a status
reportinthisregardbeforethenextdate.
4. Thematterwasfinallydisposedofvideorderdated
SpecialCourtestablishedunderthePOCSOActasthe
functionalageoftheprosecutrixis6to8yearsand(ii)
thetransferofthecasefromP.S.DefenceColonytothe
CrimeBranchforpropersupervisionalinvestigationwere
HighCourtdirectedthatthecaseshouldbeassignedto
Court.
6
5. Whenthematterwaslistedon01.04.2016,itwas
appellantthattheprosecutrixhasbeensufferingfroma
devastatingmentalandphysicaldisordersinceherbirth
andthoughsheisbiologicallyagedabout38years,she
hasnotmentallygrownbeyondsixyears.Insupportof
referredtoSection28ofthePOCSOActwhichdealswith
CourttoSections24to27ofthePOCSOActtohighlight
thatthereisaspecialprocedureforrecordingstatement
ofthechildand,therefore,whenmedicalevidencehad
shouldnotbethegoverningyardstickbutsheshouldbe
challengedandmentallyretardedunderthePOCSOAct.
6. AstherespondentNo.2didnotappear,theCourt
appointedMr.SanjayR.Hegde,learnedseniorcounsel,
asAmicusCuriaetoargueandputforththepointson
Mr.P.K.Deyand Mr.SiddharthDave,learnedcounsel
assistedtheCourt.
circulatedthatthesoleaccused,therespondentNo.2,
haddiedduringthependencyoftheproceeding. When
event,itwascontendedbyMs.Bhatiappearingforthe
Thatapart,shealsosubmittedthatafterthedeathofthe
thoughtitappropriatetoaddressthesame.
belowtheageofeighteenyearsshouldnotbeconferreda
yearsaresingularlyandexclusivelyassociatedwiththe
withtherealconceptorconceptionofage.Elaborating
theargument,shewouldcontendthatchild,asdefined
underArticle1oftheUnitedNationsConventiononthe
RightsofChildren,istomeaneveryhumanbeingbelow
majorityisattainedearlier.
theintrinsicperspectiveofPOCSOActandconstruction
includebiologicalandmentalagesothattheprotective
umbrellameantandrecognizedforthechildunderthe
contendedbyherthatlikesoftheappellantwhosuffer
unabletokeeppacewithbiologicalageandtheirmental
conceived,itwouldbeananathemathatthelawthathas
9
beenbroughtintoprotecttheclass,thatis,child,leaves
outapartofitthoughtheyareworsethanthechildren
biologicalageof30years,butinrealitybehaveslikea
childof8to10years,forthementalage,asitiscalled,
stopsprogressing.Shehasdrawnacomparisonbetween
recognizedapersonofunsoundmindtobeonthesame
protectiononthebasisofmaturityofunderstanding,to
Emphasisisondeparturefromthechronologicalageby
thelegislaturebylayingstressoncapacitytounderstand
referredtoChapterXXVoftheCrPCthatenumeratesthe
provisionsastotheaccusedpersonsofunsoundmind.
dignity.Tobuttresshersubmission,shehasreliedupon
ReenaBanerjee&anotherv.Govt.(NCTofDelhi)and
Kanolkarv.StateofGoa4.
withbiologicalagewillnotcauseanyviolencetoSection
accordwiththecontextoftheschemeofthePOCSOAct
fulcrumofthespiritofthelegislationthatismeantto
protectthevictims. Thelegislaturehasusedtheword
childandrestrictedittoageof18years,butwhena
suffersfrominadequacytounderstand,chronologicalage
shouldnotbetheguidingfactororlaserbeambutthe
realmentalage,forthecherishedpurposeofthePOCSO
1
(2015)11SCC725
2
(2015)1SCC67
3
(2009)9SCC1
4
(2003)8SCC590
11
abuseofachild.Aliteralconstruction,accordingtothe
ManagementofNewDelhiTuberculosisCentre,New
EmployeesStateInsuranceCorporation9.
harassmentandabusewithdueregardtosafeguardthe
5
(1986)2SCC614
6
(1999)2SCC228
7
(2008)9SCC527
8
(2012)2SCC489
9
(2014)9SCC657
12
interestandwellbeingofthechildrenateverystageof
judicialproceedingincludingchildrenfriendlyprocedure,
Courtsforthespeedytrialand,therefore,apersonwho
ismentallychallenged/retardedisrequiredtobebrought
withinthedefinitionofachildsothatthelifeisignitedto
thatwhensuchapersonisincapableofunderstanding
whensuchaninterpretationisplaced,itservesthebasic
thereisadistinctionbetweentwoterms,namely,age
chronologyandhence,itispossibletointerprettheword
meansyearandyearhasbeendefinedintheGeneral
ClausesAct,1897asperiodof365days.Hehasreferred
totheJuvenileJustice(CareandProtectionofChildren)
13
Act,2015tohighlightthatthelegislativeintentionthere
forumoftrial.Itisfurthercontendedbyhimthatifthe
biologicalageismorethan18yearsbytheSpecialCourt
asprovidedunderthePOCSOAct,theaccusedisnoway
affectedbecausethepunishmentfortheoffenceremains
thesameevenifthetrialisheldbytheCourtofSession
undertheCrPC. Learnedcounselinhiswrittennoteof
submissionshasplacedrelianceuponSheikhGulfan&
AshokKumar11,PratapSinghv.StateofJharkhand
andanother12,DirectorateofEnforcementv.Deepak
Mahajanandanother13.
hascommendedustothedecisioninDeepakMahajan
(supra).
10
AIR1965SC1839
11
(1987)1SCC204
12
(2005)3SCC551
13
(1994)3SCC440
14
engagedbytheCourttoassistonbehalfofrespondent
AdvancedLawLexiconbyP.RamanathaAiyar,3 rd Edn.
2005p.175,learnedseniorcounselwouldsubmitthat
thereisdistinctionbetweenmentalageandchronological
age.HaditbeentheintentionoftheParliamentnotto
makesuchadistinction,itwouldhaveincludedwithin
theprotectiveambitofthedefinitionpertainingtoadults
whosementalageislessthan18years. Itisurgedby
himthatwhenthelanguageofthedictionaryclauseis
clearandunambiguous,itshouldbegivenitsordinary
literalmeaning.Itisfurtherarguedbyhimthatwherever
thelegislaturehasintendedtorefertootherdefinitionof
ageincludingmentalage,ithasspecificallymadelike
Protectionof Children)Act,2015and,therefore,inthe
andforthesaidpurpose,hehasdrawninspirationfrom
proceedingsandalsoitwouldhavetheeffectpotentiality
toderailthetrialanddefeatthepurposeoftheAct,for
wouldfurtherurgethatvariousCourtsinotherpartsof
Bench]andOggMossv.R16[SupremeCourtofCanada].
14
BCCA1999416
15
[1901]1KB726
16
[1984]2SCR173
16
Section2(d)isplainandintelligible,theCourtoughtnot
addorreadwordsintothesameregardbeinghadtothe
andothers17andLt.Col.PrithiPalSinghBedietc.v.
UnionofIndiaandothers18.
15. Learnedseniorcounselwouldsubmitthatifmental
instance,hehasreferredtoSection5(k)ofthePOCSO
Actwhichalludestochildsmentalorphysicaldisability
Hehassubmittedthatifthetermageisinterpretedto
inconsistencies.Forthesaidpurpose,hehasreferredto
scientificviewsandmethodsvary.Theeventualstandof
proximatefigurecanneverbeconstantandislikelyto
17
(1990)2SCC378
18
(1982)3SCC140:[1983]1SCR393
17
andusherinuncertainty.
POCSOAct.Thesaidpieceoflegislationcameintoeffect
POCSOActareasfollows:
1. ..
2. ..
3. ThedatecollectedbytheNationalCrime
Records Bureau shows that there has been
increase in cases of sexual offences against
children.ThisiscorroboratedbytheStudyon
Child Abuse: India 2007 conducted by the
Ministry of Women and Child Development.
Moreover,sexualoffencesagainstchildrenare
notadequatelyaddressedbytheexistinglaws.
A large number of such offences are neither
specifically provided for nor are they
adequately penalized. The interests of the
child, both as a victim as well as a witness,
need to be protected. It is felt that offences
18
5. ..
6. ..
7. ..
17. ThePreambleofthePOCSOActreadsthus:
ANDWHEREAS,theGovernmentofIndiahas
acceded on the 11th December, 1992 to the
ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,adopted
by the General Assembly of the United
Nations, which has prescribed a set of
19
standardstobefollowedbyallStatepartiesin
securingthebestinterestsofthechild;
ANDWHEREASitisnecessaryfortheproper
developmentofthechildthathisorherright
toprivacyandconfidentialitybeprotectedand
respected by every person by all means and
through all stages of a judicial process
involvingthechild;
ANDWHEREASsexualexploitationandsexual
abuseofchildrenareheinouscrimesandneed
tobeeffectivelyaddressed.
18. ThepurposeofreferringtotheStatementofObjects
andReasonsandthePreambleofthePOCSOActisto
20
appreciatethattheverypurposeofbringingalegislation
ofthepresentnatureistoprotectthechildrenfromthe
diligentdiscernmentofthepreamble,itismanifestthat
confidentialityofachildtobeprotectedandrespectedby
importanceateverystagetoensurethehealthyphysical,
child.Thereisalsoastipulationthatsexualexploitation
and sexualabuseareheinousoffencesandneedtobe
reasonsprovidesregardbeinghadtotheconstitutional
tenderageofchildrenisnotabusedandtheirchildhood
child,bothasavictimaswellasawitness,needstobe
POCSOAct.
projects.
providesforpenetrativesexualassaultandpunishment
enumeratesnumberofcircumstanceswheretheoffence
becomesaggravatedone.Itincludesinitsambitvarious
attentionhasbeendrawnreadsthus:
(k)whoever,takingadvantageofachild'smental
orphysicaldisability,commitspenetrativesexual
assaultonthechild;
Theaforesaidprovision,asisevident,laysstresson
thementaldisabilityofthechild.
21. PartCofChapterIIdealswithsexualassaultand
whichwillamounttosexualharassment.
22. OnareadingoftheaforesaidChapters,itisquite
manifestandlimpidthatthelegislaturehasintendedto
harassment.Ithasalsolaidstressuponthementaland
23
Actprotectsthechildfromanysexualactandalsotakes
legislaturewasalivetotheconditionofmentaldisability.
ChapterIIIofthePOCSOActdealswithusingchildfor
commitanoffence.ChapterVdealswiththeprocedure
procedureforrecordingstatementofthechild.Sections
additionalprovisionsregardingstatementtoberecorded
andmedicalexaminationofachild.
23. Section27stipulatesthatmedicalexaminationofa
childinrespectofwhomanyoffencehasbeencommitted
Section164AoftheCrPC. Itisalsosignificanttonote
registeredfortheoffencesunderthePOCSOAct.Ishall
refertoSection164ACrPCatalaterstage.Section28of
everySpecialCourtforconductingthecasesunderthe
provisionsofthePOCSOAct.ChapterVIIIdealswiththe
recordingofevidence. Section35providesforaperiod
protectsthechildandcastsanobligationontheSpecial
Courttoseethatthechild,innoway,isexposedtothe
accusedatthetimeofrecordingofevidence.Recording
ofthestatementofachildisthroughvideoconferencing
orbyutilizingsinglevisibilitymirrorsorcurtainsorany
otherdeviceispermissible. Thisprovisionhasitsown
sanctity.Section37dealswithtrialstobeconductedin
25
interpreterorexpertwhilerecordingevidenceofachild.
Section42AlaysthepostulatethatPOCSOActisnotin
derogationoftheprovisionsofanyotherlaw.
makerulesforcarryingoutthepurposesofthePOCSO
Act.InexerciseofpowersconferredunderSection45,a
14.11.2012.Rule7whichdealswithcompensationreads
asunder:
(2) TheSpecialCourtmay,onitsownoron
an application filed by or on behalf of the
victim,recommendtheawardofcompensation
wheretheaccusedisconvicted,orwherethe
case ends in acquittal or discharge, or the
accusedisnottracedoridentified,andinthe
26
(3)WheretheSpecialCourt,undersubsection
(8) of section 33 of the Act read with sub
sections(2)and(3)ofsection357AoftheCode
of Criminal Procedure, makes a direction for
the award of compensation to the victim, it
shall take into account all relevant factors
relating to the loss or injury caused to the
victim,includingthefollowing:
(i)typeofabuse,gravityoftheoffenceandthe
severity of the mental or physical harm or
injurysufferedbythechild;
(vii) whetherthechildbecamepregnantasa
resultoftheoffence;
(4) ThecompensationawardedbytheSpecial
CourtistobepaidbytheStateGovernment
fromtheVictimsCompensationFundorother
scheme or fund established by it for the
purposes of compensating and rehabilitating
victims under section 357A of the Code of
CriminalProcedureoranyotherlawsforthe
time being in force, or, where such fund or
scheme does not exist, by the State
Government.
(6)Nothingintheserulesshallpreventachild
orhisparentorguardianoranyotherperson
in whom the child has trust and confidence
from submitting an application for seeking
28
reliefunderanyotherrulesorschemeofthe
CentralGovernmentorStateGovernment.
POCSOActandreferredtotheschematiccontentinits
purposiveapproachregardbeinghadtothecentripodal
mentallygrowninage,thoughmayhavefeltthesketchy
shadowofbiologicalyears. Theiraccentisnotonlyon
theprovisionsoftheActbutalsoonthemethodologyof
computationunderthePOCSOAct.
perceivetheprovisionthroughthesaidmagnifiedglass
19
148F2d737(2dCir1945)
29
interpretation:
Ofcourseitistruethatthewordsused,even
in their literal sense, are the primary, and
ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpretingthemeaningofanywriting:beita
statute,acontract,oranythingelse.Butitis
one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developedjurisprudencenottomakeafortress
out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes alwayshavesomepurposeorobject
to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
theirmeaning.
SecretaryofStateforHealth20observed:
Thependulumhasswungtowardspurposive
methodsofconstruction.Thischangewasnot
initiated by the teleological approach of
EuropeanCommunityjurisprudence,andthe
influenceofEuropeanlegalculturegenerally,
butithasbeenacceleratedbyEuropeanideas:
see,however,aclassicearlystatementofthe
purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in
River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson21. In
any event, nowadays the shift towards
purposive interpretation is not in doubt.The
qualification is that the degree of liberality
permitted is influenced by the context, e.g.
socialwelfarelegislationandtaxstatutesmay
have to be approached somewhat differently.
20
[2003]UKHL13:[2003]2AC687:[2003]2WLR692(HL)
21
(1877)LR2AC743atp.763(HL)
30
hasbeenapprovinglyquotedbythemajorityinAbhiram
123(3)oftheRepresentationofthePeopleAct,1951has
becometheelanvitalofstatutoryinterpretationbecause
ofprogressivesocialclimateandJudgesstatesmanship.
KrishnaIyer,J.,inhisinimitablestyle,hadsaidwhen
legislativepurposeorintentionislost,thentheprocess
ofinterpretationisliketoadorntheskin,andtomissthe
soul. Acourthastobeprogressiveinitsthoughtand
Judgegetsstuckwiththeideathatconstructionisthe
missedandthesoulisdismissed.Anarrowconstruction
22
(2017)2SCC629
31
ofaconceptinvitesahazardwhereasabroadexposition
enlargesthesweepandachievesthestatutorypurpose.
Thesearecertainabstractions.Itwillapplyinadifferent
Thatapart,thelawintendstoremedyamischief.Italso
setsgoalandhasaremedialintent.Italsostatescertain
thingswhichclearlymeanwhathasbeensaid. Inthat
case,thereisnoroomfortheJudgeandsolelybecause
heisaconstructionistJudge,cannotpossesssuchtool
toflyintherealmoffancifulareaandconferadifferent
cannotaffordtoromanceallthetimewiththescienceof
beentakenrecoursetoandthecardinalprincipleforthe
same.
32
thePeopleAct,1951.Thequestionthatarosebeforethe
ConstitutionBenchwaswhetheraLambardar,aperson
clausesofSection123(7)ofthe1951Act. TheElection
TribunalhadheldthatLambardarwasarevenueofficer.
TheHighCourtsetatnaughtthefindingrecordedbythe
remunerationforsodoing,yettheywereincludedalong
withvillageaccountantswhoarecalledPatwarisinState
andhence,theyareclearlyexcludedbytheprovisionsof
23
AIR1960SC122
33
submission,theCourtheldthatitisanelementaryrule
partstogetherandnotofonepartonlybyitselfandthat
grammar.Proceedingfurther,theCourtobservedthat:
Theaforesaidanalysisclearlyshowsthatasection
hastobeconstruedinentiretyandnotofonepartonly
wordswhicharesurplusage.
KailashChandMahajan&others24,theCourtreferred
readsasfollows:
Thedistinctionbetweenthepurposeorobject
of an enactment andthelegislativeintention
governing it is that the former relates to the
mischief to which the enactment is directed
anditsremedy,whilethelatterrelatestothe
legalmeaningoftheenactment.
thatthere isagreatdistinctionbetweenthetwo.While
malady,onthecontrary,thelegislativeintentionrelates
enacted.TheCourtfurtherruledthatfordeterminingthe
purposeoflegislation, itispermissibletolookintothe
thelawwasenactedandwhichnecessitatedthepassing
appreciatingthebackgroundandtheantecedentfactual
matrixleadingtothelegislation,itisopentothecourtto
lookintotheStatementofObjectsandReasonsofthe
35
remedyforthethenexistingmalady.
soughttobeapplied,thecontextbecomesanimportant
andinfluentialaspectandwhenonetriestounderstand
thelegislativeintention,themeaningfromtheexposition
ofthepurposeortheefforttohavetheremedythrough
theenactmenthastobeappositelyperceived.
UnionofIndiaandanother25, Sections4and5ofthe
andregulationofprizecompetitions.Section2(d)ofthe
competition,amissingwordprizecompetition,apicture
prizecompetitionorbyanyothername),inwhichprizes
areofferedforthesolutionofanypuzzlebaseduponthe
25
AIR1957SC628
36
buildingup,arrangement,combinationorpermutationof
contendedbeforetheCourtthatthelanguageemployed
inSection2(d)beingclearandunambiguous,itwasnot
opentotheCourttoreadintoanylimitationswhichare
interpretationtobeputonanenactment,whattheCourt
hastodoistoascertaintheintentofthemthatmake
it,andthatmust,ofcourse,begatheredfromthewords
interpretationofthewordsusedindisregardofallother
Statutes,10thEdn.,p.19,has,ingeneral,but prima
alwaysnecessarytogetanexactconceptionoftheaim,
37
scopeandobjectofthewholeAct;toconsider,according
toLordCoke:(1)WhatwasthelawbeforetheActwas
passed;(2)Whatwasthemischiefordefectforwhichthe
lawhadnotprovided;(3)WhatremedyParliamenthas
appointed;and(4)Thereasonoftheremedy.Turningto
saidActanddoctrineofseverability,theCourtcameto
holdthatitwillnotbequestionedthatcompetitionsin
whichsuccessdependstoasubstantialextentonskill
andcompetitionsinwhichitdoesnotsodepend,form
betweenthetwoclassesofcompetitionsisasclearcutas
haveenactedthelawinquestionifithadknownthatit
wouldfailasregardscompetitionsinvolvingskill,there
restrictionoftheimpugnedprovisionstocompetitionsof
termsandintheirtruespirit,andformacodecomplete
conclusion,theCourtsaid,wasthatitwasinescapable
thattheimpugnedprovisions,assumingthattheyapply
byvirtueofthedefinitioninSection2(d)toallkindsof
competitionsinwhichsuccessdidnotdependuponany
substantialextentonskill.
34. Theaforesaidauthorityhasidentifiedtwoclearcut
classesofprizecompetitionsandultimatelyappliedthe
doctrineofseverance.TheCourtwasnotpersuadedby
controlandregulatetheprizecompetitionbutkeepingin
account,interpretedtheprovision.Thus,theCourtwas
cautiousandonlytriedtotakeintoaccountwhatcould
legitimatelybetakenintoconsideration.
39
Pradeshv.ShrimatiSodraDevi26theCourtruledthat
unlessthereisanysuchambiguityitwouldnotbeopen
constructionwhichisthattheintentionofthelegislature
shouldbeprimarilygatheredfromthewordswhichare
used.Itisonlywhenthewordsusedareambiguousthat
theywouldstandtobeexaminedandconstruedinthe
principleandpractice. Forthesaidpurpose,theCourt
UniversityofSt.Andrews27.
36. Inthesaidcase,theCourtreferredtotheobjects
andreasonsoftheIncomeTaxAct,1922andturnedto
legislatureandstatedthus:
27.Ifthisbackgroundoftheenactmentof
Section 16(3) is borne in mind, there is no
room for any doubt that howsoever that
mischief was sought to be remedied by the
amending act, the only intention of the
Legislature in doing so was to include the
26
AIR1957SC832
27
1909AC147
40
incomederivedbythewifeoraminorchild,in
the computation of the total income of the
maleassessee,thehusbandorthefather,as
the case may be, for the purpose of
assessment.
Ifthatwastheposition,howsoeverwide
thewordsanyindividualorsuchindividual
asusedinSection16(3)andSection16(3)(a)
mayappeartobesoastoincludewithintheir
connotationthemaleaswellasthefemaleof
thespeciestakenbythemselves,thesewords
inthecontextcouldonlyhavebeenmeantas
restricted to the male and not including the
femaleofthespecies.Ifthesewordsareused
asreferringonlytothemaleofthespeciesthe
whole of the Section 16(3)(a) can be read
harmoniously in the manner above
comprehending within its scope all the four
casesspecifiedinsubclauses(i)to(iv)thereof
andsoalsoSection16(3)(b).
taxingstatuteandnotasocialwelfarelegislation,yetthe
Courtkeptinviewthesurroundingcircumstancesand
thereasonsthatledtothepassingofthelegislationand
furtheropinedthatthemeaningsoughttobeplacedby
therevenuecouldnotbeconceivedofwithoutadditionof
wordswhichisnotnormallypermissibleinthestatute.It
thewordsused.
TenancyAct,1949.Ineednotstatethefactsofthecase.
Section30(c)ofthesaidActreadasfollows:
(c)anylandwhichisrequiredforcarryingout
any of the provisions of the Calcutta
ImprovementAct,1911.
observedthatthewordsusedinthestatuteweresimple,
buttheirconstructionwasnoteasyandinthatcontext,
itheld,onacarefulconsiderationandscrutinyofSection
30(c),theinevitableconclusionwasthatthewordsused
provisionsoftheActshouldceasetoapplytoalllands
Section41. Addressingontheissueoftheintentionof
thelegislatureinenactingSection30(c),theCourtheld
applicationofthebeneficentprovisionsoftheActandit
wouldnotbeunreasonabletoholdthatevenifSection
Courtshouldpreferthealternativeconstructionwhichis
beneficentlegislation,iftwoconstructionsarereasonably
possible,theCourtwouldbejustifiedinpreferringthat
purposeoftheActanddoesnotundulyexpandthearea
orthescopeoftheexception.
40. Onaproperanalysisoftheaforesaidauthority,it
reasonablypossible,preferenceshouldgotoonewhich
helpstocarryoutthebeneficentpurposeoftheAct;and
expandthescopeofaprovision.Thus,theCourthasto
alternativereasonableconstructionshouldbewithinthe
permissibleambitoftheAct.Toelaborate,introduction
case,theCourts,bentwiththeideatoengulfaconcept
examinationenvisages.
occurrencewillbethereckoningdatefordeterminingthe
ageoftheallegedoffenderasjuvenileoffenderorthedate
28
(2000)5SCC488
29
(1982)2SCC202
45
ReferringtothesaidSection,itwascontendedthatthe
wordisusedintwoplacesoftheSectionandthatthe
juvenilethedateofproductionwouldbethereckoning
dateastheinquirywithregardtohisagebeginsfromthe
datehe isbroughtbeforethecourtandnototherwise.
TheCourtheldthatthewordisemployedinSection32
isreferabletoajuvenilewhoissaidtohavecommitted
anoffenceonthedateoftheoccurrence.Toarriveatthe
intendmentunderlyingSections3and26readwiththe
preamble,aimsandobjectsoftheActleavesnomanner
protection,treatment,developmentandrehabilitationof
adjudicationthereof.Itfurtherproceededtosaythatthe
protection,treatment,developmentandrehabilitationof
46
juvenilesandtheActbeingabenevolentlegislation,an
juveniles.
thattheageofthejuvenileisthedateofoccurrenceand
stretchedinterpretationnorthesubjectoftheActisread
outofcontext. Thus,thecontextandtheexpositionof
harmoniousbond.
Maharashtra30,theCourt,takingintoconsiderationthe
30
(2013)5SCC546
47
eithertothelocalpoliceortotheJuvenileJusticeBoard,
arenecessarytoprotectthechildrenfromsuchsexual
becausetheCourthasguardianshipoverminorchildren,
especiallywithregardtothechildrenhavingintellectual
disability,sincetheyaresufferingfromlegaldisability.
directionsgiveninthesaidcaseareabsolutelywithinthe
permissiblelimitsof JuvenileJusticeAct,2000andas
Courtinthesaidcasedonotthrowanylaserbeamor
showtheguidingprincipleforinterpretingthedefinition
ofthewordchildasusedinSection2(d)ofthePOCSO
Act.
Justiceheldthatif twoconstructionsarepossiblethen
theCourtmustadoptthatwhichwillensuresmoothand
31
AIR1966SC1987
48
harmoniousworkingoftheConstitutionandeschewthe
otherwhichwillleadtoabsurdityorgiverisetopractical
existinglawnugatory.Ihavereferredtothisdecisionas
itusedthewords,giverisetopracticalinconvenience.
46. InDeepakMahajan(supra),theCourtreferredtoa
TenthEdn.,atp.229whichisextractedbelow:
andfinallyruledthatitispermissibleforcourtstohave
intentionandsometimesitmaybeevennecessarytogo
behindthewordsandenactmentandtakeotherfactors
49
intentionandtothepurposeandspiritoftheenactment
objectmaynotbecomefutile.
Courthasbeeninclinedtoadoptafunctionalapproach
emphasise,therehastobeanecessitytodoso.
ChinnappaReddy,J.,emphasizingontheimportanceof
thetextandcontextinwhicheverywordisusedinthe
matterofinterpretationofstatutes,opined:
TheaforesaidpassagebyChinnappaReddy,J.had
beenreferredtoandplacedrelianceupontoappreciate
construedinisolation.
50. In UnionofIndiav.ElphinstoneSpinningand
WeavingCo.Ltd.andothers33,theConstitutionBench,
whiledealingwiththeconceptofinterpretationandthe
particularstatuteforfindingoutthelegislativeintentit
33
(2001)4SCC139
51
statutewithoutacknowledgingthattheyhaveinanyway
supplementthestatutewouldbethepropercriteria.The
fundamentalrule.Thereis,nodoubt,amarginalareain
whichthecourtsmouldorcreativelyinterpretlegislation
varyingdegreesoffurtherprocessing.Referenceinthis
contextwasmadeto CorocraftLtd.v.PanAmerican
entitledtoaddsomethingmorethanwhatisthereinthe
statutebywayofasupposedintentionofthelegislature.
Thecardinalprincipleofconstructionofstatuteisthat
thetrueorlegalmeaningofanenactmentisderivedby
objectwhichcomprehendsthemischiefanditsremedy
dwellingupontheconceptofcontext,thelargerBench
opinedthatthecontextmeans;thestatuteasawhole,
thepreviousstateoflaw,otherstatutesin parimateria,
thegeneralscopeofthestatuteandthemischiefthatit
admissibleasanaidtoitsconstruction.Thatapart,the
withotherprovisionsoftheActtofindoutthemeaning
notbeinganenactingprovisionisnotofthesameweight
asanaidtoconstructionofaSectionoftheActasare
otherrelevantenactingwordstobefoundelsewherein
thereforesaidthatthepreambleisnottoinfluencethe
unlessthereisacompellingreasonforit.
53
51. InCentralBankofIndiav.StateofKeralaand
quotedbyJusticeG.P.Singhinhisbook Principlesof
reproducedbelow:
Noword,saysProfessorH.A.Smithhasan
absolutemeaning,fornowordscanbedefined
in vacuo, or without reference to some
context. According to Sutherland there is a
basic fallacy in saying that words have
meaninginandofthemselves,andreference
to the abstract meaning of words, states
Craies,iftherebeanysuchthing,isoflittle
value in interpreting statutes. in
determining the meaning of any word or
phrase in a statute the first question to be
asked is What is the natural or ordinary
meaningofthatwordorphraseinitscontext
inthe statute? Itisonly whenthat meaning
leadstosomeresultwhichcannotreasonably
besupposedtohavebeentheintentionofthe
legislature,thatitispropertolookforsome
otherpossiblemeaningofthewordorphrase.
The context, as already seen, in the
constructionofstatutes,meansthestatuteas
a whole, the previous state of the law, other
statutesinparimateria,thegeneralscopeof
the statute and the mischief that it was
intendedtoremedy.
36
(2009)4SCC94
54
GeneralFinanceandInvestmentCo.Ltd.(supra)and
CityCouncil)v.NationalAsylumSupportService38.I
thinkitappositetoreproducethesame:
5.Thestartingpointisthatlanguageinall
legal texts conveys meaning according to the
circumstancesinwhichitwasused.Itfollows
thatthecontextmustalwaysbeidentifiedand
consideredbeforetheprocessofconstruction
orduringit.Itis,therefore,wrongtosaythat
the court may only resort to evidence of the
contextual scene when an ambiguity has
arisen.
53. InChiefJusticeofAndhraPradesh&othersv.
L.V.A.Dixitulu&others39,ithasbeenruledthatthe
constitutionalorstatutoryprovisionshouldbeconstrued
accordingtotheintentoftheythatmadeit(Coke),and
normally,suchintentisgatheredfromthelanguageof
employedbythelegislationispreciseandplainandthus
37
AIR1953SC274
38
(2002)1WLR2956:(2002)4AllER654(HL)
39
(1979)2SCC34
55
byitself,proclaimsthelegislativeintentinunequivocal
terms,thesamemustbegiveneffectto,regardlessofthe
consequencesthatmayfollow,butifthewordsusedin
theprovisionareimprecise,proteanorevocativeorcan
strictgrammaticalconstructionceasestobeasureguide
toreachatthereallegislativeintent.Insuchacase,in
beyondthearidliteralconfinesoftheprovisionandto
throwinglightontherest,thepurposeofthelegislation,
theobjectsoughttobeachieved,andtheconsequences
thatmayflowfromtheadoptionofoneinpreferenceto
certainsituationsallowsroomtogobeyondtheconfines
oftheliteralmeaningandtotakerecoursetootheraids
theotheralsogetsaccent.
56
54. In KeharSingh&Orsv.State(DelhiAdmn.)40,
theCourtruledthattheCourtshouldnotconsiderany
viewtheprovisionsasabstractprinciplesseparatedfrom
adventure,nodoubt,enlargesthediscretionoftheCourt
available. Asismanifest,theindividualnotionsshould
notcomeinthewayoflegislativeintention.
CommissionerofIncomeTax,T.N.41wouldbefruitful.
Inthesaidcase,theCourtobservedthatanargument
gathertheobjectofthestatutefromthelanguageused,
butwhatonemaybelieveorthinktobetheintentionof
Parliamentcannotprevailifthelanguageofthestatute
constructiononerelatingtocasusomissusandotherin
regardtoreadingthestatuteasawhole.Iamreferring
omissus.Inthatcontext,theCourthasruledthat:
14.acasusomissuscannotbesuppliedby
thecourtexceptinthecaseofclearnecessity
and when reason for it is found in the four
corners of the statute itself but at the same
time a casus omissus should not be readily
inferredandforthatpurposeallthepartsofa
statuteorsectionmustbeconstruedtogether
and every clause of a section should be
construed with reference to the context and
otherclausesthereofsothattheconstruction
to be put on a particular provision makes a
consistentenactmentofthewholestatute.
56. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate
complaintfiledunderSection28(1)oftheMaharashtra
LabourPracticesAct,1971.Inthesaidcase,theLabour
Courtinwhichthecomplaintswerefiledtooktheview
confirmedthatview,buttheappellateBenchoftheHigh
Act,theCourttooknoteofthebackgroundoftheAct,
examinedtheschemeoftheenactmentandreferredto
intendstopreventcommissionofunfairlabourpractices
purpose,thesaidActhasbeenenacted.ThetwoJudge
BenchreferredtothedecisioninWorkmenofAmerican
hadmadethefollowingobservations:
withtheConstitutionalvalidityofSection6(a)ofHindu
MinorityandGuardianshipAct,1956andSection19(b)
oftheGuardianandWardsAct,1890.Acontentionwas
raisedthatthesaidprovisionviolatedArticles14and15
44
(1985)4SCC71
45
(1971)3AllER237:(1971)1WLR1381
60
oftheConstitution.Section6(a)oftheHMGActreadsas
follows:
a)inthecaseofaboyoranunmarriedgirl
thefather,andafterhim,themother:Provided
that the custody of a minor who has not
completedtheageoffiveyearsshallordinarily
bewiththemother;
Beitnoted,inthesaidcase,theReserveBankof
Indiahadquestionedtheauthorityofthemother,even
whenshehadactedwiththeconcurrenceofthefather,
only after the lifetime of the father and not during his
placedafterthelifetime?TheCourtobservedthatifthis
questionisansweredinaffirmative,thesectionhastobe
undoubtedlyviolatesofgenderequality,oneofthebasic
provision,theCourtcametoholdthat:
61
Beitnoted,thesaidinterpretationwasplacedto
keepthestatuteswithintheconstitutionallimits.
Mittalv.IshwarSinghPunia47:
naturalandprobable.Andthesesignsareeither
the words, the context, the subjectmatter, the
effectsandconsequence,orthespiritandreason
of the law. See Commentaries on the Laws of
England(facsimileof1stEdn.of1765,University
ofChicagoPress,1979,Vol.1,p.59).Mukherjea,
J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in
PoppatlalShahv.StateofMadras48saidthateach
word,phraseorsentencewastobeconstruedin
thelightofpurposeoftheActitself.Butwords
must be construedwith imagination ofpurpose
behind them, said Judge Learned Hand,a long
time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we
are concerned withseekingofintention, weare
ratherlookingtothemeaningofthewordsthat
thelegislaturehasusedandthetruemeaningof
thosewordsaswassaidbyLordReidin Black
Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke
WaldhofAschaffenburg A.G.49 We are clearly of
theopinionthathavingregardtothelanguagewe
mustfindthereasonandthespiritofthelaw.
(Emphasisinoriginal)
59. Thereafter,theCourtreferredtoS.GopalReddyv.
anotherv.GujaratKishanMazdoorPanchayatand
others51andopined:
60. InRaghunandanSaranAshokSaranv.Pearey
andinthatcontext,grammaticalconstructionisrequired
tobeacceptedasthegoldenrule. InCommissionerof
held:
held:
52
(1986) 3 SCC 38
53
(1985) 4 SCC 343
54
(1978) 1 SCC 636
64
11.Ifthelanguageofastatuteisclearand
explicit,effectmustbegiventoit,forinsucha
casethewordsbestdeclaretheintentionofthe
lawgiver.Itwouldnotberighttorefusetoplace
on the language of the statute the plain and
natural meaning which it must bear on the
ground that it produces a consequence which
couldnothavebeenintendedbythelegislature.
It is only from thelanguage ofthe statute that
theintentionoftheLegislaturemustbegathered,
for the legislature means no more and no less
than what it says. It is not permissible to the
Court to speculate as to what the Legislature
musthaveintendedandthentotwistorbendthe
languageofthestatutetomakeitaccordwiththe
presumedintentionofthelegislature.
highlightthatlegislativeintentionandthepurposeofthe
legislationregardbeinghadtothefactthatcontexthas
theCourtwhileconstruingaprovisiontoascertainthe
intentionofthelegislature,foritisanacceptedprinciple
thereisnoroomtolookforanyotheraidinthenameof
creativity.Thereisnoquarreloverthepropositionthat
themethodofpurposiveconstructionhasbeenadopted
65
legislation,themischiefitintendstoobliterateandthe
fundamentalintentionofthelegislaturewhenitcomesto
variousfieldsandaddresstheissues.Whileinterpreting
statutesandifitinvolveshumanrights,theconceptions
interpretationandpavethepaththatservesthesoulof
thelegislativeintentionandinthatevent,hebecomesa
realcreativeconstructionistJudge.Ihaveperceivedthe
approachinHindustanLeverLtd.(supra)andDeepak
intentionmustbegatherablefromthetext,contentand
contextofthestatuteandthepurposiveapproachshould
causeinconvenience, itshouldbeavoided,andfurther
purposiveapproachtheremustexistthenecessity.The
personality,shouldnotwearanyhatofanycolourtosuit
histhoughtandideaanddrivehisthinkingprocessto
onlyinacaseofclearnecessityandfurtheritshouldbe
meaningisintelligible,thesaidprinciplehasnoentry.It
introduceasandwhathedesires.
facetsthatarelikelytooffendthephysicalidentityand
withsexualassault,sexualharassmentand abusewith
dueregardtosafeguardtheinterestandwellbeingofthe
provisionsofthePOSCOActhastobecongenial. The
protectionofthedignityofthechildisthespineofthe
68
disability.Thelegislatureinitswisdomhasstipulateda
definitionofthechildwhichIhavenotedhereinbefore.
viewedwiththetelescopeandtherebyshouldincludethe
mentalage.
Bankv.TheState55 whereintheHighCourtofSouth
Africawasdealingwithanappealagainsttheconviction
and,inappealthereissuesarose,twoofwhichare(1)
theappointmentofanintermediaryinaccordancewith
theprovisionsofSection170AoftheCriminalProcedure
mentalageofavictim.Atthetimeofhertestimony,she
55
[2014] ZAGPPHC 1017
69
was19yearsoldandtheStateledevidenceofaclinical
psychologistwhohadconsultedandconductedtestson
aspects.TheHighCourtposedthequestionwithregard
toobjectofSection170A(1)ofthesaidAct.Thoughthe
mental age had not come into existence, yet the court
though19yearsofage,couldgivetheassistanceofan
intermediary.TheaforesaidjudgmentoftheHighCourt
ofSouthAfricashowsthatmentalagecanbeconsidered
bytheCourtthoughtherelevantamendmentinrelation
cameintoforce.
AppealofSouthAfricain DanielJohannesStephanus
VanDerBankv.TheState56whichtooknoteofthefact
56
[2016] ZASCA 10
70
assistedthecomplainantintestifying.Leavegrantedby
theSupremeCourtwaslimitedtothefollowing:
Leavetoappealislimitedtotheissuewhether
thecomplainantsevidencewasinadmissibleon
the basis that it was given through an
intermediaryinconflictwiththeprovisionsofs
170AoftheCriminalProcedureActasapplicable
atthetimeshegaveevidence.
thedatethecomplainanttestified,thesaidSectionread
asfollows:
Section170A.Evidencethroughintermediaries.
(1)Whenevercriminalproceedingsarepending
before any court and it appears to such court
thatitwouldexposeanywitnessundertheageof
eighteen years to undue mental stress or
suffering if he or she testifies at such
proceedings, the court may, subject to
subsection(4),appointacompetentpersonasan
intermediaryinordertoenablesuchwitnessto
give his or her evidence through that
intermediary.
witnessreachedtheageof18years,therewasnopower
tooknote ofthesubsequentamendmentmadein2007
witnesseswhowerebiologicallyundertheageofeighteen
71
SvDayimani57anddealtwiththesamebystatingthus:
In Dayimani,thecomplainantwasregardedas
moderately mentally retarded and s 170A was
nonethelessinvoked(wronglysothatcourtheld)
becausethecomplainantwaseighteenyearsold
at the time of testifying. It is not necessary to
consider whether Dayimani has been correctly
decided.Theproperapproach,inmyview,would
be to consider the evidence other than that
adduced by the complainant and assess it to
establish whether the convictions should be
sustainedorsetaside.
ThereaftertheCourtheldthus:
Bydefinition,commonlawrapeistheunlawful
and intentional sexual intercourse by a person
withouttheconsentoftheother.Consenthasto
befree,voluntaryandconsciouslygiveninorder
to be valid. In our law, valid consent requires
thattheconsentitselfmustberecognisedbylaw;
theconsentmustbereal;andtheconsentmust
begivenbysomeonecapableofconsenting.2The
first two requirements do not need to be
discussed since the issue is whether the
complainant was capable of giving consent
relatedtothethirdrequirement.Whereaperson
inintellectuallychallenged,hisorhercondition
mustbeexpertlyassessedandonlythencana
findingastosuchcapabilitybemade.
57
2006 (2) SACR 594 (E)
72
rejectingtheappellantscontentionthatthecomplainant
knownthatshewasbackwardwithamentalageoffar
lessthan16yearsherbiologicalagein1999.Moreover,
therewasoverwhelmingevidenceonrecordthatshewas
incapableofgivingrequiredconsent.
66. In DirectorofPublicProsecutions,Transvaalv.
MinisterofJustice andConstitutionalDevelopment
AmendmentActobserved:
74.Courtsarenowobligedtogiveconsideration
totheeffectthattheirdecisionswillhaveonthe
rights and interests of the child. The legal and
judicial process must always be child
sensitive.AsweheldinSvM,statutesmustbe
interpreted . . . in a manner which favours
protecting and advancing the interests of
children; and that courts must function in a
mannerwhichatalltimesshowsduerespectfor
58
(2009) ZACC 8 ; (2009) 4 SA 222 (CC) ; (2009) 2 SACR 130 (CC); (2009) 7 BCLR 637 (CC)
73
childrensrights.Courtsareboundtogiveeffect
totheprovisionsofsection28(2)inmattersthat
comebeforethemandwhichinvolvechildren.
emphasizedonthesametobolsterthepropositionthat
protectingthedignityofthechildregardbeinghadtoher
agesothatstatutebecomespurposivelychildsensitive.
requirementsofSection16oftheCanadaEvidenceAct
forthetestimonialcompetenceofpersonsof14yearsof
disabilities:(1)theabilitytocommunicatetheevidence;
and(2)apromisetotellthetruth.Inthesaidcase,the
59
[2012] 1 RCS 149
74
victimwasanadultagedabout26yearsandhermental
assaulted. Thetrialcourtacquittedtheaccusedwhich
conclusionofthetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealafter
CanadaEvidenceActasintroducedin1987. Thetrial
Judgeexcludedherevidenceandacquittedtheaccused
whichwasconfirmedbytheCourtofAppeal,asstated
earlier.Themajoritywhiledisagreeingspeakingthrough
decidewhatevidence,ifany,tobeaccepted.Thereafter
referencewasmadetocompetenceofadultwitnesswith
wasanalysed.AcontentionwasraisedthatSection16(3)
adultwitnesswithmentaldisabilitywhocannottakean
75
oathoraffirmmustnotonlybeabletocommunicatethe
understandthenatureofapromisetotellthetruth.The
majority disagreeingwiththesaidsubmissionanalysed
intentionoftheParliamentandultimatelyheldthus:
Itisapttonoteherethattwootherargumentswere
raisedinsupportofthisinterpretationfirst,withouta
furtherrequirementofanunderstandingoftheobligation
totellthetruth,apromisetotellthetruthisanempty
gesture;second,Parliamentsfailurein2005toextend
prohibitiononthequestioningofchildrenmeansthat
The Court, dealing with the first aspect, held that the
shortcominginthesaidsubmissionwasthatitdeparted
fromtheplainwordsofSection16(3),onthebasisofan
76
assumptionthatitwasunsupportedbyanyevidenceand
contrarytoParliamentsintent. Imposinganadditional
qualitativeconditionforcompetencethatisnotprovided
amounttoameaningfulprocedureforadultswithmental
disabilities.Thatapart,whensuchawitnesspromisesto
tellthetruth,itreinforcestheseriousnessoftheoccasion
andtheneedtodoso. Indealingwiththeevidenceof
childreninSection16.1,Parliamentheldthatapromise
totellthetruthwasallthatisrequiredofachildcapable
ofrespondingtoquestions. Parliamentdidnotthinka
childspromise,withoutmore,isanemptygesture.
mentaldisabilitiesonthenatureoftheobligationtotell
thetruth,asitdidforchildwitnessesin2005inSection
77
brieflytracedthehistoryofSection16.1.,andnotedthe
submission:
x x x x
[63]Iconcludethat,insofarastheauthorities
suggest that promising to tell the truth ins.
16(3)should be read as requiring an abstract
inquiryintoanunderstandingoftheobligationto
tellthetruth,theyshouldberejected.Allthatis
required is that the witness be able to
communicatetheevidenceandpromisetotellthe
truth.
78
Eventually,themajorityruledthatthethresholdof
reliabilityforhearsayevidencediffersfromthethreshold
admissibility.Hadthecompetencehearingbeenproperly
conducted,thismighthavechangedthebalanceofthe
admissibility. Ultimately,theCourtallowedtheappeal
andsetasidetheacquittalanddirectedfornewtrial.
70. Ihavealreadydealtwithinextensothedecisionsas
citedbythelearnedcounselfortheappellant.TheSouth
respectofanadultwomanwhoismentallyretarded.Itis
intovariousaspectsofthestatuteappliedtheprincipleof
inherentinclusivenessinthewordsandinterpretedthe
provision.TheConstitutionalCourtofSouthAfricahas
79
Both theaspects,accordingtome,aredistinguishable.
Canadaisconcerned,itinterpretedSection16(3)ofthe
mentallychallengedandhasdeclinedtoaddsomething
elaboratedtheprocessofadequate,properandsensitive
statute.
Kanolkar(supra)willbeappropriatetorefer.Inthesaid
case,thevictimofrapewasanadultwhowasamentally
challengedpersonandherIQwasnoteven1/3 rdofwhat
anormalpersonhas.Shehadbecomepregnant,andon
beingaskedbyherparents,astowhowasresponsible
forherpregnancy,sheonherownwaypointedoutfinger
pleas. Thetrialcourtrepelledthepleaofconsentand
negativedthecontentionraisedbytheaccusedappellant
byupholdingtheconvictionbutreducedthesentenceto
sevenyears.BeforethisCourt,itwascontendedthatin
testimonyoftheprosecutrixcouldnotbeplacedreliance
relianceontheversionofthevictimandrejectedtheplea
heldthatamentallychallengedpersoncannotgivelegal
consentwhichwouldinvolveunderstandingoftheeffect
voluntaryact.Adistinctionwasdrawnbetweenconsent
andsubmissionandruledthateveryconsentinvolvesa
submissionbuttheconversedoesnotfollowandanact
ofhelplessresignationcouldnotbetreatedasaconsent.
consenttheremustbeexerciseofintelligencebasedon
theknowledgeofthesignificanceandthemoraleffectof
81
oneaspectwhichrequirestobenoted:
8.afewwordsarenecessarytobesaidabout
prescription of sentence in a case where a
mentally challenged or deficient woman is the
victim.Insubsection(2)ofSection376,clause
(f)relatestophysicalageofawomanunder12
yearsofage.Insuchacasesentencehigherthan
that prescribedfor oneunder subsection(1)is
providedfor.Butwhathappensinacasewhen
thementalageofthevictimisnoteven12years?
Suchawomanisdefinitelyinamorevulnerable
situation.Arapistinsuchacaseinadditionto
physical ravishment exploits her mental non
development and helplessness. The legislature
would do well in prescribing higher minimum
sentenceinacaseofthisnature.Thegravityof
offence in such case is more serious than the
enumerated categories indicated in subsection
(2)ofSection376.
Asitseems,theCourtleftittothelegislaturefor
canvassedintheinstantcase.
72. Thelearnedcounselfortheappellanthasdrawnmy
attentiontovariousSectionsofIPC,namely,Sections89,
90,98,228A,305,361and491. Section89IPCdeals
insanepersonbyorbyconsentofguardian.Itstipulates
82
thatnothingwouldbedoneingoodfaithforthebenefit
ofapersonundertwelveyearsofageorofunsoundmind
personwouldbeanoffencebyreasonofanyharmwhich
itmaycauseorbeintendedbythedoertocauseorbe
knownbythedoertobelikelytocausetothatperson.
Section90dealswithconsentknowntobegivenunder
private defenceagainsttheactofapersonofunsound
understanding,theunsoundnessofmind. Section305
dealswithabetmentofsuicideofchildorinsaneperson
andprovidespunishmentwithdeathorimprisonmentfor
life,orimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingtenyears.
learnedcounselfortheappellantrelyinguponthesaid
83
provisionswouldcontendthatIPCprescribesprotection
onthebasisofmaturityofunderstandingtoachild,and
sufferingfromunsoundnessofmindand,therefore,itis
limpidthatapenallawsometimesmakesdeparturefrom
capacitytounderstandthenatureandconsequencesof
anact.Onthatbasis,anargumenthasbeenstructured
totreatthementalageofanadultwithintheambitand
sweepofthe termagethatpertainstoageunderthe
POCSOAct. Inthisregard,Iamobligatedtosaywhat
hasbeenprovidedintheIPCisonadifferentbaseand
differentlyandcarvesoutthenatureofoffenceinrespect
ofaninsanepersonorpersonofunsoundmind.Thereis
impressuponusthatIcanadoptthesaidprescription
andapplyittodictionaryclauseofPOCSOActsothat
mentalageisconsideredwithinthedefinitionoftheterm
age.Iamnotinclinedtoacceptthesaidsubmission.
84
legislaturedespitehavingtheintentinitsStatementof
POCSOAct,hasthoughtitwisetodefinethetermage
whichdoesnotonlymentionachildbutaddsthewords
belowtheageof18years.Hadthewordchildalone
beenmentionedintheAct,thescopeofinterpretationby
theCourtscouldhavebeeninadifferentrealmandthe
Courtmighthavedeliberatedonalargercanvass.Itis
notso.
74.Thereisdistinctionbetweenmentalretardationand
mentallyillperson.Inthisregard,itwouldbefruitfulto
analysetheconcept.InSuchitaSrivastava(supra),the
assailwastotheorderspassedbytheDivisionBenchof
theHighCourtwhichhadruledthatitwasinthebest
interestsof amentallyretardedwomentoundergo an
governmentrunwelfareinstitutionandafterdiscoveryof
herpregnancy,theadministrationoftheUnionTerritory
85
orphanwhodidnothaveanyparentorguardiantolook
afterherorherprospectivechild. TheHighCourthad
appointedanexpertbodywhohadgivenafindingthat
thevictimhadexpressedherwillingnesstobearachild.
AstheHighCourt,asalreadystatedearlier,directedthe
womantoundergoabortion,SpecialLeavetoAppealwas
thatconsentisanessentialconditionforperformingan
betweenmentalillnessandmentalretardationforthe
addressedistheexerciseofparenspatriaejurisdiction.
hastoberespectedinspiteofotherfactorssuchaslack
86
apprehensionsabouthercapacitytocarrythepregnancy
responsibilitiestherefor.TheCourtadoptedthesaidview
womanwhoisfoundtobementallyretardedshouldgive
herconsentforterminationofherpregnancy.Analysing
mothers.Inthesaidcontext,theCourtheld:
Andagain:
Dealingwiththeexceptionstotherule,theCourt
thus:
wasamendedin2002bywayofwhichthewordlunatic
Section3(4)(a)ofthe1971Act.Mentallyillpersonhas
beendefinedunderSection2(b)ofthe1971Actwhich
meansapersonwhoisinneedoftreatmentbyreasonof
anymentaldisorderotherthanmentalretardation.
75. Dealingwiththedefinition,theCourtreferredtothe
PersonswithDisabilities(EqualOpportunities,Protection
1995Act)andopinedthatinthesaidActalsomental
illnesshasbeendefinedasmentaldisorderotherthan
Thedefinitionreadasfollows:
76. TheCourtalsotooknoteofthefactthatthesame
incorporatedunderSection2(g)oftheNationalTrustfor
RetardationandMultipleDisabilitiesAct,1999.Inthat
retardationshouldordinarilybetreateddifferentlyfrom
guardiancanmakedecisionsonbehalfofamentallyill
personasperSection3(4)(a)ofthe1971Act,thesame
requirementofconsentsincethesamewouldamountto
reproductiverightsofthevictim.TheCourtanalysedthe
reasoning enumeratedbytheHighCourtandreversing
theviewoftheHighCourtheld:
32.Besidesplacingsubstantialrelianceonthe
preliminarymedicalopinionspresentedbeforeit,
the High Court has noted some statutory
provisionsinthePersonswithDisabilities(Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act,1995aswellastheNational
Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism,
CerebralPalsy,MentalRetardationandMultiple
Disabilities Act, 1999 where the distinction
between mental illness and mental
retardation has been collapsed. The same has
been done for the purpose of providing
affirmative action in public employment and
90
33.Wemustemphasisethatwhilethedistinction
between these statutory categories can be
collapsed for the purpose of empowering the
respective classes of persons, the same
distinction cannot be disregarded so as to
interfere with the personal autonomy that has
been accorded to mentally retardedpersons for
exercisingtheirreproductiverights.
Inthesaidcase,theCourtreferredtotheUnitedNations
DeclarationontheRightsofMentallyRetardedPersons,
1971andreproducedtheprinciplescontainedtherein.I
thinkitappropriatetoreproducethesame:
ortoengageinanyothermeaningfuloccupation
tothefullestpossibleextentofhiscapabilities.
4. Whenever possible, the mentally retarded
person should live with his own family or with
fosterparentsandparticipateindifferentforms
ofcommunitylife.Thefamilywithwhichhelives
should receive assistance. If care in an
institution becomes necessary, it should be
provided in surroundings and other
circumstances as close as possible to those of
normallife.
5.Thementallyretardedpersonhasarighttoa
qualified guardian when this is required to
protecthispersonalwellbeingandinterests.
6. The mentally retarded person has a right to
protection from exploitation, abuse and
degrading treatment. If prosecuted for any
offence,heshallhavearighttodueprocessof
lawwithfullrecognitionbeinggiventohisdegree
ofmentalresponsibility.
7. Whenever mentally retarded persons are
unable,becauseoftheseverityoftheirhandicap,
toexercisealltheirrightsinameaningfulwayor
it should become necessary to restrict or deny
some or all of theserights,theprocedureused
for that restriction or denial of rights must
contain proper legal safeguards against every
formofabuse.Thisproceduremustbebasedon
an evaluation of the social capability of the
mentally retarded person by qualified experts
andmustbesubjecttoperiodicreviewandtothe
rightofappealtohigherauthorities.
No.7,asreproducedabove,foritprescribesthatafair
procedureshouldbeusedfortherestrictionordenialof
therightsguaranteedtomentallyretardedpersonswhich
92
humanbeings.Itissignificanttonotethatinthesaid
wasusedinthepasttoperformforciblesterilizationsand
abortionsonmentallyretardedpersons.Commentingon
thesame,itwasobservedthatsuchmeasuresareanti
protectionbeforethelawaslaiddowninArticle14of
mentalretardationandinthatcontext,observed:
55.Itisalsopertinenttonotethataconditionof
mental retardation or developmental delay is
gauged on the basis of parameters such as
intelligence quotient (IQ) and mental age (MA)
which mostly relate to academic abilities. It is
quitepossiblethatapersonwithalowIQorMA
maypossessthesocialandemotionalcapacities
thatwillenablehimorhertobeagoodparent.
Hence,itisimportanttoevaluateeachcaseina
thoroughmannerwithdueweightagebeinggiven
to medical opinion for deciding whether a
mentally retarded person is capable of
performingparentalresponsibilities.
78. Ihavecopiouslyreferredtothesaidauthorityasit
hasanalysedthedistinctionbetweenmentalillnessand
mentalretardation. Ithasalsonotedthatacondition
93
onthebasisofparameterssuchasintelligencequotient
(IQ)andmentalage(MA)whichmostlyrelatetoacademic
abilities.TheCourthasnarratedaboutthepossibilityof
capacitiesthatwillenablehimorhertobeagoodparent.
conditionseventhoughtheymayneedsomesupervision
andassistancefromtimetotime.Itobserved:
41.Adevelopmentaldelayinmentalintelligence
should not be equated with mental incapacity
andasfaraspossiblethelawshouldrespectthe
decisionsmadebypersonswhoarefoundtobe
in a state of mild to moderate mental
retardation.
94
maintainedinTheRightsofPersonswithDisabilitiesAct,
thatthisCourthaskeptitselfalivetothefactthatthe
Parliamenthasalwayskeptthementalretardedperson
andmentallyillpersonintwodifferentcompartments.
respondentNo.2,wouldcontendthatdegreeofmental
determinativefactorand,therefore,theprincipleofcasus
omissuswouldnotbeapplicabletothecaseathand.
thesaidcase,theCourtmentionedthesituationswhere
theprincipleofcasusomissuswouldbeapplied.Applying
contradictionthatthesaidprinciplecannotbeappliedto
theprovisionthathasarisenforconsideration.
95
ThePOCSOActhasidentifiedminorsandprotectedthem
feltitappropriatethatthedefinitionofthetermageby
retardation.Itmaybeduetothefactthatthestandards
ofmentalretardationaredifferentandtheyrequiretobe
different.TheParliament,asitseems,hasnotincluded
mentalage.Itiswithinthedomainoflegislativewisdom.
procedurewasmeantfordeterminationofthebiological
2015(2of2016)defineschildtomeanapersonwho
notcompletedeighteenyearsofage.Thereisaprocedure
prismofbiologicalage.Ifanydeterminationisrequired,
itonlypertainstothebiologicalage,andnothingelse.
83. ThepurposeofPOCSOActistotreattheminorsas
beingofthechildrenateverystageofjudicialproceeding.
Itprovidesforachildfriendlyprocedure.Itcategorically
makesadistinctionbetweenachildandanadult.Ona
retardationasafactorwillreallytantamounttocausing
anomaloussituationswithouttherebeinganyguidelines
orstatutoryprovisions.Needlesstosay,theyarewithin
97
thesphereoflegislature.Toelaborate,anadditionofthe
interpretationasfarasthePOCSOActisconcerned. I
convictionshouldnotbeallowedentrytothesphereof
interpretation.Ithastobegatheredfromthelegislative
dignityofaperson,assubmitted,hasitsownpedestal
butthatconceptioncannotbesubsumedandintegrated
interpretation.Ifavictimismentallyretarded,definitely
retardationordegreeofunderstanding.Itshouldnever
beputinastraightjacketformula.Itisdifficulttosayin
absoluteterms.
98
84. Inthisregard,ImayprofitablyrefertoSection164
statement.Section164(5A)(b),whichispertinent,reads
asunder:
Thepurposeofreferringtothesaidprovisionisto
highlightthattheParliamenthaslegislatedtosafeguard
theinterestofmentallydisabledperson.
recoursetopurposiveinterpretation.AJudgecanhavea
constructionistapproachbutthereisalimitationtohis
statethatstretchingofthewordsageandyearwould
beencroachinguponthelegislativefunction.Thereisno
99
Krishnamurthy60,thethreeJudgeBenchhasruled:
NoadjudicatororaJudgecanconceivetheidea
thattheskyisthelimitorforthatmatterthereis
no barrier or fetters in ones individual
perception, for judicial vision should not be
allowed to be imprisoned and have the
potentiality to cover celestial zones. Be it
ingeminated, refrain and restrain are the
essential virtues in the arena of adjudication
because they guard as sentinel so that
virtuousness is constantly sustained. Not for
nothing, centuries back Francis Bacon61 had to
saythus:
Judges ought to be more learned than
witty, more reverend than plausible, and
more advised than confident. Above all
things,integrityistheirportionandproper
virtue.LettheJudgesalsorememberthat
Solomonsthronewassupportedbylionson
bothsides:letthembelions,butyetlions
underthethrone.
wasreproducedwhichIthinkitapttoquote:
60
(2015) 2 SCC 796
61
Bacon, Essays: Of Judicature in Vol. I The Works of Francis Bacon [Montague, Basil, Esq
(Eds.), Philadelphia: A Hart, Late Carey & Hart, 1852], pp. 58-59.
62
Frankfurter, Felix in Clark, Tom C., Mr Justice Frankfurter: A Heritage for all Who Love the
Law (1965) 51 ABAJ 330 at p. 332
100
86. InStateofUttarPradeshandothersv.Subhash
ChandraJaiswalandothers63,ithasbeenheld:
17.AJudgeshouldnotperceiveasituationina
generalisedmanner.Heoughtnottowearapair
ofspectaclessothathecanseewhatheintends
tosee.Therehastobeasetoffactstoexpressan
opinion and that too, within the parameters of
law.
x x x x
19.InVemareddyKumaraswamyReddyv.State
ofA.P.64theCourtobservedthat:
15.theJudgesshouldnotproclaimthat
they are playing the role of a lawmaker
merely for an exhibition of judicial valour.
Theyhavetorememberthatthereisaline,
though thin, which separates adjudication
from legislation. That line should not be
crossedorerased.
mentalage.
63
(2017) 5 SCC 163
64
(2006) 2 SCC 670
101
breathedhislastandthereisamedicalcertificatefrom
AIIMSasregardsthementaldisabilityofthevictim,there
shouldbenofurtherenquiryasenvisagedunderSection
357AoftheCrPC.Thesaidprovisionreadsasfollows:
(3)IfthetrialCourt,attheconclusionofthetrial,is
satisfied, that the compensation awarded under
section357isnotadequateforsuchrehabilitation,
orwherethecasesendinacquittalordischargeand
the victim has to be rehabilitated, it may make
recommendationforcompensation.
(5)Onreceiptofsuchrecommendationsoronthe
applicationundersubsection(4),theStateorthe
District Legal Services Authority shall, after due
102
Onaperusaloftheaforesaidprovision,itisquitevivid
thequantumofcompensationtobeawardedunderthe
State/DistrictLegalServicesAuthorityhastoconductan
completingtheinquiry.Hadtheaccusedbeenalive,the
providedundertheCrPC. Astheaccusedhasdiedand
purviewofthePOCSOActwhereinthetrialisheldina
compensationaredifferent,IdirectthattheStateLegal
ServicesAuthority,Delhishallawardthecompensation
convincedopinion thatitisafitcasewherethevictim
directedregardbeinghadtothespecialfeaturesofthe
case.
89. Theappealsaredisposedof,accordingly.
.............................................J.
[DIPAKMISRA]
NEWDELHI;
JULY21,2017
Reportable
REPORTABLE
Versus
JUDGMENT
R.F.NARIMAN, J. (concurring)
of my own.
hereinbelow:-
under:
107
instruments.
660 as follows:
65
Interestingly, Charles Evans Hughes argued the case on behalf of the appellant just
after he stepped down from the Supreme Court as a Justice thereof in order to fight a
Presidential election. He fought the election and lost. Thereafter, he went to New
York and set up an extremely lucrative law practice. He eventually became the 11 th
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, being appointed in 1930 and
having retired in 1941.
112
construction thus:-
221:
xx xx xx
stated:
SCC 139:-
he said:
follows:
Heydons case.
In Standard Chartered
Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement [Standard Chartered Bank
v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4
SCC 530 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 961] at pp.
547-48, another Constitution Bench, 40
odd years later, was faced with whether
a corporate body could be prosecuted
for offences for which the sentence of
imprisonment is mandatory. By a
majority of 3:2, the question was
answered in the affirmative.
Balakrishnan, J. held: (SCC paras 23-
24)
In Reema
Aggarwal v. Anupam [(2004) 3 SCC 199
: 2004 SCC (Cri) 699] , in construing the
provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
in the context of Section 498-A, this
Court applied the mischief rule made
immortal by Heydon's case [(1584) 3 Co
Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] and followed Lord
Denning's judgment in Seaford Court
Estates Ltd. v. Asher[(1949) 2 KB 481 :
(1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA)] , where the
learned Law Lord held: (Seaford Court
Estates Ltd. case[(1949) 2 KB 481 :
(1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA)] , KB p. 499)
He must set to work on the
constructive task of finding the
intention of Parliament, and he
143
(emphas
is supplied)
follows:
states:
18 years.
are as under:
2. In acknowledgement of a wide
range of competencies among these
individuals, the Central Government
163
reproduced as under:
164
Act.
him.
J.
(R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi;
July 21, 2017.