OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1939-4S

CAMPAIGNS IX SOtlTH-EAST ASIA

I9U-I2

MLSU CENTRAL LIBRARr

-

10289CL

Cnttal EJlut

Hmir.^iiWAR pRA5Ai>^ D.urr.

COMniNED INTER-SERVICES HISTORICAL SEGTIOX

INDIA & PAKISTAN
3960

Diitribalors :

ORIENT LONGMANS
CAAIPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
1941-42

K. D. Biiarcava, m.a.
K. N. V. Sastri, pii.d.

EJiled fy

DlSllCSItWAR PRASADf D.LTTT.

TO ALL WHO SERVED
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Secretahv, Mimstrv or Dcfr.vcr, iNorA

Memters

Dr. Tara Cuand

Dr. S. N. Sc.v

pRor. K. A. Nilakahta Sastri

pRor. ^^o^lA^rMAl) llABtn

Dr. II. C. Majl'jidar

General K. S. Thimayya
U eirr.'Cr.vERAt Sjr Dt'or-Ev Rcssele
Lieut.'General S. P. P. Tiiorat
JiflUTARY AoVUER TO THE IRotl COilMlSSIOXrR EOR PaWSTA-V
N India

Sfcrtla^

Dr. BisitesiiWAR Prasad

 CAMPAIGNS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE

Campaigns in South-East Asia 1941-42

Retrcat TROii Burma 1941-42

Arakan Operations 1942-45

Reconquest of Burma 1942-45, Two Volujies

Post-War Occupation Forces: Japan and South-East

Asia
 PREFACE

The talcs of glory and imlitary conquests have often been the
theme of national hbtories, for they rouse the imagination of people
and inspire the future generations to emulate the heroism of their
ancestors. But when it comes to defeat and disaster, the historian's
task becomes arduous, for not only has he to narrate the events
wthout gloss but also to explain the reasons for the tragic results.
The opening of the Second World War in eastern and south*
eastern Asia was one such chapter of reverses sustained by the
Allied Powers at the hands of japan. The British possessions in
Hong Kong, hlalaya and Borneo were overrun by the Japanese
armed forces and for a time the whole of Asia up to the frontiers
of India in the east formed part of the Japanese Co-Prosperity
Sphere. It is the story of this military misfortune of the British
Empire that is narrated in this volume. Beginning wfth the
short struggle for the possession of Hong Kong, the narrative
proceeds to outline the rapid step-back of the Indian, British and
Australian forces from the nonhem tip of Malaya down its spine
to the island of Singapore where the last stand was made for the
control of (he eastern gates of the Indian Ocean. The odds were
against theAUied forces which were <mpeilcd to surrender, leaving
the vast land mass of Asia &om the Netherlands East Indies to
Burma to the Japanese. It is a talc of hasty retreats, encirclements
and surrenden, the forests and swamps making the prospect of
escape grim and frequently impossible. Yet the troops retained
courage and showed a high degree of morale, which is lost sight
of otving to the abject mass surrender in Singapore. Whoever
may have been responsible for that derision, it is certain that tJjc
Indian army had not lost its appetite for fight and had acquitted
itself well in evexy situation where it was placed. The ill-equipped
army without prospect of any strong reinforcements, with the
Japanese in command of the sea and air, was unable to combat

the eastern Power for long; and this circumstance prevailed xvith
the local Command to surrender in Singapore. The last portion
of the TOlumc deals trith the disaster in Borneo, which completed
the story of the effacement oftheBritish and Dutch Empires in that
region for the moment. The Japanese thrust and the consequent
expulsion of the British Cominonwcaltlj military power from
South-East Asia is the subject of the narrative in this volume.

ix
 Tlus is the ninth volume to be published in the senes
OHiaal
Histoo of die Indian /\rmcd Forces in the Second
World ^^ar
by the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, an
orgamsa-
the
lioQ which was set up by the Government of India before
partition and ^vhich was subsequently continued as a joint
venture
Dominions India and Pakistan with the object of
of the two of
producing an ofBciai history of the part played by the pre-partition
India and its armed forces in the World War of 1939-45.
This
history svas to be a truthful, objective, analysed record of military
operations and organisational activities and was to covet every
important phase of the activities of the armed forces of India tlicn.
The history has been divided into three series, one of which relates
to the campaigns in the eastern theatre, comprisingBurma, Malaya
and other parts of South-East Asia. The present vulume is the
last of this scries to be published. It is based on olTicial records,
war diaries, despatches and reports of the commanders in the fields,
which are conGned to the level of the army commanders, as we
had little access to the documents relating to higher strategy and
diplomatic developments for which I have depended on published
works. Yet it is not a mere chronicle of events, for every endeavour

has been made to view the action in the Geld in the background
of strategy and the general forces which were operating at the
moment The story is thus more a study of the d>namism of
ftrateg)* than a static account of the doings of the individual units
at a particular position. This mode of treatment has made it
inevitable to comprehend all the forces, Australian, British and
Indian, which fought side by side in a theatre, and not merely single
Oat the operations of the Indian units. In Hong Kong, the British
Indian and Canadian units jointly strove to keep the island free
from the Japanese onslaught. In Mala)'a, the Indian forces
cooperated with the Bridsb and Australian units to stem the tide
of Japanese advance; while in Borneo the Indian units fought
almost unsupported.

The volume or parts ofil have been vetted by the commanders

in the 6cld,viz., Lieutenant-General A. E. Pcrcival, Major-General
D. M. Tiluiray-Lyon, Major-General B. W. Key, Colonel A. M. L.
Harrison, Major-General a W. Mallby, Brigadier C. Wallis,
Lieutenant-Colonel J, Wilson and Colonel Kamta Prasad, to whom
I express my gratefulness for the pains they
have undertaken.
Their comments have been ectremely valuable and have throwm
light on many events for which the
documentary material was
meagre. I am indebted to Mr. Gavin Long, Chief
Editor of the
Australi an War History, and Mr. Lionel
^Vigmo^c, of the Australian
 High Commission inindia.who is the author ot Tht Japaniu Thusl,
the story of tlie Australian part in hfalaya svar, for reading the
script and making some very useful suggestions svhich have been
incorporated. I am
also grateful to Brigadier H. S. Latham of
the Cabinet Historical Section, U.K., and Colonel C. P. Stacey,
Director, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottaua, Canada,
Avho read the narratives on Malaya and Hong Kong, respectively.
I am also grateful to the members of the Advisorj' Committee for
reading the drall and according their approval for its publication.
The volume has also been seen by the Hbtorical Section of
Pakistan,

The original draft of the narrative on Hong Kong and Borneo

was produced by Mr. K. D. Bhargava and that on Malaya by
Dr. K. N, V. Sastri, both of whom were Narrators in the C.I.5.
Historical Section. This draft has undergone considcraWealtcra*
tions at the hands of the editors and veticrs, which is inevitable in
a team work of this nature. To the rivo authors Imust express my
gratitude as also to Ueulenant*CoIoneJ N. N. Madan, Dr. S. N.
Prasad, and Mr. P. N. Khera ivho have assisted me in editing
this volume and seeing it through the press, without whose co-
operation my task would have been difficult. I am also thankful
to Mr, T. D, Sharma for preparing the maps etc. for the \x>lume.
I also acknoivJcdge the encouragement and support which I have
received from the Ministries of Defence of India and Pakistan.

The Government of India have placed the documents at

our disposal, but for the stateroenU and views expressed herein I
accept full responsibility.

Bishesiiwah Prasad.
New Delhi,
January I960.
 CONTENTS

Introduction
Chapter
Politics in East
Asia
1. Powers and
II. War Strikes Hong Kong
Mainland
III. Operations on the

IV. The End in Hong Kong

the People
V. Malaya, the Land and
Defence Plans for
Malaya
VI.
Northern Malaya
Vn. The War in
Malaya
VIII. The Struggle for Central
Malaya
IX The Stand in South
in South Malaya
X. The Last Week
Singapore
XI. The Battle of
Sarawak
VII Tapanese Attack on Bom.
Dutch North-West
jSl Operations in
Appendices
Biduooraphy
Index
 APPENDICES
Page
A Garrison in Hong Kong ... ...

B. Copy of Propaganda Leafists drctpprcl by the

Japanese ortr Hong Kong ... ... -103

C. Malaya Command-Order of Eatilc-8 December

1911 ... ... ... 405
D. The Japanese 25th ArmyBrief Order of Battle
8 December 1941 ... ... 40C
E. Order of Battle8 Ind. Inf. Bde. 7 December
1941 ... ... ... 407
F. Order of the Day Issued on the Bih December
1041 ... ... ... 40S
G. Malaya Command Operation Instruction No. 40 409
H. Japanese Vnits and their Comnundm in South-
East Asia ... ... ... 411

xhr
 .. .

MAPS
Facing
Page

South-East Asia
Hong Kong and Nciv Territory shoH'ing Japanese
advance
The Afainland South of Tide Cove showing original
inner line position of Mainland Brigade 29
Panoramic Section of Devils Peak 35
Hong Kong Island showing dispositions of Allied Troops 39
Malaya, shosving progress of Japanese Operations 73
Kelantan Troop Dispositions Page 124
Kota Bharu Area 127
Kota Bharu Beach Defences 128
Jitra Area 141
Malaya, Kedah State 150
Gunin Area 171
Malaya, Kampar to Kuala Lumpur 204
KamparTelok Anson Area . 212
Action at Trolak Facing Page 215
Positions on the Slim River 219
Kuantan and Surrounding Area . . Page 22J
hfalaya, Tatnpin to Rengam . 248
Muar Area 259
Malaya, Batu Pahat to Singapore 272

Singapore Island Dispositions of Troops, February
Facing Page 307
1942
Singapore Island (South-West Sector) Page 341

Singapore Fighting m
MacRitchic Reservoir Area,
12-15 Februa^ 1942 . . . Facing Page 347
Borneo ..
re , .! _/>"
Kuching Area (Sarawak) showing Disposjuons of Sarfor
on 22nd December, 1941 and line of wthdrawal of
Regt. info Dutch Borneo 379
2/15 Punjab
Dutch N W. Borneo (BengkajangSanggau
Area) . 385
Kuchwg CSarawal)
withdraNval route of 2/15
Punjab, 23 December
19 tl ^29 March 1942

XV
 . .. .
.

ILLUSTR ATI ONS

Facing
Page
18
Hong Kong and Ko>^loon
19
Major-General C. M. Maltby .
Kaitak Aerodrome . 19
General Sir /Archibald P. \Va\'cU 104
Admiral Sir Geoffrey' Layton . 104
Lieut.-General Sir Henry Povmall 105
Lieut.-General Sir Lew is Heath 105
LicuL-Gencral A. E. Pcrch'al and Major-General H.
Gordon Bennett 186
Smoke rising from stocks of rubber burned .. 187
Australian soldiers manhandling an anti-tank gun 326
A rort\i3Td Australian patrol 326
The Parit Suloag bridge towards which survivors of the
45tb Indian Brigade and other Allied soldien fought
their svay . . . . . . . 327
Smoke Grom the Kas'al Base overshadows Singapore .
352
Alter the withdrawal of the defending air forces from
Malaya to Somatra, the Singapore Island was
snbjected to iocreasingty heavy air attacks 353
The Causew-ay to Singapore Island blown after the
withdrawal of Indian and other Allied forces from
the Mainland .... ,
353
 ABBREVIATIONS
ADB . American, Dutch, British.
Arc . Anglo Persian Company.
A & SH . Argyll and SuUicrIand IBghlandcrs.
ARP /\ir Raid Precautions.

CID . Criminal Investigation Department.

FMSVr . Federated Malaya States Volunteer Force.

GR . Gurkha Rifles.

HKSRv\ . Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery.

HKVDC . Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps.

MTB . Motor Torpedo Boat.

MRC Mixed Reinforcement Camp.

NAAFI Navy, Army and Air Force Institute.

NEI Netherlands East Indies.

RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

RASC Royal Army Service Corps.

SCMS Sarawak Coastal Marine Service.

SAP Sarawak Armed Police.
SR Sarawak Rangers.
SVF Sarawak Volunteer Force.

xvn
 INTRODUCTION
In September 1937, Mr. \V. H. Chamberlain began his book
Japan erer Asia mth the statement: A spectre is hsuntwg East
Asia; the spectre of Japan. From icy Komsomolsk, eastern tertni-
nus of Russia's neiv strategic raihvay in Eastern Siberia, to humidly
tropical Singapore, where Great Itritain has built up a Far Eastern
Gibraltar in the shape of a powerful naval and air base, on what
was formerly a jungle sivamp, Japan is the primar> object of politi-
cal, militar)" anti naval appreliemions and calculations*.* An
explanation of this fear psycliosis is to be found in the polic> and
actions ofJapan in the inters-aJ betsvecn the two \V'orJd Wars. The
development of Japan as a modem state had begun in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century and she had profitably employed
the lessons learnt in the universities and factories of Europe and
America to build a powerful army and navy based on the solid
foundations of modem industry. Her easy victories over China
and Russia had established her claim to be counted as a Great
Power, Tlie Great War of I9I4-I8 provided an opportunity for
not only laying claim to the German possessions in the Far East,
but also to exploit the weakness and anarchy in China to impose
the Twenty-one Demands for obtaining economic and jwlitical
concessions in northern China, particularly in Manchuria and
Mongolia; almost amounting to a veUed protectorate over
China
American policy vas reluctant to reconcile itself to such
Open Door *' doctrine, which
brazen-faced denunciaU'on of the
was the sheet anchor of the United Sutes policy in China. The
Lansine-Ishii Agreement of November 2917, and the Washington
steps progressively adopted by the
Conference of 1922, were the
integrilyof the Chinese Republic. Japan
United States to save the
Pacific islands of strategic value by
had gained little be^ond some
of J919-20, and bad been compelled lo with-
the Peace ScttletnentJ
eastern Siberia. The ^Vashington Conference
draw even from
homiliaUon by laying down the 5:3:3
further aceravaled her
capital ships of the United States, Britain
ratio between the
galling to national vanity. The Anglo-
and Japan a disparity
snice J90Z, was also renounced
, Allisnc* continuing
b G at Britain
under American influence, thus heightenbg the
isolation of Japan. Ev'cnts in the next few years helped
drplomatic

I Ja/IOT P-
 the United States
Hide to heal her injured vanity. The passing of
Immigration Act of 192 1, in violation of the
Gcntlcm^ s
ment of 1907, limiting Japanese immigration to the United
States, grossly offended Japanese self-respect-
The rivc-Possxr
Naval Conference in London, in 1930, imposed a limitation
on the
number of auxi)iar> craft to be consiruetcd by Japan. v\nd
Japanese hopes of exploiting Chinese weakness were being frustrated
^
by the continuous flow of Anglo*iVmcrican aid to the Chinese
Nationalists, who had fortified their position in 1927-28.
Economic factors further enhanced the sense of injui^
Japans industry, in the absence ofa large colonial empire, depCTded
on free entry in the world markets. But the economic depression of
1929-33 led the other Powers to turn increasingly protectionist
And though the Japanese did not hesitate to employ the " tariff
piotecdon of her own markets, they had, in the words of Sir
Frederick IVhyte, pinned their faith in the peaceful esepansion
of trade abroad as the best means of relieving pressure at home
And when they found foreign tariffs raised to nesv heights against
them, especially by those countries that refused to admit Japanese
immigrants, Japans predicament was seized by the military party
to clinch their argument that no good could come from inter-
nationalism", the League or the Washington Treaties, and that
Japan must rely on her own power to secure her " place in the
sun"/ The Ottawa Agreements for Imperial Preference had
practically closed the markets of India and other portions of the
British Empire to Japanese goods. The silk market of America
was denied. The Chinese market was barred by intense nationalism
culminating in a wide-spread boycott. These restrictions height-
ened the depression. But more important for Japan was the supply
of essential raw materials in svhich she was deficient. Steel, rubber,
oils, cotton and soya bean had to be imported, and in
an age of
competing imperialisms, with the spectre of war constandy haunting,
and tanff walls daily mounting, it was ine\itable for Japan to seek
her own sources of raw materials. The occupation of Manchuria,
the war with China and, to an extent, her drive against South-
East Asia were prompted by this economic motive.
Designs of
wnqueU in ^ia or the increaring hostUity to the United States and
Oreai Bntain were the consequences of the sense of economic
nutranon and the desire for Meiuraum.
Circumstances were
helpmg the rise of aggressive nulitarism
which swamped liberalism
an was fed by the Anglo-Americaa
policy of pres-enting Japanese
supremacy m the western Padfic.

TifKueMjFalU/ytpat.
 As an illustration of the then Japanese aggressive militarism
and imperial expansionism in eastern Asia, reference may be made
to the Tanalta Iticmorial, which appears to have been presented to
Uic Emperor by Baron Tanaka, tlie Prime Minister, on 25 July
1927. The memorial is an index of the views and passions then
prcs'ailing among the dominant pofiticaI sections in Japan and
might be interpreted as a clear indication of the land hunger of
the Japanese Government which planned to dominate the whole
of Asia, step by step, beginning tvilh the annexation of Manchuria.
The document, houever, deals primarily u-Ilh Manchuria and
points a H'ay out of the unsettled economic conditions resulting from
the Great War and the national humiliation consequent on the
Washington Conference. The object of this memorial and the
Officers Conference preceding it, was to lay plans for the colo-
nization of the Far East and development of our new continental
empire Mainly there is reference to Manchuria where Japanese
rights tverc affected hy the signing of the Nine-Power Treaty, svhich
*
reduced our special rights and privileges " so that " the very
cxtsicncc of our country is endangered
The Tanaka Memorial gives the appearance of Japanese
designs of world empire, but itwill be evident from a close study
of this document, svhosc authenticity is not unquestioned, that
the entire document dealsonty with theparticular and limited design
on the Three Eastern Provinces or AfanchuriaandMongolia. Itwiil
be difTiculi to support the vie%v that world domination or even the
domination of the whole of Asia was a cardinal principle ofJapanese
policy in the twenties. But Manchuria was the immediate objec-
tive and in 1931, when the dangerofits falling completely to the
Chinese Nationalists became imminent, measures were taken to
extend military .ind political control over that region. This step
provoked the opposition of Great Britain and the United States who
sought to invoke intcmationa) sanctions. But Manchuria re-
mained a part of the Japanese empire.
The occupation of Manchuria launched Japan into a further
enterprise in China. The monopoly over Manchurian economic
** Economic hlonroc Doctrine in con-
resources and a Japanese
travention of the Open Door , were bound to affect prejudi-
cially the Anglo-American interests and to lead to their opposition
which was manifested in the form of aid to China. The Japanese
policy " tvar almost a challenge to foreign J'owers with Interests In
China to combine against her The meticulous crippling
of non-Japanese enterprises would doubtless follow wherever (he

Sjapant Dream ef H'orU Empire, pp. 30^

xxi
lengthening shadow of Japan should fall. A Stop Japan
move*
mcnl on the part of foreign Powers was therefore a matter of en-
lightened self-interest if nothing else. It would complement

China's ov.-n aoii*Japancsc front, and U might tale practical

form in financial and oUicr material aids V Both the United
States andBritain, therefore, 'moved loimdcrpin ihcshaly finances
of the Chinese Nationalist Government Large credits were
opened by both the United States and Great Britain, and the
ccllapw: of Chinese currency was averted. This aid was disagree-
able to Japan whose prospects of peaceful domination of China vrete
thereby weakened. The fear of Anglo-American control over
ana with its consequent danger to Japanese hold over Manchuria,
together with the internal dilTtcuIucs and the uncertainty about tlie
attitude of Sasset Ruuia Jed the millfariit Government of Japan
under Prince Konoyc to expand the scope of their activity on the
mainland of China. The penetration of north China was relJossed
by the "China Incident" in 1937. Japan had taken this step
after aligning herself with the Nsua Germany as a counterpoise
against Soviet Russia, and had signed the iVnii-Commintem Pact
in 193$, which brought her into the camp ofthe totalitarian Central
European Powerr.
The Sino-Japaaesc War reacted on Angl>.\mcriean polic)'.
The two Wtem Powers were opposed to China becoming a
satellite state of Japan. "The maintenanet of an independent
sovereign China bearoe ibe prime Far Eastern object of British
and American policy Hence, the League of Kaiions denounced
Japanese action as Wag contrary to the plea of scir-dcfence but
sanctions were not invoked owing to the fast developing cris in
Europe. However, effective aid in money and material to China
was afforded by the two Powen. Great Britain used her hold on
Hong Kong lo transfuse supplies into China, and, later, when
tHs route was blocked, the Burma Road was developed to rush
mUicary supplies into China to bolster up her resistance. American
policy was not definite in the beginning, but soon after in December
1938, the Export-Import Bonk opened a credit 0125 million dollars,
and the American-japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 was
denounced. To add to the difliculiies of Japan, " a midget Soviet-
Japanese War" had broken out in July 1938, but it vs-as short-
lived. It was also clear that Soviet Russia was
not " disposed to
allow Japan to persevere undisturbed in her prodigious attempt to

Tti p. 4S5.
snLr.p.436.
Wh}"**- P- li-
swallow ilic Chinac dragon.* Alhbcsc expressions ofthcsynipathy
of the Western Powers for China lent thetascives to the interpreta-
tion in Japan that these Ptn\-crs were detennined to maintain their
hold o\-cr China and continue their imperial domination of Asia.
Japan felt tlic sense ofstrangulaiioti, and read in the efibrt to sa\c
the freedom of China an attempt to deny her the means of streng-
thening herself, and ultimately crwfiing her freedom, 'flic spirit
of self-prescrs'ation sv-ss thereby aroused and tool the form ofCo-
Prospcriiy Sphere and the slogan of * Asia for Asiatics Japan
slowly began toadopt tlieroleortbcdefcndcr of ihclibcrtics ofi^sian
peoples, and her aggressh-e moves were robed in the garb of ebam-
piomhip of the cause of <Uians against the western Imperial Powers.
U'hen war Itegan In Kuropc in 1939, Japan had been unable
to crush Cliincse resistance and svas resenting the Western aid to her
victim. She was eager to liquidate the Chinese Incident early,
'

and saw in the involvement of Great Ilritain and France in conflict

wiUi the Axis Power* an opportunity for realising her ambitions
in the mainland of China. Uut the attitude of Soviet Russia was
uncertain, and that of the United States definitely hostile. It was
clear that without eliminating the fear of their active interference
on behalf of Cliina the prospect of her success was remote.
Diplomacy and military preparedness were the means to that end.
With Russia she ulitmately succeeded in signing a Kon-Aggressjnn
Pact in April 1941, which secured her suloerable right flanh against
attack. But vigilance was not to be relaxed andjapan maintained a
strong force in the north in Manchuria to protect her boundaries.
Later the German imixion of Russia insured tJic latters adherence
to the Non-Aggresjion Pact, and enabled Japan to contemplate
aggressive moves in the south. Howe'er, the United Stales was
not expected to forego her interest entirely in China and the Western
Pacific;and with ever}- obstacle in the rapid advance of the Japanese
in China, (heir bitterness against the United States gresv. The
turn of the war also opened out a vast vision of conquest before
Japan as the Axis victories in the west gave the appearance of
knocking out the erstwhile imperialistic powers in the Far East,
Britain,France and the Netherlands, and leaving open their vast
colonial possessions foricuure by a powerful stale. The Japanese
schemes of a southern drive and the conquest of South-East Asia
developed in these circumstances. Considerations of the defence of
Japanese interests in China, the certainty of American hostili ty to
her existence as the prime stale in the Western Pacific, and the
/\sia.
easy prospect of replacing European impcrialbm in southern

r nii Aft efCenJUit, p. t (5.

all these factors prompted her to plunge in ^var, and
the occasion
was propitious for her. The China Incident, in these circumstances,
^Vcstc^l
took on the aspect of a showdown between Japan and the
Powers for control of the Far East.
The Uiuted States had started her career of overseas trade
in the Far East, particularly in China, whose integnt> she had
come
to regard as essential for her interests. Her insistence on the
policy of Open Door ss-as actuated by this motive.
Hence
she opposed every attempt, from whatever quarter, to
dismember
China or absorb her, and did not shirk from affording aid to any
Chinese Government which might exhibit signs of preventing the
early
rot. The United States had also patronised Japan in her
attempts at modernisation and was not sorry srhen the latter dis-
mantled the fabric of Russian imperialism in the Far East. But
with every progress in Japanese h?gemony in eastern Asia, w^hen
the spectre of domination over China began to haunt, American
jealousy and hostility grew against the rising Empire of the EasL
The Great Wax suffened this attitude, and in 1922, the United State
coni'ened the \Sashingtoft Conference to impose a limit to her rivals
The bar oo Japanese immigration into Calffonua
had estranged feelings in Japan. Obser\-ers, at the time, did not
fail to notice the signs of impending and meiatable clash betuTen
the tvi'o.

^^lth the passage of time this antagonism became more

pronounced and the United States considered Japan as an obstacle
to her supremacy of the Pacific. Japans groiving might was consi-
dcred to be dangerous to the securitj' of the American western
coast. The Manchurian crisis and the threat to American ccono-
nuc interesu in those regions heightened the tension- The United
States retaliated by extending credit and doubling the sale of
aeroplanes to the Chinese Govemmeat, The Far Eastern develop-
ments had also contributed to the bdated recognition of the Soviet
Union by the United States in Js'oi-cmber 1933, and was regarded
in Tokyo as a preliimnary moie by Washington to establish coxmter-
poiscs to Japan in the Padfic.* Later the Xcutrality Act is-as
not invoked as u nught have affected shipping of war supplies to
China- And when Japan propounded the New Order , the
United States refused to recognise it, thus causing a diplomatic
deadlock. Japan obtained a verj' large proportion of her scrap
iron, steel, oil and metal-workin g machinery from the Umted
States. On 26 July 1939, the United Slates Government gave
notice of the abrogation of the old commercial treaty of 1911, so

TKt Ap p. 6M.

xwv
as to imposean economic embargo on Japan which might bring her
to her ^ecs. In 1940 the United States passed the Compulsory
Military Service Act, and appropriated funds for a large navy.
Exports to Japan were placed on a day to day basis AH these
developments were a clear indication of the opposition of the United
States to Japanese position in eastern Asia and of her fear of
Japanese supremacy in the ^Vestcm Padfic.
British policy in relation to Japan, however, was not so
markedly antagonistic, though in the inter-war years it was consi-
derably influenced by American interests and wishes. The
United Kingdom had been led to renounce the Anglo-Japanesc
Alliance which acted as an insurance against aggression on British
interests in the Far East, because fintly its original objects had
ceased to exist and secondly it had become a source of ofTence
to the Uruted States But while abrogating it, the British states-
men ignored '* the fact that its abolition would remove from Japan
the obligation to respect Great Britains Eastern colonies or to
consult any interests but her osvn in whatever she chose to do in
their furtherance in China or elsewhere The Far Eastern
developments, after that, were not convenient to the United
Kingdom, and every move of Japan to acquire a further foothold
on the Chinese mainland affected prejudicially British interests
there. But owing to her peculiar situation, Britain was unable to
adopt a determined attitude. Manchurian alTair evoked only
half-hearted measures and resort to sanctions was not made.
Beyond giving financial aid to China and employing Hong Kong
or Burma routes, until closed, to send her supplies, the United
Kingdom did not adopt any positive measures to restrict Japanese
action there. And even when humiliations were hurled at her
nationals in Tientsin, the British Government did not make a
strong diplomatic stand but tried a policy of appeasement. In
July 1939 was signed the Craigic-Arita Agreement which recognised
that the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for
the purpose of safeguarding their o%vn security and maiotainiag
public order in regions under their control. His Majestys Govern-
ment have no intention of countenancing any act prejudicial to the
attainment of the aforesaid objects by the Japanese forces."
Great Britain had vital interests in the Far East, and the loss
of Chinese freedom would have considerably prejudiced them.
Hence British policy was opposed to any encroachments by Japan
on the Chinese mainland. Moreover, British possessions of Hong
Kong and Malaya, and to some extent Burma and India, were
 eastern
threatened by the preponderance of Japanese nav)- in the
Japanese array in China. Yet British strength, either
svaters, or
on sea or land, sv'as incapable of maintaining these far flung
possessions in the cast in face of Japanese hostility. The last
growing tension in Europe and the rapidly increasing power of
the .\xis countries made it impossible for the United Kingdom
to

station a strong fleet in the Far East or to cffectis'clj reinforce the

garrisons there. All these factors neccsitaied a temporising policy
which has been termed as one of appeasement. Vet there can be
no doubt that, after 1932, the hosrility of Japan ss'as presupposed
and the danger to British possessions of Malay's and Hong Kong
from her aggressiveness was taken into consideration in all calcula-
tions and plans
for defence.
Despite the *Ncsv Order* for China and the unconcealed
opposition of the Umicd States to her expansion in that country,
as also her alignment with the Axis Powen, Japan did not imme-
diately plunge the Far East into war when Europe tvas ins'olved in
the annageddon. This may be explained by the fear of the Uni-
ted Slates and the purely s^h policy of the Japanese who do not
appear to have sulwrdtaated their freedom of action to Germany.
AU that Japan desired at the moment svas liberty to pursue the
Chinese Inddent to the Gaish without intervention by England or
America. But this assurance was not fortbcoining. The war
situation, however, was fast changing, opening out new sdstas
before Japanese militarisis. About the middle of 1940, German
arms had made rapid advance in Western Europe leadhig to the
fall of Holland and France. The United Kingdom was also
exposed to the full blight of German bUtzkritg. This development
had its natural reaction in the Far East. The combination of
Great Britain, France and Netherlands, a guarantee for the security
of ihdr possesions in Malaya, Hong Kong, Indo-China and the
Netherlands East Indies, had practically disappeared. The inte-
grity of the Dutch and French possessions was in jeopardy. The
situation aroused the cupidity of Japan, for in the existing attitude
of the United States, imporiog pracdcaily an embargo on essential
supplies to Japan, the oil and iron resources of the Netherlands
East Indies would alone ensure her sclf-sufHdcncy and enable her
to carry to completion her Qiine^,. adventure. Similarly, Japan
was intimately concerned widi Indo-China, a sea-board for the
southern China and a route for the Co'w of .American supplies for
the forces of Chiang Kai-sbel. Japan feared that, unless imme-
riiale action was taken, Indo-China would pass
under tbe control
of the United Kln^om. Thus was added a new element in the
Far Eastern situation, the fear of Japanese aggression against the
Netherlands tasi Indies and Indo-Cliina. Her success in these
lands would react on the security of Burma and Malaya and
remotely affect the defences of AustraUa and India. The United
States too did not remain unaflcclcd by this new menace, for not
only was there danger to China but also to the Philippines, leading
to the upsetting of the balance in the Pacific.
To counteract this threat, Anglo-American policy was re-
oriented and planning assumed the character of providing against
the attack by Japan. On 2 July 1910, the Secretary of Stale for
India informed the Viceroy that, Da-clopments in Japan indicate
that in spite of rcstraiaing influence of present United States policy,
advocates of intervention are rapidly gaining ground and represent
serious threat to our own and French position in the Far East.
have therefore been obliged to consider change of policy and since
any attack upon us is mmter of common interest to United States
of America, tve have suggested to the United States Government
that tvjth a vicu- to preventing sucli an attack U.S. Government
should either increase pressure onjapan to the extentof full embargo
or despateJi jh/pstoSiagaporc infvU rcaJisation that this may resuh
in war wilh Japan, or with ourselves seek to wean Japan from
aggression by a concrete offer on the following linrs: (a) Great
Britain and U.S, to assist Japan in reaching sciUcment with Chinese
Government; (b) Japan formally to undertake to remain neutral
in European war and to rapcct status quo of Dritbh, French,
American and Dutch possessions in Pacific; (c) United States and
members of British Commonwealth to give Japan financial and
economic assistance; (d) Allied governments to receive full

guarantees against re-exports to enemy countries; (e) question of

future status of settlements and concessions in China to be left
in abeyance until restoration of peace in Europe and China
'ITic United States was prepared to restrain Japan by
diplomatic pressure and economic threat and maintaining fleet in
Pacific , but could not take any action which might involve her
in svar. Tlic American Govcmtnenl had no hopes of Japan
agreeing to any peaceful settlement ivhich might safeguard the
interests of other powers, lor her leaders were seeking this oppor-
tunity to advance political claims wherever they were not con-
fronted with opposition. Hence, there was no prospect of iveaning
Japan from aggression by policy of conciliation The policy
suggested was that of acquiescence in retreating under jhree
majeure" and at the same time of "exploring possibility of

11 Ttffsram ^
sctilcmcnl vi-iih Japan on term* acceptable to Cliina and contUtcnl
\riih principles for vililch U.S. stand
Germs of future \>'ar were luddeit in this atriiudc of the
Powers. Japan was keen to exploit the war situation and gain
territories held by France or Netherlands, ostensibly for reasons
of
sdr*prcsers-aU<Ki. The United States, though not engulfed in war
for reasons of domesde policy, was keenly watching the dcs'clop*
ments and was ready to take measure* to restrain Japanese expan-
sionism- The Unii^ Kingdom was consdnccd of her weakness in
the Far East but was not prepared to let Japan oust her from her
possessions. .\nd to this end diplomacy and preparedness were
cmplo^'cd to ward off the evil day. Ang!o-Dutch*Unitcd Stales
cooperation was presupposed in any measures that might be adop-
ted, and gradually the United States was drifting into the w-ar.
Japan was also not keen to take action immediately. Hence for
more than a year diplomacy was active to pre^tnt the Far East
from being con\-crled into a theatre of operations. Howcstt, there
was an onrcalit)- In the negotiations, and the mailed fist, though
concealed, was being strengthened to settle the issue by w-ar.
Besida China, there was the problem of the security of the
NetherUflds East Indies and Indo-Chlna. The British Cot'cnt-
ment w-as titally i&terested in the ioiegrity of these areas, for thdr
subjugation by the Japanese would afiect the defence of Malay's*
Burma and even the Indian Ocean and Australia, Hence, imme-
diately after the fall of France, an appreciation was made of the
defence position in the Far Eut and the possibih'ty of Japanese
action against the Dutch possession*. An assessment was made
of the different factors which were likely to influence Japanese
policy. Among these the most important were the China war,
the state of Anglo-Dutch defences, the attitude of the United
States, and the strain on Japan** economic resources. One of the
hypotheses was that Japan could not take for granted the non-
interrentioa of the Uni^ States who might send their fleet to the
Philippines. Also it was felt that an important factor would be
ihe ** knowledge that further aggression may lead to a rupture of
trade relations with the Umied Sutc* and Great Rn talr. . The
United States had 'warned Japan of her interest in the main-
tenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies Japans
eTOotaic structure also was unlikdy to bear the strain of a b^ch
with the United States and Great Britain on whom she depended
for some of her essential raw materials, unless she could exploit
the resources of Netherlands East Indies, especially oil, rubber
tin. On a review of these faaors, the coacltisioa of the British
duels of Stafis was that ** smtil the isne of the war in Euro e
p
xxvui
 becomes clearer, it is probable that Japan will confine her action
to the elimination of British influence from China and Hong Kong
to the greatest possible extent without incurring a rupture with the
United States and the Bntish Empire *.**
In 1940, no fear ^vas entertained of any immediate action by
Japan, though it was believed that the war situation offered an
opportunity to extend her interests. A sudden attack on the
Netherlands East Indies or Singapore was feared, but there was
greater probability that the first Japanese move would be into
Indo-China or Thailand, followed later by an attack on the Dutch
possessions. Yet, it was hoped that Japan would not "risk an
open breach with the British Empire and the United States until
the situation in Europe is clearer , The British Empire was also
in no position to entertain the idea of going to war with Japan,
Examining the possible courses of Japanese action, the Chiefs of
Staff pointed out the risks to Thailand, Indo>China, and the
Netherlands East Indies, and then considered the stage when it
might be necessary to declare ^var on Japan otving to the vital
interests being affected which primarily were the maintenance of
sea communications. The Japanese penetration into Thailand
or IndO'China was believed to threaten Singapore and make the
defence of Burma and Malaya extremely difTjcult. But, it was
held that under present world conditions**, Japanese action in
either of these regions would not justify Britain going to war with
Japan with the existing avaflable resources, as sea communications
would not be threatened, Japanese attack on the Dutch posses-
sions was in a different category as it was likely to compromise
gravely the security of vital sea communications and the base at
Singapore, But even in this contingency, though the security of
the Netherlands East Indies was regarded as essential to British
mterests, resort to war was not thought of as that purpose might
be served by rendering full military and economic aid to the Dutch.
The British authorities, therefore, did not want war in the Far
East at this stage, though as an insurance against Japanese aggres-
sion, they were keen for collaboration with the Dutch and the
United States without whose active support the security of the Far
East was in danger. At the same time there was confidence that
Japan, unless driven to extreme measures by her extremity or
tempted by our weakness, would also tty to avoid war with the
British Empire and the United States and endeavour to achieve
her aims by stages which she might hope would not involve her

> Apprecjauon in tfie Far East; C, O. S. (40) 592. 15 Auguit 1940. Alao Tel
246I.S, Secretary of Stace loVteewy, 14 Au^iMt 1940.

xxix
openly in wnr. British poGcy at this date was, therefore, to
avoid open clash \rith Japan, and aimed at
a wide settlement
in the Far East, including economic concessions to Japan But
failing a settlement on satisfactory lenrn the momentary object
was to play for dtne, cede nothing until we must and build up
our defences as soon as we can.
The year 1940 also found the British military authorities
drawing up appreciations and plans of defence which ivere based
on the presumption of intervention by the United States and the
Dutch, though no definite understandings had been arrived at with
these Powers. Being unable to station the fleet in the Far East,
the British Government did not want war in the cast unless the
United States got involved in it. Similarly Japan too docs not
appear to have been dratsm towards war, though the temptation
was there. An important factor in her attitude was the United
States whose hostility could not be easily overlooked, particularly
as it would vitally affect Japanese economy- Yet Japan was keen
to conclude the Chinese war even by means of a reasonable peace;
and was determined to eliminate all obstacles to it. It svas clear
io her war leaders that as long as China was able to get economic
aid and supplies of military equipment from the United States and
Great Britain, an early end of the Chinese incident was not in sight.
Hence she desired to close the avenue of Indo>China and the
Burma Road. The United Kingdom had closed the latter for three
months, but tinder American pressure had reopened it for a constant
flow of supplies. To Japan the dosing of these routes was vital;
hence she tvas keen to take necessary measures for preventing Indo-
China being made any longer the base for assistance to China. She
was also afraid that the French possessions might be occupied by
Great Britain. Japan was therefore anxious to dose that passage
even by controlling or occupying Indo-China, if need be. This
step was bound to cause imsgiviogs in British circles and a sense of
hostility in the United States. Important developments occurred
in 1941 in this direction which culminated in war.
Even in 1940, under German pressure, Japan had been able
to impose an agreement on Vichy France providing for the move-
ment of Japanese troops through Indo-China and the use of air
ports, and on 22 September, Japanese troops had landed at Saigon
to begin the occupation of Hanoi and six other pwits. This led
further to economic and mutual defence agreements between
Japan and Vichy France, in h(ay and July 1941, respectively.
The Utter svas aimed at giving to Japan eight air and two naval
bases in Indo-Cbina and freedom of movement and zitanoeuvifs
for 40,000 Japanese troops who would begin disembarking on

XXX

30 July 1941. This agreement superseded the earlier one of 22
September 1940, and vtss accepted by Marshal Petain. There was
a guarantee lor the integrity of Indo-China. The Japanese
Government had tried to show that this action of mutual defence
agreement, involving control over air and naval bases and stationing
of troops in south Indo*China, was necessary *' for ensuring an
uninterrupted source of supply of rice and other foodstuffs as well
as raw materials, the flow of which might be obstructed by Chinese
forces and Dc Gaullist activities in southern Indo-China.'*
Another justification advanced was that the step was taken as a
safeguard against the encirclement ofJapan by the A.B.C.D. powers
(American, British, Chinese and Dutch Governments) Tlic
Unseemly haste in occupying bases in Indo-China was ascribed
by the British Ambassador in Tokyo to the feeling that time is
svorking against them and that if they intend to seize bases there
they should act quickly to forestall possible counter-action on our
part. They svoultl tlien be able to develop these bases so that when
they hai'e achieved their object in North they srill be ready for any
further southsvard advance which may then seem expedient
It is not possible to know to what extent any preparations had been
made by the British to occupy Indo-China, but these seem to be
unlikely. All chat was contemplated svas to make an offer of support
to M. Decuox, the Governor General there, and anti*V/cby elements
to fortify their resistance to Japanese aggression. The IV'estem
were interested in the fate of Indo-China and, given time,
Allies
would be prepared to adopt measures to counteract Japanese
aggression there.
It has been mentioned above that Japan took ttvo steps in
1940, viz., the signing of the Tripartite Pact tvilh Germany and
Italy and the pressure on Indo-China leading to its military occupa-
tion, which pointed to a significaat step in her anti-Anglo-American
policy and had serious reactions on the other side. It may be
pertinent here to examine first the motives of Japan in launching
on that course and then to analyse the corresponding attitude
and policy of the IVestcm Fowen. We get a gUmpse of Japanese
policy from the British report of (heir Ambassadors talk with the
Japanese Minister for F^orcign Affaiis on 8 October 1940.
Matsuoko discussed the Tripartite Pact and gave the following
as reasons for Japans participation in it:
(i) the increasingly unfriendly attitude of the United States

sTToJAgt p. 595.

iSTelNo.Z^S Craip'e to Toreigo OB,Z3Jofy I9tl.

xxxi*
 which necessitated dcfeimN'e measures on the part of
Japan,
(ii) intention to iocalise the war and bring to an end the
tragic struggle then going on in Europe and China.

The Minister repudiated any suggestion of aggressive intenu'on
and emphasised that though some sections in Japan favoured
more aggressive policj* " the Prime Minuter was opposed to such a
couise. He also explained that the Pact had not deprived Japan
of her freedom to deride about peace or war for hcnelf, and in
this connection made a very important declaration of policy
that
Japan would not enter the war if for instance the United States
were to take action as a result of provocation from the Axis
The same sentiments were reiterated in a subsequent interview
between the two. The Foreign hiinister said, It would be a
great mistake to regard the Three Power Pact as implying cither
that Japan svanted ironble with Britain or that she wished to see
Britain lose the war. Hb impelling motive in concluding this
pact had been hia conviction that the United States* entry into
the war would ine%-itably mvolve other States including Japan.
Thus In due course the war would become worldwide and this In
turn would mean Armageddon. He emphasised "his fervent
desire to avoid war with Great Britain or the United States *i
and did not hesitate to remark that '* Nothing would provoke the
Japanese Government except Americas entry into the European
war or some serious provocation such as the visit of a pmverful
American squadron to Singapore
Yet by the end of 1940, Japans drift into the Axis camp had
become definite, and sebemes of a '* New Order in Greater East
Asia were vaguely entertained. The dircciion of her aggressive
advance had also been Indicated and Indo-China v.-as the fint
objective southwards. kVbelhcr the move was a safeguard against
the apprehended Anglo-American aggression and as a means of
stren^hening the defences ofJapan and her occupied territories in
China or a prellnunary step to the conquest of the whole of South
Asia in the event of war developments bring propitious, it is diffi-
cult to be dogmatic about. But one point is clear that Japan was
conumtted to her Aris allies to keep the United States outside the
war in Europe. She was also afrrid of her American rival, and
desired to possess positions of srantage in case the United States
entered the war, which svould be the signal for the Padfic War also
to begin.
 Until Indo>China had been loii to Japan, the A.B.C.D.
powers had not applied any sanctions and were content merely to
resent Japan** policy'. Her admission into the Tripartite Pact
caused mtsgivinps and hostile comments in the Anglo-American
countries. Japan may have been ** alarmed at firm firont shoivn "
by them. But this Jed tlic British Government to conclude " th.ii
she is not prep.irc(l at the moment to face war against both of us.
^Vhile therefore lc has in no way abandoned her aims, she has
decided to moderate tempo of her adsance in the hope, if not the
conviction, that circumstances of war in Europe svill presently
turn to her advantage and anbrti her a more favourable opportunity
of gaining her ends, at comparatively smalt cost **. This estimate
led to the viesv that " a firmer front " should be built vdih the
United States. ITic n.tfral conclusion svas that until both we
and the United States can comince Japan that ve has-c the will
and power to resist her by force if need be, our position in Far
East and in Pacific is likely to rem-^in insecure / Tlie British
Government was keen to keep out of the war in the Far East
unless the United States was actively involved in it, and was also
aware of the temper of llte Government across the Atlantic. The
United States Govemment was conscious of the danger to American
interests in the victory of (he Axis Powen, and appeared to be keen
to prevent it. But owing to domestic reasons, the United States
was in no position to enter the svar immediately. But she was also
averse to the expansion ofJapans political or economic influence
in Asi.s. Hence, an anti.Japanese wave was prevailing there,
and hopes were entertained that the United States would enter the
war in the cast to protect Anglo-Dutch interests. On thu hope
British policy thrived. But the occasion for ihb development
was lacking. It was, however, provided by the final occupation
of Indo-China fay Japan with the corresponding imposition of
economic sanctions by the Western Allies, a step which hastened
war.
The danger of Japanese southward movement was realised
quite early, and measures were taken by the British Govern-
ment to arrange for collective action with the Netherlands and the
United States. Tlic Singapore Defence Conference convened in
October 1940 had stressed the importance of mutual support in the
defence of South-East Asia and had emphasised the necessity of
scaiiing definite agreements with the United States for Joint naval
and military action in that area. In Washington, Sta/T conversa-
tions were held between 29 January and the end of March 1911,

*SeeTf**ryor Slte lt> Vlccrt)^, I Dcecfniier IWO.

XXXiii
and certain genera! principles of collaboration were ouilincd. These
emphasised the prime importance of concentrating cfTort on the
defeat of Germany in the Atlantic and European theatres; hence
in ease Japan entered the tw, the only strategy possible was to
be on the defensive. To achieve this objrct, it was agreed that
though the United States would not increase her military strength
in the Far East area, her
'* Pacific
Fleet will operate from Hass-aii
against Japanese Paafic communications in defence of United
States and British Commonwealth trade and with the object of
diverting Japanese strength away from hfalaya area A joint
plan agreed belsvccn the Staffs of the two nations was now there,
and though at gmcmmental level no pact or agreement of mutual
defence or joint action was contemplated, yet at the Chiefs of
Staff level the mode of joint action had been evolved.'* This was
followed by the Amcrican-Dutcb*British conversations which were
held in April 1941 to prqjare plan for conduct of military
operations in Far East on basis of report of IVashington conversa-
tions .*
It may not be necessary here to ductus in detail the plan
evoh^d at Singapore, but it will be penLoent to refer to the agree-
ment relaUng to the Japanese actions which w-ould call for measures
of collective military counteraction, as otherwise the Associated
Fotvm would be at great military disadvantage, should Japan
subsequently attack. These vxres
"(a) A direct act of svar by Japanese armed forces agalxut
the Territory or Mandat^ Territory of any of the
Associated Powers.
(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of
Thailand to the West of !00* East or to the South of
ItP North.
(c) The moscmcni of a Urge number of Japanese s\-arshjps
or of ft convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese
warships, which from its position aisd course was dearly
directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East Coast of
the Inhmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or bad
crossed the parallel of 6 North between Malaya and
the Pliilippines, a line ftom the Gulf of Daras to Waigeo
Island or the Equator East of \Vaigeo
In was laid on a defensive strategy,
these talks also emphasis
but operations were discussed.
ofTcnsis'c air
Indo*China was outside the zone of special interests for
defence, hence any Japanese action against the integrity of that

Semarycr Sore to Vtcaoj-S Jane I9tl.

"A. D. B. CoovontkKB, Rrfnrt, pan 2.
French colony tlid not automatically involve the application of tlic
plans of defence discussed at Singapore. Yet Japanese action
against that strategic country 'which, on tlic one side, commanded
communications into China and, on the other, svas a base for
operations against Malaya, were not altogether ignored, and called
for retaliatory measures. These were to be economic as Japan
was bclicN'cd to be essentially susceptible to an economic embargo.
Hence, svhen the danger to IndO'China was imminent, the Anglo.
American Covemmenls decided on a joint course of drastic
economic action against Japan*, which may force Japanese
to choose bctsvfcn reversing their pro-Axis policy, or proceeding
with their southward move to point of svar with Netherlands East
Indies and ourselves in an endeavour to obtain control of sources
of raw matcriar*.**
Economic sanctions being decided upon by the United States
Government, His Majestys Go\crnmcnt in the United Kingdom
readily fell into line with that repressive action. Their policy,
at the moment, was enunciated as follous by the Secretary of
Slate for India:
(i) that we must on no account discourage any action which
U.S.A. may wish to take in pressure on Japan and that
we must as far os possible match our action svith theirs,
(il) that although we see no objection to our osvn point of

view that bat moment to force the issue might be when

(and If) Japan became involved with Russia we must
In paramount Interests of Anglo^Unitcd States coopera,
tion be prepared to follow a United Stales lead in forcing
issue over Indo-China bases and
(iii) that if we arc called upon to go to lengths which involve

a risk ofsvarbctwcenoursclvcs and Japan we should make

every cfTart to obtain clearest possible indication from
United States that if war between British Empire and
follows consequent upon an attack by Japan
Japan
on ourselves or on Dutch we can count without
either
reservation on active armed support of U.S.A.**
The United Stales Government had decided to freeze Japanese
assets and similar action was demanded of other Governments.
India svas also called upon to issue freezing orders simultaneously.
A
drastic application of economic sanctions had a serious
cfTecton Japanese economy and, in the words of Churchill,

'Seereuxy of Stale lo Governor General E. A. dated No. 8588. 23 July 1941,

XXXV
 brought to a head the iniemal crisis in Japanese politics. .....
It was evident that this ^vas a stranglehold, and that
the choice
before them %sas dthcr for Japan to reach an agreement tvUh the
United Stales or go to war. The American requirements involved
Japanese withdrawal not only from these new aggressions in Indo-
China, but from China itself, vfhere thc>' had already been fighting
at heaty expenses for so long.**
The economic embargo and freezing of the assets intensified
the tension. Tlie cessation of shipments of ariation gasoline
and lubricating oil from the United States tojapan, the licensing
of Japanese trade with the United States, the appointment of
Owen Lattimore as special political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek,
the extension of the 50,000,000 dollar stabilization credit to China
for another year, delays imposed upon Japanese vesseb seeking to
travene the Panama Canal, the general freezing policy whereby
the Japanese assets were frozen not only in the United States but
throughout the British Empire and the Dutch East Indies, the
closing of British coaling stations to Japanese ships, and the appoint-
meat of General Douglas AfacAithur as Commandcr-in-Chief of
all the United States forces in the Far East
all during the summer
of 1941-^inbmed to indicate the growing tensions which boded
ill for the Pacific area Japan was now face to face with the
greatest emergency in history and the alternative before her
was to defy the Anglo-American opposiuon or to surrender all
schemes of realising her dirine mission The choice was hard
and the Japanese Government, in spite of the growing bellicosity
of the people, decided upon the method of negotiations srith the
Umted States. * Tbt conservative politicians and the Imperial
Court hoped to obtain terms which would enable them to control
their war party at home ".* To this end, conversations were held
in Washington which continued till the very eve of Pearl Harbour.
Prince Konoyc, the Japanese Prime Minister, had proposed a
personal meeiing with President Roosevelt to settle the issues, but
his proposal did not find favour srith the President. This refusal
cost him his position and the CosTrament svas formed by General
Tojo, who had the confidence of the army. He renewed
diplomatic efibrts ta solve the tangle and the Emperor persbted in
the hope of peaceful solution. But he was willing to let prepara-
tions for war proceed, if negouations did not bear fruit.
It is clear from Mr. ChurchiH's account that, in November
1941, a lUge had been reached when peaceful settlement appeared

"OmnAiU. Vot. 1(1, pp. 531-2.

Gadihal, Orietu wij
4C3>wthIl,Vol.UI.p.52i
Cwma <4 MWM MV //. p, 520

xxxvi
 to be in sjgfif. On 20 Xwember, Japan lud fonvarded her final
propQsaJj to ^\a5Jlington. These /eJated to the evacuation of
Southern Indo*China by her, pending a general scldcmcni n-iili
China, when she would withdraw completely from the whole of
Indo-China. In return, the United States was to supply Japan
with petroleum, to refrain from interfering with Japan's efforts to
restore peace in China, to help Japan to obtain the products of
the Netherlands East Indies, and to place commercial relations
between Japan and the United States on a normal basis. Both
sides were to agree to make no armed advancement in North-
East /\sia and the Southern Pacific .** The American Government
appears to have been agreeable to these terms with certain specific
conditions being attached to the withdrawal from South Indo-
China, and by modifying the extent of the removal of the economic
embargo. These were to be for a period of three months sviihm
which a general settlement co\-ering the whole of the Pacific area
was to be discussed. .Mr. Churcluil has opened a srindow on the
course of diplomat^ which prevented this modus vivendi from
being operatisr. China was naturany aiarmed andst appears iliat
Great Britain was also not happy sviih this dc\-elopmcnt, for if the
United States would not break with Japan, all prospects of her
being a party to the war, on which alone depended the chances of
Britbli victory over the Nazi forces, would be over. The fate of
Cliiang Kai-shek was the deciding factor; and the British Prime
Ministers appeal to the President that the regard of the United
Stales for the Chinese cause wH govern your action had the
effect of diverting the trend of negotiations in Waslungton. The
United States Government presented the Ten-Point Note to the
Japanese envoys, and this included a demand for the withdrawal
of all Japanese forces from China and Indo-China and the recogni-
tion of National Government alone in China.* IVis was the end of
all prospects of peace. The die svas cast and the United States and

Japan both had now to trc.id the path of war.

It svill be futile to throw the blame on one party or the other;
as the conditions for peace perhaps militated against the national
honour and interest of either of them. In Japan a large section was
keen to exploit the war situation to fulfil the expansionist aims in
eastern Ada, and this they wanted to achieve before Germany had
completed her conquest of Europe and the West. The East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was a reality for these people and they
'

N\cre not prepared to brook any hostile opposition to their objects.

Particularly at a time when South-East Asia seemed to be irithin

diurchiu, Vol. IH. p. 530.

7 C3iurchUI, VoU III. pp- 530-1.

xxxvii
thor grasp, they were furious whm they found the Urtited States
thrvarting their ambitions. In the alence of any honourable
settlement which would have cased the economic situation without
seriously humbling their pride, the Japanese Government decided
to tate up arms.
probe into the motives of the United States.
It is difficult to
Perhaps it was the climax of the fear of Japanese predominance in

the Far East, which had influenced American pohcy since 1905,
and which now sought an occasion to make the Pacific pre-eminently
a zone of United States interests. There is no doubt that the
United States had been impelled by the considerations of the
integrity of Nationalisi China with whose existence as an indepen-
dent state were closely associated the Far Eastern interests of the
American Republic. It may also be surmised that the United
States Government was influenced by the u ar situation in Europe
and the Atlantic, and found m
the Japanese attitude a means of
influencing American public opinion for their entry into the war
on the side of Great Britain. The British Government had been
building their hopes of defending the eastern empire on the close
coUaberadon and aedve support of the United States. All plans
for the defenceof Malaya, Netherlands East Indies or Australia were
based on the participation of the United States Fleet in the Pacific
to eonnteract Japanese naval superiorir>'. It sv-as, therefore, in
the interest of the British Empire that tasion, leading ultimately
to the Uoifed States entry into the ssnr, should continue.
^VhiIe negotiations were proceeding in ^Vashington, and
when hopes of peaceful settlement had receded, Japan had been
preparing for a sudden stroke to herald her coming into the war.
On 23 Nos-ember 1941, the United States Government had begun
to suspect the warlike preparations ofjapan and the President had
warned the High Commissioner of the Philippines of the impending
danger to the Burma Road, Thailand, Malaya, Netherlands East
Indies or the Philippines. He also expressed the belief that this
next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities
betv.-een the U.S. and Japan %* A week later the British Ambassa-
dor at Washington was also Inlbnned that diplomacy* had yielded
place to the war machine and the matter was m the of the
officials of the Army and Navy. The probability of a sudden
Japanese move was expressed. In Japan also the imminence of
war was discussed and their carrier fleet with a considerable naval
air force had sailed to attack Pearl Harbour on 25 November.
On I December, the Imperial Conference at Tokyo decided on
* QuMcd by Ctnreiilll, V<*. HI, p. 5E-

SQucviii
war with the United Slates. At the same time fleets had sailed for
the Gulf of Siam, and forces had mo\'cd in other directions on
particular assignments. The British Government feared that
possibly the attack might be aimed against the Kra Isthmus or the
Netherlands East Indies in which ease the United States might
not be involved in war, owing to the Congressional opposition.
Hence for the United States to be in the w.ir it was necessary that
Japan should appear to be aggressive and actually strike a blow
against American territory. These expectations were fulfilled by
Japan attacking the Pearl Harbour on 7 December and strafing
the American fleet there. Thb stroke provided the opportunity
for the United States Government to set the war machine in
motion and thereby throw in the American resources in the scale
against tJic Central European Pow-en. To Japan, the crippling of
the Pacific Elect was essential to present immediate American
intcr\tnlion in her aggressive designs in South-East Asia. The
Pearl Harbour made the conquest of Hong Kong, Malaya, flomeo,
Netherlands East Indies and Burma possible for Japan, as the
United States had no Fleet left in the Pacific to intercept Japanese
moves in the southern seas, or to render active support to the British
and Dutch forces in the South West Pacific regions. Thus the war
came in the cast and Japan w.*is In a position to win the fint
round, at a moment when the British forces were weak in the
cast and (he United States had not been able to mobilize her full
strength to strike simultaneously both in the vest and the east.
The immediate effect of war was felt in Hong Kong, Malaya
and Borneo. The story of the Angto-Japanese conflict in these
regions, in which the Indian armed forces along ivith those of the
Commonwealth countries, Great Britain, Canada and Australia
participated, is described in the pages below. It is a talc of defeats
and disasters, svhich were the inevitable consequence of imperfect
planning and inadequate preparations.

Bisheshwar Prasad
Hong Kong
 CHAPTER I

Powers and Politics in East Asia

TilE LSTERNATIONAL SCENE

The security of the British possessions in East /Isia was

gradually affected by the rise of modem Japan. ^STien Commodore
Perry of the United States Na^'y first visited the Japanese islands
in 1853, he found a feudal society and an agricultural economy,
a people no different from any of the other backward peacefiiJ,

communities in Asia. So the next year he returned with a bigger

force and compelled the Japanese to accord trade fadlities
^Vithin ten years, other H'estern Powers came in; an unfortunate
inddent took place and the British Nav> bombarded the port of
Kagoshima. It seemed incritable that events svould run true to
the usual nineteenth century pattern of an industrially advanced
European Power coming into contact with a backward community.
But the Japanese quickly realised the peril of their situation and
decided to become modernised. ^Vltbin a few decades, feudalism
gave ivay to a modern monarchy, elBdent armed forces were
set up, ^e country svas industrialised and a militant nationalism
emerged. In 1894 Japan proved her equality to the \Ve3t by
fighting and defeating the Chinese, and in 1902 she took her place
in the comity of nations by means of an alliance of friendship
with Great Britain. There followed the brilliant Japanese victory
os'cr Imperial Russia in 1905, and the Japanese partiripation in
the First Great War, as an ally of the British Empire. As agreed
beforehand, the Japanese occupied during the war all the German
islands in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups, and this
occupation >vas confirmed by a Mandate from the League of
Nations after the svar.
These acquisitions, however, merely served to whet her appe-
tite. At the time the fundamental problem for Japan tvas to feed
and give employment to about eigh^ million of her people crowd-
ed in a few small islands, not particularly rich in minerals and
other raw materials. The approved solution of such a problem
was before her eyes in the Brilbb, Dutch, Belgian and even
Portuguese empires in Asia and Africa. It is no wonder, then,
that imperialism, political or economic, became Japans goal.
Conflict between Japan and the Western Powers thereafter became
inevitable.
2 CAMPAIGNS IS SOCTH-EAST ASL\ 1941-42 HOSC EOSC

Es'cn in 1915, Japans Twenty-one Demands on China

es'okcd opposition in the United States which successfully upheld
her Open Door polic)". The Washington Xa\-al Treaty of 1922
limited the nas'ai armament race, bat the British abn^adon of
the long standing Anglo-Japancsc Alliance rcsealcd the new dip-
lomatic grouping in the Padfie regfoa. StiiJ, for nearly a decade
after that, the climate of peace continued. In April 1930, Japan
agreed to the London Masai Treaty. But the situation deteriorated
soon after hy the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and
her Miihdrasal from the League of Xations in 1933. InDcccmber
1934, Japan denounced the Washington Treaty, and two jears
later signed the AnU-Gomlnfcm Pact with Xaai Germany. The
notorious * China Inddeot * began on
7 July 1937, and the Rome-
BerUn-Tot)-o Ams appeared soon after.
Henceforth, Japans mtr-all strategy- became apparent.
She was determined to expand her territories in the south, and
she claimed a sort of ^ionToc Doctrine * for South-East Asia
by insisting on establishing a * Co-prosperity aone there. This
claim was emphasised in Prince Rono^e's pubb'c stateisenu of
3 Mosember and 22 Dece mber 1938.
Japan s^as not content merely with the theoretical declara-
tion of a Co-prosperiti* zone, but took pracdcnl steps to realise
her ambitions. larpiteoftheprotemofCreaiBriiaio, theUniied
States and France, Japanese fortes occupied the island of Hainan
in June 1939, jurti^iag the step on nulitary ground*. Soon after,
the Japanese Gos'emment announced the occupation of Spratlcy
Island, situated halfway bets'ten Borneo and Trench IndD-China,
ostr which Trance claimed jurudictioo. Further e^^denec of
Japan* aggresave designs came in the form of the sirtual
blockade of Hong Kong's leased territory from the landward
ride.
The collapse of Holland and France during the first half
of 1940 opened up fresh avenues of conquest for the militarists in
Japan- Having effectively stopped supplies to China through
French Indo-China, Japan turned her attention to the Burma
Rrd. and demanded that it should be closed to China. The
United Kingdom, at this juncture, was not in a position to refuse
the demand. Her position was desperate. The British Expedi-
tionary Force in France had lost almost all its equipment, casualties
in its tanks had bn heavy, and the Battle of Briudn was about
to Stan. Under the amroBtanees the British GosiciTiment agreed
to ebse the Burma Road for three months with effect from 18
July 1940, to specified categoric^ of war xtsateriaL This step s*as
adversely commented upon, specially in the United Sutes, where
 PO^VZRS AND POLITICS Vi EAST ASIA 3

it was considered as smacking of appeasement sinular to that In

Europe with regard to Germany and Italy.
After the closing of the Burma Road, tivo events occurred
which hardened feelings in the United Kingdom and the United
Stales against Japan. The first was Japans adherence to the Axis,
and the second the pressure put on Indo-China for stationing
Japanese troops in Tong-ldng. The latter ivas a step in the direc-
tion of assuming ultimate control of Indo-China. As a reaction
against these two events, and because British position had greatly
improved since July, Afr. Winston Churchill announced the
reopening of the Burma Road on 17 October 1940.
In July 1941, the British Government denounced the Anglo-
Japanese treaties and froze Japanese assets. This belated action,
far from deterring Japan, helped to strengthen her militarists. In
order to prove really efiective, these economic sanctions ought
to have been matched by the necessary naval and military disposi-
tions, but this was never done. Siam (Thailand) was the next
Wetim of Japanese aggression. In October 1941, the Japanese
occupied Indo-China, and threw down the gauntlet to Great
Britain.
A new Japanese cabinet was formed on 16 October 1941,
headed by General Tojo. This svas followed by bellicose speeches
to the effect that Japan was determined to settle the China

Incident * and to establish a * Greater East-Asia Co-prosperitj

sphere *. In a speech on national policy on 17 November 1941,
Tojo hoped that Third Powers would refrain from obstructing
the successful conclusion of the China War, and concluded that
Japan svas at the cross-roads of her 2,600 years of history
The effect of these speeches ivas to further the bonds of amity and
goodwill betiveen the United Kingdom and the United States
and to strengthen their united determination to put a stop to
Japanese aggression. In his Mansion House speech on 10
November, Mr. Churchill said :
They (the United States) arc doing their utmost to find
svays of preserving peace in the Padfic. ^Ve do not know whether
their efforts will be successful, but, should they fail, I take this
occasion to say, and it is my duty to say, that should the United
States become involved in war with Japan, British declaration
svill follow within the hour .

The real source of friction in East Asia may be found in

economic nationalism and imperialism which characterised
the years after 1930, when the world tended to split up into
economic blocs, and international trade svas being diverted into
certain well defined areas for the attainment of political objectives;
4 CAitPAIGVSlN SOUTIf-EAST ASIA 19tM2 ItONC KOSC

Japan was intent on establishing a yen embracing China,

bloc,
^lanchukuo and herself. Kaa Germany svas attempting the
economic consolidation of Central and South-Eastern Europe. . .

Great Britain inaugurated an era of bloc economy at Ottawa

with a s)-stcra of Empire preference. Even the Netherlands Indies
turned protectionist in 1933. Economic liberalism abdicated in
favour of economic nationalism and the tendency was for each
nation to Isolate itself from w-orld markets.' British commerical
policy svas designed to restrict Japanese competition, and the
Ottawa Agreements of 1932 marked the beginning of an
cconomico-political offemive against Japanese goods The
Indo-JafKinese Trade Treaty was abrogated in 1933 at the behest
of Lancashire interests. In 1934 the British Govenunent had
imposed restrictions on Japanese imports Into British colonies. These
economic measures were bound to affect the national prosperity
of Japan. On the other hand, Japanese measures in China could
not fail to injure British interests tberc, particularly in the Yangtze
Valley. Yanaga has remarked that ** the Amau Statement of April
17, 1934, and other pronouncements did not sen'C to relieve
Aaglo-Japanese tension. Trade controversies In India, Australia,
and elsewhere further aggravated the rapidly deteriorating relation-
ship between the two countries that once had been close alUes
Developments in 1933 and 1936 made the relations worse still,
and in December 1933 the United Kingdom became the target of
Japanese press tirade. The * China Incident increased the

tension and in the summer of 1939 a serious clash had occurred

in Tientsin between the British and the Japanese , leading to a
Japanese blockade of British and French concessions. 1940 saw
Aiama ^fani and Tctsuti Mam incidents svhich were a dear indica-
tion of detcrioradng Anglojapanesc reladons.
delations between Japan and the United States were equally-
strained. The Manchurian ciios had brought the United States
out of her self-imposed isobtion when she agreed to partidpate in
the League of Nations enquiry which deebred Japan an aggressor.
Japanese action in China sras directly prejudidal to the whole
conne of American policy there and, if successful, would have
effectively blocked her econonuc interests in the West Pacific.
The growing military might of the island empire, her control over
the mandatory German tsbnds in the Padfic Ocean and thdr
rapid transformation into naval bases, her repudiation of the naval
strength formula of 1922 and her ovxrt designs of the conquest of

Yasga,_J^as Saa Ttny, p..579

 roASERS AND rOUnCS IS EAST ASIA 5

China, all helped to alienate American opiniom The Amau State*

ment of 1934 was a reflection of Japans rcsdvcncss at the
cumulative eflects of foreign activities in China The Um'tcd
States adopted the rCeutrality Act m
1935, prohibiting the carrying
of arms to belligerent States, which was aimed against Japans
capacity to fight China, The Sino-Japanese War brought America
more openly in the field as the main prop of the Kuomintang,
Every turn in the progress of this war made the relations between
Japan and the United States more difficult of accommodation.
It will be evident from the above rcviciv of the diplomatic
developments in the Far East, that while the waters of the Pacific
had remained outwardly calm, clouds were gathering on the hori-
zon and storms were brewing. The tliulcd States could not afford
to ignore the developments in China or let Japan fortify her posi-
tion so as to challenge American intcrejis in the West Pacific.
The United Kingdom, too, was aflccted by the policy and position
of Japan, whose hostility to the British Empire was easily dUcer-
niblc. Tlie Far East could no longer be considered safe; the secu-
rity of the Britbh Empire was directly threatened by the rise of
Japan into a powerful imperialistic state in East Asia. Circum-
stances had changed and there cotdd be no more of the old
complacence about the absence of danger to Hong Kong, Malayi,
Sarawak, Burma or India.

DEFENCE PEAKS

When, Great War, Japan emerged as the naval

after the First
rival of Great Britain in East Asia, British statesmen and soldiers
began to look to the defences of Imperial possessions in that region.
These possessions included Hong Kong, British Borneo and
Malaya, with Australia, New Zealand, Burma, Ceylon
and India behind them, Hong Kong was nearest to Japan and
had no defensive depth and no space for manoeuvring. Hong
Kong was, therefore, judged impossible to hold indefinitely
against a full-scale Japanese attack. Only a tactical defensive for
a limited period was considered practicable there, for which it
svould be sufficient to /cave a smalt force on the island. British
Baroeo and Sarawak were juare important both strategically and
economically. There were valuable oU-wcUs in Borneo, many
small harbours such as Kuching, Victoria and Sandakan, and
several aerodromes and landing grounds. It flanked the sea
routes to Singapore and the Sunda Straits, and bombers and

/it/, p. 567.
 6 CAMPAIGNS LV SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 HONO KOSO

submarines based there could seriously interfere with Japanese

convoys moring against Malaya as well as Java. But, unfor-
tunately, neither the British nor the Dutch had suflicicnt resources
to hold Borneo in strengtlu For Malaya was far more valuable
than Borneo, and Singapore at its southern tip controlled the
entrance to the Indian Ocean. Singapore, therefore, was to be
the main bastion of defence for the British possessions in that region.
Together with the American fortress of Corregidor, it \s-as to support
a sride defensive arc blocking Japanese advance southwards.
British appreciation vi-as that Japan would be able to attack
Malaya only by sea and her main objcciis-c would be Singapore,
where it was decided to build a strong nasTil base. The protection
of the nasal base and of the air bases built in support of it became
the main concern of the defence plans. If the chief danger to
Malaya was a sea-borne invasion by the Japanese, the naval base
was olnnously of the greatest importance. Its security, of course,
.
depended ^timately on the ability of the Britbh fleet to control
sea communications In the approaches to Singapore.* This
was possible only tv hen the fleet was concentrated there. The then
appreciation was that the Japanese would have to launch a direct
attack on the Island of Singapore. Owing to the limited range
of aircraft, which could at best operate from the east coast of Johore
only in the ricinit)' of Messing, the Japanese would haNO to attack
by sea. A long sea voyage would necessarily limit the size of the
expecUtion. The strength of the British fleet and the belief in
its ability to concentrate within 70 days in Singapore t\-aters gave
confldence, and for many years the problem of defence was one
mainly of the defence of that island and the adjoining waters
till the fleet arrived. For this (united commitment a s'cry small
garrison was conudered sufficient.
But soon the rapid des'clopment of air power complicated
the problem of defence. Singapore was " exposed to attack by
carrier-borne and shore-based airdaft operating from much
greater distances The defence plans had therefore to be moefl-
fied, though not till the very o'c of the Second ^^^o^Id War was the
danger to the whole of Malaya fully realised, or the probability
of a land attack properly appreciated- Singapore Naval Base
continued to be the chief ol^cct of defence preparations. Hcnce
in May 1932, the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence laid down the following points :
 POWERS AJTO POtXTKS IK EAST ASIA

(a) Coast deiencc should be organised on the basis of

co-operation between the three Defence Services, the
gun retaining its place as the main deterrent against
naval attack.
(b) The first stage of the plan of defence for the Naval
Base at Singapore, modified in the light of the latest
developments in coast artillery, should be proceeded
with.
(c) Tlie Royal Air Force should continue to co-operate
in the defence of Singapore tvith such forces as might
from time to time be considered desirable. Such
co-operation should extend to all branches of the
defence, including A.A. Defence (Fighters) and
ofTensive operations against aircraft carriers, capital
ships, and other forms ofattack by sea, land and air .
In 1933, when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations,
the Britbh Government decided to take immediate steps for increas-
ing the defences of the Island of Singapore. Earlier the defence
of Singapore had primarily been a naval commitment with the
aid of the Royal Air Force. But it was gradually reahsed that it
might not be practicable for the Royal Navy to concentrate more
than a small fleet in the Far East o^ving to the British Empire being
involved in war elsewhere. In these circumstances, the defence of
Malaya and Singapore was to devolve largely on the air force whose
role was to destroy or sufficiently weaken the attacking Japanese
force on the sea before it reached the coast of Malaya. Hence
arose thenecessity ofconstructiog air fields which, against all canons
of safety, were to be buift on the eastern coast. However, progress
was not immediate and only two aerodromes were made on the
Island of Singapore till nearly the eve of the Second World IVar.
The changing plans for the defence of Singapore will be re-
viewed later. Enough has probably been said to indicate tlic
fundamental causes of the conflict and the basic problems of defence
in East Asia. The danger was dear, and the British authorities
had taken certain measures to meet it. But the Empire was too
vast for the United Kingdom to maintain sufficient defensive
strength in each part. \Vhcn war came, her defensive preparations
irere ibiind inadequate and resulted in the Joss not only of Hong
Kong and Borneo but also of Malaya and Singapore,
 CHAPTER II

War Strikes Hong Kong

THE CROWN COtOSY OP MONO KONG

The British CroMi-n Colony of Hong Kong originally conshted

of a raunber of islands off the southeast coast of China, \*Iudi
together commanded the entrance to the Canton rh'cr. These
bland? had a bad rqmtation due to the prevalence of piracy in
the neighbouring s^aters. In addition, the Colony incladcd the
pemnsnla of Kowloon on the mainland opposite, and a large strip
of territory known as New Territory leased bj- China on a 99
years tenure in 18^3. The estimated area of the entire colony
was 391 square miles. Together with Singapore and Corregidor
in Manila Bay, it stood as the third leg in a tripod of Anglo-
Saxon power and influence in the Far East.
Hong Kong bland, with an area of only 32 square nules, lies
close to the Chinese rnainland being separated from tt at Kowloon
Point by some 1300 to 1400 yards of sea, and at Lei U Mim by
only 500 yards. The channel, which separates the bland from the
mainland, provides good anchorage throughout its length except
in the I.ei U Mus Gap where the water is deep. Extremely
inegnlar in ontliae, the bland is about 1 1 miles long from east to
west, the breadth varying from 2 to 5 miles. It has the shape of
a rough and broken ellipse with two long promontories running
out to the south and sooifa-east , The island consbts of a chain
of hniy ridges which extend ihrou^out its length, the highest
point bang the Nlctoria Peak which rises to over 1800 feet anfl
sersed as a station for approaching vessels in the harbour.
The hills consist oflow granite ridges broken at intervals by tortnons
valleys. The central >Vong Xci Chong Gap divides the bland
clearly into two sectors, east and west, and b of vital strategic
importance.
The coast-Une b deeply indented, specially in the south
where Tyiam Bay runs inland for about 24 mOcs. In the north-
west sector of the bland, lies the city of Metoria which stretches
for about 4 iiin, and between the town anH the rnrtnl^T>ft b
situated the harbour, one of the most picturesqu e and spacious
haiboois in the svorld, with a water area of more than lO
But tMs harbour had to be cleared of shipping in the first week of
December 1941 when war with Japan appeared imminent, and
.\bcTdeen in the soaih-westera part of the bland became the
principal harbour .
 WAR STRIKES UON'G KONC 9

Victoria ivas the chief and only city on the island with a
poptilation of about half a millioiu' 'fhcre were a number of
villages, the most important of which were Sau*Ki-Wan in the
north*east and Aberdeen in the south>wesr.
Of the small neighbouring islands forming part of the Colony,
the Stonecutters Island Ecs to the north*\vest of Hong Kong.
About a mile in length and a quarter of a mile in breadth, this
Island, whiclt contained the main naval communication depot
and wireless transmission station, was fully fortified. The largest
of the surrounding islands, lamma, has the famous peak, Mount
Stenhouse, which rises to a height of 1140 feet.
Directly opposite Victoria Ucs the peninsula of Kowloon,
mostly inhabited by Cliinesc, tvhich was ceded to Great Britain
under the Treaty of Peking of 1860. To the north-east of the
city of Kowloon lay Kai Tak aerodrome, the only one in the
Colony, which prior to 1941, tvas being used for both commercial
and notary purposes. The main toads cut across the peninsula
and a railway from the southern tip went north as far as Canton,
passing through Beacon Hill and crossing the frontier south of
Sham Chun Hu.
The New Territory lay to the north of Kowloon on the Main-
land and was of value toHong Kong because of the protection it
altorded toKowloon from an attack from the landside. The
Mainland, with the exccpu'oa of a broad strip of swamp and
irrigated land running south-west from the frontier, was for the
most part moimtainous and uncultivated, a scries of steep, grassy
ridges strewn srilh granite boulders and intersected by many
inletsand scrub covered valleys. The whole territory was washed
on the west by Deep Bay and on the east by MIrs Bay.
A 50-miIc road encircled the main portion of the New
Territory and its eastern arc ran close to the Kowloon-Canton

Railway. Two good roads the Castle Peak Road on the west

and Taipo Road on the cast ^ran from Panhng and linked up to
the south-east of Golden HilL It was along these roads that the
Japanese advance on the mainland took place. A number of
mide tracks ran through the narrow passes gin'ng access to the
south.
All the approaches from the north were dominated by the

Golden Hill Smugglers Ridge region which was itself completely
overlooked by Tai Mo Shan and Needle Hill. From a tactical
point of view, the most important was the Devils Peak Pem'nsula
overlooking Lei U
Mun strait.

In l&40 tIepopuIoawa* 416,SM.

 WAR STRIKES IION'G KONG 9

Victoria was the chief and only city on the island with a
population of about half a nuIKon-* There were a number of
villages, the most important of which were Sau-Ki-^Van in the
north-cast and Aberdeen in the south-west.
Of the small neighbouring islands forming part of the Colony,
the Stonecutters Island lies to the north-west of Hoag Kong.
Abcfut a mile in length and a quarter of a mile in breadth, this
island, which contained the main naval communication depot
and wireless transmission station, was fully fortified. The largest
of the surrounding islands, Lamma, has the famous peak. Mount
Stenhouse, which rises to a height of 1 140 feet.

Directly opposite Victoria lies the peninsula of Kowloon,
mostly inhabited by Chinese, which was ceded to Great Britain
under the Treaty of Peking of 1860. To the north-east of the
city of Kowloon lay Kai Tat aerodrome, the only one in the
Colony, which prior to 1941, was being used for both commercial
and miUtary purposes. The main roads cut across the peninsula
and a railway from the southern tip tvent north as far as Canton,
passing through Beacon HiU and crossing the frontier south of
Sham Chun Hu.
The New Territory lay to the north of Kowloon on the Main-
land and tvas of value to Hong Kong because of the protection it
afforded to Kowloon from an attack from the landside. The
Mainland, with the exception of a broad strip of swamp and
irrigated land running south-west from the frontier, svas for the
most part mountainous and uncultivated, a series of steep, grass>'
ridges strewn with granite boulders and intersected by many
inlets and scrub covered valleys. The whole territory was washed
on the west by Deep Bay and on the cast by Mirs Bay.
A 50-miIc road encircled the main portion of the New
Territory and its eastern arc ran close to the Kowloon-Canton

Railsvay. Two good roads ^the Castle Peak Road on the west

and Taipo Road on the east ran from Fanllng and linked up to
the south-east of Golden HiU. It was along these roads that the
Japanese advance on the mainland look place. A number of
mule tracks ran through the nanow passes giving access to the
south.
All the approaches from the north were dominated by the

Golden Hill Smugglers Ridge region which was itself completely
overlooked by Tat Mo Shan and Needle Hill. From a tacticsd
point of view, the most important was the Devil's Peak Peninsula
overlooking Lei U
Muu strait.

In 1940 the population wit <16, 355.


iO CAUrAlON^ IN KJUTK-EASr AMA I9H*)2 fffINtJ KOVO

The Colony of Hong Kong Ur> hhtfi the tropicj. lu

lempcraturc ranges betwrtn W" and 40' F. During the winter
montlis, from October to Fcbrtiary, the climate i deJigbtiul
Tljcrc j very litilr rain, ami the air is cool and bracing. T1)C
temperatuTe begins to rise during March and April anti a few
showers fall. Tlic rainy season begins in ^^ay and tails upto early
August. This period is marled ity rntermitferjt rainCilI and
extreme beat. Tli^ mean annual rainfall U C5 inches. Ilong
Kong is subject to typhtions about the autunsn equltiox, which
occasionally cause great damage to shipping in the harlxmr.
The population of the Colony jncrcaH-d remartabJy during
the Ixst fifty years. In IBOl the total popuLstion was only 221,4-11
but the census taken in April 1911 showed llwt it liatl risen to
1,500,000, an increase of about 700 per cent. Acrording to the
despatch submitted by Sir Hobrrt Ilrooke-Fopham, Commander*
in-Chief Far F-vit, to the British Chiefs of Staff on 28 May 1912,*
the population cxclume of that of the New Territory on the Main*
land in April I9H was;
Hong Kong .. .. .. .. 709,000
Kowloon .. .. .. .. 581,000
Hnating Popuhtion .. .. .. 1 5-1,000

Total .. 1,-1+1,000

At the outbreak of hosittiUcf it amounted to nearly 1,750,000

and included a Urge proportion of Chinese, whose number had
doubled during the tluec years between 1938 and 1911, owing
to the large influx of refugees from China since the Japanese capture
of Canton. Tliis great increase led to seriom footl and water
(UfTiculties when war broke out, and made it easy for the Japanese
to bunch fifth column activities on a large scale. In mid-Decem-
ber 1941, a ^S'a^ Ofllce appredatJon contained the remark, the
most serious weakness of the situation was the presence of 750,000
Chinese in the city of Victoria Prior to December 1941, on
the advice of military authorities, a large number of Eunpin
women and cliildrcn had been evacuated.
The adRunistration of the Colony was vested in a Governor
who was assisted by an Executive and a Legislative Council.
Sir Geoffrey Northcotc handed over charge as Governor to
Sir Markkoung on 10 September 1941, who continued to hold
this office during the critical days of December 1911. The Exe-
cutive Council conasted of six oHiens, inclnding the General
 WAH STRIKES IIO.VC KONO 1 {

Ofilccr Commandinp, bcM'dcs ihc Governor, Tlic Legislati^-c

Council was composed of eight non-odicial members and nine
ufTicials, presided over by ihc Governor. Of the eight non-ofTicial
members, six were nominated by tlic Crown, three of whom were
Chinese, one by the Chamber of Commerce and one by the Justices
of the Peace from their body. The people Iiad therefore practically
no say in tlieir own governance and iittic enthusiasm for tlic cause
of their rtders.

HISTORY

Great Britain was at the pinnacle of her power and glory

in the I9th century. The Industrial Revolution had made her

the workshop of the world and the battle of Trafalgar had

left her without a rival on the seas. Tlie old colonial policy of
the 18th century had given way to a policy of free trade and the
principle of the Open Door
'
Britains command of the seas
enabled her to open up new markets c\crywhcrc for her goods,
and it was in pursuance of her trade and commercial interests
that she came into conflict with China. China figured prominently
.as a commercial, El Dorado in British eyes offering magnificent

prospects for her trade; and British diplomacy was actively interest-
ed in opening the China market progressively, irrespective of
whether it meant war or peace. The Chinese reacted violently
to this attempt to force foreign goods on them, which led to open
hostilities in 1839.
The first of the Anglo-Chincsc tVars arose over the notorious
opium trade. The importation of opium into China had been
banned by an Imperial edict of 1800, but the trade flourished at
Ginton because of the activities of the British traders and Chinese
smugglers who found it extremely profitable. In the course of the
war in 1811, Great Britain occupied Hong Kong which was sub-
sequently ceded by the Treaty of Nanking, August 1842. Hong
Kong thus came into British possession. TIic island was then
inhabited by nearly 7,500 Chinese fishermen, and was considered
one of the most unhealthy places in the ^vorld. From the very
beginning no restrictions were placed on other nations trading
with China through Hong Kong and it has remamed an open
port ever since. No spedal privileges were reserved either for
British traders or British vessels. In 1843 it was constituted a
Crown Colony.
The next stage in the growth of the colony of Hong Kong
commenced in 1856 when war brolx out again between Great
Britain and China. The immediate cause of the war was the
J2 campaigns IS sourjt-Ast ASL\ l9tl-42 honokonG

capture by the Chineic of a trading ArioWf sailing under

sliip, llic

British colours. The Treaty of Tientsin was signed in June 1858

after a series of u-arlijtc operations, but trouble arose later
when the British envoy was obstructed on his way to Peking
to get the treaty ratified. Then rc^onunenced the hostilities; a
joint Anglo-French expethtion invested the Taku forts and occupied
them, marched on Peliog and forced the Chtnere to sue for peace.
By the comention of Peking signed in October 1860, Kowloon,
on the mainland opposite the island of Hong Kong, was handed
over to the British. The occupation of Kowloon peninsula greatly
strengthened the defensive position of Hong Kong.
A
further addition to British territories of Hong Kong was
made in 1898 by the acquisition of a considerable area of land to
the north of Kowloon on the hfainiand, and of a number of islands
situated near Hong Kong. These territories were leased for 99
years on the ground that it would help in the proper defence and
protection of the Colony from hostile attacks. Possession of the
Kew Territory was taken over a year later, but its inhabitants did
not like this change-over. They revolted against the British
occupation authority*, but were soon crushed on 18 April
1899. The convention of I860 had originally prosoded for the
continuance of Chinese jurisdiction in the city of Kowloon, except
as far as may be inconsistent whh the military requirements for the
defence of Hong Kong but the disturbances of 1899 were made
an excuse by the British for the definite inclusion of the city under
full Bridsh control.

DEFENCE SCBESfES

In the years that followed, Hong Kong enjoyed complete

iramujuly from danger due to the Anglo-Japanese AlHanp^ Es-en
after the First iV'orld War the IVashington Treaty maintained a
certain stability in rtie region. But with Japans repudiation of
that treaty in 1936 and her attack on China in 1957, Hong Kong
lost her sense of security. The Japanese capture of Canton,
only 90 miles aay in 1938, was ob^usly a grave threat to Hong
Kong.
In the o-ent of irar, it became apparent that Japan would
attack thiou^ blew Tcrot/Kg and. Ow Ti WVi,
news came that Japanese troops had taken np stations on the land-
frontier of Hong Kong thereby blockading the Colony from
the
Mainland- Subsequent border ioddents lectiniBg with monoto-
nous regularity had created an attitude bordering on pUloso-
 KAR STIUKE3 HONO JCONC );)

phical rcjjgnation, fostered by iJic belief tlaat hostilities must sooner

or later break out *.*
The defences of Jlong Kong were on a \-cry limited scale as
it was considered ofilclally as an undesirable military commit-

ment, or else as an outpost to be held as long as possible At

one time cvcji the demilitarisation of Hong Kong was scriomly
considered, but it was ruled out by the Chiefs of Staff Comrm'ttcc
in October 1910. 'llie Defence Plan, prepared as far back as 1937,
did not contemplate a prolonged defence of the hfainlami, but,
in xacw of the limited strength of the armed forces, confined
its pur\icw to a defence of the Island only. The main object
of the pUn was to deny the use of the harbour to the Japanese rather
than to retain it for use as an advanced base of operations for the
British fleet. On the Mainland, the Defence Plan cm-isaged only
a delaying action svhilc ncccs$ar>' demolitions were being carried
out and evacuation completed. This pbn must be considered as
a part of the general defence policy in the Far La.st. After the
coUapsc of France in -June 1910, it was considered advis.ible to
withdraw British troops from Peking, Shanghai and Tienuin,
but troops could not Ik mthdrawn from Hong Kong because of
its strategic importance to China. Tlie Island was extremely
valuable to the Ciunese as a port of access. It has been estimated
that 60% of Chinas arms were imported through this port; Chinese
Interests therefore demanded the retention of the Island as long as
possible, and with the increase m
Chinas dilficuhics as the war
against Japan developed, their anxiety for the safety of Hong Kong
also increased. General Chiang Kai-shek actually offered to send
ten di%dsions of trained soldiers to help in the defence of the Main-
land if the British could provide the necessary arms. But due to a
woeful shortage of anns and munitions the proposal could not
materialbc If the Chinese had anticipated that Britain did not
consider the defence of Hong Kong a practical proposition for any
length of time, the clfcct on their morale might have been bad.
As it was, Britains determination to fight to the last in spile of
meagre resources strengthened General Chiang Kai-sheks hands
and In all probability played an important part at a critical period
in Chinas War effort.
There were t>vo pliases of the Defence Plan. The first
related to defence on the Mainland, and the second, and the more
important, to the defence of the Island. It was not considered
feasible to fight for an indefinite period on the Mainland with the

sTbc War in Hong Kong Fiiojab,p. 2.

Sir Robert Bniokc-Poptiaro'i Despaidi op. tit., p.
t2 C.\ilPAJON$IS SOUtll-LASt ASIA 19*1-12 llONO KOSC.

capture by Ujc Chinese of a trading ship, llie Amiv, sailing under

British colours. IBc Treaty of Tientsin was signed in June 1858
after a series of warlike operations, but trouble arose Liter
when die BritisJj envoy was obstructed on his svay to Peking
to get the treaty ratified. Then re-commenced the hostilities; a
jointAnglo-French expedition inicstcd the Taku forts and occupied
them, marched on Peking and forced the Chinese to sue for peace.
By the convention of Peking signed in October I860, Kowloon,
on the mainland opposite the island of Hong Kong, was handed
over to the British. 'ITic occupation of Kowloon peninsula greatly
strengthened the defensive position of Hong Kong.
A
further addition to British territories of Hong Kong was
made in 1898 by the acquisition of a considerable area of land to
the north of Kowloon on the ^tainlantJ, and of a number of islands
situated near Hong Kong. These territories were leased for 99
years on the ground tliat it would help in the proper defence and
protecdoa of the Colony from hostile attacks. Possession of the
New Territorj* was taken over a year later, but its inliabitants did
not like this change-otxr. Tlicy res'olted agalrut the British
occupation authority, but were soon crushed on 18 April
1899. The convention of 1800 had originally 45rimded for the
continuance of Chinese Jurisdiction in the city of Kowloon, except
as far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the
defence of Hong Kong **, but the disturbances of 1899 were made
an excuse by the British for tlic dclinile inclusion of the city under
full British control.

OErEKCi: SCItEUES

In tlie years that followed, Hong Kong enjoyed complete

immunity from danger due to the Ai^lo-Japancsc Alliance. Even
after the Fint World War tle Washington Treaty nsaintained a
certain xtabiUty in the region. But with Japans repudiation of
that treaty in 1936 and her atuek on China in 1937, Hung Kong
losther sense of security. The Japanese capture of Canton,
only 90 miles away in 1938, was obviously a grave threat to Hong
Kong.
In the event of war, it became apparent that Japan would
attack through New Tenitorv and Kowloon. On 27 June J9IQ.
news came that Japane.<ie troops had taken up stations on the land-
frontier ofHong Kong thereby blockading the Colony from the
hlalnland. Sul^qucnt border incidents recurring svith monoto-
nous regularity had created an attitude bordering on philoso-
 .

War muKEs iiOKC kosC IS

phical resignation, fostered by the bcUcftliat hostilities must sooner

or later break out V
The defences of Hong Kong were on a very limited scale as
it was considered officially as " an undesirable military commit-

ment, or else as an outpost to be held as long as possible At

one time even the demilitarisation of Hong Kong svas seriously
considered, but it was ruled out by the Chiefs of Staff Committee
in October 1940. The Defence Plan, prepared as far back as 1937,
did not contemplate a prolonged defence of the hlainland, but,
in Siiew of the limited strength of the armed forces, confined
its purview to a defence of the Isbnd only. The main object
of the plan was to deny the use of the harbour to the Japanese rather
than to retain it for use as an advanced base of operations for the
British fleet. On the Mainland, the Defence Plan envisaged only
a delaying action while necessary demolitions were being carried
out and evacuation completed. This plan must be considered as
a part of the general defence policy in the Far East. After the
collapse of France in June 1940, it svas considered advisable to
-

withdraw British troops from Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin,

but troops could not be withdrasvn from Hong Kong because of
its strategic importance to China. The Island was extremely
Valuable to the Chinese as a port of access. It has been estimated
that 0% of China's arms were imported through this port; Chinese
interests therefore demanded the retention of the Island as long us
possible, and with the increase in China's dlfEcultics as the war
against japan doclopcd, their anxiety for the safety of Hong Kong
also increased. General Chiang Kai-shek actually offered to send
ten divisions of trained soldiers to help in the defence of the Main-
land if the British could pro\-idc the necessary arms. But due to a
woeful shortage of arms and munitions the proposal could not
materialise If the Chinese had anticipated that Britain did not
consider the defence of Hong Kong a practical proposition for any
length of time, the effect on their morale might have been bad.
As it was, Britains determination to fight to the last in spite of
meagre resources strengthened General Chiang Kai-sheks hands
and in all probability played an important part at a critical period
in Chinas War effort.
There were two phases of the Defence Plan. The first
related to defence on the Mainland, and the second, and the more
important, to the defence of the Island. It ivas not considered
feasible to fight for an indefimte period on the Mainland with the

1 The t\'ar {o Hong Kon?2/J4 nuijab, p. 2.

Sit Robert Broeke-topham', Despatch op dt., p. 5 1 J
H CAMPAIGNS IN SOUtlt-EAST MIA 1941-42 HOXO KONG

forces then available; hence the fighting there was intended to be a

delaying action only, which would proside the defenders in the
Island valuable breathing time. According to Major G. E. Gray
of 2nd Battalion, the 14th Punjab Regiment, there tvere three
plans for the defence of the MaUand which may be conveniently
referred to as A , B ' and C * A
' tvas the original defence

plan wWch envisaged fighting on the Mainland to be conducted

by one battalion only. This plan was nc\'er brought into action,
because the arrival of the two Canadian battalions on 16 Nwem-
ber 1941 consderably reinforced the Hong Kong garrison. B
ivas the actual plan adopted which pros'ided for the defence of the
Mainland by three battalions. It was anticipated that casualties
in their ranks would not adversely aflect the subsequent defence
of the Island. Plan 'C* w-ould has-e been put into operation
if another battalion from Canada had arrived in time to participate

in the fighting.
It was not intended to hold the frontier posts on the Main-
land and in the cs'cnt of an attack forward troops were to withdraw
after carrying out successive demolitions. The main line of defence
on the Mainland was the Gindrinkers Line or * Inner line
This line had been constructed several years before the war
when the Maginot line mentality dominated military strategy,
and the intention was to hold it by a force larger than a
brigade. Besides pill-boxes, there were dug-in positions, later
surrounded by mines and barbed wire Sir Robert Brooke-
Fopham estimated that a proper defence of this line would have
required tv%'0 divisions or mote.
The Island had been, however, carefully prepared Ibr defence
and much originality and imtialive , had bn displayed in
the coustmclion and concealment of pill-boxes and other obstacles.
But the civil authorities did not lake all the necessary measures.
Major-Genctal Maltby attributes it to three factors ;
(a) The general doubt that Japan would declare war
against the Allied Powers.
(b) The weakness of our intelligence s>stcm.
(c) The belief that Japan was bluffing and would continue
to bluff to the last. The true gravity of the slate of
affairs was not reflected in the embassy despatches
from Tokyo *.*

IViSence'Wam were not put into operation,

the Japanese exploited transport and supplies to thdr own
use,
as for example when they cioned over from the Mainland
to the

S SUtiby*, DrrptJcb in SupplcrocBl to the London Gut(,

27 Jtntiary I!>48, p. COT.
 WAk {TIIUKLS ItONC KONG 15

Island, small craftand sampam were tiiiliscd by them and they

n!$() found large supplies in Kowloon.
Tlie normal garrison in the Colony consnted of one ftriddi
and one Indian unit. After the fall of Canton at the end of 1938,
its strength was doubled. In October-Xovember 1910, with the
arrival of 5/7 Rajput and 2/14 Punjab from India, there were two
British and two Indian battalions in Hong Kong- Two Canadian
battalions also arrived in No\cmbcf 1911, but unfortunately tvilli-
oui their mechanised transport which had been despatched separa-
tely. nje first load on board the Dan Jtse readied Manila in the
PhiUppincs on 19 December 1941, but was held up there, and
there being no prospect of its reaching Hong Kong, it was made
availiblc for Use by tlie /\merican forces. The other consignment
on board the S. S. Fernplant could not proceed beyond I-os Angeles
from where it was relumed to Canada owing to the imjsossibility
of ever readiing the destination.
its Hosv far did this deficiency
and usefulness of tlic force is dilficuU to assess, for
affect tlie v.alue
otherwise these troops svere reputed to be wcU-lraincd and
sscll prodded widi equipment'.* The Canadian force had been
rent in response to an urgent request by the British Government
in September 1911 and was the best which could be prodded in
the circumstances. By this addtUon Uie strength of die garrison
was raised to six battalions besides auxiliary troops whose dctials
arc givcn later. It is dinicutt to be sanguine about the fighting
value of ever) one of the component units and the competence
of this small garrison to Iiold Hong Kong for long against a major
attack is doubtful.*
Tlicre was practically no air power arailablc for the defence
of the Colony. Among the limitations of the force under his com-
mand, Major-General Maltby put the absence of modem air power
first. The garrison's air force consisted of sue planes two IValrus
amphibians and four Vildebecstes, which were located at Kai Tak,
the only aerodrome in the Colony.* On 21 Novcmlxr 1911, a signal

S Rrpoft Ko. 1C3, HitioficaJ Section, Canadwi .Miltu/) Hc<tc{U37(rri. CaiuJ/aa

rutlciMiioi ia Uie IMcnce of Hons Kom. DcMmbrr I pam, 39^4.

Tie CoKaJUn Arwj 1939-45. pp. Z7J-1.

* The XviSas Xvitxolry iiMUUoo* mttt jont epuV^ral *oA lUd Jiave juorUn
or ammunition till immediaidy brfore the outbrnX of heatililim and bad, according
10 Brigadin' tS'allu, (heir fint praeu'ee wtch tbu wr a pon durinfr the battte on (ho Main-
land. 'The morale of (he Royal Soot* art* anrgra to be low. The Canadian units
have been teported by Brigadier Walltstoiacic training, though they contained a iprmk-
ling of veteraAt. They had little of imali armf or sigsal traiamg Hhen tb^ landed, and
every rfrort svai made to make good these dcSciencies, but the time avaiUbte was too

a Canadian rqxn-ts speak of (roly 3 Vildebcate aircran. The figure of 4 lus been
accepted on the authority of the War OfSee. See Rqmrt 163, Para 61, File
G0I/780a/H.
16 CAIIPAJCNS JN SOirru-EAST ASIA IIONO KO.SO

irai sent tn the Chiers of Staff for stationing a fighter squadron at

Kai Tak, but this svai not agreed to. These planes were not expect*
cd to last long in case of war because tlie aerodrome was an open
target without adequate anti*aircraft protection, llic aeroplanes
being antiquated were no match for the Japanese fighten. flicy
were all \irtually pul out of action by die first Japanese raid on the
aerodrome. The garrison also suffered a great deal from Lack
of air reconnaissance. There was also no radar equipment avail*
able. Tlic few AA guns tUd cifieii engage the Japanese aircraft
but that had no effect on their activities. Royal Air Torcc person-
nel in Hong Kong consisted of 8 uIHcen and about 80 other ranks.
No outside air support could be expected by die defenders as the
nearest British acrixlrumc at Kota Bhani was nearly 1500 miles
away.'*
Ncitlier were the Colony in a salUfactcry
nas-al defences of the
condition. The squadron and the posverful submarine
cruiser
flotilla Hong Kong had been withdrawn.
usually stationed at
Simultaneously a number of naval units had Iwen transferred to
Singapore. "It was a matter of general knowledge that Singapore,
in view of the perilous situation of Hong Kong vis-a-vis Japan,
was being set up and fortified as the main Far E.astem base
At the time of the Japanese attack, the na\*al uniu available in Hong
Kong were: one destroyer, the Thtatian, four gunboats, eight motor
torpedo boats, seven auxiliary patrol vesseb, and an auxiliary croft
used for roincfield duty (not a fighting unit), Naval personnel
numbered about 1300 Brilisli and 300 Indian and Chinese. Since
the Victoria Dockyard was vulnerable to attack from the Main-
land, it was dedded to transfer the navy to Aberdeen. Defence
measures consisted of patrolling tlie approaches to Hong Kong
and laying mines.'*

indicp. Study d the past biitoiy cT Jtpiam t/pemiom had led n.. _ ..w-..-
ihat they were paat majtert to combined opmuoat, and throughout the period of the
1 ^weys uitKipatcd n Unding m tbe owihent thores of the IiUnd, and Uck of
dutnnt teawaid rccotmnuunoe -wat for me s dututet handicap Sinularly I knew iliat
t^ lack of oppouiiod to tbe incemast enemy air raidi had a tomewhat deproun?
cfT-ct towards the rod on tbe Iroopa, and definitely metcaaed the accuracy of the raemy
I the material da^ge^dw. For limilar reaiuni the enemy, counter

tbs Defence of tiong

Koos December 1941.
** Interview with Commodore A.C. C C.B.E.,, R.N. (Retd.) at C.KL H-Q.,
27 June 1940 cited mnote on Canadiaa Rartictpatioiz,
sMajor.CeneTal Mallby wrote anmutively ef the work done by the naral
penoonelj the forces available carried not their duties m very difficult circumstances
tt gallani^ and in the inH! ofjhe Royal Naw. 1 have nothing
but praue for their gidlant conduct . . .Maliby's Dcipat^ p* 700. t
 U'AR STRIKES nONC KONO 17

DrrncttTia Excoif-vrEaeo ts oefexce

'Use presenre of a population of about a million and three

quarters in the Colony war a serious Imndicap to the defence
plan. Tlic nonnal population was swollen by the large influx
or refugees from China after Japans capture of Canton in 1938.
It is not surprising, therefure, to find references to the difTicultics
of rice distribution in the short ofTicial communiques. Most of
the rice needed for Hong Kong was imported from Siam and
Ilurma, and it was found didicult to keep up even the normal
rice imports because of shortage of vessels. Aforcover, since fish
might not be available in case of svar, and storage of alternatives
over a period of montiis was difficult, the problem of providing
rice supplement was serious. Food difiiruhjes ap.']rt, the tremen*
dous increase in population had Jed to medical, /wlice control
and water supply difiiculties. It was almost impossible to keep a
careful watch on the floating Chinese population moring comtanily
to and fro between the Mainland and the Isbnd, and this enabled
the Japanese fifth column to get fairly dcmiled and accurate
information regarding the duposition of troops, nature of terrain
etc. One of the great factors contributing to Japanese rictory
was the splendid work done by Japanese spies, whose task was
greatly facilitated by the constant mosvments of the population.
A
number of good rcservom on Hong Kong Island and the
Mainland gave a plentiful supply of water. TJie main reservoirs
on the Island were situated east of Wong-Xci-Chong Gap in the
Tytam region. Tlicy were partly filled by rain-svatcr and partly by
supply from tlie Mainland. Normally in a year of good or c%'cn
average rainfall, no difTicultics were experienced regarding the
supply of water, svhicli was howes'er seriously afTccted when the
supply from the Mainland was cut ofT. The early capture of these
reservoirs Iiy the Japanese proved later to be one of the factors in
the ultimate surrender of the garrison.
The Air Jlaid Pfecautions Organisation consistctl of about
12,000 personnel of .'ll! categories before the war. Near the town of
Victoria, air raid shelters had been dug out of granite hills, svhich
were considered bomb-proof. The tunneb and strengthened
houses could accommodate nearly 300,000 penons at one lime,
and the rest of the population could be lodged in hutments outside
the tosvn in case of emergency.
A
very large number of Turopean women and children had
been evacuated from Hong Kong July 19H. Those remaining
in the Island consisted of 918 women who were employed as nurses
and clerks or were engaged in Air Raid Precaution duties.
lU C.\PA1CNS IN SOUTH-EAST AStl !yn-J2 HONG KOSO

A stand by
onlcr was issued on 1 December and in the

evening an official announcement stated :

The Government coiuiders it desirable that persons not

required for duty in the Colony in the event of an outbreak of
hostiUiics, and who arc able to remove themselves and their lamiUcs
from the Colony should take any existing opportunity to do so
Aspecial ship was chartered to evacuate people, but the res-
ponse was so poor that the proposed sailing was cancelled. It
was so particularly because the nuropcan and Cliinesc business
men could not believe that the war was so near. Passages were
booked in other steamers for the few who had registered.
During the first week of December 19-11, the situation became
critical and war was expected any momenr. At To Kar, only 8
miles from the frontier, three Japanese dlsistons were reported
to have been mobilised and on 7 December Japanese troop
concentrations were definitely seen in the frontier v'iH.-iges. If
will thus be clear that the Allied forces had to face a very difiicult
shuatloQ. \Mthout any substantial air or naval support, and w-itb
no hope of rcceMng reinforcements ftom elsewhere, Ilcng Kong
was doomed from the outset if the Japanese were to attack with
>asUy superior numbers, which they actiuUy did.

BRmsH TROOE oisposmo.vs

The land farces in Hong Koog consisted of Headquarters

China Command and t>vo infantry brigades (each consisting of
three battaliosu), one emplojed on the Mainland and the other
in the Island. The two brigades with supporting arms and
ancillary troops were imder the oscr-all command of Major-
General Maltby.

^^ainl^lnd Infanlij Brigade

The Mainland Infantry Brigade was under the command
of Brigadier C. IVallls with brigade headquarters at Sham Sui
Po and tactical headquarters at the north end of ^Vatcrloo Road,
Kowloon. The forward troops led by Major G. E. Gray consisted
of one company (G) of 2/14 Punjab, four carriers, two annoured
cars and other ancillary umU. Their headquarters were at Fan-
Ung, the junction of Tmpo and Castle Peak Roads, The object
of the force was to ensure that all prepared demolitions were carried
out and to delay the ads-ance of the Japanese towards the Gb-
drinkers or Inner line. Three Infantry' batufioas
manned the
WSe Map di^
fa pag? 28
PlJlTE I
 WAR STRIKES nOSO KON'C 19

Gindrinkers Line; the right flank was defended by 5/7 Rajput,

the centre by 2/14 Punjab and the left b)' 2 Royal Scots/^
There was a gap of about 1500 yards between 2 Royal Scots
and 2/14 Punjab along the SMngmun Nulla. The Reserve Com-
pany (D) of 5/7 Rajput was brought up from the rear to fill up this
gap on 9 December, while C Company, 2/14 Punjab, forming
the bulk of forward troops, did not take up its position in the
Gindrinkers Line till the evening of 9 December after withdrawal
from Fanling. The three infantry battalions occupied a front of
approximately miles on ver^' commanding country but with
certain inherent weaknesses. It had necessarily little depth,
which in two localities was particularly dangerous, viz. Customs
Pass and the Pass between Golden Hill and LaichikokPeninsula
Each battalions lay-out consisted of a line of platoon localities, the
intervening gaps being covered by fire by day, and at night by
patrolling. There were very fetv troops available as reserve, and
it was not found possible to employ more than one company of

each battalion for this purpose. These reserve companies were

located in prepared positions and covered the most dangerous lines
of Japanese approach.
Of the two Indian battalions manning Mainland defences,
2/14 Punjab, which liad been assigned the original role as a
Mainland battalion, made little alteration in its former dis*
positions. The 5/7 Rajput commenced wiring beaches at Port
Shelter only on 14 November 1941 and started work on defences
in its area as late as 22 No^'cmbcr 1941, Both the Indian batta-
lions had been weakened by repeated milkings for new units,
and the reinforcements which they received consisted of only
partially trained recruits There were serious gaps in their
equipment also, particularly in mortar, and in training in its me
as platoon weapon.
In addition to the three infantry battab'ons, No. I Cornpany
of Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) svas stationed
at Kai Tak aerodrome to prevent any attempt by Japanese
paratroops to land in force. There sverc also four troops of the
1st Hong Kong Singapore Rc^ment (HKSRA), deployed as
follows :
FilterBeds .. .. (4*5 in. Howitzer)

At3pfacmgp,23.
__ TIie Company layout of the three
bafUb'iHii lias
Hje 2 Royal Scot* were in a highly malarial area and many caie^ Out of a (oul
(MaJtby* Uespaten, a., tp. cU. 702).
strength of 771, they had only 600 efftetiw,

p. 4.
WW.p. 5.
 . .

20 a\ilPAlCSS IK SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1911-42 IlONO KOKO

Tai Wai . . (3'7 in. Howiucr)

Customs Pass and (37 in. Howitzer)
Kowloon Polo Ground .. ( 6 in. Howitzer).

Island Brigade
Lawson was iii-cliargc of the forces on the
Brigadier J. K.
Island, which consisted of the two Canadian battalions (Royal
Rifles of Canada and \Vinnipcg Grenadiers) and I Middlesex
Regiment. The bst battalion had been in I4ong Kong since
August 1937, and being a iiLachinc-gun battalion, occupied pill-
boxes on the perimeter of the Island. The brigade headquarten
was at IVong Xci Chong Gap in (he centre of die Island. Tlie
Roj-al Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers fud their
headquarters in Tytam Gap and W'anchai Gap, respectively.
All the anti-aircraft artillery in the colony, consisting of 20
gum of dilTcrcnt types, wa* sited in the Island, at various points,
inland and around the coast. 3 and 4 Medium Battcrys of the
1st Hong Kong Regiment were deployed on coastal defence and
other vulnerable points.
The Hoag Kong Voluoteer Defence Corps supplemented
the regular forces of the Colony and numbered approximately
2,000. Colonel H. B. Rose conunanded the force wliich
represented many oationalities. They gave valuable support to
regular troops in the defence of the Island.*

5/rrng<A ef ifu Fonts

The total strength of the garrison,** and of all personnel
mobiUsed at the ouibreab of war with Japan, was 14, 5M, details
of which are as follows:
British . . 3,652
Canadian .. 1,972
Indian . . . 2,254
Local Coloiual . . 2,428
Hong Koi^ Volunteer Defence Corps .. 2,000
.4uxilijr) Defence Units. .. 2,112
Kursing Detachment 136

Total .. 14,554

Major-General ^taliby, the G.O.C, Uter paid a m^ficent tribute to that

tSe-hetoierr n,Aia6teport^o/-t(iBg,rruoii. Dipeace

Uier bad lumndered a great deal of their Idtors to tralnios. their oofailizatiea wai

eompirwd rnoothly qmeUr^ in action they povtd themtelvcs ttufebom and
saiiant aoldia ..

.. . . Despatch, tp. ot. p. 702).
_
*ETO^f<^^rQ3patch,op.cit<6>peailii'H'.'
Umo mdjriri
... Heog Kong

.jtAppendix'F' Local Colonial and AuxiUary
^ and Sn^pur
.
Smitapur B
RA, Hcaig Kong Signal Company
and Hong Kong Mule Corpi.
 >S'AR rrWKtS UONO KONO 21

/ArAXEIF. rORCEl

K'timatc* of the strcn:;th of the forces which the Japanese

would throw into the battle diflerrd widely, and the cardinal error
which tJic Far ilasl Comrmnd made was that of underestimating it.
It has been rccordcxl b>' the Winnipeg Grenadiers that at a lerturc
delivered to the Canadian olhcers soon after their arrival in the
Colotiy, they were pstn to understand that the Japanese had only
about 5,000 troops svith srry little artillery support opposing
the /Wlics from the north; tliat their troops svere ill-equipped and
not used to night fighting; that their aircraft were very mcdit)cre;
and their pilots were incapable of dive bomhing ossing to poor
C)Tjighr.
Tlie General Ofliccr Commanding Hong Kong had abo arriv-
ed at the following conclusions from the information made available
to him:
Fliat the
(a) Japanese night svork was ptH>T.
(b) Japanese preferred stereotyped methods and fwed plan.
(c) Japanese light automatics were not os numerous as ours
nor 30 up to date.
(d) Japanese " Combined Operations * were thorough and
that they had excellent 60.115 and equipment, but their
successes against the Clunese were fi.ittering as there had
never been real opposition.
(e) J.ipancsc Air Force svas not up to first class European
standards, th.it their bomhing ivas poor, and that they
would not go in for night bombing.
(0 Japanese fifth column actisitics would be encountered,
though no actual proof of such organisations existed.
The proximity of Formosa, with its mixed population
of Japanese and Chinese Formosans, and, Canton,
furnished the enemy witli admirable intelligence bases.*
However, three or four weeks before tlie outbreak of war
with Jap.in, there was unusual activity in Canton. The Japanese
garrison there was considerably reinforced, and their defence
lines had been drawn in so as to encircle the city more closely".**
The Allied commander obtained a good deal of useful informa-
tion from a Japanese deserter who came .ictoss the frontfer on I
November 1911. His information showed heavy concentrations
ofJapanese troops across the frontier of New Territory', and hfajor-
Gcncral Maltby estimated that the Jap.icse had a corps of large

* MiJtby'i Desrtch, e/>. <il. Pp. TttM.

t*/H4p. 703,
22 aWPAIGN? IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 19tl-42 HONG KONG

calibre artillcr). According to CUncse reports three Japanese

divisions were concentrated for attack on 5 December at To Kat,
about 8 miles from the frontier. The Far East Combined Bureau,
Singapore, considered that the attack on the Mainland would be
launched by only one ^vision, another being held in reserve.
Acco;^ing to reports appearing in the Japanese press soon
after the invasion, the attack on Hong Kong svas carried out by the
9/A Division and the I03rrf Dttiston, with a third division held in
reserve.** Early intelligence reports in the War Office mentioned
the Japanese 18/A Dirutoa and i04/A Division as taking part in the
Hong Kong operation, although it is now known that the former
svas landed in Malaya.** The latest information on the subject
has led the British official hutorians to believe that only the Japanese
38/A Division {L{eut.-Ceneral T. Sano), with certain additional
units under command, was involved in the invasion of Hong
Kong. The 66/A Infojitrj Re^irmt of the 38/A Divisiori was detailed
to cheek any Chinese attack to Uok up u-i/h the Hong Kong garri-
son, so only three Japanese infantry regiments are now said to have
been available for the inv'arion of Hoog Kong.** These regiments
were supported by heavy artillery aod aircraft in large Dumber*.
Careful and exhaustive preparadoru for the campaign had been
made by the Japanese Army. There are said to have been three
companies of infantry composed of expert swimmers, who swam
across the narrowest part of the channel dividing the island from
(he mainland and gained a footing on the shore

*sjipanoe L^nd Opmiloro, File SI 17.

Cknadun Pirtid^lKA, FootBoSe 3. pan 202.
SKirbrS. VVootfburn: 7T1 ttVAfa/urt Vol. T, AppendixSj Her Majeity'*
Sistionery OSice, Loikdan, 1957-
 CHArXER III

Operations On Tlie Mainland

nir. INTTIAL ATTACK

On
0 December 19M, Japan attacked ilic American naval
bac at I*carl Harbour at 0125 hotm. Hoop Kong time.' At OM5
hour* intelligence sources of the General Stafi* intercepted a
Tokyo broadcast message warning the Japanese that Vi-ar with
Great Ilritain and the United States of America tsas imminent.
This information was immediately passed on to the Governor and
was at the same time conveyed to all units. Major G. E. Gray,
commanding fonvard troops, consisting of C Company of 2/14
Punjab, and four carrien, two armoured cars of HKVDC and
detachments of Royal Engineers and Signals, was ordered to blow
the frontier belt of demolitions east and north of Fanling. Two
hours later the whole garrison lutd been told that they were at war
with Japan.
The Japanese struck soon after. At 0800 hours their
bombers which had taken off from an aerodrome on the out*
skirts of Canton, launched a heavy attack on Kat Tak aerodrome.
Some of these bombers attacked from a height of not more than 60
feet, indicting heavy d.smagc on the parked aircraft. The Royal
Air Force Hong Kong detachment lost three planes, in addition to
one seriously damaged and one slightly damaged. The entire
commercial fleet of China National Amtion Corporation, consist-
ing of one clipper and seven other planes, was either destroyed or
seriously damaged, and one of the huge oil tanks of the Standard
Oil Company was directly hit. The Japanese did not lose a single
'*
plane in the course of this action. Cruising leisurely over the
field, the Japanese airmen bombed these targets with no more
difficulty than if they had been on bombing practice on n range in
peacetime They also strafed ibe areas held by B and Com- D
panies or2/14 Punjab but without causing any casualty. According
(a a report /tvnr 2 Royal Scott the Rambcr ot Japanese
bombers participating in the attack was twenty-seven,* but
the figure of thirty-six mentioned by Major-General Maltby

The HawaiUn time ^l 07S5 hounon ) December. The timings mentioned here
re allHong Kong time.
* Jjpaneae
IahA Opatiiora, p. 3.
swar Diary and Narralive, Mainland InTaalty Brigade, p. 6.
24 CASIPAICXS DJ SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 HOSG KONG

appears to be more reliable.* The Japanese bomben had fighter

escort.
At about the same time, twelve Japanese planes bombed
brigade headquarters at Shamsuipo svhich received four or
but fortunately the number of casualties was very
fi\x direct hits,
small. The heasHest bombs dropped weighed 250 lbs,, but a large
number were of lesser weight, and most of them fell into the sea.*
There ts'erc further raids in the course of the day on Kat Tak
aerodrome and the Stanley Peninsula, but these were on a smaller
scale and did not cause any appreciable damage. Japanese
planes also dropped propaganda leaflets addressed mainly to the
Indian troops and Chinese auxiUaries, but these do not seem to
have had any effect on them. As ^fajor-Genera! MaJtby puts
it, " They were poorly draum up and carried no weight cither
with British or Indian troops
At 0820 hours S/7 Rajput tsas asked to send an officer to
Kai Tak to take all necessary defence measures, and to keep a
sharp look-out for Japanese paratroops. As the first bombs were
dropping on Kai Tak aerodrome, the leading units of the Japanese
army sverc crossing the border of the Kew Territory. At 0730
hours on 8 December, the Allied frontier obser%-aiion posts reported
Japanese bridging parties south and south-west of Sham Chun
Hu, and within half an hour a large number of troops estimated to
be a battalion began ad\-andDg through the North Gap into Laflans
Fkun. .Another battalion of Japanese troops advanced a little
later straight down the Taipo Rcd. The tactics adopted by the
Japanese were almost ins'ariably to push a strong body up the
nearest hill and round a flaol directly any line of approach was
found to be blocked.^

ACTION OF FOXWAXD TROOPS OX THE TAIPO BO.AD

Immediately on the declaration of war svith Japan, orders

had been given toblow the frontier bell of demolitions in accordance
srith the plan of defence prepared by the General Officer Command-
ing. The most important of these blows was at Lo \S'o Railway
Bridge, which was successfully carried out at about 0900 hours
on 8 December after a hectic three and a half hours ssork of charg-
ing.* In the meantime the threat of a battalion moring round
* U. CoU Kanta Fraud (IIM Fopjab) cotfinbed ibc manber ai 36 ra bit No-
He la the area hih tte aucralt flnr when procredinf lowarfj Kai Tat
aWar Diarv, Mamtaad loTancry Eric^e.
S^tirrT tjopaicb. f. nt. p. 704.
*Tbc War in Hcif p. 4.
 QPr.RATIONS ON Tlffi MAINLAND 25

iheir risht flank wnj becoming scriou* for Major Gray's troops.
He, therefore, decided to withdraw his troops south in accordance
Viith the pre-arranged plans on the ranlingTaipo Road after
making sure of the big demolitions, one mile north of Taipo in
the narrow Pineapple Pass, 'fliesc demolitions blocked the road
for about thirty yards and the railway alto for some distance. But
the advancing Japanese troops by-passed the railway and the
Taipo Road and made their svay lon-ards Taipo riotvTj the SiiaJo
Tung track. Thc^- svere, Kowc\-er, engaged by Allied machine-
gun fire at a range of eies-en hundred >'ards and a fesv casualties
were inflicted.
By 1500 hours, a large number of Japanese troops sverc
concentrated in the Taipo area, but their initial attack svas beaten
off bj* heav7 fire. Soon after, tlie Japanese abandoned the idea
of a frontal att.ack on the iVlUed postilions, but carried out out-
flanking moN-ements which necessitated a further ssitlidranal of
Allied troops to the south of the Taipo Causeway.*
Tlie Japanese continued their advance and infiltrated on
(lie leftflank of 2/M Punjab at about 1730 hours which forced
the latter to svithdraw as far as die high grtmnd to the south-
east, where hfajor Gray hoped to remain for the night. .\ Japanese
platoon was ambushed to the north-west of Taipo, and heavy
casualties svere inflictedon it by madiine-gun and light ,aulomatic
fire from a range of one hundred yards. But in the bright moon-
light, the Japanese, aided by local guides, never relaxed their
pressure. Late in the evening, about 150 Japanese troops landed
in samparvs behind Allied troops near Cheung Shui Tan, again
Ibrdng (hem to withclraw. The /Vlicd troops took up fresh posi-
tions along the line of the Fotan Vallc^' an hour after midnight
due to Japanese infiltraliou behind the dispositions of the forward
troops. Meanwhile, by 0330 hours on 9 December all demolitions
had been successfully completed cxaspl one at Taipo where the
Japanese forestalled Allied plans by an extremely quick action
of their forward patrols. Later at dawn the whole Allied force
had readied hfonastery Ridge, svherc it maintained the positions
all day denying reconnaissance of the Ginclrinkcrs Line to the
Japanese. The force him suhsequenl}y ordered at dmk to
draw into Gindrinkers Line, whldi it did under mortar and small
arms fire. Througliout (Jic rapid svitbdrawa! of (Jie fonvard troops,
communications were well maintmued. The approximate number
of casualties inflicted on the Japanese was one hundred. The
enemy forces opposing the forward troops were estimated at three

# Maliby't Dapalch ep. at. |>. 7M.

26 C.OIPA1CS5 LV SOVTK-EAST ASIA 19{M2 HONG KO^O

battalions of infantry', one cight'gnn medium batter)', tractor

dravi-n, and three light batteries on pack The Forward Troops,
in the words of Major-General Maltb)-, " had fulfilled their role
admirably,* and had successfully carried out suctcen major
demolidons on the road and railway.

OPtkATTOSS AtONO THE CASTti PE.M: ROAD

While the troops of 2/14 Punjab were falling bact along the
Taipo Road, the Japanese were adx*andng along the Cast/e Feat
Road, the other main line of approach, running west of the Main-
land. In accordance with the pre-arranged plans, the Au Tau
bridge waj blown up in the monung of 8 December, and late in the
es-ening Japanese transport was seen banking up there, which
testified to the thoroughness of the demolition. 5'^inch guns weir
drawn by tracton up to the bridge and then manhandled by the
Japanese into a \nlhge to the east. This battery fired at intervals
on Hong Kong Island during the next thirt)'-ii* hour*, and several
shells fell near Aberdeen Reiervoir.
The Carrier Platoon of2 Royal Scots on the left was in contact
with the Japanese at Ping Shan about halfway up the road. In
the course of the day after ruccecfuUy blowing ^e prepared demoli*
tion on the road, except the one at the Dairy Farm, Allied patrols
withdiewr at first to Brolhen Point along the Castle Feah Road
and subsequently U) Tsun Wan Wai, north-west of Gtndiinlcn
Bay, where the)* sta)ed for the night. Meanwhile the Japanese
column had pushed south through Telegraph Pass, and their
pressure forced the Allied troops to withdraw into the Glndrinlxrs
line by first light of 9 December. 2 Rxn-al Scots took up posi-
tions on the left of the Gindrinkers Line covering the entire area
firoa Gindrinkers Bay north to Golden Hill and Shingmnn
Redonbt.*
During the course of their advance along the two main
roads, the Japanese had shown considerable knowledge of the
CTOS-coontry tracks and, led by the lool guides, developed their
attack over difficult country very quickly. The Japanese also
displayed ** a high standard of uighl training

TBi crmxtvczzs lzsz

By the ewning of 8 December, two battalions. 2 Rojal

Scots a^ 2/14 Punjab, were in their pontions inside the Gindrinkers
Tts* Wr in Eoeg3.14 Pntnab, p. 5.
Daptich, ccc a. ms.
ni.p.7W.
 OPRRATJO'rt < THE IJMSLAND 27

Lint, ant} jhe 5}7 Rajput defcntlwl tJje right end of the Line.
Owing to the ihortage of troops, there existed a gap south-east of
the Shtngmun Redoubt between 2 Roj-al Scots, svho held a sector
from Gindrinker* Bay to Shsngmun Redoubt, and 2/M Punjab
who defcndctl die line from the Shingmun XulU to Wong Uk.
The Shingmun Redoubt, itself a strong-point of defence, was held
b)' only one platoon of 2 Ro}'a}Seots,a STf}* meagre garrison toman

the defences. Hence, early in the morning of 9 December, 5/7

Rajput was ordered to move its resers'c rompany (D) to man Uic
gap Until the direction of the main Japanese (hrttst was disclosed.
Along the remainder of the front, however, only minor adjustments
were made during the day and acthaty was largely confined to
patrol work and sporadic shelling of troop movements. 2 Royal
Scots sent strong patrols on the tracks lc.ading south-east from the
Kam Tin area, which confirmed the news that the Japanese
troops were making use of Chinese guides drawn mostly from the
%411agc of Tiun Wan ^Vat. Small l^iet of Japanese troops svere
aUo reported to be crossing Tide Cove towards BufTalo Hilt. A
precautionary day and night standing patrol on Heather Hill was,
therefore, organised. No serious attack, however, developed
from this direction until the evening of II December.
By esming of Tuesday, 9 December, the entire Main-
the
land Infantry Brigade comnunded by Brigadier Wallis was in
position behind the general line, Tsun Wan Wai-Wong Uk-Hcathcr
Hill Punjab Hill. Phe brigade commander hoped to hold this
line for at least a week, but during the night the surprbe capture by
the Japanese of Shingmun Redoubt held by 2 Royal Scots, forced
the Allied troops to withdraw 'firrther south to a line along Golden
Hill Ridge. It w.is clear that A
Company of 2 Royal Scots had
been surprised in the Redoubt, having failed to maintain active
patrolling as ordered by the brigade commander. TJic loss of
this key position which dominated the left flank was a grievous
blow and had serious consequences on the subsequent defence
arrangernems. Tlie possession of this strong-point by the Japanese
gave them a covered route into the Dritisli area and they were now
in a position to exert pressure on the defence line from the fianlu
and rear. The possibility of an Immediate counter-attack in this
area was discussed by Major-General Maliby with Brigadier \VaUIs,
'*
but it was not considered practicable because the nearest troops
were a mile away, the gound precipitous and broken, and the exact
situation round the Redoubt very obscure".'* The Japanese

'SSc Map fadof pa^ 23

HMkllby'i Detpttch, ef. til. p. 70S.
2ft CAMPAIGNS IN SOtmi-EAST ASIA I9-1I-42 HONG KON<5

worked feverishly ifaroughout the night to reorganise the captured

position to meet the counter-attack whidi never materiaUsed.
At midnight on 9/10 I^cembcr the reserve company of the
Winnipeg Grenadiers, which was in position at ^Vong Nei Chong
Gap, tvas moved from the Island to remforce the garrison on the
Mainland. The company reached the Mainland Headquarters
at 0400 hours, and was placed in brigade reserve at the Kowloon
Polo Ground, ready to pvc all possible support. Moreover, in
an effort to stem the Japanese advance south-east of Smugglers
Ridge, an artillery concentration was directed against the Redoubt
which took heavy toll of the moving Japanese columns. Confused
fighting took place in this area for some time, but further Japanese
adsance was stopped by the vigorous action taken by the Officer
Commanding D Company of S/7 Rajput, supported by artillery.
The Japanese were compelled to retreat into Shingmun Redoubt
which was then shelled b>' 6-inch howitzers. Severe casualties
were inflicted on them in this action.
At 0930 hours the next day, Brigadier U'aUis asked the
Oflicer Commanding, 2 Royal Scots, for his plans regarding
counter-attack, but the latter felt that this task was beyond the
capacity of his battalion because tbc Japanese svere strongly
entrenidied in Shingmun, and the ground nas both diSicuh and
exposed. Moreover, the battalion had been \seakened by* sickness
and casualties in its ranks and the morale was not high. It was,
therefore, decided to relinquish all thought of a counter-attack and
to establish a new line between Golden Hill and Lai Chi Kok to
the south-west at dusk. The withdrawal was carried out without
any incident by 1930 hours on 10 December, the Japanese making
no attempt to intercept the retreating troops. Some necessary
adjustments in the position of 2 Royal Scots were also carried out
before dawm.
In the sector between Shingmun Redoubt and Wong Uk
occupied by 2/14 Punjab the situation des-eloped rapidly after the
withdrawal of the troops inside the Inner line . The Japanese
advanced along the line of the bill-tracks north of Needle Hill,
and troop movcments were also noticed in the valleys running
up from Tide Cove. Throughout the day, the pou lions occupied
by 2/14 Punjab were heavily shelled from gun-positions along the
Taipo Road, out of cflcctivc machine-gun range. Many forward
pill-boxes at IVong Ut received direct hits and some of these were
totally destroyed. A Company of 2/14 Punjab suffered heavy
cavities during the shelling of the pU-boxes. It U apparent that
spies had given information to the Japanese which made
their fire
so accurate.
THE MAINLAND S-
SH0WIH6 ORISIHAL IWWER LIKE
 OPtRATlON"* 0*< TJIf. MM.VMND 20

the aheniooii on 10 December snuit Japaneir

Ihirinq
partifi readied Monattcrj' Kidqe and the lower dopes of Kcedlr
Iltll. D Comjjany of 2/14 Punjab brought hi mortars to Ijcar
cm the: troops, Init the effca could not fe observed. At about
li30 hour* two wmpani appeared m
17de Cove, mmintj in the
ilircclion of the beadi to thr east of Woop LfL TTicy confined
Japanejr lrtx)ps dii;uised in Chinese tires*. The ramparri were
tunk by a 2/14 Punjab pill-bot at Won? Uk, flingin? their ckcu-
p.inls into the vsater, wthere mmt of them were drowned- A few
ctcrvivnra were obvr.Td to reach the shore who finally cicaped
intci the dense country near DulTiUi Hill. A Japatieic patrol
iindcr cover of darkness alH> came out in the vicinity of Sfiatin
Jevel-crossin?, contact vsith which caused one casii.t?ty.
Ihe Dome JliH rector occupied b) (.'om|n) of 5/7
itajpui SV41 alvj shelled in the course of the day, and ome of their
pilblxixes were either damaged or destro)ed. n>e trtiops occupying
them vsere immediately movYsl to thrir alternative position*, but
thetf were abo found to be untenable sometime bicr and the troops
fatd therefore to w-itfidraw at dusk further louth. A medium
m.iflne*gun rection ssas moved up .at alrout the wme time to one
Rise More, routh^-nst of P^ime Hill, to rrinhtrr^ the right /Itrtk
nf the Jl.njpiji compny.
On 10 l)eceinl)er the Ryal Air Force evacuated Kai Tak
acrmlrome after de*tnj)ing machines and equipment According
to M-sJor-Ceneral Maliby, at this time there svas Icfi only one
maeJune fit to operate. Obstnietions ssfere pbeed on the aerodrome
by using * concrete rections of drains, railings from thr surroundi
and derelict M.T.
Tlirougbout the night of 10/11 December there vsas inter*
ntittent ihelling on the Mainbnd and the Island by the Japanese.
Tlie shelling on the Mainbnd was directed against the area
Tal-^Vn^-^Vong Uk. Before dass'n four hits had liecn scored on
Bnssen Road Hospital.'^
On the M.slnbnd at dawn of 11 December, the Japanese
bunched an attack on the JrA flank of 2 Royal Scots, preceded by
heavy mortar fire. In face of this pressure, the Royal Scots retreat-
ed fn tfisordcr as far back as the Pencii Factory, thereby exposing
the junction of Oie C.astlc Peak and Taipo Roads, and jcopaidismp
the position of the troops based on the Taipo Road (2/H Punjab, one
company 5/7 ilajput and troops 4-5-iach and 3'7'inch liowifrers}.
Hence one corop.iny of Wnnipeg Grenadiers and the Bren Carriers

t. 70C.
30 CAitPAlCNS IN SOimr-RAST ASLA 19J1.42 nONO KONR

from Kai Tak aerodrome wre mmTd into position to an'cr the gap.
B Company of 2/14 Punjab svbich vras ia ihe procesj of wthdraw*
ing, howex'cr, engaged the Japanese trucks with small arms fire and
3 inch mortars and knocked out one of them. That stopped further
Japanese advance temporarily.
At 0800 houn on 11 December, at a routine conference held
by Brigadier Wallis, plans were explained for a general with-
drawal to the Island, if this should become necessary. Up to this
lime there vczs no thought of immediate wnthdrassal and the
General Officer Commanding was hoping to keep the Japanese
troops at bay for a tseek or ten days. Tliis conference laid down
careful plans for succcssI\t Uybacb. Wthln two hours, howescr,
the alarnung news of the hasty retreat of the two forward companies
of 2 Royal Scots on the left flanks was received, which entirely
changed the utuation. The reasons for the withdrawal of the
Royal Scots will nc%-er be fully known, since the two company
commanders were both killed In the action. According to Bri-
gadier WalUs.thc probable reason was that the two left companies
were again surprised by a strong enemy patrol near (he main road
when some b'gbt mortar Are was in progrts. One platoon panick-
ed and retired and then others in turn alto withdrew and refused
to remain, thinking they were being heattly attacked Major-
General hlaltby felt that the poution of Allied troops had become
exceedingly precarious because of the presence of a Japanese force
south of Golden Hill and the obvious threat to Kowloon. In
order to as-oid a large portion of the brigade from being cut off,
he dedded on immediate srithdrawaL All Mainland troops
(less 5/7 Rajput and troops of 1 Mountain Battery, RA) were
ordered to start oucuatlon at dusk that day. 5/7 Rajput bad been
detailed under the scheme of withdrawal for the occupation of
Devils Beak Reninsula. The withdrawal of 2/14 Punjab over
hills and difficult tracks in broad daylight was fully exposed
to Japanese fire, which was directed against iu S Company in full
measure. The situation was made worse by obsersation by
Japanese aircraft. Nevertheless, the battalion continued its tnosT,
manhandling anti-tank rifles, S-inch mortars and machine-guns over
the steep hills to the Devils Peak, hfcn had no food either, and
the first meal whidi they had was tea in the Island at about 0300
hours on 12 December. The route had not been reconnoitred
earlier, but lucidly there was no follow up by the Japanese.

o sad Argrle Sereet

 oPERAno.vs ox -nrc AtNL.^Nn 31

At 1000 hours on December the Japanese began landing

11
on Lamma Island, and they were fired at by guns of Aberdeen and
Jubilee batteries. A Japanese attempt to land on Aberdeen in
Chinese sampans at 1300 hours sas foiled by machine-gun fire.
During the afternoon a concentration of about one hundred
Japanese junks off Lamma w-as engaged by artiilerj' fire. Mcan-
svhilc, Japanese bombardment of Stonecutters Island conu'nucd
throughout the day. Much damage was caused to buildings
and telephone communications. British troops were withdrawn
from the Island in the afternoon, after successfully carrying out the
destruction of gxms and inuno\-ablc stores, plans for which had
been prepared well in advance.
NVhile the situation on the front held by ^Ulicd troops was
rapidly deteriorating, fifth columnists in dark grey uniform and
armed with rifles were active in Kowloon. /Vlso rioting and looting
occurred in the streets. To add lo the embarrassment of the
defence personnel, a large number of lorry and car drivers, and

a number of launch cretv almost all of them local residents
deserted, dislocating plans of es*actia(ion.
Hong Kong svas repeatedly bombed throughout the day.
Although casualties were few, much damage was caused to the
Royal Nasy Dockyard, RASC and RAOC Depots.'* The
morale of the cit'd population did not go dosvn appreciabi}, but
the news of the early cs'aaiaiion of the Mainbnd had a rather
depressing effect on them.

wmtDRAWAL or TROOPS FROSl TItE lAr.VLA-VD

The withdrawal from the Mainland was well carried out
according to Major*Gcncnil Maltby.'* 2/14 Punjab, along with
D Company 5/7 Rajput, was to retire through the passes
along Anderson Road to the Dcsnls Peak, an isolated and com-
manding position. The cos-ering troops consbted of the main
body of 5/7 Rajput and one ballcry of 3'7-inch howitzers. This
a s'cry diflicult operation since it inwlved a move by night
across the whole front through Kowloon Pass, Shatin Pass and
Crojscuttcrs Pass, hut the Indian troops perfonned it succcfully
and acquitted themseh'cs well. The Mule Corps assisted in this
cvaciuUon since mechanical transport was of little luc over such a
difficult terrain, the roads being quite impassable at se\'eral places.
Brigade Headquarters, 2 Royal Scots and various administrative

^Maltby*! DCTPaifb, tf. eil. pp. 706-7.

p. 707
 1

34 cuipAioss IS sDirrn-EAST asia 1941.42 hong koso

The morale and standard of discipline of the personnel of

the two Indian battalions was high, although they were exhausted
after four daj's of continuous day and night s-igilancc and long
lught carries, over rough tracks and coolie paths, of many machine-
guns, light automatics and mortars.** Great difficulty was
experienced by the troops in the course of their withdrawal due to
acute shortage of mule transport. Ewn
during peace exercises, the
shortage of mules was clear, but the situation had become worse
with the arrival of the two Canadian battalions, whcBC mechanical
transport had not been received when war broke out. Great
credit is due to all concerned with the withdrawal operations. The
whole operation was carried out successfully except for one solitar)'
inddent. In the darkness Headquarters details of 2/14 Punjab
and some other troops came down to Kai Tak aerodrome by mistake
and became involved in street fighting with fifth columnists in the
outsUrts of the city of Kowloon.**
2 Royal Scots withdrew through the line held by D
Company Winnipeg Grenadieh and down the Kowloon Peninsula,
and finally embarked from one of the Kowloon docks. A
situation
report described this withdrawal as a difficult operation in view of
constant pressure by superior numbers, who were very good at turn-
ing the flanks which were necessarily ofien offered owing to the
sinkllness of unia The Winnipeg Grenadiers company covered
the svithdrawal of 2 Royal Scots and overcame the sh'gbt opposidon
offered by the fifth columiusts in Kowloon. By 2230 hours on 1
December, the Royal Scots had reached Victoria, and three hours
later DCompany 4Vinnipeg Grenadieis crossed over to the
Island. All armoured can, some mechanical transport and nearly
all Bren carricis were esacuated. At dawn the Royal Scots took
o\xr the north-^ast sector of the Island defences as a precautionary
measure. It had proiously been occupied by some Headquarters
personnel of 1 hdddlesex plus a platoon of No. 3 Company
HKN^DC.

riGHTlXC IN THE DEVlts PEAK PENINSULA

The Hong Kong Defence Plan had envisaged that in the

event of failure to hold the Gindrinkers Line, the Mainland Brigade
wouM retijrc to the Island, feavnng 5/7 Rajput to continue the
fightaround Devils Peak. This plan was now given effect to.

*<3ted in C n Hia n Pulidpauoo, p. 56.

 OffH-^TTOrcj OS MMSUVNI) 35

At A and B (lojnpamcs uF Sp Hajput occupied forward pod-

lion K)udj'ej: and mii of l^u Ton^ uieli Bjiuli'on Head*
quarten and C Company at Hai Wan in rhe rear. I..ait minute
improvement! tti-ere jnade durin(* the course of the day in thw
tine, !^hich had been rpecially prepared, and fresh rations and
ammunition were brought forward. Owing to diortncst of time,
commumcalJnm in the Devils Peak area were still incomplete.
At about 1000 lioun the Japanese made a heaty dive>bombintr
attack on the adminisfrativc area, but no casualties sserc suffered
by the pcnonnel or animats.
Late in the afternoon sf 12 Decendser It became clear that
the Japanese had ocoipted Chtn loin Clm and from there at about
1745 hours the)' launched an attack on the two forward Bajput
companies, TJie Japanese attacking force sraj estimated at one
battalion. By 1815 hours, the attack ssas Iseaten off by hea%y
maehine-Run and artillery" fire, nie Jap.-\nesr withdrew in dis-
order ha\'inB failed to penetrate the frontal twit of wire and after
lufTcrinR hea\y casualties.** 6-inch howiiten opened an accurate
and doTistaling fire on the tetreatins force until darkness obscured
the targets. By 2100 houn all was tjuiei again along the line,
but the Jap-mese were in close contact with B Crunpiny. An hour
later Xfajor-Ceneral .kfaltby decided to csnaiatc one Rifle Comp-
any and .Vo. I Battery RA to the Isbnd, and ordered the Rajputs
to ssithdraw to the shorter Hat Wan line because their flanks
were exposed to w.ater>bornc atweks. Tliis sviihtlrawal was also
considered necessary in snew- of the pressure by the Jap.incsc, the
rapid dcsrlopment of their beasy mortar fire, the ronslricted
passage across the Lei U .Mun Strait, (and) the short.igc of launch
*'.*
crews
About this time 2/H Punjab Battalion Headquarters and C
and D Companies began embarking for the Island. Their with-
drawal was followed fay the o^acuation of the 3*7-inch howitzers
wrhich had given s-aluahlc support to the defenders throughout the
day. It svas proposed to hold the short Hal Wan line by 5/7
Rajput with Headquarten and two companies, which were to be
the last to withdraw from the Mainbnd. TIic rest of that battalion
wa* to withdraw- from the M-inland, aPer 3*7-inch howitzer troops
had mos-cd. By midnight A and B Rajput Companies had iritb-
drawn from their Ma Lau Tong positions, the withdrarval having
been covered by a D Company platoon on Black Rock Hill. An
hour later B and C Companies occupied their new positions onHai
w 71>Ii wu Ibe onty ocfuion when the Japtutoe sttsek wii not nude under
cover of hnvr and morur bomlMidtnrnt.
initial ftrullery
SMilthy* Derpairh, f- * rP- TOT'-*.
36 CAMPAIGNS JN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 19M-42 JIONO KONO

^Van Line, the former occupying the rigltt sector and the Litter the

left.

During the final withdrawal to the Island, tlic w.atcr-transport

position became extremely precarious because of the desertion
of the Chinese crew and the bad condition of the launches. This
involved serious delay in the time scitedulc, and it was not till
0130 hours on 13 December that 2/14 Punjab was acroa.
At 0400 houn on 13 December the bulk of the fint troop
RA and one company of Rajputs had safely embarked, but the
Mule Corps had not arrived. After a discussion with Brigadier
\Vallis, Major-General Maltby decided to withdraw all the troops
to the island immediately to avoid the cbnger of daylight crossings.*
One Rajput company tvas ordered to cover the withdrawal of the
rest, and then ilielf to embark in the last ferries. Brigadier
Wallis was at first reluctant to withdraw from the Devils Peak,
thus leaving to the Japanese a feature which completely overlooked
the eastern extremity of the Island, but the necessity of saving the
small Rajput force from eventual destruction by asuperior Japanese
force led him to decide upon immediate withdrawal to the Island.
To assist in the evacuation, three motor torpedo boats came from
Aberdeen and an additional MTB was recalled from patrol in
Junk Bay. The destroyer Thtadan also assisted in evacuating
personnel and equipment which was being done slowly and steadily
by the Vietana.
By 0730 bouts on 13 December, Battalion Headquarters
5/7 Rajput and the last covering troops were svithdrawing in broad
daylight, and they reached Aberdeen at 0920 hours. Fortunately
there WM no Japanese air activity. The evacuation ivas completed
without casualties, covered by artillery fire from several island
positions. Almost the entire 5/7 Rajput Battalion assembled in
the Tytatn Gap area by noon and was given tivcnty-four hours to
restand refit before taking over the north-cast sector of the Island
from 2 Royal Scots. At the same time, 2/14 Punjab occupied
the north-west sector of the Island.
The invasion of Hong Kong Island was noiv considered
imminenL The Japanese could attack either through the narrow
strait of Lei U Mun or through the water passage of Victoria.
The rapid withdrawal from the Mainland came as a great shock
to the civilians, who had anticipated a much longer resistance
irevspy i.v lONref the prucihAnecf sfrengtA efthe
defences.

defciK*, in witbdrw>l waj amtaaplzKd &tnn the

Devirlp^'


ciiArriift i\'

The End in Hong Kong

TtIK INTEIUU r^RJOD

The withdrawal of Allied tfoopi from the Mainland marked

the end of one phajc of the llong Kon^f campai^ and the beginninp
of another, during which the Iibnd war subjected to a heavj-
attack and intense fire by the Japanese. Thit was preceded, hou-
evTr, by a Japanese offer of peace, induced, perhaps, by the
disorder and chaos In Kowloon after tfte retreat of the /VUi'cd
forces. At 0000 houn on 13 Decemf>cr a ship flying the flag
of truce arrived at \'ictoria Pier. A staff officer of General
Officer Commanding Japanese forces, delivered a letter to Sir
Mark Young, the Gos-emor of Ifong Kong, tn which the Japanese
demanded an unconditional surrender of the Colony, threatening
JCV'ere aerial bombardment and artillery fire in ease of refusal of
the demand. But the Japanese ultimatum which was due to expire
at 1500 houn on 13 December was summarily rejected by the
Gosemor, There could ! no question of laying down anus so
long as the garrison could obtain food, water and ammunitiun.
'Hjc Governors refusal to surrender b.td the full approval of Mr.
Wnsion Churchill, the British Prime .Minister. In a message to
theCos'cmor artd defenders of the Island, on 14 December, he said;
H'c are watching day by day and hour by hour your
stubborn defence of the |ort and fortress of Hong Kong. Von
guard a vatal link long famous in svorld cirilization between the
Far East and Europe. /Ml our hearts arc with you in your ordeal.
Fvcry day of your resistance brings nearer our certain Wetory .
With the withdrawal to the Island, the Allied forces were
faced with the possibility of a stron^r attack from the Japanese
w-hen their own strength was reduc^ by the casualties they had
suffered. In view of the fact that British attention was divided over
many theatres of war, the beleaguered garrison had little hope
of receiving any reinforcements or outside support. However,
they stuck to their task manfully until the inevitable happened.
The first centenary of British occupation of Hong Kong coincided
with its tragic fall to the invaders.

Dispositions

In the reorganisation of dispositions of troops, the positions

at midday of 13 December were as follows:
38 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTII*rJT ASL\ 1941-42 HONG KONG

2 Ro^al Scots had taken over temporarily the north-eastern

sector of the Island from 1 Middlesex.
2/14 Punjab occupied the western sector facing Victoria
water-front from Green Isle to Causeway Bay and also the high
ground to the rear with battalion headquarters in Garden Road.
5/7 Rajput was resting in the Tytam area before taking up
its allotted place on the north-east sector.
Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadien occupied
the south-east and south-west portions of the Island. Anti-para-
troop posts were established in the area held by Royal Rifles of
Canada to prevent possible parachute landings.
1 Middlesex had its headquarters at Leighton Hill and mann-

ed the pill-boxes along the perimeter of the Island.

On the c\-ening of 15 December, the Rajputs occupied the
north-eastern sector betsseen Causeway Bay and Pak Sha IVan
Vrith headquarters at Taikoo relieving 2 Royal Scots who in turn
mosTd at about 1830 hours to the Stubbs Road area, east of
Wanchai Gap. A small area between 1 hfiddlescx and 2/14
Punjab, north of Mount Parish, was taken o\-cr by a company
of the Royal Scots.
The garrison was now dirided into two brigadesEast
and West Infantry
Brigades under command of Brigadiers
Wallis and Lawson, respectively. Tlie inter-brigade boundary,
indusis'c to East Brigade, was Pill-Box 52 the nor^-east comer of

Causeway ^Tai Hang vilbgeJardines Lookout (exclusive)
Wong Nci Chong Rcsers'oirVoilct Hill (inclusisT) Stanley
Mound Chung Ham Kok.' All troops east of this line came under
Brigadier with headquarters at Tytam Gap.
4Vallis They
consisted of 5/7 Rajput, Royal Rifles of Canada with attached
troops (1 and 2 Companies HKVDC), two companies of 1 Middle-
sex in the pUl-boxes of the beach defences from Sai ^Van Bay
to ^Vcst Bay. The troops to the west of the line formed the \Vest
Infantry Brigade and comprised 2/14 Punjab, 2 Royal Scou and
^Vinnipeg Grenadiers. Bnidcs there were the troops under the
command of the Fortress Headquarters consisting of the head-
quarters and two companies of I Middlesex, one of which was in
the piU-boxes while the other was in reserve.
This eased the rituation for Brigadier \Vallis who had the
larger half of the Island to command and for Brigadier Lawson
who v?as wnfanahaT with the ground.* In support of each
I
War Dury uxl Nairarive cl Ean tnfaotrjr Brigade and
Brigadier C. tVallu,
Atudied troop*, TbisWar^aryaDdNarTattvewai corapiledm Argyle Street,
pige +.
Kowtooi, PromencC War Camp, be twoen I June and IS Auetm. 1W2
Maltby'a Detpatcb, >. rit p. 710.
 a

Tilt: KVD fV IIOVG KO\0 30

wc moWIt luilcrii-i of (lie Irt Iloni; Konj; Rrsi'mcnt,

UKhRA and (ro.Mfaf deftnee jjua^ rangtnt; in calibre from 4 to 92
indiei,
.Nfajor'Gfncrat ^faItby apprebended that an attack on the
Island from the Mainland mJRht well be in combination
sv-ith land*
m:;son the south shore at a number of points simiiltaneoustj*
danger emphasised b>' $e\*eral Japanese Landinp on I-amma Island
durmi; 11 and 12 Dccemlser. He therefore considered that a dis*
penal of the forces under this command ss-as essential, in order
to co\*cr the entire perimeter of the Isbnd.

All pilMxixes aroitml the Island ss-ere e/Tectistly manned ss-ith

t?c purpose of inflictint; maximum casualties on the Japanese
atiaekinit force, ndiind these pill-boxes were stationed on high
ground tlic fis-e infantry- battalions with their own merves ready to
counter-attack in case of Japanese mfiliration at any point. In
the north-east sector sihcrc the Japanese svcre expected to launch
their initial attack, B and G Companies of 5/7 Rajput were
held in Trser\*c near T.ai llantj village .'tnd south of Taikoo Head*
quarten. B Comp-iiiy sras eapecied lo cover the North Point
area, while C Company was ordered to counter-attack near Quarry
Point or Bracmar. In the north-ssest sector B Company of 2/M
Punj.ib Was held in resepk-e at Tai Ping Shan because the sector
was partly covered by an antl-brtt boom laid olT shore between
Green Isle and 5heung Wan (517005). The continuation of this
boom towards KeUel Island was, however, pm-ented by tlic
dearrtion of Chinejc crew.
All asmilabte mecli-amcal transport in the Islsncl sras con-
centrated at the J/.sppy Valley Race Tract ro the east ot Victoria.
From this Vehicle Control Centre, trucks were lent to units by the
Olliccr-in-Cfiargc and were to lc relumed to him on completion
of their allotted task.*

Preliminar/ Operaltoru
During the pcriosl between Uic e>'acuation of the Mainland
and the first J.npancsc landings on the Island (December 13-18),
tfic J.apancsc svcrc busy restoring order in Kosvloon, collc/ng
all assailable boats for transporting ihctf forces mainly at Baileys
Shipyard, bringing up their hcasry artillery and dropping leaficts
on the Island. But there was no respite for the besieged garrison
from Japanese shelling and bombing. Soon after the rejection
of the unconditional surrender ultimatum, Japanese artillery
fire from Kowloon and various other
plices on the Mainland

JCanaJUn PirtJcipstion, p. 20,

40 CAMPAIOST IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941*42 JIOSO KONC

increased in intensity and accuracy. A direct hit knocked out one

9'2-inch gun at Mount and Belcher Point in the north-
Davis,
west sector of the Island was aflame by hcas'y shelling at dusk.
set
Serious fires sserc also started at Kennedy Town and ^Vcst Point
in the area held by a company of 2/14 Punjab. Coastal defence
and HKSRA Batteries could not offer any effective opposition to
the Japanese concentration of fire as llicy were far out-numbered
and their targets were too numerous .and wcU-conccalcd.* The
official communique described the day as difficult , and difficult
it certainly was. Japanese shelling and bombardment shook
cisilian morale to some extent. Japanese iifUi columnists exploit-
ed this opportunity. The antl-aircrafi search-light position at
Sau Ki kVan was attacked at night by fifth columnists who helped
in sniping and spreading fabe abim. A large number of army
transport drivers also deserted, and some cs'en took away
their vehicles with them. This created rious transport difficulties.
The police however took some action in the nutter wliich prevented
the situation from worsening. They were also able to maintain
order in Victoria except in the ARP tunnels.
The next day (14 December) was one of great anxiety. The
serious fires at Belcher Point and Kennedy Town at 0200 hours
could not be put out by cisal/an fire-brigades, and mibtaryassistance
was called for. Their combined efforts, did, however, control
the fire by midday. There was chaos in the whole area due to
fifth column activities and each telephone call had to be checked
up carefully before action could be talsn. Police found it extremely
difficult to keep law and order svith the limited resources, and
several STilnerablc points had perforce to be left ungturded.
Throughout the day, the north-west sector of the Island was
again subjected to intense and accurate shelling from the Main-
land. Some damage was caused to guns at Richer Point and
Mount Davis, and the latter pbee had its communications cut off
for a couple of hours. A direct hit on one S-inch anti-aircraft gun
at Mount Dasas caused 30 per cent casualties to the personnel and
led to the desertion of a brge number of Chinese gunners. Tele-
phone wires sverc constantly being cut and a particubrly heavy
concentration of artillery fire on hbgazine Gap damaged eight
main cables invoWng 195 arcuits. All these were repaired by
the Royal Corps of Signals, but such incidents undoubtedly laid

^According to J 2 paaeie sccounti, the Eritub troopi were inactive Little

ifany sRcRipt wuinade toIotcrUKt thepasetovn the hint north of Kowloon, and the
invaden poured troop* down into the plain, in full view of the obaenration posts on
Victoria Peak, with eery little inti-rfermecaoil with
a ninimura of casualties. (Japanese
OperaliOM, pp. 5-6).
 TIIE END IN nONO KONG 41

a heavy burden on the detadunents working on Iincrcpairs and

impaired the garrisons communications.
\VhiIc tile defenders in the north-west sector were having a
hard time, there was no respite irom Japanese shelling for British
troops in the north-east sector also. It has been estimated
that by 16 December more than half the pill-boxes between Lei
U Mun and Bowington liad been put out of action, testifying to
the remarkable accuracy of the Japanese shell and mortxir fire.
One pill-box had " forty holes drilled right through by a high
velocity gun of small calibre located on Kosvloon peninsula
Many instances were reported of Ughis being flashed from crude
lamps across the sea to the hlainland to direct artillery fire on
to concealed gun positions and mechanical transport. 'Whenever
such signallers were intercepted, they were shot.
There was inadequate provision of alternative pill-box
emplacements. Less than a dozen positions had been completed
before war broke out. niese should have been completed
in peace-time, but in the words of Major-General Maltby it
would have meant rcquisitloniog valuable Codown and office

properties, and requisitioning had not been sanctioned until the

proposed Precautionary Period.* In any case the alternative
positions which were rapidly prepared in basements and godowns
were also shelled and hit. By nightfall, all civil and military
telephone communications were severely interrupted in the north-
east sector, including those to pill-boxes Nos. 40 to 53. But repair
work was at once taken in hand and communications were partially
restored before daybreak.
On 15 December, there tvas heavy shelling of Sai ^Van anti-
aircraft redoubt at 1 004 hours. At noon mortar fire from specially
fell near the Royal Navy Dockyard, Command
prepared poations
Headquarten and Lower Peak Tramway terminus, liie Japanese
boldly attempted a surprise night landing which ivas reported
by Pak Sha ^Van Battery. The imaden, with small rubber boats
and petrol tin rafts as their equipment, tried to swim across in fair
strength, but they were all shot /a the water. Bstimates of their
strength varied from one to three companies.
During the day, final adiustmenU to dispositions of troops
were carried out and Indian troops ocarpied the whole north face
of the Island and manned the piU-boxes. A IVar Office apprecia-
tion of the situation in Hong Kong at this time took a gloomy vieiv
of an undoubtedly serious situation The strength of the
Despatch, tfi- cii. p. 710.
6lhid. ..
^Canadian Partidpatwm, Appendix F .
40 CMn*AlCSS IS SOUTII'EAST A^A l9iI-42 HONO KOSO

increased in intensity and accurac>'. direct lul knocked out one

A
north-
9-2-inch gun at Mount Davis, and Belcher Point in the
west sector of the Island was set aflame by heavy shelling at du^
Serious fires were also started at Kennedy Town and \Vest Point

in the area held by a company of 2/14 Punjab. Coastal defence

and HKSRA Batteries could not ofler any cncclivc opposition to
tlie Japanese concentration of fire a* they were far
out-numbered
and were too numerous and well-concealed.^^ The
their targets
official communique described the day as *' diflicult and difficult
it ccrniinly was. Japanese shelling and bombardment shook
cK-ilianmorale to some extent. Japanese fifth columnists CTploit-
cd thb opportunity. The anti-aircraft search-light position at
Sau Ki ^Van was attacked at night b^- fifth columnists who helped
in sniping and spreading false abrm. A large number of army
transport drivers also deserted, and some even took asray
their vehicles with them. This created serious transport difficultic*'

The police however took some action in the matter which pm-cni^
the situation from worsening. They were alw) able to maintain
order in Victoria except in the ARP tunneb.
The next day (14 December) was one of great anxiety. The
serious fires at Belcher Point and Kennedy Town at 0200 hours
could not be pul out by cirilian fire-brigades, and military assbunce
sras called for. Their combined efforts, did, howe\-er, control
the fire by midday. Tliere was chaos in the whole area due to
fifth column acUritles and each telephone call had to be checked
up carefully before action could be taken. Police found it extremely
keep law and order with the limited resources, and
difficult to
had peribrcc to be left unguarded.
several vulnerable points
Throughout the day, the north-west sector of the Island svas
again subjected to intense and accurate shelling from the Main-
land. Some damage was caused to guns at Belcher Point and
Mount Davis, and the latter place had its commumcations cut off
for a couple of hours. A direct hit on one 3-tnch anti-aircraft gun
at Mount Basis caused 30 per cent casualties to the personnel and
led to the desertion of a large number of Chinese gunners. Tele-
phone wires were constantly being cut and a particularly hcav>'
concentration of artillery fbc on Magazine Gap damaged eight
main cables involving 195 circuits. All these were repmred by
the Royal Corps of Signab, but such incidents undoubtedly laid

*AeeDidiDs to Japanae aecoosu, the Hritiih troou were inactive'. ** Utile

jrany attempt wai made to interdict fbe pana Over the ElUf mnh of Kowloon, and ibe
invarien poured troops down roso U>e plam, in full view nX tbe olnervanoo pasta on
Viclorla Feat, with verr Ultle interferenoeanii wirb a minirnttm ctcasuallies (Japanese
Operaliooi, pp. 5-6).
 KOKG 43
THE ENt) iJi IIONC

garrisons surrondor was mado

flying a white fkg. P P
to the harbour in two launches
Conunandcr, Lieut..General
were siened by the Japanese
Z .hfNavaf Con,ia^ader-i-Chiof,
proposal to stirrender w^
m
case of refusal. Sir Ymog the Governor,
nate bombing fnlJowine words:
again summrfly^qecd to

declines IJi^Jtoiutely to et^^

surrender of Hong Kong and
he
Admiral Masaichi
fying laerrt -General Taka, to
to receive any im
Niimi that he is not prepared
subject .
tion from them on the , r j,ajcstys
This message for the Colo-
Jr? of State
Govemment in Great Bntam. Th the stirrine conduct
nles added: "Your resolute ^thfd ,"rd.niration
are
of all defenden of the fortress g Alhes throughout
Ejnpne
and conSdence by to whole
the world. Hold on. disconcerted at
proposals appeared thought that the second
this rejection. Major.General hto tby^^
demand for surrender suggested
tha
Chinese threat m
pect of attacking across the attempt to under-
f
their tear was taking effett, , 3 d quiet. The first
mmc Allied motale f bOTUse subsequent events
on
two suggestions cannot hold thought that
probably
the Island belied them. TO sacrifice men and
the Allied commander would
f" ,ccessaW of the
hopeless position
apparently hopeies p
material in view of to
defenders. luU for the defenders
.vclcome
These PP?\ communications etc.
whichf^cd
repair
until 1600 hours w utuiseu to
' r
, ^^^^^ds about this

Japanese tovity Island

Oonsiderablc , ;,f i,ama
dme; a 2000.ton freighttr one steam tug and
vessels launches, PatE'l; shipyard
and other
near Kai Jaa ^ a j Kowloon
a motor boat-were noticed
on the Mainland, , ^j^,, period was over
commenred enough,
Shelling ^i Surprisingly
and continued throughout ndtish artillery suffered
neither
several ^1"
for the first time in
Un '^yd. a number of Japanese
casualties nor damage. >-tib Hill and also three
mortars
batteries on DevUs Peak,
and Gun uiuu

tit-
sMAllby** Dejpatch, efi. P-
H CAUPAJO^J IN JOCTII-K.UT AMA l9U*t2 1^0^C I^SC

on the Kov.!oon wattr-front **erc cfTccthtly silencl It)

coMUtcr-batlery action dutin 5 the day. At about 2100 houn

17 December, the large paint t*-ork3 at Bracinar were set aflame
by
the Japanese aitiUery. Huj necetdtaled the removal to an alterna-
tive position of IB-pounder Beach Defence guns sshicJi sserc
tv,-o

ncarb). The of the north-east sector was tery heav)

shelling
and due to breakage of vi-ircs and cables many ptU-boxes sserc out
of touch. Brigadier Wallis informed the General Ofllcer Comman-
**
ding-in-Chief, that the situation on north face was not stt)
bright
Between nudnight and one in the morning of IB December,
Aberdeen came again under shell-fire from the sea. One shell
struck the Ituiustrial School, but fortunately failed to explode.
Ileavy shelling alsocommenerf almo-t at fust light along the entire
5/7 Rajput front. Owing to terrific fire, C Company was forced
to change its lying up area", but this was done without any
casualty. At 0950 hours, the RsttaUon Headquarters at lytam
rtceh-cd a direct hit which cut off the main telegraph lines. Half
an hour bter, Japanese fire was concentrated on the Sugar
Tactory and Taikoo Dock areas. Some necessary relief was gin
after dark to the Fak Sha Wan platoon which had ruffered heasT
casualdes from incessant Japanese fire. Feirol and oil storage
Unks at North Point were set ablaxc and were subjected to shelling
at intcrsuls throughout the day. The North Point fixed beam
across to Kowloon Point could not function owing to the intensity
of the heat and the dense smoke ariring from the buining of oil
installations. This fire, coniinuixig for several days, proved a serious
handicap to observation. The two 18-pounder Beach Defence
guns, in their new position at Braemar Police Station were blown
up by (Bred hits. *rhe crew fortonatcly managed somehow to
clear out- By early afternoon the road between Sau Ki \Van and
Causeway Bay was studded with large bomb craters at sevrral
places, and the fallen tramwircs and standards bad made the road
well-nigh impassable for mcchaiucal transport and despatch
riders.
At 1000 hours an air raid of considerable intensity took place
on the Central District and Victoria. Further raids occurred from
1500 hours onwards and the Sai Wan aiuUcry observation post was
divebombed and also shelled. Major-General Maltby and Brigadier
^VaHis w-eie cerTain that the Japanese wnuld make an attempt
at landin g after dusk in view of the extremely heavy bombardment
by art^cry and mortars on Ld U hlun Peninsula. Numerous
collections of small crafts and troop movements between the south
end of the Devils Peak and Kai Tak were noticed.
 Tin. FSD IS nose kong

Ii not l out of place here to mention the e/Tcct of

H-il}

Iwmbifig and shcllinj^ on civilian moraic. A'j Japanf'^c bombard-

ment of the Central District and X'Icton'.i increased in intensity,
there was an exodm of people to the southcni parts of the Ilonj;
Kong Island. Tills considerably increased the strain on the auihori-
tlcj. On
15 December Sir Mark Young, the Governor, had felt
that the most serioul problem ivat the control of the CJiinesc
population. A
large rtiimber of Chinese svorkers had deserted,
and in mwt cases it became mcrcasingly dinicult to depend on ilicir
steadfastness. Desertions from duly were particularly conspicuous
in the CISC of army transport drivers. Thereby the distribution
of supplies and ammunition was seriously aifcctcd. Japanese
propaganda was carried on side by side. A
numljcr of lea jlcts svcrc
dropped to we.in away tJic sympathies of people from the Allied
cause. To counteract this, authorities in the Island took some
action, but its effect cannot be correctly assessed in sacw of the
slender evidence available. Major-General M.altby lias categori-
cally stated that civilian morale improved on 16 and 17 December
and that rice distribution svas easier. The arrest of a prominent
Chinese mercJj.ajit for defeatist talk on 16 December is
reported to have produced good results.
During the period 13-10 December die Japanese made a
serious attempt to soften up Allied defences in the north-east
and north-west sectors of the Island and they were fairly successful
in achieving their object. By the evening of 18 December, it was
clear that the Japanese would make an attempt to land on the
Island during lljc night In the north-east sector taking advantage
of the fact chat the are.a was obscured by smoke drifting across the
water. By 2100 hours the Jap.ancsc were successful in a/Tccting
landings at scrv'cral places, and thus began the last phase of the
campaign.

TK LANOWes ON JIO.S'C KONO ISLAND

T/te ffortk-East Seclor

On the night of 10 December, the final and most desperate
phase of the campaign began. TTie Japanese crossed the narrow
Lei U Mun clianncl at about 2030 hours and landed simultaneously
on North Point and Lyemun under cover of darkness and of die
heavy pall of smoke from the burning oil and petrol tanks at North
Point. Tlic confusion caused by
smoke perhaps prevented the
happening, and two companies
defenders from realising what was
of the Japanese leading battalion were already ashore before they
16 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1S41-12 HONG KONG

could be brought under fire. 5/7 Rajput Fill-Boxes 43 and 44

at Taikoo Docks, observed Japanese troops approaching
the shore
opened
in small boats towed by ferry steamers and immediately
fire on them. In spite of this, the intaders were able to land on
Taikoo Docks, Aldrich Bay and the Sugar Refinery ^Vha^v^.
Japanese landings were greatly assisted by the successful reconnoitr-
ing work done the pres-ious evening by a Japanese officer, Lieut.

Zempei Masu Shima, who swam ashore at Taikoo to find weak
spots in the Allied defences, and discovered suitable landing sites
both at Taikoo and North Point for subsequent Japanese landings.*
The defence svirc in the Taikoo Dock and the Sau Ki Wan
arcashadbeen cut, evidently by fifth columnists' before the invaders
'

landed there. Within an hour of the landings, the invadeo

surrounded Pill-Box 44 and knocked it out. This success enabled
them to infiltrate across the main road to the high ground between
Taikoo and Braemar. G Company (less two platoons), one of the
two 5/7 Rajput reserve companies, svas ordered to prevent the
invaden from moving south- Soon after, an excellent 6' ardUcry
concentration was put on sugar Factory and Dock area of Taikoo
tvhich inflicted considerable damage on the int'aders and tempor-
arily delayed their advance. As ljcut.-Colonel Cadegan Rawlin-
son puts it: It came down actually 100 yards too short causing
some my men, but was invaluable for its speed, morale
casualties to
and delaying action on the enemy
effect The crew of Pill-Boi
43 fought bravely and continued to inlUct heavy losses on the
Japanese till about midiught when most of them tverc wiped out.'*

M'itkdraa.al by Ballalton HtadtparUrs:

By 2200 hours confused fighting was in progress in the streets
and on the high ground, east and west of Taikoo Headquarters.
Due to pressure by the invaders, 5/7 Rajput Headquarters was
temporarily fijrced to witbdiasv to a position south on the road
to Sanatorium Gap. It returned to its old Battalion Headquarters
temporarily by dislodging the Japanese, but was finally forced to
withdraw again by midnight. By this time situation in the north-

lapu, jnronnadon araeand for the first (inie in the

jaben Tmt WtaUy of I?
September 1942 {Voj, Xlli No. 3) la a atafioa for bravery, (War Diary 5/7 Rajput,
t'WarKary.p. H
(Appendia B. I, ofMaltby-s Despatch eft. n'M.

'*\Sar Diary, 5/7 Kajput, p.
Wimton Churchill lent the foOowine mestage to
the Governor of Hon j Kong:
We were greatly concemed to hear of landingi on Hone Kodit T-tanH ^hieh have
bsl by IipaiMse. There mtW hoa-ever be no tbouebt of rurrender. Every
fW of the liland mmt be fought and enemy resiited with utmost itubboraneas
iGeneral Headquarters Far Eait War Diary, VA IV, Appendix
No. 303).
 THE END IS nose KONO

coastal sector ssas out

of control. An hour Liter, however,
CMI
headquarters were occupying new posh
the survivors of battalion
the south-west slopes of Sanatorium rcKtutram. nris
tions on
site was chosen fintly
to give depth to A
Company and secondly
withdrawal towards Tat
and North Hang
because it permitted
Point localities in case
Company positions were forced.
A
December, 5/7 Rajput B.sttalion
About 0200 hours on 10
froin the left, vrhjch neeewitated
Headquarters was attaeled
the of Mount Butler, vvhjch nr
withdrawal to a position on
Heavy rmsualtres were tuO.eted
tumwasattaeked about 0330 horns.
on a strong Japanese
patrol moving m
close formatrou along the
the Japanese continued to
this set.b.sck, press
rid but in spfte
road, but of
p ijliimalclv, the Rajputs were forced to quit
the defenders /=>'<'. moved with a nucleus ba tie
this posruon aim.
,J,|, ,he object of Joining B
headquarters Lookout. The remain-
^nlLiec \'ia Jardincs
Company at
tng ' half an
J
first Ught.

hour
Mben the party
later, heavy fire was
I okout
reached yards. Under cover of this
distance of 400
opened on
up the north-west slopes and prevented
fire, the Japanese ad P They were, therefore, forced
Hane.
wTatH^^^^^
these nicn from shppmg
to go through the Jap
^
commander explained
The
Tuk after and expressed hU opinion
,}5riMdicr Wallis
the whole position . ould not hold for more than ttvo
J? gf
that the line of the high n<ndicr Wallis had received orders
hours. In the ^ctanlcy area and asked the Batta-
Stone i
to withdraw to tlic Tytam Tuk to ensure
lion Commander to defend interfered ivith by the
withdrawal was n
that the brigades
invaden.**

Opiralkns Earl ond ll'" '1^, Tfj*^iut was umucccssfuUy trjing

Wiilc C Corapt'Py
,/ fiiwvecn Taikoo
anrl Bracmar,
to prevent Japanese jjrth Point area heU by D
fbO*"!?
the invaders secured . j^jvance rewards Jardincs
Look-
Company and rapidly began rtwir ^uch
5(7 Kajput unable to ea,;^
out. Us, therefotc,
with battalion
l.eadquartm
out its eouutcr-attaek
rule- ^ jaese, consequcutly,
emdy
Bracmar and Tar
Lookout, one
broke through D ComP^bJ

able to oppoutrou.
Hang and were ,vi,hout further
peaks on me
of the highest
"
Nstrsiive ri->
anJ, Narrative c
M tVar Diary
18 CAilPAIGSS DC lOUTrU-EAST ASIA 1SI1*42 HONG ONC

The last riKntioned place, only Ughlly held by a platoon

HK\T)C, v.-as occupied by the Japanese at midnight (IS*jy

December).
A Company's positions south of Aldrich Bay also wre for the
most part by-passed by the Japanese who rapidly occupied the north
and Donh-eastem slopes of hfount Parker. This resulted in a
Canadian (RRC) company on the eastern slopes being forced
to fall back towards Tytam Gap. The fixed beam at Dyernun
was twice attacked by a Japanese patrol with hand grenades and
the Ofiicer-in-Charge left the light exposed, locked the doors
and srithdrew his six men through the Japanese lines to jmn t^
Royal Rifies detachment near the Saiwan 6' gun j^tions in
Lyeinnn Gap. ^VTien he left, the Japanese were shooting straight
down the beam with an ** Infan try gun , 50 per cent of the shots
hitting the concrete surround of the light .** In the meanume
Saiwan anti-iurcrafi gun positions had been captured by
invaden. A counter-attack by two platoons of Canadians to reg^
this position was launched at 0100 hours, but it did not succeed.
By midnight 18-19 December the situation in the whole north-east
sector was Cist deteriorating. B Company of 5/7 Rajput vras bow
mosing to the area of PiU-Boi 43 to the sven of North Point, a
machine-gun platoon of 1 Middlesex Regiment was sutioned
near Pill-Box 50 and one platoon of B Company 5/7 Rajput was
still holing out in North Point area.

The premises of the Hong Kong Electric Light Company

in the same area were defended by a nnall group of elderly
HKATIC vctlualeers known locally as the Hugheslicrs.'* Souk
time after uudnlght, the Japanese incirased their pre^uie on the
Hughes group, and there was some talk of withdrawn^ the whole
force, but in view of the imponacce of holding on to the poiiuon,
it was decided to fight to the last. A
withdrawal at this juncture
would have saved many pr ecious lives, but there c-an be no question-
ing the wisdom of the decision taken because it gave saluable time
to the rest of the defenders. As Major-General Maltby himself
writes, The delay the force imposed was very valuable to me
The Hugheslieis fought gallantly against heavy odds throughout
the night but by lOCX) hours on 19 December the Japanese w^re

*S ItalOxy't DopMdi, af. <U. ^ 7IZ.

WHi lorti* r Cenned fona aher tbe oatlnafc efww ta 19S9 d
4..-.. SS rf faitty of tlMCk cf assd
iBawMB ia Use Cedeer. Thn (vee waied
oada U*
Hao. riamtai
lO nk wa> the pr-aratMa </ sabouro ta Uw doctrie piaat. Tbe tom w*j mcbreed
a !a DacBlxr amssber of rcbsiiccTt wiud> ladailcd twa oGeCT ub cJIaarr
etpcraca. lol cal J.*eDRa.
JSIahby*, Dopiteb, tf. m. p. 112.
 Tilt: IIN'D ts ItOVO KOSO 40

in great force on the hi^h ground abosT the Power Station and
to the ca^t and south of it. It had by then become obtiou? tiiat
no heJp could get through and die portion being complicated
by iljc presence of a number of women and cmlians, .a withdrawal
was decided on, but a way of escape was denied to iljern. Scatter-
ed Japanese parties were in the coajyanl and on eidicr side of
Electric Road; the piIi*box m
Causeway Bay had been werrun;
and coming under cross-fire from macliinc-guns, the Hughes force
svas forced to seek shelter in the houses oppswiic the
main gale of
the Kings Slipway. IjIc in the afternoon, the Japanese ofTcred
terms of lurrender and threatened to burn the houses in case of
rcfiisal. Tlie surrender terras wtsc accepted by the force, only
a few managing to escape.
D Company 5/7 Rajput was pressed liard but continued to
fight in the same area until the afternoon. Tlie Rajput B Comp-my
and I Middlesex platoon who were reconnoitring the area north
of Tal Hang \nlbge were able to provide little assistance to this
hard-presjetl force. Tlie Company Commander lost hti life in
at^'on and only a few stragglers from his company managed to
join 1 Middlesex positions south of Causes-ay Bay. Others surren-
dered along with the Hughe.slicn after a gallant resistance.
Wide the llughejlien s-erc putting upa slilTresiitance, heavy
fighting was taking place tn the hfount Parker area and the
sector occupied by /V and C Companies of 5/7 Rajput, nicsc
two companies held their ground to the last, but their posiiions were
mostly ovemin in the early hours of the morning of 19 December.
Pill-Box 40 continued to fire till 0330 houn and other isoLited
units in the area temporariiy kept the im-aders at bay until shortly
before dawn wlien they were forced to surrender.
Iri unsuccessful counter-attacks which the Royal Rifles of
Canada delivered in the hfount Parker and Sai Wan areas, it both
sufTcred and inflicted heavy casuolticr. Between 0100 and OGOO
hours, rcinforang platoons of the Royal Rifles of Canada were sent
forward on to the Mount Parker higli ground, but they failed in
their efforts to evict the Japanese from the summit of the hiU.
At daybreak on 19 December, the Japanese were securely
in posscsiion of J.rrdlnes X.ookoul, Mount Bulter and the northern
slopes of Mount Parker. Wth these pLices in their bands, the
Japanese could fan out to the east and west and could easily advance
up die valleys leading to the high ground in the centre of the Island,
A signal sent from Hong Kong to General Headquarters Far East
very grave
at this time described the situation as because of

>\S'ir Gmtnl Ilca4qositen Far Fait. Voi. II, Shwrt N(t. 300.
50 I.AMJAIU.VS in south-east ASIV 1911-42 hong kosc

deep Japanese pcnciration. The small force at NorlJi Poini was

still holdtns out heavy odds but effective resistance was at
an end in tlic whole north-east sector. Tlic Royal Rifles of Canada
found u increasingly difhcull to mauitain their positions on Mount
Parker and since they svcrc obviously not adequate to act as a
serious stop to the invaders, Major-General Maltby decided to

withdraw them to Tytam Gap. 5/7 Rajput, who had borne the
brunt of the Japanese push, was now completely disorganised-
initial

B Company and a few survivors at Tai Hang and a small number at

Tynam were all that remained of that battalion and it was pheed
under command of hfiddicsea at Leighton Hill.
1

In the early morning of 19 December, the Japanese sent

heavy reinfarcements to their Island force, A number of barges,
motor launches and ferries loaded with troops crossed os cr to Jiorth
Point; six Motor Torpedo Boats were detailed to attack lhce from
Green Isle. Tlve fint attack by two Motor Torpedo Boats (07 to
09) was successful and led to the sinking of one Japanese landing
craft; another was set on fire and a third was for^ to go back.
Each of these barges contained about '10 troops. One of the
Allied Motor Torp^o Boats was damaged during Ute course of
this action.The second attack however failed. \Vlthout causing
any trouble to the invaders one Motor Torpedo Boat was badly
damaged. In the course of the third attack by two Motor Torpedo
Boats, one sank with all hands. The Japanese aircraft covered
the landings by attacking Allied p>od(ioru with light bombs and
snaclune-gun &e. Allied casualties in this counter-attack, accord-
ing to Major-General Maltby amounted to 50 per cent.'*

TYTASS CAP

The Japanese occupation of Mount Parker was a serious

threat to the position of East Brigade Headquarters in Tytam Gap.
At 0900 hours on 19 December small arms fire was directed on
Tyum from Mount Parker. In the meantime No. 6 Platoon of
No. 2 Company HKATIG at Poidn^r engaged Japanese troop*
moving from Lyemun towards Tytam and one Japanese Platoon
was observed moving down from Jardiaei Lookout towards Wong
Nei Chong, the headquarters of West Infantry Brigade. The
thcrtallCT was chiefiy concentrated around the Gaps
(Tytam and Wong Nei Cbong).
Half an hour later, Briga^er Wallis gave to
the General
OfhcCT Commanding ids appreciation of the situation,
the
fcfiliby's Ckipaich, tp. tit. p. 71*.
 51
Ttir. EJn> IN novo Jiovo

to
objrc. ofhich .n c:r, a mobile
against ihc Japanese, wlimc
*:**''**^.V 'Hie Allied
steadily
two battalions which was being . fr,i 3 go,iWf, Sliick O
troops wxre widely scnttercsl
p^und.
and were useless agamn an nraibblc inrantry
^
Brigade Wallis *''7 -'^,
should be concentrated. Hi P*^" 7.__ .a nart of B
Rides of Canada. D
Company 1
^^''^J llKVDC^in Stone
Company I Middlesex HiU line.
HiUStanlcy village area south "'77 , ithdrasvn from
All mobile artillcr)' < ''f
"t'
Stanley peninsula.
C.uige Il.asin ytam Fotl.
and J
1 .
1 ^^ ibroogh G.iuge
was '".'n"''
This force after concentration p,urc Jfotmt
Basin nr by the Repulse
me un^" S'-arte.
wa,
'
Butler and Jardine'. Looltout.

to mo%*e to Stone Hill

">>'''='?
"sS.'c^S'Mallby and
This pUn was
Riven elTect tn them ,sp position at
Tylam Gap
ml
drawal Mtijor-General Mttlllj of a serious attack
was eatremely precarioui and
tin
p, 1 j. losins the
area there ''''.'
in tint
lleadquarlen but the cutting
oirof i^m mwp
,yr,|.||ie[roopiinthcareaCollin-

son Battery-D'Aguihsr 'he General Olllcer

svas being
the above appreciation } H fire directed
ComnudinR:THam paplnd^m=^^^^^^ uy mo-
from Saiwan Ildl, and Dnpad tuauon at Gauge Basin svas
Tl'' s 5,,,ation
ment from Mount Barker. ^rHRVDG
lennun-an
uncertain and the OfTiccr jj^^jput
'orde at all costn^^^^.^
was ordered to hold the
.it lyta
Battalion Headquarters adequate ccwordma-
ed to hold tl.e Tytam "tr"?'*., had passed through
at

tion of local defences of die

then n:lL-ed by a platoon
to lut retie
about 1330 hours: it was
Royal RiBes of Canada.
ofl m m P
positioin,
During llic wilhilratval unfortunate nus-
several mobile batteries
wem des m>em jostroyed his
nkc Red remam-
the ofTiccr-in-chargc
wm^t^der 1 .^ G.sugc Basin by
at Gaug^_^^
guns. Similarly the battery The loss of
ing in action too long, subsequent countcr-
a gwat handicap
lianu p in
these mobile batteries svas
attacks by the Allied forces
and sni a b
Sa;
^
m
ting East Brigade from
thctmcivc* confronted by enemy
the Infantry always found
52 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 19-ll-i2 MONO KONO

conunanding positions and were without the neccssar) covering

.**
fire to support any assault
No loss was sufTcred by the Allied troops during the coune
of this svithdrawal because low clouds hampered Japanese bomben,
but road discipline svas bad. All attempts to prevent the bunching
the
of men at the cross-roads prowd futile. The sviihdrawal of
whole brigade, including some 40-50 of the Rajputs, was bowev^
completed soon after dusk. By 2200 hours on 19 December, the
whole brigade tvas in its new positions. The remnants of 5/7
Rajput, consisting of some 40 or 50 other ranks along svilh their
battalion commander, occupied positions in Stanlej'.* Royal
R.i[lcsof Canada held the line Stanley \Tew Stanley' Mount

Sugar Loaf Hill the north-eastslopcs of Stone Hill Palm Villa. B
and D Companies of 1 Middlesex occupied Pill-Boxes 23 to 28; one
platoon covered the approaches to the Police Station, and two Pla-
toons were located at Mary Knoll. No. 1 Company HKVDG
held in Tcservx at Sunley Fort to cover the northern approaches to il.

tS'OKO NEI CItONO CAP

Wc may now turn to the activities of the West Infantry
Brigade with Headquarters in Wong Nci Chong Gap. The
retention of this strategically important Gap \s-zs a vital factor
in the Island defence scheme. Situated in the centre of the Island,
the main lines of communication between the East and West Bn-
gades ran through it Major-General Maltby took steps to rein-
force this area in the early hours of the morning of 19 December
and arranged with Cluef Engineer to send a Royal Engineer party
for an ir^ntry' fighdng role. This party was composed of seventy'
British and Chinese pcrsonncL** When it reached near 'Wong Ne
Chong Gap, it found the We Brigade Headquarters under heavy

maclune-gun and mortar fire. In the lace of heavy fire, any

access to brigade headquarters was out of the question and the
Royal Engineers had perforce to take up a position nearby.
The Royal Navy also actively participated in land fighting-
They were scheduled to take os*er Infantry posts in the area of

Aberdeen ^little Hong Kong, thereby releasing A Company,
^VInnipeg Grenadiers, who were to move towards the Gap at about
0500 hours. Nothing is defimtely known regarding the fate of
this company. It appears that at first light it reached Vfoag Nc>
Chong Gap but was ambushed by superior Japanese forces.
Some of the troops were lolled and the rest were taken prisoner.
* Wr Ditry uid NiTUTe of Ewt
loCuitrr Eneads. o 23.
Wjt Diary5/7 Rajput, p.13.
Accnoit to another report, the party tomUted of 70 Eritijh and 70 Chiooe.
 THE END IN IIONO KONG

Shortly after first light on 19 Drermber, the

cd towards the Gap from Janlmoa '
(^ itself.
Police Station sittiated on a
prominent
*,,5jese
The Allied force, ^ade ^'1
from this hc>' position
w day^^^
during the nt tv. > ,

reoccup.ecl the Gap

were of no nllhough they partly
of their counter-attacks. ^^Vonc
the Jardme , Looloul^
T.nfttout t

Account, of the fighting in

Nei Chong Gap area are "'' unit, were in^
svas perhaps inevitable, because
no I;,;f"seven .
troops, like
and
ed which had ,eparatc eommaadcrt, e
the Royal Navy. Royal Arfilk^ rrain: The
fighting in an unaccustomed role , 555 during the
course
rapid and unexpected advance t^ops in large num-
ofthc night had enabled them to points. At
^ tacUcal
bers on the hill-sides communications prevent-
the disruption of the
At
the sametime
cd a true npprcdation of the T-nanesc attacked the
'

hourt on .1? nemW,

the
At Om at
^
Sunlcy P
3'7-inch anti-aircraft iwsition,
west. Two small rcinforang P had to be withdrawn
..ooos
Japanese. By 0830 hours Company HKVDC
press
on account of Japanese -
juffermg 05
.

and bravery Malthy

fought with great teuaetty
casualties out of a total hunter-attack onjardines
tried to create a diversion by meam oi
from reserve
Royal
Lookout. A Company of 2 ^ this company
or2/14P^jah.M0730^hj^^^^
in the defence sector ^

leftWanchai Gap and P"';.;'S caused heavy casualues

to
road-junction. Jopo"' was too heavy
^
latdtnes Lookout
to this force, and fie=, f"; -"S' ,400 hour, the force managed
permit an attack to be launched. 7 Brigade Headquarters
to force its way to within
a fwy^^ company to only 20
nr
but heavy machinc-gun
1000
effectives or so. . T-nrtrrss Headquarters at
Brigadier Lawson Pir""' about to
, ^nd his staff were
hours on 19 I>='"'>V.'t'ashis5helters were surround-
go into action outside his
Heaq
j.hlank range
inside them.
.

severe
ed and firing was *5.1.' Fighting here was
.Me
jnst hands
He did so and was killed shelters changed
and practically
m of Z^st elTorts of the A>fi.
infhct-
.phe Allies both
several times, hut sltc
defirotetod^r. as
Japancse secured" a .
^_^^^^, ^^I,hy
heavy casualnes.
id and suffered
M CAJirAlCM IN SOt^Jt'E.^^T A?l\ 1911-42 ItONG KOSC

infornvii by a Japancic Staff Offjwf afer ihc capitulation ^tha^*

udc alMj had suffered \try hwy
coiuallies in th area.**
here was of a " mmt confused nature, and
hast been nude tlut in the crnusc of cfninier-atiacfa Uong
_2sei

Clion Gap was regained by the Allict. Tlie /MUcd troops certainl)
time, it
got svithin eWe rroximity of the Cap and for most of the
was a hotly contested "roman** Und.
at 1000
A party of 2/11 Punjab wat sent to Stubbi Road
hours on 19 Hecember from Wanchai Cap with three Bren-carnw
to cover the ev-acuationof WeitBrigadeHcadiiuartcn.but it armed
at the place too late to be of any atiistancc. On it* return
journey
the party was attacked and in officer was bUcd in a moment
of

exposure, although the llirce carrier* were brought back safely.

Meanwhile B Company 2/14 Punjab was mmed out from the
of
Police Station area in Metoria at 0330 hours with the objert
capturing two small featnres north and norih-wwt of Jardincs
Lwkout. The Japanese were contacted at about 0515 houn o

the area ef Petrol Pump and riher Beds east of Jardinc* Lookrob
and were atucfced with hand grenades and nnall arm-v Shootins
continued foe nearly four hours causing hcasT casualties on each
side. Cut the hill fetures were occupied by 1000 hours and the
Japanese ssere drisen away from the neighbourhood of the Gap.
This enabled 2/14 Punjab to man the gap between 1 ^^ddle^
on CamUne Hill and 2 Royal Scots to their south. The battahon
under its commander stuck to the pons against htasy mortar
and shell foe in spite of the withdrawal of the fianidng units. But
aficr a gallant defence it was finally forced to retire during the
afternoon of 2 1 December.
At 1100 hours on 19 December, the Commander 2/14 Punjab
reedved orders to counter-attack with two companies, A and
D, in an easterly direction from Ixighton Hill with the object of
linking up svith D Company 5/7 Rajput in the North Point area.
This attack, it was assumed, wxnild cut in at the Japanese rear
and also olntnicl further landings and mo\-emenu in the North
Point area. 2/14 Punjab made a preliminary recormaissance at
about !200 hours but litde infonnaiion about Japanese mose-
menu could be obtained. Liaison with the Middlesex Regiment
produced no better results and owing to a break in communications
betsveen Fortress Headquarters and 1 Middlesex Headquarters no
further information was obtained. The Punjabis reached their
first objecthe, Caroline Hill, withoat incident, form where they

SXlallbr'i D-ratrh, tf. o!.

**n>e War ia Hmf
 THE END IX HOXO KONG 35

'vantcci lo attack up the slope of a high from which Causeway

hill
Bay Reservoir svas clearly visible. The county' was extremely
dilHcult, consisting of deep ravines and steep ridges. Covering
troops of 1Middlesex came forward to support the Tunjabi compan-
ies, and the combined force advanced to its final objective, a high-
ridge overlooking Caroline Hill, nearly 1000^'ards to the north-east.
iVhen the Allied troops were only a few feet from the top, contact
was made with the Japanese. Then followed fierce fighting in the
couRc of which one or two men managed to get a glimpse of the
country beyond, but there was no sign of D Company 5/7 Rajput.
Consequently the Allied troops, unable to force the Japanese posi-
tion, withdrew to Caroline Hill and thence to the Race Course,
where transport was waiting to take them back to their city posi-
tions. During this action, the Allies sulTcred casualties amounting
to 30 killed and wounded. It was later learnt that while fighting
was in progress, the few 5/7 Rajput survivors had slipped through
Japanese lines and rejoined their battaUon,**
Fully realising the necessity of the recapture of Wong Nei
Chong Gap, Major-General Maltby ordered a general advance
eastwards to begin at 1500 hours. The first objective to be reached
was the line Middle Spur Wong Nei Chong Reservoir Clements
Ride, after which they were to join up svith the men of A
and D
Companies 2/14 Punjab who wnre carrying out an attack in the Tai
Hang village area. Troops on the Bank based on Mount Cameron
were to attack the objectives Middle Gap li^ong Nei Chong

Reservoir Gauge Basin. The Royal Scots was detailed to coun-
ter-attack Jardincs Lookout, supported by only eight field-guns.
Two companies of 2 Royal Scots and one company of 'Winni-
peg Grenadiers left hlount Cameron and proceeded along Blacks
Link with the intention of joining up with the other Allied troops
at Wong Nei Chong Gap- By 1745 hours the entire force reached
a point just short of Wong Nei Chong Gap. Subsequently, they
could not make any headway due to heavy Japanese fire, and were
forced to withdraw. They eventually reached ^Vanchai at 0200
hours on 20 December.* At dawn the same day the ^Vinnipeg

Grenadiers held the line Middle Gap Cable Hill with 2 Royal
Scots on the north-cast slopes of Mount Nicholson.
In the meantime the general counter-attack by hfajor-
Gencral Maltby to recapture the Gap had failed, because the
Japanese were found to be in greater strength than had been
originally believed. On the other band at about 1630 hours the

wija. p. iG. .
eCantdha pjrucipauoo, p. So.
56 CA41PAICN5 IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1911-42 HONG KONG

invaders hea\'ily shelled Leighton Hill area which

was ocMpid by
Company
Headquarters 1 hCddlcscx, B Rajput Company and B
of 2/14 Punjab.
During the night of 19/20December West Bngade, reinlorccQ
r ^
sent row
by about 100 Indian gunners and 2 armoured cars, was
Repulse Bay by Brigadier Wallis, and temporarily
which seems have been desertrf by
^\*ong Kei Chong Gap, to
Japanese. An hour later an attach on the Police Station was
by B Company of 2 Royal Scots under covering fire from
Station
Guns. These troops forced their way up to the Police
but there met with hea\'y grenade fire. This prevented
^bem from
eas
maldng further headway and they had to withdraw to the
end of Blacks Unk. Another attack on the Police Station
about 0300 hours had a similar fate. Meanwhile C Company
but e
of 2 Royal Scots attacked towards Jardincs Lookout,
attempt awas dawn 2 Royal Scots took op
failure- Just before
defeiuive positions for the day; D Company just west of the wp
and B Company echeloned behind. By that time the Gap
three
was a '*
no man's land ", invested by the Japanese on
Grena-
rides (north, south and east). One company of ^^^nnJpeg
diers which had a protective role for ^Vest Brigade Hcadquart^i
continued to hold its position to the north of the Police Station
until 0700 houn of 22 December. .
The Allied troops had now been fighting continuously
clesen days, and were imdoubtedly suficriDg badly from lack
sleep. Signs of strain were be^nning to appear. To encoi^g^
the tired forces the Governor sent the following message at
hours *'
The time has come to advance against the enemy. The
do
eyes of the Empire arc upon you. Be strong, be resolute and
your duty".

FIGUTINC IS THE EA5TZKS HALF OF THE ISLAND

The withdrawal of the East Brigade from Tytam Gap to
its new positions had not only enabled the Japanese to consobdate
their gains in the eastern half of the Island,but also to erect a
double wedge between Stanley Peunsula and the western
portion of the Island. Brick Hill in the south-west, and Violet
Hni to the south of Sianley Gap had been occupied by them
during the night and a small party had found lodgment in the
buildings south-west of Repulse Bay Hotel by 0740 hours on 20
December. Japanese troops had also occupied Middle Spur there-
by hindering any Allied advance from the south towards ^VoDg
Nei Chong Gap.
 THE EN*I> IK nONO KONG 57

The Royal Canada detailed for the counter-attack

Rifles of
along the shore of Repulse Bay was not in good condition. Because
of iack of propjcr nourishment and continuous fighting for sevcral
(laj-SjCven in the earliest stage
of the Island fighting, it is recorded;
" some wouldfall dosvn in the roadway and go to sleep, and it toofc
shakings to get them going again
5e\-cral A
counter-attack by
an exhausted and depicted battalion without adequate fire
support in a mountainous terrain svas a task of great difficulty.
NcN'crthelcss, during the next three days the East Brigade at Stanley
made a scries of gallant attempts to drive northsvards and join
bands svith the main body of troops by piercing through the
Japanese lines. The first attempt took the form of a leftward
thrust by the Repube Bay route, as the unexpected withdrawal of
Headquarters No. 1 Company HKVDC from Gauge Basin
had rendered an advance by that line almost impossible. A
Company Royal Rifles of Canada foUotsed by B, and D Com-
panies began the adNmnce at 0800 hours and, after overcoming
Japanese resistance, occupied Repulse Bay Hotel garage by
1100 hours. The Canadians then took up defensive positions
in the Hotel and in a large private building just beyond Castle
EuclifT since they were unable to advance Further in the face
of fierce machinc-gun fire from hill positions. All attempts to
capture hCddle Spur or reach the road-junction failed. It was
therefore decided to withdraw some of the troops to their original
positions about noon.
A Company Royal Rifles of Canada was ordered to defend
the Hotel at all costs, but it ran the risk of being surrounded during
the night by the Japanese who were holding all the dominating
features. D Company made an eflbrt to reach Wong Nei
Chong Gap across country by the east aide of Violet HZU. An
exceedingly stiff climb was followed by moves of some 2800 yards
through two water catchments which ran generally in a north-
westerly direction . The troops came imder heavy fire from artil-
lery estimated to be 75-mm from Violet HIU, so their commander
decided to give up the idea of reaching the IVcst Brigade. The
company returned to Stanley View at 2100 hours under heavy
rain and took up positions at the Chung Ham Kok for the night.
After the failure of this effort. Brigadier ^Vallis decided upon
a new plan of attack, confirmation of which was received from
Portress Headquarters late in the evening. The new plan envisaged
an attack through TjTam Tuk and Gauge Basin and it was hoped
that this would relieve pressure on West Brigade and Repulse Bay
area and enable East Brigade to maintain contact with West Bri-
next day. From intemutteat
gade. The plan was given effect to the
58 CAMPAIGNS IS SOUTtl-EAST AS!A 194M2 HONG KONG

LMG during the night of 20/21 December,

>t
rifle and fire
forces
appeared that the Japanese tvtre in contact with the Allied
from the Twins feature.

ncimsc IN THE westers sector

On the ssesicm side of the Japanese wedge A Company

2/H Punjab had been ordered to clear the road from Aberdwn
to Shouson Hill to the south-east of Little Hong Kong and
matcly linL up with East Brigade in the Middle Spur area.
The
company had little infonnatioo concerning Japanese dispitions,
roa
but it was known that they held a position astride the main
between .Aberdeen and Deep Water Bay. The company
Bering only twenty-fi\e reached Aberdeen via Pok Fulam- The)
came into contact with the Japanese at the road-junction

Cookhouse Lane ^Island Road, where the latter bad a strong
to
machine-gun post in a euhort under the road. -All elTorti

dislodge the Japanese failed in spite of se\ml casualties sufiered

by thb small force, which bad to spend the night on the road. Two
carriers sent front Rear Headquarten proved to be of little
with the road most effectively blocked by two 15-cwt. truclu du-
^
ablcd earlier in the day. The night passed off without incident,
but the troops, without waterproofs and great-coau, had to under-
go a severe ordeal on account of rain which fell throughout th
period. Only in the morning (20 December) did the party receive
some welcome food and ammunition.
The ^Vest Brigade had been srilhout a commander after
Brigadier Lawsons death till the morning of 20 December when
Colonel H.B. Rose (HK.VDC) took over command. Its role
as before was to dear the Japanese from Wong Nei Chong Gap
and to estahlijh itself on Stanley Gap high ground. To achieve
these objects a counter-attack was launched from Wanchai Gap
via Black's lank at 1930 hours on 20 December by a company pf
Winnipeg Grenadiers. This company was given adequate arul"
lery support, but notlung was achieved nor could it succeed in the
preliminary clearing of hfount Nicholson owing to the strength
of the Japanese there.
In the meantime, the Japanese had launched a counter-
attack at 1 700 hours, and drove oat a company of 2 Royal Scot
and some AMnnipeg Grenadiers from Wong Nei Chong Gap-
From there, Japanese troops moved to the high ground. Mount
Nicholson. Just before the last light they also succeeded in dis-
lodging British and Canadian troops from their positions on the
eastern slopes of Mount Nicholson, and by dawn of 21 December

THE EN'D IX nOXG KONG 59

the Japanese had succeeded

in advancing as far as the middle
Gap after inflicting heav>- casualties on the Canadian troops in
that area.
During the afternoon the Japanese ferried considerable troops
from the Mainland and landed them in the North Point area and
Taikoo Docks. Landing areas were shelled by West Brigade
but its results could not be observed.
artillery guns, About this
time, a report svas received that Chinese planes had bombed
Kowloon, and the Chinese had concentrated 60,000 troops
at Sham Chun on the frontier ready to launch an attack. The
following message was therefore issued to all units:
There are indicatiom that Chinese forces are advancing
towards the frontier to our aid. All ranks must therefore hold their
positions at all costs and look Ibnvard to only a few more days of
strain
The night of 20/21 December caused severe strain to the
tired forward troops in the diflerent parts of the Island because of
heavy rain and bad visibility. Few had great coats and many
had to go without meats for about 24 hours. By midnight it was
arranged to pojt two 3'7*inch howitzers near Stanley Prison and the
East Brigade had at its disposal only one 18-poundcr from a Beach
Defence Unit. Lack of adequate artillery was one of the main
reasons for the failure of the counter-attack launched by F.ast*
Brigade on 21 December. To encourage the garrison the Secretary
of State for \Var sent another message svbich was received at 0445
hours on 21 December.
4Vc send you and troops under your command, said the
message, our congratulations on the splendid defence you are
making. Your continued resistance plays an important part in
our struggle with Japan fay extending the enemy and denying to
him facilities of great value. Your tenacity is worthy of the highest
traditions of the Armies of the Empire. Secretary of State tor the
Colonies associates himself personally svith this message and sends
his own congratulations and good svishes to the Governor and his
ofRcers,

Brigadier \S^alUs, after the failure of the attempt to reach
WongNei Chong Gap by the Repulse Bay route the previous day,
decided to send his troops via T^am. The attack was scheduled
to be launched at 0900 hours on 21 December at the earliest, but
delay was caused by lack of transport and the virtual breakdown
of ujut coromunicatioos. The failure to move early cost the brigade
dear- The carriers were slow in moving off and in the meantime
the Japanese forestalled the column by occupying Red HillTytam
Tukr Cross-roads and Bridge Hill. At 0915 hours the advance
GO CKMP.UGVS IN !iOirni*EAST ASIA 19U-42 IIONC KOSO

off
i^uard consliiixig of No. 1 Company HK\T)C ino%cd
at tne
Palm \1IU and soon after encountered strong opposition
cross-roads south of T>nani Tut Resenw. Tlic

under and machine-gun fire from Notling Hm

rifle

and Red lIiU on the right. The force was reinforced

t;j-

^
Company of Ro>-al Rifles of Canada. An attack on the
with great s^gour and
positions on Brigade Hill was pressed
hiU feature along with Netting Hill came into Allied
han^ O)
was almost
1300 hours. A Japanese pam- holding the cross-roads
wiped out, but the going was wry slow.* ,
The advance was resumed, but it came to a lull
_

resiw
niachine-^n fire from Tyiam cross-roads and considerable
tance by Japanese troops. The road on the west of the
Cana
was dear of Japaiiesc troops, but the Royal Rifles of
o
could not advance further because of the wide dispersal
^
the various companies. 1700 hours the Japanese
towttbdrt
a counter-atuck with three light unfa, but were forced
tiu
after a brisk exchange of fire. i\s darkness fell, it was^ realised
further advance was impossible and the footing gainrf OQ
of Brigade Hill was precarious. The Japanese were in itje^j|
is Gauge Basin and on the Twins and were in occupation of
cross-roads. Thus there was a grate
danger
Hill and Tylaci Tuk
of the Japanese capturing Stone HUl Headquarten. It was there*
*
fore dedded to sviilidraw all the troops to their former prouom
Eart
1800 hours. This was the last serious effort made by cither
bot
or 'West Brigade to recapture the Cap, and from then onwards
brigades worked independently.
Curing the day the gun-hoai Ciea!a was ordered ^
assist land operations in the Deep Water Bay area. It shdW
Japanese mortar and artillery positions, scoring several bits. sJiw
fortunately due to repealed air attacks she was badly holed and
sank later in the l^amma channeL

In the sector Aberdeen Shouson HIU, the Japanese abandon-
ed their presious positions and were now in occupation of Shouson
Hill, which in normal times was a popular residential site. "Ihe
Japanese had to he evicted by a sxry smaU 2/14 Punjab force ssith
no inachine^;un or mobile artillery support. The advance started
ataboutOSOOhouison 21 December and all went weU in the beginn-
ing. The party got within 20 yards of the summit, but scarce!}
had the Gnal assault started when the company was caught by a
withering fire from the smnnut of the hUl and from a nearby
boose. There was no ewer whatsoever and the steep ascent made

WrDUj7 tad Kamihe (f Eaa lAlonry Br%*i3, p. 5a

 THE END irr IIONO KON'O 6J

a foothold difficult to maintain. In a cJo^e and extremely fierce

fight, only eight men survived out of a total of 20.*
The remnants
of the party withdrew to Headquarters C Company I .\CddIcsex
at Uttlc Hong Kong.

^V\NCHAI GAP AND THE STANLEY PENINSULA

In the north-west sector on 21 December, a fresh attack was

launched by the ^Virmipeg Grenadiers from Middle Gap to recap-
ture \Vong Nei Chong Gap, but the attack was a failure and the
Canadians ss-ithdrew after suffering some casualties. The position
deteriorated in this area during the course of the day. At 1025
hours a report was received by the General Officer Commanding
that the Allied troops were being pushed back north of Black Link
and Mount Cameron. The U'lnnipeg Grenadiers holding the
latter place were ordered to stick to their positions at all costs
and they did hoid it under heavy mortar fire and dive-bombing
attacks throughout the day. In the mcanume Major-General
Maltby, in anticipation of a Japanese break-through from the
Mount Cameron area, had reinforced Wanchai Gap (the head-
quarters West Infantry Brigade and the \Vinnipeg Grenadiers)
vvith a section of machine-guns. All 2)14 Punjab garrisons from
pill-boxes on the north shore were asked to withdraw to Battalion
Headquarters. D Company 2)14 Punjab was rearranged facbg
south-east, linking up with the forces on its right at Wanchai
Gap so as to cover a possible break-through by the Japanese
from that direction. There was some mortar shelling and sniping
of their area, but by nightfall all was fairly quiet.
The isolated B Company of 2/14 Punjab, with a total
strength of only thirty-five, at the foot of Jardines Lookout was
attacked from three dificrent sides in the afternoon of 21 December
and compelled to withdraw to Headquarters 2 Royal Scots in
Stubbs Road. At about iiudnight, while this company was with
2 Royal Scots, it had been also subjected on two occasions to very'
heavy and accurate mortar fire causing casualties. All movement
in the area was under observation by the Japanese. During be
night, two casualties were caused to B Company 2/14 Punjab
by Japanese smpers, after which the company was recalled to Rear
Battalion Headquarters and placed in reserve. In the south-
west sector, by midday the Allied line of defence ran from
UtUe Hong* Kong area to the southern slopes of hfount Cameron.
In the former area two parties were holding out and fought very

War io Hang iCong2/14 PkiojaBip. 17.

iTie
G2 CAMPAIGNS IN SOITH-FAST AMA 1011*42 MONO KONG

gallantly, rcpellint; all Japanew attacks from 20 Decrmli^r to

afternoon of 25 December. ,

On 21 December no further Japanec advance occurred m

the western half of the Island afier midday, 'riie ^Mlled forces

by nightfall held Wanchai Gap, the southern pan of Mount Came-

ron, Little Hong Kong (tviih iu RAOC magazine) and Bennett
Hill. Japanese reinforcements rontinued to rro*t over to North
Point in large numbers. Some troopt were also landed
near
Cameway B.ty and the housetops in that area were reported crowd-
ed svifh them During the aAemoon pilJ-boxes on the
59
shore were subjected to accurate high velocity shell fire, Pill-Box
receiving as many as thirty direct hits.
At IGOO houn on 21 December, a telegram was received from
Chungldng that the main Chinese attack Could not start before 1
January 19W, but they promised to bomb the aeitsdromes under
Japanese possession.
The night 21/22 December passed quietly on all fronts and
there were no attempted Japanese landings. On the 22nd the
Japanese increased pressure in Stanley area where Brigadier Walhs
had been placed in independent command. The idea of advancing
north ssTU given up in sicw of the Japanese attacks. About this
time the J.tpancse succeeded in cutting off the water supply In
Stanley fay capturing the machinery in Tynam Rc$ers"oir area.
There was only two <Uys* supply of water and food for the Repulse
Bay area. At 1400 houn the Japanese adsunced in the area and
the Hotel had to lx cs-acuated 1^- A Company Royal Rifles of
Canada during the night. Small parties of women and children
had to be left behind. The Japanese also began infiltrating south
from the high ground, the Tsvins and Notting Hill, and by cs'cning
they had succeeded in occupying Stanley Mound. The position
on Stone Hill was equally precarious. At midday Sugar Loaf
Hill was occupied by the Japanese, but they were driven back
from this feature by a spirited attack at nightfall. Japanese
sniping and light machine-gun fire condnued in the forward area
throughout the lught (22/23 December) but there was little artillery
activity.
In the western sector, the Japanese began determined attacks
on Mount Cameron during the coune of the day ( 22 December ).
The area was heavily dive-bombed and mortared at 1030 hours
and in the afternoon the Japanese began concentrating troops
between Mount Cameron and little Hong Kong, obviously with
a siew to attacking Wanchai Gap from that side. The Allied forces
gallantly stuck to their posts throughout the day although they had
no mortar support and no cover. They could do nothing except
 niE ENtJ C* IIOXG EOSC.

ick i. out with tmuU arm; fuo

uith imuffidont mobile urtillcr)' >PPO.

'disertit^rou^.-
defence position!. Th
r >(.'l,tNichobon. There
line in the area of the
f 2/14 Punjab and the left
existed a gap between the "KI*- f'a,taek touardr
ul'
^ through this pp
"I clear that an attack
if"-asciea
It uL
the Race Course straight
would envelop the whole had insufficient
Wanchai. Major-General
.
. WtM
in to d Company of
troops to meet such Course,
''''h|'"S'suth-ea!t of the Race
2jl4 Punjab was moved sst of Mount Nichol-
the Roy , s",,,,
thuj establi^hins a link wth
son Camp. , . ,s,aned a very heavy
mortar
At 1600 hours the^withdrawal of
Satfne
Hill area, ncc
fire in the Leighton ..
^;;>H---^^^
yRo^d, Wanchai
Headquartenl hliddlem
-the demely south-east as a
precautionary
Rajput group was o^^c^d The Japanese
measure against Japanese pc g^Q^nd success- .

pmdiom ", f:, of only

attacked the companys
fully, although the
oompony was o e
Companies
the remnants of B
an
two platoons formed from
of 5/7 Rajput. .u v/hole of the
. Wanchai
After midnight the P^'/'O" . Mount Cameron
Gap area developed dvemely for the j^^nec.
at
'
Ul ^ut md
was captured by the Japanese ^
troops withdrew in
disorder
'''\''"^5J,hem. vital area me
Gough where an day-
WancM Gaps was lightly held at
between Magaame and p compames of
break by Royal arra, while
rushed up to this
HKVDC. A
patty of
movements were ndced on Mounts Cameron
considerable Japanese
and Nicholson.

Maliby DpatrJ^
op- P-
p. 720.
6i CAitPAlCNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 HONG KONG

Between 0800 and 1100 hours on 23 December, the ^neral

the
OfCcer Commanding recehed conflicting reports regarding
situation in Mount Cameron area, but it was clear that the Japanc
held the crest of this commanding and important feature .
Their local headquarters and organising centre SN^as located m
\Song Nci Chong Gap but due to the configuration of the
ground
it was not possible to shell it efiectively.
Meanwhile the situation at Leighton Hill gave some ca^e
for anxiety. There was increasing artiUeiy fire in this area
during
the morning and afternoon and the remnants of the composite
company of 5/7 Rajput, sadly reduced in numbers and being
of food and ammunition, svere forced to withdraw at about 0800
hours. This snihdiawal exposed the right flanh of the Middles^
positioa on Leighton Hill. At 0922 houn the Japanese infiltrate
there in large numbers, ooenpying houses and streets, and at 1000
hours the ^Ddd^esex positions were attacked strongly.
By HOO hours the Japanese had succeeded in forciag soim of
the Allied troops back from Ldfhton Hill after a sesere arliUcO'
bombardment. At the same time Magazine and \Vanchai C3aps
were subjected to hcasy bombing trom the air. According to
General Malibj- the position at these gaps was uaemiable
and pron'ded an excellent target for the enemy airforce, which
did not ftul to tale due advantage of the opportunity
^
At 1430 hours on 23 December the new Allied line in the
western sector ran from Wanchal Gap to Bennets Hill in the south,
with the Ro)^] Scots holding the west slopes of hfount Cameronand
patrolling forward. Bennets Hill was successfully defended in the
afternoon and a Japanese attack was beaten off. Xo further attacks
took place in the csxmr^ and the night was comparatively quiet,
except for a minor sHnnisb on the northern slopes of Moont
Cameron in which a Japanew patrol suffered casualties.
The 2/14 Punjab positions in Victoria City underwent only
slight change during 23-25 December. A Company personnel
totalling only six wicnt back to battalion Zieadquartcrs from Utile
Hong Kong since they were sersing no useful pxupose there. Diis
occurred on the morning of the 23id. At that time B Company
was in reserve while G and D Companies remained in their
original positions near Fortress Headquarten in order to provide
a kast tiitdi* reristance il it 'became nccesary.
At the same time, in the StarJey Peninsula, the Allied forces
not fare any better. The counter-attack against Stanley
Mound started at about 0730 hours on 23 December, but by 1940

wnii p. 720.
ssOii p. 721.
 Tiir rxft IS iioso ko.o GS

houn It wat drar tint tlic attack had failed. TJjc Royal Rifle*
nf Canada liad ulTcrrd hea\-y catualtiet, it* Imie* since the out-
hfeak of hmtiUtlei lirJnfj 18 officen lilletl or wounded. Tlic
Japanese started infihraims in this arra soon after and the C.ma-
dians were forcetl to withdraw hj' 1900 hours, since tliey felt that
they Could put up a lietter reu'iance on flatter ground and on a
turrower front. At last lij;ht the whole East Brigade Ss'as reorganis-
ed along the line aermt Stanley Peninsula from near Pill-Box 27, to
Fjiam Bay through St. Rtephrm College Imildlng* to Wot Bay,
vith Brigade Ileadquaricf* at Stanley jjfiion. The 1 Middlesex
trevr had vrithdrassn from the Repulse Bay area ssith all their
^tjuipment intact. Shelling of the whole of Stanley Peninsula
area was sesTre on 23 and 24 Dcremher but there ssas enough
footl, water and ammunition for the garrjion.

In the morning of 2 4 December diiposiiions of V!efi Brigade

were as follows: Brigade Jiradquarim was aj Magarinc Cap;
the Ro}.ti Scots and \N'5nmpeg Crrnadien were holding Wanclia)
Gap; the Ro)-al Scots still orcvpietl s*Tst slopes of .Mount Cameron;
1 Middlesex held Race Course and part of Ixighlon Hill and two

companies (4 and 7) IIKVDC manned the area from Mount

Kellci to Afount Gough, Tlie Japanese mainly concentrated on
the Race Coursel-eigliion Hill sector in the north, and advancer]
to a point near the Ceinetry south of the Ra ce Course. One resenr
platoon of Rajput sas put tm Mount Paridi to strengthen that
vseaVly held area. At the same lime 30 marines arrived to patrol
the higher ground on the right of fhb area, upto 3Vanthai Gap.
At about 1500 hounaftrrn severe artillery and mortar bombard-
roenl in addition to dis-r-bombing, the Japanese attacked Leighton
Hill. Tlie garrisrin, l>eing pressed from three sides, ss-as rapidly
surrounded. Tljc Hill feature was occupied by the Japanese at
1530 hours. At 1&15 hours, troops were auUioriscd to escape
through the streets leading north-west to C.'tn.'il Road. During
the withdrawal, 1 Middlesex sufiVred 25 per cent casualties afler
a determined and valuable resistance. /\fter withdrawal the troops
took up defensive positions in the area between I-cc Theatre and
C.inal Road. WUi the capture of I^ighton Hill, the Rajput
post to the south-east of Race Course was withdrawn, but tlierc was
no clinnge in the other occupied positions. An attack on Mount
Parish by the Japanese, shortly before midnight, was success-
fully repulsed by the Rajput platoon with casualu'es on both
sides.
At about 2200 tours on 24 December there was a general
move by the Japanese from Mount PRchoIsonAfount Cameron
area, northwards towards the Race Course. Between 2200 and
66 &>LiI?AlCS-S IN SOimt-EAST ASIA 1941 '42 HONG KONG

3-inch
2300 hours the Central District of NHcloria came under
mortar bombardment. , .
bs
About this time Christinas greeting were sent to all units
the Governor and the Prime ^Cnister. The former read:
In pride and admiration I send greetings mis
Xmas Day to all who are 6ghting and to all who are workup
assan t
so nobly and so stcll to sustain Hong Rong against the
of the enemy.
Fight on. Hold fast lor King and Empire.
God bless you all in this your finest hour
The message from the Prime ACnister s>3s as under:
Xmas greetings to Let this day be historical
you all.
in the proud annals of ourEmpire.
The order of the day is hold fast
Bui Christmas Day was not deiiined to give any respite to
the beleaguered garrison, which was utterly worn out in conrinnons
back to the s<aU fighting.
The B.o>a3 Rilles of Canada was withdrawn to Stanley Tort
well dow-n the Peninsula away from contact with the Japanese.
But this respite was of a s-ery short duration. About 1800 houn
on 24 December the Japanese, after a severe artilleiy and mortar
bombardment of East Brigade portions, launched a strong oSen-
sise in the Stanlc)- Feninsiib area. Thej were able to move south
hy the eastern and western beaches and from home to house down
the centre of the Peninsula. Very heavy fighting look place at
Stanley- Police Suiion unul 2330 hours. Mary Knoll defenders
randnued to resist until 0500 hours on 25 Decemfer, and only a few
survivors managed to cape. The perntion was captured by the
Japanese at 0630 hours. The Japanese succeeded in infiltrating
south-east from Stanley \lew about midnight on 24--25 December.
The Royal Rifles had to be brought back in the early hours of
Christmas Day because of increasing pressure. Brigaificr IVallis
ordered a. counter-attack near Stanl^ Priion in the afternoon to
recover the ground lost during the night. But it did not succeed
although the attacking company suffered heavily. From about
1600 hours the Japanese intensified their artillery fire on Stanley
Fort and destroyed much cqmpmeat. In the late evening another
company of the Ro^-al Rifles was moving forward in lace ofJapanese
fire when a car, flving a wlute flag came down the road with the
news that the Colony had sui tendered to invaders. Brigadier
Wallis was not prepared to beCeve the news and continued the
fight till he had confinnation for which he sent his Brigade Majes-
to the headquarters. The latter returned in the early hours of
26 Decemher svith written orders to surrender and then Brigadier
 THE END IV HONO KONO 67

\\anij ordered the hoisting of the uhiic ibg and the cease fire For
Stanley Force at 0230 hours on 26 December.
In the viestcro hairoflhe Island, around midnight, a Japanese
attach in the area to the south of Wancliat Gap was successful and
they cfTccted a slight penelraiion. They also succeeded in occupy*
tng the northern slopes of Bennets Hill svherc they "dug in
during the night of 24/25 December but the Allied troops conii*
nued to hold the eastern slopes till daylight.
At dassTi on 25 December, the position in the Wanchai Gap
area became serious for the defenders. Although anti-tanfc mines
h.id been laid in the main approaches to Wanchai from the cast,
yet the invaders succeeded in infiltrating from house to house.
At about 0700 houn the Japanese put op a heav7 concentration of

artillery and mortar fire on Wanchai Gap and an hour later they
occupied a line from the south end of Cana! Road to the west .arm
of C.autcway Bay.

rue tl'KKENOeR

'Hte defenders of Hong Kong found themsches ja desperate

straits on the morning of 25 December. Sliortly after 0000 hours
two Knglishmen, well-known in the Colony, came across the
Japanese lines under a white flag. They were sent to Fortress
Headquarters by the Japanese and described to the General
OlTicer Commanding the incredible amount of Japanese guns
and troops they had seen during their journey across the Island
from Repulse Bay and cmpltasised the hopelessness of continuing
further resistance. Tlicy also stated that the Japanese would
observe a truce for tJirec hours while the garrison debated the
question of surrender. Tlu's impromptu truce was difficult
to stage, for Japanese planes, operating from Canton, did not
conform to this and kept bombing Stanley, Aberdeen and Mount
Gough.
An emergency meeting of the Defence Council whidi met at
lOOO hours on 25 December considered the proposal for surrender,
and decided to continue the fight. After the expiry of the truce
period at midday Jap.incsc artillery opened up on a large-scale.
The Japanese rapidly resumed their offensive and within half an
hour a platoon 5/7 Rajput on Mount Parish reported fierce hand-
to-hand fighting against an overwhelming number of Japanese
troops. By 1300 hours the platoon was forced to svithdraw to the
north-west, and Mount Parish fell into the invaders hands.
^VIlh its fall, the Japanese advan^ along Kennedy Road putting
Fortress Headquarters area,
which was garrisoned fay only one
68 CAMP.UGNS IN SOXrrH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 IIONO KONG

tvcre
platoon of 2/14 Punjab, in jeopardy. Coramuiucations
no
dilRcuU to maintain and between 1100 and 1200 hours there was
contact by Fortress Headquarters with Stanle>' area, and 'W'ancbai

and Magazine Gaps. In many parts the North Face Road

by
quite impassable to all except runners due to damage caused
shell-fire.
Between 1300 and 1430 houn, the Allied troops consis-
ting of 5/7 Rajput,some 60 to 70 men of 1 Middlesex Regiment
and small parties of Royal Na\'y and Royal Engineers held the
Canal area north of the Race Course when thejapanese increas-
ed their pressure. At 1430 hours B Company 2/14 Punjab >vas
sent to reinforce them, but in spite of this a withdrawal to sccoim
line (OBrien Street Line) 500 yards to the west, was considered
advisable. Headquarters 1 Middlesex svithdrew to Murray
Barracks.
The situation then deteriorated rapidly. ^Vanchai Gap
was captured by the Japanese shortly after 1 430 hours after a heavy'
dive-bombing attack lasting for half an hour. Magazine Gap
similarlyatucked and incendiaries were dropped which set the
on fire and burnt the field cables. The Commander ^Vest
hill-side
Infantry Brigade reported to Fortress Headquarters that the area
could not be held for more than 24 hours at the most against a
determined attack. At 1450 hours the new 1 Middlesex5/'
Rajput line less than a mile from Fortress Headquarters was report-
ed to be brealdng and could not hold out for more than half an
hour- Bennets Hill had been forced to surrender. There had
been no touch with little Hong Kong and East Brigade Head-
quarters at Stanley since midday, and their resistance could not
in any way infiuence the position in the western half of the Island.
Two 2/14 Punjab companies (C and D) and a mere handful
of tired troops stood between the invader and the thickly populated
central district of Victoria.
Consequently, taking into consideration these and other
factors like the strength of the Japanese, the exhaustion of
the Allied troops by their strenuous struggle against enormous
odds, the lack of ammunition and the serious water famine, Major-
General Maltby decided that fuTthcr fighting svas no longer justifi-
ed. Continuance of the fight W'ould have meant useless slaughter
of the remaining troops and considerable hardship to the civil
population without affecting the final outcome of the struggie-
At ISlShottrs, therefore, be advised the Governor, Sir Mark Young,
to cease fighting, and all commanding officers were ordered to break
off fighting and surrender to the nearest Japanese commander as
opportunity offered.


THE T-VD IN* JIO.VO KONO G9

T ic
famul surrender of the gam'ion loot pLicc at the
2

Japanese Hcadquarlcn in Tai Hang at I BOO houn, but as mentioned

earlier, the capituUtion of the force at Stanley sos delayed till the
early houn of 26 Dereniber.
Mter the turrender, I^rd Afoyne, Secrctarj* of State for the
Colonies sent the fotloNNing message to the Governor:
It is a gofxl fight you hav'c fought The defence
of Hong Kong will livT in the stor^- of the Ilmplre, to wfuch it adds
yet another chapter of courage and endurance
Titus Hong Kong became the lint British possession in the
far Kast to fall into Japanese hamls aftcra heroic struggle of eighteen
days. Tlie Colony fell to the Japanese assault more rapidly than
had been expected, but Japan's control of the seas had scaled tlie
fate of this isoLated outpost long before the garrison actually
surrendered. The defence of she Colony, short-lived though it
tvar, was considered to be of great value to the Allied overfall
strategy in the Tadfic. fn the words of .NfajorGcncral Mahby:
'* I submit th.at although
I and my forces may have been
a hostage to fortune, sscsscre a detachment that deflected from more
important objectivTs, such as the Philippines, Singapore, or perhaps
mtn Australia, an enemy force that consuted of two first line
divisions, one reserve division, corps artillery, about eighty air-
craft and a considerable naval blocitade force. Strategically
tve gambled and lost, but it w.ai a worthwhile gamble *.*

M niJ. p. TOO
 CHAPTER V

Malaya, the Land and the People

1
Tlic sacrifice of the defenders of Hong Kong was meant pri
Wrily to gis'C indirect help to ilie British forces in Mahya,

'Vm* "'3' tremendous strategic importance for the control of

/V^ulh-East Asia. As such, the campaign in ^fallya deserves to
f studied in considcrabie detail.

hfalaya,js situated approximafely betucen J and 7 hTorth

d 100 and l&t East, Geographically, the peninsula begins
the isthmus of Kra and ends at Tanjong Bulus, and is bounded
g' Thailand, China Sea, the Singapore Straits and the Strait of
Malacca. At the beginning of lhcSecond^WJd U'ar, hon'cver,
lerriior) of MaLtya did not extend beyond Pcrlis in the north
I

I
Singapore in the south. Its length then was about six hundred
* piles and its breadth not more than Uvo hundred.
A
range of granite mountains rum iilce a spine north and
uth and divides the peninsula into two portions, the larger of
hich lies to the cast. This is Icnovm as the Great Central
ngc. Smaller ranges run parallel to It in many places, and there
isolated spursfrom almost all of them. The descent from the
mmits of the Central Range is gradual on the \s-cstcm side and
uU of alluvial deposits of tin, while on the eastern side it is extremely
cep and covered by granite, quartz and limestone formations.
ic liighest mountain is bclie\-ed to be Gunong Tahan on the
orthern frontier of Pahang, with its tallest peak 7, ICO feet
ugh. On the west, the coast is bordered by mangrove*s^vamps
nany miles in width. TIjc east coast is served by the northeast
onsoon svhich occurs from Nowmber to February and lias
ndy beaches extending over scsxral miles. Islands abound on
ilher side of the peninsula with adjacent shore features.
peninsula is one vast forest intersected in every
The whole
direction by countless rivers and streams which together constitute
one of the most lavish water-systems in the svorld. Only an insigni-
ficant fraction of these forests has ever been traversed by human
beings, and those who travel rarely leave the banks of streams
except to pass from one river system to another.
The prinapal rivers on the coast arc the Perak, the
Bemam and the Muar. The first is navigable for steamers up
 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTII-E.^ST ASL\ lOH'-lS
MAUWA
74

to fortv nulcs ana tor coumry tnui

^
Bemam is deeper and navigable for alwut onc
miles. Tbc
%-^cy and
nulcs, ^^hile the Muar irrigates a very
fertile

for local craft to a hundred and fifty

miles. On
the east co
>nipofl^t
rivers arc the cliicf means of communication and the
ones among them are the Kuanmn, Romptn. Kebntan, I'anang

rcmarlably fertile both m

the
"xhc^il of the peninsula is

nlains and on the mountain slopes. This is so partly owing to

partly to
decay of vegetable matter for ages, and
of hug
The richness of soil has resulted in dense growth
changes.
trees, shrubs, hushes, underwood, creepers,
climbing^ planu ^
vines, all hung by ferns, mosses and pamsioc gros
trailing
In rnos
and bound together b)' rattans and ropc-lii-c trailers.
thick that it Is impoaible to go
through u
places the jungle is so
without the aid of a wood-knife, and even the wild bea^ are
the
known wcU-wom game-tracks to move about. In
to .use
interior, brakes of bambooe are found, many
of whicli sprea
for nules along the river-banks. .
ana
The fauna of Malaya is as s-aried as, and no less profuse
eoa*
crowded than, its vegetable life. From the elephant to the
nut-monkey, the tiger to the Jungle cat, the wild boar to the I"*
fox, the python to the hamadryad, the alligator to 9'* **^***^^**',
from a lemon-sired wasp to red ant, divene STirietics of
bw
and insects abound. Birds, insects, scorpiom and cenupedu
swarm the land, and though they open a splendid field for
research, are nesertheless pests for the ordinary man
and the
occasional sdsitor.
The climate is more like that of Burma than that of wes
Africa. But neither an Indian nor a European can
be too
fond of it. It is not only extremely burrud but also ins'ariably hot.
On the whole enervating, and foreigners must leave Malaya
it is

c\-ery for restoring their health elsewhere. Rain

now and then
also is oppresjisre; days, 160 to 200 days arc rainy. Oa
out of
the west coast the quantity varies from 75 to 120 inches per ann^.
while on the east coast it is about 155 inches for the same period.
But a few abnormalities of climate and rainfall hasre also been
noted. On 27 December 1926, Kemmaman in Trengganu
had I5l inches of rain. In the same month Trengganu recched
7654 inches of i^, the Perak risrer rose 3&4 feet at
Kangsar and the Pahang osrer 60 feet at Tcmerloh. The
Sumatras or violent gusts of windaccompanied by heavy downpew
of short duration arc another characteristic of the climate of the
' peninsula.
 THE lAND AKD TItt TEOPLE
MAl-^VA,

regions lUstem and

Malaya falls broadly Into two natural
Utter fourteen sub-regions,
Western. The former has nine and the
all of which have some common
features.

^
Tren^.1
or.h. three rtr.er
and Kclar^an and i. featured by Hefner
. nf par^^b
om
generally north-routh, ranger
cnlnunaung m
Main Range which i.
f A Jis
tts northern porUon the East

the wide nit eoattal plain of

Coast Rang
northern

Trengganu thir Pnnge choter out

the

comes to Pahang it dccrcaseyn elc\

a
^
Ttimuphout
KelanO^
X h

plain again attaint tome

importtnee.
*
^"
Ranee
5' cficcm-ely
^
flXa-t?haXTo'"theXerncm^^^
&"t^nTnT;h:XX
important north-touth e ,1,5 rivert in the upland
upland, Dratvingtn
area and they these tsvo riven
themselves the ssaters of
n^y tributaries,
during the north-
arc subject to considerable
rise m normal,
monsoon(Nosxmber -January). A rise
^

cast
but only for a few days. ^

jjjg coastal
nre main line, f, the Eat. Coat,
""'"f' m pm. of
arcat and north to touth the largest areai
of fresh
this range 1 e
jso
Range. To the wet. of
f ,pak
appear
water swamp, though there of
of die Pahang
lymg touU.
iu the Tasek Bera area
and west of the lower are
^ tlic culUvated areas
covers practically
liudted .0 .be
* VXbaS." ?rte' and
h
U.= nortb-soud.

corridor along the eastcro types:

thii "S'
Natural routes of beacbei of the eatt
coast,
"f
,d ,he Pahang, and
the intermittent
(i)
boundary of
eastern
t S
lorrfdoe a. the

the
Only two ""jor
Main R"S'-
^ jid{ Range and
of Malaya. They
connect
are:-
eastern region
with me w
the
 CAMPAIGNS IN SOiml-t.AST ASIA 191M2 HALAYA

(i) Gap and Frasers Hill, wlh the road from Raiib to
Kuala Kubu Bahru.
(ii) Ginltng Sempak, with the road from Bentong to Kuala
Lumpur.

TJr U'estern lUgion

The Western Region lies west of the main ditide and also
two states ofNcgri Scmbilan and Johore.
includes the whole of the
Itsprominent topographical feature is a series of ridges running
roughly north and south and more or less arranged in cchcloris.
Far to the north-west runs the Xakawm Range, then comes the
Kcdah-Singgnra Range, and lastly lies the Blnlatig Range extend-
ing from Built Buhus to the Bindings. The Main Range wWch
extends along the whole eastern boundary of this region from the
northern frontier to Tampin in north Malacca lies
immediately behind the Bintang Range. In the remainder of the
repon the babied peabs of Mt. Ophir and MaOkil and the low
granite hilb of eastern Johore mark the configuration of the npland
areas.
lapping the edges of these ranges are low-l)ing Cat areas
of alluvbi deposits which form the bases of the western eoostal
plains. considerable portion of the lowbnds b swampy and
A
there b usually a sharp line of dKnrion between the uplands and
the plains wluch affect the drainage of the country and the course
of the ris'en.
The most imponani feature of its STgetation is the almost
continuous tree cover. Only in southern FerUs, western Kedah
and north-western Fro\ince Wellesley are there brge open areas
under paddy cultivatnn.

The Ceast-liru
The west coast from the Thailand border to Tanjong Prai
(west of Singapore) is approximately 390 miles long. There arc
a number of blan^ off the coast, the Langkaws group, Penang
and Pangtor, and the unnamed and uninhabited group of mangrove
b bnds provide different grades of sheltered anchorages. Generally
speaKng the coast b fringed with mud, and there are only three
stretches of coast where there are sandy beaches suitable for landing-
These are to the north of Prai, in the Dindlings and from Port
Swcttcnhani to Malacca. TTiere ate, however, numerous pbces
up the rivers where bndings can be made, and there arc sandy
beaches also on the Ldngiawi Islands, Pubu Penang and Oulau
Pangtor.
 JL^LAVA, TIlC LAM) AUb TJtE fEdPLE

'rhc coast highly susceptible to ebbs and tides, the average

is

being about tivo to three Jmots. There h a constant current in

the Malacca Strait both in the nortli and the south, svith an irre-
gular one in the centre. The rise of tide above datum of soundings
for ilic whole coast averages nine feet at springs and five to six
feet at neaps. The exception to this phenomenon is at Port
Swcttcniiam where it is above thirteen and nine feet, respectively.
At Penang (Georgetown) the spring rise is slightly less than the
being seven and three-fourth* feet.
ascragc,

Clmalic CoRdition*
In Malaya there is little temperature variation throughout
the year, wind* are generally light, and rainfall is often heavy.
The diurnal variation of weather is the predominant feature;
it protluces strong contrasu of rain and cloud between day and

night, though the weather of one da> does not necessarily repeat
that of ilic day before. Tlic average temperature range is from a
maximum of 85* P during the day to a minimum of 73* F at night.
Four seasons can be distinguished
/ioTtk'tASt mens^n smon: late October to the end of
hfarch. N'onh-castcrly winds blow strongly over the rea and
the cast coast, but lightly elsewhere. Much heavy rain and
low cloud occur over the east side of mountains.
Souih-uKtt mwonstasm: end of May or beginning of
Singapore
June to September. IVinds arc light, southerly near
and variable. Rainfall is very heavy, vrith much cloud.
Two transitional ieasons: April to May and October.
Winds are generaUy light and variable. Rainfall is again
heavy, with much cloud.
the season* vary much
These arc very broad genentliralmns;
pem'mula. The nights arc usually clear
in difierent parts of the
towards morning muts may form
and Quiet and reasonably cool;
sheets of cloud mantle
the slopes of the mountains,
in vaUevs and
usuaUy doodlew. Soon after sunrise,
thouch the summits are
of distant mountain* become les* distinct
however, the contours
hour or two shimmer blurs
their outline, the suns
,A after an nour
and uncomfortable to be without headgear,

th^* hS of cloud dissolve and for a short time the sfc>' becomes
cumulus clouds frequently begin to form and
but by noon
SA;/rrrows intense.
Curing the late artemoon the cumulus
the
_a5C to large drifting thunder-clouds, and thunder-

.f . feSr may !a only for about fifteen or thirty

Storms heavy and tlie rain may even overflow
^Curing the early part of the night the thunder
thiTroad drains.
78 a\MP-UCSS IS 80LT-tAST ASIA t9U-l2 Al.\VA

clouds tend to flatten out and by morning the shecM of strato-

cumului co\XT the mountain ilopcs and the rnisU ns'cr the Aallej'S
return.

pounuAL sYrreif asd tcosottic nfsot'scts

BrilUb Malaya ts'as organised into three separate govern*

mental units according to the manner in which areas were
brought under British controL
1. The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Afalacca,
Tcnang and Province Wellesley, with Christmas Island
and the Gocos-Kceling group in the Indian Ocean;
2. The Tedcrated Malay States, which lie across the
central area of the country and condsi of Perak, Selangor,
Negri ScmbHan and Pahang;
3. The Unfederated Malay States, consisting of Johore
in the esetreme south and west, Kedah and Pcrlis
in the north and Kelantan and Trengganu in the ease
The Straits Settlemeols were British lerritcrry administered
as a Crown Colony; the Federated and Unfederated Malay States
were British Protected States, under the rule of Sultaat who were
juridically independent, though politically dependent on the
British Crown.

TJu Slreils Sdtlmrnls

The British Parliament was the final legislative authorit>'
as well as the final executive authority for the Crown Colonies, but
it le^slated for them only in matters unsuitable for local legislation.
The Act of 1867 under which the Straits Settlements were constitut-
ed as a Crown Colony made provision for the establishment of a
Legislatise CoundL In its latest form the Coundi was composed
of the Governor as President, with thirteen offiaa! and thirteen
members, all of whom, under the Statute, had to be
non-offidal
British subjects.Of the non-ofiicial members, eleven ss'cre no-
minated by the Gos'emor and the remaining two, since 1924,
had been elected, one by British members of the Chamber of
Commerce at Singapore, and the other by thewe of the Penang
Chamber of Commerce. The Covernor had both an original and
casting vote,so that there was, in efiect, an oiHdal majority.
The dUBculties arising out of a constitutional s^-stem such as this
were, however, in a great measure obviated by the relations which
the ExccuthT Gos-ernment had established with the representatis'es
of the different communities and the non-ofEcial members of the
Legislative ConneiL There was a well-established comrntion by
 MALAYA, niE LAKD AND THE PEOPLE 79

which difiicult issues were made the subject of infonnal discussion

and agreement outside the legblaturc, and where diiTcrcnce of
opinion arose within the I^^latlve Council, the Executive showed
itself increasingly responsive to the viesvs of the non-official members.

T}ie Federated Malaje States

This area was not in the technical sense British territory,
and inhabitants did not rank as British subjects. British connec-
its
tion with these States orginated in the desire to protect Chinese
residents in the Straits Settlements from piracy on the coastal
tvaters of these States and from robbery and oppression when trad-
ing in them. There is much contemporary c\'idencc to show that
the prevailing condition in many parts of them svas one of law-
lessness and anarchy.
In 1895 the growing need for joint action
in matters of communication and the provision of economic and
social services led to a mote definite measure of co-ordination.
By agreements made with the States in that year, they were federat-
ed under a ResIdent-GeneraL The Act of Federation provided
that the joint resources of the States might be used to assist any
State which might require financial aid, and it is of interest to
note that it abo included a provbion that if Her Majestys Govern-
ment were engaged in war with any other po^ver, each State
would provide a body of Indian troops to serve in the Straits
Settlements.
1909 when a Federal Council
A further change ^vas made in
was under a President who svas styled High Commis-
established,
sioner and who was abo the Governor of the adjacent Colony.
The members were the Rcsidcnt-Cencral, whose designation was
now altered to that of the Chief Secretary, the four Malay rulers,
the four Residents and the four nominated non-offidab
British and

Chinese The Malay rulers showed themselves unsvilling, on

personal part in the debates of the
the CTOund of prestige, to take a
1927 they were relieved of membership,
Federal Council, hence in
their places being taken by
four Maby chiefs free to speak on their
There were abo added an Indian non-official member
Public ^Vorb, RaUway, Education.
and the heads of tlie Medical,
Chiaese Affairs depariments, who were
Labour agriculture and
position to reply to the entiasms of the European
thus pbeed in a
It became apparent, however,
and nther nOB-official memben.
authority svhich the Federal CouncU had drawn to itself
that the
four States of all power, not only over their
fn deorive the
their annual budgets. The rulers for their
own Icfnsbtiort but over
some envy the greater liberty of action still
tafded iriih
tht UnfcdOTlcd States.
th. nJen of
by
CO CAJIP.VIONS IN SOtlll-lAST ASIV 19tM2 HAI-AYA

Shortly b<f<rre 1939 the Secretary war aboUihcil,

pmt of Chirf
an'l h place a? a ci>-'jtti}naiing authority wan taken by a f
cderal

Secretary, junior to all the Resident!, 'flie pown of the Federal

Council were also reduced. But it still safeguarded the financial
credit of the Federation Iry keeping control of the coUrction and
appropriation of its rcsenucs as a whole, and instead ofsCTUUniring
and fixing c\ery detail of each State's expenditure, it made la each
of ilicm an annual block grant to meet the cost of the sciAices which
were now transferred to their control. These Kmces comprised
agriculture, co-operation* education, public-works, forests, public
health, mines, prisons and the s-eterinary service. The power to
Icgisbfe for education, forests, and some phases of health and
agriculture was transferred back to the State Councils. Uniformity
in legislation was secured by making the Federal Trcaitxrcr and the
Federal Legal Adviser members of the four Slate Councils as well
at of the Federal Councit.

Tke Vft/tJnaUd Mdkj StaUs

TTic most important of these five Slates was Johore, with a
population of nearly ihree-quartm of a million. It had been clo-
sely associated with the British ever since the foundation of Singa-
pore in 1819. For many years it had a British Consular Asent,
but in 1914 it asked for a British Genera! ^\dviscr. The British
control osier the northern Staira dates lack to 1909, when ruxerainty
osTT them was formally ceded by Sam. Advisen were tlicn
appoinred to them. There wax, howeser, some difiereBce in the
extent of the authority possessed by the ^Vdvisers in the rarious
States. In Trengganu, for example, the Adviser had only consular
powers till 1919, and dlfTiculty of cotnmunicadoa tended to isolate
Kelantan till 1931. The treaty relations with these States are
best illustrated by the agreement concluded with Perils in 1930.
The State was declared to be under British protection and the rights
of suzerainty were reserved to the Crown. There were to be no
dealings with otherPowen except through the Crown respresenu-
tise. The Resident would adsise in all matters except those
connected with Malay custom or the Islamic religion- The
State would be gosemed by the Raja, with the assistance of a State
Council, the composition of which was prescribed in the agreement.
The Gos'crnmcnt of Perils was to be conducted by Perils Malay
or pure nadscs except where there was any work which the Suic
Council considered them incapable of performing. The succeoor
of the Raja was to be a descendant of the existing Ruler or of bis
ancestors.
 rilorLE
AL.^VA, Tlir. I.0 AMI till'.

n, tW ./ Ml
ornatinn..li.y,

ho iiric of .1,0 Malay raro

an
immigrants
sii^
immi^^ntJ ^^c^e normally Untiin nractice. for travelling
had in Law oitly ^'"'1' Slaloi, whothcr rocognirod
inhabitant of .1,0 NIala) a..
abroad, nuny ^ ccrtilicato of

ni,iS;^"'-v;r,L';:oVoa;d^

Touerr. . . j luMwccn the juridical

obaious
fVhilo thoro woro ,j ,|mt of die
of
or constilulional position n^ajl^cdUneofdistinc-
tsw, tho
Straits Sottlomon.i, it oid in praouoo by
octent of ih As
lion between the Colony, respectively.
tl.c Stat .an
Brituh authorities in
far as ciraimstanccs Sultans. Dccbrations
of ,i,e
Gtivcrnmont to roipoct lli
.1^ Under Secretary of
State

mt.de in 1025 by
tbe
the Permanent
Under
b>-
for Ibe Colonies,
."<1 S" Brimio> ?
Secretary, the mamtenatwe of
.^^.lieations and that
States rested on
're") 5 . jl5n mutt alwap be a cardinal
pmns ^
tbe authority and declarations also called attention
submer-
point in Britith ll'l ' ,P"rt.c Malaya from political
^ the need for
immigrant ele
in the
populadon. It u clear,
rule proteaed to
genec by the ,

however, that
wbde ' 1' l",c Sultan tri.h hi. oavn subjects,
some
V,".. imfaf rottem
a C'O" "'r!;
was in all dta. .. was expres ed
there Ttfecmd by the fact
nutter ally a
which was no. This may have been less
<haj_^_^
in terms"f ad'oe' rad," dte Pederated States,
and the
Unfedera personality of the ruler
marked in tbe
position no
doubt tended J^inbrence mainly of degree.
Al-
but thu of economic and social
md his council; of number
administration
iiouk the undeM^^^
to
IcSFederated
declared
"-as
State
^j^ntal direction of hca^ some of
in the '

Settlements. TheClunese
Governor, fein the Straits
headquarters w tended to look primarily to
whose
Indian immigra and his council as
and them
was of particular significance to
the Brilidi and it

the source
of for the maintenance of order and of an
ulumatc gu
that the
 .

82 c.uipa:cns jn jotTU-RAsr asia 1911-12 malaya

impartial judicial ^yUcm lay with the Britl'sh adminiJtration

and not wth the Stales authorities.

Pof-alalkn
The total area of the three component parts of llrithh Malaya
vras about 5l,C30 square miles, and in 1931, the last date for which
detailed census fifjures are available, the total population ss-as
4,385,3^0:
Approximate PopuUtion
Area 1931
(sq. Miles)
Foreign 31.631
Straits Settlements ... 2,2CO 1,114,015
Federated Malay States 27,340 1,713,090
Unfederated Malay States 22,020 1,526,601

51.880 4,385,346

At the end of 1938 the estim.atcd population according to the

land of origin svas:

Federated Unfedcrated
Race Siraiu Maby Malay Total
Settlements States States

Europeans 17,816 8,624 1,771 28,211

Eurasians 12,762 4,970 578 18,310
Chinese . 861,910 921,701 436,603 2,220,244
Mala)Tin$ 303,421 687,495 1,219,951 2,210,867
Indians .. 149,636 463,874 130,015 743,555
Others 12,279 17,065 28,335 57,679

Total 1,357,851 2,103,729 1.817,283 5.278,860

As compared with some of her neighbours, hfalaya had a

markedly low density of population. It was estimated in 1938
that only tsvo-fffths of the total area svas mhabited. Then were
large areas still under primeval evergreen forests, within which
lived onlya few jungle tribes known as Sakais.
The greater part of the indigenous population was to be
found tn the rural arcasj there were only eleven towns svhich in
 AND TirE PEOPLE
JJALAVA, TIIE tAN1>

1,000 pcrtoiu. The Malays werc

1931 had a population ofcr
primarily
they were
[^toglheir o knd^nd'id not
planta-
f bhour for the rubber

rr
for fishing,
rrdri5.|.
and the remoteness of an
area Irom urg

which they tended to Malacca as

Ctanese
.
settled in
Tl,e descendants of the but
far backas tlirce centuries aG population represents
of P
Jhc ovcnvhclmmg majority twenUeUi
the result of immigration of the mining
^ proportion
formed a mgn p
century. The Clunese had p^ In contrast to
population, and were also
engag_ P tbe toivn
.
^ UP
Jhe'^ Malays, the Chinese >PI'.^',;f,niues for material
amcmucs and it P
with its greater ^ owned by
advancement. Nearly
^^deh were almost endrely peopled
the
W
them and, even . ^^,ed In Singapore, where
Malays, Chinese shops nearly eighty per
total popubdon
cent were Chinese,
TIi
Xh 'they have nmde .0
one oT ^eat
country has been
devclopmen Chinese
the economic
ha
^ be tradidonal
>bed spirit of enter-
importance, for they
qualities of industry
and Itaftlmtl^^l^^
*""
biter took M
prise.They were 5 foUowed
|dch the widcscale
^vantage of the of this century,
ot the begiindog
introduction of
European P
j^-ortant position m
trade and
soctcen
Not only have they 10^937 that they held
estates, and
commerce, but it '^'copied by the rubber

^The Indian S represented more var ed

,b Chinese, Inian
dian eidier dte
Malay* ^^^^^cteriae as a whtde, The
types and was
less eiuy
t
iitly, and their clucf acti
arrived only ^bberA certain
lmnls had labomert
estates.
j^_^^ce and industry; Indians
iSTS been as
*e rubber estate
bad
proportion
'?J'"g 3
??me fom par aent of
labourers or as sub-
as labourersjr
0d'p
employed
had! for instance, lO. am"loT
Vp^COO
taiif
mtunly to
mdiuSeriOthe 'ff^g,rfttom'24.00oTnd were
temtory or
The Siamese ^ States bordering
.
large
the about 18,000 .0 19,000, formed a
be found in
Thailand. Cey
D4 &\mpa!Gns in south-east asla 1941-42 jialaya

proportion of the government clerical stafT. There were a number

of i\rabs, of tNhom many were practically Malays with only an
Arab strain. There were, lastly, some 6,500 Japanese, of whom
over half tecrc in Singapore and other towns. A considerable
number were, howeser, interested in rubber planting. The
Japanese owned important iron and manganese mines, and
there was a considerable Japanese fishing community.
The Europeans in Malaya, the great majority of whom
were British, numbered in 1931 under 18,000 or onlj 0*4 per cent
of the total population. The largest proportion, over lO.OW,
svere in the three ports of the Straits Settlements, the majority
being in Singapore. Nearly 2,000 were soldiers, who were trans-*
fcrrtd every fesv years; some 400 were tin miners; there wrre
1,000 or so in the gcncmment services, and outside these services
there were professional and business men. A
large part of the
European population was made up of women, most of whom had
no employment. Moreover, although the majority of the male
Europeans were employees, very few owned landed property or
had any permanent stake in Malaya beyond owning shares in the
various government loans and public companies.

Eeonmic Jlneunt!
The exdtement produced during the Ian one hundred and
fifty years by Malaya in the west (including the Uruted States)
on account her rubber and tin u very' ritnilar to that produced
by In^a with her spices in the days of Elizabeth, and is still the
cause of ioiematioaal misunderstandings. Malayan economy
depends on two factors: the tropical climate and the mineral
w^th. The first of these life one of ease and plenty, involv-
ing little enterprise. The second makes Mala)*a much more depen-
dent on foreigners for her pros perity. The chief item of tropical
produce wluch has attracted foreiga capital and enterprise is rubber.
It was introduced from Brazil over half a century ago and became
the staple product of Malaya, accounting for one-half of
the worlds output. Its export value vastly exceeded that of
any other commodity. In 1937 this sto^ at o\-cr .50-5
miilioQS, respresenting half of Mala^Vs total trade. But in
1933 it was less than .32 miUons. The Government
had also restricted production for a few years by international
agreement.
The foUovi'ing table relating to 1940 gives the figure s of area
under rubber cultivation and the population engaged in it according
to the three categories of political units and the nationality of the
people involved.
 ..
.,

MAr.\v\, the i_and axd Tur. t>r.0PLE

85

tumpfan fndi'an
Tmiiory
( NH, Arm Ko.} Awti Sa. Aots No. Atm
j j

Aflfay Sucr* i. tr >37 003 23 / M-220, 33 12-JM 1-3I1^I,079 334

1
Sttilonrfltj
UnfnJfTatfd '
I7J fi)-537 48 town 5 J'528 3<K 2X510
htiUySuin tss 152 737 j
WflcJOt{.(i{
I
117 S2C53/ B2-5I0 873]^ G34 017
Bniivi),
I

!
"1 (

!
1

Teiil for
1

Jt_ 351-93^ 30C 91819! 87' 9(;or,r| 2'52a2-tl9-8CI

A simUar position vas occupied by tin; over a third of the

"r X
MaUya and it xvas the second in value
01MaUyan exports. The demand for this mineral had increased
own^ In the svorJd i development of canning' and motor-car
JndiHtnc.s,and as the Chinese could not pro<!uce adequately the
Cuwpeans entered the field and installed svestern machinery for
quick and c/ncient production. In spite of this,
hosvev'er, (he
Chinese owned onc*tlijfd of tlie mines in I&il. rractically
all
the ore was hitherto smelted by uvo British companies at Benang
find Singapore, and an attempt by the Unhed States to undertake
this was thwarted by imposing a prohibitive export duly
on the
unmclied ore.
The following figures representproduction in various States:-

1931 1935 1936 1937 1938

Negri Long
Scmbilan 980 1*279 1-769 2*517 1*691 tom.
Tahang . 1'443 1*771 2*760 3* *58 1*924
Perak . 20*203 25 048 33*030 44*874 24*958
Selangor . 9*911 12*689 21*115 24*576 12*633
All other
States . 1*352 1*532 2*021 2*074 2*054 >.

Total for
Malaya 33*919 42*319 60*703 77*199 43*260

Malaya's output estimated potentially as 10,000 tons in 1939

was limited by the International Tin Control scheme to kp up
prices,
BG CKitrAIONS IN SOUni-EAtT MIX I9H-12 MALAYA

TR-VS^PORT AVO OOICSICAT10N$

Forcjcn capital and entcrpnie % rcipomiblc alit* fur the

dcA'eloptr.cnt of important communicatiofir, electric power and
protected water-supply.
There were at least four type* of meaiii of communication.
These were railways, ro.ad*, water-way*, and clectncal communica-
tions.

Rsilu err
The Federated Malay State* Railway was the only line seiA'-
ins the peninsula. Tren^tjanu wa not serAxd by thi* or any
ocher railway. The total length wa* 1,068 miles of which scYentecn
and a half on the main line was doulilc-tracked. It wa* connected
with Banc;tok without change of gauge, and train* ran through to
that place from Singapore. ThU was knosvn as the Main
Line.
There woj an alternative Uoc from mh to north from Genu*-
This passed through a most difficult country and wm* comparatisYly
unimportant. For about two hundred miles from Genu* it su at
least sixty miles from the coast, and it touched tlic east coast only at
iu noTlhem terminui. A causeway carried a single-track line and
motor-road across the Johorc Strait. Apart from the Taiping
Pass Section and a numlwr of major bridges, the country preseoted
no problem in construction to the engineers. The arerage spe^
of trairu was permitted up to forty-fire miles per hour on certain
Kctions of the Main Line, but it was not leas than twenty-five
ebewhere.
Besides the Main line there were nine branch line* in the
Main Section and one in the East Coast Section. Throughout
most of iu length the Main Line passed through the rubber-
growing country. Rice-growing districts were trasxrsed in Pro-
s-incc Wellesley, Perak and Jsegri Setnbilan, and the on area
was covered around Taiping. Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur. Similarly
the branch lines served the most welJ-de\xlopcd parts of the
peninsula.
Before 1912 the railway was owned and adnunisicred by the
Federated Malay States Government, except the portion in Johorc
Slate which was held in lease from t^t State. The total number
employed in 1939 was about 12,600 but the Europeans were only
90 while the Indians and Ceylonese srere about 9,300. Track
maintenance was done with Tanul labour, ports were served by
the Chinese and the Indian labour, and administration was in the
hands of Europeans and Eurasians.
 ilALAVA, TIIE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 87

The standard of maintenance of the permanent way before

the war was not unifonn. That of the Main Line ^vas generally
good, while the line between Gemas and Johore Bahru svas poor,
the rails being of inferior quality and tn poor condition. S^vamp
was troublesome in Port SnCttcnham branch, cotton soil gave a
bad foundation in the Kedah repon, and the East Coast Line
was generally neglected. Second hand rails, mostly crippled, had
been used on this line all through, and ballasting too was indifferent.
Railway telegraphs, telephones, block and elcctric-tnim-
lablct s>-stem and certain other electrical equipment were main-
tained by the Federated Malay States Posts and Telegraphs
Department under an agreement.
No part of the railway was electrified. The number of
locomotives before the war was 185 and there were 12 steam rail-
cars. Obviously these were inadequate to deal with the dvil and
military requirements, and locomotives were running a high
average mileage of 102 per day.
Coal fuel was obtained from Batu Arang. But reserve stocks
of hard coal were imported from India, and there was no dearth
of coal at any time.
In January I9f2 the stock of carriages and wagons was
considerable. There were 515 carriages anti 480 bogies and 5,150
four-wheeled wagoas. AU of them were in good condition but
were fast becoming inadequate in view of the civil and military
requirements.
The capacity' of the line was between ten and twenty trains

each day each way according to local circumstances, the East

being capable of the maxi-
Coast Line from Pmi to Singapore

there were four tunnels on

the matter of vuincrabib'ty,
tunnels on the East Coast Line and fifty
the Main Line and nine
Main Line and seventy-three on the East
underbridges on the
ComL, All crc of first
Workshop at Sentul. The railway owned
There was a Central
important places, rcrrics plied between
ferries and wharves at all
Palekbang and Kota Bhani.
pS and Penang and between
Port Weld, Tclok Anson, Port
Wharves were maintained at Prai,
Palekbang and Tumpat. Sidings
Swettenham, Port Dickson,
were
the Federated Malay States Railway there
Kght railways and tramways, serving
a number of isolated
.mm> auarries, estates,
cte. In the island of Tekon
were sb^ lengths of line, and on Penang
Sir and Elbin there
miles west of Georpitown, there was an elcctri-
about four
Island
88 CA^1PA1G^S IN SOt,TH*EAST ASIA. 1941-42 JIALAYA

cally-operatcd cable raiUsay with two sections of 1400 and 900

yards each. The steepest gradient was 1 : T95; near the top
^^as a tunnel, 285 feet long, on a gradient of 1 : 2*04- The upper
station on Stra^sberry Hill was 2400 feet above the sea-IcsYl-
Theic were metre and broad guage lines on the Singapore island
administered by Afferent authoiitici, On some plantations in the
west of the island there were probably tramways.

Jifiadi

These were mostly constructed by the State governments and

fell into two systems, the east coast and the west Coast, the division
being made by the mountain range in the centre. There were two
Cross roads, Kuala Kubu to Rabu and Kuala Lumpur to Bentong,
Icaihng to Kuantan, and a third one between ^tu Pahat and
Mersing. The west coast road was the main trunk road. It ran
from Thailand border to Singapore and for much of the distance,
south of Kedah boundary, there was an alternative coast road.
These two were inter-connected by an ertemrve network of metalled
roads. The main network of the east coast w'as located in Kelaatan
which was connected southwards to Kuala Trengganu. South
of this point as far as Endau various isolated stretches of road tverc
known to exist along the coast. There was no continuotis road
from Kota Bharu to Singapore. The low mileage in Kclantan or
Trengganu was highly sig^cant.
TTse main trunk road and the principal branches and altcrna-
ti\-cs were well sign-posted prior to the Japanese occupation.
These sign-posts were similar to those used in England, the rule of
the road also being keep to the left
*

In general the roads were very narrow and, except in towns

were suitable for alngle-line traffic only. But there ss-ere parts
where turn-round had been made possible and most of these were
at the entrance to estates. Bridges and culs-ms were of wood.
Masonry or brick was confined to piers and abutments. But on
all important roads timber bridges were being replaced by steel or
reinforced concrete structures. This meant that there were
three types of bridges before the war in Malaya, timber, steel
and rcinfoTced-concrcte. The most diflicult aspect of bridge-
building was in relation to depth of soft mud in paddy-growing
areas where concrete piles to a depth of sixty or more feet had to
be driven before obtainii^ a set. Recently constructed bridges
had been designed to carry two-thirds of the British hCnistry of
Transport standard train. For the older bridges no standard
spedfication exined, and a Ust was kept acco rding to the wxight of
traffic know-Q to have crossed the bridges. There were no fords
 MAIAYA, niE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 89

on the principal roads. On the >astalroad in Johorc there ivcre

important ferries at Muar and Batu Pahat. The Pahang Trunk
Road crossed two ferries, cast of Jerantut and west of Kuantan,
and On the cast coast generally thc svas a considerable number of
smaller ferries over the river mouths used for local trallic on the
rough coastal tracks. In general the gradients were very easy,
not often exceeding 1 in 30. The steepest climbs occurred on the
two main roads crossing the mountain range into Pahang over tlie
Gap and Ginting Sempah. The gradients lay between 1 in 20 and I
in 8. Those on the roads leading to Taiping
K. Kangsar Pass
were between 1 in 30 and 1 in 20,
Many sections of the original roads svcrc very svinding, but
improvements through the years had changed these into ^vcll
engineered curves, tvith moderate banks and good visibility.
There were still a number of sharp turns on the sccondaiy' roads
and in approaches to towns and bridges. Defiles were not many.
The important ones among them, were the motmtain stretches of
the two roads crossing the main range, where onc-s^ay traiHc
Control was introduced in 1941 for the Royal Air Force vehicles
crossing the Pahang Trunk Road. Afany sections of the main
and secondary roads u'cre liable to flooding after heavy rains in die
mountains where most of the rivers have their sources. Before
the war considerable svork svas carried out to mitigate the effects
of flood by raising the level of certain stretches of road and by
re-ah'gning the course of rivers. Heavy rains could also cause
slips to occur on the mounlam sections of the two roads crossing
the Main Range. Efforts were being made in 1941 to reconstruct
these roads by widening the parts of the Pahang Trunk Road,
but this work was not completed and both the mountain roads
were still Uabic to blocking. The unmctalled roads became slippery
in wet weather, and the latcrite surface
became sticky at the same
time Under heavy mechanical transport these roads would be
extent of becoming almost
quickly rutted and destroyed to the
impassable for heavier vehicles. , . , ,
not vulnerable apart from the
In general the roads were
bridges The chief exceptions were the Muar and Batu Pahat
of which would stop traffic on the coastal
ferries tlie destruction
suitable boats as an alternative could be
road in Tohore unless
mountain sections of the Pahang Trunk
brought into me. The
were also very vulnerable to blasUng
Road and Temerloh Road
produce slips similar to those caused by heavy rains.
which could
in the hills, on the side of cUfB and
There were some places
the road could be cflectivcly
through paddy fields, where
destroyed.
90 CAMPAIGNS IN SOlTTH-ZASr ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

ira/mtffrr
Thtre are not less than one htindred and thirteen waterwaj"*
on the cst coast and not more than tvi-enty-five on the east coast
and half a dozen in Singapore island. AJl these arc so cs'cnly
distributed that if one is missed the oilier is not too lar, especially
on the west coast. The rivers in general are of no great length
and are navigable only for comparatively short distances from
ihcir mouths, the Perak bor^ a notable fsrceplion. Considerably
more use was made of the rivers on the west coast than on the east
coast partly for economic reasons and partly owing to the blocbng
of entrances bj sand ban on the east coast. The more important
risTrs had ports at or within about five miles of the entrance, and
a fair trade of coastal steamers sas carried on benwn all pons.
In the interior of the country where thick jungle predominates,
ris'w nasigation country boats svas often the only means of
cotnmunjeation. Apart from this limited use of the ris'crs
there was one noteworthy cross-country route from the Muar to
the Pahang. But it was usable only b} small craft and imohrd a
pottage of about four hundred and fifty yards from one river to
another.
CanaU were intended almost exclusively for irrigation and
drainage purposes. They were comparatively of small capaatj*
and navigable only by boats lor local tralHc. All down the tr^^t
coast there was a s'ast number of canals running down to the scai
which could be used for infiltration followed b>' 5CTa.mbIe landings.
Malayan craft may be divided into two main categories,
fishing and trading. The fishing craft were all small sessels of less
than fift)' feet in length, and with the exception of Chinese and
Japanese power boats at Pangtor and Singapore respccth'ely,
all were cmmtry boats refjing on saS, oar and paddle Ibr propnl-
sion. The tra^ng craft may be subdivided into three groups:
coastal trading, lighter and harbour, and miscellaneous. In
1938 there were about 10,500 fishing craft in the Straits Settlements
and the Tedcrated hlalay States, and those in Singapore were
Chinese-built and hence of sounder construction than many Penang
lighters. There were construction and repair facilhies all over the
west coast. The PuhUc Works Department had workshops at
every conceivable port and importairt coastal town, but private
engineering firms too had their ow-n near the port areas.

Sigitels
As usual, these were fay tefephone, telegraph and wireless.
Telephone and telegraph ran u^ether on the same pole route, but
there were minor places where one connected the other bj' a special
 PEOPLE
MALAYA, THF. LAKD AND THE

telephone wires running into

r^ter
arraneemtnt. For instance,
lengths were connected with
estate^ and of considerable connectron
offices with telephone
on Ihe main routes, and post
communicated messages by te^ph
mto
J
were a numher of zonal
and internal cxcltang^,
tclcnhone. There

Kuala Lumpur
pfuSoS^bt w^ KKl-lh. conductors at

and Ipolu and *' >'-

maintaining the telegraph
phone were the post and
offices
supp
^chTthlFs work,
co-operation everywhere and service
^ j telegraph

The whole system had access to the 2'"^f?S Extension

through the Singapore nd Pe^ng
oto
of ffic EastSn

Australia and Penang and

^'."^^''^^^J^Circuit^con'necdng
Z;,::htn"srarin^3S,.herewere35^^^^^

telegraph offices
5,', Malaya was
telephone communication,
Tor the purpose of j^^n^.e^change for each,
sU zones tvitb a rane
divided into
sevend. was planned
f ^ intention being to
Each aone
A centre,.
provide direct '''""r. pu:entre exchanges and each
setved
was divided into areas ^^chad, direct co^ee-
such exchange had,
or "ould
tiontooneormorezme^ntm_
^
^jeh of the remammg
'

Exchanges, nonnaUy
smaUer exchanges,
had direct connection
knosm a
either ^ aone-eentre exchange,
smallest exchanges,
usiiaUy

The exceptions were s

exchange equipment,
which were
those with rural cliange.
ennneeted to a wireless station,
,
m
Malaya
.
,, ,

There were about erere government-adoimistered.

fcd. Mo staUons being admmmered
when Singapore jJ^jeasting
the Penang u""! ^^cietv Apart from welye
or corporation.
semi-ifflcially by
a society setdements. there were four in
broadcasting tft'u in Kedah and Selangor and
each
stauon was
Pahang, three in palc. The largest

Navy.
92 CA-MPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 19+1-42 MALaYA

Eltclridlj Supply
During the last fifteen years before the war, the electrification
of Mala^a had developed considerably, and excluding the private
supplies of potverfor tin mines, dredges and rubber factories, there
were more than a hundred towns and villages in the peninsula
tvith a public supply of electric power. Much of the development
centred round the Perak ri\-er and tin-bearing valleys of the Kinta
and the Selangor rivers. But the development of remote tot\'ns
and villages by means of small oil stations continued satisfactorily,
and connection .to high voltage distribution systems would soon
have become possible in many places. There was no grid s>Stem,
and no inter-connection between the principal undertaHngs existed
except bcUvecn the two Singapore Power Stations. The pylons
were generally steel lattice towers, but another type which was
probably less common svas the steel tubular Key * pylon.

Profteted ]i'aln'Supplj
As stated before, there is plenty of svater in Afalaya. The
rainfall is and rivers, streams and springs are always full of
high,
water. The only dry areas arc coastal plains. All the larger and
most of the smaller towns obtained an adequate supply of good
water from impounding reservoirs. Another ready-made source of
supply in tin-edging areas was the paddock or pool in which
the dredge followed. This covered an area several acres in extent
and contained an enormous volume of easily accessible potable
water.
Malaya was a profitable Colony for the British which had
lulled them into a life of ease and comfort. An administrative
s^'stem with divided responsibility and a colonial economy, with
nndcvelopcd means of communication, prevented the concentration
ofits resources, both in men and matcrird, for the purpose of defence.
Moreover, the inhabitants of Malaya felt no bonds of loyally to
ihrir government, which was foreign in its origin or control, and
hadno obligationsfor the defence of their homeland. This psychologi-
cal factor was an element of weakness in the defence of
Mala^'a which had been greatly complicated by the lack of adequate
equipment and inability of the British Government to maintain
a steady flow of men and material for militarj operations in
Malaya.
 CHAPTER VI

Defence Plans for Malaya

East
defence poUej- in the Far
In lunc 1937, the British m
the Unded
the Chiefs of Staff
as eataistively renewed by sva, based on tsyo
Wngd" I^e assessment of reqnirements

sea-borne,
'""'EtrS'Ji.rthreat to our interests tvonid be
send to the Far East nilhm
hi that sse should he able to
strength to protect
three months a fleet
of sufficient
India and gi%e cover
the Dominions and
communicatioas in the Indian
.

E,eet^emrr:Str:j^3HSs,::t
S^r^flrMaCtd^
he1otoUhe7ni- >- -
rieet.
in his despatch that in November
Percival has stated
.
P
General defence
1937 he made a rjektion of
of Singapore and based on that appreciation,
In ms d
by the Japanese. ^-nJrance of the danger from
first '
he, probably for the
j attack on Singapore figured
and, though even n nevertheless
the north Malaya was
pronunently, the southern Thailand would
recognized. His appre invasion of Malaya, and
that its
bo used by '''>&"'',I^Idthcnacqmrcincmasodimpomnco
northern area and
Jonor areas svere gamujned
These
vrew ol
from the point of hich were not deemed
forces 'a
by the volunteer General Pcrchal suggested rem-
adequate for Pf But even in this early
battalions.
foreement by Malaya, more emphasis
,ace tu
prognostication of which a huger air forCT
of Singapore for
waslaidontheprot^i^^ ^demanded, as landing attacls
and stronger
inlantry m
feared.
were .,.^,,d,ritiesthencerorwardbecamc conscious
The local exprraion
ad from time to time gave
of the danger f General Dobbies appreciation
of May
to thisaspect of defence.
r938ff,SShe?pSicaIlyd,dWattentio
M CAifP.MGNS IN SOUnt-EAST ASU 1911>i2 M^LaYA

He ^sTOte: It an attack from the northward that I regard as

is

the greatest potential danger to the fortress. Such attack could be

carried out during the period of the north-east monsoon.
jungle is not in most places impassable for infantrj.* The line
of defence stiggestcd tr>' him was Johorc River, Kola Tinggi, Kula
Pulai River. But it was not till 1940 that the old assumption of
the a%-ailabiiily and eflicacy of the British Fleet in the defence of
Mala) a made room for the comdetion that, in the altered circum-
stances, overland threat had become a major menace and that
land and air forces had an important role to play. Hence, just
before the war started in Europe and when the political situation
had grosvn tense, the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade group ""as
sent to Malaya as reinforcement.

APPRECIATIONS OF 1940

The year 1940 is important for the de>elopment of defence

pUn-s and the gradual unfoldment of the danger which faced
Malaya. It is also remarkable for the changes which were then
being made in the orgamsation of commands. In April 1940,
Lieut-General Sir Lionel Bond, the General Officer Commanding
Malaya Command, prepared a new appreciation on the ground of
the possibilit)' of a Japanese base being established In southern
Thailand,and the northern borders of Malaya being held against
a conddcrable force for several momhs. His estimate of the
forces required was four disisions wotb three machine-gun battalions
and two tank regiments. However, the strength of the army
might admit of reduction if the Ro)?! Air Force would undertake
to prevent a Japanese base being established and the line of
communication being operated. As General Perdsal has remarked,
the problem now emerging prominenUy was the defence of
the whole ofMalaya and not merely of Singapore and its immedi-
ate neighbourhood.
With the collapse of France in June 1940 the risk to Malaya
became greater stiU. It was in these fast developing new dreum-
siances that the Chiefs of Staff prepared their Far East Appreciation,
in August 1940, and officially recognised that the fundamental
bases on which 1937 Appreciation was built were no loiter tenable.
It was now realised that the British Fleet might not be concentrated
in the Far East, and that a Jafanese threat to Mabya was a reality,
which implied that it was not sufiidem to concentrate upon the
 DF.FF.SCt PLAS% rOR MM-WA
to hold the
MandA"
t t hut
but it wa necessary
defence of Singapore ,

whole of MaUya .
rev-iewed the situation in
ThU Apptccialion f dtfcncc. It t>-at

Ea and nuthnnd thn Bnu

the Far ipacc from the
aim
hrld that Japans msonrens of raw matrnal.
FarFmstinordtrlobnablntocontro ^ ccnBar>'
in that repion. To which .hern would
he a

^ Japan, it "'as bch^

Stng.
for Japan to capture
f'
po.rn.lal threat to her
rd,would take '
f,
^ Xiim
Xt r Sion
ii Europr and
In thr esentuaUty.
m;h
risk

an open breach with thn no. be m

commitments in Eum^, the ^^^h Empire miehtHence the
large
a^i.ion measnn: ""
10
to asoid "1
was
^irtSsh with JPen
concession, to
British policy ,
onomie
settlement, no. fawourable.
sm.ed, ^a general me.
desirable. But to play for
Japan, is be
Falling this settlement,
cede nothing until
we mud, and XSd f
up our

defences as soon
^curing the hd
as

me . me amapt
we nan. At the t, fundamen.a defenee
of the
military cowtperation Japan, and all
nfBridsh poUcy svas ' were conditioned
ilas of the Far East

ruiSbotthe"

s5:issa3s=
SRl9I0.sv..newdm.geX^^

lands East ina ^aliscd w victims

or Thailand, it of
^rhaiUnd would enable the
Wd be
aggres'**^;.
prevent
^netration of make the
of threaten SnP*PP^^ dlfRcult , by establishing
-ro'^gapom. Penang, the
SnTof^Xjl^Sn
shore-based
aircra

,ao3.
95 cAitPAiGss IN soCTH-EAsr Asu 1941-42 Malaya

Malacca and the Rangoon oil refineries , as well as organi-

Straits
sing land ads'ance against Malaya from the north. Moreostr,
there ss'as danger to communications in the Indian Ocean with its

effect on the seenrity of XIalaya, based as it was on direct help

from the United Kir^dom. This was a new litelibood which had
devTlopcd owing to the collapse of France and the absence of the
British Fleet from the Far Extern skaters. The danger to Indo-
China and Thailand had developed, for it was easy for Japan
to establish her bases iheir, sshciher by force or by persuasion.
And with such bases being formed there it was practicablefor Japan
to attempt a lantUng upconmry' in Xlalaj'a and then operate
southwards under co\Tr of shore-tmed aircraft This svas more
feasible than a direct assault on Singapore Island, and would be
preferred by the Japanese. Hence the whole aspect of defence
planning had to alter, and, instead of the emphasis on sea-borne
assault on Singapore which alone was apprehended earlier, an
overland attach on Singapore was nosv to be provided against.
The Chie& of Staff refened to the necessity for holding the whole
of Malaga rather than concentrating on the defence of Singapore
Island. This invoU'ed larger land and air forces which were
estimated as follows:

Jir Fere/
.Vor/Arm AfaUjc: Bombers: 4 squadrons (64 aircraft)
Fighters: 2 squadrons (32 aircraft)
Singapere: Torpedo Bombers: 2 sqiiadrons (32 aircraft)
Fighters: 2 squadrons (32 aircraft)
East Malena: G. R. Landplanes: 2 squadrons (42 aircraft)
G. R. Flying Boats: I squadrons (6 aircraft).

Besides this, provision was made for the protection of sea

communications and the defcDCC of Borneo. The total require-
ment was calculated at 336 first-line aircraft and the programme
was to be completed by the end of 1941.

hand Forets
The army v>as reqmitd for bolding the whole of XIalaya
and affording protection to ibe aerodromes. For this purpose,
a force equivalent to six brigades wath ancillary tnp5 was estimat-
ed. At this stage primary Tcliance for defence vsas placed on the
air force. Role of the army was the dose defence of naval and air
bases, inicrnal security and dealing with such hostile troops as
might gain a footing on the XlaUyan soD. For this purpose
immediately three divisions were tecpiired. But the force available
 DEFENCE FLAKS FOR MALAYA 97

inMalaya was far belo\v this figure; and neither the United King-
dom nor India was in a p(ition to spare the requisite reinforce-
ments. Australia had trained troops available, and on that basis
was now built up the plan of Commonwealth co-operation for the
defence of Malaya. Dutch co-operation, too, was necessary.
Hence the idea of joint defence plans by Australia, Britain and
the Dutch (ABD) developed and many conferences were held to
implement joint action.
Subsequent to the Appreciation by the Chiefi of Staff, a
Tactical Appreciation was prepared by the Commanders in Singa-
pore. Meanwhile in September 1940, the Japanese had occupied
the northern portion of fndo-China which aggravated the threat
to Singapore. This event considerably altered the basis of defence
planning, for the Japanese invading force could nosv concentrate
within close striking Stance of Malaya instead of being transported
all the way from Japan. The whole problem of the security of the
Far East was examined by the Singapore Defence Conference
which met in October 1 940 and was attended by the representatives
of Australia, Burma, India, New Zealand, Dutch East Indies and
Malaya. An American observer svas also present. The discus-
sions at the Conference revolved round the Tactical Appreciation
which was built up on the assumption that a strong fleet based on
Singapore was essential for the protection of communications and
Allied possessions in the Far East. But until such a fleet was avail-
able, the biudcn of defence must fall on the Royal Air Force backed
by such land forces as might be necessary for garrison purposes in
Malaya. The holding of Ihc whole of Malaya was recognised as
the basic principle of defence, for the appreciation tvas that Japan,
despite the war with China and by maintaining peace svith Russia,
would have ample sea, land and air forces to attack Malaya from
Indo-China and Tiiailand. In this contingency, the course open
to the British was to be on the defensive with a strong army on the
northern frontier, and if necessary to occupy southern Thailand.
The Tactical Appreciation had alM aUocated the role of the three
services, the Royal Air Force tvas to defeat all attacks, the army
to defend all bases and defeat all forces intru^ng on land
while the
Royal Navy svas to co-operate with the other two and protect
trade. For this purpose the requirement
was estimated at 566
aircraft of the first line, four brigade
groups in addition to the
static formations in garrisons.
The Singapore Defence Conference reviewed the entire
It proceeded on the assumption of
situation in the Far EasL
American and Dutch neutrality though
their intervention was not
ruled out; it svas possible in the case of the former and
complctel)
93 CAltPAlGS^ IS SOCTII-EAVr AIA 19H-42 XALAVA

probable in the latter. It \s-as atsoasnimed tliat in case of a Japanese

inwion of Australia or New Zealand their rural forces would
not be arailable, and that a battle cruiser and aircraft-orrier
would operate in the Indian Ocean as desired by Mr. Wnston
Churchill. The Confercn considered the various lines of action
by the Japanese, lumcly, the invasion of Aaslralta or New Zc^nd
seizure of Islands in the Pacific Ocean, attack on Hong I^ng,
invasion of Malaya with the object of seizing Singapore, seizure
of baies in British Borneo, overland attack on Burma from Indo*
China and Thailand, and raids on shipping in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. Of these the invasion of Malaya was most prob-
able. British policj-, in the absence of sufiident naval forces for
ofTeiuive action,was merely one of defence and concentration on
*.*
the protection of vital points and vital trade and convojr
For the security of Matay-a, which was the first and im-
mediate consideration , the Conference endorsed the Tactical
Appiecution and recommended the immedbtc rtmedying of
deficiendes in the army and the co-operation
air force, fay seeking
of India, Australia and NewZealand. The plan was outlined
as fellows; what are available we reua ue to prtsTiit
air forces
or at least to deter the Japanese from establishing naval and air bases
within striking distances of our vital interests in Malaya, Burma,
the Dutch ^t Indies, .Australia and New Zealand. By using
adv-anced operational bases throughout the area, we should aim
at beh^ able lo concentrate atrcTaft at any point from our coUcc-
the Mr resources in the Far East, Australia and New Zealand
For this purpose it was necessary to prepare facilities and ground
organisation for the air force to operate.
Besides laying down the general principles for the defence
of the Far East, the Conference also utllis^ the presence of
American and Dutch representativTs to discuss plans for co-
ordinating the employment of British, Dutch and American forces
in the event of war with Japan. It was fully realised by this time
that in the Far East the interests of these powers were cIoly related
and that, in case of war with Japan, combined action by them
w-as inevitable. Hence staff conversations were suggested to
afford the best employment of their respective forces and formulate
common plans of defence. The Singapore Defence Conference
paved the way for such discussion and, in the next few months,
Conversations made considerable progre. In November 1940,
naff conversations were held wWi the officers from the Dutch
 PEtE.VCE rtAKS fOR lULWA 99

Eajt Indies, and In February and April conferences were held

with Australian, Dutch and American representatives.

DISCUSSION IN 1941

Between February- and April 1941, three conferences svcrc

held in which the British, United States, Dutch and the Dominion
representatives participated. The first conference met from 22
to 25 February 1941, and arrivTd at lentatn-c conclusions relating
to the extent and direction of the threat of Japanese attack, the
attitude of the United States and the character ofJapanese reaction,
the need for co-operation in the Far East and the method ofcombin-
ed action. The report of the Anglo-Dutch-Austraiian Com'crsa-
tions (ADA) formed the basis of further comrrsationi in which the
co-operation of the United States was made more explicit. Mean-
while, staff talks had been held in Washington, wherein it was
decided to convene a conference at Singapore to prepare plans
for conduct of military operations in Far East on basis of Anglo-
U.S.-Dutch co-operation in conformity tviih rtporl on IVashington
conversation but without poh'tical conversations Consequently
two sets of conversations were held, first between the American,
Dutch and British representatives (called ADB conversations) and
the second between the British, and Dutch representatives (called
BD conversations). The value of these lalJcs Jay in the assessment
of the danger and the resources which were available to counteract
it. Plans then contemplated were based on two alternative assump-
tions, the United States entering the war on the side of the Auodat-
ed Powen or remaining neutral. Angio-Dutch co-operatioa for
mutual defence was pre-supposed. The plans were also to be
divided into two phases, one before the arrival of the Far East
Fleet, which svas contemplated by the ^Vashingto^ conversations,
and the other afler it. The plans envisaged employment and dis-
position offerees in the whole area of the Indian and Padfic Oceans
and Australian and New Zeahind waters.
At the outset it was made clear that priority would be accord-
ed to the war in Europe and the first object was the defeat of
Germany and her allies. This naturally limited the scope of
activities in East Asia, where the object ivas defined to be the
maintenance of the position of the Associated Powers against
Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long term economic pressure
against Japan until we arc in a position to take the offensive

tVr Office 10 C-in-C Far Eaji No. 580, 7 1941. (Appendix 38, General
Headquarter War Diary, Far-Eafl). . .... ,
6 War Diary of General Headquarters Far Eajt. .appendix 45, para 4.
100 (iWPMCNS IN SOtTIJ-EASr ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

At the same time important /VUied interests East Asia were

in.

jpedfied as {a) the security sea communications and (b)

trf

the security of Singapore Asubridiary interest was also the

security of Luzon in the FhiUppine Islands. In appraising the
situation in cast Asia it svas realised that while Japans object ssas
*
to obtain complete political and economic domination of South-
East Asia and the islands in the Far East Area in order to secure
control for herself of the sources of tal war supplies , her action
ssould be governed by the knowledge that a^^ression against one
of the As-vociated Powers would im'olve united resistance, by her
lack of trust in Russia and the intensity of Chinese resistance
which might gain momentum by the entry of the /\ssociatcd Powers
in the war against Japan. The direction of Japanese attack was
also forecast with its relative intensity against several objectives.
The Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Borneo and sea
communications were conridcred to be threatened. In the case of
Malaya, it was stated that the attack would be through Thailand
and would be made in two stages:
(a) Political domination which would give some indication
of intention,
(b) Military occupation which would mke time and would
provide ao opportunity of forestalling action in the
Kra Isthmus
Direct attack by landing on tlie cast coast of Malaya was
also not overlooked, as it could be without prclimiDary warning ,
but this required on the part of Japan a greater degree of control
of the seas and mr communications , The arrival of some rein-
forcements in Malaya made the task of invader not so easy and it
was felt that tmtil Hong Kong and Manila had been reduced,
either line of attack would be "a formidable proposition as
a long and precarious Bne of communications " was involved.
Hence, until the air forces and submarines maintained in the
Philippines'had been eliminated, Japan wnuld take a great risk in
laxmcMng an attack towards the vsest on Malaya or the Netherlands
East Indies or in the east against Austarlia and New Zealand.
This appreciation of the danger naturally led to the emphasis
on collective action by the Associated Powers, and actions were
enumerated the occurrence of which should be the signal for collec-
tive counteraction. Among these, movements of Japanese troops
into any part of south Thriland and of a large number of their
warships or a convoy of merchant ships, escorted by war ships,
directed towards the Isthmus of Kta, or the east coast of MaJaya,

* lUJ, para 14.

 VtTt.\Cr. MAM TOR >L\LAVA 10!

cfc con^idertd to constitutr a real dinger aguirut which measures

of counteraction uerr to be initialed immediately. But the
Jtrategj' in the Far Fast, as long aj Germany and Italy had not been
tlefeatctl, \>-as to be mainly defensive.

These cnnienatiom also deiermincd the employment of

their respective naval and air forres and the dindons of command.
We arc not here concerned vhh the details about the dispositions
of the naval and air fotrei which extended oxer the entire Far
Fast Area. It may suffice to mention that the responsibility for
the eastern portion of the Area was that of the United Slates
/\s)atlc Fleet, and the British and Dutch mival units had as their
charge the protection <sf their bases and the maintenance of sea
communications in their rones. Also Singapore svas to be the base
from which in Flta.se II (he Ilridsh F.-utem Fleet would operate.
The employment of bnd and air forces to hold an attack was limit-
rd by the comparative simllness of the land frontiers which had to
be guarded. These were only in Burma and Malaya. The
northern frontier of llic latter was strategically weak and attack
could proceed from louilt TKiiland or after a landing. F-xcept,
therefore, for these frontiers of Burma and Mabj-a, the hostile land
forces attacking any part would ncceisarily be seaborne, and their
objective would be the sea and air bases on which the defence
riuinly rests Consequently, the poliq*. as outlined, was to
organise the defence s)'stcm to rist the greatest possible security
to these bases. This togeihcr isith the denial of polenltal air and
naval bases to enemy occupation, will be the primary task of the
land forces. We can thus fully employ the mobility of air forces
both independently and in coKiperation with naval submarine and
surface farces, to effect concentrations against any naval forces
or sea-borne expeditions during their approacli and landing, to
discover and destroy enemy air forces and to operate dispersed for
*.**
the protection of sea communications
The ADB convemtions ws:re comprehensive and related
to general strategy. Simultaneously with these, and in elucidation
of the points .ngreed to at the ADA
Conference in February 1941,
conversations were held between the Bridsli and the Dutch, which
made speciffc rctcrcncc Co Cflc ilngSj-Ctefrft cu-operaCron in the
western Mne. About Malaya and tlie N'clhei lands East Indies
including British North Borneo, it was agreed that simultaneous
attacks might be launched agaimt these, but owing to Japanese
commitments in China a major attack would develop only in one

Ainiean-Durch-IJriiih Convmaiton*. Stngaporr, April, IJtl, Rrport p.

pir C9. (Gmerl Jfeai*jurl- Fr-Eafr >V^D/ary Al^odi* S5).
102 CAMPAIGNS LN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1911-42 MALAYA

of these while against the other the attack w ould be on a smaller

scale and mainly of a sul^diary and divcnionary nature It

was further assumed that Japan would develop her hold on Indo-
China and Thailand and thereafter deliver her main attack on
Mala^-a with the object of securing Singapore. Hence Ac
plan of action was directed towards the security of Singapore which
depended largely on the defence of hfalaj'a. In these conversa-
tions, as in the others, greater stress was laid on the cffcctrieness
of air defence, the role of the land forces being largely the defend
of the natal and aur bases and the denial of potential naval and air
base to the enemy. It was further slated that there is little
possibility of strategic o/Tensis^ action bj'land forces and a localised
strategic policy is ihercforc already established for the land forces.'*
No co-ordination of command was therefore necessary in the case of
land forces, which was how-es'cr inevitable in the instance of naval
and air forces.
It will appear from the preceding account that the basis
for defence preparations in Klala)^ was the Chief ofStaff Apprecia-
tion of 16 August 1940, which led to the framing of the Tactical
Appreciation by the auihorities in Malaya and the convening of
Anglo-Dutch-American-Ausiralian conversations for mutual co-
operation in the defence of South-East Asia. British policy till
about the end of 1911 continued to be one of avoiding war with
Japan as long as the struggle in Europe absorbed her resources
and pret'ented her from stationing a strong fieet in East Asia.
Attitude of the United States, though apparently one of co-operation
and collaboration against the Axis Powers, was not yet quite definite
and could hardly permit of the dclence plans being prepared on the
basb of spedfic American military aid. The Dutch were presumed
to be the victims of Japanese aggression equally with the British and
their co-operation was assumed, but at this stage the British did not
have enough resources to render military support to the Dutch,
and unless the Netherlands East Indies were attadred simultaneously
with Malaya or British Borneo, the British Chiefs of Staff were not
confident of depending upon effective Dutch co-operation in the
defence of Malaya. The utuation in Europe made the prospects
of releasing the fleet for action in East Asia quite remote, and
ssiihoul that, full security of British vital interests in that region
was difficult of achievement. Hence in the absence of capital
ship fleet , reliance had to be placed primarily on air power
in conjunction with such naval forces as can be made available
and land forces were to be employed against the landings.

mi, para S>9.

104 CAMPAIGN'S IN SOUTH-EAST ASU 1941-42 MALAYA

the range of hea\y bombers. The whole of northern ^Llla>a

was the range of ewn light bombers and fighters. Nor
were the Japanese presumed to have any difficulty about reinforce-
ments which the)' might easily get by A-irtue of their control over
Indo-China and Thailand and the command of the China Sea.
Hence a sudden Japanese attack, fully prepared and in great
strength might be faced, and this Tactical Appredation was
framed to meet that contingency.
The role of the three sersnccs in this plan was defined. The
air force was assigned the function of defeating Japanese attack, if
sea-borne, at sea and during landing; and if land-based, by attacks
on the ads'ancing troops, landing grounds, lines of communication
and military objcctiws. The role of the army wTis that of close
defence of na%'al and air bases, internal security and defeat of
Japanese forces gaiiung a foothold on British territory. The nasy,
vthatea-er it was, was allotted the task of local defence,^ ti^e
protection and reconnaissance of and attack on Japanese shippmg.
Primary emphasis at this stage vm on the air force, and for that
reason a force of 566 aircraft, distributed as below, was considered
an essentia] minimum;
(a) lUconnaissance and attack onJapanese sea-borne
forces . . . . . . ^..186 aircraft
(b) Bombersfor striking land-based Japanese forces 192
(c) Fighters to oppose Japanese fighters and protect
areas . . . . . . 144 ,,

(d) Army co-operation . . . - . . 44

566

But until the R0)'al

Air Force had attained this strength,
the deficiencies in it to be made good by additional land
were
forces, and ** the land and air forces were to be so tUstribul-
as'ailable
ed as to offer the maximum resistance and to proride the maximum
deterrent to attack The disposition of land forces svas related to
the protection of existing aerodromes and maintaining intact
their operational fadfidcs. Aerodromes in Mala)a had been
shed at Scletar, Sembawang, Kallang, Tcngah, Kluang, Alor Star,
Kota Bharu, Sungei Patam, Penang, and Kuantan. Hence
the land forces had to be organised for the defence of Kcbntan,
Pahang, Trenggannu, Perils, Kedah, Penang, Singapore and
Johorc approaches, and the north-south communications on the
west coast. On this calculation a force of four brigade groups
besides the fixed garrisons of Sii^pore, Penang, Kota Bharu, and
Kuantan was recommended for Malav'a.
 DEFr_VCK PLANS rOR 1MLAV<1 lOj

In thU Appreciation, defemiv'e in it< cluracter, there is the

fint indication of the necessit)' of aniicipaiing ilie Japanese troopi
in south Thailand or the Kra Isthmus, At the outset the local
commanders recomnrended ** that serious consideration should
be Riven to the question svhether, ifJapan advances into Thailand,
s*csI>oiild not in self-defence sewc at Jeait pari of South Thailand
The object in doing this was to (I) deny to the Japanese the
tisc r*f air and tea bases close to the Malapn Frontier, (2) improve

the frontier we must hold and piwide aJfcmativc communication

with Kota Uharu, and (3) give some measure of protection to the
cliatn of aerodromes l>etv\TCti nurma and MaUya through which
our air rcinforcementi must pass *.*< But for political re.asons this
step was not consi<lercd feasible, though without it tlie sseakncsscs
of the defence plan ssere gbring, and of svliich the authors of the
'Iactical Appreciation ssorc (uUy conscious. Ifcnce they stressed
llie imjjojiance of more reinforcements boUi for land and air forces.

The problem w.is a difRcult one as the forces svcrc weak numeri-
cally and Lacked essential equipment like artillery, tanks, anti-
tank sseapons, mortars, and y\nny Co-operalinn alrcraA. There
svcrc also no reserves for the replacement of " tired units. At
cver>* stage, taking intoateount the probable reinforcements, the
deficiencieswere serious and the force tjulie iasdqeuafe to cope
with the danger.
From the middle of 19-10, reinforcements had begun to arrive
in Malaya and, bj the middle of 1911, the elements of the 9th
and 11th Indian Infantry* Divisions, the 8th Australian Division
and the nucleus of the III Indian Corps had gathered in Mala>*a.
The air force had alio expanded though not proportiotiately to the
estimates under the plans, and the old obsolete tyj^s like
Vildbccstcs were still in operation. A number of aerodromes
u-ere constructed on the cast coastand in tlie north, and the kind
force whose primar)* role was that of the defence of air bases
was dispersed for (his purpose.*
The then disposition was gos-erned by the necessity of defend-
ing acrotlromcs and denying tlicm to llie Japanese. Sir Robert
Brookc-Popham admits lliat the disposition nught have been
different if the policy h.id been to defend Malaya by means of
Army forces and not " by means of air power which was an
essential feature of tlic then strategy.** Owing to the need for the
defence of aerodromes, which were sited largely on the east coast
to provide reconnaissance over the SouUi China Sea, from which

Taciical Apprreiation, Oclober p. S para 17.

'S See PcTcivari l>mtcb cp. tit. for deuib.
arnnVe-Pophami Dopalcb (it. para 11.
106 CAMPAIONS f.V SOtmt-EAST ASIA ISJMS MALAYA

direction the threat to Malaya by sea was greatest,' there was

considerable dispersal of the land forces. There svas great dincrcncc
of view regarding the advisability of, and the best method for,
defending the important sectors of the east coast. The length
of the beach and the inadequacy of troops would, it tvas argued,
make it difTicuIt to prevent landings at every place, and wotJd
enable ibc Japanese to outflank the defenders. It was feared that
an attempt to hold the beaches would result in a purely linear
defence, with imuindcnt troops in hand for counter-attack;
hence tlic best course would be *" to fight on a prepared position in
rear where the road leading into the interior could be defended
This view did not, however, find lawur with the General Head-
quarters, Far East, who regarded the holihng of the beaches essential
during the period of landing, even if it might give the appearance
of Unear defence. AU round perimeter defence was an alternative,
but that failed to be practicable with the limited forces, and lack
of reserves. Hence Sir Robert Brooke-Popham decided on the
Plan that the first line of defence should be the beaches, and
ordered preparation of obstacles and defence posts at hfersing,
Kuantan and Kota Bharu. The Commander-m-Cbief, Far East,
abo envisaged the possibility ofa break-through in the Mersing
area which would have isolated the southern and northern Malaya
from Singapore. To provide against this darjgcr depots were so
sited as to enable the forces to be based on the Kuala Lumpur-
Perang line of communication and thus be independent of Singa-
pore.'*
The whole scheme of defence thus %vas essentially defensive
in character, and was baud on the earlier appreciations of sea-
borne invasion and the reliance on air power to resist the attack.
But when the reaUsation of land-based invasion arising from south
Thailand grew, the stratepc value of the Kra Isthmus for meeting
the threat was fully appreciated. Sir Robert Brooke-Popbant
writes that the possibility of an advance into this Isthmus, in
order to hold a posidcu} North of Haad Yai Junction, was consider-
ed soon after the formation of General Headquarters, Far East .*
General Perciral also mendons that before he left London to take
over the Malaya Command, he had discussed on broad fines a
proposal of this nature, and on his arrival in hfalaya, he was
commissioned by the Commandcr-in-Ghief, Far East, to examine
this matter in detail. These discussions led to the formulation of
 DEFENCE {LANS FOR iL\L\VA 107

ihc Operation Matador which owing to Its political implications

could not be implemented without prior reference to London.

Matador
The object of this operation for fonvxird defence was to meet
the invader beyond the northern frontiers of Malaya on the soil
of south Thailand or in the Kra Isthmus, which contained the main
lines of communications leading into Malaya. The plan svas
to move the 11th Indian Division across the border to hold the
Singora area and to fight defensively on the Patani-Kroh route.
This step Would enable the defenders to bloch the main road from
Singora via Ilaad Yoi junction into Kedah and the secondary
road from Patani via Yala to Kroli in north Perak. The successful
operation of ihb plan would have led to the forestalling of
the Japanese on a position near Singora But its execution
depended on being able to take action before the Japanese,
which in the state of Thai neutrality and the policy of the British
Government not to provoke hostilities with Japan, was not easily
practicable. London did not permit any action without its prior
sanction being obtained 24 houn before, and yielded (o 72 houn
notice only on 5 December 1941. Nevertheless the planning of
the Operation Matador proceeded rapidly.
During July 1941, a staff conference was held at the head-
quarters of Malaya Command, which was attended by the
representatives of the General Headquarten, Headquarters hlalaya
Command, III Indian Corps, lUh Indian Division, Royal Navy,
and the Royal Air Force. The points for its consideration were
two: one, how far the project for the occupation of the Kra Isthmus
by a joint Army/RAF force from Malaya, which could deny to the
Japanese the port and aerodrome facilities in that area, was
feasible, and the other, whether this denial could be elTcctcd with
the existing forces in Malaya. The conference recommended
that Matador, holding Singora area and the Ledge was practic-

able if (a) two divisions were provided, a preliminary secret

reconnaissance could be made, adequate warning was given and
Patani-Kroh route was also held, and (b) a minimvm of twenty-
four hours start of the Japanese was granted and the whole plan
was carried out during the north-cast monsoon when the Japanese
would not be able to use their tanks off the roads. The scheme
was so attractive as an altcmalive to the most unsuitable Jitra
position that it was readily approved by the Chiefs of Staff in
London, and reconnaissance was made. Careful and comprehen-
sive plans were drawn up to move troops by road and rail into

** /5iV, pra 50.

103 C.VWPAICNS IS JOUtll-r-AST AA 19U42 t\tAYA

Thaibnd with the co-operation of air firrcc in nortliem Ablaj-i,

and the units were trained and trimmed for the jump at arts'
motnenl.

SsKdxuk
The impracucahiUty of Matador had also led to the formula-
tion of an attenuated plan, oiled Operation Sandwich. This
plan coittisted of a mos'c forw-ard b>- toad transport of the 6th
Indian Inlantry Brigade and 1/14 Punjab to Singora with the object
of dcitn/jang its port facilities, opposing the J.tpanc?e landing
and thenialliDg back to Jitra carr^-ing out dcmolitinns on the route.
This operation found greater fos'our with the Cliiefs of Staff who
had janciioned U as a substitute for Matador, though in the later
stages the Gommander-in-Chief, Far East, was authorised to
carry out Matador without reference to London in the esml of
either of the two contingencies: that inTormaiion was av-adable of the
ad%ance of the Japanese arpeditwti info the Kru rslhrous or the
Japanese had siolated any other part of Thailand.

Drb.SC ?LA.V5

The adoption of an oflendve plan of operation to forestall the

Japanese invasion was conditional upon many factors and
difScuIt of achles-enteot, in view of the limited rtsoumes in Mala>i-
Henoe the main emph.sstt was on the defence of the nemhem and
eastern portioiH of the country, and the disposition of land and atr
forces was made on that basis. TnitbUy stress was laid on air
defence, and aerodromes were bmh or cjctcnded to male use
of the mobility of aircraft for concentrating a large force in any
area and also to co>er a maaiinuin distance both for reconnaissance
and oflensHe operadoDS. The nnmber of aerodromes was related
to the estimate orrequireraentsof fonx, but as this target was nescr
reached, many aerodromes were surplus to the needs and became
a serious liability, Tbc siting of these aerodromes was in reference
to their mitabiUty for flying operatiom or facility in mo\-cmeni
of labonr and material and did not bear any relation to their suii-
aWlity for defence. But their location deteriraned the disposiiion
of the land forces, for the primary role of the army ss-as to protect
the aerodromes. The other coounitment for the army, pariicularfy
after the danger of osxr-Und im'anon from the north svas fully
realised, was to deny to the Japanese the use of the railway and
roads leading from the Thai border towards Singapore, whose
Natal Baa was the main object of defence. But as the direction
of hostile approach might be eiihcT from the north from across
 DKFENCE plans OJl !kL\LAYA J09

t!ic Thai border or from Ujc northeast by way of sea, the defence
preparations t>ere directed towards preventing landward pcnclra-
tion from the north and landing on the beaches of the eastern
coast of hfalaya.

The J^otthetn I'renlier

Tlic Malaya-Thailand frontier was crossed by only tsso roads
and one railway, though there were a number of bush tracks abo
which might be used by stray parlies. The main road from Alor
Star in Kedah to Haad Yai in south Thailand and thence to
Singora crossed the frontier a lew miles north of Clianglun. The
other road crosicd (he frontier at Kroh and then ran to Patani
in south Thailand. T}ic railtvay, passing through Alor Star,
crossed iJie frontier in the Slate of PcrlJs on its way to Haad

Yai Junction and thence to Singora or Bangkok. These snain

approaches from the north were ordered by Uic Commandcr-in-
Chief, Par East, to be put in a suite of defence. In thb area the
main aerodromes were situated at AJor Star, and in Kedah and
Province W'ellcsicy, which had to be covered and protected. Tliis
involved the siting of the defences suflidcntly north of Alor Star,
and the position selected for thb purpose was the village of Jitra,
nhich lay at (he junction of the main road ivith the branch road
to Pcrlis, about 18 miles south of the frontier. This position ,
according to General Percival, had obvious disadvantages, chief
of which was die wc.akncss of the left flank in dry weather, for bet-
ween it and the sea was a stretch of some 12 miles of open or semi-
open country, intersected b>' small canals and ditches. The main
defences were, therefore, concentrated astride die two roads,
reliance being placed on a skeleton piil-box defence combined
with a maximum use of natural obstacles fur the protection of the
left flank. Flans were made to flood an area astride the railway,
which seemed to be a probable line of enemy advance. On the
main front anti-tank ditches were dug where there were no natural
obstacles and defended localities were constructed.** The Jitra
line was 17 miles in extent, the cast flank resting on the jungle.
On the other road on (he Kroh-Patani road the most suitable
defensive position ivas found to be The I.cdge , about 35 to 40
miles on the Thailand side of the frontier. Here the road had been
cut out of a steep hilbidc, and could be easily blocked by demoli-
tions. But no prior preparations were contemplated in pcacc-
Umc. Hence another site known as Kedah position was being
prepared just west of Kroh astride the Baling road, in order to
protect the right flank of the Jitra position.

rCTdvt' Despatch if. lU. fiaraa 30.31.

llO CMIP.MCNS IN iOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-4-2 MALAYA

The main object of these northern defences was to guard

the Alor Star aerodrome and deby the hostile advance for as long
as possible. The
northern defences svere the responsibility of the
llth Indian Division, hut from the very beginning it svas realised
that the force then available \vas wholly inadequate for the task.
Moreover, the Jitra position excited no enthusiasm In the officers
who preferred to meet the Japanese advance at Singora.
East Coast
The other threatened area was the east coast of Malaya
which abounded in beaches suitable for landing, not only in the dry
season but during the monsoon months as well. The east coast
was an undeveloped area and lacked communications. But
infiuenced by the needs of air defence, aerodromes had been
constructed in that region, and the army was called upon to render
protection to the aerodromes and deal with the hostile forces land-
ing on the cast coast. Three areas were primarily selected for the
purpose; these were the Kelantan area, the Kuantanarea and the
East Johorc area. According to General Percival, the primary
role of the Army in the first two of these, both of which were
situated at the end of very long and v-ulnerable communications,
was the defence of aerodromes which had been constructed there.
In both cases, the forces which could be made available tvere
in.idequatc for the task .** There were three aerodromes in
Kelantan, at Kota Bharu, Gong Kedah, and Machang, all east of
the Kelantan river. The force resopnsible for the Kelantan area
was the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade which had an extensive
front comprising six beaches, each approximately 5 miles in length,
and a river front about 10 miles, besides the local defence of the
. three aerodromes.
The Kuantan area was assigned to the 22nd Indian Infantry
Brigade which had the liability to watch two long beaches besides
an aerodrome, 9 miles west of Kuantan. Its task also included
the guarding of approaches from the north through Trenggaionu
or from the south through Fekan at the mouth of the Pahang river.
In the Kelantan area, beach defence pill-boxes were to be built
and anti-tank obstructions constructed. So also material defences
were to be comlructcd in the Kuantan area.
In east Johorc, there were two small towns of strategic im-
portance, hfersmg and Endau. Mening was connected svith
Singapore by a motor road and had good landing beaches, both
north and souili of it. It was also Connected with Kluang in the
centre of Johorc and thence to Batu Pahat on the west coast by a

'iPtrcIval'i Dnpalch. 0^. tU. paraSS.

 DErr.NCt PLANS FOR JtAUVYA Ul

lateral road, which branched from the hferung-Singapore road at

Jcmaluang. This Jemaluang road junction was sital to the
defence of this area. In the Johore area, ihcrcforo, there were
three contingcndcs to be prodded far: (a) an attempt by the enemy
to land in the Endau area with the object of either modng on
Mersing or via the Bukit Langkap iron ore mine to the KJuang
road and the Kluang aerorlrame situated dose to it; (b) a landing
in force in the Mersing area; (c) Landing of small forces fijrlher
south with a view to cutting communications with Singapore ",
This task was allotted originally to the 12th Indian Infantry
Brigade. The general plan was to hold in force the Mersing
area and the beaches to the south with a detachment at Endau
and a rcserss: in a prepared position north of the Jcrruluang road
junction; other detachments watched the communications to
Singapore .* Beach defences were also prepared.
In addition to these defences, the Singapore Island defence
svas organised as fortress defence svilh its own acrodtomes and fixed
nas'al defences.
The defences as planned, irrespeaive of Matador or Sandwich,
which had an oficasive appearance about them, had as their
object the watching of a long coast line with its beaches suitable for
landing, and the northern frontier which allosv-cd easy access,
because of its roads and railway, to the invading forces. Prepared
defences sscre to be sited in the north to cover the main approaches
and to deny the aerodromes. On the coast line also three areas
were to be defended svhich held the aerodromes and contained
some important beaches from svhcrc road communication to
Singapore was possible. These defences, though local, sverc linear
in their character and were thin in disposition. Defences had
not been prepared in dcpih, and owing to the paucity of troops,
reserves were not adequate to deal svith the insadcr when he
succeeded in demolishing (he first line of resistance or in outflanking
it. This weakness of defence was evident to the Commanding
Officers, but in the absence of sufficient aircraft or land forces, no
other allcmativc was practicable.

REJNFORCKSIENTS

The gradual modification of the defence policy from a close

defence of the N.aval Base in Singapore Island to that of the whole
of Malaya, involved an increase in the forces stationed in that
country. It may be recalled that initially greater stress was laid

|>ara 3<5.
112 CAJn*AlC.SS IN* SOLTU'EAST ASIA. 1941-42 UAUWA

on the cITcctivenejs of ihc Roj-al Xa\y, but v,hcn in tbe early

stages of the ssar in Europe it wa found necessary to concentrate
the British Beet nearer home, the burden shifted to the Roybal
v\ir Fenx on which was placed the primary rcspomibilit)' for
the protection of Malaj'a and the East Asian region. The fint
appredatioa estimated a minimum fora of 336 airciafi for the task.
11115 5as soon raised to 562; but this lai^t was imauainable and

at best the number did not rise above 180. Hena the army
to fill up the gap and compensate for the dcficienc>* in aircraft
and tlie abscaa of the nat-y. But here too the estimated strength
for adequately guarding the pemnmla could not be gaihered-
HowesTT, rcinfofremenls flowed in during 1941 lyhich we may notv
rmacw.

Jif Fane
At the time wben the estimate of rtqtiireir.ents was fixed
at 336 aircaafi, the total strength of the air force in Mala)"* was
88 fint line aircraft made up as follows:
Bombers 2 squadrons Bleahetcv 34 aircraiT
Reconnais-
sanee 2 squadrons Hudsons (RAAF) 24
Torpedo
Bombers 2 squadrons \'ildebeeste* 24
General
PurpcEC I squadron Wlrraways (RA.\F) 12 >.

Flying Boats I squadron Singapotes4 aircraft 4 ,,

Toul 88

Of this number, only Bfcnhdms and Hedsons totalling 48

aircraft might be counted as modem. VHdebcestes were an obso-
lete type and were to be replaced by Beanforts which were to be
tnanc&ctared in Australia. But circumstances prevented this
replaceuKiit and tins type continued to be there in Malam when
the Japanese invasion came. The other types were also needing
ONCihauL Yet the greatest weakness of the air force coaarted in
the utter absence of fighters. The defiidendes were too glaring and
the Gomnundcr-tn-Ghiefi Far East, was maiang fervent appeals
from time to time fer the inflow of necessary reinforcements, s>hich
failed to xnatcriafbc except in driblets. Them was no lack of roper
p
undenlanding of Um situanoo anrt the Chiefe of Staff cannot
be blamed of neglecting the requirements of a theatre which
fest drifting into the whirl of war. But, as Mr. IVmston Chnrchill
has explained, the competing claims of other zones made Malaja
 bEFfcKCE PLANS POR llALAYA 113

to starve. He tvrhcs in his book, **

as regards air n'lnforcemeats
for Malaya, the Conference at Singapore recommended the urgent
dispatch of considerable numbers of aircraft. With the ever-
changing situation it is diflicult to commit ourselves to the precise
ntunber of aircraft which we can make available for Singapore,
and tve certainly could not spare the flying-boats to Jie about idle
there on the remote chance of a Japanese attack when they ought
to be playing their part in the deadly struggle on the North-Western
Approaches. Broadly spcabng, our policy is to build up as large
as possible a Fleet, Army, and Air Force in the Middle East, and
keep this in a fluid conditioD, either to prosecute war in Libya,
Greece, and presently Thrace, or reinforce Singapore should the
Japanese attitude change for the worse. In this way dispersion
of forces will be avoided and victory will give its osvn far-reaching
protections in many directions.**
There appears to have been no support for this policy by the
Chiefs of Staff, but the Prime Minister had his way. Consequently
the air branch of Malaya or Far East defence remained unpronded
and even neglected, and the posiUon on 22 November 1911, has
been so described by Sir Paul Maltby; ** The R.A.F. Far East Com-
mand was not yet in a position to fulfil its responsibility of being the
primary means of resisting Japanese aggression. The calls of the
'
war in Europe had allowed it to develop only a fraction of tlie
necessary strength (namely, 336 aircraft). Re-equipment of
squadrons had not taken place and was not likely to do so in the
near future; Vickers ViMebecstes were still our main striking
strength. Buffalo fighters had arrived, it is true, but their perfor-
mance and armament were disappointing, and inexperienced
pilots were still being trained to man them. The aerodromes in
Northern Malaya on which so much was to depend, especially
during the early stages of the war, had none of the pre-requisites of
secure air bases for occupation in the face of the enemy. The
number of fightcn available was very inadequate for providing
eflective fighter cover. Both heavy and light A.A. gum were quite
insufficient. Dispersal arrangements for aircraft and their protec-
tion from blast were not as complete as was planned. And, in
Ihe absence of an adequate air raid warning system, the
aerodromes were open to surprise attack. But the role of the
command remained constant. It was not practicable to alter it.
It svas (a) to find the enemy at sea as far away from Malaya as
possible; then (b) to strike hard and often, (c) to continue attacks
during the landing operations: and (d) in co-operation with the

ia.urcliill. T/i/.5fnd t IVM UVir, VoL It, Appeo Jix A, p. 62S.



114 CAIIPAICNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASLK 1941-42 MALAYA

Army to delay hh advance. ^Vhile real progress had been made

in fitting the Command for its allotted tasks, deficiencies were still

apparent in almost every aspect of its functions.* As a matter of

fact the position of the air force at the outbreak of war on 8 Decem-
ber 1941 , was analogous to a bridge which gave way at the passing
of the very first vehicle over it. The Comraander-in-Chlcf, Far
East, promised to do his best even after the outbreak of war with
Japan to defend Malaya successfully if he could get more aircraft
immediately, cspcdally long-range bombers. But the British
Cabinet closed the conversalions with general remarks on the
principle of air superiority in war, and with a promise of many
things to come.* The strength of the air force, as on 7 December
1941, in hlalaya was 157 serviceable aircraft, as against the lowest
requirement of 336. Sir Robert Brooke-Fopham has summarised
the defidendes in his despatch as follows:
" Our most serious deficiency at that time was in reserves,
partly of pilots, but prindpally aircraft. It was not only a stock
of reserve aeroplanes was wanted, but also a continuoiu flow of
new aircraft to replace wastage, for aeroplanes must be regarded
as expendable material, and there must be a regular, continuous
channel of supply. \Vithout these It was impossible to keep the
squadrons up to their first-line establishment. Apart from the ,

material weakness, Qiilure to keep up what is commonly known

as ** full breafcfasc table alwap Im an adverse effea on squadrons'
morale .**

}\avy
The posiuon of the navy was no better. There was not a fleet
worth the name in East Asia after the outbreak of war in Europe;*
only the United States had anything which was good enough
against Japan, as the table (on reverse) will show;*
In Australian waters there were 3 Australian cruisers, 3
destroyers, 1 Free French destroyer and 2 New Zealand cruisers.
As against this on 7 December 1911, Japans operational
strengih was more probably 1 1 battleships, 8 carriers, 2 converted
merchant-ship cairicn, 8 seaplane cajiicis, 18 heavy cruisers, 20
light cruisen, 113 destroyer* and 62 submarines. All these were
comparatively far less scattered than the Allied flceL
^Sir Paul Kblib/i Dapsub m tumAaaeal U> the Loodon CazMie, 26 Februarr.
Vt, IWM VS2 . V.
s>.
ICMJn No*. 131/6. 1ff7;C nd SCTT, djvnl B. 11 and 17 December ropcctivth'.
Euftf to Tnicppm. MotSeem Cable* Na 56.829, sod 53,683 Troocen lo Eadae, 9
Aod 13 DcecmncT ItHI.
>*Ceocae.pophaffl*a DeiMleh wp. tA
wtVrcnal. Li. Gen. A-t-, Tin liar ct AfaSaT*, p. SO, para 3.
*C.B. 3,031(8) lUltle Summary No
14 , Lm a ILmA. SViarr ai>d
 1

DEFENCE PIANS FOR MALAYA 115

Eritijh Eicpiiv
U.S,A.
XetbeitaJMls
.. 1

i
1^
,
2
B

1
1

1
Cm-

1
'

'
light
Cru-
hen

S
7
1
D<at-
roy-
CfJ

7
1
Sub-

13
Free France 1 :: 1

Total
j
10 1i
^
i__j_iiJ i
22 no j
73

Japan . .
j
10 12 1
23 J27 86
( 1 1 1

The August 1941 was to form a fleet of 7

British plan in
capital ships, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers and 24 destroyen.
But it was not carried out and various alternatives were considered.
Meanwhile, the political situation in East Asia steadily deteriorated,
and Mr. ^Vinston Churchill and the Defence Committee constdec-
ed it of some importance, at least psychologically, to send two
capital ships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, to the Asian
waters. It was thought that the presence of a strong United States
fleet based on Hawaii would be sufficient to restrain Japan from
undertaking any major venture involving the close support of their
main fleet in the Gulf of Siam. The two capital ships with four
destroyers (Eleetra, Express, Encounter and Jupilrr) arrived at
Singapore on 2 December 1941.
There w'as much
regret at the very difRcuJt position of this
* unbalanced force On
1 December 1941, the Admiralty suggest*

cd to Adnurai Phillips to send the ships away from Singapore to

_
disconcert the Japanese and increase the security of the force at
one stroke.On 3 December 1941, the co-operation of the United
States fleet was suggested. Admiral Phillips accepted the latter
suggestion. But four days later the Japanese struck at Pearl
Harbour and thereby completely altered the strategical situation.
The basis on which the British ships bad been sent to the east was
thereby destroyed. A week later the British fleet was attacked
and a vacuum was created m
the defences of the British in the Far
East, Thereafter, the duties of the British tja\y were performed
only by submarines, minesweepcis and destroyers aided by the air
force, while all tlic battleships were warned not to come beyond
Colombo without cruhen, destroyers and aeroplanes accompany-
ing them.*'

Armj
In 1936 and 1937 there were only a few troops in hfelaya,
the bulk of them being in the island of Singapore. These were
*'$fcret caWe A'b. 782 Eattaa Fket ueAdmiraier, II Dtcemhrr 1941.
IIG CVMP.MCNS IS SOUni-tA5r ASIA 19M-12 MALAYA

three British battalions, A-iz- 2 Loyals, 2 Gorriom and 1 Manchester

in Slnt^porc, one Indian Battalion \iz. 2/17 Dogra at Taiping, and
one ^Iala^a Regiment at Port Dickson. In addition tlierc v^tre
A'arious TOluntccf nniu at Malacca and Penang, anti-aircraft
defence units of the Rojal iVrtiUeiyand troops ofsct'eral ancillary
units in Singapore. By 1939 the x-olunteers had been organised
into compact and trained battalions; and a* the limalion in Europe
was dcicriorating, ihe British GtnYmment ordered in .\uguit of
that year reinTofccinents in the form of Porte EMU
to Malaya.
This consisted of the I2th Indian Infantry Brigade, compriung 2
Argyll and Sutlierland Highlanders, 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment
and 5/14 Punjab Regiment, and was commanded by Brigadier
Paris. 5/14 Punjab was sent to Penang, but the rest Here station-
ed at Singapore.
Gcnc^ Dobhie, who was tlie General Oflicer Conunanding-
in*Chicf, Malaya, placed requirements on the bash of his plan for
the defence csC Malaya at three dKisions an<l two tank re^ments.
Nothing y> as done to bring the forces in Malaya to this Ics-cl oh^
to the Battle of Britain being at iu height. At the same time
Japanese occupation of Northern Indo-China and her Triparttte
Pact svith Gennany and Italy made the reinforc emen t question
much more important than ever before. Consequently, one finds
greater aeteatioa bdng paid to the stirngihening of the jEsbya
array by some means or other.** In August 1910, sshen Shanghai
seas es*acaated, the two British battalions, namely the Scaforth
Highlandcn and 2 East Surrey, sseie shifted to Mala)!!, the former
to Penang, where 5/14 Punjab had been placed, and the latter
being attached to the 6th Indian Ic/antiy Brigade in February
1941, The Cth Infantry Brigade had come along with the Stb
Indian Infantry Brigade in the course of October November
1940. Of the three battalions of the 8ih Inthan Infantry Brigade,
2/10 Baluch Regiment, 3/17 Dogra Regiment and 2/18 Ro^'al
Garhwsl Rifles, ihe first two were statiooed at Kota Bhara and the
third w-as disposed at Kuantan. In ihu same period the Head-
quarters of the llth Indian Division also arrived was stationed
at Kuala Isimpur, where the division took oser the command of
the Northern Area from the Headquarters of Federated Malay
States Volunteer Force. NlaJorXlcEeial Murray-Lyon took charge
of this command. In the be^nning there were no artillery and
signal units; but soon 22nd AlounCain Regiment a detachmen t
of signal operators belonging to Federated Malaya Stales Volunteer
Force was asigr^d to the divuioxi.

HOturduniTlr&vW MV.VoLU.p. 412.

 DETENCE PLAH3 FOR XfALAVA JJ7

In February 1&41, I Leicester arrived from In^ and relieved

the Seaforth Highlanders at Penang, the latter going out of Malaya,
and at the same time the 8th Australian Imperial Force Division
under Major-General H. Gordon Bennett arrived; but it contained
only the 22nd Australian Brigade and various divisional troops.
At the moment the Australian Imperial Force acted as Command
Reserve, and therefore the 22nd Australian Imperial Force Brigade
was stationed in Port Dickson-Seremban area and the divisional
headquarters was located at Kuala Lumpur.
During March next, the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived,
as also the Headquarters and two companies of the 11th Indian
Division Signab from England, Of the three battalions of thb
Indian brigade, namely 2^9 Jat Regiment, I/H Punjab Regiment
and 3/16 Punjab Regiment, the last was kept at Taiping wMe the
other two were stationed in Ipoh area. Other arrivab in thb
month were a few In<han Slates Force battalions; all these were
put down for aerodrome defence, Hyderabad to Kclantan, Mysore
to Johore, and Jind and Kapurthala to Singapore.
Id April 1941, (he 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade arrived
from India. At the same time Northern Area was abolished,

and the 11th Indian Division took its place in the west, and the
9th Indian Division, which had come just then from India, assumed
responsibility of command In the east as far as and including
Pahang. The headquarters of these divisions were Sungei Patani
and Kuala Lumpur, respectively. The infantry of Bahawalpur
State abo arriv^ during this month. 3/16 Punjab Regiment
moved to Kroh in the latter part of the month, and a line of
communication area was created in the land comprbed by Prai,
Bidut Mcrtajam and Gemas.
General Perdval assumed the command of Malaya on 16
May 1941. As it was his duty to review the strength required
for (he defence of Malaya, he gave it as hb opinion that the III
Indian Corps, which was then forming, should have full three
dhdsions, llie 8lh Australian Imperial Force Division should contain
both the brigades attached to it, a full revision each would be need-
ed for the General Headquarters reserve and the Fortress of Singa-
pore, and one Tank Regiment of 14-ton tanks was the minimum
force for the successful defence of Malaya.* It seems that the
Commander-ia-Chief, Far East, and the Chiefs of Staff, London,
approved and accepted this cslixnatc " but it was recognised that
the target could not in the existing circumstances be fulfilled in the
foreseeable future

MTic Afalayan Campaign: Prccif of a lecture by Liniimant-CerMTal Sir Lewb

IleaOi. 60I/98W/H. p. 3.
UTit Wet tn ii/itera. p. C5. para I,
lift CAMPAIGNS IS SOUTH-EAST ASIA 191M2 MAI-AYA

In the month of June 1911, the III Indian Corps was finally
cstabli<.hed at Kuala Luntpur, the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade
Headquarters and 5/11 Sikh Regiment mos-ed from Ipoh to
Kuantan, 2/12 rronlier Tortc Regiment ssWdr was in Taiping
shifted to ilic ftlh Indian Infantry Brigade in KclanUn, and 1/13
rronlier Force Rifles remained at Manlin in the III Indian Corps
reserve.
In August, the 8th A-I.F. Division received its second brigade,
the 27(h ^V.I.F. under Brigadier Maxwell; the 22nd A-I.F. Brigade
then mo\ed to Mersing area, while the 27ih A-I.F. Brigade remain-
ed temporarily in Singapore. The 1 1th Indian Dirision was
strengthened by the addition of 155 Field Regiment. At the
beginning of September 1941, the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade
irith 2/1 and 2/2 Curkhn Rifles arrived and was stationed at Ipoh;
its third battahon 2/9 Gurkha Rifles was stationed at Ttipmg.
It was eonndcred as a III Indian Ckirps reserve and meant
to set 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles free to join the 8ih Indian Infantry
Brigade in Kdatilan- But at the same time it became almost cer*
lain that the new brigade would join the llth Indbn Division if
Japan attacked MaUya from Slngora.
In October no fresh troops arrived in Malaya. The 27th
A.I.F. Brigade was iraruferred from Singapore to west Jobort;
Brigade Headquarters and 29 Battalion went to Segamat, 26
Battalion to Jarin and 30 Battalion to Eatu Pahat. Arrivals in
JCoscmbcr, most of which came from the United Kingdom, includ-
ed 588 and 137 Field Regiments and 60 Anti-Tank Regiment, but
India sent one reconnaissance regiment, 3rd CavTilry, which was
yet in the process of meebanuation. This was attached to the
llth Indian Division.
Reinforcements of miscrllaneous types also came to Malaya
before the outbreak of war in December. These included t:hnical
and administrative units and personnel and wrapoiu, ammunition,
motor transport, supplies and other war material from the United
Kingdom, India, Australia, and South Africa.
 CHAPTER VII

The War in Northern Malaya

JAPANESE COJrt'OVS SraifTED

Atabout 1300 hours on6Dccc/nberl941,ivhcnthcnorth-cast

Jiiojisoon was blowing and rains were pouring in torrents, the morn-
ing air reconnaissance winch was watching the approaches to the
Gulf of Thailand reported having sighted two Japanese convoys
steaming due west. These convoys consisted of wanhips and trans-
ports and, when sighted, >crc approximately one hundred xmles
cast-south-cast of Pulau Obi, an island off tlic southern-most point
of Indo'Cliina. The first conwy, sighted at 1246 hours, at approxi-
mately 8 degrees north 106 degrees cast, consisted of tsventy five
mcrcliant ships escorted by one battleship, five cruisers and seven
destroyers. Tiie second com'oy was sighted at 1300 hours in a
position 7 degrees 35 minutes north 106 degrees 20 minutes east
and comprised ten (later amended as twenty-one) merchant ships
escorted by two cruisers and ten destro)ers.' Earlier, at 1212
hours, one motor ve&sel and one minesweeper had been sighted
nearly forty miles south-south-east of Pulau Obi steering north-
west,* These sighdngs were all obtained in conditions of very
poor visibility, and later evidence indicated that there was in fact
only one major convoy which wassighted twice in different positions.
The same day, two hours later. General Pcrdval ordered the
commander of the III Indian Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir
Lewis Heath, to assume the first degree of readiness, and,
in anticipation of operation Matador to instruct the commander
of the Ileh Indian Division, Major-General D.M. Munray-Lyon,
to be ready to move at short notice,^
The Comnjander-in-Cbier, Far East, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Robert Brookc-Popham, in consultation with Admiral Sir
Geonrey Layton and Admiral Palliser, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips,
Chief of Staff, concluded that the probability was that the convoys
would not continue their course due west, which svould have
brought them on to the Kra Isthmus, but that they would follow
the mine-layer and mine-ssveeper and round Cambodia Point
with a view to demonstrating against and bringing pressure to bear
on Thailand. With this appreciation and bearing in mind the

tVar DUry, General Headquariei* Far East, 6 December 1941.

SeclJ, 26Febreary 194S, p. J363, para 150(b)
tJtm. Serial No. 5.
SFercivat'i Despatch, al. Section XVIf, para 120.
120 aon.MESs in south-east asia 1941>42 malaya

poUcy of avoii^g war with Japan, if possible, a pnodple wliich

had been re-affirmed by the Chiefs of Staff as recently as 29 Notcm-
ber, as well as in view of the sitaation in the Umted States where
the Kumsu tal1c< were still gtring on in ^^'ashington, the Gom-
majidcr-in-chief. Fax East, decided not to order operadoa Matador
at this stage and informed the General Officer Commanding,
Malaj'a, accordingly.*
In spite of attempts by the British aircraft to watch the
mcAtment of these com'oj's, contact waslost and no definite infonna-
tion was atTuIahle of the whereabouts of the Japanese ships.
The presence of these coa\-oj-s in the Thailand wraters appeared
ominous. Orders were, therefore, tsmed to fire on any aircraft
not established to be friendly.
At 0900 hours on 7 December information was reccistd
from the Deputy Director of hClilaiy IntelligcDce that the United
States Consul at Tsinglao had teporirf, on 1 December, that three
loaded traospOTts had been learing Tsiagtao daily risce 21 Xovem-
bcT. It was presumed that thdr moN-ement was in the direcdoa
of south-west as the Japanese troops were wearing summer uni*
ibnn. The truth of this report was confirmed b>' the fact that a
nvBaber of Japanese vesseU were agfated b> Hudson reconnais-
sances on this date. At 1345 hours one merchant s'este) of 6,000
to 8,000 tons was sighted ui the Gulf of Thailand steaming wet
and another was seen at 1545 hours, one hundred and twenty
imJe ncrlh of the Anambas Islands, steering south* with a large
complement of men in KhaH on the deck. Later at 1750 hours
one merchant vessel and one cruiser, steaming on a bearing of 340*,
were sighted about a hundred and Iwnlve miles north of Kota
Bharu. Again at 1848 hours, under conditions of %'ery bad
viribiht)-, four Japanese nas-al vessels, perhaps destro)-ets, s%-crc

spotted silly miles north of Fatani steaming due south.

It may be noted that owing to bad weather, for a period
of nearly thirty hours after the first vessels had been sighted, the
air reconnaissance had Jailed to make contact with the main
Japanese invanoa force. Meanwhile, the llth Indian Division
was still standing by for cipejation Matador with anununidon,
rations and eqiupment already loaded, but there was no undue
alarm owing to lla tiew held by the General Headquarters that the
Japanese erpedhion was direct^ against Thailand. It was propos-

t*r a iliina, tf. trf. p. JOft.

SWr Ihi7 Cat<t Fw Zmi 7 Dccsaiba mi.
Tuil ttnUiyi IWpBtcJ) f
to. p. tSftt. P*ra 165. It
rtnry (Inc irpccts rcpittc; tbc eucs fOBSiera rf the Uupi onae
u x>M pmUc
r to the K>bR<nest
daOTjeooo et ffvarit.
 TIIE UAR IS NOKTriERS MALAYA 121

cd to morning of 8 December by sending a

verify this in the coastal
reconnaissance to the Lakon Roads.

TS'VASIOX BEGIS'S

At about 2345 hours on 7 December the beach deicnee

troops near the Kota Bharu airfield reported ships anchoring olT
the coast. Shortly aftenvards, at 0100 hours, the beach defence
artillery' opened foe and the Japanese ships replied by shelh'ng
the beaches.* At 0115 hours the Japanese started landing from
the three or five ships lying three miles off shore- Thus began
the invasion of Malaya.
Singapore woke up to the horrors of war soon after. Shortly
after 0400 hours on S December, scvtntccn Japanese aeroplanes
raided the Singapore area twice- TTicy had probably come fitrm
Indo-China, a dbtance of about seven hundred miles. The air
raid alarm was sounded, but the city was not blacked out when the
aircraft arrived. Bombs were dropped on the Seletar and Tcngah
airfields and on the town itself. Damage to military installations
including the aerodrome and a lew aircraft at Tengah, tras slight
but there were considerable casualties amongst the civilian popula*
tion. This was the first indication the citizens of Singapore had
that war had broken out in East Asia.*
Simultaneously with the attack on Kota Bharu and Singapore,
the Japanese had invaded Thailand and made landings at Singora
and Patani. Communications between Thailand and Malaya were
cut. The Thai resistance was insignificant and lasted only two
hours. This token resistance confirmed the impression that it svas a
mere show and that the Japanese invasion bad the countenance
of the Thailand authorities.
Meanwhile the General Oflicer Commanding, Malaya,
and the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, decided that the
task of the air striking force was to co-operate with the army in
repelling the attack on Kota Bharu. Accordingly, the squadrons
based on the Kedah, Kuantan and Tengah airfields were ordered
to attack the Japanese ships lymg off Kota Bharu at dawn on 8
December. Upon smrs? at Kota Sharv these atreraft were uoahie
to find the Japanese transports, which had by then withdrawn
behind the Pcrhentlan Islands, nearly fifteen miles off the Kelantan
coast. One squadron went on to Patani, where other Japanese
transports were seen and attacked, but owing to fighter opposition

XVU.
^Percintlt Despatch ep. tU., Seetkia
pt-n tZ6. Seealto Tie Wtria JU^^,p.fU.,pp. Ill tad tl3.
122 CAMMICNS rv 50Vhl^C^ST ASIA 191142 MALAYA

it is doubtfxil if they succeeded in scoring any hits. Henwiorth

Uck of modem escort fighters H-as keenly felt, particularly when
Allied bomberswetc chased by Japanese fighters. The AlorStar air-
field was attacked when the letunung aircraft were landing. Of the
ten aircraft, only two were left serviceable; the petrol dump explod-
ed and the Operations Room was hit. The airfields at Sungei
Tatani, Buucrworth, Penang, Kota Bhani, Gong Kedah and
Machang were also attacked the same morning. Sungei Patani
airfield was attacked at 0715 hours and again at 0915 hours. On
the first occasion the petrol tanks were set on fire and three planes
on the ground w-erc destroyed. On the second occasion the Station
^V'ircless and Operations rooms wcie hit, as wcU as four more planes
on.the ground. The performance of the Japanese aircraft of all
types, and the accuracy of their high level bombing in regular
formations of 27 to 60 aircraft had come as an unpleasant surprise.
The Royal Air Torcc had been gnisely weakened by the end of the
day and the support to the army to the nCFTlh-wesicnt part where
the malo Japanese advance was expected to des'elop was be*
commg progressively doublfuL
At 0800 hours, General Headquarters, Far East, received
imtructions from the Chiefs of Staff at London to go ahead with
operation Matador. These instructions were passed on to the
hlalaya Command but with the addition of the words ** Do not
act The principal reason for ihis decision was that the air
leconnabsance sent to Singora and Patani at dawn reported at
0915 hours that die Japanese forces had landed at these plac,
that there were a number, of ships lying oft the coast and that the
Singora aerodrome was being used by the Japanese. It was dearly
too late then to adopt the offensh-e Operation Matador. General
Perdvalwas thereupon authorised at about 1100 hours to tell the
Commander III Indian Ccayis to tarry out the defensive plan
already prepared. Cooiequcntly ordert were issued to the
Commander III Indian Corps to occupy the dcftnsi\'e positions on
both the Singora and Kroh-Patani roads, and to send a mobile
covering force across the ftontier towards Singora to make contact
with and to harass and delay the Japanese.*" This order which
implied that hiatador was cancelled, arrited at 1330 hours in the
Adranced Headquaxten of the llih Indian Division, in the Jitra
poation, alter the British and the Japanese had been at war Tor
over thirteen hours."

Dcrpalcb, tp. Secdoa XVII, par* 128.

uHjMory rf inMaiaBDfviH-oa Cofel A-MJ.

a, Hairtu*.' VMoroe I
ChaTvtFrlll. TJ- ?0-
 THE WAR W HORntERN MACAVA 123

The rest of the day on 8 December was eventful only in

Kclantan. Various reports of the landing of more Japanese troops,
of suspicious vessels lying off the east coast and of damages by raids
were cormrg in and creating confusion. Fortunately, aJJ of
them were discovered to be fabc. But one fact was found to be
true, that the Japanese were penetrating into the area and the
situation on land was becoming serious. Towards 1600 hours the
position at Kota Bharu aerodrome was dangerous. The Air
Headquarters thereupon ordered the total evacuation of that
aerodrome and the withdrawal of all aircraft from there to Kuantan
to which they flew at 1620 hours. This rendered Gong Kedah
aerodrome virtually undefended and exposed to the Japanese attacks
from the coast.
By the evening of 8 December, the situation so developed that
the Japanese expedition to capture the Kota Bharu aerodrome area
was succeeding, and the use of aerodromes in this area was denied
to the Royal Ar Force. The troops of the III Indian Corps were
thus ivithout dose air support. The Japanese main force tvas
landing unimpeded in the Singora^Fatani area, covered by air
operations against the British aerodromes in north Malaya. Their
advance towards the north'west frontier of Malaya bad already
begun, and the troops of the 11th Indian Division in the forward
area bad made contact. The Japanese ships at Singora had not
been attacked, partly because the aircraft at Kota Bharu were busy
locally and partly because the undciended aerodromes in north-
western hlalaya having been attacked, the squadrons based on them
were rendered unfit Ibr sustained operations. The Japanese
air force was operating in strength from Singora aerodrome, and
the invading troops sverc making good progress.
The Japanese thrust was in two directions, south-east in
Xelantan and south-west towards Kedah. The story of their
early advance and the resistance offered by the III Indian Corps
may now be studied in the two sectors separately.

THE WAR tN HORTM-EAST OR KELANTAN

In December 1941, there were three modern airfields in

Kelantan, one five miles north-east of Kota Bharu at Pengkalan
Chepa, another at Gong Kedah, about tliirty miles down the coast,
and the third at Macbang on the KraiKota Bharu road. All
these lay east of the Kelantan river. When the 8th Indian In-
fantry Brigade moved into die area at the end of 1940, the
commander was instructed that his primary task was to secure
the aerodromes for use by the air force and to deny them to the
 ;

TllR WAR Ut NORTHERN MALAYA 125

Japanese. He was cany out this

also instructed that in order to
task, he was to endeavour to jncvcnt a hostile landing and that,
for this purpose, pill-boxes were to be built and beach defences,
both anti-personnel and anti-tank, were to be constructed as far as
resources svould permit. The commander decided to keep his force
east of the Kelantan rivxr, with the exception of small mobile
detachments whose task tvas to watch the IVontier and, In face of
a Japanese advance in force, to fall back across the Kelantan river.
Arrangements were also made to destroy the railway bridges
near the frontier. The bulk of the force was therefore concentrated
about the aerodromes at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah rvith beach
defence troops on the most likely landing areas. Rcser^cs were
held at Chongdong and Peringat. Headquarters was located
in the Kota Bharu area, in touch svilh the Sultan and his British
Adviser. Railhead was at Kuala Krai where the main reserves of
supplies, stores etc. were held.**
On 7 December the order of battle of the 8th Indian Infantry
Brigade was as shown in Appendix E.** The brigade dispositions
were as follows:

A. COMMAND

In Kola Bharu Town

Headquarters 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.
19 Indian Field Company R.B S & M.
15 Indian Field Ambulance.
The Kelantan Volunteers.

B. BEACH DEFENCES

1 . Right Sector
A
frontage of approximately eighteen miles from exclusive
Sungei Besut to exclusive Kuala Kemasin.
2yi0 Baluch with headquarters and reserve rifle company
at Pasir Putch. Under Command; Gong Kedah airfield with
Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force ground staff; two
companies Mysore Infantry; one machine-gun platoon, 4
Pahang Volunteers. Also, on the outbreak of ivar, 272 And-
. Tank Battery, situated at Gong Kedah came under command.
The sector was divided into three company areas
(i) Semerak Beach.
From exclusive S. Besut to inclixsive S. Semerak.
126 CUIPAICSS IN SOCTH-EAST ASL\ 19^11-42 4t\UA.YA

Appimbnalcly 3,500 yaidj.

(ii) Melaw Beach
Prom mclus\-e Kuala Bjcham to approximately 2,000 yards
south of Bachok ^ilIage. Apprtnitnatcly 6,000 yards.
(iu) Bachok Beach
From apprtmsnatfcly 2,000 yards south of Bachok
\nllage to cxcluavu K. Kemann. Approxiinalcly 9,000 yards.
The gap betKwn the S. Setnensk and Ktiala Relam, approxi-
maldy 15,000 ) 3rdr, was not held. Damm)- deleoces, however,
compnszngdurnmypni-boxes and o&e belt of wire, were conslnict-
fd- It was felt that 18 tmles was too great a hontage for oae
battalion to hold every point. It was thtreTore decided that the
Tclong Forest Reserve, a wooded, swampj- area which presented
a conadetable obstacle to any hostile force attempting to penetrate
inland, should be left unguarded.

2. CesJraJ Sttlor
Frootagu of approodmately ten miles from incliirive Kuala
Kemasaa to e3clud\% the Kelantan river,
3/17 Dogras with headquarters and mervt rifle company
at the 3|hLS. Camp (3| miles from Kota Bharu). Under com*
maud: one niachioegun platoon 4 Pahang Volunteers. In
lopport: 21 Indian hfouatain Battery*, the guns being located at
Kota Bharu airfield.
Thh sector wasdhided into three company areas:
(i) Kemasia Beach ; Frma K. Kemann to Soagm Fcngkalan
Datn.
(u) Sabak Beach: From S. Fcngkalan Datu to Koala
Paamat.
(iil) Badang Beach: From K. Paamat to the Kelantan
rh'er.

3. Ltjt Scciar
(The area west of the Kelantan mer)
(a) Goal Feriok
One company leas two platoons 2/12 Frontier Force Regi-
ment patroffing railway to the Siamese frontier.
(b) Toia|at
One plaiocm 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment on beach
defence.
(c) Kampong Lobok Kawah.
One platoon 2/12 Froader Force Regiment patrolling
tracks leading from the Siamese frontier.
(d) Repek
Ease for patrols fnra 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles,
TIfE WAR IN NORTWERV iUI^V'A w
 TIIR WAR Kf NORTlttR-N ALAYA 129

C. AIRHELD DEFENCE
Kota Dharu Airfuld
1 Hydembad In&ntry

9 Battcr> (Hca %7 Anti-Aircraft)

(lonj Ktdah Airfuld
Two companies I Mysore Infantry
One platoon I tlytlerabad Infantry manning two Naval
Anti-Aircraft gum.
Afaehajig Airfuld
1 Mysore Infantry less two companies.

I). Lr.vE or comttwtcATtov OErtvcE

Kuala Krai
One company (Jess two platoons) the MaLtya Regiment.
Detachment Hyderabad Infantry.
Dabctig
4 Pahang Volunteers (less two platoons) on the railway
between Dabong and Kuala Lipu.
Au<tf Seli
One platoon Perak Volunteers (Malaya Frontier Patrol)
watching the approach to Dabong by the S. Pergau.

R. BRJOASE RESERVE
2/12 Frontier Force Regiment (less one company) at
Chongdong.
1/13 Frontier Force Rifles at Peringat svith patrols west of the
river based on Repek.
73 Field Battery (5 Field Regiment) at Chongdong.
272 Anti-Tank Battery (80 Anti-Tank Regiment) at Gong
Kedah.

F. AIR SUPPORT
Kota Bliaru Aitjitld
One squadron of eleven Lockhead Hudsons and three
Brewster BuiTalocs.
Gong Ktdah
One squadron of nine Vildebeeste Torpedo Bombers.

G. ANOLIARY Am> ADillNISTRATIOX UNITS

Based on Kuala Krai.
130 CAUPAIOSS ts SOUTH-ZAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

It noted that 2 Baluch and 3 Dogra each had two rc-

may be
condinoned 18-pounder guns manned by the battalion pcrsonneb
The total defences available for eadi beach were:

Tmps Arms Extra Armament

One Rifle co) 9 Bren guns 2 18-pdr. guns

3 2* Mortars I Northover Projector

2 A/Tfc rifles 1 or 2 Lyon Lights

2 Tommy guns 275 A/Tk mines

One Sec (3) Carriers 3 Bren gum 250 Shrapnel mines

1 A/Tk rifle 96 Xo. 36 hand
grenades

One Sec. 3* Morurt 2 3* Mortars 2 Vickers hLM.Gi.

Four signallers Mobtov Cocktails
Vere> pistols.

As will be seen, the beach defences covered a very wide

stretchof the coasr, and the estuaries of the Kelantao and several
smaller ritTn had to be watched. Of all the riven in the area,
only the nouib of the Kelaotao river was protected by a boom.
Many tracks coroing from TbaUatjd west of the rit'cr bad also to
be patrolled. The protection of such a large area by our brigade
im'otved dispersal. The force was quite inadequate to provide
for any defence in depth.
The beaches had multiple wire fences and a line of concrete
pill-boaes about 1,000-1,200 yards apart. Though well construct-
ed, these piU-boxes were too far apart for mutual support. Eadi
pill-box was held by one non-commissioned ofBcer and six men-
Shrapnel and anti-tank mines were also laid near the pill-boxes,
while dug-down posts were held between them. Conc^ed opc-
nirigs were provided in the wire fence for the defending carriers to
move in for counter-attacks. The forward positions were connected
to the Company Headquarters by telephone. Behind the line
of piQ-boxes were resrevx posts similarly spaced, but even more
lightly manned. In the case of the Dogra, each beach company
had a front of three miles and Ibis left a company resenx of approxi-
maicly twenty-five men. The company frontage in the case of
the B^uch v.as even greater. The Baluch reserve rific company
was at Pasir Puich wluch was scvxn, twenty-two and twenty-six
miles from the Semerak, Mclawi and Bachok beaches, respectively.
Cotuiderteg the distances and depths involved, it is at once
obvious that all beaches were grossly under-manned ao't under-
 THE ^VAR !M NOR-niERK JtALAVA 131

gunned, and that unless brigade reserves and artillery support

could reach the penetrated areas qulcldy, a break-through svould be
achieved at any point.
At about 2315 hours on 7 December, the beacli defence
troops on the Sabak and Badang beaciics reported ships anchoring
about IJ miles from the coast. Shortly afterwards the beach
defence artiller)', consisting of one IS-pounder manned by the
pcnonncl of 3/17 Dogra and 21 Indbn Mountain Battery opened
fire. The Japanese replied with naval gunfire, particularly in the
vicinity of numbers 13 and 14 pill-boxes, which were on either
side of the Kuala Paamat (the mouth of the Sungei Pengkalan
Chepa).'*
At 0030 hours on Q December, the Japanese attempted to
land in the vicinity of numbers 13 and 14 pill-boxes. Small
arms fire was found to be quite inefl'ectivc against the armour
planting of the bndtng craft. Hence some of the landing craft
entered the Kuala Pa'amat, and landings were eficctcd behind
the beach defences as well as in front of them, possibly led by some
fifth columnists. By 0100 hours, the Japanese had succeeded In
capturing the piU-boxes numbers 13 and 11, and had established
defensive footholds on either side of the Kuala Pa'amat on the Sabak
and Badang beaches. The garrisons of the two pill-boxes inflicted
very heavy casualties on the im'aders before being wiped out
themselves almost to a man.
Thereafter the Japanese immedbtely began to fan out along
and in the rear of (he beaches which they had successfully breached
once for all. Brigadier Key also was alert on his side. As soon as
the first landing had taken place, 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment
(less one company west of (he Kelantan river) and 73 Field Battery
were ordered up to Kota Bharu from Chongdoag, and 1/13
Frontier Force Rifles, still in reserve, svas warned to be ready to
move at first light- Meanwhile, the reserve company of 3/17
Dogra had also moved to the south bank of the Sabak creek opposite
to No. 13 pill-box to counter any penetration towards the air-field,
and for the same reason the reserve company of the Hyderabad
infantry was moved to the north corner of the Kota Bharu airfield
opposite the Sausage Island, which lies in the delta of the river
between Sabak and Badang beaches.
As soon as 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment began to arrive.
Brigadier Key ordered one company to Sabak and another to
Badang to be used in those areas to hold and counter-attack the
Japanese who had already landed. The battalion, less these
MTliif river moutb u at the point oTjuDctioa of the Sabak and Badang beachn and
ii about 1 1 milei from the Kota Bharti airfield.
132 C.KMPAIG?{S IS iOVni-EAST /MA i91M2 MALAYA

t>\o compames and the company writ of the river, wai held in
fcser^r immediately south of the actodrome.
The 73fd Field Batteiy (less one troop) sent to Montgo*
tnery Camp Kota Bharu airfield), and one troop
(south of the
moted to the main road junction Immediately south of Kota
Bhaiu.
Mention has already been made of the futile attacks of the
British aircraft on the Japanese shipping at dassTi of 6 December
and of the Japanese chase of these British planes to their
also
base in Kedah and Kclantan. This seal not all. la Kelanlan,
three acrcdipiaes were attacked by thejapanesc aircraft during that
day. At Machang one company of the MjTore InCintry was
caught at 0530 hours on the move from one positioit to another.
The first Japanese planes dropped smoke bombs which caused panic
doe to the ^fief that gas was used. The terruLining planes dropped
high cxplon\-e bombs which caused thirty-fisc canialues.
Ateut this dme information was received from the police
and emtom* peso that the Japanese were detraining at Songei
Kolok railway station which lay one mile inside the Siamese froader.
The Royal Australian Air Force was asked to destroy the Songei
Kolok railway bridge.'* This task was succmfully accomplished.
In addition, one company of 1/13 FrtmdcT Force Rifles was
despatched to Parir Mas (west of the Kclantan river) to contact
thevarsoss patrols and the platoon of2/l2 Frontier Force Regiment
on the railway, and to delay the Japanese adsance.
Moicosei, the dawn air rrconnaissance reported, as slated
already, that there were no ships off the coast further south. This
enabled the brigade commander to mos-e his only remaining resers-e.
1/13 Frontier Force Rifles less one company watching the land
frontier, from Pmngat to asMSt in the operatioru on the Kota
Bharu beaches. A coK7rd(naicd couster'attack was planned to
destroy the Japanese who had landed and to restore the situation.
Meaow^e, beasy fighting bad continued on both the Sabak
and Badang beaches. On the Sabak beach, in addition to Xo.
13 pffl-box which was in Japanese hands, Xo. 12 p31>box had also
been isolated. The ncuadon had been restored by the company
of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment which had been originally scat to
this beach. Hus company then contlruied down the beach to Xo.
13 pill-box but was held up nearly two hundred and fifty yard*
short of its objective.
Onthe Badang beach, Xo. 15 pill-faox which had been
temporarily lost had been retaken by the merve of the company

OTtie Su:^ va* UiefraDtKT OaLtf* aod

 THE WAR !N NORTItERM MALAYA 133

of 3 Dogra which then down the beach towards No. 14

pill-box, captured by the Japanese half an hour after the initial
landing. The reinforcing company of 2/12 Frontier Force Regi-
ment also moved across country to co-ordinate its attack with the
company reser\'e of 3 Dogra on No. 14 ptU-box. This attack
also failed. A Japanese counter-attack regained No. 15 pill-box,
and the reinforcing company of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment
was held up by sn-ampy ground near Saus.ige Island, where the
company comnwnder got killed.
Orders for the counter-attack by 2/12 Frontier Force Regi-
ment from the south and 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles from the north
svcrc issued at 1030 hours. 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment {less
three companies, two already committed and one west of the
Kclantan river) was to cross the S. Pcngkalan Chepa from the
direction of the airfield, clear up Sausage Island from the soutli
and pres'cnt hostile infiltration from that direction towards the air-
field. 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles (less one company sent to Pasir
^fa 1 and one company retained In the brigade reserve) was to
counter-attack on Badang beach, restore the situation there .ind
drive soutli to Sauuge Island in order to link up srith 2/12 Frontier
Force Regiment. ITiis move was directed by Brigadier Key as
he realised the importance of closing the gap at the Kuala Paamat
before dusk, when the Japanese were likely to commence landing
fresh troops with a view to infiltrating into the airfield during the night.
But the counter-attack was doomed to failure. Both batta-
lions were held up fay the tfiick water-logged country and the deep
creeks lying behind the beadics. At dusk both the battalions svere
at a standstill, 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment on the mainland
south of Sausage Isbnd and 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles at a point
four hundred yards from No. 14 pill-box but separated from it by
a deep creek.
At about 1700 hours. Royal Australian Air Force Station
Commander received a report that the aerodrome was under
small-arms fire from the Japanese ground troops. A similar
report had earlier been received by Air Hcatlquaricrs at Singa-
pore, who had believed this, and ordered a withdrawal'*.
Brigadier Key immediately went to the aerodrome which
was In 3 state of some confusion. The Japanese aircraft svere
machine-gunning and bombing it, while some of the Britbh
planes were taking off and a few of the huts svcrc on fire. A
reconnaissance however showed that the Japanese ground forces
had not reached the aerodrome wire and no change had taken
place in the dispositions of the troops defending it. Howe\'cr, by
>C Uoael : Thtjafiaiust Tinal, p, ISS.
131 rjkM?AtG* IN soi-Tn-tArr AtA mauaya

ihis lime the Allied aircraft had gttne, and an hour later the
Australian ground italT v>-at ru teult for Kuala Krai, leaving the
petrol and bomb clumpi and the aiffield runway* intact. Thtn,
one of Uic three aerodrome* had been lost prematurely.
Shortly after 1800 hours. Brigadier Key wa* infornied
on the telephone b) Major General Birsfow, commanding the
9th Indian Diviuon, that the bolding of Ket.i Bliaru wa* left to
his dhcrelion but that he ua* not to risk annihilation.
At 1900 hours, nvrire hoMilc thip* were reportcil off the Saluk
beach. The general situation may be mmmed up from the report*
received at the brigade headquarters between 1900 and 2000
hours of that day. Increased Japanese actinty wa* reported aerms
die S. Pengkalan Chepa and to Ae north-east of the airfield. Tbi*
resulted in some desertinm from 1 Hyderabad State Infantry
which nesjitated the use of Singnallers to cover artillery gun
positiom. Al*o headquarter* rompany and the company of 1/13
Frontier Force Bifles which had mamrd from Badang and the
company which had returned from Patir Mas were sent to trin-
force the Hyderabad State Infanuy m the airfield area. MoreosYf
21 Indian htountain Battery wa* tirdeted to rejoin 73 Field Eattcr>'
in Monlgomeiy Gamp, south of the aerodrome.
At the Badang beach Japanese were infiltrating between
the beach posts and it wa* doubtful if the company sited there could
hold out BOtil dawn. No reports were obtained from Sabak
beach owing to the durupdon of telephone lines.
On 2/10 Baluch front there was no actisiiy except the
bombing of Gong Kedah air-fields.
ln\ncw of these reports and the likelihood that the Japanese
might land strong reinforcement* from behind the Perhentian
Islands during the night and because the air-field in Kota Bharu
had been abaodoned, the conunaoder of the 8th Indian Infantry
Brigade issued orders for a withdrawal to the general line Kedai

Lalat Sungei Raja Gali, a position covering Kota Bharu town,
with the left based cn the Kcbntan rh-er. Ibis line was to be
held as follows:-
On the right: from extlmis-c Kedai Lalat to the cross-
roads one mile east of M.S. 2 on the air-field Kota Bharu
roadsTwo companies of2/12rroniier force Regiment and two
companies of 3/17 Dogra (from Sabak beach and creek
area).
In the centre: up to the Sungei Pcngkalen Chepa:
I Hyderabad Sute Infantry, I/I3 Frotxder Force Rifles less one
company. Headquarters Company 2/12 Frontier Force Regi-
ment and 3/17 Dogra.
 TTIE WAR tS NORTKERN MAWYA 1S5

On the up to and inclusive of the Sungei Raja

left:

Gall bcacli; one company of IflS Frontier Force Rifles, one

of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment, one of 3/17 Dogra (al! from
Badang).
The withdrawal began at 2100 hours. The dark ni^f,
the swampy nature of the ground, lieas'y rain and hostile action,
all these combined to make the operation extremely hazardous,
diflicuh and confused. Also shortly after 2100 hours, the petrol
dump at the Kota Bharu air-field was set on fire by73FieIdBattery.
This lit up the svhole area, and the Japanese, who had by now
penetrated the aerodrome, opened hcavj fire. The commanding
officer and the adjutant of I Hyderabad State Infantry wre killed
and the battalion disintegrated. The companies of2/12 Frontier
Force Regiment and 1 /13 Frontier Force Rifles had some difliculty
in extricating themselves, but eventually they fell back to their
allotted positions near M.S. 21. Moreover, the brigade acrow
the creek at Sabalc had been destroyed, and the Japanese were
infiltrating dosvn both the banks. These factors made the task
ofwithdrawal in tins area a formidable one, the troops experiencing
the greatest difficulty in crossing the creek. Consequeaitly the
withdravi-al could not be completed until afier dawn on the 9th.
Even so, many men sverc ssvept asray in the current and others
lost touch with the main body.
On the Badang beach tlic company commander of 3/17
Dogra was out of touch with the commanding oflreer of 1/13
Frontier Force Rifles and the company of 1/13 Frontier Force
Rifles which had penetrated to the creek south of No. 14 pill-box.
He sras also not in telephonic communication svjth Jiis own compiny
posts. However, this company succeeded in withdrawing to the
Sungei Raja Gali bridge by 0500 hours on 9 December along
with part of the company of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment originally
sent as reinforcements. The officer commanding and the
company of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles could not be located and
were, therefore, unaware of the withdrawal.
On the Kemasin beach (south of Sabak beach) the company
of 3/1 7 Dogra which had not been attacked, withdrew daring the
night via Kedat Lalat and Fcringat.
The situation of (he Sth Indian Infantry Brigade on the
morning of 9 December was extremly precarious. On the right
there svas no news of the troops from Sabak. In the centre the
Hyderabad State Infantry had faded away. On the left there
svas still no news of the company of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles.
A thin line did exist, however, and was held on the right at the road
junction immediately west of Kedai Xalat by a company of 3/17
136 CAifPAICXUN SOUTU-EAST 1911-42 UALAVA

Dogra. Along iJic lateral road lo the road junction at M.S. 21

were elements of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment- At the Sungei
Raja Gall bridge %vas the company of 3/17 Dogra and part of the
company of 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment from Badang. Pat-
rolling ^tween llic centre and the left was one section of carriers
of 3/17 Dogra.
By 0730.hourj die Japanese were advancing dowTi the road
from the aerodrome and also along the south b^k of the Sungri
Fcngkalen Chepa. The centre of the brigade positron came under
comidcrablc fire. The Japanese troops were also infiltrating
between the M.S. 2J road junction and the right flank. It was
evident that tiicy were on the point of launching an attack astride
the air-field road. Thereupon, Brigadier Key authorised a with-

drawal to the general line Kubaitg Krian the northern eMts
from Kola Bharu. At the same time orders were issued to the
troops west of the river KcUntan lo complete demolitions and
withdraw. The silxution was fast growing desperate. The ritna*
Uon report at 0900 hours on 9 December J91J made mention of
further Japanese landings oa 8 December and their ships were
believed to be l)iag behind Perhentian Iilands from which ibej'
were landing troops and stores by fighters. Considerable infiltra*
lion was alw proceeding and well armed Japanese parties were
working round the flanb of the Brituh positloiw. The dcfcnden
on their side had evacuated Kota Bbam aerodrome and demolished
it and the 8lh Indian Infantry Brigade had retreated to the north

of Kota Bharu. This line was untenable Ibr defence, and a further
withdraw^ was ordered lo the road junction immediately south
of Kota Bharu.
But the Japanese followTd closely on the heels of the Indian
troops Into Kota Bharu and there was considerable confiision. A
rumour spread that the brigadier and the brigade staff had been
overrun. Tins rumour was actually passed on to Kuala Lumpur
where the Commander, III Indian Corps, was in conlerence with
the Commander, 9th Indian loiantTy Division.
In view of the rapid advance the Japanese forces a further
withdrawal down the Krai road to Kota Bharu was ordered at
1030 hours. Tlus withdravral was covered by the reserve company
.of 2/10 Baluch brought up from Pasir Pulch, and a position just
south oCKoia was cstabliihcd by parts of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles
and 2/12 FtonUer Force Regiment,
The company of 3/17 Dogra and part of the company of
2/12 Frontier Force Regiment, which had been at Badang, were

IVVarIKarT(Jaiei*lHtadijtnenFrEl,A{^>endi*Xo. Ml.pinl.
 THE ^VAR !S NORTHERN MALAYA 137

sent to Chongdong to reorganise. The company of 3/17 Dogra

^vh^ch had been at the road junction immediately ^^e3t of Kedai
I.al3t and one company of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles adjacent to
it, withdrew \'ia Kubang Krian. Tlic remaining troops from Sabak
aUo arruTd in Kubang Krian about this time. Hut the Japanese
were still close on the heels of the withdrawing troops, and confused
fighting look place in Kubang Krian, the Indian troops falling
back to Peringat svhere the company of 3/17 Dogra from Kemasin
beach had arrived late in the mining.
Meanwhile, the 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment of the 12th
Indian Infantry' flrigade, Mala)'a Command Retetar, Iiad arrived
inKuala Krai from hlantin and also been ordered into a position
immediately north of Ketcreh (M.S. 12).
At about 1200 hours the Japanese ss-crc reported on the road
Tunrung west from Kota ilirough Salor to the Kclantan river
immediately east of I'aiir Mas. This ncccssilalcd a withdrawal
to a position near M.S. 6 wliicli was effected. During the after*
noon the rompaniet of 2/10 Balucli were sviihdrawn from the
Melawl and Bachok beaches, those from the btfer going to Peringat
and those from the former to Melor, south of Peringat. At the same
time such troops of 3/17 Dogra and 2/12 Froniier Force Rcgimetit
ai had been engaged during the morning near Kubang Krian were
tent back to Ghongdong to rest and reorganise.

Ky dusk 4/19 Hyderabad sv.as in position nortJi of Ketcreh

and onlcrs ssere gi'irn (o the troofM at M.S, G to svididrasv to
Chongdong. During the night of 9/10 December some svild firing
svas indulged in by 4/19 Hyderabad at wliat was probably a hostile
patrol. At Peringat the companies of 2/10 Baluch and 3/17 Dogra
maintained their position without any Japanese interference.
Throughout the night, straggler* from the beaches and the KoLi
hhani air-field, or from the skirmishes round Kota Bharu and
Kubang Krian, found their way back to their own unit lines and
were sent to Chongdong. liic commanding officer and the
company of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles arrived early in the morning
of 10 December having worked their ssay round the outskirts of
Kota Bharu after the Japanese had occupied it.
On 10 December 19//, ZfKf Balack svas onJcnrd to came
nearer the main road betsvecn Koto Bliaru and Kuala Krai, svhere
the bulk of the Imperial army had been gathered on a line of
general withdrawal. It occupied a position at M.S. 8 on the
MacfiangPasir Puleh road. But the aerodrome runway could
not be demolished and the diarist of this regiment bemoans that the
whole sector svas cs-entually surrendered without firing a single
13S CAMP.UGXS IN SOUTM*EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

shot.** On the next day the aerodrotne at Machang was similarly

cs-acoated, ith the runway again left intact. By now, djc
defenders had come as far back as ^LS. 2&J, which was about a
mile from Machang, and Ueutenant-Geneinl Pcrasnl adds that

the demolition of the great Guillemard bridge cr the KclanM m

river, the longest railway bridge in Malaya and an engineering
shoviTsicce, was ordered on this day.*
From the standpoint of the Japanese, Kelantan was as g^
as conquered b)* 12 December 1941. \N'hea Knantan was being
threatened on one side and north-wcsicm ^^ala}a was being tner-
run, the defence of Kelantan was no easy matter. There was no
road between Kuala Krai and Kuala Lipis; the railway between
these two towns was not dependable, for esrn if a angle bndge
was damaged, it would render the whole line worthless. ^bJ^e
oser there was no olgect in fighting for Kelantan when the aero-
dromes had been esneuated. Hence, it only remained to withdraw
without much loss of men, material and morale. The nsenxment
of the Imperial anny hereafter was anologous to that of a nan
walking step bj* step while still fadog the tiger irith a sweid
in hand.
12 and 13 December 1941 were field daj-s for the Bahich
Regiment, which with 2/12 Frontier Fotee Rc^ment acted as the
rearguard in contact with the Japanese patrols. The Balach
companies fought bard and infficted scnttc losses on the Japanese
while themselves suffering some losses. The ground was appal-
lingly bad afier the rains and with a waist-deep canal to croa
betides. The Japanese were also using armour pierdng ajmrnnu-
tioQ in their rifles and light automatics, against which the thin
walls of the Bren.Gan Carricn afibidrd no protection- At the ei^
of the day on 13 December, the Baluch withdrew to M-S. 34^
and ver)' soon after was jmaed by 2/12 Frontier Force R^fment
on the right of the road, while 3/17 Dogra and I/I3 Frontier Force
Rifes went in reserve behind the brigade headquarters, with
enough artiiiery for the forward battiions.
The brigade contimzed its withdrawal which ended on 22
December 1941 when UreachedKcalaLipis Jcrantui area (except
for 2/12 Frontier Force Reguncnl, which went to Knantan to rejeau
the 22nd Indian Iidantry Brigade). While these riiscotiraging
operations were taking place in Xo^-East Malaj-a, the Japanese
had attacked in the north-wen comer also, and bitter fizhting
was in progress in Pcrlis.

IMl
^ Lrai=ist<a*3ryrl J F. Frith., 10 OecoBto
7V ItV t iUff4, oLpp. 137.133.
 TtlF. WAR W NORTER.V JfAlAVA 139

TUB WAR IN TIIE NORTII-^VBST

On
29 November 194J, the 11th Indian Diviiion had been
put on six hours notice to launch operation Matador. When
the III Indian Corps assumeil the first degree of readiness at
1515 houn on G December, the lUh Indian Division was placctl
at half an hour's notice for operation Matador, and all troops
were moved to tJieir pons for immediate action. The dispositions
of the troops for this operation were at shown below:-

C/A Indian Infantry Brigade

Iadang Besar One Company 2/16 Punjab
One Section 7 Indian Mountain Battery
One Section 45 Army troops company
S and M
Arau 2/lC Punjab {Ics one
company) IJ Wailmg
7 Indbn Mountain Battery f .
.

(less one Sector) J

One company 2 Jai
Tanjoflg Pau 2 Surreys *> Waiting

r
1/8 Punjab J embus
22 Indian Mountain Jlegijncnt
(less 7 and 21 Batteriet).

15/A Indian Infantry Brigade

Bukit Kayu Hitam One Company 2 Jat
One platoon 1/6 Punjab
Arau One company 2 Jat
Tanjong Pau 2 Jat (less two companies)
Anak Bukit I Leicester "j
Entrained
1/14 Punjab J
11 /A Indian Division
Smgei Patani . . Divisional Headquarters
155 Field Ib;giment
273 Battery of 80 Anti-tank Regiraenf.

At 1330 hours on 8 December orders arrived at the Tactical

Headquarters of the lllh Indian Division at Tanjong Pau to the
effect that Matador was cancelled and the Jitra position was to be
occupied immediately. Also a small column was to be sent into
Thailand to delay the Japanese advance from Singora and
Krohcol was to advance and hold the * Ledge *. The effect of
HO CAMPAIGNS W SOimi-EAST AMA 1911-42 SIaLAVA

ihc delay in cornmunicalmg tbb decision was considerable. ^ A

whole days work on thejitra defences waa lost; work on this position
had of course been in abeyance since 29 November. It resulted
in rushed moves which caused the troops avoidable fatigue.
^Yorst of all, it losvered morale because iu sstss a sudden, last-
minute change from an ofTensK'c to a defensive role on the cw
of the battle. The delay gave the Japanese at Patani a flying
start in the race for the '
I>edge
Heavy work was required to complete the so-called Jitra
position and the defences required considerable attention after
the tropical rains which had started on 6 December and which
continued, almost without break but with varying intensity, for
a week. ^V3re had to be erected, mines laid and telephone cahlc
run out. In addition, strong parties were required to carry wir<>
reserve ammunition, mines etc. to company locations because the
iveather had made the tracks Impassable for mechanical transport.
The main position named after Jitra town stretched from
the track between Bt. Penia and Bt. Tunggal Kechil through M.S,
13^ on the Singora road and M.S. I3j on the Kodiang road along
the AJor Chahglun canal to the coast at the mouth of the Jerlung
river. The right sector which was .allotted to the I5ih Indian
Infantry Brigade had a frontage of approximate!) 3J miles from
Bt. Tunggal Kechil to nearly M.S. 14 on the Kediang road. The
left sector sms alloited to the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade and bad
a frontage of 15 miles, 8 miles of which lay south of a large impass-
able swamp and north of a wide expanse of paddy and were
undefended. To make this position more secure, a scheme for
flooding had been worked out but had keen turned down owing I
expense. The dividing line between the two sectors was the
Kodiang road, which was included in the sector of the 15th Indian
Infantry Brigade which had two forward battalions, 2/9 Jat on the
right and 1 Leicester on the left, with their dividing line parallel
to and three hundred yards east of the Singora road- 2/9
Jat covered a front of two thousand eight hundred yards and
a depth of a thousand yards. The east side was flanked by jungle
clad hills at the fool of which was a narrow expanse of rubber.
West of this, paddy fields, thirteen hundred yards in svidth and a
thousand yards in depth, filled the area between the rubber and the
S. Bau, which was thi^ feet wide. The paddy in December of
1941 was well-grown and the fields were knee-deep in mud and
slush. Ruimitig through the centre of this paddy from north to
south wasAhe.Palong, a stream with steep banks which, like the
Bau, was at that season in full flood and unfordable. It had been
bridged for foot traffic in two ptares. Both the Palong and the Bata
142 CAitPAlOS-S IN SOtni-EASr ASA 1911-42 M-ALAYA

were fringed with trees and jungle to a depth of about 6ft5 yar^.
The Paloag siream not only cot across the field of fire of the localities
fianldng the paddy fields bni also offered a cos'cred lice of
approach To the Japanese- The remaming nine hundred >ards of
battalion front, west of the Bata, were covered with rubber trees,
in the eastern half of which there was a strip of jungle.
The forward companies held the cetrrniilics of this extensive
front and were separated by a tactical gap of ibirleea hundred
yards covered by paddy. On the right, B Company had a good
fieldof fire over paddy fields, northwards to the pipeline five
hundred yards ahead, and westwards to ibePalong. Two machine-
guns, a 3-laeh mortar and a Breda gun were included in B Com-
panys armament On the left, D
Company was in a wTll-wooded
jungle and robber country; much of the jungle had been cleared,
but the field of fire was short except eastwards lowards the Palong.
The soQthnn edge of the tacucal gap was held b>' C Company-
one thousand yards south of B Crapany, and by A
Company,
six hundred ya^soutlxast of D Company. The covered approach
along the banh of the Palong was guarded by a fighting patrol
from A Company.
The tactical gap had one great defect; the field of fire acrew
itwas intemjpted by the wooded banhs of the Paloag. Moreover,
the destruction of any Japanese troops who might advance into it
demanded a strong mobile reserve qsedfically earmarked for this
role, but the troops to fonn this reserve were not av^able. The
anti-tank pitch was complete only from the battalions left Rank
to the Palocg. On the whole the position occupied by 2/9 Jat
was a difficult sub-sector.
The other battalion, 1 Leicester, covered a front of three
thousand two hundred yards which inclnded both the Singora
and Kodiang roads. Th^
was a gap of some 200 yard* of swampy
ground which included a copse about seventy yards square on the
ri^t of this snb-seclOT. This copse had been left uncleared in order
to coTUxal an anti-tank gun detachment lodged in ic Between Uie
roads the forward poddoiB lay just inside the rubber planuoons
which faced on to the paddy* fields having width varying from four
hundred to dghi hundred yards. The paddy fields ofiered an
excellent field of fire; taoreos'cr, the S. Kazauatiag, which ctosed it
fiom ncuth-east to sonth-west was an tfiectirc obstacle.
The left posiubn was Kg. Runba w here two pOl-boiei armed
ssith mathine-g^ had been constructed- The reserve battalion
of the 15lh Indian Infamy Wpde
was to be 1)14 Punjab after
its withdrawal fiom the
covering role at Asun. Its altematisa
positions about Forward 50
or south of the
Bata, astride the
 niF. V'AR IX NORTUfRN MAT^VA 1(3

in.iin road, were far from complete.

The Brigade Headquarters wai located cast of the main
road just inside the north ^gc of Tanjong Pau Camp. ITicrc ss'crc
no Iiuts in this area. During the b.aitle this headquarters svorked
in a sea of mud and under a sheet of rain, using its tnicfc as an ofiicc.
The dispoaiiJons of the Cih Indian Infintr)' Brig.adc do not
call for any detailed account. The right sul>-scctor of the brigade
was held by 2 Surreys front Pisang to Budi (near tlic railway),
a frontage of three thousand ^-arsls. The left sub-sector wliich
included the undefended eight miles along (lie Alor Changilih
canal was allotted to 2/16 Punjab. This battalion h.ad its right
company positioned astride the railway and iu left company
ssas at the junction of the canaland the Jerlun riser. Tlie other
two companies were to be responsible for patrolling the canal when
thej* returned from their forward role in the Padang Besar .irc.'i.
The reseiat battalion I/O Punjab, h-id a dcfensiv'c position
prepared one mile south of the railway bridge, but only one
company was to be placed initially in Uiis area. The rest of the
battalion was to be held in the Tanjong Pau esmp, west of the main
road, ready to fulfil counter-.atiaek roles.
The headquarters Gth Indian Infantry Brigade was located
three thousand yanls west of the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade
headquarters and, like the latter, it was dependent on its ofiice
fntek for cover.
TIic 28th I\dian Infanir) Brigade did not come under the
command of the llth Indian Disiston until 9 December. This
brigade, (less 2/9 Gurkha Rifles which was pLneed at Bt. Besar 12
miles South of Alor Star srith the task ofdc/tndlng the aiffieldsof
Alor Star and Sungei Patani), on its arrival was disposed with 2/2
Gurklia Rifles cast of the road on the south edge of Tanjong Pau
camp, and 2/1 Gurkha Rifles one mile cast ofthc Alor Star air-field
at Kcpala Batas. The role of the brigade was cither to
counter-attack in the Jat's sector or tosvards Rimba or to occupy
a position astride the roatl on die south bank of tlic S. Besar at
KcpLi Batas.
TIic independent company was to guard the Japanese
approach to Alor Star via Kuala Nerang and svas at Pokok Sema,
tlurtccn miles cast of Afor Star. Of die Bahawafpur Stale fnCmtry
one company svas on (he Alor Star air-field and its satellite air-strip
at Jabi, one company was at Lubofe Ktab air-field (tsvcivc miles
soudi-east of Sungei Patani) and its satellite airstrip, tJjrce miles
to the north-cast, near Batu Pekaka bridge over the Sungei Muda.
The rest of the batulion was at Sungei Patani acting as an anti-
paratroop mobile column. The Kedah Volunteer Force was at
144 cAiiPAJCNs c; somi*rAST asia 191M2 u^laya

Sungci Patani air-ficId with a dctachmentatKuIim- On $q^dzon

of the 3rt! Cat'alr)- was at Butterworlh air*6eld and another squa-
dron tsas in rescr%T at Sungei Pataiu.
Of the two batteries of the 155lh Field Jlegiment, oas was sn
support of llie 15th In^n Infantry Brigade and the other in suppt^
of the Cth Indbn Infantry Brigade. Of the 22 Indian MOTnotn
Regiment (le.'s 21 Battery*, which was with the 9th Indian Disidoa)
4 Battery was to be with the I5ih Indian Inlantry Brigade on
Szngora Road, 7 Indian Mountain Battery svtth the 6th Indi^
^
Infantry Brigade on tlie Kodiang Road, and ID Indian Mountain
Battery in rwen'e in Tanjong Pau. The last was sent to Kroh
on 9 December. Besides, there was 80 ,\nU-Tant Regiment (less
272 Battery with the 9th Indian Disasion). All these units were at
Tanjong Pau camp.
The demolition scheme in, and north of, the JIfra poatioa
included six demolitions on the main Stngora road of which thenawt
important were the bridge at Asun, the bridge aver the Kaoiiating
and the bridge in Jitn itself. the Kodiang nd the
important of three demolitions was the one at Mangjoi (0575).
A section of 45 ^\nr.y Troops Company w-as respoariblr tat the
demolitions on the railway, including that of the bridge os'cr the
/\lor Changlnn canal. Important demolitions in the rear belt*
were the Iron Bridge oser the S. Bata, two bridges over t}^ S.
Besar north of Alor Star airfield, and the road and railway bridges
at Alor Star.
17 Indian FjeldCompany wasrespomiblefor theraaiatcnacce
of tracks and for water supply. But the truth was that track
mamtenance, in the weather thm prevailing, was far beyond the
capabHit)' of a single Field Goc^jaay. Cable layout was complete
only ia the right sector. ImeT.coomiuiiication was, however,
adi-crself afiectrf in this sector by the location of the 15th Indian
Infantry Brigade Headquarters, which precluded it from using the
other brigade's peace>time exchange in Tanjong Pau caop-
In the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade area, tigwal communicatioas
w'cre far from complete owing to the cable bex^ reserved Tot opera-
tion ^Catador.
The Jitra plan included delaying action from the fhmtkr.
This was to be carried out by one battalion or its equivalent on each
of the two roads, the Singora road which was the responsiKlity
c^ the ISfdx Indian Fidanlry Brigade, the railway and'RodianS
road for which the6ih Iraiian Iidantry Brigade was to be responsible'
In the area assigned to the former aa outpost positron was to be
otxupsed at Asun, 21 mnes north of the tnain position. This posi-
tion was to be taanned by 1/14 Punjab, 4 Mountain Battery, one
 nic WAU IN N'ORTIICKN JIAIAVA 145

Scctjon 2 /\nti-Tank IJattcry and 23 rndian Field Company.

The mitpwjt poHiion at Asun wm
cowred by .n manh, the
bridge over wide)} bad been, ai slated earlier, prepared for demoU-
tion. 'Huj outpo^t garrison u-a* lo pmh forward to Bt. Kayu
lliiam, almost on the frontier, a dciacbment coniiulng of two
companies and a carrier platoon of 1/14 Punjab, 4 Mountain
Battery, one section 2 A/Tfc Battery and demolition parlies from
23 Indian Field company. The main task of this forward
contingent tsai to debay the Japanese advance from the frontier.
In the area assigned to the Cth Indian Jnfantr) Brigade the
forward role liad Iscen divided Isetwecn isvo battalions. One
detachment consisting of two companies of 2/lG Punjab, 7 Indian
Mountain Battery and one section of 45 Army Troops Company
was rcs|>onsib(c for dehayinR the Japanese advance right from
Padang Bewr dosvn to the outpost position by carrying out demoJi-
lions on the railway, to ilte left, and by dcl.a)Tng action on the
main road. The out|>ost position was at Kg. Imam (0302), five
rrulcs north of the tn.ainjitra position, and was to be manned by
two comparucs of 1/8 Ptinj-ab, 7 Indian Mounuin Battery, one
'
Section 273 iVnti-Tanfc Batter)' and 3 Indian Field Company.
WIdJst the Jiira position, together with its outpost and
covering positions, was being occupied, a mechanised column
consisting of
two companies 1/8 Punjab
the carrier Pbitoon Iffl Punjab
one section 272 A/TTr flatter)
two sccliom 17 Ind Fd Coy
was onlcrcd to " cross the frontier and gain contact with tlje enemy
.to impose maximum delay by harassing tactics and not to become
inextricably involved 'V TIic column crossed the frontier on 8
December If^ll at 1730 hours and arrised at flan Sadao, about ten
milesinsidcThai]3nd,.'it 18I5hours. Here the telephone svircs sverc
cut and the troops disposed forward of the vilbgc, the left flank
resting on the road which led to Padang Besar. Fonvard of this
position the carricn were placed in depth off the road covering
(he anthtank gum, which were sited to shoot down the road.
At about 2115 hours on 8 December the headlights of a
Japanese mechanised column were seen approaching slowly. As
their Ughts topped each rise of the undulating road they could be
counted. Thirty-five vehicles were counted and, as tlicy drew
nearer, the noise of track indicated that the column ivas headed
b) tanks. Fire svas held until the landing tank w.as svithin one

Iliitory of llih Indian dvttlon tn Malaya, Volume T. p. 29. (original.)

 1941-42 SI-SUlVA
146 CAMPilCKS IS SOCTH-E.sr ASIA

hund^iurds. Thcll.r<.Ica61.U^.r^
bW AAA, BidBcnmMtth
*
ta Its r.ar
Thn "J*
And mnchins-Emis. CAirists'
b\' Iheir surprised drh'crs,
Sh, autonST^ This
svere sprayed
greetmg. hieh y ,
nncADect-

ed by lie Japanese, might siell toe j ' j ,,^ 3, jnd, an

iramed
But the Japanese bad evidcnlly been envelop-
emergencys nsc iidantry rapidly
h.ch
ins moseirent supported by
mortar. PJ^P"^ ^ti,
aeuon from the posidons off die r,d 2
and destroyed by this tnorur 6te. Faced
^ by ie sto opposition gpg^
mthdtasv,
the Indian clrramn decided to Oa
doing under eoser of dm ann-tanb
''ji^J^ra third
its nay batl into Malay a
it demohsito me
one partially, and crossed the bonner at
pa mSO h^,
throu^TIhe fom-ard cos-ering posidon at S'- ^Jbie
necessary to add here that eoncuttendyjn* ^oro/ie
Singora mad, an armoured train mann^ rf ^ ^ nv adysmeed
Pu^ah and a detachment of 3 Indian Field as
lain sum Iron. Fadang B^The toi Bn.
die 200.toot guder bridge imm^tely so^ of

alter Ihii bridge seas succeasfhlly

desmyed Sj^P.
honrj on 9 Pecemto,
wh em
and arrived at Padang Besar at 0200
the forsvard ccmntng deuehment eompnsmg 45
^o
Battery and one secti
2/16 Punjab, 7 Indian Mountain
ritmy Troops Company was in posinon. estab^S
,,blishin?
Japanese lor
9 December was utilised by the
aerodromes in northern MaUya arid at the
same
^ m r^5
the strength of the British
Imperral defenro on
land front. ConseqnenUy there was,
raid on aU aerodromes as Ur as
to
Petal and Johi^at
Sungei Pauni, Bultcrsrorlh and K na ma n.
-hr ^c s^nd
^
S sm
^
fonr pUces fire of the Japanese
aeropUnre srere shot dowm
osssng to the sartna*
aerodrome at Knantan sres erecuated

reenred ibjer
n Ptile.r tSejp caJaild oa tie rtpeen
Uhe i>.St!^iS IlmSqmrtm h<l aoiatrf the Jrpaatae etiassa scum

w
ScfaocJ. ad ibe Ttrr*ii rf the etrftann
V3>

Ckn{3t~
net. rffour -ad.tri
V. tchex* r
fctisidJwl -ftcBCx; n
uj-are
DSart .to .

"aJ
iLMdoic to tie Bnodi OScuS
i>e Bno* OSciS %Var ILwrir the Jipaae
%' a (imvT .^toa*T
mrf tbnt 5th Dtti^ *ai oaat^ *= >1.'**
y -wre-tw-n rtiay. oe cmn pecT et utfa. lae jiijooo f eare,

OU* So. +<1/6, Tr^ to

Oxrr. C2>rrl Ikadinianexia Ttx Eut,
Twp**i ^ l^*i Af5W So. HI.
 TJIK >VAR I.V SORTJtZRS HKLAY.K 147

impmjibiUiy of defending; Per contra, the Royal iMr Force Blcn*

ii.

hcimj,clcvcninnumbcr,bombed ihcSIngcjra aerodrome where forty

Japanese bombers and forty fightets were located. But five of the
Blenheims were lost.** ^\hal depressed most svas the air reconnau-
sance report that the Japanese had brouRht one battleship, two
enusers and $c\cn destroyers to Kota Bhani, one transport to
Kiuntan and a powerful force at Singota too. The Japanese did
not make any demonstrations on bnd, hence the Indian troops,
in their turn, rpent the day in Jtrengthening the Jitra positions
svithoiit any interrupiion. So far as tJiese were concerned, the
day satv no change, although ses'en Japanese light tanki svere claim-
ed to hasT been destroyed in minor operations and the Krohcol
reached Betong by ICCX) houn, while the Kuantan troops drove
off the Japanese who tried to land nonli of Beserah.
Kow that the destruction of the Klong Ngch bridge had
effccdvely interrupted the running of trains from Singora, it was
clear that nothing would be gained by retaining the detachment
at Padang Besar. Accordingly, at 0300 hours on 9 December,
this detachment received orders to wathdrasv to Bt. Ketri as soon
as the installations at the stadon ftad been destro^rd, and to demo-
lish three raiJwa}* bridges .as it came back. The withdratrsl, tvhlch
was by train, svas efrcctcd without incident.
At dasvn on 9 December, the 28th Indian Infantry Btigade
(Brigadier W. St. J. Carpendalc) beg4n to arrive and was ordered
to the locations assigned to it. 2/9 Gurkha Rifles detrained at
Kobah railway station and marched to Bt. Besar (about twelve
miles south of Alor Star by road). 2/1 and 2/2 Gurkha Rifles
detrained at Anok Bukit (about ne'e miles north of Alor Star) mar-
ching thence to their allotted areas east of (he Alor Star air-
field atKepaJa Batas .and in Tanjong Pau Camp, respectively.
All the three battalions were busy with reconnaissances throughout
the day. The two forward battalions svcrc warned that on 10
Decembr they would be asked to work in the reserve areas of the
Jitra position.
At dusk on 9 December, the demolitions on the Singora road
at M.S. 29j and 28 were blown. About midnight, the Japanese
made contact with the forward troops, a platoon cos'cring the
demofisfied causeway at M.S. 29|. Ttvo hours isfer the position
was outflanked and then the platoon liad to be withdrawn.
Throughout the whole of 10 December the Indian troops sverc
in contact with the Japanese forward elements, but at the same lime

*sODe of Uie t>iIou itiot down In ttiii tucfc wu ^uadron Leader A.S.K. Scarf,
who vaa fuha^uniUy awarded the VtcUria Cnwi for hta gallantry, ihu being (he Tint
won in htalaya.
Victoria Cros
148 CMIPAICN'S S SOUni-tAST ASIA I941--12 MAL.AYA

the detachment from Bt. Hitam witlidrct*'. It was a fighting

^^^thdra^sal o\^r six miles of enclosed amnii^ carried out mcihc^i*
cally and stilfiilly. It was dusk vt ben the Changlun position behind
the S. at M.S. 23l was reached. The detachment sufTertd
only ten casualties.
Meanwhile there had been a slight change of plan. The
dhTsional commander had ioTonned Brigadier Garrett,^ the
commander of the 15lli Indian In&olry Brigade, that he whhed
the Japanese to be delaved north of the outpost position at r\sun
until at least the dawn of 1 1 December so that the troops in the
main position could complete the essential work and also get so^
rest. The brigade commander represented that this would require
the whole of 1/14 Punjab forward of Aiun. His plea was accep^
by the disisional commander, who, accordingly, ordered Brigadier
Caipendale of the 28lh Indian Inlantiy Brigade to place 2/1
Gurkha Rifles (less one company s\hich was the airfield reserve at
Mot Star) under the command of the 15th Indian Inlantiy
Brigade to hold the Asun position so as to enable the emplo>'niient
of the whole of 1/14 Punjab fonsurd. 2/1 Gurkha Rifles spent
the day eontructing resenv localities in the Jifra positioa aod
then marched at 1930 hours. The men ssrre ferried in trucks to
Asua where the>- all arrived at 2130 hours.
Elsewhere in the divisional area the day had been uaes'cntful
except in tie State of Perlis, on the acrodromm of northern hfataj'a
and on the Faiani road. The detachment of 2/16 Punjab at
Kodiang had withdrawn its platoon from Kuala Peflis and had
blos'T} the bridge at Kangar, the capital of Perlis, on orders from
the disidonal commander, thus leasing the area to the Japanese.
^Vnother unfortunate dcsrkrpment was that daring the moniins
of 10 December, Alor Star aerodrome w-as evacuated fa>' the Rosal
/\ir Force," This was done without any warning or subsequent
report to the Dhidonal Headquarters, where some perturbation
naturally arose when a huge p^ of smoke was seen hanging over
the aerodrome and the sound of explosion also was beard. The
hangars had been fired and a few indgnificant holes had been blown
on the runwuy.
A third depressing inddent was, as will be told in detail
later, on the Patani Road where 3/18 Punjab svas imohed in
trouble. This regiment had left Belong at (MOO hours, and, sshen
3 J miles short of the Ledge, had ruet the Japanese who had put
in a taiik attack as a result rf which two companies were found
 TKE iVAR tv .voitnreRV walava U9
mming. In the c\*ening of Uic same day the terrible ncu-s reached
the dirision that H.M. battleship Priact ej Wcles and II.M. battle
cruiser Rtpufst had been sunt Japanese aircraft at midday,
not far from Kaantan on the east coast of .Malaya.
TJic Japanese had shossm remarkable sbIJitics of rapid in/ilira*
tion and outflanking, orn on the most difTicult ground like that
to the east of ChanglunJitra road- Their planes gave splendid
support to the ground troops, cspccialiy in the matter of directing
the fire toss-ardi their enemy. Their artillery was lighter and their
mortars more accurate than those of the British. All Japanese
soldiers were supplied sriih tommy guns.
^VTicn the day dawned on 11 December the whole of 1/14
Punjab had been holding the Cltanglun position in Kedah. At
about 0800 hours a mortar Isombardmenl preceded Japanese
attack on its right flank. This ss-as dri\-en back after a local counter-
attack. At 1130 hours, the position sas again heavily mormred.
The demolhion of the Changlun bridge svas later effected as the
Japanese sscre pressing forsvard, anti a t.ank too h.nd appeared.
By midday, however, the Japanese attacking from the right flank
had penetrated into the middle of the Changlun position and the
commander of this covering force * decided to withdraw behind
the Asun outpost position, calculating that he would be able to
re.'tch it fxfore the attacking tanks could negotiate the damaged
bridges. Accordingly, l/l4Punjab dbengaged and wiihdresv to
a position about 2l miles in the rear from where it was intended to
withdraw later through the outpost troops at Asun, as its prime
role was to delay but not (o become im'oK'cd, At 1430 hours,
howes'er, the commander of this coscring force was ordered
by the divisiotuil commander to occupy a position li to 2 miles
north of Asun with a siew to imposing further delay on the
Japanese. At about 1630 hours, os the covering force svas
/nosing back, there occurred the first of many incidents svhich
demonstrated the effectiveness of the tank especially against
inettpcricnccd troops. Screened by a deluge of rain, twelve
Japanese medium tanks followed by infantr) in lorries and by light
tanks charged through the Punjab rear>guard into the rear of the
withdrawing battalion. Pesv of the Indian troops in this area
fiad seen a tank before. The tanks broke through the rear of the
column, then through a company of 2/1 Gurkha Rifles which was
in position at M.S. J8| to cover the svithdrawal of J/J4 Punjab.
Continuing down the road the Japanese flying column caught the
bulk of 1/14 Punjab on the sides of the road waiting to go into
position. Scattering these startled troops, the tanks continued
on their svay,and there was at the moment nothing to stop them
150 CAiiy.UC.Si IN sOl7M*.%sr MW 194M2 M.KLAYA
 TJtr. ^^AR 1.V .NOftTHERN MAtAYA 151

until they came Asun manh, and

to the Jitra pmition, except the
that too only if the road*bridgc acrmi the /\jun had l>ecn prewoudy
dcmoltihcd. But such demolition had not l)ecn possible and the
tanks attacked the bridge, blazing ihelh and bullcu from their
quick-firing cannon and maeWne-gunJ. Tlic Viceroj*s Commis-
sioned Sapper Officer in-charge of demolition vas hit. A
Japanese shell cut the wires from the plunger to the demolition,
and the Commander 23 Indian Field Company was wounded by
Japanese machine-gun fire as he was attempting to mend the wires.
The demolition did not materialise. But, providentially, the
Comp.my Iharildar of 2/1 Gurkha Wiles aligned a Boyes anti-tank
rifle and Tlie leading tank slued round and stopped. The
fired.
second tank in attempting to pass the first w.-is also hit. Two
more tanks arrived, one was disabled and the other withdrew,
whereupon the Company Hasildar dashed Toward and carried
back the wounded Sapper officer. This anti-tank rifle was one of
the two received by the battalion on the previous day and these
were also the only two in the battalion. The J3p.inere advance
had been h.alted by these stray weapons, but only temporarily
and at heavy cost.
Many men and much material and equipment had been lost.
Some two hundred men of I/I4 Punjab, witli Brigadier Garrett
who was wiling the battalionatthctimc, were cut off and rejoined
the follow ing day. But the battalion was overrun and temporarily
rendered incfTcclive.
The Japanese infantry soon began infiltrating into the Asun
position. Parties were dispersed by Gurkha bayonet and Kukri
charges, but the Japanese kept coming on from the front and
flank, wading chest-deep through the ** impassable manh and
screened by the gatliering darkness of the late evening. Not long
after, the two forward companies of 2/1 Gurkha Rifles were
practically surrounded. At 1845 houn the tanks followed by
infantry broke into the position, and seven tanka passed through the
battalion headquarters. By 1930 houn, the line of communication
with the two forward companies had ceased to function. Patrols
were sent out but failed to return. The firing in both the forward
company areas dwindled and died awa}'. The commanding
officer bclicvcd Uiat these companies had either withdrawn or had
been destroyed and therefore lie withdrew with his headquarten;
for the time being even this battalion was as good as useless.
Certain posts in the battalion headquarters area remained
in position all night, repulsing every hostile attack. Some of these
men were reported to have been kUlcd when the Japanese closed
in the next morning, the rest, however, escaped. Few survivors
152 CAUTMONS IN saUTlt-EASr ASIA 19n-'l2 MAtAVA

of Uic two forward companies and of the company <vhich had been
covering the %vithdrawal of 1/J4 Punjab ever rejoined the
battalion.
On the Kodbng road, the withdrawal of the detachment of
/Jt
2/16 Punjab from Kodiang had conformed with that of 2
P unjab from Changlun.** At 1800 hours it had passed through
the outpost position at Kg. Imam. The armoured train also bad
vidihdrasvn down the railway and had crossed the railway bridge
over the /Mor Changlun canal at about dusk when the bridge wm

also blown. Then occurred an unfortunate incident. /Is tt
understandable nitlj inexperienced troops, a demolition was
prematurely blown. This was the ^langgoi demolition at M-S.
Inutn.
13| on the Kodiangroad behind the outpost position at Kg.
Tor various reasons it was not repaired in time, although there
was fortunately no contact on this front, and all transport gum
and carriers of the cos'ering and outpost troop* and scstjj anti-
tank gtms, vhtch had been sited 'vith the East Surreys right
company in the Puanghlaaggoi area, had their lines of with-
drawal blocked, and s>erc lost.
The disastCH on the Singora and Kodiang road op till now
had a profound influence on the battle of Jitro.* which wsu soon
to foUosv. The Japanese position was strong not only in this

of Kedah but aUo on the Grik ^Kroh road. The British official
report of the operations on this road stated that 'attacks by
pectedly strong enemy forces which included tanks and Ught
artillery forced our troops back towards the frontier. Situation
confused but gives cause for some amdety as, if tWs enemy force
breaks through, whole of X. Kedah position will be threatened.
It ivas appredaled that the Japaucse would certainly moke a thrust
down the road leading from Patani with a view to cutting the
11th Indian DKisions Uncs of communications at Sungei Patani
or Kuala Kangsar. If this were adueved whilst the division was
fighting north of Sungei Patani or oven in north Perak, it would
be threatened with annihilation.

EKOncOl. QPE&ATIONS

11. was
It nas Originally intended inai me
uiicnaca that the column operating
operaung on the
ou u.
D-s * _ ^ .r- S/fJ
iCrofi-Patani, roadr known as Krohcol, should consist of
.

3 VvrIK^Gner*IHftiilqurtet.PrE*it,CbleNo.
0 t 61 .Cener*l StogP*
foTre^^ DrtOTte. IMI, l!aooi,G.M.T. Appendix
ia .Vo. 170.
*71/ Kerte
W43. Cepera)
^
nr.,p. 127.
Far San, IW.
12 ITnxrober IWt,
 TIIK \VAIl IM NORTHUIN It-VLAVA 153

Punjab, 3/lG Punjab, and one battcr>' FMSVF** besides Utc

field company and field ambulance. The FMSVF battery
had, howcscr, been unable to mobilise In time, and was replaced
later by 10 Indian Mountain Battery from the North Kcdali
front. 5/14 Punjab was mowd up to Kroli on 8 December, lc.ivinf
one company in Penang. Tlic battalion (less one company) had
not arrived when operations started. Responsibility for operations
on the Kroh front was, on 8 December, therefore, delegated by the
Commander III Indian Corps to the Commander Ilth Indian
Disision.
The role of Krohcol was to stop the Japanese advancing
down the Paiani-Krnh road. It was understood that tills might
be achies'cd only if Krohcol gained possession of the Ledge
in good lime to carr^' out comprehensive demolitions on the stretch
of this precipitous road-cut before the Japanese arrived. Tlic
'*
Ledge was a six-mile stretch of the road cut out of the mountain
side overlooking the Patam river. lu northern end lay thirty-
five miles from the frontier and sixty-nine miles from Patanh
The terrain at the ** Ledge svas extremely difficult for Infantry,
and the repair of long stretches of road, the debris of which when
demolished would literally fall down the hill-side, would be a lengthy
and tedious business; it was estimated that comprehensive demoli-
tions would dehty the passage of lorries and tanks for at least two
months.
Tlic timely anticipation of the Japanese arrival at the
Ledge was therefore a pre-requisite for holding up their
advance. It was also hoped that they might be forestalled at
Banangsta where a single ferry, whose capacity was only one lorry,
crossed the Patani river. This village lay half way between Patani
and the frontier.
In all the pre-war British High Command appreciations
it had been considered that opposition by the Thais would be most

unlikely; in fact it was expected that they would welcome British

troops and give them every assistance. Krohcol commander,
however, was taking no risks. The road between tlje frontier and

V.U commanded LL-Cotonct Moorhead of 3/16 Punjab and iti final

rompoiltioti
5/>4 Punjab (less one company retained tn Penang).
3116 Punjab.
10 Indian Mountain Dafcery.
cine iroop 273 Anti-tank Battery.
40 Army Troops Companies Sappers and Miners (less one section at Padang
Besar).
A detachment Div. Signals.
A detachment 2/3 Auilraltan Resrtvo Mechanical Transport Company.
A detachment 36 Field Ambulance.
2/3 Australian Motor Ambutonce Convoy.
IM CAJtp.uGNS IN soimi-XAST ASii^ 1941*42 Malaya

Belong passed a defile fian&ed on either side by high lulls covered

with thick jungle- In the unlikely evtnt of the Thai opposition
it would be fatal to be caught In lorries on this stretch
of rtd.
He, therefore, planned to match to Betong, and on amva
there to call his troop-carr^'ing lorries, embus bis
up troops and
occupy the Ledge.
d
The occupation of the Ledge devolved on 3/1
intitial
Punjab. Because it was only after 1330 hours on 8 December,
more than 12 hours after the Japanese began landing at Pat^L
that the order Operate Ledge was received by the Comnundcr
of Krohcol, and as 5/14 Punjab had not yet arrived, helmd to
immediately in personal command of 3/16 Punjab which was to
own battalion. At 1400 hours the leading scouts arrived at the
frontier barrier gate. It had been closed and padlocked. So me
scouts smashed it vvithaxes and resumed their adtancc. Immed^
tcly the leading scout had set foot across the frontier he was greetrf
by a fusillade of fire and fell dead. This unexpectedly hostile
reception required some readjustment of ideas, but for lack of dw
the advance svas resumed within -a few minuies. The earner
platoon Rioted ahead as advanced guard, while two companie*
cut their way through the jungle on either side of the road.
The locals, posably assisted by the Japanese (who on 8
December had landed a strong force at Patani) employed gueflua
tactics to obstruct theiradvance, and consequently the progre^
continued but slowly until dusk. Blocks were found at evciy bend
of the winding road. The Sank companies cither hacked a laborious
way or made quick advances, as jungle and rubber alternated-
Thus, by dusk, 3/16 Punjab had covered only three miles in four
and a half hours, at the cost of fifteen lives. Six dead Thais had
been left on the ground, and five Japanese rifles and one Japanese
light automatic bad ba captured. It was estimated that
the
battalion had been opposed by one hundred and fifty Thai
gendarmes whose casualties were estimated at twcnt>'-four.
The battalion went into perimeter camp for the night, when it
was subjected to constant sniping. 5/14 Punjab (less one company)
arrived at Kroh at 0400 hours on 9 December, but it was stopped
there bj- the order of the command^- of Krohcol as, in his opinion,
the country <hd not allow the use of more than one battalion.
At fight on 9 December, 3/16 Punjab resumed its
advance. It was now opposed by approximately three hundred
and fifty Thai gendarmes who exhibited the same tactics as on the
previous afternoon. Sappers of the 46ih Company (Army Troops)
did gallant work clearing several blocks. In the afternoon aU
opposition ceased as suddenly as it had begun, but the battalion
 TJIE 1.V NORTlIER.N MaLAVA J55

had suffered fificen more About thrily men of tlic

casualties.
hostile force had been killed in close fighting and six wouiidcdThais
were captured.
At 1600 houn the battalion arrived at Belong which was
decked with white flags, ft was welcomed by a minor ofHcial
of the Thai Government, who also apologised lor the opposition
which was due to, as he described it, a " mistake and also the
absence of the regular district officer.**
At OGOO hours on 10 December, 3/16 Punjab embussed in
lorries of 2/3 Australian Resenr M.T. company and moved off,
headed by the carrier platoon and one company. It debussed at
1330 hours at a point only six miles south of the " Ledge , as there
was no turrung point for lorries further north. The move had
not been witliout opposition from the air but no change occurred.
No opposition was met with on tlic land until the advanced guard,
comprising the carrier platoon and one company, had moved two
thousand yards when they encountered slight opposition. This,
however, caused little delay and tlicy were able to continue their
march for another mile before any stronger opposition was met
On thb occasion the opposing force consUted of the Japanese svho
had covered sevcnty*elght miles from Patani within a little over
thirty hours and on roads which were in very poor condition. They
had presumably supplemented the single ferry at Banangsta. As
against this the Krohcol had covered only ihirty*lsvo miles. The
force was still three and a half miles souUi of the Ledge . The
Japanese had won die race.
3/16 Punjab immediately began an outflanking movement
west of the road. The first company (B) syas held up after
progressing a few hundred yards. A
second company (D)
advanced through die first company and occupied a hill, known
as Jungle Hill, in the rear of the Japanese right flank. This
caused the latter to withdraw and permitted a third company
(A) to push ahead along the road. But suddenly a Japanese
motorised column headed by tanks appeared. The company
let the tanks pass and then attacked the lorries. However, another
group of tanks was found to be following in the rear of the first,
asa resuU ofw^kVi ACompawy bauk ovt-rwhelnwag
odds for thirty minutes by the end of which practically the whole
of it had suffered casualties. It was indeed a gallant fight, which
inspired the remainder and also gave to them a valuable respite
during svhich they were able to occupy a defensive position behind
tlic Kampong To stream, and also partially to wreck the wooden

9 This District Officers car wa* tbumftfiiebainexl day racing north. Apparently
he bad been up to warn the Japanese.
156 C\M1'AIC^& IN SOCrW*E.\ST ASLA I3-IM2 jlalava

bridge across that risailet. After dealing svilh the company ca t^

road the Japanese tanks continned southwaids but s'.-crc stopped by
the partially demolished bridge ot'Cr the Kampong To stream
and were forced to vnthdraw in the face of accurate anti-tank
fire.
Mcanwltile, the Japanese were also ss-orldng round tfe
west slopes of Jungle Hill and were threatening to cut off D
Compan)' firom the rest of the battalioo. The company commander
decided to withdraw following a wide detour through the jungle.
Thus, at nightfiiU, 3/16 Punjab was short by two companies. Ttc
battalion (less two companies) was then disposed south of the
Kampong To stream. The unfordabte S. Patani flowed one and
a half miles east of the right flant, and both flanks of the position
lay against steep hill-sides covered with thick jungle wluch was
then classified as impenetrable. MeanwMe 5/14 Punjab
(less one company) with Indian Moimiain Battery under command,
had been ordered to occupy a position about nine mfles north a
Belong. It had been decided not to bring the battery forward
in ropport of 3/16 Punjab as there were no ruitable gaa pooiKsa
In the area.
The cenunander cf Kroheol also tent a message to the
dititional headqiuneis rvportiog the rimation and stating that
withdrawal was likely. Thedhisicnal coasiander, who waaoce
hundred and thirteen tmles (rom the scene of battle, was in c
portion to tmastigate the situation or to influence ELrohcol opera-
tions. However, to reinforce the cnlumn, one troop of 273 AnO-
taid: Battery was sent ihrm Jitra.
The tu^t of lO/l! December was for 3/16 Punjab one of
acthx patrolling. The saj^rs, though continuously ssiped, comp-
letely demolished the wooden bridge over the Kampong To stream
making it impassable even for iefanny. By dawn ^11 December,
the battahoa less the twxt rnimn^ companies (A anrf D; was fairly
well consolidated and an early mcwiuag bombardment by Japanese
mortars had dose little damage. At 1000 hours, D Company,
the corrpacy tom Jua^c Hill, had arrived back.
Diiring the afierKton the Japanese laimched three separate
attacks. The first two, at I5W) hours and I6GO hours respectively,
were beaten off with heavy lone*. Later, at 1730 hours, a cO"
ordinated battalion ana^ was launched by the Japanese against
lie whole front. It was tuppu; t ed by infentry gnia which cno-
centrated on the Erituh carrier s which had hero " deg in
ihc road and camonSared. Many of th<^ carrier* were iiteraUy
blown out eC the ground. The attack vms, however, held and
eventually the tfaee-rach laortan tilenced the Japanese gum-
 TtlE WAR m NORTHERN UUaYA 157

In consequence of this fight the battalion had suflered thirty casual-

ties, bringing the total to tvvo hundred casualties sinceit had crossed

the frontier, but it had held the Japanese and indicted severe losses
on them. The battalion howev'cr had now been on the move or
in action for four days and had not slept for two nights. The
mounting casualties and complete absence of sleep could not go on
indefinitely. The commander of Krohcol, therefore, derided
that it was and join up with 5/14 Punjab
essential to willidrasv
before his unit became too shattered and worn-out to fight, and
telephoned to the divisional coounnnder who sent orden by the
hand of an officer, giving discretion to the local commander to
svithdraw if necessary but reminding him of the vital importance
of preventing the Japanese from reaching Sungei Fatani. The
Krohcol was also fold that the prepared Kroh position must be the
limit of their withdrawal.
At 0400 hours on 12 December, a strong attack against the
centre of the position was repulsed after hand-to-hand fighting,
but dawn revealed that the Japanese were by-passing the position
along the banks of the Sungei Patani on the east Hank. At 0700
hours again the Japanese launched the strongest attack yet made
on the Indian battalion. Their outfianking troops used light
automatic fire from the tree tbps, and soon they were well round
the east fiank and threatening to cut the route of the Indian
withdrawal.
By 0900 hours all carriers except four had been knocked out,
and the derelicts were dragged on to the road as obstacles. By
this time the west flank of the position had also been outflanked, but
one company was sent back to occupy a *' lay-back position about
a mile to the south. The other two companies were then with-
drawn, covered by the four remaiiung carriers. Two more carriers
were knocked out before the battle commander, who was himself
personally in charge of the rear party, was satisfied that his forward
troops were clear and could give the order to retire. The
Japanese apparently felt that they had had enough, as they did
not follow up the withdrawal. 3/16 Punjab was thereby enabled
to move back in lorries of 2/3 Atutralisui Reserve Mechanical
Transport Company to the Kroh position, and at 1500 hours three
hundred and fifty men of the batt^ioD passed through 5/14 Punjab.
On the night of 12/13 December, Krohcol ceased to be under the
command of the 1 1th Indian Oiviston and came under the direct
control of the Corps Commander.
It is necessary to observe that the men of 3/16 Punjab had
indeed put up a magnificent fight and added a glorious page to the
history of their Regiment. This due to the " psychological
158 CAitPAICNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1911-42 MALAVA

advantage* which it enjoyed from its splendid initial advance mto

the Ledge area. This battalion, besides, alone of all the batta-
lions in the llth Indian Division, was spared the demoralising
effect of that twelfthhour change of role from Matador to

Jitra from offence to defence.

",
The Japanese attack on the Jitra position and Kroheo
had considerably endangered the position of the army in the first
of
three days of the war. It was further affected by the polic>'
of
withdrawal of the Royal Air Force. There was difference
opinion regarding the effective employment of the air force. The
Air Officer Commanding believed that the correct employment
of air forces was in the attack of the shipping and concentrations m
the Singora area*,** whilelhe General OfficerCommandingwanKd
the British planes to attack the Japanese aerodromes and give
immediate relief to his tioops in northern Malaya. The question
was of coarse decided according to the Generals svish. But in the
mcandme the Royal Air Force had evacuated the aerodromes m
the north, and taken shelter in more peaceful places Iikc_ Ipob,
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and in a few places had failed to
clear equipment and stores. In some places they bad even leii
the runways intact, which enabled the Japanese to mount sv
attacks from these airfields without delay.
The situadon at this stage of hostilities has been summarised
by General Percival in the following terms; In the air the situa-
tion was not much better (than on the sea). The Japanese Ar
Force was already well estabUdicd on the aerodromes in South
Thailand. .. .There was also, of course, the long-range aircraft
operating from the aerodromes in South Indo-China. The
Japanese probably had at least 300 modeni aircraft available at
this time. Constant attacks were kept up on our small air force
and its bases in North Malaya, in which we suffered heavy losses.
.The situation was made worse by our lack of fighter protection
and of proper anti-mrcrafi ground defence.**
Meanwhile a ^Var Council had started functioning at Singa-
pore from 10 December, with the object of directing the war in the
East. It asked Royal Air Force to afford air cover to the ground
troops and maintain control over air primarily for the defence of
Singapore and also to provide protection to the convoys bringing
land and air reinforcements to Malaya. Next, it decided to
withdraw the troops from Kclantan. Above all, the responsibility
 THE WAR is NORTHERN JULAYA 159

Tor the Krohwa* tramrerred from the 11th Indian DKision

front
from the midnishi of 12/13 December.

RtTRt:AT FROM jrTRA

In the battle of Jifra, by 1800 hours on 11 December, C

Company of 2 Jai and .i platoon ofB Company in Kg. Mahtu had
already engaged with the Japanese snipen svho must have by-
pawed 1/14 Punjab during the encounter at Chunglun in the
morning. At 1930 hourr, when news rcac/jcd the llth Indian
Division tliat Brigadier Garrett had been cut olT on the Changlun
ro.nd, Brigadier Carpendale of the 28tlj Indian Brigade was placed
in command of the 15th Indian Brigade as well as his otvn.
By 2030 hours J.ipanesc tanks, sriih headlights on, reached
the demolition at M.S. 13J. This was costred by I Leicester
and a section of 215 Anti-tank Battery. The demolition failed
but tn-o tanks uerc knocked out by the anti-tank section.
Tlte tanka which closed up behind and shelled the position were
enectively engaged and silenced by an artiller)* concentration from
155 Field Kegimenc.
In the rear areas there liad been a p-irachute scare. At
1322 hours a report that fifty parachutists had been seen landing
between Gurun and Silk was received by 2/9 Gurkha RiBes at Bt.
Bcsar.** Seven minutes later B Company moved off in mechanical
transport accompanied by one section of the carrier platoon to deal
with them. But the report prowd to be baseless.
Shortly after midnight of 11/12 December, the Japanese
infantry was in contact svith the left forward company of J.st, cast
of the Singora Road. Two houn later the frontage Iiad been
extended to ins'oh'c the right forward companies of 2 Jat and 1
Leicester. Firing was continuous but no attack developed. By
0-100 hours on 12 December, the right rear comp.any of 2 Jat
was also being sniped.
In view of the persistent reports of considerable Japanese
activity on the right flank, Brigadier Carpendale ttskecl for reinforce-
ments from the Cth Indian Infantry Brigade. The two companies
of 2/1 6 Punjab, which had been forward at P.idang Besar, were sent
across to come under lus orders. These two companies were pul
into position on tiie edge of fJsc rubber plantation betiveen Kg.
Kelubi and Rear SO (1 173) to deal with any hostile move round
Uic right flank from the directions of IJt. Alur, and were in

SJ Pereivali Drtpatch, efi. tit. p. 58, pan 105.

War Diary, General HeadqnartnaFar Eait, II December 1911, Serial
 1941-42 MALAY*
,6

psW 0 A by dAYY. on 12
to occupy a ^rve p Bridge on the
had been ordered

JapaoLK. I UicaatcT had do, road-Wl

'">f
cast of C Company s fotv/asd '"" j ^pblic Works Depart-
was rushed by the
also
Tent huts tses. of the '-1
occupied b^ them.
On
company
^"#1
and the 4
position were
ras a W
gunnc. 155 Held Regiment
B
one also for the
British ^ 3 ^ yield
Battery
Indian Mountain
Regiment was moving up
u toeorthe "'^4 - => hal'
On 12 December the
Japanese

J ? ^
to occupy gu"

Urree major
P^
begun-

company

Tl'teS: Srif
successfully blocked
rS ~VThf ro^^f
in a
after fi g
ww' barely dawn
attack came shortly

. heavy fire from the
d^pour oC rain when Je J^JP"'a\n7dSre and U.
the rnnka pla-
Copse. Simultaneously cStged the left
suatained screams
of *
Uie ftonl^aud flank.
The cha^e

rt^fd^.:srer/.aai.-

'-'Sr?* lrlSei5d.Tndiai

companies
Infantry Unad 2/16 Puniab (less two
guirding .the^V
Ztnnd Icrlun. and 1/8 Punjab (less two compames also m

(onginal)-
IndUn Ihv^ m ,. nx. Vot. t. p. 51

RWW" 1 Frd - wm: biU.

SSHUtorvof lltlk refpectivtJy.
t I 1173 nd lt?4
 THE WAK IS NORTHERN ItALAYA 161

was not be neglected by the Japanese; Jt led to Jitra

likely to
directly behind the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade. The railway,
too, easily reached from M.S. 16 on the Kodiang Road, led to the
lines of communication of Anak Bukit.
The divisional commander considered the situation at
0800 hours on 1213eceniber,* On the Patani Road the Japanese
had won the race for the Ledge and had battered 3/16 Punjab,
then in a situation from which it was diihcult to extricate it. If
3/16 Punjab did not get back, for the defence of the Kroh position
only 5/14 Punjab would be available. In any case it was then just
a question of time before the Japanese might Ibrcc their svay
through Kroh, and then move cither doim the road leading to
Sungei Patani or to Kuala Kangsar.
The situation at Jitra did not compel withdrawal. But
signs of deterioration were visible and the loss of two battalions at
Asun and Changlun had reduced the divisional reserve to the
neghgible proportion of one company of 2/1 Gurkha Rifles in the
Kepala Batas area. There were also strong indications of the not
unexpected eastern out'flaokiog movement is the Jitra position.
There were as yet few symptoms of Japanese advance down the
Kodiang road, but this was unlikely to deferred much longer.
If the layout for a night withdrasval was initiated at once
while the two brigades nere in control and not hotly engaged, an
orderly withdrawal might be possible; but if the initial moves
were deferred until the situationat Jitrahadconsiderablydetcrioral-
cd, such withdrawal might be extremely dilHculU The plan of
the divisional commander was therefore to pull back the I5th
Indian Infantry Brigade to the line of the S. Bata and the 6th
Indian Infantry Brigade to the S. Besar at once, and to withdraw
behind the S. Kedah at Alor Star overnight. The request to pemul
withdrawal was sent to the HI Indian Corps at 0830 hours. As
the Corps Commander was on his way to Singapore, the message
was referred direct to the General Officer Commanding Afalaya
who replied that pending further order? the battle was to be fought
on the Jitra position.*^
We may now revert to the Bghting on the position near
milestone 13|^. It may be recalled that in the first attack on D
Company of 2 Jat, C Company of I Leicester had also got involved
in the fighting. A
counter-attack by the remaining force of 1
Leicester drove out the Japanese from their foothold in the Public
Works Department huts in C Company's area. But despite the
SS Kistof? cf lltb tndUn Diviatooia&blaTa. *$ or. Vol. I, p. S3 (origiaal).
sr pemvaTf Defpatcii. efi. Section XXIt pva tS7. Sic zZk>. 73d ttV <
ilatr/d, if. ciC. 133.
162 C.MCPA1CNS IN SOCTH-EAST ASIA 1941-12 MAtAYA

success of the counter-attack b\' the resersc force of I Leicester,

C Company uas still ia aa unfaapp)* jimation. The tanks on the
road and the Japanese snipers in the Market Garden Copse
area were maldiig conditions not too pleasant. A
section of 215
Anti-Tank Batter)' vi-as not well situated to deal with the Japanese
tanks and orders were issued for the guns to move into a better
position. INTiilst mosing, the guns and their crew were badly
shot up and suffered heas-y casualties before the sorvis-ors could
run for ewer. The guns continued to draw hcav\* fire from the
Japanese tanks; slttlh and bullets were splashing around them and
one gun was mertumed by a direct hit. N'othing daunted, the
leader of the anti-tank company rushed forward and sighted one of
the guns. Thereafter, accurate fire from this gun lilcnced the
Japanese tanks whose crew bolted away.
Although the tanks had been silenced, the Japanese in the
Market Garden Copse area were still making things extremely un-
pleasant for both the Leicester* and the Jats. As the Leicestm
apparently were unable to deal with the simatioo. Brigadier
Carpendale asked Brigadier Lay for more rcinTortementt to esuhle
him to stage a counter-attack in the area between the two battahow-
Brigadier I^y agreed to send the remainder of 1/8 Punjab and, **
date appeared to be of paramount importance, suggcited that he
hinuelf should issue the order* for the counter-attack direct to
the commanding officer of 1/8 Punjab. Brigadier Caipendale
agreed to dm and in the orders gat-e the Market Garden as the
Qbjecth-e. He also agreed with Brigadier Isay's suggesdoa that
the starting point for the counter-attack should be the Iron
Bridge and the time 0930 hours.
Meanwhile a coonter-aitack was launched by a platoon of
the rejers-e tempany of 2 Jat to recapture the pill-b behind
ihcif sector. The 1/8 Punjab counter-attack had an unhappy
start, .^s the companies were advancing in open order through

the close rubber phmtatioa and jungle to the rear of the Jat head-
quarters, hca\-y fire was opened on them at N-cry close range from
the east. This uraacpected appearance of the enemy behind
ihejatsectorcaiiscd panic among the tired troops. It took some
rmnutes to restore controL Ii was soon found that the so-called
ecany was no other than the rcsers-e platooncf 2 Jat mos-ingfor*
ward to the headquarters for a oouater-attack on the pilJ-boi- Both
1/8 Punjab and 2 Jat had nnstaken each other for the Japartese.
The Market Garden Chspse area was strongly held b^- the
JapMCse. The carriers of 2 Jat which were accompanying 1/8
Punjab to take part in the couiaer-attack could advance no further
because they were getting bogged. There was no field Observa-
 TirE WAR. Df KORTHCR.V StALAVA 163

lion Ofiicer and, therefore, there was no artillery support. More-

over the force had suffered casualUes owing to the unfortunate
mistake and had dwindled to about two platoons. This force
was not adequate for the task but orders ivcrc received for the
counter-attack to proceed. Despite the determination of the men
to reach their objective, the mortar fire and the hail of bullets
which greeted their advance reduced the ranks of the attackers.
Those who reached the Copse were quickly liquidated in dose
combat with greatly superior numbers.
The next Japanese attack dcs-eloped at 1230 hours. Between
this and the last attacks there had of course been continuous firing
by [)oth the sides; under cover of heavy mortar fire there were
repeated attempts at penetration on the part of the Japanese, svho
at points effected lodgements in the Jat area. The Japanese were
also reported to be east of Kg. Penia. This second attack, unlike
the fint one at dawn, svas fully co-ordinated, and it was also initiat-
ed by one battalion. The Japanese were met by intense artillery
fire and they suffered heavy casualties. An hour and a half after
the start of that attack, the British and Indian guns were running
short of ammunition. Many of the rifles and light machine-
guns of D Company of 2 Jat, the target of attack, werealso getting
too hot to hold, while some others were unworkable owing to being
clogged with wet mud. Meanwhile, the Japanese svere massing
in the anU-tank ditch immediately in front of the company defences.
The last conversation down the telephone between the company
commander and his commanding officer svas;
The men cannot fire. Sir.
I cant give you permission to withdraw.
O.K. Sir. We will fight it out with grenades and bayonets.
The men arc splendid. I reckon we have got about five
minutes left .
Good luck to you
^Vhen the Japanese charged, D Company faced them with
fixed bayonets. At the end, only a few survivors emerged from that
gallant stand of the Jats.
It was expected that the Japanese would soon reach the area
of the Jat battalion headquarters and the Brigade Commander
gave permission for the headquarters and A Company to move to
the area behind G Company in the Kelubi Estate and link up with
the detachment of 2/16 Punjab which svas in position south of the
Kelubi Estate between Rear 50 and Kg. Kelubi. The
Japanese, howes'cr, did not immediately exploit the success they

S^ Hiitory of Htb'lndisn I^viiion in Malays, tp- ol., vol. 1, page 58 (Origrtul).


Jfr} W r<5*TH*fc.WT A11A UMAVA

had pjainfd, ar.d ihU tn'nr nf Jat bauallon va catTi^rf

%jdio\il tntftfffcncf.
nii^ thtnl Jiparcv attack %sa* msdr imnirdiately f:>U'Min;
the attack on the J at teft compAny. lid* itevr thru't wai dirrcled
acj'mit li0>mpany cf I Ijctrcjtff. The japanev: cained *n early
jtjccrtt Ia the capture cf a Waliiy cm th^ r5yt;i Hank, but
iiluaticin wat erttoted by a rr>utt!rr*3tt3ck ly the can>cti cf Pj't
Surary.
hy 1500 bnun all tlie attacki had petered out. Hut itb
the capture of the area held by Jat I> Company, llie ritjht fiank of
the Lciceiten wai completely rxped and therr Hat a pap d
and a halfrr.ilet between the pAiitlnm held b)* the J^icrrtfM and the
Gurkhai Ixhind the Jv. Bala. Into ihi* pap tJjc Japanese ttarted
to rnnitrate, but t^erc ttopj>cd on the S, Jttra Iry a company cf
1/8 Punjab, sent fiin^ard liy Btipadtrr Carpendale, and by a ctm**
fire frum tlic Leiceiten.
Becauw ofllut pap the position needed immediate ceadjuit*
mcitt. Ibedisdjlonal commander apteed toBtipaJier Carpendalc t
plan to bold the per.eral line Rear 50 RauIron BrW?e-~
Rimba Mitlt, from ftjshl U> left, twt companiei of 2/16 Punjab;
2 Jat; A Company 1/8 Punjab; 2/2 C.IL and I I-eicester. On
the right all units verc position eieept 2 Jat. The boldini?
m
this line Hculd entail pulling back B and C Companies cf 2 Jat,
the sthole of I I.eicejter, altrady dajigett'uily exposed to the
Japanese attack on tJe east flask, and the tail Surrey and the
company of 2/lG Punjab at the Ator Changlun Canal raUss'xy
bridge. The plan abo included a tnuntcr-attack e3stv>'rdi on the
follotsing day from the Leicester area betvseen the Iron Bridge and
Rimba. The otjecu>*c was the area of the S. Bata bci>'eeo its
junction *ilh the S. Jitra and the S. Palong.
.\t about ICOO hours the stithdrawa! urders wre iwued.
1 Ixicoter strongly protested on being mo%Td from prepared
penitions in Ssluch the men were quite happy, to an unprepared
line ts^Tj and half miles hmi;. But their protest >*-as os'crrulcd.
/Ml units cre back on the line soon after dark, except the right
forv.ard company of 2 Jat which no-er received its ssnthdrawal
orders and its D
Company hich had been ssiped out cafher.

The line was nosv from Kelubi cwluiive Hill 50 Hill 50 area

the line cf the S. Bata to industve the Iron Bridge eaclujisc Iron
BridgeRimba. 2/9 GJL less two companies were astride the
road St hI.S. 10 J, about ^
hundred yards south of the Iron Bridge.
But the situation was not too whcdcsome. 2/2 GJL
was being
heavily mortared. The Japanese were massing on llus front, and
their tanks s^tre ntosing down the road In^iration into the
 TIIE \VAR IN NORTHERN MAL/VYA 165

Tanjong Pau camp area was also taking place between Rear 50
and the S. Bata. The LcJccsters were m
a bad plight and had
sustained losses owing to the difficulty of communicating the ivith-
drawal orders to all their sub*umts. The men had no option
but to stand in mud and paddy to obtain a field of fire, and there
was the greatest difficulty in communications.
The Divisional Commander, therefore, decided that his force
must svithdrasv that night. He applied again to the III Indian
Corps for penmssion which was accorded at 2030 hours. The
orders for the withdrawal from the Jitra position w'cre issued
to the brigades at 2200 hours on 12 December but it was not to
commence before midnight. These orders required immediate
withdrawal of the whole division to the south of Alor Star, as a
step preparatory to the occupation of the Gurtm position, which
was to begin when the Japanese exerted heavy pressure on the
Kedah line. As a result of the svithdrawal the 6th Indian Infantry
Brigade was to move first to the Kepala Batas area and later, when
the other two brigades had vnthdrawn, it (less 2 Surrey) was
to hold a rear intermediate posiaoo at Simpang Empat (seven
miles south of Alor Star). Tbe other brigade, the 28th Indian
Infantry Brigade, was to withdraw to the S. Kedah. Out of its
battalions, 2/2 G.R. was to move to Langgar, and 2/9 G.R. (less
two comparues), in position at the Tanjong Pau cross-roads, was
to cover the retreat of all troops away from Jitra and was to with-
draw eventually, through 2 Surrej, to Alor Star, where it was to
hold a posidon south of the S. Kedah and cast of the main road.
2 Surrey, holding the bridges over the S. Padang Terap and the S.
Besar after covering the withdrawal of 2/9 G.R., was to svilhdraw
to Alor Star and hold a position south of the S. Kedah and svest
of the main road linking with 2/9 G.R. The third brigade, the
15th Indian Infantry Brigade, was to be withdrasvn into the
dirisional reserve.
The plan of withdrawal of the combined 15th and 28th
Indian Infantry Brigades was for I Leicester to s%-ithdrasv first
through 2/2 G.R. and then for units south of the S. Bata to with-
draw via the main road; the last unit, 2/2 G.R., to cover 2/9 G.R.
which was acting as the rearguard at 0300 hours on 13 December,
when 2/9 G.R. would also withdraw. The combined headquarters
of these two brigades was opened at milestone 10, in the rear of
2/9 G.R.
The divisional artillery, except 501 Field Batter)- in support
of the 28lh Indian Infantry Brigade, was to move back and
harbour clear of the paddy arras (whi^ oficred neither cover nor,
except on the road, gun positions) and to make preparation to
166 cAitPAicss tN souni'EAsr asia Malaya

ihc Gurun position. It was further decided that the British

co'.cr
ofTidah of the Kedah Government at Alor Star Vi-erc to o'acuaic
immediately, but the movement of refugees tvas to be strictly
forbidden. >

withdrawal did not go according to plan. The

Hosscvcr, the
approach Japanese hands and the ss-ooden
to ibe Iron Brid^ was in
bridge further dossiutream had been swept away by the flood-
^^^len their time of withdrawal came the Leiccsters attempted
to cross the S. Bata by sssinuning and by sampans. By 0500
houn otx 13 December only fifty men had managed to cross the
flooded river. The commanding ofljccr, therefore, decided to
mo\c the rest of the battalion (less tsvo companies which did not
receive the order to withdraw) across the country to the railway
line and then along it to Alor Star. The fifty men who had
managed to cross the S. Bata set off towards Tanjong Pau camp
which they found to be occujued b>' the Japanese. The party
turned westwards where it came to the paddy and swamp area
south of the Alor Changlun canal. IVith the assistance of a
Chinaman they reached Jcrlun at 1630 hours and there
found D
Company of 2/16 Punjab who knew nothing about
the Jitra engagement and had receK-ed no orden for
withiawah
The next morning on 14 December the Leicester party and
company of 2/lC Punjab set offfor Kuala Kedah where the^' learnt
that Alor Star was in Japanese hands. The whole party set sail
in three junks for Penang where they arriNTd on 15 and I6
December. The entire Leicester party was there, and one hundred
and twenty men had rejoined 2/16 I^njab.
The withdrawal ofother units OQ the night of 12/13 December
would ha\-c been diSicsdl even under the most fa\-ourabIe circum-
stances. But with units all mixed up as a result of the da/s fight-
ing, a pitch dark lught and commumcadons broken, it was inevit-
able thatordem would be delayed is communication. Some units
and sub-umts withdrew without inddent; others, finding themselves
,
unable to use the only road available, had to make their way as
best as they could across country. Others a^ain nestr received
the withdrawal orders and were still in posidon the following day.
2 Jat (less B Company) and the deUchment of 2/16 Punjab were
hca\ily attacked on their withdrawal when they were about four
hundred &om the main road. In the ensuing melee the
ya^
battalion disintegrated. The commanding officer the second-
in-command and the officer commanding 2/16 I^jab detach-
ment endeavoured to collect as many men as posable and made
their way southwards independently.
 THE ^VAR IS SORTItEES JULAYA 167

But the whole of the Jitra garr^n had not withdrawn.

To the cast, covering Bt Benia, B Company of 2 Jat was stili in
its original position. Three miles to the west sverc two companies
of 1 l-eicester standing knee<deep in the paddy, wondering why
ever>thing was so silent. On the eastern outskirts of Tanjong
Pau camp ninety Gurkha survivors and their commander from
Asun lay north of the track to Kelubi. Rcallsadon slowly dawned
and the sounds of battle far to the south convinced the forgotten
men that the engagement at Jitra had been over and that they
were left behind.
The remnants of 2/1 G.R. were the first to realise that the
division had withdrawn, and they moved of at 0700 hours.
INTien they arrived at Langgar at 1830 hours they had not eaten
for forty-seven hours. One company of 1 Leicester was surprised
to find a Japanese staff car conung up the Kodiang road from
Jitra. Both the Leicester companies moved thereafter to the coast
and thence southwards by sea and by land. Very few men from
these two companies ever rejoined their parent unit.
It was not until 1830 hours on 13 December, that B Company
of 2 Jat and about one hundred stragglers from Asun and Cbanglun
started off. They had not gone far when the men, whose nerves
were stretched to breaking point, began "seeing things* and the
cry "Dushman" caused the disintegration of the party. The
company commander found himself alone svith one British officer,
seven Gurkhas and one Jat. This small party struck across country
westwards reaching the coast on 15 December. Eventually they
arrived in Sumatra fay country craft on 23 December.
The artillery got away without difficulty, except for one
battery of the 155th Field Regiment which became mixed up in
a " battle " with some crackers. Heavy firing started at dusk
to the left of 2/9 G.R. position and behind their left forward
company. Every " weapon in the area, including those of the
stragglers who were passing through at the time, took up the
fight. The " heavy firing was caused by crackers ivhich gave
a very creditable imitation of light automatic and rifie fire. These
crackers were apparently fired from a gun some miles away. After
dark, when order had been restored, it was found that in the genera
I

rush on the part of the stragglers to get away from the firing the
right forward company of 2/9 G.R- had been swept away, except
its headquarters. The divisional withdrawal from Jitra was
to be covered by battalion headquarters, the carrier platoon less
two sections and one rifle company, B Company. This company
168 CAJtPAlCSS IN iOUTU'EAST ASL^ 11MM2 MAtAYX

was tlicrcfore mo\t;d to poutkm astride llic road and when the
tt

withdrawal orders were received a road-block was constructed.^

All units were supposed to pass through 2/9 GJl- But owing
and the difiiculty of movement in
to the Japanese inhltrauon
dark, units bypassed the position and only one company ^
G.R- passed though, and that loo at 0300 hoiirs- As 2/9 G.R. oao
seen nothing of 2 Jat, 2/16 Punjab, 2/1 G.R< or of 1 hekeiUr, w
the
officiating commanding ofneerdedded to wait in the hope that
others would soon appear. But hard on the heels of the company
of 2/2 G.R. came the Japanese. An extremely fierce en^gOTmi
thereupon ensued. The night was black and it wa* raining hare.
The darkness and the patter of the rain on the rubber trees afford-
ed all the co\-cr which the Japanese needed- The first rush was
silent and unseen. The company commander who was assisting
in huilding the road-block was suddenly caught in the centre
ofa
mass of humanity on whom he used his fists, knees, feet
ssviiling
and the butt of his revolver. The company commander's ordenj
he
was seized round the waist as he was fi-xing his bayonet-
eotiM do was (o jab upwards, and this most cflectively trani^d
^
the Japanese. ITie anti-tank rrfieman covering the block used bo
anti-tank as a club.
riile
Almost simultaneously with this rush on the ioad*blw
came the attack on battalioit headquarters frem the east. 'Tho
attack was anything but silent. The Japanese came in screanung
" Banzai * and blazing the way with their automatic weapoi^
The company fought its way back to protect the battaUon heath
quarters w here ali Japanese attacks were successfully resisted, and
they were also counCer-chatged three times. At 0430 boon on 13
December it was dedded to withdraw. The battalion headquarters
and B Company bad to fight their way out. The unit had suffered
tlurt)' casualties during the course of the engagement.
The m^n delaying position from where it was possible to cov'cr
the withdrawal to Gurun was astride the two roads leadmg
southwards at Langgax and Alor Star. At the Lasggax posiuoa
was 2/2 G.R., the cranpany of 2/9 GJl. from the K. JCcrang wad
junction, and one troop of 273 Anti-unk Battery. Tlis position
was under the command of Brigadier Carpendale. At Alor Star
immediately south of the S. Kedah was to be 2/9 G.R. (less one
company at Langgar) with one company of 2/ 1 G.R. from the Alor
Star air-field under command, 2 East Surrey and No. 2 Anti-tank
Batter^'.** Seven rnfies further south at Simpang Empat and Tokai
were 1/8 and 2/16 Punjab Regiments respCctivTly.

THi potitke wa, under l&e cesnauid ef Lieat^Cc^ml Sd!r-

 TIIE WAR IX KOKIHERX SULAYA 169

\Vc may now review the circumstances in svhich this

withdrawal was effected. The Indian Division had to face tremen-
dous difficulties which made the task of retreat a formidable one.
The Japanese had infiltrated into the gaps between the brigade
headquarters and the outlying troops, owing to the length of the
line covered. Moreover, the troops, spcdally 2 Jat, 1 Leicester
and 1/8 Punjab had passed through a period of twenty-four hours
of intense fighting in heavy rain; and I Leicester was dispersed
over a wide area and the wooden bridge which carried its \vith-
drasvai was broken. The route leading to the faff-back area,
a distance of 12 to 18 miles, was not &cc from Japanese infiltration,
hence the withdrawal was made in close contact with them. The
motor transport was fully employed in evacuating stores and sup-
plies. The troops had therefore no alternative but to cover the
distance on foot. The movement of storcs-vehicles itself svas no
easy task. But despite these odds, the withdrawal was pushed
through and except for the losses mentioned earlier, the
three brigades had been able to extricate themselves and return to
Gurun position.
Though 13 December was unev'entful at Langgar, it was
certainly not without incident at Alor Star. The line of the river
was thinly held. On the right, exclusive of the main road, 2/9
G.R. front extended some two thousand five hundred yards and
included the railway bridge. On the left was 2 Surrey. There
Was no artillery support as no gun positions were found in the
extensive paddy areas to the south. At 0930 hoius three Japanese
motor cyclbts came down the road and over the bridge. This
was a complete surprise. The Divisional Commander, the Com-
mander Royal Engineers and Commander 2/9 G.R. were standing
a little south of the bridge at the time. They all drciv their revol-
vers and fired. The leading Japanese cyclist got asvay but the
second and third were killed. Suspecting that these cyclists were
an advanced guard of their tanks and motorised troops the Divi-
sional Commander ordered the road bridge to be blown at once.
The road bridge was successfully demolished but the demolition
of the railway bridge failed, and 2/9 GJl. fought the whole day to
retain possession of the bridge and prevent its use by the Japanese
tanks and motorised vehicles. The railway bridge was attacked
several times and once a party of Japanese troops managed to
cross the river. These were inuncdiately killed.
Further svithdrawal to Gurun position was now necessary,
and it began at 1800 hours from Alor Star and two and half hours
later from Langgar. The troops from Alor Star did not reach
the Gurun position until the dawn of 14 December. Howes'cr,
J70 CAilPAlG.VS J.V SOUTJUCAST AJl* J941'J2 MaLAVA

tJje ifoopi from Langgar did not reach iheir

farril tt'orse, for they
fcctor of the Gurun position unl3 1900 hours on H
December,
liasTflg marched all the way \Ta Padang.

THE BATTtt AT GURUS

The Japanese objective was to dri%T a wedge between l^hot!
and the 1 ih Indian DKision.
1 Their weight was therefore direc^
against the area on the left flank of Kroheot and the right flank ^
llie drtTsion- On 13 December, they were in contact with the
right flank and had got tanks south of the demolitions at Aior Star.*
This hostile penctradon had led to tome fighting, the losses in wh^
had lowered the morale of the Indian force. It was to asert this
new danger that the pcsiuon in Gurun was organised, making the
right flank immeaiarahly strong and the left flank comparatisxly
less so.
^VTxilst the battle of Jttra was in progress on 1 1 Rod
12

December, Ueut-Colonel Selby (commanding 2/9 G.R.) was

reconnoitring a position north-east of the jungle-clad Kedah Peak,
known as Gunong JeraL This thickly wooded prteipitc^
mountain, 3,992 feet in height, filled the whole country west of the
t-tUage of Gurun between the main road and the coast The
new position was known as the Gurun Position, across the matu
trunk road and railway, about three mUes north of the tallage of
Gurun. His recommendation was that the pouuon should not
along the East Road from milestone 25 on the jeniang road to Guw
Chempedak. This would leave the rubber estates with thetf
roads to the south, while to the west of Guar Chempedak the for-
ward localities would be aligned north of the toad to Yen, so that
the several butted ** islands in the paddy would act as strong
points. Xot only would this ensure an exccltcnt all-round field
of fire but the marshy paddy fields would greatly hamper the
attackers.
The Dhisional Comraander adopted these rccommccdaiions
oulyparriafly, for, to him, the exirtence of paddy fields with their
hutted islands was not an unmlxed advantage. The paddy fields
would restrict communications, and the islands *vere conspicuous
and STilnerable to air and artillery action. There war also eatrecoc
diflictilty in obtaitung covered lines of withzbawal, and artillery
support could only be given at extreme range owing to the lack
of suitable gun positions. Hence he decided to align the central
and left sectors sooth of the Yen road- This resulted in a number
of concealed fonning-up positions in the rubber plantations being

^4' War KuT. C^Q-, Ttr Eue. Appeodix No. ISI. See tSto, Sj Paul SWt2>T>
Deipat^ tf. ai. p. 1371, pan 2S2.
THE WAR IN KORTllEKN MALAYA I7I

6URUN AREA
ecALE
 172 a\MPA10X3 IN SOIi*n!*EAST ASH 1911-42 JIAIAYA

line of the forvraii

left for the Japanese, north of the selected
defended localities.
The forward localides of the Gunin poadoo, occupied on 14
December, ran along the East Road toGuarChempedak raflwa)
the
station and thence through znSestone 20 on the main road to
ttllage of Tia Teras. The 28th Indian InfantryBrigadc was
on
the right and the 6th Indian Infantry Brig^c on the left, their
dhnding line being the railway which was included in the sector
of the latter. The 28d tndbn Infantry Brigade was placed between
znilestooc 24^ and milestone 28 on the Jeniang road.
AU
o
infantry was in the vicinity of milestone 25 and to the south
the
the road, while artillery- positions were on hill-tops and in
valleys ^t\en the hiUs. Kone of the position was, howoi"^*
complete for action though natnre afforded excellent positions
in this area.
The 6th Indian Infantry Brigade had been greatly depicted.
However at Guar Ghempcdafc railway station was Ickmted 2/16
Punjab, comprising only the baUaJion head5 uarters and B
Company. Bett^ecn the railway and the main road wcre two
companies of 2 Surrey. A Company and headquarters of Surt^'
were at mUesmae 22. D Company' had been deuced from
battalion and vras placed under the command of 1/8 Pun^*
On the left, astride the main road and up to the rillage of 1*0
Tetas, was 1/3 Punjab. This batuUon was probably the most
tired battalion ofa wcaiy bzigade.
One gun of 215 Anti-tank Battery was in action about three
quarters of a mile ahead of the forward infantry on the trunk
road os'criag a demolished culvert immediately north of the
Yen Crossroads. It had an escort of one section ^
Suirc)'. The
headquarten of the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade was sitistcd
in a small Iklalay hut on the routhem outsitirts of the village of
Gimin. The only brigade reserve was the carrier platoon of 2/1
Punjab which had only one ofits sections. The B8th Field Regiment
C
and Battery of the 153tb Field Regiment were in support of the
two forward brigades and the 215th Anti-tank Battery was under
their command, one tro<^ being allotted to the 28th Indian
Infantry Brigade. The SOlstFicldBattcry (I37th Field Regiment)
was under drvisioaal control with the particular rote of barassiflg
the trunk road north of the Yen crossroads. Depth in anti-tank
defence was provided b>' the 2nd and 273rd Anti-tank Battery.
The I5lh Indian Infantry Brigade totalling barely six
hundred men, was in dhisio&al reserve in the area of milestone
23. One platoon of the Lmcesteis was detached to guard against
an advance down the coastal road via Y'cn and Tg. Jaga.
 Tire WAR n NORTHERN JMtAYA 175

The Gurun positionwould have been a formidable one if it

had been fully prepared and occupied by a complete and fresh
division with adequate reserves in fmnd. As regards preparations,
arrangements had been made for two thousand coolies to start
work on 13 December, but as a result of the news of the Japanese
advance on Jitra and the bombing of Sungei Patam, the coolies
had failed to appear. And the weary troops coming back from
Jitra bad little time to carry out the preparations.
As early as the noon of 14 December, Japanese patrols svere
in contact tvith the Surrey section at the Yen crossroads. Two
hours later eleven lorries full of troops came do^vn the road led by
three tanks. These weic held up by the demolition and were
also immediately engaged by the forward anti-tank gum and 501
and 352 Field Batteries. At 1500 hours an enveloping attack
forced the anti-tank gun and its escorting section to withdraw,
and one hour later 1/8 Punjab was under heavy small-arms and
mortar fue from the rubber plantation ahead of it
There had been a certain amount of retrograde movement
and Brigadier Lay (6th Indian Infantry Bngade) ordered one
squadron of3 Cavalry to push through 1/8 Punjab and attack the
Japanese. These cavalrymen were mounted on trucks; they
had no armoured cars and no carriers. Moving up the road in
their vehicles this squadron was attacked by the Japanese infiltra-
tors some considerable way south of milestone 20. Brigadier Lay
who quickly learnt of the situation decided that it required his
personal intervention. A counter-attack under his personal
command was carried out by the carriers of 2/16 Punjab and by a
mixed bag of fifty men from the Surreys, Brigade Headquarters, the
80th Anti-tank Regiment and 1/8 I^njab. This counter-attack
was successful in clearing the whole area astride the main road up
to milestone 20 of all infiltrators.
Immediately after his counter-attack, Brigadier Lay informed
the Divisional Commander that it was imperative to occupy the
Yen crossroads which be planned to do before davm on 15 Decem-
ber, using the Surreys for the purpose. Meanwhile at 2000 hours
on 14 December, heavy fire was opened on 1/8 Punjab. At 2230
hours the Surreys received Brigadier Lays orders for the occupa-
tion of the Yen crossroads. Zero houn was fixed for 0515 hours
on 15 December, following half an hours preliminary artillery-
bombardment As there were then only fifteen men left with A
Company which was the battalions only reserve, a ninner was
despatched to 1/8 Punjab asking for one platoon of DCompany.
But at 0100 hours on 15 December this platoon had not reached
the Surrey battalion headquartersand the Adjutant was despatched
174 CAMPAIGNS IN sourn-tAsr ASIA I94M2 uaiava
was
10 bring back. At about the same time wry intense fire
it

opened on the right flank of 1/8 Punjab. One hour later it wm

reported that the right flank of 1/8 Punjab tvas being pressed
lieaviJy and heavy casualties had ensued, and that in contcqucnct
it woidd be unable to hold out much longer. line of conunuma*
uon between tlic headquarten of 1/8 Punjab and the
Headquarters had meanwhile been cut. Ulli/nately, by 0300
hours the right flank of 1/8 Punjab was overrun. At 0400 hoi^
the Adjutant of 2 Surrey arritTd at the headquarters of 1/8
having run into parties of Japanese troops who were south
w
the poiiiion and were by that time moving down the main road
in considerable numbers. At about 0155 hours the Si^V
headquarters at tmlcstone 22 began to be heavily mortared-
continued for three quarters of an hour with steadily increasmg
intensity. By 0320 hours the much depleted A Company of *
Sunej, which was four hundred y'anis north of the battahro
headquarters, was overrun and the position was in Japanese handj.
By 0530 houn the headquarters had also been overrun-
At 0300 hours shells from British guns began to fall into */o
Punjab's resert'c position. They caused no casualties but WT
misled the Commandiag Officer into making a faulty decision.
He considered this to be an indication that the brigade commander
had assumed that the battalion had either withdrawn or had been
overwheimed. He therefore decided to withdraw westwards and
mcAT down the Yen road to rejena the di'risios. Consequently
1/8 Punjab with G Company of 2 East Surrey left the main posibon
at about 0600 hours. The maio line of advance lay open to the
Japanese. The subsequent fate of most of ] /8 Punjab and C
Com-
pany of 2 East Surrey was the capture in Penang.
hleanwhile, further south, a composite company of ^
Leicester had bees sent from the I5ih Zodiaa lolactry Brigade to
the assistance of the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade to help restore the
dtuatioD in the area round niilestoBe 22. But before this company
could arrii'e the Japanese had broken into the Brigade Headquarters
and the Brigade hlajor. Staff Captain, Brigade Intclfigence Officer
and several others were Idlted. Brigadier Lay escaped as be had
just left on a visit to the headquarters of the 28th Indian Infantry
Brigade.
Things were obviously not going too well for the 6th Indian
Infantry Brigade. The maio road and the country to dte
of it lay wide open. Of the brigade staff only the Bri^de
Commander was alive, both internal and external communications
had broker} down, and Brigadier Lay had known nothing of wba*
had gone on in this brigade. However, the 28th Indian Infantry
 THE WAR K NORTHERN KULAYA 175

Brigade was not yet in contact with the Japanese and the much
depleted 15th Indian Infantry Brigade (numbering as stated
already only about hundred men) was still in the rescn-c por-
tion. 352nd Field Battery had one section in action at the road
junction and one secdon at the level crossing. One section of
273rd Anti-tank Battery was also in action at these two places.
Available ai infantry in this area were about a dozen men of 80
Anti-tank Regiment and the whole of the 28lh Indian Infantry
Brigades employment platoon and its signal section. This
infantry was disposed about the level crossing and road junction
and was ordered to construct a road-block on the jeniang road.
Brigadier Carpendalc, (15th Indian Infantry Brigade) on
hearing of the disaster, immediately ordered the carrier platoon
and tts'o companies of 2/2 G.R. to mwe
to his headquarters. 2/1
G.R., now little more than two companies in strength, was moved
svest to cover the railway. Meanwhile, Brigadier Lay had contact-
ed the composite company from I I,eice8ter near the road junction.
He ordered one platoon to drive off the Japanese who svere west
of the south-end of Gurun. But this platoon was forced to break
action and withdraw in a south-westerly direction owing to the
overwhelming numerical superiority of the hostile force. The
second platoon svas then ordered to drive the Japanese from the
former headquarters area of the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade, but
it was also immediately pinned down by fire. The third platoon,
meanwhile, was placed astride the main road, north of the road
junction.
At 0800 hours on J5 December, considerable Japanese
mortar fire began to be directed on the village, the road junction
and the railway, north of the Icvel-crosung. The road junction
was also under small-arms and light automatic hre. As against
tWs, only one section of the 352nd Field Battery at the road junedon
was in action.
As soon as the carriers of 2/2 G.R. arrived, Brigadier Carpen-
dale sent them to Brigadier Lay who ivas at the road junedon.
The carriers, which were number, were ordered to clear the
five ui
village. They reported that the village was clear of the
Japanese up to six hundred yards north of Gurun. The carriers
were then ordered to carry on up the main road with a view to
gaining contact with such forward troops of the 6th Indian lafantrj
Brigade as might still be left. IVhen they had hardly proceeded
two hundred yards, the carrieis encountered the Japanese tanks,
one of which was compelled to turn tall, but soon the carrien svere
themselves driven bade by the remaining tanks. All communica-
dons to the forward elements of the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade

176 CAilPAlCNS IN SOUni'EACT ASIA 10iM2 MAtAVA

had ceased; even runners could not gel Toward oMng to the large
number of Japanese in the area.
The Japanese infantrj' was also convergingon the road
junction and the guns had to pull out. The engagement had aw
extended to the area of the 28ih Indian Infantry Brigade
the
quarters, two hundred yards east of ihc level crossing. But
Japanese main attach svas launched against the hcadquarWrs
of the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade which was forced to move further
cast, giving the appearance as if the whole brigade had
been
overrun or had disintegrated. Brigadier Lay, as he had apparently
nothing left to comraaod, rnoved away from the area to acqu^^
the Divisional Commander of the situation. At the same umc
Brigadier Carpendale sent orders for 2/9 G.R* to withdraw
headquarters and for 2/1 G.R. to move to the level crossing. Tws
order puzzled the Officer Commanding 2/9 G.R. became be
that the whole of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was intact and
had not cv'cn been engaged. He knew also that B Company of
2/16 Punjab was in position soutlt of Guar Chempedak railway
station. He, therefore, reported in person to the Brigade Hed'
quarters, where he arrived at the same time as the Divisional
Commander.
The situation, as explained to the Divisional Comrnander
by Brigadier Carpendale, was as follows;
(a) As far as could be surmised 2 East Surrey and 1/8 Punjab
bad been overrun.
(b) The 6lh Indian Infantry Brigade Headquarters position
had been captured and most of the staff either killed or
wounded.
(c) The Japanese were in possession of the area of the head-
quarters prcricmsly occupied by the 28th Indian Infantry
Brigade.
The force which the Divisional Conunander then bad in
hand was:
28th Indian Infantry Brigade (Hith 2/1 G.R- very weak),
one company of 2/16 Punjab,
15th Indian Infantry Brigade, which numbered about six
hundred men who were not in a fighting condition.
The position was very well r^neseated in the official stuation
report which, after describing the weight of Japanese attack,
mendoned;
Touch not yet restored in spite of counter-attack
**

by battalions of 28 Indian Brigade. Command reserve

consisting of 12 Indian Brigade group less battalion has
one
been sent to this front. Trouble arises from impossibility of

TItE W/R IK KORTHERK tfAtAYA 177

relieving e;chaustcd troops who havc now been iighring conti*

nuously for over a week o%ving to lack of adequate reserx-es
in Malaya and danger of uncovering Fortress area in view of
our naval and air weakness. Doubtful if it will be possible to
hold Penang which has no adequate garrison for increased
scale of attack. In Kedah enemy attacks pressed home with
fanatical courage in spite of very heavy losses, and Kedah is
hb main effort *.**

In view of these circumstances, the Divisional Commander

decided to break action and withdraw behind the river Muda.
Consequently he issued the following orders:
(a) 15th Indian Infantry Brigade was to withdraw to the
Sungei Lalang where the independent company which
had arrived from Penang the previous evening was
already in position.
Under Brigadier Carpcndalcs command
(b)
(i) 2/2 G.R. to withdraw* to a position covering the
Sungei Tok Fawang (two and a half miles north
of Bedong);
(it) The rear elements of 2/16 Punjab and 2 Bast
Surrey and all stragglers to withdraw behind the
Sungei Lalang.
(c) Under command of the Officer Commanding 2/9 G.R.
(i) 2/9 G.R., 2/1 G.R. and any troops of the 6th Indian
Infantry Brigade still on the ground were to cover
the withdrawal and then withdraw through Sungei
Lalang;
(si) The withdraival was not to start before 1200 hours

on 15 December.
The withdrawal of the I5lh Indian Infantry Brigade, covered
by the carrier platoon of 2/2 G.R. and the detachment of the 80th
Anti-tank Regiment, began at once. By 1300 houn, the brigade
was back at Sungei Lalang and bad found the independent company
holding the south bank of the Sungei Getah.
The Divisional Commander issued other orders which were
as follows:
(a) 15th Indian Infantry Brigade to hold the Sungei Lalang.
(b) Independent company, under its command to hold the
Sungei Bangkok south of Bedong.
(c) 28th Indian InfantryBrigade to continue its withdrawal
through Bedong and Sungei Lalang and to occupy a
position on the Sungei Fatani.

S* War l^ary, General Headquarter Far^East, Appendieea Xos. 203 and 203.
 1911'42 MAIAYA
CAMPAIGNS IN SOimi-EAST ASIA

(d) All troops of the Cth

under the command ol *hc l5tl Indian
of tne to
(c) 137th Field Regiment and 80th 28ih ^5
subsequenUy the
support the 15ih Brigade and
Leiccstcrs at Tg. J g*
Brigade (the platoon of the
vvilhdra\s-n without incident). . ^nnt.>cted
Mcantvhiie the rearguaid under 2/9
both the compatiict of 2 Catt Surrey-
^ Tht
the
^ behind
other moved back independently to jotn 2/2
Tok rawting. Guar Cbetn^d
2/16 Punjab from ^
Sungei ^^
station was alto collected. The withdraw^ sou .
pass two miles east of Gurtm through
the
ue,
sou* of
and across the Sungei Bangkok tmntcdialely
went stulhout h
began at 1300 houn. The wdthdrawal
the Harvard Estate bridge aetosa
the Sunget
TTii,
^
flooded as to 1 impo
to be demolished and the rivet so
oftokum J
meant that the withdrawal routeof the repaid
Infantry Brigade via the East Road was bilked.
Ta^ete.
free from the J P
then made for the main road which was
the Sunsc
but it was found tliat the bridge across
mediately south ofEedong had also been ^""'1''*;. ckage
slowly and with considerable difficulty
i^mbeiedm
of the bridge, and it was not unnl after
wete south of the Sungei Bangkok- All
transport with this roar- ^m
guard had to be dcstrojed- _ withdrawn
Meanwhile the 11th Indian Divuion had 16 "
back from the Sungei Lalang. It was not unnl 'Sn
in
December that the rearguaid made contact wsth
e ,

Sungei Patani and motor transport \%-as sent to pick

up tnis ex
weary force diiec nules north of the tovsiu . ^
On 16 December, the utuatioo in Kedah was repor
cially at dawn to be as foUows: r.;..;cinn is
Hea\7 fighting continue*. I! Indian
now on fine of R. Muda wiih 12 Indian Infantry
protecting its right Bank. Losses in men and equipment
troops
been heavy. This coupled with exhaustion of
Krian v.
neccssiuted a further withdrawal behind line of R-
it is hoped to be able to reorganise force.
In
will no longer be possible to hold Penang
from w

some troops have already been drawn to join Kedah
6 Indian Infantry Brigade cut off yesterday and strecg
duced to a few hundreds. 15 In^an Infantry
minm^
VCT)' weak. Intention henceforth is to cover Perak tin
area which mostly lies round Ipoh which was bombed mor
 TIIE WAR IN NORTUE&N MALAYA 179

15/12 by 20 aircraft, part of aerodrome petrol dump beincr

hit,
Tile report sent later on that date added that further
withdraival behind R. Krian was in progress. At the same time
Uic prospects of stabilising the situation even at tliat point
were not at all good. Tlic brigade, which was Uic sole
command rcser\-e, had been committed in the north-west, and
only reinforcemenu from outUde Malaya could help strengthen
the force in that corner.

WITHDRAWAL SOUTH OF THE RRIAN RIVER

By the morning of 16 December, the 11th Indian Division

was souUi of the river Muda and had passed into Province Welle-
sley. It settled down to rest behind the flimsy screen guarding the
approaches to the river Muda which, on the left, were held by a
composite force knosvn as Holmes Force, It comprised:
One squadron 3 Cavalry at Kota Ferry,
Tlic Independent Company and one company 1
Leicester, covering the two bridges at Bumbong Lima,
The annoured train guarding the Bt Pinang Tunggal
railway bridge and
137 Field Regiment with the Mountain Battery under
command.
On the right, 3 Cav.vlry (less one squadron) guarded the crossings
at Batu Pekaka and Kuala Ketil.
During the early hours of 16 December, 5/2 Punjab from
the 12lh Indian Infantry Brigade, relieved 3 Cavalry (less one
squadron) at Batu Fekka and Kuala Ketil. The latter then moved
to the Padang Serai area. At Batu Pekka the bridge had been
partially demolished before the arrival of 5/2 Punjab and was
unfit for vehicles, although it could be used by the infantry.
In four days Uic 11th Indian Division had retreated seventy
miles and lost much of its strengib. Of the 6th Indian Infantry
Brigade (whose commander was admitted to hospital on 16
December) 1/8 Punjab had been completely lost, 2 East Surrey
mustered only ten officers and two hundred and sixty men and 2/16
Punjab which Iiad done practically no fighting had only about
five hundred men. The three baU^ona of the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade totalled less than the war establishment for one battalion.
The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade had only one battalion intact,
UWar Oiarr, Central Headquarter, Far-Easi. Appendices No. 213 and 224
(read wi* Appends No. 208). See also Sir Paul Maltbyi Despatch Op. nt. p.
l371,pwa 2M.
 19*1-42 UALAYA
180 aWfPAJCN^ IN SOUTH-EAST ASLK

namtlv. 2/2 Gmlha Eia. 2p Gariha KScs apart

caruaWts had oat had dU

rvithdrawal from Gunm, aad 2/1 oita.
only
then been cut off three times mustered ^jnu.
Apart from the numerical losses then^d b^^^
equipment, carriers and !ucles. The surv-is-ots m the jjaiions

short
were^badly short of food and desperately
suffeMg r
were numerous, many had fever or were
sores caused b>* leeches. The
** Indian Divion^
operations. Fresh
in no fit state for further put
svere not as-afiable. The oidy
already,
Jj^P^ncse *
/^e " eSy
a considerable distance between the advance
delay the hos
Indian and British troops, and hope to
by demolitions.
ja*a^ of the
At 1030 hours on 16 December, as tlm l^t .

28th Indian Infantry Brigade (namely 2/9

Gurta
oIBb
arrhdng in its rest area at Jarak (n.-e rmles
the Corps Commander sMted the
the Utter
Ginger. After dbenssing the sitnaUon ssrth
issnS his orders, that the 11th Indian Disasmn
should^
behind the Krian river, which svas to be held
from j ,5
J"
coasL The move was to be completed
witMrawal rUic
December and was to be co-ordinated svsth ibc
12lh Indian Infantry Brigade which was
5/14 Punjab would come under lU command.
Dh-iaon was also to tahe Kiohcol under
its
Ine
^
to move m
6th and 15th Indian Infantry Brigades were
Taipinz and the 28lh Indian Infantry- Brigade
was to
soutii bant of the Krian irier. Penang was to be evacuate
17 December. . gjc
to
The withdrawal was made none too easy owing ^
control on 16 December having completely
broVen dwii.
Muoa,
28lh Indian Infantry Brigade, after crossing the nver
taken four hours to travel as many miles. Fortunately
air-craft appeared and the lltb Indian Division
was
down for a short rest in comparatisx peace, hleanwmlc,
^
Japanese on reaching Sungei PaUni, directed their

down the Sungei Paiani Baiu Pekaka road, instead of
down the main road towards Bumbong Lima. This
c by 5/2 Punjab which had one company at Kuala
m-ered
-j
^
(369-1) and another at the Batu Pekaka bridge
(3293);
junction
remmodex of the battalion being in rtscrvx at the road
(3490) one mile north of hfezbau Pulas. On 16 December, fut
about 1500 hours, one Eurc^an and about twelve Asians
 TJIE WAttlV .VOJITMEJLV M\MVA 181

KluU unirorniiapproached tlic Batu Tclaka bridge from tlic

dlrcctiofi of Sungti Iatani. Thej' ^va^-ed white handkerchiefs
and the European, who appeared to be a British planter, spoke
in indifiertnt Ifindutlani to the bridge guard. He svas told to
leave hii compantont on die bank and to advance alone to the
bridge. This he did and approaclung a Hanldar on die bridge
grappled with him. This was the signal for the planters party
to open firr. Tlie European, who In all probability was a German,
svas killed and the party of Japanese driven off. Shortly after this
incident the Japanese made determined cillnts to cross the river
and at ICOO hours tliey succeeded in establishing themselves on
the south bank; but an immediate eountcfattack b^' one company
of 5/2 Punjab led by the commanding ofTiCcr restored the situation.
It was deduced from the absence of Japanese activity on
die main road and from their determined action at Batu Pekaka
tliat their intention was to by.pats the llih Indian Division in
Province Wellcslc)'. To counteract this move, 2 Arg>il and Suthcr*
land Highlanders (less one company whicli had been ordered by
in Corpi to Grik on 13 Decem^r) belonging to the I2th Indian
Infantr)* Brigade, who had a quiet day In (he Baling area, were
ordered bark during the evening and ensuing night ibreugb 5/2
Punjab to line TiU Karangan (3381) which they were ordered
to deny to the Japanese until 1200 hours on 17 December. 5/2
Punjab had also been ordered to deny Merbau Pubs, three miles
north of 'Hti Karangan and three miles south of the rivxr .Muda,
until 0630 houn on (hat day.
At 0200 hours on J7 ibeember, after Die rear party' of 2 A
and SH hail passed through, 5/2 Punjab commenced withdrawal
from Ujc Kuala Kctsl Batu Pekaka position and by 0530 hours its
rear party had reached Merbau Pulas. Tlie Japanese followed
up quickly and rushed the Nferbau Pulas bridge, but the attack
was repulsed and the bridge was successfully blown at 0600 hours.
'fhe position on 17 December was not vTry hopeful, as the
dctacJjment defending Grik area had been attacked by the Japanese
In some strength. Reinforcements locally available had been
sent to repulse the attack but these were neither considerable,
nor very eiTcctivc. In this situation, the British appredation
was tliat " if this attack develops it will constitute serious threat
against communications of our forces north of Kuala Kangsar.
To prevent an ugly situation from developing, withdrawal was the
only alternative. Hence the 1 Ith Indian Division was to wiihdrav>'
in the night of 17/10 December from the h'ne of Muda river to the
south of Krian river. This withdrawal was proaeding according
to plan. The III Indian Corps was also autljoriscd to withdraw
182 a'^MPAiGss c; soxith*zast asl\ 1941-42 malaya

Perak river. The Wlhlndian Infantry Brigade coaona*

bchifld ths
ed to cover the right flank of the 11th Indian Division,
while w
28th Indian Infantrj* Brigade was on Sungci Krian. Th*
sufTcred some
and 15th Brigades arrh'cd in Taiping, having
casualties.**
In the course of ivithdrawaj on 1 7 December at 0930
5/2 Punjab passed through 2 and A SH
and moved to Lunas. H
an hour later the forward company of 2 and A SH
was attacked.
A brief but successful action was fought in which the Japan^
suffered no less than two hundred casualties compared with
clet'cn sustained by the Argylls. At 1200 hours, 2 and S A ^
withdrew and ino\-ed to the TerapK. Selama area. 3 Caval^
(less the squadron with Holmes Force) which had acted
as the
had
trest flank-guard during the early stages of the withdrawal and
been harassed by the Japanese outflanking parties, withdrew m
conjunedon with 2 A and SH from the Padang Serai area to Terap*
afternoon
3/2 Punjab, then at Lunas, further wthdrew in the late
through Terap to Selama. where it came under the command
ofKrobcolandmcnrdto take up its position covering the eitmtngs
over the S. Krian in the htahang area. .
Daring the night of 16/17 December and the morniog
,

17 December the remnants of the 6tb and the IStb Indian InfanW
Brigades mos'ed from the Kapala BatasBt. Mertajam area by
road and rail to Taiping. On the same momiag, the Japanese
reconnaissance parties al began to appear on the north bai^o*
the river Muda in front of Holmes Force. Apart from this and *
tfl\e-bombing attack on I Battery of 137 Fidd Regiment, there
was no exdtment in the Holmes Force area. Shortly before noon,
however, the appointed hour for withdrawal, a large party of strag-
glers arrived on the north bank of the river Muda, oppoute
Kola. The time for wiihdrawral was put back, sunken sampans
were salvaged on both banks and the stragglers were ferried acros-
These numbered about two hundred and comprised a large body
of 1/8 Punjab from Gnrun and a number of stragglers from other
battalions including forty of 1/14 Punjab who had escaped at Asun-
Holmes Force withdrew at 1500 hours, the squadron of 3 Casahy
mo%-ing to Bandar Babm on the Kiian rrver close to Parit Buntar
and coming under the command of the 28th Imiian lafantiy'
Brigade, The reminder of Holmes Force mosxd back to Taiping-
By the night of 17 December the whole of the liih Indian
Dis-iiioa and the !2th Indian Infantry Brigade, with the exception
of 2A and SH (then acting as rearguard eight mites north of ib*
Ganatl Ileadq-AKcr, Far^Eut, ArnecdicEs Nc*. 228 *J 2*^
.
Imd lofttaer). '
 THE \S'AR IS NORTHERS ilALAVA I S3

Tcrah OCOO hours on IB Dtmbcr) and 3 Cavalry* (Ic^i one

until
squadron) ilicn at Tcrap, were l>eUtnd the Krian river. Mean-
while, the evacuation of Penang was being hastily carried out.
TIic rcmov.al of ammunition ami ordnance stores from the ordnance
depot had started some da)^ previously and the bulk of these
svcrc got away. Tlie cable station was put out of action, the aero-
drome whicJi was on reclaimed ground was flooded; tlic rail and
dock facilities were dam.iged as much as possible. Although
the mpitl evacuation of the island was on the whole well carried
out there were two serious omissiom; one was the /aiJurc to dispose
of a number of motor propelled craft, wluch were later used by die
Japanese as a means of outflanking Indian positions on the svest
coast, and the other was that the Penang Broadcasting Station
was left int.act, which was consequently taken into immediate
use by lheJ.Tpancse when they occupied the island on 19 Decern,
bcr.
Some of the Penang troops sverc evacuated by sea to Singa-
pore, others were used temporarily to hold the Bogah Ferry
Nibong Teba! bridge sector of the Krian river, whilst the 28di
Indian Infanir)- Brigade svai resting. TJie troops carrying
out this task were 3 Mixed Reinforcement Camp and die European
elements of the Penang and Province Wellesley Volunteer Force
(the indigenous portion of this unit having been disbanded).
In addition a company of 2 Malaya Regiment which had been
employed in protecting the ordnance field park and ammumiion
dumps at Val Do'r (south ofBu Merlajam) was placed under the
command of 3 M.R.C., as was a part of the Baliawaipur State
Infantry when tlic latter moved b.ick from Bt. Mertajam.
The Krian position ivhich svas occupied by the division on
Ujc night of J7yiB December covered lliirty miles of front from
Mahang to the coast. On this front the Japanese had two main
lines ofapproach, the road from KuUm to Sclama and the main
road which crossed the risxr by the Nibong Tcbal bridge. The
distance between Selama and Nibong Tcbal was fifteen miles,
along which many tracks from the north led to the river. Tiie
separation of the two localities was accentuated by the floods
which liad extended across the lateral road from Sclama via Uriah
to Bagan Serai; thus communications between the two localities
by road entailed a fifty-mile detour sna SemangoL Nibong Tcbal
was defended by tlic 28th Brigade while the 3/lG Punjab held Sel-
ama. Krolicol was disbanded.
On the evening of 17 December the Corps Commander
reviewed the situation. Owing to tlic threat down the Grik road
and the possibility of a threat from the coast once the Japanese
184 CAiJPAir.Ns IN souni'EAsr ASIA 1941-42 malava

occupied Penang, wai c^'ident that any protracted defence of Ac

it

Krian river line was impossible. The question at the moment

ss-as: ^S^lerc was the Japanese advance to be stopped ?
_

next possible stop line was the line of the S. Perak. *1^
little better than the Krian river line. The Perak river line s*3i
al'o greatly extended and would require to be held in two Mdci)'
separated sectors, one in the likandar and En^jor bridges
near Kuala Kangsar, and the other in the Blanja Pontoon bridge
area near Siputch. The latter sector was considerably souA
ibmicr and by road, sda fpoh, the distance was about fifiy-m
miles. Moreoser, west of the river the Japanese svould have
two
roads on which to advance towards the Blanja Pontoon
Furlliermore, the Iskandar and Enggor bridges sector could
be outibnked from the north by means of a track leading from
the upper part of the Chendcroh lake to Kampong Chadek, whenw
there was a road to SungeiSiputon the main road south of Kuau
Kangsar. The Corps Commander, therefore, planned lo stop Ac
Japanese at some place south of Ipoh. The exact position had
yet to be selected, but he had in mind the position about Kamp^r,
twenty-four miles south of Ipoh.
The immediate role of the 11th Indian Division was however
to hold the line of the Krian rher. The next bound would bo
doubt to Uie Perak riter.

svrrriDRAWAi. east or -nie perak wve*

TTif /Jicd
On Ac morning of 18 December, 2 A and SH {less one coo*
pany on Ac Grik road) co\-cred by 3 Cavalry (less one squadron)*
wiAditw across Ac Selama bridge held by 3/16 Punjab and moved
to Kuala Kangsar in readiness to move up Ac Grik road. After
2 A and SH bad crossed Ac Selama bridge completely, 3 Cavab}'
(less one squadron) also withdrew from Terap across Ac same
bridge, whlA was blown up immediately after, while one squadron
was sent lo ^lahang to rehes-c 5/2 Punjab. ITje rest of Ac uni*
sta^-ed in Ac Selama area in Ae tear of 3/16 Punjab. 5/2 Punjab,
on relief at Xfahang in Ae late aricmoon, started for Kuala
Kangsar.
On the sector of Ae Krian river front, Ae 28A Indian
left
Infantrj' Brigade relieved the improvised force composed of 3
Mixed Reinforcement Camp, the Bahawralpur Sute Infantiy, one
company of 2 Malay and Ac European elements of Ae Penang
and Pro%-mce 4VcllesJe>- Volunteer Forces. 2/1 Gurkha Rifi
was on Ae right cm-eri^ Ae Bogah Ferry (at Ae junction of
Ae i>. Bogah and the Krian river) and wiA dcuchmcnts at Sim*
 THE WAR IS NORTHERS \LAVA IBS

pang Lima and Tiii Strong. 2/2 GurJdu Rifles uas on the left
cm-cring tlie Nibong Tcbal road and railway bridges and the ferry
at Bandar Bahni. 2/9 Gurkha Rifles st-as in rcscr\-e at Began
Serai where aUo was the Brigade Ifeadquarlcn. One squadron
of 3 Cavalry svas at the mouth of S. Chenaham and w.ts made
responsible for patrolling the road Irctwccn the mouth of
S. Cljcnaham and Bandar Bahru. 8ft Field Regiment (less one
batter)') iv.i5 under the command of the 2flth Indian Infantrs*
Brigade.
From Taiping the remnants of the CUi and I5th Indian
Infantr)' Brigades mos-cd back on 10 December to Ipoh, where Uicy
svcrc to be re-organised into one combined brigade. The JIth
Indian DI\-isii>nal Ileadquartcn and III Indian Corps Ads'anced
Headquarters aUo moved from Taiping to Ipoh.
For two days no notable engagements took place and the
lltli Indian Division had respite from determined hostile attacks.
But on 19 December two estnts of strategical importance occurred:
the Cih Indian Infantry Brigade evacuated Kelantan, the north-
eastern state of Malaya, and the Japanese occupied Penang. On
20 Deeemberi there svas a certain amount ofjapanese patrol activity
on the Selama sector of the Krian ris'cr front and reports were
receitvd th.it they had crossed the river at MaJiang and were
making for Kampong Redang Panjang area, from which place
there was a road to Ulu Sapetang, sshich was on the main road
north of Taiping. In view of this threat to the flric of communica-
tion, it svas decided to wilhdrasv from Selama, and in the c\ening
3/16 Punjab withdrew through 3 Cavalry positions.
In the 28lh Indian Infantry Brigade sector of the Kn'arj front
there was increasing Japanese activity on the north bank of the
river. In tlic evening, the commander of the brigade was notifled
of the intended witlidrawal of Krohcol to UIii Sapetang. About
2100 hours, Krohcol came aclualJy under bis comm.ind. Tlic with-
drawal of Krohcol from the Selama sector necessitated correspond-
ing moves by the other units of the 28tli Indian Infantry Brigade.
2/9 Gurkha RiHcs and 351 Field Battery svere moved to UJu
Sapetang. 2/1 and 2/2 Gurkha Rifles with 352 Field Battery and
troop of the 2 Anti-Tank Battery were moved to the Bagan Serai
position, 'fhc svithdrawal from the S. Krian commenced at about
2230 hours, and Ac two forward battalions withdrew Uirough the
squadron of 3 Cavalry which had been brought in from the left
flank. The svithdrawal svas completed during the night w'ithout
Japanese interference, and by the morning of 21 December, the
28th Indian Infantry Brigade with Krohcol under command was
in a new position.
 19V1'12 MALAGA
CAMPAIfiNS IS EOUTII-FAST ASIA

Owing toheavy hoMilc pretture down 4=

further and immediate
"'J"'''?Ju,^r,"j 2 tliIndian^Inrai>tn'
DivisionalCommanilerwatrnronnedthat Ae 12
Brigade would come under htj .
raj/, withdraw
he decided o
December. On considering the situation,
the diviMon that night from Ulu
Sapetang and B. g
post the units in tlic foUenving
areas:
Ami.Tant Balter)'
An
3Cavalry v.ith one troop of 215
to Ct. Jering (five miles soulli-wcst
down altal road
maximum delay on any Japanese advance
towards Blanja and Ipoh. ;u, wi-t of Kuala
Padang Rengas (nine miles
3/16 Punjab to
^^ 2/9 GurUia Rifles to Lawin at the junction
of the Gri

and main roads. , , . _;i.. rast of

2/2 Gurklia fUrtes to
Salak North, four
the Iskandar bridge, where j* one troop
2/1 Gurkha Rifles with 10
hfountam - and
of 2 Anti-Tank B-ittery and 17 Field bridge
west of the Bla J
Miners) to the road junction six miles
which crossed the Perak ris'er. ... Qjjjiha
troop
2 Anti-Tank Battery (less one "
Rifles) and one troop of 273
Ano-T.ink Battery
and Kuala Kangsar.
137 Field Regiment at S.Siput.
the
By the dnwn of 22 December,
wru di^mied mordered. During Ihnt day all fronw
eaeept that of the 12lh ludian Infamry
Brigade I"*''
J, ud by
^
quiet

engaged by the Japaneie troopt moving via *'

road, and aU forward uoopi were Eghmg
north of KM
"
was evep^ m
only eight miles north of Lawm. There
outflanking movement to cut the trunk roao
of a Japanese
river Pera^
rear of the dhision on to the far ride of the
At IBOO hours on that day the Divisional
Com^
,r,ndcr

issued further orders. His object was to commence wJthd

The 12lh Indian 1
at 2100 hours behind the river Perak.
and
Brigade was to clear the Lawin comer by midnight
could rest
to the Sabk North and S. Siput area, where it
following day preparatory to the occupation of a
ol xp
had been selected on the main road twelve miles north <X)
the Lawin
2/9 Gurkha Rifles and 3/16 Punjab were to hold
2/9 Gur
untU the 12lh Indian Infantry Brigade was clear.
 TIIF, WAR IX NORTHERN MALAVA J7

Rifleswas then to be withdrawn to S. Si'put, where it could rest the

fof/owfng day prior to being moved to the Siputch area (between
Jpoh and theBlanja bridge}. 3/16 Punjab sva* Uicn to rnovc direct
to Siputch. 3 Cavair)' was first to hold Kuala Kangsar and Gt.
Jering and then to witlidraw at dawn on 23 December by the river
route (from Kuala Kangsar to Blanja) and by the coastal road,
imposing^ the maximum delay on any Japanese advance and
demolishing the cuberu. On reaching tijc road junction six
miles west of Blanja, this regiment was to come under the command
of 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, which was then to return to the 28th Indian
Infantry Brigade when the latter had reached the Siputch area.
2/2 Gurkha Rifles svas to occupy a bridgehead covering tlic Iskandar
bridge which it would crow and dcmoiuh after 2/9 GurJUia Jliflet,
the last unit, was clear; it was then to go to Ipoh and llicreafter
come under Corps control.
All these withdrawals were completed before daylight on
23 December, though there were numerous hitches. The J2di
Indian Infantry Brigade pawed through 2/9 Gurklia Rifles guarding
the junction of the Grik and main roads between 2330 hours and
midnight. When Uie Brigade svas well on the safe side, 2/9Gurk}ia
Rifles svitiidrew across the Iskandar bridge which was then blown
by 2/2 Gurkha Rifles.
The role of tlie llih Indian Division was now to delay the
Japanese advance whibt die reconstituted composite C/lSih Indian
Infantry Brigade (the remnants oftic <Jtb and I5lh Indian Brigades}
constructed a strong defensive position about Kampar, twenty-
three miles south of Ipoh. The 28U Indian Infantry Brigade
(exclusive of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles but inclusive of 3/16 Punjab) was
to hold the Blanja bridge sector of the Perak river whilst the 12th
Indian Infantry Brigade held a series of deliyins positions in the
S. Siput, Kantlmn Halt and Chemor areas, north of Ipoh. The
commander of the lUb Indian Division was informed that the
new I5th Indian Infantry Brigade would come under his command
at 0600 hours on 21 December and that the Kampar position
was a defensive position which must be held at any cost and not
treated merely as a position for a dclayit^S action. The orders
whicffhc had received from the Corps 0>mmandcr on 20 December
remained unchanged: he was to hold the Japanese north of Ipoh
until at least 26 December,
The division had been thus extricated from General
Yamashitas trap. It had escaped; but of its tlirce original brigades
two had been completely shattered and one badly mauled, and the
stamina of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was near the breaking-
point.
 C:.\UPAIGS5 IN SOtTlI-feAST ASIA
194142 malaVa

TliiCrikRsailCmfygml momine of 13
In the Grit road posiuons, early
1,,
the
, mom g
^
December, 5)K Punjab war the toad
Its Bank. S
Japanese were threatemng to turn It

behind this battalion might be cut,

t 'est of
embussed at Betong and mos-ed back to ja,.,

Kroh on the Kroh-Baling road. ^""J^nmdoa

balance of the
3/16 Punjab had destroyed the jV,
Xroh
etc. which could not be eyacuated from
5;U Punjab west of Kroh. leag Xtheblowag
of Kroh to delay the J apanesc
advance and also to cover
up of some demolitions on the road. J^h, Kroh
Wlh the vsithdrawal of Krohcol
Grit road was left open to the Japanese. or
Kroh to Lawio and coveted second
the Brst seven miles between toh

and kIW
Id aa loan it was a
InU^Tt
From Khan Intan to ."
class metalled road. 5 .hndted-
fair
than a track though negotiable in olanUtions
weight tmets. This tract ran tough eond
southsvnrds.
jungle for twenty^ine miUs ....btnreen
classmetalled road ran up tut'J"" f<>' as any
dem.m^^_j_
Grit and Kg. Kenering: it w^bordered byi^gU as

in Malaya. Between Ise. 'f, -tw in,le and

of forty 3 *
of it on the main road at a distance
junglenolfarteyond
rubber planutions alternated, with
Use Chendemh
side. Beween Khan
lotan
beadworts
Perat hydroelectric company s rnn-
closely Banted bo *e sw
were situated, the Grit mad s.as
nver. South of bl
ing upper reaches of the Pemk
Grit road lay in the line ofeoimnunicauon area, wto ^
secnon of the leo
Brigadier Moir, who had only one
Car Compair>
Malay Stales Volunteer Force Armoured
the Perak BatuKon as-aOable to hold it.
platoons of
^
On 12 December, the 12lh Indian Infantry-
been ordered to mo%-e north to reinforce
^hcol
bae of commu^
Japanese mtcrfcrencc from the east on the
of the 11th Indian Division. Two
of its baltahons
9th Indian Division, and of these, this division
was unable to re ^
the 8th Indian Inl
4/19 Hyderabad Regiment which was with
Brigade in Kclantan. However, 2 A and SH from Jcranlu
 The War is nortiIern >al,\Va 109

5/2 Punjab and Uic of the brigade troops at Singapore, together

rcsl
with 278 Field Battery of Uic 122nd Field Jlcgiraent, moved up
to the llth Indian Divuion' area. On 13 jScccmbcr at Ipoh,
2A and SH \va^ ordered to detach one company and a section of
armoured can which were sent to Grik.
Apart from this imigni'ncant detachment of volunteen tlus
casyapproach to thesolelineof communication oflhc llth Indian
Division was guarded by one company of 2 A and SH which had
been sent to Grik on 13 December by the Corps Commander. It
w as, howc\'cr, hoped that even sviih a force as small as one company,
considerable delay might be imposed on the Japanese in the
reputedly impenetrable jungle between Grik and Kg. Kener-
ing.
2 A .and SH (less one company) moved to Baling where
l arrived on the evening of 14 December .and went into position
covering the road junction. 5/2 Punjab, 278 battery of Ujc 122nd
Field Regiment and the rest of Uie brigade troops were still tn reute
from Singapore.
On 14 December there was a certain amount of patrol
activity in front of the Kroh position. In the late afternoon a
strong patrol attacked the left flank of 3/16 Punjab, but was repulse-
ed. Shortly after this. Brigadier Paris, commander of the 12th
Indian Infantry Brigade (Malaya Command Reserv'c) arrived
at Krohcol hcad(juarten with orders for the withdrawal ofKrohcol
during the ensuing night. Brigadier Paris had been given the task
of preventing ihcjapancsc Falam Force, wliich had then occupied
Kioli, from reaching Patani (fifty miles west from Kroh). During
the night of 14/15 December, the withdrawal of Krohcol from the
position west of Kroh >vas cflcctcd without inlcrfcrcncc.
On1 5 December 2 and A SH
had a quiet day in the Baling
area. The Japanese did not press do'vn the road from Kroh;
instead of doing so they moved forward on Uic Kroh Klian
Intan road and their forward patrols were encountered on the track
from Klian Intan to Grik, some five miles north of Grik, by the
patrols from the detached company of 2 A and SH at Grik.
The company of 2 A and SH remained in contact with the
Japanese at Grik throughout 16 December. There had as yet
been no indication that the Japanese were in great strength, but it
was evident from their failure to advance west of Kroh that the
force which had landed at Patani w-as destined to c.xploit the
attractions of this road. Nevertheless, the detached company
of 2 A and SH was forced to gn ground. On 1 7 December, the
company was hard pressed and bad to fall back to Sumpitan,
It was evident that the Japanese were bringing a strong force to the
190 C-OtPAlGXS DC SOCTH-EASr ASIA 1941-42 U-MAVa

Grik area and that British reinforcecicnts >vould have to be des-

patched there. As an imme^atc remforcemeiil, one compel
of the Perak Battalion Federated Malay States Volunteer Force,
and one section of the Federated Malay States Volunteer
Armoured Car Company, \s-erc ordered to move there from ipeh.
When the ness's of this Japanese thrust reached the Commander
m Indian Corps, he Immediately ordered the v.-itlidrawal of the
!2th In^n Infantry Brigade to Kuala Kangsar, where it was
m
come under Ids own command for operations up the Grit n)am
A
Baton the Grit road the company of 2 and SHhad been forced
back to a position coreriag ijii^gong which was held bj the most
war-worthy Independent Company.
Brigadier Paris had been ordered to impose the maxim^
delay on the Japanese and to present them from cuttii^ the une
of communication until the Jltb Indian Drvisioa had wiihdia^
clear of Lawin. The orders were that Lawin should be dcnirf
for at least four dajt.He decided to nanforce the twu compame*
at Lenggoog with the remainder of 2 A and SH and one company
of 5/2 Punjab. This whole force was ordered to deny Kow
Tampan (twentj'-three miles north of Inwin) to thejapanese.
various vadHations in which advances and withdrawals were
the poddoa was stabihsed two mflesaorth of Lenggoag. 278 FieM
Batterv* of 122 Field Regiment had meanwhile arrived in
Lenggong area and had carried oulsome eflecm-c firing durinj^i*^
witbJrawaL
On the nmnung of 20 December, 2 A and SH was in contact
near Ixnjgong, AJapanese party which had come down the
A
S. Perak on rafts, b)'-pasi^ the right flant of 2 and SH, landrf
near Kotah Tampan. Here they were engaged bj a detached
platoon of 5/2 Punjab and by a company of 2 A and SH which had
been sent back from Leoggoeg where news of the Japanese aavt'
ment dow-n the xwer had been obtained from a Chinese. The
Japanese were then threatening the road four miles to the rear of
2AandSH, whose immediate withdrawal was therefore imper*
ti^e. By 2200 hours the whole battalion was across the small
causeway, a mile north of Kotab Tampan, which was blown by
15 Ticld Company.
During the ni^t of 20,21 December the commander of
the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade had sent forward the whole of
5/2 Punjab, and at dawn on 21 December the brigade was disposed
**
as follows:
2 A and SH held Kotah Tampan,
5,^ Punjab held the Ihirian Cauicwaj (MS I8;19}.
Kg. Sauk (M.S. 13) and the Chenderoh dam.
 tllE \SAR LN NCRTilEkN MALAYA l9l

278 Field Battery U'as in support of the battalions on the

Crik road,
5/14 Punjab was guarding the bridges over the S, Perak,
Brigade Headquarters was at Kati (M,S. 8).
Shortly after dawn some Japanese rafts ucrc successfully
shot up. 2 A
and SH was in contact throughout the day and
inflicted heavy casualties upon the Japanese. But ultimately it
was nithdratvn through 5/2 Punjab to Kati in the ewntriQ. During
the day 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment also arris'cd and moved into the
jXBition covering Sungei Siput.
On 22 December, 5/2 Punjab with 278 Field Battery in
support w'as in contact with the Japanese, north of (he Sauk road
junction. During the afternoon the latter put in a fairly heavy
attack down the Grik road, but this was diccked fay 5/2 Punjab
who inflicted considerable casualties on them. Meanwhile, orders
had been issued for the withdrawal of the 12tit Indian Infantry
Brigade across the Iskandar bridge. Tlie brigade had passed from
the command of III Indian Corps to that of the llth Indian
Dhnsion on the previous evening after the decision to withdraw
behind the Perak river had been made. 5/2 Punjab disengaged
about 1800 hours and moved back from Sauk to Kali. From
there 2 A and SH moved oitat about 1930 hours and went to Salak
North. 5/2 Punjab, when the troop carrying transport had
returned, left Kati about 2230 hours and also went to Salak North.
It b diflicult to decide whether the retreat east of the Perak
river was justified on the day It was ordered The situation was not
.

too bad On any day before the night of 22/23 December when the
last unit had crossed the Iskandar bridge and the bridge itself was
blown up. On 20 December the Japanese had not attacked in the
Krian area and had been active about Lenggong on the Grik road.
They were perhaps more anxious about the crossing of Chcndcroh
Lake, because the road had been destroyed. On 21 December,
the BritbU troops were still not badly pressed in the western sector,
although Kuala Lumpur had a pounding from the air and the Grik
road recorded a sanguinary fight somewhere to the north of the
lake. On 22 December, it was recorded that there was practically
no news of 1 1 Division to*day. Consider situation sau'siactory.
12 Brigade is lying about south end of Chcndcroh Lake'V* But it
was supplemented by the nesvs that the Japanese were moving to
Siput by rafts on the Perak river during the nights and
tlicrcby entering eastern Perak by a process of b>-passing. This
would appear to have prompted the General Oflicer Commanding

46\v Diary, General Ilcadquaner Fa>4taa(, Appendix No. 299, para I.

 jjalava
192 CAUPAICNS LN SOfTH-EASr ASIA 19U'l2
Perak riser
InfanUy Brigade to cross the
to order the 12th leidian

Ste1fe'Ue,. relatiog to ^e ^^Utdrawal

questionable. According to General Pcrasa ,
^ staiava seas
repeated about this time that the aim f JS; c^;deia-
stillthe securit)' of Singapore Nasal Base
and no o

at an m_t
tion ought to compete soth this. Agam,
ence at Singapore on 18 December, It vsas deeded
j
Japanese in north Malaja and not let them
oreupy a "WP ,
a^res " ^
from sshich thej- could threaten Bntish
meats. On the same day the Gcneml
^ S^
at Ipoh
the Commander of HI Indian Corps met
to ihe
plans. But the former had already agreed
drassal to the cast of the Perak riser
and Ac '>"
orders to that effect.** Gonsl^*y that it

manding was beaten by hb own instnicuons and

regre

seemed a pit>* not to take adt-antage of the good

too Mve
rit er Perak .** The Japanese aceounu
able surprise at the retreat of the
Indian^ibsh
y .^nese
haste on the night of 22/23 December.
Of
declared that no movement had taken place on 18 belund
when III Indian Corps had issued the
the Perak river; but the situation teporU
and vrar dianes o
tiotu throw much doubt on ihb statement.

Tie ii AfJ^, f- riL p. IM. Fax Eial. App**^

"/irr*. page lS4.SIioWwDury,G>CTlHlqua/ttn,twt-*'
No. 223.
*'>Tte War in Afaleje, f - <> P- tM.
 CHAPTER VIII

The Struggle for Central Malaya

THE (SENtRAI. STRATEGIC SITUATtOS

Central Malaya conwted of the stales of Perak, Selangor

and Negri Sembilan in the vvest, and of Pahang in the cast. It
may be regarded as die heart of Malaya, sshuse loss would be fatal
to the British hold over that counlr>'. It was also tlie key to the
security of Singapore. Central Malaya had important characlcrb-
lics, firstly, it could be controlled better by sea, especially from

the island of Penang, than by land; secondly, it was more diflicuU

to defend on account of the greater area of open land; and tliirdly,
Kuala Kubu was the key to the possession of Paliang.
Central Mala)^!, also oITcrcd numerous olntacles to an
invader, who had to cross many riverr, to penetrate jungles and
negotiate swamps. Tliere were few places from where supplies
could be drawn, and there were difiicult communications between
the coast and the main road to Singapore. The riven Perak,
Bernam and Selangor oITered natural obstacles to the invader as
there were few bridges worth mentioning across them. The sole
bridge across Uic Perak river was at Blanja, but that too was made
up of pontoons. Other rwers which were crossed b) the main
trunk road had also many bridges which, if demolished, once again
ofTcred impediments to the invader. As a matter offact the Perak
river was a problem to Uic DriUsh as svcll as to the Japanese. It
ran souUt from Kuala Kangsar right between the main road and
the west coast.
There svere only three important positions where the invader
and the defender could come into cont.act with each oUicr, \nz.,
Kuala Kangsar, Ipoh ria Dlaiya Bridge and Tclok Anson, and each
of these positions was of considerable strategic Importance. If
an invader crossed the river Perak at Kuala Kangsar he svas bound
to proceed along the milwayandlhchigh-road in a linear direction ^
parallel to the river for over one hundred miles until he could
arrive at Kuala Kubu.
Regarding llic bridge at Blanja General Percival observed:
This bridge, which svas constructed of pontoons, svas Ukcly to
become a vital point when our withdrawal started. Between
it and Kuala Kangsar on the main road a good secondary road

ran parallel to the river on the west side, but there was no road
194 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 WAEAVA

far
on the cast side. This we thought would be a weakness as
as defence svas concerned because it would give the enemy cas)
access to the river while at the same time making it \'er> difficult
for us to watch it.'
Brigadier Paris emphasised the importance of holding
me
roads, and remarked : I loathe this talk of position and holding
lines. In this is one and only one tactical
country there feature

that matters the roads.

I am sure the answer is to hold the
roads

in realdcpths Another mcxlc of defence was the construction

the
of field fortifications at Ipoh, Tclok Anson and Slim risxr,
blowing up of the bridges, the delaying of the Japanese progress,
these
and the greater use of patrols and fire-power- As against
principles of defence the Japanese evoKtd the method of' stabbing
the enemy in the side destroying the British lines of communica-
tion (such as railways, roads, telegraph, telephone etc.), demorali^
ing the spirit of the soldiers, increasing fifth-column actinties, and
dropping leaflets from the planes for publicity and propaganda ot
their own political ideas, Mov'ements were made b>' both the
British and the Japanese usually at night and in small numbers*
if in advanced posts; or in large columm, if in the rear ones.
Terror
was attempted by the Japanese by bombing and machine-gunning
from the air. When the Japanese landed at Telok Anson and
Kuala Selangor, the>' used only small craft, which no submarine
could touch nor any aeroplane could hit except at low
^^hcnc^'e^ the Japanese attempted a critical mostmeni by landi
air or sea, their fighters gave full protection to the mosing forces.
Tlie objective of the struggle between the British and the
Japanese in thb large area was the possession of the road to Sing*
pore. The British Cabinet made thb point clear on 22 December
1911, "The message said, vital bsue is to ensure security of
Xaval Base. They emphasised tliat no other consideration must
compete with this It was added that the Malaya Command
must cmploj delaj-ing tactics and also continue opposition on
mainland to cm-er arrival of our rcinTorccmcntsandihc execution
of maximum demolitions. It bfor >'ou to judge when and to what
line you arc forced to fall back, having regard to the danger of
expending your forces unduly before the arrival oricinforccmcnu.*
Jhc Japanese were equally delernuned to get possession
pore. In fact, the capture of Singapore was vital to the success

Tit MV n pp. tM-S.

> Tinrurr 27S.

tar Ei. Apprwlia No. JW. irj I.
S/J^
 Tiir. mur.oLfc for ce-ntrai, xialaya 195

of tlic Japancjc campaign in the souUi'Vcstcm Pacific. Not only

wat the IlrinMi fortre and naval bawamaterial obstacle to opcra-
tifins against the Nctherlandi East Inslfes and India, but
it had
come to have tremendous psjthological value In determining the
atliturlcs of the people* of all joutlj-caitem Asia. Kightly or
wrongly, these peoples fch that if Singapore were to fall, their /ate
svas scaled; and similarly, the Japanese felt that as long as the
fortress liclcl out, complete success could never be acliicsed.
Singapore was thus a symbol to both side* in this wara symbol
of the win to \ictory
'fhe Japanese Commanderdn-Chief, General Vamashita,
fcness' the condition of the British army too svell. It had fought for
more llian livo s*-ceks without re or adequate equipment, and
rcinforrementswercyci not forthcoming. Hcdecided toslrcngihen
his own army by adding one more dUnsion to it and employing
two complete disisions simultaneously in the sicst-coast campaign.
Air raids were also to be increased in order that the communications
of the llritlsh army might be completely dcslrojrd and in consequ-
ence the wiUidrawal of that army might be compelled I>cfore the
nrriv'al of reinforcements.
Having lost heavily in the Brat round of the war the British
Cabinet was aiwioui to win at least in the nest one. They drew
the attention of their Commander-in-Chicf, Far Bast, to a few
problems like the evacuation of unwanted civilian* in the military
areas, scorched eariJi policy,* cooperation between the army
and the air force etc. ,* emphasising thereby the supreme importance
of increasing the c/ficiency of the British anny and tiying to de-
crease that of their enemy. At die same time they approved of
a scries of reforms in the army in Malaya svitJi a viesv, perhaps,
to increasing its usefulness. It is very difTicuU to say how far
these were helpful in waging the war with greater acst. One
opinion svas that such centralised control from lA)ndc>n was detri-
mental to the British interests in distant Malaya.
nic most urgent need of the army in Malaya was reinforce-
ment. The required rest and relief ibr at least
c-xisllng b.t(taIlons
a few days, Bui the British Cabinet could do Ulllc to provide
these immediately. However, some reinforcements were sent on
board A fount Vernon in the fastsveefc of Bcccmbcr 19 11,'* and some
quantity of ammunItionaUowasrclea.sed tothcMalaya Command"

ejapanev Land Opr/aiicra, Sfroon IV- Tlw AfaUya Campaipi, p. 21, wra
I'tS'ar Diary, Cfneral I!eadqor(CT Ftf'Eait. Appendix Noa. 3M and 318.
^ ApPendice* S'ot. Z87 and 30#.
lirm, AppoKlix Ko. #72.
"> Won, Appendix fio. 562.
' Mon, Ari>efidu No. #28.
 1911*42 U.UAYA
196 CAJfPAiCNS IV SOiml-EAJT ASIA

hundrt
tants and four
besides one squadron of scsTntccn Ksht
men to be in charge of Uiosc tanks.'* , ordered
More or less simultaneously U.c Bniuh
certain clianges in the higher comnund. On 2
, b\'
Chief Manhal Sir Robert Brookc-Topham r a^,
General Sir Henry PosNuaU as
Commander-m-Chie ,

nujor
but Sir Henr>' was Instructed to deal with ^
and =tra.fS>- joMy
Fleet, and keep off from opcrauonal control *
to in
regulate th
ga\-c General Perds-al more freedom to
Malaya. At the same lime Sir Geoffrey La>
ton uho
|
j
^
from SingapOTC to Colom^.
of the Eastern Reel was shifted
m January 1912 Mr. Duff Cooprr, ff.c Cabmet y,
the Fat East, had to leave Singapote
on the aod
appointment andSirShenton Thomas, sho was
the
of the
High Gommusioner of Mala)-a, succeeded as Wm
*
, \^'j^xll .

Far East WarCouncil; and. above all. General Sr

l,
v.howasthe Commander-in-Cluefof the Indian
Army ,
j^j,. .
. ^
cd as the Supreme Commander of the the
Australian (.\BDA) area on 3 Januar>'^ 1 W2,
a^tb g
Sta .
Coinnuader*in*Chief, Far East, as hti Chief of
at his ''j'
General Perchal'i sente of reiponsibilit)-
of tte
ed him to mate a few ehanget in the orga^auon
mto oM
He had eombined the 6th and 15th Indtan Bngadm
gade, Inovtn as the new I5th Indian Infantry
3;16)_were ro ^
battalions of 16 Punjab Regiment (2jl6 and ^

into one. and the two British battalions (2 p'

Leicester) svete combined under Ihc name of
The commatid of this new 15ih Indian Infantry
Etitish Ba^
Engadc s ^
lo lieutenant-Colonel Moorhead who had
distii^uishcd

at the head of the contingent on the Kroh Road.

General W
of Major-General Muira - J
second act was the retirement
of me
and the appointment of Brigadier Paris as commander
Indian Drrison. The vacancy caused by the
promouon o .

I- -
gadier Paris was filled up by Lieutenant-Colonel

Slight imptwements made in Army Headquarters

wre
also in this period. On
1 January 1942, the smaller
Fighter
Headquarters in Singapore was expanded. It became
asNo. 224(F) Group. Group Captain Rice remained m
airo
mand.'* On 4 January 1942, Air \Tce-Maishal Maltby

AppeoSx No. 337.

>s litm, As|ndKci Kos. 443 sod SIO.
M Sir Fsol MsIlbTi p. 1373, psra 270.
 Tire STRtrCGtE FOR CENTRAI, SfAMVA 197

in Singapore as Chief of Siaif-designalc fo the

Commander-j/i-
Chief, Far East.*
On the side of the Japanese abo there were a few significant
changes at the beginning of this period. General Yamashita
introduced an amphibious striking force to co-operate with the
army, proceeding along the main west-coast road. He cancelled
operations by parachute troops as the British had fixed sharp
bamboo poles all over the open ground and formed an effident
defence in all clcared-up areas. However, he put in three divisions
for attack on the British
ihe Tamashha Group, the Maliui
Group, and X Group.'^ In the battles of North hlalaya, the
Japanese had fought with practically only one division. So far
as equipment was concerned their army was fortunate not only
in having what it wanted from Japan but also in acquiring what
the British army had lost during its withdrawal: ammunition,
guns, small sea-craft, petrol and stores of military importance.
Turning to the dispositions of units in the eampaign for
central Malaya, one may notice generally a crippling scarcity of
troops and lack of reserves. The Perak river area demanded
one more division for its defence, but this could not be had. The
9lh Indian Division could not be transferred to the western aonc
as it had still a vital task to perform in the eastern part of Malaya,
(he 16th East African Division could not be expedited in its journey
to Malaya, and no extra help was received from Australia. The
forces attached to the Singapore Fortress could not be touched
in view of the highest value placed on the defence of the island in
the whole Malayan defence scheme.
From the strategic point of view the key to central htalaya
was the high road to Ku^a Lumpur. This could be captured by
crossing the Perak river at the Iskandar Bridge or at Blanja
Bridge, or by landing troops at the mouths of the Perak and Bcrnam
rivers. The struggle for Central Malaya was decided by the opera-
tions at these four vital points, as described below.

THE FALI. OF iron

The struggle for central Malaya began on 24 December

1941. Its first phase was directed against Jpoh, whicli fell to the
Japanese on 29 December. Wemay begin the account of the
campaign in central Malaya with this episode.
Geographically, the area inwjlved was enclosed by the
Perak river and the road from Kuala Kangsar to Blanja in the west,

A'o. 278, Malaya Campaign 19-IM2, p. 75, para 3.

 SOimi-IAJI ASIA !91Il2
MAMYA
198 CMIPAIOM ts

frran Salat
by the msm rtisil And railway
Ktn Gajah in the eat., and by nnall 7 and
and Salat Xotth in the north "'.*7?,
linsunr ^rig frein

IJatu Gajah in UlcsouUi. InsideUiUarea Hat

rhe entrance
norlh to south and enacted stlutha.ardi
sontltv.^^^
or
into thi, position ara, cidter
from f^alnt I>onh
pontoon bridge eaitwardt. So long a
from Illanja
entrances were guarded, Ipoh avas safe. ,,j:,lvat Salat
The defenders organised their
e) 'laced the
lands.
North and hUnja and in Uieir suburban
12th Indian Infantry Brigade to
hold the inJn toa ^
^
"'>0'
and the adjacent lands up to tlie 'S, '
,
pbeed
Kantang Halt, while the 28th Indian 'uf?""!' paniab and
eoniiiting of ajir a
on the Blanja front. A reseta-e p^erated
secTO
three armoured car sections (the Ilh
Malaya Slates Volunteer Force and two
h'u pLj lately
Com-
formed) was tept as divU'tonal resera-e
JfJj
43 Field Fart^ Company
c
pany, 40 Army Troops Company and
vre responsible for the demolitions on
all
An.ton VeO'
was kept Tclok
The Independent Company at
ho\^evcr, was done to afTord protccuon
ogw
little, 2 -,.rnJptuS

also not adequate fw

the air or b>- sea. Air forces were
the Japanese line of communication along
the dcienc^
caknc detracted from the efreaiveness of
The Japanese reaUsed that Kuala Kangsar, ^yog
wa>
Anson were well defended and that the Usl , denl
them was b>* directing against each of thc J^jocs
by air force and artillery-. AU the tl^c
divTsion supported
plan, ana
were to act simultaneously according to
Yamashita took personal charge of the campaign. j

On 23 December 1941, the situation in Perak area

stable. There was contact with the Japanese a* , 951,
near the railway bridges about Kuala Kangsar.
Indian Infantry Brigade was on the eastern side o*
and the iots
river, the two railway bridges were demoUshed
the n
began to mo\-e to Chemor, ten miles north of Tpoh. On
J

Infantry
front, 3 Ca\-a1ry and a battalion of the 28th Indian
were still west of the pontoon bridge with the supporting
Infan n
Parit area and another battalion of the 28th Indian
Brigade in the area west of Bata Gajah. On 23 Decembw
Japanese air force bombed and machine-gunned Ipoh
and
Blanja bridge, damaged the railway at Chemor, and attacked
transport vehicles of a battalion of the 12th Indian
Infan^
the
Brigade near Salak North, causing some casualues. Of these,
 THE STRUGGLE TOR CEXTIL^L MAL\YA 199

attack On Ipoh was tlic worst, because an ammunidon train ssliich

liad airis'ed lately and the signal box at the railway station
were bit, and the petrol pump also was dejtro)'ed. Tltis produced
a shock which rocked the svholc of central Malaya for some time
to come, especially after the terrible air battle over Kuala Lumpur
on the prewous day and the consequent withdrawal of all British
fighters to Singapore.^
tVhen the day dawned on 24 Det^mbcr, there was cverj
hope that the British Commonsvealih troops svould keep the
Japanese on the western side of the Perak river, whatever iiught
happen in the air or on the west coast. TIic high command had
ordered the I2th Indian Infantry Brigade to employ delaying
tactics and the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade to pres-ent the
crossing of the river. Both appeared to be comparatively easy
tasks.
24 December was a day of comparative calm. The Malaya
Command ordered the III Indian Corps to use eight light antia{f-
crafi guns to protect troops and transport on roads only on scale
air attack.'* The6/I5orne>v 15th Indian Infantry Sngade report-
ed Uuit * CIO considen Perak river and Kampar centres of
fifth column aciirirj', particular danger from Red Flag Society,*
and other units confirmed this with ^cts which had come to their
notice. 5/14 Punjab blew up the two bridges near S. Siput
with the idea of delaying the Japanae progress, and 5/2 Punjab
was made responsible for Uiis. The road from S. Siput to Kg.
Talong was patrolled by armoured cars. There was no contact
with the Japanese on llie ground anywhere. But the Japanese
air force attacked all forward areas svilh heavy bombs, srith
the result that all troops were withdrawn to the east of the Perak
river and all bridges across were demolished. At the same time,
the in Indian Corps withdrew some extra units from forward
areas and ordered No. 46 Army Troops Company, Queen Victoria's
Own Madras Sappers and hlincrs, to be in readiness for the
wholesale
destruction of civil installations and services in Ipoh
On the Chrutmas Day, the Japanese allowed the British to
enjoy generally a quiet day but spent their own time in sticking

posters in S. Siput, in dropping pamphlets in Chinese, Mala)

and English with scurrilous accusations agmnst the white race*'
in Singapore Island, and in spreading a wild rumour in Ipoh that

'T tVr Diary, General ttejJcnaftcn 'Far Ar>peodca 317 and 327.
'War Diary, Keadquarters, Malaya CamminiL I127lwun24 December J94J.
'9 War Diary, 15 Indian Infantry brigade^ 2* JX^ber IWJ.
fir*.. ,c . r'..,..nanvOMn t^etonaf Own,]

2330 bourt, 23 December lOtl.

 C.^MPAIC^J IX SOUTH-EAST ASET 19W2 SIAEAYA
200

British officer hove bten shot

ovrins to fact

Tam ** Thcr* >'crc sending some of

the prisoners
^ e

British side, ?ho were telling their frfcnd,

not oeated badly during '^H^casualfe

fonvard. Their casualties hate
been few.
ntorale h
have been much, theirs ate noE
high." The whole population
estate areas became unfriendly
to
jjiong robbet
in S. Siput and J
could
^ ^
no information about the inosxment panel
that day wem
be available. The opetauons
and esc air
5,12 Punjab and the
Japanese, J P
aetions between
attaeks on the 28d. Indian Infantry *' line

20 December was another qmet

da^
j e iJf -nd r3fl-3)'
troops, though the 28th
Indianjn&ntry Lujnpur,
communicadom at Tapah, Tanjong . japaneie
Seremban Tampin and Segamat were '^***J* l^joparSot^
Ipoh
aircraft,
all stores
the local dnl population in
and
t\ra in the presence oflocal
^
^
that

, jjj jediaa
the first consignment of NAdUl stores sent
Corps under Rcq-al Amy Semee Co^ France.
without let ot
area was lost only bj* being looted that
Japanese propaganda was so strong
^ng _ ordered
at Tanjong
the Bridhh Resident, Perak, >s-iihdras^
not to aUow them
to keep chil police at duty and As
without permission of military comm^dcr on
against these discouraging sjuiptonij. are
s^ssful skirmishes during the day. The a
uoticed in the war diary of the battalion on t^ dam ..I
successful day for the quite a lot of fighong and prttj^
Bm
losses infiiacd on the enemy
wiih comparamTly lew w ^
It was estimated that the Bn.
had infiiclcd at Ic^t . cf

300 casualties on the encnij-, whUe it had only

The mens morale was high, they had fought wcu
15 itself.
w
bother and a busmess-bie 7-
the day without fuss or in
their fa^
^
seemed that they could now be trusted to take
\-olanteerea ro ^
battle .** (uj Sepo)' Shiv Ram who had
enertij-
to ISKAKDAR Bridge 9
(a distance of miles in
J .

on bicycle, brought back infonnation that half a Bn, a ^

half were
liad already crossed the Iwidge while the other
 TIIE STRCCCLE FOR CENTRAL MALAYA 201

do so.* {iii)
A PI.
of enemy on bicycles approached demolished
bridge at S. Siput. D Coy. on a prearranged signal from
Sep. Shiv Ram opened hea\y fire on the forward pi. of the enemy
.* It has
and killed all but about three who managed to escape
been recorded that Uie enemy attack generally was not so well-
'

planned as normally. He came in frontally to start and got some

hca \7 casualUcs. He then tried the left against B. Coy. but did

not go wide enough die ground being open The enemy
then tried the right flank (A Coy.) but with no more success dwn
on the Ic A
the ground and observation situation being similar .**

At dusk this battalion withdrew to Milestone 14 position in order

that the brigade plan of counter-attack might be
earned out
successfully.
The new plan required 5/2 Punjab to move to Milestone 14^,

whUe 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders attacked the

with the support of two batteries of 137 Field Regiment. 4/19
Hyderabad was to put in a flank attack simultaneously in the
of thwe
area east of the limestone elifls. The main intention
attacks was to delay the Japanese svithout the brigade
being heavily
the day and
committed. The method was a limited attack, and
time were 0930 hours on 27 December 1941. , .
nghj^g
The next day svas consequently a day of severe
mght. The
and subsequent withdrawal from the north dunng the
road ft 0615
Japanese launched n very heavy attack astride the
it prevented the
hours on 27 December which svas repulsed but
brigade plan from being carried out. A
fresli ^ack developed

against the right flank at about 0815 hours.

The Cghung had
along the ivholc
thickened and hand-to-hand fighting went on
front in which A, B and C Companies of 5/2
Punjab were involved.
and restore the ntua-
D Company was ordered to counter-attack
tion on the right flank. This company
made a gallant effort but
and coming under hea^ machine-gun nrc
having lost its leader
failed to restore the position. At 0900 hours the Japanese pre^me
became heavy and the battalion was compelled
"'''dra'v pin-

out beingpursued owing to thesevere losses

of 4/19 Hydwabadt j
ing troops."" At the same time one company
wiped
which cLe on too narrow a front was
in
^
suffered '"'='"'7."^'
Japanese."' Intheirtum thejapancse also
mainly due to the British artillety getnng a f J'/in
praetieaUy stopped
in the early part of the day. The fighnng
 '9'"^
;02

,h^ ,rtcrn'-..
t0.ou?li Ac >panc JhJftyc'='
Irfun inr H tun>mj n..nrinrnu

rtoM in pnAins l.V A.

Vrom 22 to 20 Dccrmbtr '*'
to imptmT tho loatl f'
TaMri: roH '
ofcngincon i,.c!tT,
nnd infnntt,' thotn
thtir aitilk,,- ,t AtK If?
mo. the ti.-er

Ae auAult wa. the 27A

in rubber
, ^ J:.,ti 5 ht
tf
neatly haH

for
bontl^rt rpreaJ terror ener
the '"Sat!' fT'
Je''n ea for .Ultej

hour, anJ a. the la.t plane PPr^^ arhine.surj

the tner. But the llnlnn
paddling aero.,
opened rueh an interuc fire .. ^e
batterie. jg,;tertheleth
up and no attempt a. t^de
to
'yp,, ij,h Ini^
lapaneu: vuceeeded in petting
atw the ..re all i"!

Inrantry Brigade ha. Sd'^Aete * ,'2

agairat both Brigade.. Bo*
uere
preeandon .
>a.
DMiion reien-e. So utlhdeaual )2Aand20th lnd
night the
fte *' 9":
During - nizhx
' the
.ueeeufuUy carried out.
aJd, bv
anA !
th
Infanin- Brigadet

, wm luccewfuUy ^
had pyi in
I. o.
na .. Dember
of 27 - - f 19"> General \ama,h.ta flh.oAetfn
rtijrtnr to march to Ipoh,
Ip one from
dl,o.ion. f
AttheendorAatdayU.eBriti.hdn^i.o.o^---^^^jO
a. foll'
..ett.
Indian .'"fanto Bn^g
3 C...ulry near Blanja, 12*
Brigade n '
ofChemor, 15th Indian Infantiy j,c rishl-
fBiendenang Roa^^^ ^
28,h Indian Infantry Brigade on , 1,
at lelo
The Independent Company conUnwed
naval patrol wmen
which had
naa lunk
luu.. mvw
three a.aa.. waft
amall
1,-, u,.o.nnl a
m coa't-

Panckor Wand on 26 December roamtamed

or. r rehef
ofrche*
rather Ulan a
General Perei.al remarV. i,h mrrow ^
.vnihout a bitcn.
that the wihdrawali proceeded.,
went to the enemy.** oanuence cfd*
The ollpoh appeao to have been a
!o*s
dccisiJapane5e advantage in numbers and
moved in small dctachmenU at night, moving
rapim)
tacucs. 1 ^ JapaD^
J
^ ^cy
gular interval* and incurring only a few
c^alfc*
did so. Further, they put in one whole
dninon
coast compaign, wWch fact was not known to
had brought two specially organised assault
the t>rj
haiuo ^ g

number of knocked-down motor-boats for their landing

pVVi Dsarr, 12 tadlu b^nirr Boesde, 27 l>e*iBlw I

*
nVVir DiBiy. Cnxnt Ita&puf*1 Fir Eirt, Appmtia N-
MTltf Ittf n a/at^c, p. tC2.
 THE STRUOCLE FOR CEKTRAL MALAYA
As stated before,
Anson. This loo svas unknown to the British.
much to be desired m
the British intelligence system left
denied aU co-
this extensive area where the civil population
resources ss-ere
operation. Moreover, the British
to be
limited. Equipment, transport and personnel had
sparingly. There was no reserve battalion
the m
while
DivisiL, and the III Indian Corps,
in being as a fighting
delay onJapanese progress, had also to remain
formation.*

THE STAND AT KAMFAR

The scene then shifted to Kampar where I*'

tions had withdratvn. A glance at the map

has s
Malaya vdll show, what General Pcrcival '
. ..

Kampar position was probably thestrongesl position

Malaya." There were '>>1" 8^
Comieonwealth forces in
for holding this viewt firstly, it was
more
which the Brtush enjoyed
to artillery action in
secondly, the towering hill knosvn as .p"'"?
4,070 feet high, dominated the roads,
railway and the mm nti^ g

country through which the Japanem

had to P
thecompacinessoflhewholeareato^defendcdp
^ Tapah,
furth
and reserve positions to be maintained control
If the ^
Bidor, sum river and Tanjeog MaUjn.
the sea and the air, the stand at KaP f Sng
their <>'>1"'
until the middle of January 1942 and Smgapore
the enemy for as long a, we could at
in, would have
to enable reinforcements to be brought
tcalis^.e
position extended from .'^'P"?
and from Telok Anson to Sahum.
The
^

Gopeng to Bidor through Kampar, Temo
Bidor
minor roads connected Telok Anmn Gopeng with Bidor
through Changkat Jong in the pS'
P^
through Dipang, Sahum, Chenderiang perimeter of
or outnne
The main railway lay more
less

Kampar position. There ai ad in the Kampar

;;grrno:mad

*
w CO, Hctswio. f-
. 96 H'ar m P-
 205
THE STRUGGLE FOR CENTRAL MALaVA
Dlpong,
Kampar river had an important bridge at %Tllage Kuala
while the Dipang river, running parallel to
I^mpar bU the m
Pahlawan ^sar and
north, had two bridges, and the CWkus,
Kampar road had each one unportant
Bidor rivers on Ct. Jong and
bridge. would certainly affect the course of war
These bridges
both in point of time and in matter of
tactics.
r n .
as follows.
The defensive arrangements were generally toivnslup of
The main position was semi^ircolar covering the
from the north, west and south-west on a
frontage of ^ut
Kampar
four miles Its eastern flank tested against the
western side was marked by the mam
road bordered
hill, and its
open stretches oi
by narrow belts of rubber plantauon and by
field of lire up to Mclme
tin-tailings beyond it, which afforded
To the south-west lay a big
mbber
hundred yards.
the Cicely Estate. Tin-tailings filled
to the
and the road. The main approaches
mnk "'r'
the trunk road, the railway, and the
road from
Penawat and Cicely Estate femra,
Tg. Tualang to the
ferry wa gu
which had been destroyed. The latter
If the Japanese
platoons of 2/16 Punjabis
road from Gopeng, they could ^P^T H'!!^Tje*^'laUer
^
it by taking the road to
Sahum and S*

was easier than the former, because K w^

not so -B ,

defence. A, a result of this the 28*

Indian Inlan^ 5"^
placed to guard this route. at Kota
place c
area by railway, it was necessary to
Bharu and Malim Nasvar railway staUons
s

actual defence being delegated to the

bnga cs behind ^Kamoar
.

posi-
tried to
them. If, however, the Japane^
tions by the routes provided fay
femes, further
be required in the west and south-west. j.cerv'c some
The details of the defence oirangcmcntt
was
mention, The main Kampar posiuon
(i)

Mart Mantry Brigade GP-^ w" p 3/16 Punjab Jb. (with

face of the perimeter was held by J '
.
Jyjj.j,t at the
Punjab,
351 Field Battery) and 2/16 Tat/Punjab
Malim Newar feny; 2^ Anti-Tank Battery was
Battalion (with 278 Field Battery), _ .u- Cicely Estate
in depth north of Kampar
with one
village, (ii)

road. The Brigade Indian^nfantry Brigade

The Sahum posiuon was given * ,.,potisibIe for
rcsponsiDic its defence,
and 2/2 Gurkha Regiment was wade
i^IhuL M-b Vrf
. I

(original!,
t S
aP- P-
sSHatoryoniihlndianDivoiooinMalara.'"-
205 CAMPAlCN-5 IS SOtmi-EAST ASIA 191M2 MALAYA

with an outiMsi role

2/9 GurUia Regiment was two mile* ahead
and in contact with the forward D Company of 1

2/1 Gurhha was placed about four

and a half imlcs down the roaa
The
to counter any wide out-hanking
roos,-e.
was
quarten was at Sahum. 155 Field Regiment
brigade. Tlic 2-poundcn of one troop of
215 Anti-Tank Batteo
and two anti-tank rihes were available
2/2 Gurl^^d
Uie bridge on the Sungei Dipang in front
destroyed. It was a standing instruction
should n^er aUow itself to be cut-off. (m) In
to
Telok ^nar ,

Company. 5/KFunjab
die defence ss as assigned to the Independent
of 215 rknti-Tank BatieO.
and 7 Mountain Battery- and one troop
there ww
The Independent Company was so disposed lint
platoon each at Bagan Datoh and Uun
Mchngtang an
at a
companies at Telok i\mon. 5/H Punjab was
stationed

nee of four miles on the road from Telok

(iv) The I2th Indian Infantry Brigade
was
Anson to
originally
J
assi^ca to ^
dispwed as foUow.
Gopeng area to fight a delaying acUon. Iiwas w
Hyderabad held an outpost position at hUestooe
4/19
ArgyUs and SuUicrIand Highlander* south of
Punjab in depth between MUcstonc 16 and
pcslooe 18.
Brigade Headquarters was at Dipang. At
station, which was a responsibility of tins
bngade, the
Armoured Car Company bad placed two sections mambig lor
retire P.
the Japanese, with a warning that they should
After this
after the ambushing had been completed.
two days and ful^led its
^ ,

had stayed in this area for

cfver the n g
permission to retire to Bidor for rest after handing
head at Dipang to the 28th Indian Infantry Bngade. W inc

llth Indian Dhision had its headquarters at
Tapah, aim
reserve "
sequcntly a few units were kept in disisional
Temoh and Tapah. 5/14 Punjab and 7 Mounum Batt^
Decern r
recalled from Telok Anson area to Temoh on 30

22 Mountain Regiment was left at Temoh, 2

AnU-Tank Battciy
the Ipoh sectio
was put in depth between Temoh and Tapah,

one section of the Kedah Aimoured Car Company
* Gurkha Gang "
to remain at Tapah and 3 Cav'alry and the
hDIcstones 3 and 25, respeemt y _
asked to hold positions at
road to Cameron Highlands. The 16th laght ^O-
Battery had A troop at Kampar and B troop at
Tapah.
n
had of course left on 27 December to join the 9Ui
DhTsion. , r ^
These dispositions harf been made to strengthen
of Kampar, and precautions were also taken to get the
help o^
 THE STRUGGLE FOR CENTRAL MALAYA 207

Sakai tribes for scmce as guides and to drive out the local inhabi-
tants, especially the Chinese and the Sikhs, wlio, * although driven
out during the day, returned at night, and there were doubtless
fifth columrusts among them .** NoneUielcss the available force

tvasnotadequafc/bre/Jectivercjistance. Kampar position requir-

ed a full and fresh division to hold it, with a new brigade in III
Indian Corps reserve on coastal dut). A
few tanks were also
required if air and sea force* were not available. The weakness of
the svholc defence Jay at two points, the first in the Sahum position,
where (he Japanese could inJiltratc tlirough jungles, hills and tracks
in the mountainous area, and the other in Telok Anson area, where
the Japanese with the command of sea and air could land almost
anjwhcre on the coast
28 December was a bus)- day for the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade, A report arrived that approximately 2,000 Japanese
had been moving towards Busing and Batu Oajah on that day.^
and tliat the ambush arranged with two sections of Kedah Armour-
ed Car Company at Simpang Pulat and Sentu had failed miserably
at 1000 hours. 'Japanese artillery which seemed a good bit
heavier than Infantr)' guns, had already started to shell Gopeng V
while their aeroplanes were bombing the battalion position.
Before noon (he pou'fion of 4/19 Hyderabad, which was evidently
known to the Japanese, came tinder mortar fire, and by 1400
hours their patrols had come into contact with the forward
companies of the Hyderabad Regiment, and one of their patrols
had approached also the detachment of the Argyll* at Kota Bharu
railway station. However, the 501 Field Battery forced the
Japanese to stop before they could make a regular attack, and the
armoured car patrol of the Argyll* wiped out the Japanese mortar
detachment near Kota Bharu railway station. Notwithstanding
this energetic defensive action, the Japanese continued on both the
flanks of the Indian brigade and compelled 4/19 Hyderabad to
withdraw to a position about MS 14/16 between the Argyll* and
5/2 Punjab, leaving one company as an outpost about four hundred
yards ahead of the Argylls.
It has been stated that tlic object of this withdrawal from
Gopeng was to let the Japanese occupy it that ru'gh t and to make
a frontal attack with artillery support early the next mor-
ning directed to a depth of two thousand yards through Gopeng.
The details of the attack and the artillery barrage were all worked

S)kbjor E.F.D. Hyde: Account of (lie LlaJaya Campaign, vot. I, part Ilf, cliap.
2, p. 138.
War Diary, 15 Indian Infantry Bngade, 28 Deensber 1911.
4<War XHsjy, 5/2 Punjab, 2S Deceniber 1941.
208 cutrAiRM IN soirrw-EAsr aha 1941-12 malaya

out.* This scheme however Tailed as the Japanese forestalled

it bj' themscK'es attacking frontally with tank support. In fact
the rught of 28/29 December was spent b)- the Japanese in patrolling
and assembling tanks and motor-cycle*, svhich they had probably
brought b>' railway from Batu Gajah to Kota Bhani-**
29 December was consequently a day of heav7 fighting and
confusion for the Commonwealth troops. The high command
reported that 'there has been increased enemy artiUery activity
in Perak area. The guns arc not infantry' guns and are reported
as being of about fisr-inch calibre.^* There was also widespread
air acUs-ity inKampar area, and eighteen aircraft bombed and
machine-gunned Kluang aerodrome, causing no damage, what-
socsTr. But the situaUon in front had deteriorated and the 12th
Indian Infantry Brigade had to fall back. The Anti-Aircraft
Battery was alw ordered to svithdraw south ofTapah owing to
the fact that hostile aircraft were attempting to cut the line of
communication-** There svas very low morale in the entire 12th
Indian Infantry Brigade** and although it held up the Japanese
advance for 48 hours, no aJtemaUs'c was found to withdrawal to
Bidor- Major-General Paris visited the brigade to see how the
men had fared and also to study the latest situation. He gave
pemussioQ for its withdrawal from Oipang at 1900 hours, and
ordered the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade to cover this iviibdrawal
with two companies at bridge-head. The withdrawal commenced
before noon and ended at 1815 hours in the midst of a terrible
confusion. The bridge at Kuala Dipang was also blown up soon
after; the two companies of 2/2 Gurkha which had given coirr
for withdraw-al returned to their battalion after completing their
duty' at the bridge-head.
There is no doubt that 29 December was a trying day lor
the men of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. The (Japanese)
tanks, medium and iigh^ moved at 3-6 miles per hour and at 10-20
yards intervaL Their machine-gun and cannon fire was intense
and iatimidatiag but ineiTectii-e except against targets actually
on the road But the night was comparatively easy as the
Japanese had also ruffered casualties from rearguard action of the
12thrndianlnfantry Brigade and the artillery daring the mght.**
On 30 December, the Japanese probed into the Kampar defences

Koe: IH JXtf ftgiiitg, p. 81,

*S SVar tXuy, i'Z Fuo)ab, 1443 brnn S Deceiahfr IMI.
^ IVar IXaiy, GcDenl HoAqsanea Tar gait, Appadix Ho. 377.
^Wxr ttaair, 13 Indiaa laSjxnJT Tngaie. 29 Decs>bs 1941.
^War Dozy, 52 Paojab, 29 Dniibcr 1941,
*>HMtarr < llth Indian Dmsoa ia alalara,r{. I (Oripnal), i&ap. X, p. 1^
44lVaT Diair, Ca>sl lleadquaner* Far East, AjipsKiix Ko.iSi.
 Tlir. STRUGGLE EOR CENTRAL MALAYA 209

at various points from Sahum to Telok ^Vmon, and attacked the

area from the air. As Kampar had a four-battali'on front, each
battalion was in slight contact on this day. On the 6/15 Indian
Infantry Brigade front forward troops on the left flank had a brush
witli a small number of Japanese troops during early hours.** At
the same time Japanese forward elements sverc moving in front of
the position and a certain amount of mortar-artiHery rc fell in
front of the forward company.** There was a report that the
Japanese were advancing dosvn the Balu Gajah road probably
to the Cicely Estate, but a p.'\trolor2/lC Punjab found no confirma-
tion. None-the-Iess, a detachment of 1/14 Putyab at ifalim
Nawar station withdrew after slight contact with the Japanese,
and anodier combined detachment of 2 Jat and 1/8 Punjab at
MalimKawar ferrj* did the same in view of its dangerously isolated
position. The detachment at Tanjong Tualang feny, however,
remained, because it was strategically posted at the Cicely Estate
point and it was tveJI supported by a section of Federated Malay
States ^''oluntecr Force Armoured Car Company which svas patroll-
ing there.
In Sahum area, during the night of 29/30 December 1941,
while 352 Field Batter)* harassed the trunk road north of Dipaog
and the railway, 155 Field Regiment and the machine-guns of
2/9 Gurkha svere involved in a similar action on their front. At
dawn of 30 December, the Field Observation OlRccr ordered
eight rounds of gun-fire on four Japanese slafT cars and destroyed
Ixtth men and vehicles. In the morning an ambush was success-
ful in the central track area. Shortly after this a patrol which
included a German was desU'o>'cd- In the afternoon successful
attacks were also made to capture the Managers House Hill in-
flicting heavy casualties on the Japanese. Finally when the forward
detachment of the 6/15 Indian Infantry Brigade was withdrawn,
2/9 Punjab was abo withdrawn to Sahum area.
Meanwhile, the 12lh Indbn Infantry Brigade was resting at
Bidorandrcconnoitringpositioiutolhcsouihofit. The divisional
commander formed an immediate reserve at Tirnoh by moving
5/14 Punjab and 7 Mountain Battery from CL Jong to that place
and by brinpng B Squadron of 3 Cavalry from Tapah-Camcron
lEghlands road to Gt- Jong area; at the same time representatives
of the press were permitted to go round and talk to the men, in
order to counter false rumours and improve morale.
Before the new year dasvned. General PerdvaJ, in consulta-
tion with the Commander IH Indian Corps, liad come to the

49 tVar Diary, ISili Indian loTanliy Biigade, 30 Dcconber 1941.

so tVar Diary, 3/16 Funjab, 30 OeenDber
210 CAMPAIGNS IN SOimi-EASr ASIA 19JM2 MAtAVA

decision to hold on to the Kampar position for as long as possible

and in any case not to fall back behind the Kuala Kubu road
junction before 14 January without permissions It was
essential to liold the Japanese as far astray as possible from Singa-
pore to enable the much needed reinforcements, then on their svay,
to arrive. Kampar positions must be held
\VIlh the loss of Ipoh,
to present a rapid Japanese dash southwards. Their pressure on
Sahum position continued undiminished, but the Kampar position
liad not yet cracked.
So the new year 1942 dawned with the Kampar position still
intact. But on the morning of 31 December 'air reconnaissance
had reported some small steamers with barges in tow mosing
down the Perak coast,** wUch was most alarming. Nothing worse
could happen to shatter the seeming impregnability of the position.
The Japanese landed at 1500 hours atTcloki\nson; and they had
the choice of three routes viz. to Bidor direct, via the Bemam riv'er
to Slim tos^-n, and do\^n the coast to Kuala Selangor.
In Sahum area, held by the 28ih Indian Infantry Brigade,
the new )ear dawned with comparative peace. But before Uic day
was out, the battalion had to be svithdrawn. On 2 Januaiy
1942, 2/2 Gurkha {less one company) went to Lima Bias Estate
in Slim area, the remaining company going to Temoh to reinforce
2/1 CurLha, and 2/9 Gurkha with B Battery of 1 55 Field Kegiment
remained at Sahum, with permission to fall back on Jabus Mine
area if considered necessary.* 155 Field Regiment less B Battery
mosTd to Tapah to coser any withdrawal from Kampar to a posi-
tion in the south. The 28lh Indian Infantry Brigade Headquarters
svas moved to Temoh, and Brigadier Selby assumed command
of 5/14 Punjab and 2/1 Gurkha. In the 6/15 Indian Infantry
Brigade area a most destructive but successful fight was waged
against the Japanese on Thompson Ridge, in which 2/16 Punjab
and Leiccster-iurrcy troops were imolvTd on 1 January.**
But these petty successes did not remose the danger, which
on the contrary became accentuated owing to the threat ofJapanese
infiltration into the Perak and Bemam risers, which exposed the
flank of the Central Malaya defence. Endeavours were then
made to discover the details of the Japanese forces on the sea,
but the air force was unable to make any headway and suffered
losses. All that the hfalaya Command could then do was to move
the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade to reinforce the 3 Cavalry
S' TTu War ti> Malaya, p. 192.
S^Acoadiaf to (be KatOTT-of (be llttlaclun DiTWonmllUlarz *' prepareti by
Colonel A.M.L. Harrijon, 2/9 GurUut wu mpported by C Bauery d 1S3 Refi*
Eooit and one troop cC 215 Anil Tank Batteryp, 2IS, Hie No. 7531/11, Part II.
SSWar Diary, 3/16 Punjab, 1 Jaisiary 1942.
 nir. rrRfOote itiR cr..vTRAt. MAUAyA 211

iqtiadron In Ct. Jong area.** Tlmi brigade took up iti position

at night. Ahortv.hiIc before thU, the platoon of the Independent
Company ilationed at Ragan Datoh liad withdrawn to Tclok
v\nson after a bnnh v.iih the Japanese at Simpang Ampat.
In \-iew of the possibility of a Japanese landing further south
at Kuala Selangor, 3 Ca\-ali^' (less B squadron in Telok Anwn
area) was mosTd to Ilatu Cavrs area. As the detachment has
weak in strength, the 0th Indian Division was ordered to
send 3/17 Dogea of the Bth Indian Taraniry Brigade to
Kuala Lumpur to come under the command of 3 Cavalry. Nasy
and air force were aho at the same time asked to do s^ltat they
could to deal with this threat *.** This possibility of attack from
Kuala Selangor side was not .at all .an imaginary threat because
there were several air raids on Port SwcHcnlLsm on this day
damaging rubber godowns, and on Klang, hitting marshalling
yards.
In Kampar position and on Telok Anson road also hanl
fighting continued on 2 January' 1912, but, as the J.>panesc liad
appeared in Kuala Selangor area, withdrawal from the Kampar
position Isccame necevary and the forces were moved south to rein*
force the Kuala Selangor area. lIowcsTr there was no improve*
mcnl in the siiu.iiion.
nic scatwmc threat against the left rear of tlie 1 hh Indian
Disbion had further developed, and nearly two balfaJioni had
landed In the Perak and Bernam areas near Telok Anson. Tliough
(his force was cng.iged, yet some of the Japanese troops succeeded
In breaking off contact and threatened the communications of
the llth Indian IJivisinn. Another force a(t^mp(^d a landing at
Kuaht Selangor sshcre it was engaged Iq- the British artillery,
and, (hough it suffered casualties moved off to the north. This
greatly enhanced (he danger to the line of communication of the
llth Indian Division, which was ordered to thin out in front in
preparation for a general withdrawal to a selected position in the
rear.
At dial moment M.ijor-Gcncral Parb ordered the withdrawal
of all brigades in the north during the night, to the Slim position.
The ?ero hour was fixed at 2100 hours for the 6/15 Indian
Infantry Brigade, while the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was
directed to deny Uic road junction at Kg. Ayer Kunin until the
28th Indian Infantry Brigade had cleared Bidor about midnight
of3/4January, and then to pass through the 6/15 Indian Infantry
Brigade at Bidor and occupy the Trotak section of the new Slim
SttSV Diary, Cmeral Tar Eail, Appendix No. 1H.
Tkl iVar In p. 192.
212 aMIPAlCNT IX SOimi'EAST ASIA lMl-42 MALAYA
 TIIE STRUGGLE ROR CENTRAL SIALAYA 213

position. B Squadronof 3 Cavair)' was to leave the !2lh Indfan

Infantry Brigade and join 2/2 Gurkha Regiment in Slim River
area. The dMsional headquarters was to be Sungkai.
Coascqucntly, the 6/15 Indian Infantry Brigade moved
iirst, but tlic withdrawal eould commence only at 2130 hours.

Tlje forward companies had some difTicakym extricatwg themselves

and suficred casualties. Meanwhile 1/H and 3/16 Punjab had
withdrawn without incident. But 2/16 Punjab starting to with-
draw at 2230 hours was attacked by a Japanese company coming
from the north. An enfilade lire was opened upon the invaders
and the Japanese fell back with some loss. Aftersvards the batta*
lion withdrew peacefully. But the Japanese lost no time in return-
ing to their task of following up the uichdrawal of the 6/15
Indian Infantry Brigade until 0500 hours on the next day.
In broad outline the dispositions of the 11th Indian Division
on the morning of 3 January 1942 were as follows: the 28th
Indian Infantry Brigade in Tapah area, the 6/15 Indian
Infantry Brigade in Bidor area, and the J2th Indian Infantry
Brigade in Ct. Jong area. But this comparatively incidentless
withdrawal did not represent the true position, for the Japanese
had inflicted considerable damage all over Central Malaya and
thereby appredably weakened the strategic position of the Malaya
Command. They had acquired air supremacy and bombed Tan-
jong Malim,** Tengah, Tapah bridge,** Uic Sungkai area,*
Rasa* and Kerling.' The British Air Force had suilcred further
losses; while the land force was none too strong. The Japanese
were active not only against the communications of the Ilth
Indian Division in Selangor and Perak but also were paralysing
and destroying the British organisation for effective defence, especi-
ally svhen their resources were at the lowest. The Japanese at
this moment had two objectives, the landing at Kuala Selangor
at any cost and clearing the Tclok Anson area, which they achieved
before the end of 3 January 1942. The 12lh Indian Infantry
Brigade was withdrasvn to Trolak area before the dawn of
4 January 1942, and the 6/15 and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades
had mo%ed to Sungkai and Slim river areas. 58 Field Regiment
(Jess 464 Field Battery) had moved to Kuala Lumpur in the line of
communication area.
SSWar Diary, Xlalaya Command, 3 January IM2.
SrtVar Diary, Genwal Hesdquarten Far Cast, Appendix No. 444.

so War Diaiy No. 6 Bridging Sectioo (Queen Victcrias Own, Madras Sappers
and Mlnen), Indian Engineers, 2 January IW2.
C War Diary, General Headquanoa far Eaa^ Apptnaoi No. 431.
214 oatPAioss IN sounr-EAST Asu 194M2 ualaya

Thus ended ihc stnnd at Kampar. General Perds'als remark

that the responsibility for the loss of this battle lay much higher
Uian on the local commanders uouM appear to be justified.

THE ROUT AT TROtAK A>T> SUM RIVER

The next sector prodded strong natural defences. The route
between Sungkai and Rawang was a narrow corridor running in
a north-easterly direction, which if properly held would not allow
esxn a bullock-cart to proceed from the north to the south. The
total length of this corridor was about twenty' to thirty miles, and
road and railway ran very near eadt other, except between the Slim
ris'cr and Tanjong Malim. On the eastern side of this long
corridor was a thick, forest overlooked by high mountains, and on
the western side of it was another thick forest behind which was a
dangerous nt-amp almost up to the sea coast. Hence from the
point of defence it was an excellent position. Brigadier Stewart
of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade said that the position to
be occupied by 12 Brigade had been selected by me 4 days
prcsiotnly. It was designed in the case of forward battalions
to force the enemy into defiles of the road and railway, thus allow-
ing economy of troops on our part, and concentration of targets
for our powerful artillery; in the case of the rear battalion, to take
advantage of the good lateral communication to meet any sridc
.**
encircling Tno%*e through the Jungle as soon as 5t should emerge
la the entire area south of the Slim river, terrain was favourable
for defence, but it was only at the Slim rrier that ti was exploited.
Esen the Japanese admitted that * the terrain at this place is some-
what similar to that encountered by the Japanese in the pass
through the Larut Hills, and they were forced to employ the same
tactics in their attempts to overcome Bridsb resistanccat this point.**
One may go to the length of saying that the Slim ri\-er position
was stronger than the Kampar posidoD and that the object with
which this poritioa was held, viz., delaying the Japanese progress,
to the maainium extent possible without getting deeply committed,
appeared to be easier to achieve here than in the previous position.
However, before the natural strength of the Slim river
position was exploited. General Fercival perceived the danger
to the rear of the llthlndianDHisionby possible Japanese landings
on the coast between Kuala Selangor and Port Swettenham.
This would outflank the Indian positions and cut their line of re-
weaA, He-v/iC swv 4 ^zsias^ .W1, kt vsAd
 TJIE yTRVCGlJi CZSTJUL MALAYA 215

that >ou u jJlapprfcjalc grtal iirafc^'icil Jmjiaitancc of preventing'

'

enemy KCtiiiiR control uf Kuala Lumpur anti Pori S>\cttcnham

aerodrome* for ai long as possible Licuf.-CcneraJ I/cath
was not merely to hold up the Japanese advance dovsn the trunk
rt)ad but alvo to guard agaimt Japanese landings from the sea
near Kuala Selangor and Port Svsettenham, It was obvious
that the defensive jxiiitiont vtould be outflanked by lucli landings,
and they v>uuld be fuiced to willtdraw south to Kuala Lumpur.
Tliis ncccuilaied a further icarrangcmcnt of the troops;
the C/IS Indian Infuniry Brig.idc was oi^crcd to vsithdraw to
Tunjuiig Malim while the I2ili Indkin Infantry Brigade remained
in the Trnlak area.
On January 10{2, the Japatscse bombed and machine*
-I

gunned Tanjong Slalim intermittently and dcsiru>cd several

vehicle* on convoy duty, 'flscy appeared in front of 3/I6 Punjab
{XjvtO'uns in the .Sungkai area, but as the G/15 Indian Infantry'
Brigade had wiihdr.vwu .nt dusk, no contact was made. Tlie
neat day. they adopted a netv method of air attack by which tno
or three aircraf) at a lime bombed tltc railway or targets on the
road, and dicn circled round locking for targets which they might
machlitc-gvm.**
In die 4JI0 Hyderabad sector there was contact in die after*
noon. A large party nf Japanese advanced down the railway.
TliciMilr Coinp.iiiy of this battalion held its fire and did considerable
damage at short Keliabic estimate* put Japanese
r.-iiigc.

casualties at ISO.*^ Unforturutcly iu left forward company grew

nervous, necessitating an order for the wididrawal of the whole
battalion by the Brigade Major in the absence of the Brigade
Commander, vtluch was however later countermanded.
On die main ro.ad immediately bcliind and under the
command of (he I2tlt Indian Infantry Brigade, 5/I4 Punjab was
to hold a |Kition astride (he road, about three miles south ofTrolak.
And behind (his battab'on was die 2S(h Indian Infantry Brigade
in charge of SUm river position. It was plaiuied that 2/9 Gurklia
was to cover the junction of die wain road with die loop road
near the Slim river railway station; 2/l Gurklia was to hold a
positionbetween ibc Slim river and Slim; and 2/2 Gurkha was to
be responsible broadly for the south-western sector of the whole
area. But all the tlircc baiulions2/1 Gurkha, 2/9 GutUia
and 5/14 Punjab were still in harbour, resting in the vicinity of
Slim river railway station, and 2/2 Gurkha had its companies

SsWar Diary, Mala) Oxiunand, 4 lamury

SVVr Dury, Ma]a)a Cuenmand, 5 January IWz.
lirvl.-Coluntrl E. L. WtUua Haflenden: Oprtalioni ro Malaga P. eOl/TOTAfll.
 TIIE STRUGGLE FOJl CENTRAL MALAYA 215

that you will appreciate great strategical

importance of preventing
enemy getting control of Kuala Lumpur and Port Swcttcnliam
aerodromes for as long as possible*.* Licut.-Gcncral Heath
was not merely to hold up the Japanese advTjnce down the trunk
road but also to guard against Japanese landings from the sea
near Kuala Selangor and Port Swctlenham. It was obvious
that the defensive positions would be outflanked by such landings,
and they wouid be forced to withdraw south to Kuala Lumpur.
This necessitated a further rearrangement of the troops;
the 6/15 Indian Infantr) Brigade was ordered to withdraw to
Tonjong Malim while the 12th Indian Infantry* Brigade remained
in the Trolafc area.
On 4 January 1942, the Japanese bombed and machine-
gunned Tanjong hlalim inlcrmittcnlJy and destroyed several
vehicles on convoy duty. They appeared in front of 3/16 Punjab
positions in the Sungkai area, but as the 6/15 Indian Infantry
Brigade had svithdrawn at dusk, no contact was made. The
next day, they adopted a new method of air attack by which two
or three aircraft at a time bombed the railway or targets on the
road, and then circled round looking for targets which they might
machine-gun.
In the 4/19 Hyderabad sector there was contact in the after-
noon. A large party of Japanese advanced dosvn the railway.
The Ahir Company of this battalion held its hre and did considerable
damage at short range. Reliable estimates pur Japanese
Casualties at 150. Unfortunately its left forsvard company grew
nervous, necessitating an order for the withdrawal of the whole
battalion by the Brigade Major in the absence of the Brigade
Commander, which was however later countermanded.
On the main road immediately behind and under the
command of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, 5/14 Punjab was
to hold a position astride the road, about three miles sou th ofTrofafc.
And behind this battalion was the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade
in charge of Slim river position. It was planned (hat 2/9 Gurkha
was to cover the junction of the main road with the loop road
near the Slim river railway ststion; 2/1 Gurkha was to hold a
position between the Slim river and Slijn; and 2/2 Gurkha was to
be responsible broadly for the south-western sector of the whole

area. But all the three battalions ^2/1 Gurkha, 2/9 Gurkha
and 5/14 Punjab were still in harbour, resting in the vicinity of
Slim river railway station, and 2/2 Gurkha had its companies

WWar Diary, Mata>-a Cotenund. 4 January tWZ-

6*War IKaiy, Malaya Command, 5 January 1942.
Uru.-Colonrl E. L. Wilson llafTTOdai: Operation* in Malaya F. 60I/707A/H.
216 CAMPAICVS IN SOimi-E.VTT ASIA 1911-12 ifAL.\VA

scaltcred from ihc bridge wer ihe Bcrnam river lo the Slim river
railway station, with responsibility for the roads in that south*
westem area. The 155 ricld Regiment w.T 5 at the same lime
allotted to the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Tkt Tank Tkruil hj the Japonesf

This position the Japanese hadbeen preparing most energeti-
cally and secretly lo storm. Their force * was timed so as to arrive
at the defile early on the morning of 4 January'. The divasion
commander had preceded his troops and had his plans all ready
when the first of his units arrived at the scene of battle. As in the
Larut Hills fight, the only way lo advance was for the troops to
force their way through Uic pass by sheer superiority of fire power.
AU of the division's artillcr)* was brought to bear on the narrow
British front, and white the bulk of the Infantry remained well
behind in assembly areas, one battalion at a time, aided by a
few flame-tlu^wlng tanks and spcdally trained engineer teams,
attacked the strong-points in succession and fought desperately
against the Indian counter-atiaeks until the next assault battalion
passed through it to assail the strong-points in the rear Their
preparation was almost pcifecl, because the Japanese were in
possession of full and correct mformatien about proximity and
nature of the Indian troops in Perak area, and they bad also
come to know the time-table of mmemcats and withdrawals of
the units from day to day and from hour to hour. In .contrast
to the meticulous preparations of the Japanese command, the
defenders were confused and worb'ng in the dark. The Brigade
Commander ascribed the inactirily (of the Japanese on 6 January)
to the knock wtuch the enemy had recei\-cd on the railway
during the previous afternoon, but the Divisional Commander
suspected that the enemy had initialed an outflanking move through
the dense jungle .** LatcinlheariemoonaTanjilrcfugeeinfornied
the commander of the 12Ui Indian Infanliy- Brigade that the
Japanese were ready to attack bis position irith eighty tanks,
and the bridge at Sungkai bad been repaired. This story was
discounted b>' the brigade commander. At the same time a sugges-
tion was made to him that ' all wheels forward should be with-
drawn and first-class anti-tank obstacles, such as road-cratering
combined with a minefield of some size, might be created. But
he refused to accept this idea, because 4/19 Hyderabad had an
adequate tank stop in front." But he permitted la> ing of mines in
Sr Japanoe Land Opmtioas. p. 33.
** VVr Da^, GoMnl Hadq\t2itp Far Ean, Appenda Kck 17$.
HHutorr u llih Indian Divtsco to Mab^a, tf. cu. Vol. It. chap- XIIl.p. 267.
r*War Diarf, 5/2 Pun^b, 6 January IW2.
 THE STRUCGLE FOR CEJJTRAI. MALVYA 217

the Uvo cuttings, leawng the old switchroads clear for wheel
movements. The rear minefield svas covered by a detachment of
two anti-tank guns. The delay in lafa'ng adequ.sfe measures
heightened the weakness of the position and paved the way for
the disaster which followed in the course of the day.
According to 4/19 Hyderabad, the Japanese made their attack
with a detachment of 30 tanks at 0300 hours on 7 January 1942,
in moonlight.' At that time both forward companies became
engaged, by infantry on the railway and by artillery and mortars
on the road. TJie anti-tank gunners sscrc overrun, and the tanks
penetrated the wired barriers, all within twenty minutes of the
first contact. Ten minutes later the battalion was found to be
breaking up, and permission was gisirn to withdraw. The
Japanese attack appeared irresistible. 'The leading tanks were
medium ones of the 20-ton variety, each armed with a 4-pdr Anti-
tank cannon and two *303 MGs. In addition, many of them
had a light mortar mounted on them which was fixed to fire indts-
criminatcly on one side of the road only, both sides of the road
however being covered by basing them on di/Tcrent sides on altema-
tive tanks. Behind medium tanks came some light tanks of the
whippet variety, each armed with one '303 hfG. Besides, tic
Japanese made use of noise as an instrument of war. One moment
the night was still, with Uie inky darkness brooding over the
Jungle; the next moment all hell broke loose, withmen yelling,
automatics firing, engines roaring, and tins clattering. It was a
ner\'c shattering experience. 4/19 Hyderabad had only three
companies, and, in the confusion of the fight, many of them were
cut o/T and were not seen again. The Quartermaster and his
drivers threw hand-grenades to stop the tanks, but in vain.
By 0130 hours, the Japanese had entered 5/2 Punjab area.
By 0630 hours, they had passed on to the next area, the one held
by the Argylls. Their progress was obstructed by the two mine-
fields, artillery fire of the two-pounders of 215 Anti-Tank Battery,
and a few anti-tank rifles in action. But the most important
factor was the determination of the Punjabis to fight on until the
end of their moral and material resources. D Company in for-
ward position was the first to meet the Japanese, but against
superior force it failed to maiatain its posidoa. Sy 0450 hours this
company had dispersed and was seen no more. Thereafter the
Japanese were able to enter the second minefield more easily, and
their losses svere less than in the first minefield. Only four tanks
21B C.\MPAICN5 JN SOUTH-EAST AMA 19H-12 MALAYA

wrc blown up or disabled. Of ihe other companies, C disintegrat-

ed, A was out of touch, and B was still fighting on the rear of the
cutting and throwing grenades and Molotov cocktails
At
0630 hours the tanks discovered the disused loop road and passed
on to it. This put an end to the organised resistance of 5/2 Punjab
and the battabon decided to withdraw. Then it was found tliat
the Japanese had brought their infanlrj' round the cast flank by
svay of the jungle track, to encircle the Indian force. Hosvcs'cr,
5/2 Punjab managed to make its way through the encircling
Japanese infantry.*
After the dvseomfitute of 5/2 Punjab the Japanese arrived
in the area held by ArgjUt at 0630 houn. This battalion svas
not quite prepared to meet this sudden intrusion, because they

had hastily gone into position on news of the enemy attack
no anti-tank oltac!c had been prepared to block tlie road and the
battalion had not had lime to pul dowTi anything cncctive.*'
The tanks passed the Pioneers of the Arg>lls as they started their
work of blocking the road. They svent through C Company
of the battalion, which was holding the road, and past the head-
quarters. This compelled the battalion commander to order /ts
withdrawal, and he himself left at 0800 hours and the companies
moved on as they liked. A Company reached 2/2 Gurkha near
SUm river along the railway, B and C went into the wfldemess to
the east and west, D turned west to be virtually aniuhilated, and
the two headquarters companies followed their leaden into
oblivion.

The Loss of Slim River Area

After Trolak was occupied, the Japanese mwed on directly
to the Slim river area, which was defended by the 28lh Indian
Infantry Brigade. The brigade had no warning of the impentfing
attack and consequently su^ered dbastcr. The Japanese mastered
the whole position and occupied the main road up to hClcstone
79 within a few hours. In this sector the Japanese army had
strong air support, which rendered its task easy.
They overran 5/14 Punjab when it was marching to the
cemclry at 0715 hours. 'Fhe Japanese met this force at a point
about a mile from the Slim ri'xr and by concentrating their fire
on the men inflicted S'ery severe casualdes. All but a hundred
and tbstt>-five men were dead or ineSective; and the survivors
reached Tanjong Malira on the next day.
220 CAIPAJGVS IS SOtTlt'tAT A*U I9n*-J2 MVLAVA

Ulc dead A few moment later llic tanli were rcmr'jreed

b> the lorried infantr)', and the refjimen! wa? at it^ worst. Bu*
the Japar.e^ tank thrust was halted immediately after, as uddenly
as it had begun. The Rear Headquarten and B Batter)' mwed
back, while C Battery evaetrated all trtxjps and transports.
bridges up to Tanjong Malim were then blown up. The Japanese
ads'ance wras thereby effectixtly strapped.
After the battle of the Slim river, the Japanese declared that
one division of the enemy was almost completely annihilatcd-
Thc remits of the battle were several hundred dead abandoned
enemy bodies, 1 ,500 Prisoners of War, and the leirure of 68 weapons
including 12 cm howiiicrs, anti*lank guns, etc., 50 armoured
can and 500 various types of sThlcIesV* On 9 January 1912,
the British Command admitted that details of fighting by HI
Indian Corps (are) still not rrceh-cd but it is known that U
Dhanon has lufTcred (in Perak and Selangor) hcasy casualties in
men and equipment V* It is obvious that tanks caused tltc disaster,
that eommunicatit/ns broke down, that bridges were not blown up,
and that the troops (both oflieers and men) were too esthausted
to fight Uie Japanese, who had put in f5nt<lan, fresh troops inW
die field. iMihough the Japanese uved tanks, infantry and aen>-
planes, their loss of men was not small Their respect for the
British and Indian resistance wras undoubtedly great and itneere,
and they took their task very seriously. Tltey were prepared
to sacrifice their men and material for quick success.
On the other hand, the defenders had been fighting with
tired troops and had little time to adjust the defences to the esu-'
gencies of the terrain- After the sci-back at Kampar, the hasty
manning of the Slim riser position did not afford adequate protec-
tion against armoured attack. The British and Indian troops
stuck, to the roads, to the estates and to the one route to the south.
The Japanese exploited their adsantages by area-bombii^, firing
into jungles and plantations on both sides of the main road and by
occup^-ing cross-roads and road-junctions.
It should also be remembered that Major-General Paris,
General Officer Caminandmg the 1 1th Indbn Division, and
Brigadier Stewart, Commander of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade,
had no experience of Japanese tank attacks as demonstrated at
.\siin andJiM and perhaps underrated armour potentialities in
the thickly wxioded Malayan terrain. Apart from the lack of
222 t-.\MPAXG.v$ IN soLtii-Kast Asia 1941-42 MalaVa

pbaes, reinforcements, and e^>coenced leaden, there was not

enough of planning on the Brtddt side. NVbatcvcr the causes in^
have been, it is universally acttpted that the disaster on the Slim
river jeopardised the defence of the entire Central Malaya,
and
robbed the hfalaya Command of time to prepare adequately the
ntal defences of Johorc and Singapore with the help of the
reinforcements which were coming. The onerous task of delayii^
to
Japanese ads'ance In Central Malaya to enable reinforcements
arris'c svas not being achiesed.

THE FALL OF KUANTAS

The next phase in the battle of Central Malaya, was the

fall of Kuantan. This was a small isolated tosvn on the eastern
sea-board of Malaya, and in the same latitude as the Slim rtsur.
It was about half-way between Kota Bharu and Singapore, nearly
two himdred miles from either of these two places. It beca^
important, with the development of aerial warfire, as a major
air base from which a large area of Central Malaya was donunated.
Consequently, in the war with Japan, its military importance lay
almost solely in the Royal Air Force aerodrome, which was nine
miles from Kuantan on the hundred-mne road to Jerantut.
Kuantan was connected with the rest cf the cotintry by three
possiblemodes of communication. The first and forem^wasb)
roads towards the north, west and south; the second was by the
Pahang rirer from the sea to a far-off town in the interior, Jeran-
tut Ferry; and the third was by sea to any point on the east coast
of ^falaya. But these lines of communication could be exploit-
ed or blocixd, as necessary, by a strong air force. It was also
posable to bring an airborne unit and drop it on a rubber planta-
tion or on one of the paddy fields on the western or southern side
of Kuantan. The sea-coast was sride and extensis'e, with long
stretches of sandy beach wide open to amphibious attacks. There
were tsvo ferries, one at Kuantan and the other at Jerantut, which
had to be successfully negotiated by an invader. The points of
vantage for the defenden were the clear-cut tracks and lanes
branching off to the north and to the south from the main road
Dora Kuantan to Maran. If the defender could plug the entrances
to these side-tracks and lateral roads, itwatprarii raU y impossible
for any invader to get into the Kuantan area. The river Kuantan
was, however, an uncertain element. If low, it provided the
invader an easy erossing, espedally in the upper regions- Conver-
sely, if the river was running high, the mouth of the river would
offer difficulties which nught not be canly overcome. The boom
 THE fTTRUCCLE TOR CENTRAL llALAVA 223

\shich vas spcciany comtniaed at the mouth of Uic Kuantan

river could not be easily operated owing to timber and foliage
coming down svlth the current and snapping the tv ires and bolts
in (iic middle of (he river. Tlie Pahang brought sand and dc*
jKMitcd it right at the mouth, and prcsTnlcd anyone from sailing
up to any place on its banhi in the intenor.
In a country like Kuantan, and in the circumstances in which
the British were placed, the defence could be organised only along
the cn.nst from Tg. Gelang to Pekan and in the north between
Trengganu and Pahang states. Tlscrc svas also the task of
watching the riwr'fronls in the Kuantan and die Pahang basins,
the preparations of demolitions on the roads and bridges, and
the placing of guns at strategic points. For these tasks, one
brigade, cortststing of two good battalions with some fire support,
W.1 S considered adequate, Tlie 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade
was sent to this area and it comprised 2/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles
and 5th Duke of Conaaughtt Own Battalion, the 11th Sikh Regi-
ment, with one detached section of tsvo 3*7' hosritzers of 21
Moimiain Bauerj', Headquarters 5 Field Regiment and 63/81
Battery to support them. Other troops were 22 Field Company
Sappen and Minen, 27 Field Ambulance and 47 Mobile Work-
shops.

Tlic two battalions were dbposed as follows: 2/18 Garhwal
held (he fonvnrd line of the defence on the coast from (he S. Balok
to the mouth of S. Ku.antan. to stop any liostilc landing on this
p<}rtion of the coast-line uhicli was disided into three sectors,
each scclor being allotted to one company. B, A, and D Com-
panies held the southern, central and northern sectors respectively,
and C Company was in rcsersT at the Bcscrah-Ayar Puleh road
junction to cover sviilidrawal from tlic northern and central
sectors, if that should become necessary. There were four obscrv.v
tion posts, one cadi at Bukit Pengorok, S. Karang, Bukit Bcscrah
and Tanjong Tembeling, to report all ship mos-cments by day
and night. With the northern and central sccton were associated
T section of carriers in mobile rcsenT and two 3' mortar detach-

ments.
5/11 Sijdi was committed to river line defence from the
bend near Bukit Rangin to the first bend west of the bridge on the
Pekan road. This however induded ferry crossing, anti-aircraft
defence of the aerodrome, prcsxntion of Japanese incursion from
Pekan and the Pahang in the rear and of hostile penetration from
the tracks coming from the north to the Kuantan-Maran road,
counter-attacks in the Kuantan forsvard area and defence against
parachute troops in the areas west and south of the river line.
224 CAiJPAJGX? LN SOimi-EJOT ASIA 1941-42 U-ALAVA

**
Certainly a tall order for one battalion
Besides the pill-boxes there were stochades on the river fronts-
A Company svas in charge of the aerodrome viith one section of
carriers, tsvo medium machine-guns and one 18-poandcr ficld-gun-
B Company tvas in charge of tshat tvas knovi-n as the southern
theatre of operations from Milestoite 21 to Fekan. Company C
stood behind the long rn'er front, from a point about 500 yards
to the north-tvest of Setong Kol via the junction of two risTis

and the bridge across the Sungei Belat to the first bend in the river
to the t\-e5t of this bridge. If the Japanese broke through the for-
svard area, this river front would be further extended to tt^o miles
up to the river bend, north of Bukit Ran^n- D
Company svas m
rcser\e, located Viith the battalion headquarters and the head-
quarters company in the rubber plantations at about Milestone
6 with a number of emergency dudes- In all these sections pdl*
boxes and stockades bad been constructed and a plan for demo-
litions had been made.
The artillery nhich arrived on 6 December 1941, vir.. Head-
quarters 5 Field Regiment and 3/81 Battery, was distributed
widely in the whole area at Beser^, in the rubber plantation
near Sungei Ealok, at Milestone 5, in Town Camp and at \*ictory
Camp at MUestooe 10.*' The Sappers and Miners and 27 Field
Ambulance uere stationed at Valenda Camp at MBestone 11*
Advanced Brigade Headquarters equipped ssith ISlreless Tele-
graphy sets, was established at Milestone 1 on the road to Snngei
Lembing tin mines. Rear Brigade Headquarters tsnth 8 Sopply
Issue Section and 7 Field Post OIBcc remained at Volunteer Cainp
at hlilcstonc 9.
On 8 December, there were in Kuanlan acrodonne 21
new Hudsons, 8 old Blenheims, 2 Swordfish and
aircraft, \4z., 10
1 Vildcbeesle, The acrodrornc was well equipped with evep'
type of bomb, includiitg the 500-Ib armour piercing bomb, incendia-
ries and 2! torpedoes. .All buildings had been completed, and
the aerodrome was under the admiimtrathe command of a 4\'Ing
Commander of the Royal Air Force. There was an emergency
landing ground at Kampong Sungei Pabaog Tua. Petrol had been
stocked in plenty.
There was a plan for the construction of a pontoon bridge
several hundred yards to the north of the ferry to supplement the
normal ferry crossing. But the necessary material was made
available so slowly that it was not completed before the war

^ D, C. Ru^cl^RiAcTW Tbc Routaft OpTirsijes, p. 5-

 THE STRUOCLE fOR CENTilAL JfALAVA 225

broke out. The

roads on either side of the projected bridge sverc
however fully laid out by that time.
The history of the Kuantan operations from 8 December
1941 to 8 January 1942 was made up of three phases. First of
all came the withdrawal of Uie Royal Air Force personnel from
the Kuantan aerodrome. Then there was lull in the operations
from 10 December 1941 to 29 December 1941. Lastly, came the
attack which ended in the occupation of Kuantan by the Japanese
army.
At noon on 9 December 1941
Kuantan was subjected to
its firstexperience of high bombing, followed up by the bombers
flying low and shooting up at will .** The airfleld had no anti*
aircraft protection, and there was a dangerous congestion of air-
craft. The buildings had been shattered, more than half of the
craft had been lost, the armament and two bomb stores had received
direct hits, and the Japanese air raids had been condnuous.^
Hence Royal Air Force ordered svilhdrawal of air force as it was
almost useless to risk staying on for no purpose. This withdrawal
of the Royal Air Force greatly disheartened the ground troops
and reduced the chances of a successful and prolonged defence of
the area.
In the evening of 9 December 1941, all demoIiUons on the
Pekan road beyond the bridge .at Milestone 21 were blown up,
the Pekan Polo-ground being the first. During the night of the
same day two shipsone empty and the other srith ground staff

of Kuantan aerodrome slipped away to Singapore in spite of
tlie existence of mines in the estuary and also of the scare ofJapanese
landing in the northern part of the coast. At 1900 hours
die first report of the appearance of small ships out at sea arrived
from the observaUon post Bukit Pclingdong. At 2200 hours, a
further report of firing on a boat in D
Company area was received.
Afterwards the whole coast was full of reports of the landing of
the Japanese troops at dificrent places. Fire continued until
0200 hours of 10 December 1941. Even the southern front fired,
because it wanted to bluff the Japanese that even in that area
defence was organised. But when dawn broke there was no sign
of the Japanese troops anywhere on tlc coast. This was due
to the fact that the Japanese force had retreated after the
firstrepulse and their olyect was to probe the British defences and
discover the weak spots in it.
During the subsequent three weeks, there were no Japanese
troops whatever in the tficatre of operaliom in Kxiantan. But

Sir Paul Xfaltby'a Dtipalch, p. >368, parai 203 and 201.

Millie Kuanian Operauoiu, p. 19.
 n

22S CAMPAIGNS LV SOCnt'EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

ihere were prcparalioru for war on both sides. The Japanese

planes flew o\cr the area csery day and bombed important places
and machine-gunned the town- On 13 December, twcnty-sci'cn
planes concentrated their attack on the aerodrome, but did little
damage to it. The Sritish patrols were actn-c all over the countr)'.
Meanwhile, up in the north, the British influence in Trengganu
was gradually gi\-ing way to that of the Japanese. As early as
the afternoon of 10 December, all officers were ordered to leave
that state, and the Medical Officer, who was asked to stay on, ran
away the next day. For two or three days there was chaos in
the dbtricls of Kuala Trengganu and Dungun, because the police
had disappeared, there was an air raid bj the Japanese planes, and
the administration had broken down. Roads, bridges, ferries and
telephones were intact, and the local Japanese inhabitants in the
mining areas got the upper hand in the affairs of the state. The
Japanese army howes-er did not come to Trenjnranu until about
20 December 1941.
On tlut day a subaliem of 2/18 Royal Oaihwal Rifles met
a^car containing some Japanese about ten miles north of Chukal-
Xext day a body of two hundred and fifty to three hundred
Japanese troops svas reported to have arrived in Kuala Treegfanu,
and in fact the Garhwal patrol did have contact with them near
Kerteh. On 22 December again the Garhwal patrol operadnf
to the north of the Kemamanrhcr ran into
Japanese forcescom*
ing>uth;andthenew5orthearm-al of a large Japanese forte
in the area south of Marang and Dungun by motor
transport reach-
ed Kuantan on 23 December On this dale it was realised
that the Japanese would enter Kuantan by land
and not by sea
and therefore certain readjustments became necessary in the general
defence plan. C Company of 2/18 Royal Garhwal
Rifles was ukr
out of the battalion rese^xr ,o occupy the road junction of Jeram-
Kuantan and J^r Valley roads, and its place as a reserve was
filled up A Company of 2/12 FronUer Force RcgimcnL On
24 December, the rest of the regiment and 21 Mountain Battery
(!c a dctachrf sc^on already at the aerodrome)
arrived from
Kclantan and halted at Milestone 10 and Milestone
9 respecth-cly,
on KuanUn-Maian road. The deUched section was lifted to
a posiuon near Mi cstoM 10 to cmxr the open ground suita-
blc for parachute landings just north of Milestone
10 On
25 December, the Japanese were in dvil control of Treneeanu and
had amred north of Kcmaman. WMc the brigadrreported

t,Wi/Di,G^Ha<JquWo^FEart.Mrf2/iaR.Grti.Ri.24I>ember
Wu Diary. 22 lotkntry Bn^ad^ 24 and 25 D-tembw
IIMt.
 THE STRUCCLE TOR CENTRAL itALAVA 227

150 as the strength of the Japanese to the nortJi of ChuLif, 2/18

Royal Garhwal Rifles thought that they were in good strengUi at
Kg. Chcraling. On 26 December, 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment
and all the six guns of 21 Mountain Battery moved to a hide-out
in the rubber plantation which was two furlongs east of Gambang,^
the guns being fixed on the perimeter of the camp svith observation
posts on the tracks, and the regiment patrolling and protecting the
line of communication from Japanese penetration along the tracks
from the north and the south. The Japanc.sc had arrived at
Kg. S. War, 150 strong in motor transport. But 2/18 Royal
Garhwal Rifles reported as follows: 1000 hours, 5 Trucks reported
coming down coast towards S. fialok. Enemy troops debussed
and dbpersed under cover. 1100 hours, enemy were spotted
by G. 7 who fired on tliem. Artillery also fired. 1625 hours,
more trucks arrived North ofS. Balok, enemy debussed, artiller)
fired on them *. This Japanese contingent was loaded in five
out of which ti*t) were destroyed.^ Asa result of this danger,
lorries,
the artillery was strengthened by transferring tlie left section of
A Troop of 63/61 Battery from northern sector of 2/16 Royal
Garhwal Rifles to the Tclok Sisek area and by moving F Troop
of 464 Battery of 88 Field Regiment Royal Artillery (vrhicb
had arrived with an establishment of eight 25-pouDdcrs on 15
December 1941) from Milestone 5 to a position four miles along
the Ayer Puteh Road, with two observation posts, one each in
Sungei Balok and Sungei Karang.
On 27 December, the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade contacted
the Japanese troops on the north bank of the Balok river, and its
artillery and 2' mortars kept them at a respectable distance.
Meanwhile, the Japanese planes flew over Beserah and bombed it,
though srithout inflicting any casualties.* On 28 December, a
river block was formed at Lubok Patu with suitable combinations
of the infantry and the artillery available at Gambang. This
was perhaps the last of the preliminary arrangements made to
prevent the Japanese from coming into and occupying the Kuan tan
area. Meanwhile, the Japanese had consolidated their hold on
S. Balok position and tried mortaring their opponents. But
their mortars were silenced by the superior artillery fire of the
defenders. Five Japanese planes bombed forward areas and the

ZXano, HeadqaartenMatafaCoaia>aad,22 Jjidian Ifi&alry Bri^^2/18

R. Garb. Rit, 25 nd 26 I)ecanber JMI. Abo oT Cnseral Headquartm, far East,
Appendix No. 339.
8? War Diary, 2t Jlfouncain Cattwy, 2S VmmbeT J9tJ.,
88 War Dianea, General Headquanm, Far Eait, Appendix 360, 22 Indian Infan-
try Brigade, and 2/18 R. Garb. Rif., 26 December I9tl.
8* tVar Diaries, 22 Indian /nfaniiy firtgade, and 2/18 R. Cvh. Rif., 27 Drtembcr
1941.
228 CAXIPAIGNS IN- SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAVA

beaches, xvhile the Japanese infantry received reinforcements and

On 29 December also air raids
collected at the S. Balok pTOition.*"
were continuous and sex-erc. Ktiantan town svas bombed and
machine-gunned, and the northern sector was raided bj- five Aim)'-
97 hca\y bombers.*' On 30 December, Gambang was hcasHly
bombed,** and very fetv buildings remained standing after theraid.
The hospital was damaged, but there were no military casualties.
About the same time one troop of armoured cars of the FMS\T
Armoured Gar Squadron was made available to patrol the motor-
able portion of the track north of Jabor Tcngah moving svcil into
Trengganu. This addition to his strength was very' welcome,
because the Brigade Commander considered it likely that the
Japanese would advance down the Jabor Valley,
The real attack on Kuantan, however, l^gan early in the
morning of 30 December 1941. The Japanese who had full
informadon about the dispositions of the 22nd Indian Infantry
Brigade, adopted two lines of advance: one betsveen 3/11 Sikh
and 2/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles and the other on the aerodrome.
They penetrated into Jabor valley from the north evading patrob,
and fighting dex-eloped in the area Kg. Jabor Ulu to Semambu
Kstate.** There was, besides continuous actiricy
by groups of three
or four reconnalisance bombers, bombing and machine-gunning,
but without material damage to property.**
At 0945 hours fifty
Japanese troops were reported at 581902 and
2/18 Royal Garhwal
Wfles sent out fighting patrob against them;
at 1305 hours the
Japanese in considerable numbers were collecting south of Bukit
Tinggi cross-roads 610856; at 1515 hours the
ferry was heavily
bombed and all telephone wires to Kuantan were cut. In the
cornuuon of the fighting, many companies
temporarily lost touch
with ihcu parent units, Sungei Lembing svas evacuated and
Kuantan mil officials were sent to Gambang.
Considerable air
acusity of the Japanese was reported
throughout the day. The
day s fighting showed that the Japanese tacucs
on the ground w'cre
umilar to those of the highly trained
fonvard compames 012/18 Royal
guerillas. By evening the
Garhwal Rifles had been with-
^awn from the coast, and a line was formed from Beserah to
hongsang to bl(^ the roads from
the north. Both the reserve
cnmp.in. had been committed,
and the company in the central

Siepunttin Bituty.
30 DreonW lOtl
IMI.
Duiy. Gnml Suff ftnn^ IfcaAjiaxim, 9 Indan CKviuoo, SO DfcnnbfT
 Tltr. STRUCRLC rOR CENTRAL M^JAVa 229

sector was pulled into rcsrrxT. Ortlcri sverc issued for nc\s!y
defined outpost line to be taken up b)* 2/18 Royal Garhsval Rjfics,
and for all putu and remaining vchtclcf to be withdrass-n across
the riser dtin'np die niplit.** *niepsins were ssllfidrawn jimulta-
neously. Durinp the nipht all civil Installations in the town, includ-
ing the wireless Jtatinn, the wlusrf and the pier and the ATC and
Soctiny
oil tanks ssere demolished, and everything on wheels
ss'3s taken mxr to the south bank of the Kuantan. The
second ferry was ready at 2000 hours on this date, the fint
one Hhich had been bomlscd ss-as fully repaired by 1630 hours,*
and the tssn ferries helped to evacuate transport, puns and licasy
stores aerroj the river by 05I0hour*on 31 December 1911. This
was indeed very lucky.
So far as 5/11 Sikh vai concerned, C Company uorked
throughout the night to rnovc ferries forss-ards and backwards. D
Company, svhich sai in resers-r, occupied the Ilulit Rangin post-
tion to r.QHntcp tlic Japanese occupation of the Jabor Valley Estate.
B Company left the Taj Line (the position at the 21 Milesfoneon
Pekan road, prep.ired by Captain Khanzada Taj .Mohammed
Khan M.C.), blew up the Belat bridge and came into reserve
near Milestone C on the main road. Tlie detachment at Pekan,
however, remained there alone. 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment
carried out reconnaissance about one mile west of Gambang to
select a defcaus'c position.
Tlir Japanese also were busy durinp the night of 30/31
December 1941. One group svas quietly moving in a north-
westerly direction to cross the Kuantan river in the upper regions
and far Iwyond the Indian brigades risTr line positioas, svith a riew
to att.nckinp the aerodrome from the west. Another proup, stronger
than the first, entered Kuantan town on 31 December 1911, and
actually attacked the post at the north bank of the ferry at 0510
hours, only half an hour after the last \Thiclc had been shipped
across the nVer with (he strong current.
In the morning of 31 December, it was discovered that the
Japanese ha<l reached (he Sctongfcol area by infiltration. The
2/18 Royal Garhwal Rides svas dispersed over a wide area, with
its Ileadqu.irtcrs and A Company at Tan.ih Putrh ferry, irs D
Company at Reserab Gap covering Bescrali-Semambu arca^. its
C Company missing, its D Company reported to be in Bukit Ubi
area but cut off from all communications, and its E Company
occupying the cross-roads on Kuantan-Bescrah road. Because
the ground was so thinly held, the Japanese were able to infiltrate

M CrisarfW O.W.A. Painiw! JrTjonal Arcomt, p. J2.

W) 1830 hour,
U anoih<T vcfir.
230 CAWrAIONS IN Miirril-EAST AA 19U--12 MALAVA

deeply, to ail ofT communifatiom aod lo attack the rear arcaias

far as the Victory Camp. At noon telephone communicationi
broke down, icat-intj all companies out of touch and bcjond reach
of any w.Tming. The Brigade Commander and the Battalion
Comm-andcr maintained touch across lltc river only by simal
signalling and shouting; and therefore the Brigade Commander
decided to withdraw 2/18 Roy.al Garhwal Rifles across the river
with artillery and mortar support, either in the counc of the day
or after sunset. Tins was duly communicated to the battalion
commander by signali. /Vfierwards, the Dth Indian Diasion
was asked by Uic Brigade Commander whether 2/18 Royal
Garhwal Rifles, likely lo be cut off by infiltration, might be with-
drawn to Maran. But the reply was against any such move and
the Brigade Commander confirmed the abandonment of the propo-
sal, but wiili the observation that the Japanese * infiltration round
left flank against aerodrome (w-as) otdya matter of time. Fight to
deny aerodrome will only result in losses. (He will be) dcnjnng
aerodrome tonight, withdrawing Garhwal FUfles across rir.
The escning was spent In transporting as many as 300
men of 2/18 lyjyal Garhwal Rifles across the ris-cr, in destrojing
the ferry and in sending B Echelon transport back to Marar. At
night, stragglen were helped to come across the rnTr, the
remainder of the battalion was withdrawn near Milestone 9 o**
the main road, he. lo the area of the aerodrome,
-IM (25-pounder)
Field Battery was sent to Jerantut, and petrol dumps
on aerodrome
and Fekan road junction were dcsiro^-ed and all engineering and
Public kNorks Department material of value of the Japanese were
also derued-
A further withdrawal became necessary immediately after-
wards. The Banks of 2/18 Royal Garliwal Rifles were being
turned by the Japanese mosing through the jungle,
and all attempts
^td^the arc of defence failed. Forward companies were
sull in action in the Jabor Valley,
Semambu and Jeram Kuantan
est;^ areas, but without communications
with the headquarters
of their battalion. In these circumstances
there was no aUcmathc
buttowithdrawthewhole battalion to the aerodrome area imme-
^tely, and the Brigade Commander issued the
order accordingly-
e al ordered 2/12 Frontier Force
Regiment to concentrate
near the aerodrome area, leaving one
company to find detachments
at Fulau Manis and Lubok
Paku, where guns of 21 Mountain
Battery had now been placed for
action against possible mowimcnt
ol hostile craft up the Pahang
river.
The new >-ear opened with an order of the day to deny
the Japanese the use of the aerodrome
up to 5 January 1942 so
 TJIK STRUGGLE tOR CCVTRAL lULAVA 251

that Dritisli convoys, almost in sight, could reach Singapore. Tlie

situation reports on thh date referred to several dangerous
dcvclopmcnlt. Confused tidrtnishes svere going on all tntr the
front. The Japanese were continuing their infiltration.
The night of J/2 January 1912 passed litcsvisc viddiout inci-
dent. The situation on 2 January 1912 svas pracucally the same
as on the presaous day. Then two reports liastcncd the di\*ision
to Ie.ive Kuantan. The first svai the receipt of news from Kuala
Lumpur about Japanese landings on Uje west coast, and the
resultant threat to the rear and flanV of the 9d Indian Division.
At the same time, Singapore reported the afTTsal of the cons'oy
with rcinfurcements and supplies. This led the higher authorities
to order the withdrawal of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade to
taie efTect on the night of 3/-I January 1912. This decision svas
further justified by die deteriorating local situation, betokening
an encirclement of die brigade, llic Japanese had infiltrated
on to the Data Sowar track. Fite was exchanged resulting in some
loss to the Japanese. I^icr In the e^ening, two or three of their
scouts peered into the Victory Camp from n point to the north
of the track. They svere drism out b)' the Brithh gunners. But
it became certain that the Japanese troops w-ere in coruiderable
strength in the north. The niglit or2/3 Januar>' 19 12 was peaceful
But the d.iy of 5 January was fateful for the 22nd Indian Infantry
Brigade. Sot being at all happy about the lack of information
regarding the Japanese to the north of the main road, the Brigade
Commander posted four platoon piquets to watch the tracks at
.approximately Milestones 7, 8, iO and 11, and abo to prevent
ambushes on the main road. AMth these preparations withdrawal
began. The first batch to withdraw consisted of 5/11 Sikh, die
bulk of 22 Field Company, a portion of the artillery, followers,
mess and all others who might pro\x impediments. A detachment
of the pioncen was retained with the brigade for blosving road
demolitions svhich had been prepared. By 1800 houn^ all umts
except the Brigade Headquarten, 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment
(less two companies), one section FMSVF armoured car company
and one section of 63/81 Battery had gone beyond Jfilestone IJ
at great speed, and not an ounce of store or equipment was left
behind. But there was little luck after that. The camp perimeter
was a long one, and die number of men to guard \stal points
in it was diminishing gradually on account of withdrawals. This
enabled die Japanese to infiltrate at svill. Meanwhile darkness
was increasing, and sisibility had diminished. Firing increased

SS'ISJO houn* b nothr vmion.

232 awPAJONs iv rouni-EAyr asw 1941-12 malaya

using
by about 1930 hours, and the Japanese created confusion by
ordinary* fireworks such as crackers on all sides. They'
came
aod
in mass from the western boundary of the \'oluntccr Camp
started hand-to*hand fighting with bayonets, pistols and tommy
guns.** Very soon the attach came also from the north and at

close quarters.
Lucky was the Brigade Headquarters staff which was able
a
to depart in the midst of this noise and firing. Then followed^
lorncs
section of guns at the water tower, the last batch of heaiy
and two armoured cars. But the lighting on the aerodrome
continued to rage fiercely. B Company of 2/12 Frontier Force
Regiment had b) this time become engaged, though not at cle
quarters. It was originally at the northern extremity some fi'c
hundred yards from the camp, but, as the fighting dcstlojwdj it
had come nearer. * In this action Ueut-Coloncl Cummmg, -
Frontier Force Regiment bha\-ed with the greatest gallan^',
for which he was subsequently awarded the\'ictoria Cross.
Meanwhile, the Japanese climbed up trees and plajtertd the tracks
and pathways with fire and they also occupied all vacant biulding*
and trenches in the area, although grenades and other weapon*
caused heaiy casualties to them. The slaughter was terrible.
But as night advanced the fighting became Jess intense,
the Japanese occupied the aero^roe at midnight.
The course of the brigade after the midnight of 3 Januaiy
1942 was comparatively peaceful. The Japanese did not dbturb
it either by land or from air. After crossing the Pahang by the
Jeranlut ferry, the brigade scattered; 2/18 Royal GarhwalRiU^
proceeding to Raub, 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment to the Gap and
5/11 Sikh to Belong, and this crossii^ of the last man and the last
vehicle in the early hours of 7 January 1 942 brought the Kuantan
operations to an end.
It has been said that the Japanese made two serious niislakes
in th operations: one was that they underestimated the British
artillery and lost one or two ihousand men on the whole, and the
other was that the British line of communications was not cut off
before 3 January 1942.'** This is true. But the British too made
a few serious mistakes: the Brigade Commander, the raan on
the spot, was ovxmilcd in tactical matters; the British High
Command was mistaken in eacpecting the Japanese to attack fay
sea; the Royal Air Force did not lift one finger to encourage the

StaffHeadqnarien.S lodian Dtttoq, lOJOhouit,

G.W.A. Fainter: PentBiaJ Asocct. p. 17.

BrisadifT
Cxpuio D.G. lUaiell.IUierBtTlieKaiitan OpeniiaM, pp. 36 aad 41.
 THE STRUCCLB FOR CENTRAL MALAYA 233

land force, and the local dvil population was ignored. The
Japanese created a few surprises: they moved almost crawb'ng
and unseen at night, they produced a small arms bullet of 256
calibre made of hard steel and enclosed in brass against which the
British armoured cars were not imper^'ious.

THE BREAKDOSVN OE THE UNE OF COSIMUNICATIO.V AREA

The next phase Malaya related
in the struggle for Central
to die breakdown of the lines of communication and the fall of
Kuala Lumpur into Japanese hands. This area tvas of immense
strategic importance and the hub of the main communications
of Malaya. But the vastness of the area and inadequacy of its
defences led General Wavell to the decision to withdraw from tWs
region, ^^'hen he saw the nature of the country and the condition
of British troops on 8 January 1942, he decided to gis'c up its

defence. He has recorded his reasons as follows: * I visited the
hfalayan front on January 8, the forward troops being then 35
miles north of Kuala Lumpur. The Japanese had broken
through their position on the Slim River on the presious day,
and the tuo fonvard brigades were reduced lo a handful of wry
tired men. After seeing the troops and their commanders down
to Brigade Commanders, I came to the conclusion that the 3rd
Indian Corps, uhich had now been iighung and retreating
continuously for a month, was of little further fighting value without
a rest; and that it would soon disappear allogctJicr if the present
policy of gradual svithdrawal was followed, cspcdally since the
country south of Kuala Lumpur was not suitable for delaying
action. I at once issued orders lo General Heath to cenTr
Kuala Lumpur for as long as possible without awaiting full-scale
enemy attack, and to impose the maximum delay on the enemy
by' extensive demolitions. I informed him that I proposed to
withdraw the Indian Corps to Johore to rest and refit
He continues: ' After discussion svith Lteut.-General Perdval,
General Ofiicer Commanding, Malaj'a, and with Major-General
Gordon Bennett,....! laid down on January 9lh, the following

general plan for the defence of Malaya: (a) 3rd Indian Corps,
after delaying the enemy north of Kuala Lumpur for as long as
possible (I did not think this was likely to be longer than January
lllh), to be svithdrawn by rail and road into Johore, leaving
suifident mobile rearguards to cosTr the demolition scheme, (b)
8th Australian Division, less one brigade group in Mersing area

IS' Dopatch Operations in Soulb.Wen ^dfic. JaDuary Febniary 25iii.

C
1943 by CeotnJ Sir ArrfutaJd Wavell, . C. B, CM-C, M.C, A. D. =a para 6 p. 1.
234 CAMPAIGNS IN SOtmi*EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAVA

on Eastern coast, to move furthvnth to north western frontier

of Johorc and to prepare to fight a decisive battle on the general
line Segamat
Mount Ophirmoulli of Muar river. The brigade
group in Mersing area to join the remainder of 8th Australian
Division as soon as it could be relieved by troops from Singapore
Island, (c) The 9lh Indian Division, to be made up from the
freshest troops of 3rd Indian Corps and 45th Indian Infantr)'
Brigade (which had lately arrived in Malaya from India, and
was now in Malacca), to be placed under General Gordon Bennett
for use in the southern portion of the position indicated in (b)
above, (d) ath Australian Division as soon as possible to send
forward mobile detachments to relieve the rearguards of 3rd
Indian Corps and to harass the enemy and delay him by demoli*
tions. (c) 3rd Indian Corps on withdrawal to tahe over res*
ponsibility for cast and west coasts of Johore south of the road

MersingKluang Batu Pahat, leaving General Gordon Bennett
free to fight the battle in norih*west Johore. 3rd Indian Corps
was to rest and to refit llthIndian Division and to organise a
general merve from reinforcements as they arrived
Thu plan allowed the Japanese to come to the northern
boundary ofJohore without opposition, and certain riskswere taken
on the east coast by substituting the Australian brigade group by
troops less fatnilar wiili the ground. But the merits outweighed
these defects. The new plan strengthened the western side of
Johorc which was immediately threatened, limited the Japanese
lines of advance to the Segamat-Muar
river line on the left, to
impenetrable jungle on the right and the tea on the extreme left,
and placed full responsibility on General Gordon Bennetts shoul-
ders for the success of defence in this area.
General \\avell hoped
that the Royal i^r Force and the
Royal Navy would play their
parts as fully as possible in giving
close support.
^eIdea before General Wavell was appointed as head of
^encan, British, Dutch and Australian
Command was to hold
thisarea at least for a week or ten davs,
until the reinforcements
arrived and were distributed in
different fields of action. The
^enforcement convoy reached Singapore
. i on 3 January 1912,
* ^ *he 45th Indian Infantry
_ . Brigade commanded by
Bngadier Duncan, and along with it
a pioneer battalion which was
a non^ombatant labour unit. This
brigade was sent at once to
the MalaccaJasm area to gel
familiar with local conditions and

Htadqujutcr* Ff Eajt Appendic

Not
rvot 5 ad 3(M, nd ABDACOAn
I2.'p. ^ OfnU Aianl /
*'""^
Aerordme*'
05
07,11 iht Sadk-h at Finfit
General Fercr^ the
^
menticBitd m (e) wa* Eodau-KIuaDg-Bsto Hlia% vidt,TTi
eThi H'gr in Mal^e, tp.fit-, P-
1
 TJtZ STRVCdtX FOR CENTRAt. SfAMVA 235

the hfalayan jungle. OnSJanuary I9J2, an important conference

was held at Segamat, winch was attended aho by tlic representa-
tivesor the Australian army. At that rneefing, a gradual sWthdra-
wal to and the defence of Johorc were decided upon. General
Percival lias said that * the plan in outline was that the 3rd Indian
Corps was to fall hack slowly by the west coast roads and take
up n portion on the general line Segamat-hfuar, while the Austra-
lian Imperial Force remained responsible for the defence of die
east coast '.*** The river line from Segamat to hfuar was tactically
e.xcellcnt, because the Muar river was crossed only by one
r.aihv'ayand t>'o road bridges, all of them near Segamat. Betivecn
that place and the sea, the river was crossed only by a
%'ehicle ferry at Muar where it was several hundred yards wide.
It was *' decided to site the defences on the soudi bank of the river
so as to make the best use of the ss-aier obstacle* and the swampy
valleys on its tortuous course. TIic conference discussed also die
danger of Japanese invasion of Singapore Island from the western
side and decided to ask the commander of the Singapore Fortress
to strengthen his defences on that side. It settled a few minor
questions like sending the 4Sdi Indian Infantry Brigade to Muar,
continuing the role of the III Indian Corps to defend the svest
coast and creating a line of communication area for Johorc.
But diese earlier decisions were nulli/ied by the disaster
at Slim river and General WaveUs new plan. General Percival
Ims observed that * the main diflerence between this plan and the

original one was that the State of Johorc, instead of being divided
longitudinally so that each force would in depth and fall back
on its osvn communications, was now dhided laterally. The new
plan also involved the temporary splitting up of the Australian
Imperial Force which I had been doing my utmost to avoid. All
the same, I do not sec how any better plan could luivc been evolved
in, the circumstances as they existed at the U'mc \ '** The prinap.il
merit of the plan, liowcvcr, was that llie person on whom the heavy
burden of defence lay, viz. Major-General Gordon Bennett, had
approved of it and he could be depended upon to discharge his
duty efficiently and enthusiastically. Another merit of General
WavcUs plan svas that it invoUxd the necessity of strengthening
tlic defence on the nortli side of Singapore Island while the Japanese
were held up in Johorc area. These defences were ordered to be
put in hand at once.*

*S 7%t IVttr fa Mat'jia, p. 200.

y4i</.'p-210.
itfi Wavcll'f DtrpnUM. Para 9, p. 2.
236 cKXiPAicvs IN sounr-EAsr asu 19n*42 maiaya

A slight modilicalion, probably to suit General Gordon

Bennetts personal wishes,'* was in the plan on 10 Janu^
made
1942, at another cotxference at SegamaL It was then dedded
that the main line of resistance should be on the general line
Baw
Anam-Muar, as the large open area astride the road near Batu
also
Anam oficred excellent field for the artillery and there W'as

much scope for ambushes. Further, two infantry battalions from

the garrison of the Singapore Fortress were ordered to the mai^
land, 2/17 Dogra attached to the 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade
to the east coast and 2 Garhwal attached to the Isl Malaya
Infantry Brigade, less one company, to the Segamat area.
'nxcre was to be no svithdrawal bet'ond the line Segamat-
Muar sdthout the persorul permission of Ueutenant-Gener^
Pcrcn-al, vibo fell that as the area of fighting was resliictcd he
exercise a more direct personal control over all operations than bad
hitherto been possible. This Uoe, connected with the other
one
along the Endau river, was the last defence line the Common-
wealth forces nught hold to save Singapore, and no risks w^
to be taken to preserve this line from being broken b)' the
Japanese-
But in svar nothing is more difficuU than withdrawal wnue
in contact. In Central Malaya the 11th Indian Division and
line of Communication Brigade were too deeply im'oK'cd in the
stni^le with the Japanese to be able to diswnnect tbcrnseh'ns
without some loss.
MeanwhDe Selangor was also affected. There the
hint of the coming Japanese attack was reccised when, on
1 Januarj' 1942, Port Swxttenham was attacked severely from
the
air and Klang manhalling yard was also bombed by Japanese
planes. On2 January 1942, a Japanese force attempted a land-
ing at Koala Selangor; but the British artillery set a small steamer
on Ere, sank four barges and drove off the rest towards the north-
It was now clear that this part of Malaya, from Kuala Selai^r
to Malacca, known as the line of Commuiucation Area, and
under Brigaidicr ^loirs command, was open to attack by sea and
land, and also b> air. A complete reorganisation of the defence
was an immediate necesdt>', therefore. At the commencement
of hostil it ies the Li ne of Communication Area was responsible
for the coastal defence of Selangor and 2vegri Sembflan, and the
troops to vvhom the job was asdgned were those of FMS^T
Brigadc^l Perak, 2 Selangor, 3 Kcgri S^TTiViilftn and 4 Pahang
Battalions, and Kedah and Kelantan Voluntary Forces with

frfy FiH, p. 81.

 iJALAYA
Tlir. STRUOfiLE FOR CENTRAL

auxiliary unit,. Actually the .cnd and the

thi, rca.
were the only two in service witliin g Port
aenrfrome,
were Kuala Lumpur and it, 1942,
^par.a. B) J |,^(le55 n
Diclcson, Kuala Selangor, and
73 Field Battery, 272 Anti-tank Regtaent had
Squadron) had come mto th,, battalion wa, sent
to
tR*
also been brought mto it. / ,i ;n Mnnb.Seoane and
Puchong area, while 3 Cavalry
Dingkil section. IVhcn the Japan
^
..(.^pted a landing,
as

t minimum of force
statfd already, at Kuala Sd-S-. "l^nroop of 73
yet at tliat point, and itwasFMSV On
Field Battery which drove off the Japan P
Selangor K
thcJapancscvesscUwcrcst.llncar
3 January 1942 ,
while their fighter patrols er-t
3, ^ack by
Blenheims
Britbh movements
on numerous ,mall Boat..ofr rot.
^nham was ineffective.'

On January 1912, the silnauon at

4 Sed in the area

-ca north cast of Batang

"aSaS';va::l;tteS
'^Su.teat had to be met

SqVar-a':
at Kuala Selangor, ^lang. at Kapar

.
3 Cavalry was
machine-gun company was at Jcr. Cclangor iviih a
volunteer
but one of its squadrons was at ^ing^ however,
3 Cavalry
18-poundcr Field B.attcry. J" j nirii Robinson road junction,
an
was moved to Batang Bcrjunlai Kuantan, was sent
and 464 Field Battery, wh-h .
j^Iodb. There
irc a
except one going to
to Port Dickson, ^ j-nt Company
I
few other unit movements, the ^ Upn to Dingkil
area.

Port Swettenham and 2 ^][P*^Y .-sccyclistforccof nearly

ol
In tlic night of 4/5 January 1942, miles nortli
a movc-
800 men engaged the defenders
P^,^
necessitated the
Kuala Selangor along *hc coast ^n 5
Infantry Indian Infantry
ment of the 15th Indian jgtji
i^ca.
into the Line of Communication 3^j7 pogra,
jax,
Brigade had under its command
1

>6 Sir Paul Maliby.

liradquartna I ar i-
i-S War Diary. Genoal
' IbiJ., Appendix AO- WA. .....nUrv.IIeadfluar-
... War Diary. 2/9 u
"a AnoUiCT vmion ii During
,._,.,Mr 1!M2.

.'S War Diary, Ileadquarim *Z

238 cAitPAJGN5 IN sotTii-rAsr ASIA 194M2 Malaya

3 Cavatrj' (1^'* B Squadron), 352 Field Batlcr)' and FMSVT light

BaJlery.
TTie situation continued to remain confused vith Japanese
pressure beingcxcrtcdonlhc iSlhlnsBan Infantry' Brigade position-
In consequence some troop redisposiuons vrere essential, particularly
osving to the prime necessity of defending Kuala Lumpur. Thus,
on the day that Genera! ^Vastll sisiied thi* area, the troop disposi-
tions in the sector were as follows:**
1. The trunk
nod occupied b> the remnants of 28th and
I2ti) Indian Infantry Brigades.
At Tanjong Malim, 2/lG Punjab, B Battery of 155 Field
Regiment and two troops of 2 AntiTank Battery.
At Rasa, The 28th Indian Infantry' Brigade ssith the
strength of only one battalion, the rest of 155 Field
Regiment, one troop of 2 Anii-Tank Battery, one
troop of 215 /\nti-Tank Battery, and 23 Field
Company.
Inrcser\-e, 425 ihaitcred men of the 12th Indian Infantry
Brigade, and B Squadron of 3 Ca>*3lry.
2. Sriengererm-^cupiedby the 15th TndianlnfantryBrigade.
In the Sodin Estate, 1/14 Punjab holding the south bank
3.
oTS. Sebngor.
At Batang Beijuntal, the British Battalion (two miles wtst
of the abos-e).
At Et. Robinson, 3/16 Punjab.
At Rasvang, 3/17 Dogta.
Ardllery for these regiments
7 and 10 Mountain Batteries
and 273 Anti-Tank Battery, 15 Field Company.
Coastal road
^At Kuala Selangor, Headquarten A and
B Companies of 2/9 Ja^ 4 Mountain Battery and
Volunteer Light Battery.
At Jeram, C company of the abosr regimeni-
At Kapar, B company of the same regimen^ and
headquarters and C company of 3 Gas'alry.
Tie Line o/ C^mmaticafun viraroccupied by FMS\T' and
others.

At Klang and Port Swxttenhaxn 3 Jsegri Scmbilan
Battalion (the latter for Klang Aerodrome).
At Kuala Lumpurthe rest of 3 Selangor Battalion
(one company for aerodrome) a detachment of 14
Anti-Aircraft Battery. Armoured Car Company,
FM5VF in rese rve.
Hijloty of llih IwEm in MiUja, YcL II (Oripnal), p. 319.
 TnE STRuaoLE FOR CENTRAL MALAYA 239

South of the Port Swettenham Kuala Lumpur Road-
Puchong-DingJdl-Sertmban-Morib. One company
of 3/17 Dt^ra, the Independent Company of
Roseforce, one squadron of 3 Cavalrj-, 88 Field
Regiment, 272 Anti-Tank Batter>.

At Port Dickson and Sepang ^Two companies of 2
Malaya Battalion, ttvo platoons of 1 Perat Battalion,
278 Field Baltcr>' (122 Field Regiment).

At Kajang In reserve, 5/18 Royal Garhwal Rillcs; one
troop 16 IJght Anti-Aircraft Battery.

East Flank of the llth Indian Division 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade in the area from the Gap to Raub,
Sdi Indism Infantry Brigade at the crossings over
the Pahang at jerantut and Tcmerloh.
The Headquarters of the llth Indian Dirision was on that
day at Batu Caves.
It will be clear from the above dispositions that the dclcnce
was tvell Organised. All the roads to Kuala Lumpur were properly '

blocked, and if only the Royal Air Force and the Royal Wavy
could support and if the reinforcements also were had in time,
the Japanese army might have been rolled back on the roads by
which it had come so far. But this was not to be.
The adoption of General WavcHs plan eliminated confusion
and half-hearted moves. Each division and brigade had its own
programme of withdrawal, but in co-ordination with the others.
The llth Indian Division was to svithdraw only after midnight of
lO/II January 1942. Its first bound was to hfandn, which was
thirty-five miles south of Kuala Lumpur, and the number of
demolitions on its route was to be as many as possible.
It was
hoped that the combination of big bounds and comprehensive
demolitions svould enable the division to shake off the pursuit
after passing through Kuala Lumpur'."* The 9tli Indian Division
had to ivilhdraw fn conformit) ivith the other division to Gemas
by railway and by road via. Bentoixg, Kuala Pilah and Tampin.
^Vithdrawal is ncser an eas> operation and on each of the three
fronts
north, north-west and svest the Commonwealth army
suffered further losses in the course of it.
9 January 1942 passed oJT without any serious attack
by the Japanese, but e\-cry hour waa one of amdety and watchful-
ness. Kuala Lumpur was about to falHnto Japanese hands. The
aerodrome was demolished at 1745 hours, and the wireless station
closed dosvn. Citizens were evacuating the town and streets

>s p. 327.
 240 CAUPAICNS IX SOUIB-EASr ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

prescnied a deserted appearance. Demolitions, strategic and

tactical,wre being carried out on all roads leading to the cjt)
and scorched earth policy' was being applied ruthlcBly. At the
same lime backloading of stores was going on to the marimtnn
working capacit)' of the railways. This had started even as early
as 29 December 1941," but there were still vast quantities
of
military and d%il stores there and in other parts of the area to be
evacuated, which it tvas quite impossible to mo\e. Pillars of
smoke and flame rose into the sty as rubber factories, ^ mine
machinery, petrol, and oil stocks, were dcrued*." But the time at
the disposal of the Afalaya Command sras only thirty-sic houn,
because the 11th Indian Division had been ordered to hold the
Japanese away from Kuala Lumpur until midnight of 10/11 January
as
1942, and the Divisional Commander had fixed 1600 hours
the zero hour up to hich all roads should be denied to the
Japanese. Further, the 15th and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades
and the Line of Communication Area battalions svere to srith'

draw stmulianeousf)' using Rasvang, S. Buloh and KJang as their

rcspecth'e key-points. These two brigades were to withdraw
through Kuala laimpur while the Line of Communication troops
had to deny Baiu Tiga while Kuala Lumpur was held; and each
brigade was to withdraw onl> by the routes svhich had been
prescribed for it. Their destinations for the first stage were:
Mantin for the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, Labu for the l5th
Indian Infantry Brigade, and Sepang and Port Dickson for the lin
of Communication troops. At the second stage the dcstinatioiis
were Tampin for the 28tb Indbn Infantr>- Brigade, Alor Gajah
for the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade and Alalacca for the line of
Communicadon troops.
Prior to the withdrawal, on 9 January 1942, the 28th Indian
Infantry Brigade had been ordered to tale up a front line poation-
Coasequently 2/16 Punjab w'asata point slightly north ofSerendah
(one thousand yards ahead of 2/2 Gurkha RiHcs* bridgehead),
2/2 Gurkha Rifles (with which 2/1 Gurkha Rifles had been amalga-
mated) occupied a reserve positiem to the south of the same tillage,
and 2/9 Gurkha Rifics held the right sector, while 3/17 Dogra
Regiment occupied the left sector of the main position, which was
appTODcimately one nule behind Serendah village. 5/11 Sikh,
which ought to hast jmned this brigade, svas ordered to go to the
I5ih Indian Infantry Brigade which was reported to be hard-
pressed by the Japanese. There was good artillciy support for the
brigade, 4*5-inch howitzers at Serendah and 25-pounder guns at

'* \Vr Kit, m inr^Iin Corps 29 DnenJ^cr IWI.

71r U<o- ar AUi^e, p. 219.
 THE STRUGGLE lOR CE^TRAL SfALAVA
little contact mth
Rawang. But Uiroughout the day there was
shght paml
the Japanese. Only during the afternoon there tvas a
and the forward
skirniiS. between 2/16 Punjab
the fortner and th^ slight
Japanese, resulting in mortar fue on
the Serendah n\ cr.
withdrawal up to almost the north bank of
In ^.e a^rea oeeupied by the 15th 7te
sulfered disaster. It svM "
1 /14 Punjab f
rnomiug, and the situation remarned
weakened >>atlaliou was m fart
the day. But the tired and
overrun and praeUeally ceased
rn this la^
But for this tragedy, all battalions *
uneventful day-the British battahon
and 5/11 f, w
S. Buloh road, 3/16 Punjab at Kuang,
SCI miles west of Ra g
tain Battery at die road junetton
Area also there
of Batu Aranp In the Line of Communication
were no serioL development, although
and grmving strong in numbers.
to C. Squadron of 3 Cavalry
> ";* aS g
armoured car was destroyed. mf KJane due
o
Companies) was withdrawn slightly durine the after-
to Japanese fire. It must also
Im men on -l following
noSn of this day, Ure Brigater
agatiul J
gqSn
units to defend the area p Companies
of 3 Cavalry (C Squadron
hemg 7* Regtaent, the
of219 Jat), (in
od 4|5 Field Battery
Independent Company, Roscfii ^
jjgjit moves
addition to 351 Field Batteol-
of other local units. These
a large poruon of the Line
ap^ared to be raier ^om.
^ ^
beeanse

been removed from Klang area a 2/9 Jat

January 1942.
a, all costs unul .0

It was^also of
Uireat to the west coast and the
bygone of the roads from
eastward towards Kuala _ ^ P through Kuala
j
lldr
west, the ."Tr,, 7aL^y 1942.
Lumpur during the night 1942. the I2th
Ii^ian
J.jp'j
During the
f4Cjab moved to the Mantm Pa;
Infantry Brigade and 5/1^ j^^S.Bulohcross-roatU
Battahon and 3/I&
the British
J
2/16 Punjab crossed
and Kuang road nwr under pressure from the
the berenuA.
the bridge across
Japanese.
242 CAltP.UGNS IS SOCTH-EAST ASIA J&4M2 ilALAYA

spite of hea'7
10 Jan\iar> ivas fired for wthdrawal, which, in
opposition, started %seU. On the trunk road the Japanese
of
attacked DCompany- of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles and &e remainder
blew it
2/16 Punjab, but these t\vo retired across the bridge and
brigade position to
up. 2/16 Punjab mo\-cd back through the
Milestone 22, just north of S. Choh %Tllage. But
Company D
pressing on and outflanking it on the
staj'cd on, srith the Japanese
ground and dive-bombing from the air, and at0900 hours Briga^er
Selby reported contact in Serendab posilion. 2/2 Gurkha
gardei^
had to srithdraw after close fighting amongst houses and
attacto
but ossing to continuaus low flying and dive-bombing
The battalion arrived
it could not start mosing until 1000 hours.
at S. Choh and took up its position at 1030 hours to the south
helpe
of the river. ^ITie ssithdrawal of this battalion, howesxr,
the Japanese to attack 2/9 Gurkha Rifles and 3/17 Dogra
Regiment
in the main Serendah position at 0800 hours. The
good
continued for rtvo hours. The 155th Reid Regiment gasr
support to 2/9 Gurkha Rifles. As the fixation of time for withi^'
wal was important these battalions were asked to withdraw
1200 hours. The^ disengaged at 1220 hours with little trouble
and arm-ed at 5Gltone 22 where 2/16 Punjab was in positiotu
But S. Choh svas then in the possession of the Japanese,^
2/2 Gurkha Rifles (b the south) and all ether battalions of the 2^
Intlian Infantry Brigade (b the north) lost touch with each other
owbg to the infiltration of the Japanese bcrtvTcn them. C Battery
of the 155ih Reid Regiment sviihdiew b
lime, while the others
svere left bchbd. At about 1300 hours the Japanese attacked
2/2 Gurkha Rifles from the west and on D Company's front
heasy
fightbg took place for a short time.
The other battalions arrived and opened attacks upon be
Japanese, but had to fall back when fated srilh the danger of getting
trapped themseh-es. 2/9 Gurkha Rifles moved north-westwards
and escaped destruction, but 3/17 Dogra Regiment was badly
caught in the Japanese net. Its D
Company entered the heart
of the village which was full of the Japanese. From bous,

from behbd walls and hedges, from the trees and from the drains,
they opened up a fusillade'* and deomated t'his company. E'^cn
B Company was gone and the rest of the battalion took shelter b
the wQdcmess. Uidbrtunatcly, Brigadier Sclbj- could get no news
of this tragedy which vras being staged b the north- The one
attempt of hlajor North of 3/17 Dogra Repment to make a dash
through the Japanese lines b
212 Gurkha Rifles carrier failed meer-

"* ItaUrjr cf lldi Tnrtrm DirsieB b> Atk!*ra, VoL II (Or%iaaI). p. M9.
 THE STRUGGLE FOR CE.ST1L\L JtALAYA 243

ably,and (here ^^'as therefore no nc^vs of (lie fonvard units. He,

therefore, dedded to withdraw, partly to conTorm >vith the general
plan and partly to escape Japanese enveloping movements on his
own flanks. The Japanese were still active o\-erhead ssntli dive-
bombing in front and rear of the brigade position, and they were
dropping pamphlets too from their planes. At 1500 hours some
3/17 Dogra and 2/lC Punjab carriers made a rush through and
managed to arrive at 2/2 Gurkha position. But at about 1530
hours this last battalion withdrew under orders as far as Rawang,
taking advantage of cover provided by the rubber trees. Here,
the position allotted to it was about tsvo miles further to the south.
During this lime it was noticed that 2/9 Gurkha Rifles, 2/1 6 Punjab
and 3/17 Dogra had passed through this position on their way to
the Kanchin Pass. 2/2 Gurkita Rifles was the last to leave Rawang
position, acting as rearguard to the brigade which was in turn the
rearmost force on the road. iVfotor transport arrived afterdark
and carried the men off at about 2130 hours. Two oflicers and
ten Gurkha other ranks remained behind with Uie Sapper demoli-
tion party and two platoons of B Company, while the rest of the
battalion proceeded via Kuala Lumpur to Tampin. The demo-
litions took some time, and in all some ten or twelve road blocks
or blowing of hill-sides on to the roadsverc accomplished, but before
the first bridge was blown at Rawang a number of stragglers and
some wounded came in. The major party arrived in Tampin
area in the early morning of 1 1 January 1 9 12, and the demolition
parly reached later in the day. The 155th Field Regiment
proceeded to Alor Gajah which was its harbour area.
The I5lh Indian Brigade svas moring on the central roads,
and during the night of 9/10 January Brigadier Moorhead had
adjusted his depositions by withdrawing 5/ 11 Sikh to the road junc-
tion on the Soefm road, five miles west of Rawang, and concentra-
ting the whole of the British baltaUon at the Batu Aning road
junction on the Batang Setjunlai road. He moved his own head-
quarters and B Company of 1/14 Punjab nearer Rawang."* The
route oftrithdrawal of this brigade was Kundang-Kuang-S. Buloh-
Kuala Lumpur-Labu. Its troops commenced withdrawal at about
1400 hours on 10 January and moved towards Kundang road
junction held by 5/11 Sikh. The Japanese were then harassing
this battalion from Bt. Rantau
but the unit was well supported
by 4 Mountain Battery, They withdrew tiirough Kuang road
junction held by 3/16 Punjab and
embussed for Labu. 3/16
atS. Buloh cross-roads
Punjab passed through the British BattaUon

*9 /W</.
2U CAjjpAicMiN lomi-rAjrr AA 1911*12 mal-wa

Tlje Drith Battalion uith 10

Mountain
and thrnrc to
Battery withdrew at about 2100 louf and reached
Kuala I^mpur
until
at aliout 2300 houn. There it waited for itt Tcarf:uard
0130 houn. Afierwardi, the battalion blew up the
main road
cotnpan>
bridge in the capital town and went tn I^bu with one
IcM which acted at rearguard coverinsj demolition* on the
way an
^
rcachinf; Labu in the ariernoon of the neat day. Thi*
Indian
had prm-itlcd the reartjuard for the withdrawal cf the 11th
tn c
Diwion tluough Kuala Lumpur, which w.i* completed t

early hours of II January 1912.

runnint;
Btinjjver^'ncar the leacoaitand liavintj lewral road*
to it, Klan;; waj naturally an important ohjecitrt for the Japaww.
The Brlthli too placed peat store on the defener of K!.nnR^ndp,
and ordered it ' to be held at all emt* until 1 1 January' *. 2/9 Jat,
3 Kepi Seinbilan BaHalinn and 73 Field Battery and one company
of 2 Sclanjpr were a**ipied this iat- Tlie plan of defence wai
(on
that Companie* of 2/9 Jat were to be in the north
A arul C
the ri^ht bant of the river) and B and !> Companie* with
poinw
Squadron of 3 Cavalry held the two road* from the north at
two miles each from the townand at the junction* with the latcra
ro.td,3 Nepi Sembilan *vas in the south of the tow n. B Company
protect
of 2 Selangor remained within the town, initi.tlly to
i

against loot and later to guard the Diatc road tlirtc miles on
IM
way to Batu Tiga, and 73 Field Battery wa* to the south of the
to support the bridge-head troop*. Thl* force might n^'^
acluoTd the purpo*c of defending Klang until the prescribe
hour; but the troop* were all weary afier a mo\c and a counter-
move throughout a wel night, and the Japanese were clo*eIy
ing on their heels. Fighting began almost a* day
about 1000 hours there was contact witli the Japanese on boM
,

the roads in the north. By noon, tliey had infiltrated and ouif!.mked
B and C Companies. G
Company counter-attacked, but wa*
surrounded by the Japancic and compelled to lay down its arm*-
However, the defence remained strong in spite of this loss of men
and arms. 73 Field Battery worked hard to maintain the posi-
tion intacL Surprisingly enough, the Japanese appeared heutant
and lacking in their usual </, A war-diarist has recorded
as follows: This was a minor success for the enemy which he made
no effort to exploit, but shortly afterwards about 120 enemy
svere seen advancing down the road from Kapar on bicycles 5
abreast. They were engaged by the artillery (and) auiomaucs
and suffered at least 75 %
casualties. Later a sinular advance
was made down the other road with equally successful results
for our forces. Aficr these set-backs the enemy did not *ho*v
 245
niE STRUGGLE FOR CENTRAL JCAL-iYA

front, hut a strong

sigm of advancing further on the batlaUon
the company of 2
party had now appeared in front of
advantage of artilleiy supjwrt . The
Battalion which Iiad not the
held unltl dusk
Klang bridge was thus saved, and Klang could be

the afternoon Line of

Ko. 16, dated
Brigade Issued the Operation Order
laid down that the Japaiiese
advance
1912. It
to join "P.,* J'
^ a
ed all the way, Testerforce was
Tiga, which must be held at all costs
clearod Kuala Lumpur at midnight.
unul the 11th
Four phases ^
to
were marked out; (A) RJchforce LmSu 4a-
Jamesforce to hoM Ba w^ga^
Morib, Batu Laut and Sepang; (B)
Pochong, H,.
(C) Testeribree to withdraw by f
Datok, Morib and Sepang; (D) *?
Mcrah. All non-fighu'ng troops and B Eche'on
Roscforce uerc
troops other than
to go to Port Dickson, and all
Scmbilao was made respon-
ro SrW mp4 up Dibkson.
the
,3 Ne^
slblc for blowing The wlh-
hours

drawafM'Semllo'frtoff^lTWpr-^^

Jat was badly in need of

some this after
night in which the had not
J,",,. -^he evening meal
being in contact at Batu
,o get it on arrival
been issued as it was hoped to hunerv" But worse was

Sg^a^^ anr 2/>X,e

was
s ly

near Milestone 20. Firing g ,-.i, 5i,cd jungle

and by the
svas heightened Iv the
pU*
^ds of crashing and rushing
yell, of the ""'' rapao's^ disintegrated. Some
threw the "P arrived at
-F ad the Klang river and
parties reached the raiiw y were the com-
honts^jl among g them
Batu Tiga at abuut 0200
manders of both the um . ambush or thereabout and
or armoured ears to "Jf P" ^le bridge .vest of
Batu Tiga
siga. j
bring the men to Batu counter-
had been blown, and Ja"'^^^ die early hours of *c
f?
attack on the Klang Batu Tiga that the 1 5th
' Indian
11th morning, news
am%e
w DW. ais j*'- f"'
246 CAIJPAICNS IN SOimj-ZAir ASIA I 94'l -42 UALAYA

Infantry' Brigadewould withdraw through Kuala Lumpur

Toe
Selangor Battalion withdrew at once from Batu Tiga.
troops
withdrawal of the remainder of the line of Gommumcation
was une%cntful. 3 Negri Scmbilan withdretv from Klang,
wi
after blowing up the bridge at 1930 hours. 2 Selangor
drew from Batu Tiga Sepang through Kg. DingKl and Sa
to avoid the Japanese at hforib. i\nd the rest of 3 Cavalry*
A and B Squadrons) went to Labu.
So ended the stand north of Kuala Lumpur. The
been
Division appointed task and it had not
had fulfilled its
trapped. But the cost had been heav7
The rest of the withdrawal was dull and monotonous. The nt
stage was Tampin-.Alor Gajah-hfalacca, to be reached during mc
11th
lughtof 12/13 January 1942,andafteronc day on thatlinc the
rndian Ksisioii svas to pass through the Wcstforce to Johore area-
troops o
General Percival remarked that by the fourteenth all
the 3rd Indian Corps had passed through the forward t^P*
to
of ^Vestfo^ce and the command of the forward area passed
Gordon BennetL Heath assumed responsibility for south and ea*t
Johore at 8 P.M. on the same day. During the withdrawal
demolitions were carried out on all roads. In pardcular gap*
were blown in all bridges over what might constitute an anti-
tank obstacle, but as usual they did not cem to impose any great
delay on the enemy
On 11 Januaiy 1912, the army was disposed as follows:
The 12th Indian Infantrj- Brigade, with which 5/14 Punjab was
attached, was at Maiuin Pass,'** supported by 352 Field Battery
and 7 Mountain Battery. The I5th Indian Infantry Brigade was
in Labu area supported 22 Mountain Regiment (less 7 Moun-
tain Battery). To the west of this brigade stood the line of
CoTTununication Area brigade cosering the coast road, and 5/18
Royal Garhwal Rifles and the Independent Company held the
line of the Sepang riser. The artillery with the lane of Commuiu*
cation troops consisted of the Federated Malaya States Volunteer
Force Light Battery, 88 Field Regiment fless 352 Field Battcrs'l
and 73 Field Battery (5 Field Regiment). The 28ih Indian In-
fantry Brigade rarnTd to Tampin, and the 45th Indian Infantry
Brigade was in Malacca area svith 7/6 Rajputana Rifles at Mu:u.
The Malay's in Federated Mala)*;! Stales Volunteer Force units

"* Hstcry cT lih I ndian IXvtrat in atalna, VoL {Orinoar. A!o Wavin*
0ipiA, p. 4, para 14.
I II ^ *
nr ISV ia p. ZI3.
AoMbCTTCTiioo ii Setul: W'wIXary. IZtblttSan Islantry Brisadr. 11
J
 tUE STRL'OOLE FOR CENTRAL MALAYA 2J7

were permitted to lay down arms,'** resign and go

they felt home if
thej* should do so in their mnt interest, and many of them took
advantage of this pemmslon. On the east llanJc, the 9th Indian
Division svas moWng back from Benlong to Kuala Bilah con- m
formity with the 11th Indian Dmsions withdrawal so as not to
expose the right flank of this division. Conversely, the withdrawal
of the latter had to be so arranged as to enable Uie former to
withdraw most carefully and through well defined routes.'** The
formation of 'iVcstforcr was notified on tliu dale.
12 January' 1912 was another uneventful day, although
the Japanese had come as far as Kajang with three tanks and twelve
lorries. Tlic day svas howe'er spent in pulling back the units to
the next stage viz. Tampin-Alor Gajah-hfalacca. '* The 12tli
Indian Infantry Brigade alone had to go to Singapore early on
the morning of 13 January from Gemas. The ISiIi Indian Infantry
Brigade was to move to Alor G.-ij3h. with 5/11 Sikh going to Jasin.
Tlie Line of Communication Area troops were to move back to
Malacca area, the 45ih Indian Infantr) Brigade proceeding back
to Muar. The units of Uic 28t]i Indian Infantry Brigade spread
themselvei in the Tampmarea; 2/2 Gurkha Kifles north ofTampin,
2/9 Gurkha Regiment with the carrier platoon of 3/17 Dogra
Regiment atKendong Gate road junction further north of Tamprn,
3/16 Punjab at the level crossing on Kendong Gatc-Alor Gajah
road, and J/J-1 Punjab a few miles west ofTampin on Tampin-
Alor Gajah road. The artillery was distributed conveniently;
23 Mountain Regiment at Tangkak, 38 Field Regiment (less 352
Field Battery) at Tampia, 73 Field Battery (5 Field Regiment)
at Tangkak and Federated Malay States Volunteer Force Light
Battery at Malacca. 88 Field Regiment (less 352 Field Battery)
was allotted for the support of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade.
AH withdrawals were made between the evening and the early
morning of 12 and 13 January respectively, mostly between
the hours of darkness.
General Pcrcival gave some particulars of other aspects of
this great withdrawal to Major-General Paris, the commander
of tlic llth Indian Division. They were: the final position
Segamat-Muar to be held at tlc latest In the evening of 14 January
1912; IS Field Company to go tojehore and come under Corps
control; Line of Commuiucatlon Headquarters and all volunteer
units to get back to Singapore; the Independent Company and 3

* War Diary, GfnwalSwff Branch fHead<juartTi 9th Indian DivUon, 12 Jinuary

1M2.
/W.gjanuary 1942.
The detail! of dUpojillon vry. Tlwc ihM nre given here re aceordingto Major
E. r. D. Hyde.
RE

TO

fauPiN
 TIIE STRUOOLE FOR CENTRAL MALAVA 249

Cavalry to go to Batu Pahat at once wi'tfi Batu Pahat-Pontian

Kcchil area under Corps control; D Company of 2 Malaya Regi-
ment to Koris aerodrome (eight miles south of Batu Pahat) and the
28th Indian Infantry Brigade (less 2/16 Punjab) to Pontian Kcchil;
and the remainder of the 1 llh Indian Division to Rengam-Kluang
area. The Kluang aerodrome was to be guarded by 2/9 Jat which
would come under the command of the 22nd Australian Brigade.
The withdrawal of the 11th Indian Division and its
companion, the 9th Indian Division, continued svithout serious
interference in the next few days so that the III Indian Corps
retired to the Johorc area as defined by General Wavcll.
By the evening of 14 January 1942, it had completed its with-
drawal. The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade moved to harbour in
the Soefin Estate at Chaah near Labis. The 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade went to Kluang area. The Line of Communication
Area troops went to different places: Federated Malay States
Volunteer Force units to Singapore, the armoured car
company and light battery to Pontian Kcchil and 5/18 Royal
Garhwai Rides to Muar. The artillery distributed itselfas follows:
88 Field Regiment (less 352 Field Battery) to Segamat area,
352 Field Battery to Buloh Rasap area, 22 Mountain Regiment to
Kluang area, 155 Field Regiment also to Kluang area and 73
Field Battery (5 Field Regiment) to Segamat area. Those which
remained in Segamat area came under Westforce which was
then formed.
General Wavell came to Segamat to meet Lieutenant-General
Heath and Major-General Gordon Bennett on 13 January. He
noticed that his plan of withdrawal and renewed defence was being
put into execution but that the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions had
suffered further Josses in fighting north of Kuala Lumpur and
Uic enemys advance had been more rapid than I had hoped.*
At the same time be was hopeful that the Australians would
stabilise the situation and smash the Japanese attacks, although
he considered and cabled to the Chiefs of Staff that the battle
for Singapore would be a close run thing."*
But his plan for the defence of Johore was othersvisc ready,
and the units had been deployed accordingly: 2/30 Australian
Battalion ahead of Gemas (w/th one company some four miles
ahead at a bridge over the Gcmcncheh river) to ambush the
Japanese; a brigade of the 9lh Indian Division with 2/26 Australian
Battalion a little in advance and guarding the flanks between Batu
Anam and Gemas; the other brf^de of the 9th Indian Division
8 tVavellj Dapati/:, p. 4, par* M.
id'en.
250 CAJIPAIOSS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 191M2 MAt-ATA

to guard Scgamat-Muar road near Jcmcntah; and the 45th Indian

Infantry Brigade to prctxnt the Japanese from crossing the river
at Muar, v.ith outposts across the ris*er.
On 14 January 1912, Major-Ocneral Paris the commander
of the llth Indian Dis-ision was replaced by Major-General
Key, because, as General Percival said, " at this stage Heath
represented to me that an Indian Army OfTiccr was required to
pull together and re-establUh confidence in what remained of
the llth Indian Division.** Major-General Paris rejoined the
12th Indian Infantry Brigade at Singapore, and Brigadier laiy
was leading the 8ih Indian Infantry Brigade.
On 15 January 1912, Major-General Kc> took over the
command of the llth Indian Division, while Colonel Challcn-
took charge of the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade and Brigadier
Moorhead resumed command of 3/16 Punjab, The newdKisIonal
commander held a conference of commanding officers at Kahang
and decided on rest and close order drill followed by intciinve
2i9 Jat relieved the Auslralbo
training for a period of eles-cn days.
Imperial Force company at Kahang in the afternoon of this day,'*'
and 5/14 Punjab and I Bahawalpur Slate Infantry "ere allotted
to Kluangfor aerodrome duty. The I5th Indian Infantry Brigade
was warned that it should be ready for operations at Kluangi
A>er Hitam or Yong Peng.
The war in central htalaya was over by 15 January. The
formations of the III Indian Corps were then disposed as undcrt
Headquarters III Indian Corps .. .. Johore Bahru
Headquarten llth Indian Division . . Kengam
6/15 Indian Infantry Brigade and llth
Divisional Artillery . , . . Kluang
28th Indian Infantry Brigade . . Pondan Kcchil
3 Cavalry, Independent Company and one
Company Malay Regiments . . . . Batu Pahat
\VWlc this chapter was closing, rcinforcemenu arrived at
Singapore. On 13 January 1942, 53rd Infantry Brigade Group
arrived at the Naval Base, and the 35th Ught and the 6th Hcav>
Anti-Aircraft Regimentsat KeppcI Harbour,** and fifty Hurricane
fighters with their crew also reached at the same time. It is
said that on arrival the tiot^ were healthy but soft.' Their
equipment was not old and familiar. They had no guns or
transport. Above all they were ignorant of Jungle warfare in

nfiTlMWabt Malayc, pp. 213414.

tVr Diary, 219 Jat, IS Juniarf 1942.
War IXi7, Htadquziter, Malaya Conmand, 13 January 1942.
'SS Fettival* Dtipaidt para 332.
 THE STRUCOLE FOR CElTTRAL lUlAYA 251

the Malayan style. On 14 and 15 January 1942, the detachment

of Dutch Marcchaussees reached Singapore by air from the Nether-
lands East Indies. Its strength was eighty all told with European
officers, trained for jungle and guerilla warfare, and it was station-
ed in Labis area. With these new reinforcements and with rest
for the tired veterans of the Hth Indian Division, the prospects
for the next round in Malaya appeared distinctly belter.
 Chapter ix

The Stand in South Malaya

THE OEXERAl- STTUATIOS

The region l>Tng bet^vcen Singapore and the line Kempa^

Tampin-Gemas-Endau was known as South Malaya. It connstcd
Malacca
of Malacca, the state of Johore, and Singapore Island. _

and Singapore wre directly administered by the British, while

Johore, the largest of the three, was under its osm Sultan.
The terrain in this area was generally flat, Vr-ith the inevitable
jungle and rubber plantations intervening ^tween fields and
swamps. The rhen, particularly the Muar, %*cre long and wind-
ing and were navigable for small boats for many ntiles from their
mouths. There were no big towns and only four nunor seaports,
namely, Bandar Maharani (Muar) and Batu Pabat (Bandar
Penggaram) on the west coast, and Eodau and Mersing on the ext
coast. Strategically, the most important line of commumcation
War the road and railway ninniog southwards from Genurt to
Kluang and on to Singapore. The importance of this route was
enhanced by there being no bridge on the Muar river near Bytd^
Maharaiu^e feny that crossed the wide Muar at that place
sed considerable delays even on normal peace-time traffic. The
subadiary' road from Tampin to Bandar Maharani and Batu
joined the main road at Ayer Hltam, which was the hob of road
communications in the area. From Ayer Hitam a road went
north to Segamat and Gemas; another went east to Kluang on the
railway and onwards to Mersing and Eedau on the coast; and a
third road joined Ayer Hitam to Johore Bahru on the mainland
opposite Singapore Island, apart from the road, mentioned already,
linidng Ayxr Hitam with Batu PahaU Of rail tracks there w^
only one in the region gmng from Gemas to Johore Bahru via
Segamat, Labis and Kluang. Apart from these strategically
important lines of commumcation, there were two positions of
considerable defensive strength- One was knoss-n as the Defile
and lay on the road Yong Peng to Parii Sulong. For its first six
miles the road ran through a belt of rubber trees flanked by a
manh; it then crosed a quarter-mi'ic causeway, and continued

along an cmbanloncnt dead straight for 1 J miles before climbing

a forested slope to a small pass. On either side of the pass rose two
sleep hills, and both osTrlooked the straight stretch of road.
Beyond this Defile, the road was flanked by jungle and ridges and
 niE STANt) CJ SOUTH MAU^YA 253

roic slcadjlj, /maJIy over Pt. Payong Saddle,

three miles to (he
north-west. The second strong defensive position was Uie road
running from Endau to htcning. Thb stretch was flanked on
either side swamp that was considered impassable.
fay
The geographical features described abos-e were s-erj' advan-
tageous to the Malaya Command whose object was to impose the
maximum delay on the Japanese in order to give time to the
reinforcements which were coming to reach Singapore. On 24
January 1942, General Wavcil reported to the Combined Chieis
of Staff that his intention was to hold a line in Johore as long as
possible. If the reinforcements due mSingapore in the next two
days arrived safely, the situation should be impros'cd.' The Allied
troops in the forward areas had strict orders not to withdraw
without clear permission from the High Command. According
to Air Vice-Marshal Sir Paul Maltby, the directive to the air
forces in Malaya in this period of the war laid down that protec-
tion of convoys at present takes precedence over action against
other Japanese forces. If, however, nesv expeditions arc located
threatening the cast coast of Malaya or endeavouring to pass
south of Singapore, all available air effort should be directed to
destroying such targets The directive also stressed the impor-
tance of slowing up the Japanese advance on land by attacking
Singora, intervening In the land battle and of reducing the
scale of Japanese air attack On the other hand, the Japanese
ivere intent on capturing Singapore on the earliest date possible.
The moral effect of an early fall of this so-called impregnable
fortress upon both their owm people and their enemies was one
important point, as was also the desire of the Navy to secure
possession of the naval base thus obtaining free passage of their
sWps through the Straits of Singapore....MorccFver, the troops
engaged in the siege of Singapore were badly needed for the cam-
paign against the Netherlands East Indies which was now well
under way, and for the campaign in the Philippines which was
not progressing according to plan To achicv'c their objective
the Japanese stepped up even further the strength and tenacity
of their attacks. Exceptionally courageous by nature well trained
and flushed with a series of brilliant successes, the Japanese troops
huikd thtinstlvM in ztUcks aTter attacks irrespective of thjrir
own casualties or of the strength of their enemy. In the final
stages of the war in Malaya, the deeds of heroism were many,
particularly at Sakri and Mengkibot. At Bakri, a Japanese tank
company was said to have refused all offers of help and gone
25V CAitPAXGNS LN SOtmi-EASr ASIA 19-VM2 malaVa

forth into battle sajing, go b)' oursch'cs*. At

No. We will
Mcngkibol a Japanese unit commander ashed his men to give
me your livTs. From now, we are all going to die to the last
man in the line of duty He was as good as his word, and the
whole unit sacrificed itself in fanatical attacks soon after,
Japanese also recch*ed reinforcements regularly and three divisions
were reported advancing along the front from hluar eastwards.
Their engineers and armoured units had already distingiAhed
themselves in the fighting in north and central Malaya, and in the
south the Japanese bic>cle units proved themselves equally for*
midable. On one occiuion in particular these troops made their
way through waist-high swamps under constant fire, holdmg
aloft their bicycles. The Japanese also had the advantage of
excellent information from the large numbers of their compatriots
working in the plantations and towns in the area before the war
and from a fairly active fifth column.
The Japanese plan was to attack the Muar-Gemas-Endau

line with approximately three divisions. The 55tk Infantiy

vieid (with two battalions only) was to advance from Kuantan
to Endau and Merstng on the east coast. In the centre was the
5lk Diziam, strengthened by the 2Ut Infantiy Rt^ment, with orders
to advance down the Gemas-Labis road. The Imperial
Dinsieyi was placed at Malacca on the vsxst eoast, and was givcB
the task of capturing Muar and advancing against Yong Feng
and Batu Pahat.

thsTOsmoNs or the iwrs

By midday on 14 January 1942, dispositions of the Mala)'a

Command were complete on the Muar-Ocmas line. The force
was organisedin three groups, the Westforce, Eastforcc and the 1 1th
Indian Division. These were Ibrmed as follows:

Ufsl/erce

(
1) Thc27thAustralianIinpcriaIForccBrigade. 2/30BatU-
lion astride the main road at Milestone 62 (three
miles west of Ocmas) with one company four miles
further forward at the S. Gcmencheh to ambush the
Japanese. 2/26 Battalion (less one company) in the
Faya Lang Estate about four miles east of Gemas,
one company covering the road and railway bridges
over the Gemas.

S Ennof {nibCcatino No. Z78, pp. 133 anl IS.

 tlJE STAXD LH SOtrro itALAYA 255

2/29 Battalion was intended to hold the Fort Rose

Estate area south of the main road and about four
miles cast of Gemas, but actually it remained at Bufoh
Kasep in reserve.
(2) The 9th Indian Division.
(a) The Bth Indian Infantry Brigade. 1/13 Frontier
Force Rifles covered the road and the railway at
Milestone 128 west ofBatu Anam, tsiih one company
patrolling Batu Anam-Jementah road.
3/17 Dogra Regiment guarded the road and railway
at the bridgeson the S. Muar near Buloh Kasap.
(b) The 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade. 2/18 Royal
Garhwal cox-ered the Segamat-Jementah
Rifles
road about ten miles forward ofSegamat. 5/11 Sikh
stood at the junction of Batu Anam-Jementah-
Segamat roads.
2/12 Frontier Force Regiment guarded the bridge
across the S. Muar about 6 miles from Segamat.
(c) The 45ih Indian Infantry Brigade. 4/9 Jat covered
'

the line of the S, Muar from Lcnga to Jorah village

with rivo companies (A and C) on the northern
side of the river on patrol.
7/6 Rajputana Rifles svere responsible for the line
of the S. Muar from Jorak rillagc to the coast at
Muar. This battalion also had two companies
(B and D) to patrol the northern parts of the river,
B for the area north ofTanjong Olak and D for
the Kesang area.
5/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles acted as reserve on the
Parit Jawa-Bakri road, with one company watch-
ing the coast between Muar and Batu Pabat

The \Uh Indian Division.

(a) The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade. This comprised
2/9 Gurkha Rifles, the amalgamated 2/2 and 2/1
Gurkha Rifles and the remnants of 1/14 Punjab
Regiment besides Federated Malaya States Volun-
teer Force Armoured Car Company and Federated
Malaya States Volunteer Force light Battery. It
was responsible for Pontian Kcchil area as far
as Benut up the west coast.
(b) The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade. This consisted
of I I.cicester/2 East Surrey, combined 3/16 and
2/16 Punjab, and combined 2/9 Jat and 1/8 Punjab.
256 CA>1PAI0M IS KfOTJI-C-OT ASIA 191M2 MAt^YA
ready to
It remained in Kluang as reserve but
operate in Batu Pahat, if nccenary.
At JJatu
Pahat there were 3 Cavalo', a company
ot -

one detachment ot me
Malaya Regiment and
Independent Company. -
Bahaw
(C) Aerodrome defence troops. At Kluang,
ot
pur Slate Infantry'. At Koris a detachment
Johore Military* Force. . .

(d) 1 1 ih Indian Dividon Ucadquarten

and admimstra-
tion trtwps in Uie Rengam Area.

" In the r.ndau area. One company each

of 2/19
(a)
souibem
and 2/20 Batuliom, the latter on the
the former
side of the mouth of die S. Kndau and
partly on the coast up to the S. Pontsan

of bozv
in F.ndau itself. There were a number
for mo\emenl on the rher and two
gun-boa
Endau.
(b) In the Mcfsins awa. 2/18 Battabon,
area},
Battalion (l o*'* company in Endan
and 2/10 Ticld Regiment (less one batiery}.
(e) In the Jemuluang area. 2/19 Battalion (lew
company} and one battery of 2/10 Field Regira*
(Ico
(d) In the Mawai area. 2/17 Dogra Regiment
one company) to guard the boom at the mouth
*>

company to
the S. ^dlU and the detached one
Dohol ano
patrol the cast coast road between
Jesnaluang. .
o
(e)At the Kahang aerodrome. One detachment
Johore Milttary Forces.
The headquarters of III Indian Corps was Johore Bahru.
The air situation was rather depressing. On the afternoon
*tate
of 18 January I9J2, when an appreciation was made, the
of serviceability of the Air Force in Malaya showed 74 bomber
and
general reconnaissance aircraft and 28 fighters, all based on Singa-
pore witn the exception of a small detachment at Kahang-
Morccnxr, many of these aircraft were obsolete or obsole^nt.
Against these it was esdmated that the Japanese were maintaining
in Malaya at this time a force of 150 fighters and 250 bombers.
tn
If the situation had to be saved the Royal Air Force needed,

* Sa P*ul ilaltbri Dntctci p. 1S77, rarm 303. Aeecufmg to Royal Air forte
^u g were 27 C^ten ana SS toiobtn ami ground acack plaaci, a total el
 lur, rtANU IN lowit MvLava 257

addiunn (o the rxlstins aircraft, four Ion? ranirc bomber Hju.ifJroni

and four Jon;; ran^e fishier aquadrom, cacli aquadmn \^^th 12
aircraft, initial equipment,*
At fcpjnit rc.fpmvrr, General Percival femarlcd aea-
povrer, lupportcd ly air power, liad Ixcnme. .one of the
dominatinj; factor! in tlic lituatlnnonly thit time it tvaa Uic enemy
and not we who held the tnunp cardi
A word it neceasar) alwut die rcinforcemcntt. In Uesf-
force, the onlynew elemrntt weic the Amtralian unlu and the 45lh
Indian Infantr)* Unmade. Of the former General Gordon Bennett
laid that Uiey intned *fi>rward into battle, happy and confident,
givin?; the " ihumUj-iip * jj^n t> any of their comradci dscy
patted on tlic n)3d",*and of the latter. General Percl\al liat remark-
ed Uat they "were \Tr) j'oun;;, unteatoned and under-trained*
ufdit for leriice mmeai Of the Britith aoldicrs included in the
53nl Infantr)' Brigade, the opinion wat dial the)' looked like
iquarepef;i in rtnmd hole*, and time wat... .required for the troops
to become acclimatiied /Ml the troops, contained In the Oih
and 1 Ith Indian Diridom, wrre tldn, weary and wurnOut- TIrere
were but Uirce thousand in the latter dnosion widt Nxry dcfccUsx
and deficient weapons, and the 0th Indian Dit^ion was perhaps
just lixty per cent of its total strength. On djc odier hand, the
Japanese forces were WTlbtrained, fresh and enthused widi success.
Tljey h.nd numerical superiority and new tanks; equipment was
adequate; and air co-operation was ready and full. They Iiad
captured a Jot of British .inns and material already) which they
were using to the greatest ads'antage.

TTfK SttTAR SECTOR

The Japanese Altaek

As already mentioned, Muar had been giwn as its objectisx
in the Imperiai Coords Dieisicn. Its comm.indcr. General Nishi-
mura, began his drhx southwards from Malacc.i with two regi-
ments. The 5lh Guards Regiment was on the left, widi orden to
cross the hfuar risrr srcJl to die east of Miwr, and dicn wheel right
and advance towaitls Bakri and Yong Peng, Urns outflanking the
garrison of Mu-ar. The 4lh Guards Regiment advanced directly
on hfuar, to pin down iu dclcnder* and give them no chance
to withdraw before tliclr line of communication was cut behind

t^ABDACOM", 31.
fit, p.
^Tht SVar in p. Z20.
1 Why Singitf^ till, p. 37,
-Iht War Vi Mahpa. p. 207
4/SrV, p. 217.
258 CAJfPAICNS Vi SOVTll-ZASr ASIA l9U-i2 UAIAVA

them by 5tk Gttards After capturing Muar and an^i*

laUng the 45tb Indian Infantry Brigade there, 5lh Guards Re^mrA
^as to advance on Yong Peng, while -f/Jl Guards Regim/nt continued
its advance down the coastal road and attached Batu Pahat.
General N'lshlmura was so confident of the success of these ino\Ci
that he sent a solitary battalion {Ijdlh Guards Battalion) b>' sea
to land far the coast, to the south of Batu Pahat, so that
down
Batu Pahat might be cut off from Poniian Kcchtl.
also
In accordance with tlicsc plans, the Japanese attach began
ort 15 Januarv-, although their bombers been raiding Muar
h^
regularly for the past many daj's. Troops of 4tk Guards Regimstit
evaded and cut o/T the two companies of 7/6 Rajputana Rifles
patrolling the north banh of the Muar river. Tlicy reached the
ferry opposite Muar toisTi, and opened medium machine-gun
fire on the town across the river- TTic^ also succeeded in quickly
obtaining a toe-hold on the south banh between the Advanced
Headquarters and Rear Headquarters ofdic^Sih Indian In&ntry
Brigade. Another attempt to cross the river at its mouth
detected in lime, and artillery fire was opened against the boau
'
sheltering in the lee of an island Under the direction of
Major-General Bennett, Brigadier Duncan {45th Brigade) bad
spread out 7/6 Rajputana Rifles to guard some nine miles of the
river front from the sea to Jorak; but some of its platoons v>erebas*
diy collected to counter-auaeh the Japanese near the ferry. The
situadon before Muar town appeared well in band on 15Jaauar>.
But, in the meanwhile, Sth Guards RegimsrA had quietly cross-
ed osTr the Muar river further east near S. Mad. Guarding
that scctorwas 4/9 Jat, whidi also had been spread out on a front
of about 15 miles. The Japanese, therefore, only encountered
some weak patrols of the Jals, whidi were brushed aside. They
marched rapidly south and, on 16 January, captured Simpang
jeram and cut the road between hluar and Bahri. The road
between Bahri and Pant Jawa was also cut by cyclist and lorry-
borne troops. On the same day, Japanese troops landed from boats
far to the south, between Batu Pahat and Senggarang.

The MIlAdrazcct from Muar

In the confused fighting that resulted from these moscs,
all the three battalions of the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade suffered
heasy losses. The first to suffer loss was 5/18 Royal Garhwal
Bifles. The commanding offeerwent at 0630 houn on 16 January
to the Advanced Brigade Headquarters at Muar, and while he

Draft of the OSida] BriiiUj IliUivr, VoL I, Pan II, p. 452,

2G0 CAMPAIGXJ IN SOtni-EAST ASIA 19H-42 liAlAVA

was rttuming from that place to his ads'anced battalion head-

quarters at Simpang Jeram road junction, he ran into a Japanese
po*5tion and was killed at 1015 hours. By 1245 hours, 5/18
Royal Garhwal Rif.ei luiTcted many casualties due to lack of
cover and heavy sniping at Simpang jeratn. A counter-attack at
1300 hours failed, and the battalion withdrew. The second
force to suffer similarly was 7/6 Rajputana Rifles. At about
OSOO hours, A company was sent to reinforce C company on
the light, the water-front and the coast line being left to be guard-
ed b>' miscellaneous headquarter details, supported b>' A Cwn-
pany of 3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles. .-Xt about 1200 hours, five
Japanese motor barges anempted to enter it from the mouth of
the river. Each barge could hold 150 men. But they were driven
off by a 25-pQundcr gun belonging to a troop of 65 Field Batter^*
It was reported at 1330 hours that a small party of the Japanese
with macluae-guns had been located In the rubber plantaoon
near Dutapar Tringgi School, and one or two battalion camci*
had been ambushed about 200 yards touth of iu The coininantl*
i!^ officer entered this position with thirty men but was shot dead
along Vfiih many others. At 1745 bosirs it was reported that A com-
pany was practically dedmated. At 2000 hours, the Brigade Head-
quarters ordered the withdrawal of the battalion Muar
to Bakri by the inner one of the two coast roads via Paril Jawa.
The third unit, 4/9Jattn the upper and eastern regions of the Mime
river also suffered heavily. At 1800 hours a fighting patrol of
D Company attacked the Japanese positiom at Milestone 3, but
was repulsed with a loss of 27 men killed or wounded-
By the evening of 16 January, therefore, the 45th Indian
Infantry Brigade had suffered grievoas losses and the Miot
sector was beginmng to collapse. Such a collapse vs'ould have
thrown open to the Japanese the vital road to Yong Peng and thus
endangered the line of conimunicatios of Westforce then fighting
near Gemas. The Japanese lanthng south of Batu Pahat was a
further danger, tince it threatened both Yong Peng and Ayer
Hitam. Major-General Bennett, thereToTr, held urgent consuh
tations with Major-General Bantow and Brigadier Maxwell, and,
later in the evening of 16 January, dedded to reinforce the Bakri
and Batu Fahat areas. 2/29 .Australian Imperial Force Battalion
(less one cotnpanvl was sent to reinforce the 43th Indian
infantry Brigade, v.hich shows that the Japanese strength at hlnar
was still under-estimated. Xew airangemenls were made by
General Pereival for the defence of Batu Pahat. ffhe order said,
Batu Fahat will come under command 11 Tr-fttan Division forth-
with. 6 Norfolk and Battery 135 Field Regiment join dhineu
today and remainder of 53 Brigade totnomrw. Commander
 inr. STANU L\ SOUTH \LAYA 261

53 I)r5s;jflc nrpoftj Ay-er IJilam 0930 Ijour*. One jOaifalion IJ

IiKlUn Di\-i<m will be |ifcpafd to rcl^c^x 2/19 Battalion at
JentaUian:;".'' At tlie same liinc, the 15ih Indian Infantry Brigade
was Sited tn place the Briiidi Battalion, a battery of 155 Held
I^epimcnt, a troop of 2 Anti-Tank Battery and one section of 3
yield Company at one hour** notice to mm-c to A)er Ifitam,
where they were to report at 0930 houn. 3/lC Punjab was ordered
to reconnoitre Jemaluang.
In accordance sviih thcsc dccbiom, 2/29 Australian Imperial
Force left Bakri on 1 7 January in the morning, 7/C Rajputana Rifles
was located between Barit Jawa and Bukit 5fuar, and mwitered
only two companies of about 90 riflci each. 4/9 Jat remained at
its camp near Milestone 10, on Craigielca nstatc; but, due to the

telephone lines being cut, its location was not known to Brigade
Headquarferi. T^ie third battalion of the 45tJi Indian Infantiy
Brigade, 5/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles, was near Bakri and was
stronger than these two, having suffered less casualties thepres-ious
(lay. So, when a plan was adopted for a countcr*aitack on Muar,
the Garhwalis were Riven a prominent role. Tlie plan was for 2/29
Australian Imperial Force to advance from Bairi and 4/18 Royal
Garhwal Riflej from Barit Jass*a, to converge on Muar. The
atlv.ince was to begin at 0200 hours on ID Januar> in order to pvc
time to the Australians to reach Bakri and to enable 5/18 Royal
Garhwal Rifles to move out from Bakri to dieirtmrcmg point at
P.irit Jawa.
But the rapidity of Japanese advance foiled this counter-
attack before it began. Tlic 2/29 Australian Imperial Force
reached B.tkn' at 2000 hours on 17 January, and was attacked by
the Japanese l/nmcdiately nftenvards. TIjc Australians threw
back llic attack, and svilh the help of their anli-lank guns and
armoured can, pushed on to within a few miles of Muar town.
But further progress was found impossible. The 5/18 Royal
Garlisval Rifles left B.skri For Farit Javra about 1800 hours, in two
columns, one on lorries and the other on foot. The lorried columns,
reached near Barit Jawa at 1930. As the men started getting
down from their lorries, fire was opened on Uicm suddenly from
both sides of die road. I.Ight machine-guns, medium maclnc-
giins and mortars opened up on them from close range, andinflicl-
cd heavy casualties before the Garhwalis could disperse and take
cover in the bushes flanking the road. Sounds of heavy firing
towards Bakri showed th.it the marching column also had Iven

> Iluwy of M* Indian pijjdoo in Mntajn^ Vot. It, (Orijinslh ehp. XVIII,
p. 337.
262 CMJPAIONS IN SOOnt-EAST ASIA I9il-i2 SIALAYA

ambushed by the Japanese- The GarhwaJjs, therefore, were a^

tacted and dispersed wih heavy losses before they even reached
the starting point for their attad: on hfuar-

^{uar Force Cul-oJJ'

After the failure cf this projected counter-attack on Muar,
no important developments took place in the sector for some tunc.
Major-General Gordon Bennett sent another Australian battalion
to refnibree the Muar sector. This battalion, 2/19 Australian
Imperial Force, moved up from jemaluang and reached Bakn
about 1000 hours on 18 January. The tired and badly battered
units of tire 45th Indian Infantry Brigade rested that day. The
troops of 5/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles and 7/6 Rajputana Rifles u'cre
holding a position about 2 miles from Bakri on the Parit Jawa
road. The 4/9 Jat was still out of touch trith Brigade Head-
quarters, but was reported to be about 7 miles north of Batn
and withdravdng slowly. Headquarters 45th Indian Infantry
Brigade, with four armoured can, was situated near Milestone
99, Of the Australians, the newly arrittd 2/19 Australian Im*
perial Force was sent forward from Bakri towards Muar to keep
the road clear of the Japanese and maintain contact trith 2/29
Australian Imperial Force further down the road. The Japanese
on 18 January confined themselves largely to an eflbrt to cut off the
road behind 2/29 Australian ImperialForcebutwere frustratedby
the active patrolling of 2/19 Australian Imperial Forte.
The next day, 19 January, the Japanese renewed their
attacks in force. The first attack began about 0800 hours that
morning, and, under cover of heavy artillery and mortar fire, the
Japanese tried to establish themselves on the Bakri-Muar road
behind 2/29 Australian Imperial Force. This attack svas beaten
back, and the attackers retired, leaving behind many casualties and
some light machine-guns. But heavy shelling continued, and
at 1000 hours an unlucky hit destroyed the Brigade Head-
quarters with most of its staff. The Brigade Commander suflered
setcre shell-shock, and so his Brigade Major temporarily took over
the command"*. Attacking from the south-west the Japanese then
captured the positions held by the Rajputs and Garhwalis south
of Bakri, but were thrown back again by a spirited counter-attack.
Soon after this, about half of the 4/9 Jat battalion arrived at Bakri,
and reported that the remainder was following behind them.
But the remainder never arrived. Thejapanese soon succeeded
in finally cutting the Babi-Muar road, thus cutting off the
 THE STAND LV SOimi M^UAVA 2G3

rttrcator2/29 Atniralian Imperial Force and the companies of 4/9

Jat whom it Iiad been \*a!nly tryinij to sas-c. Ultimately, only a
few hundred men of 2/29 Australian Imperial Force and a few
dozen of 1/9 Jat succeeded in rejoining their units after ev'ading the
Japanese.
During die evening of 19 January', orden arrived for the
45lh Indian Infantry Brigade to withdraw from Bakri to Yong
Peng. TTic exhausted remnants of the brigade svcrc obn'ously
unable to hold the Japanese attacks much longer. Moreover, the
Japanese landed near Batu Pahat had consolidated their hold,
as described later, and were threatening to cutoff the 45th Indian
Infantry' Brigade from ^'ong Peng. So there svas nooption before
the Malaya Command but to order the force to fall back from
Bakri to Yong Peng.

End of Muar Force

But it was already too late. The Muar force began its
retreat early in the morning of 20 January. It was a column
over a mile long, with the Australians as advance guard and re.-^r-
guard, the Indians on both the Banks .ind the guns, armoured
cars and ambulances on the road in the middle. At 0800 houn,
a road'bloek was encountered, made up of felled trees and covered
by medium machine-gun fire. UTtile men svere being moved up
to assault and clear the road-block, the rear of the column was
also heavily attacked. The Japanese rained bullets, mortar bombs
and artillery* shells on the packed column, which fought back
gallantly. Fighting u-at fierce, and Brigadier Duncan was
killed while personally leading a counter-attack to the rear witli
troops of 4/9 Jat and some other units. But the Japanese were
repulsed and the road block was also cleared by a desperate
counter-attack. D.-rkncss li.id fallen by then, but the exhausted
column pushed on and reached Milestone 91 about 2230 hours.
After a brief halt, the column, began iu retreat again and neared
Parit Sulong in the grey dasvn of 21 January.
Pant Sulong had also been occupied by the Japanese. The
advance guard of the column forced its way into the outskirts of
the village although the Japanese kept firing steadily into it and the
casualties were mounting. The tired and dispirited troops soon
grew panicky and could be controlled with difneuity. At 0830
hours (on 21 January) a strong Japanese attack from the rear
overran some of the anti-tank guns, but was then halted again.
They, however, kept up their incessant attacks throughout the
day, and Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the column
frequently. In spite of it all, a sdgorous counter-attack was launched
264 cA3fp.uc.vj rv soimt-tAsr aslk 1941-42 malaya

to forcea M-ay to the river. Sorae troop? managed to reach the

m-cr bank, but the opposite there ?\-a? also firmly held hy the
Japanese.
*1116 situation was now desperate. The battered and worn-
out column was eomplciely surrounded by the Japanese and could
neither advance nor retreat. Sniped, mortared, shelled and bomb-
ed from the air, the troops could only endure the pounding and
fight on as long as possible- Their spirits revived when a message
was recehed saving that a relieving fora: was on its way, hot no
one came. \Mscn darkness fell, the remnants formed a perimeter
and fought cfT more attacks by Japanese tanlo.'* But, fa)' the
morning of 22 January, the Nfuar force was almost disintegrating.
Although some supplies and medicioes were dropped to it by the
Ro)'al Air Foroe that morning, its situation was obviously hopeless,
^lost of its officer? were laUed and the survisor? could hardly
remain on their feet after to many days and nights of incessant
fighting. It was cruel to Icavx behind the woimded, but there s-as
no altemath'e. At 0900 houj?oD 22 Januar)-, Lieutcnant-Coloiscl
AedeROR, the commander of the force, called his gallant tato to
pull out b)' companies try to reach Yeng Peng as best they
could across eountiy. The carrier? and the guns were destrO)'ed.
and the ssounded left behind. Sapprisingly enough, most of the
troop? managed to slip through the Japanese posidom, and bj' the
evening of 23 January, some 530 Australians and 400 Indians out
of the total of 4000 in the Muar force, had rejoined their units at
Yoi^ Pei^. Thus ended the sad but berote story of the force
defending Muar.

TOE ].VP ANISE CAPTCmE THE DETELE

clear frejm the above account that the Muar force was
It is

destxoj-edprimarily because of the Japanese capture of Pant

Salong and the vital Defile section of the road from Muar to Yong
Peng. If its line of retreat had not been thus blocked, the 45ch
Indian Infantry Brigade would have safely withdrawn to Yoeg
Peng. TheoperatkmsleadingtotheJapancsecapiureoftheDefilc
may cow be described-
From later infonnation, it seems clear that the Japanese
who atUcked Bain on 18 and 19 Jaaoar)- belonged to the
CuSris Rfpsiei:!.^ The 4th Guards ftegtsien! meanwhile had occup.cd
Parit Jaw-a and pushed on down die coast road. It crossed the
Batu Pahat river north of the town and, tunung left, cut the stretch
of toad between Buiit Pelandok and Pan't Sulong. Thev were the
 Tlffi STAND IN SOOnr MALAYA 265

troops of tlic 4lh Guards Regiment, who blocked the retreat of the 45th
Indian Infantry Brigade at Parit Sulong and ensuredits destruction.
General Percival was, of course not asvare of these details,
but on IBJanuary he learnt that the Muar sector was being attack-
ed by a fresh and formidable Imperial Guards Division. That fact,
and the deteriorating situation, convinced him of the grave danger
to the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade. Therefore, at 2145 hours
on 18 January he ordered the Muar sector to be transferred from
thecommand of General Bennett to General Heath, the commander
oflll Indian Corps, so that the former could be relieved of res-
ponsibility for those distant and critical operations. The next
day, orders svere issued to the 15lh Indian Infantry Brigade to rein-
force the British Battalion near Batu Pahat, and to 3/16 Punjab
to reinforce 6 Norfolk of the 53rd (British) Brigade at Bukic Pelan-
dok on the road bettveen fiakri and Ybng Peng. No Japanese
troops were till then in evidence in this area. But it svas vitally
necessary to ensure the safety of this road, which svas the only
escape route for the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade which, as already
mentioned, was ordered at the same time (19 January) to begin
withdrawal along this road from Bakri to Yong Peng.
But the Japanese struck even while these orders svere being
issued. At 1330 hours on 19 January, the company of 6 Nor-
folk holding Bukit Pelandok was suddenly attacked and thrown
out from its positions. The Japanese quickly established them-
selves on the slopes of Bukit Baloh also, thus finnly holding the
DeiUe. In the afternoon, 2 Loyab came up and tried to recapture
Bukit Baloh, but the attack failed. Brigadier Duke of the 53rd
(British) Brigade planned another attack for the morning of 20
January, and ordered 3/16 Punjab to capture Bukit Baloh and
6 Norfolk to reoccupy Bukit Pelandok. The Punjabis attacked
first, but, in the gloom before dawn, ran into a party of 6 Norfolk

who, unknown to them, were still on the top of the hill. Mbtaking
each other for the Japanese, 3/16 Punjab and 6 Norfolk exchanged
murderous fire, and the Japanese, who appear to have been hiding
nearby, attacked both before the confusion was over. Consequently
the attack failed with heavy losses. 6 Norfolk ako failed to reach
Bukit Pelandok, and the vital Defile remained in Japanese hands.
In the afternoon of 20 January, Major-General Key (the
llth Indian Division) ordered Brigadier Duke (53rd Brigade)
to make another efiort to recapture the Defile, but the latter pointed
out that * its occupation was beyond the power of the troops at his
disposal and would not help the withdrawal of the 45th Indian
Infantry Brigade.' The General thereupon ordered the 53rd
Brigade to attack at dawn next day, and reoccupy the two hills
266 cAStPAiONS IN sotmi-EAir aa I9M-42 malaya

BL Baloli and Bt. Pclandok, but Brigadier Duke again showed,

by an analysis of ihc force on hand, that it was in no strength to
carry out this task. Consequently, the whole plan was deferred.
Partly as a result of this inaction and partly due to isolation and
lack of food, the two platoons of 6 Norfolk detached for duty
at Parit Sulong withdrew from that place and reached Batu Pahat
On the following day.
Some more plam were made for recapturing the Defile
and extricating the 45ih Indian Infantry Brigade. General Kc^
ordered the 53rd Brigade to attack the Defile positions at NOO
hours on 21 January, with the Loyals as the spearhead. But the
order was wrongly transmitted, which made it impossible to amount
the attack at the stipulated time. At 1200 hours on 21 January',
the 53rd Brigade and the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade were again
placed under the command of Westlbrce, leading to some more
uncertainty about the projected attack- The Loyals could not he
concentrated quickly for the attack, so it had to be postponed by
a few hours; then the artillery failed to register accurately, o h
had to be postponed once more. Finally, on the morning of 22
January, the Japanese planes bombed and strafed the troops
deploying for the attack and scattered them. The plan ofrecaptu^
ing the Defile u'at then gis-en up completely, and the 45ih
Indian Infantry Brigade was left to extricate iise^ as best it could,
Nviih the result already described.

W'mrDRAWAL PORSI SECAM-ST

fujt Centeel
tSTiile the 45lh Indian Infantry Brigade and the 53rd
(British) Brigade were fighting hard on the Bakri-Yong Peng road,
the Japanese were not inacth-e in the other sccton. On the main
road from Gemas to Yong Peng, the Japanese 5lh Dicisien opened
itsattack on 14 January. It made an inauspicious start that after-
noon when a ssbole Japanese battalion on c>-clcs was ambushed
about 7 nules west of Gemas and lost about 450 men tilled.
After the ambush, iowestr, the company of 2/30 Australian
Imperial Torce withdrew to the main positions covering Gemas,
lca\4ng behind a damaged bridge to delay the Japanese ad\-ance.
By the next day, 15 January, the Japanese had repaired the bridge
and attacked Gemas with the support of some tanks. In the day-
long fighting, 2/30 Australian Imperial Force again inflicted
considerable caiualdcs on the Japanese and destnj>-ed six tanks,
but wdthdrew behind Gemas in the evening. On 15 January, the
Royal Air Force also attacked the Japanese lorries on thcTampin-
Cemax road and destroyed several ofthem.

nre STAND IN sotmi m\laya 2e7

By then, the situation <tt Muar appeared

threatening and
the Japanese were also reported to have landed near Batu Pahat.
To stabilise the situation at Muar, General Gordon Bennett consi-
dered it suBicient to send only 2/29 Australian Imperial Force
there, as has been already described. But General Percival con-
sidered the situation of graver import and on 16 January, he
placed Ball! Pahat-Yong Peng area under the III Indian Corps,
and also felt compelled to send there the newly arrived 53rd
(British) Brigade or the Wth (Briftsh )Brfgadc.

Mlihdratral Btgini
From 16 January to 18 January, the Gemas sector remained
quiet, and all attention was focussed on the developments in Muar.
By the evening of 18 January, the situation in Muar sector showed
no signs of improving, more Japanese troops were reported from
Batu Pahat and General Percival had a! last learnt that one whole
Japanese division svas attaclcing Afuar sector and another was
operating along the Gemas-Segamat trunk route. It appeared
necessary, therefore, to withdratv UVstforcc from its exposed posi-
tions. It was to enable Genera) Gordon Bennett to devote his entire
attention to this withdrawai so that the Muar sector was also tem-
porarily transferred from lus command to Genera! Heath that even-
ing, at mentioned above.
As ordered, Wcstforcc fell back to Buloh Kasap during the
night of 18-19 Januaiy. The road and rail bridges before Buloh
Kasap were blown up. The 1/15 Frontier Force Riiles and 2/10
Baluch had minor skirmishes with the Japanese during the with-
drawal, but no serious Japanese pressure developed.

dt'ew P/ans
'
At 1420 hours on 19 January, there was a conference at
Yong Peng in whicli Generals Perdval, Heath, Gordon Bennett,
Key and Brigadier Duke took part. Situation reports were
heard, and a discussion took place on what should be done next.
General Percival is.sucd orders inaocoitlance widithe resolution
at the conference, as follows;
"I The 53rd Brigade Group should hold a position from the
.

bridge at Parit Sulong to the high ground west of the

causeway.
2. The 45th Brigade Group should svithdraw at once
through the above to a position svest of Yong Peng.
3. The Segamat force should continue its withdrawal at
once.
4. The 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, on its arrival at
Yong Peng on the night of 20/21 January 1942 from
268 CAifPAlG^S IN SOimi*EAST ASIA 1941*42 itALAYA

the Scgamal front, should be at the disposal of the IJth

Indian Division
As soon as the Generals returned to their respective head-
quarters they hastened to givT efiect to these orders. The
Australian troops withdrew to Yong Peng; the 8lh Indian Infan^
Brigade proceeded to Campoog Chasah; and the 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade got back to Labts. 5/11 Sikh Regiment was
temporarily detached to hold the main river crossing. After hav-
ing been in contact with, and inflicting casualties on, the Japane
forward elements, this battalion al^ rejoined the brigade m
the Labis area.
At this stage General Sir Archibald IVavcH made a general
survey of the situation in Malaya. He came to Singapore on 20
Januar}' 1942 and discussed the situation with Generals Perdval,
Heath and Keith Simmons. Afterwards, he reported to the Com-
bined Chie& of Sufi in Washington that the situation had greatly
deteriorated, and added: My hope of holding the enemy on the
SegamatRiver hfuar line until the whole of the 18ih Division
could be landed to reinforce the forward troops and until the
1 llh Division was rested and re-fitted, had been disappointed. The
raw and partly trained 45th Indian Infantry Brigade had been
unable to stop the enemy from crossing the Muar river and had
been cut oft east of the river together with two Australian batta-
lions. The 53rd Brigade, the leading brigade of the 18th Division
had had to be committed to the battle without watting for the
arrival of the remainder of the diviuon and was already heavily
engaged. It was obvious that the force would hav'c to fall back
to the approximate line Mersing-Kluang-Batu Fahat and that
there was every prospect of the force being driven from Johorc
into Singapore Island. I found that very little had been done in
the preparation of the defences in the northern part of Singapore
Island; I instructed General Perdval to continue the fight in
Johorc and to endeavour to hold the enemy on the mainland until
further reinforcements arrived; but to ma^ every preparation for
the defence ofSingapore Island.'* On 21 January, he received a
cable from the Ghieis of Staff, London, drawing his attention to
certain important points in case the Malaya force should be
compelled to withdraw into Singapore Island. These points
included:
(i) use of fortress guns against landward attack,
(ii) obstructing land approaches to the Straits and landing
places.

WavtlTi DattSek, p. 6, pr 21.

 TIIE 8TANT) IS SOUTH IfALAYA 2G9

(iii) di\*erjIonof some oT the beach dcrences and machine

gtins from South to the Xorih of the bland.
{Iv) control of Iwati and small craft,
(v) Creation of sel^contained defendve localities and
SM'itch lines,
(\-i) measures against surprise night landings,
(vii) defence of aerodromes agauut airborne troops,
(viii) dispersal and control of the civil population and
suppression of Fifth Column aedv-ity,
{) use of penonncl in fued defences for tasks in local
defence schemes, and
(x) development of a good lignab communication sj^tem
sriilun the fnrtreis and to aerodromes in use in South
Sumatra.'^
As aresult of the withdrawals ordered, by the morning of
21 January the 27ih Australian Imperial Force Brigade had readied
Vong Veng crou-rosdi and was holding the road open to enable
the 53rd Brigade and 45th Indian Infantry Brigade to withdrass*
from the Defile are.i towards Ayer IJitam. The 22t)d Indian
Infantry Brigade was then near Laibis, with 2/12 Frontier Force
Regiment at Milestone 101, 2/10 Royal Garliwal Rides at Milestone
100, 5/11 Sikh near Milestone 90 and the Brigade Head(]uarten
jmi behind it.'* Behind the 22nd Indian Infantrj* Brigade was the
0th Indian Infantry Brigade, with 3/17 Dogra and 1/13 Frontier
Force Rifles on either side of the ro.-td, and 2/10 Baluch backing
them up.
At this stage, the utmost care was required to coordinate
the ssilhdrawals of these three brigades and the 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade through Yong Peng, so that confusion and block*
ing of the single road might be avoided. To ensure thb coordina-
tion, the command of the 45th and 53rd Brigades in the Defile
area was handed back to General Gordon Bennett svitli effect from
1200 hours on 21 January.
In a conference at Yong Peng that day, General Percival
announced that his intention was to hold the Japanese at the line
nmrung from Jemaluang on the east coast to Batu Pahat on the
west coast, passing through Kluang and Ayer Hitam. ^Vhen
the withdrawal to this line was completed, the available brigades
were to he reorganised into three forces, each with a separate line
of communication to Singapore. These forces were designated
Eastforce in the Jcmaluang-MersiDg area based on Kota Tinggi
road, the Wcstforcc (which svas to receive back 2 Loyals) in Yong

tfi. til. p. 31, Para 23 (Q

>
A Diary oT 5th Baitalitn (D.C.O.). The Sihh in the htalaya Campairn, p.
270 CAJfPAlCNS IN* SOCm-EAST ASIA 1911-42 MALAYA

Peng Ayer Hitam-Kluangarea cowring the Irunkroad, and the

11th Indian Division in Batu Pahat area, covering the coastal
road to Pontian Kechll and onwards to Skudai. Operations on
the following days svcrc based on this plan.

The Ulthdrawel CompleUd

The 22Qd Indian Infantry Brigade started to withdraw on
21 January, from Labis through the positions of the 8lh Indian
Infantry Brigade. Since the Japanese were pressing liard on its
heels, an ambush was laid for them near Milestone 101, and 2/12
Frontier Force Repment svas posted on either side of the road.
The Japanese came rushing in, and suffered about 600 casualties
williin fi\x or six minutes, although the coughing of a * Jawan
gaw away the stratagem ^(bre all the Japanese were truly in the
bag. The 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade then svithdrew srithout
interference and reached Kluang, 2/18 Royal Carhwal Rifles
suffering some losses In Japanese attacks near Paloh. The 8th
Indian Infantiy Brigade then renuined the rearguard of
force, holding back the Japanese near Kampong Bahru. By
24 January, the 8th Indian Infantry* Brigade also svithdrew to
Kluang.
On 22 January, the 8th Irtdian Infantry Brigade was attacked
by the Japanese, who succeeded in uiBltTating behind the Indian
troo; through tlie numerous routes in the Soclin Oil Palm Estate.
This resulted in a withdrasval of about six miles that evening,
and the front was stabilised behind the riser Bakok.
According to the plan of withdrawal, the 53rd Brigade
started to evacuate its positions west of Yong Peng on 23 January.
IVhile thus engaged, it was heavily attacked by the Japanese
infantry and tanks. In the confusion, some bridges were blown
up before all the troops had crossed over, and all units of the
brigade, particularly 3/16 Punjab, suffered heavy casualties-
However, they somehow* got away and reached Ayer Hitam the
next morning, leaving behind 2 Loyals which joined IVesiforcc.
The other tsvo battalions of the Brigade, 3/16 Punjab and
6 Korfolk, were put in lorries and immediately rushed off vU
Skudai to the Batu Pahat sector, which in the meantime had
started crumbling.

THE BATU PAHAT SECTOR

The arrival of the Japanese in the Batu Pahat area has already
been mentioned. As the operations de\*cloped in the Muar
sector. General Nishimura, the Commander of the Imptrial Guards
 Tiir. sTASO ix socmi X(alaya 271

decided to encircle and deJlro>- the British troops in Bam

Dicisien,
Pahat area. He had already cni /// Guardi Daltalton to land on
the coast south of Batu Paliat He nenv ordered anodjer battalion
to attack llie town frontally, while dth Guards Regiment went round
to encircle the parriion and lint up with it* ijolafed battalion
on the coast. The 5lh Guards Regiment Was ordered to cross the Batu
Pahat .Ajrr llitam road further east, then wheel svest and cut the
co.astal road also at Benglt. A
double rini; of steel would thus be
throsvn around the doomed (garrison of Batu Pahat. The operat-
Ions iliat resulted from these plans arc described below.
Prom 16 Januarj- onsvards, there were rumours of strong
Japanese forces landing on the coast and quietly Infiltrating Inland.
On 17 Janti.-!ry, llie llth Indian DKislon had established its
hcadquarten at Ayer llitam and the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade
was m.'ide responsible for the defence of Batu Pahat area. Some
units of (he IStli Indian Infantry- Brigade had frequent skirmishes
ssith small parties of Japanese troops on 15 January, and the
next day a weak Japanese attempt to cross tlie ris-cr near Batu
Pahat was beaten back.
These incident* left Brigadier CJwllen (J5tJj Indian Infantry
Brigade) definitely uneasy about the situation that svas developing,
and he re.ired th.it both the Ayer Hitam .and Pontian Xechil roads
might be cut lielund him. He represented this to Generals Heath
and Key svhen they visited Batu P.ihai on 21 January, but svas
ordered to hold fast in his sector, .ind, svith 5 Norfolk to assist his
brigade, to maintain actisr patrolling. It was a/*o arranged
to stock ten d.ays provisions and supplies at Batu Pahat, in the
hope that, even if cut oiT (he town might serve as another Tobruk-
Tlie same esxning (21 January) the Japanese reached the
Ayer Hitam ro.ad and established a road*block near Milestone 71.
This was smashed on 22 January by 5 Norfolk advancing from Ayer
Hitam and the British Battalion Irom Batu Pahat. But the
Japanese attacked a field battery on the coastal road also on the
same day, and again cut the Ayer Hitam road near Milestone 72.
On 23 January, 5 Norfolk and the British Battalion attacked this
road block, but sverc repulsed, and retired to Ayer Hitam and
Batu Pahat respectively. 5 Norfolk was then sent round by
bus to Pontian Kcchil to try to reach Batu Pahat fay the coastal
road.
Brigadier Ghallen was alarmed fay the growing threat to his
force in Batu Pahat. Since Jus wireless was temporarily out of
order, and he could not get in touch with the Ilth Indian Division,
he ordered a retreat from Batu Pahat on his osvn initiative. Later
the -same day, (23 January) the wireless link was restored, and he
 THE STAND IX SOtmi SIAtAYA 273

reported his decision to General Key, who had dear orders

to hold on to Batu Fahat. He knew that General Perdvars
whole plan of defence was anchored on that town. Hence
he countcr*mandcd the order to retreat, reporting the matter
to the III Indian Corps also in view of the real threat to the IStJi
Indian Infantry Brigade in the area. General Heath confirmed
General Keys order, and the 15th Indian InfanlryBrigaderctraccd
Its steps and rcoccupied Batu Fahat during the night of 23*24

January.
coNccunox

In the Endau .\fcrsmg area, at the other end of the
defence line, the tliird week of January was rclalis'cly quiet
Japanese patrols were in contact with Ujc defenders from 14
January onwards, and their planes frequently bombed Endau
and Mersing. By 17 January, Japanese pressure had grown
considerably in the sector. Brigadier Taylor, commanding the
22nd Australian Imperial Force Brigade in that area, had only
tsvo battahom, since 2/13 Australian Imperial Force had been sent
to Balffi, as already mentioned. Brigadier Taylor, therefore,
dedded not to risk a major operation. During tl>e night of 17'IB
January, 22nd Australian Imperial Force pulled back to Mersing
afler systemadcally and thoroughly destroying all bridges, culverts,
hamlets, crops etc, and blocking the road at several places. This
scorched earth policy hampered the Japanese advance. By
the evening of 18lh the Japanese pushed on to Mersing, but they
had to svade through swamps and clear the road block,
and so could not attack Mersing in strength fur many days. At
Mersing, Brigadier Taylor was told that his new role was to protect

the Jemaluang Kota Ting^ road and his force would be knosvn
as Eastforcc from 19 January.
As a result of the operations described above, the defence
line in south Malaya up to 24 January ran from Batu Pahat to
Ayer Hitam and thence to Kluang and Mersing. In accordance
with General Pcrcivals plan of 21 January, the whole force was
divided into three separate formations, Easlforce, Westforcc and
the 11th Indian Division. Each had its own line of communica-
dota ta Sia^pcK sard Til Iirdha CsvpJ i2/ pisced in ovsraii
command of the three forces. The stage was thus set for the next
round in the Malayan campaign.
A few points concerning these operations may be noticed
before describing the subsequent course of the fighting in Johore.
The original intention was to delay the Japanese advance
until tha reinforcements would arrive and as long as possible. The
274 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA I9tM2 StALAYA

army ^vas to fight within the Scgasnat-Muar line and not to with-
draw behind it without the personal authority of General Pcrcival,
and navy and air force were to cooperate in the realisation of this
object. This was a severe though necessary limitation on the
liberty* usuallyenjoyed by old and experienced battalion and bri-
gade commanders, especially in a wild and undeveloped country
like Malaya where communications were extremely difficult
and undependable. But the special circumstances of the case
justified General Perclval in taking exceptional measures in an
attempt to halt the retreat.
The method adopted to slow down the Japanese advance
>vas to block the roadsand lo hit them hard if and when they tried
to move round the flanks. Consequently brigades and battalions
svere placed at cross-roads like Segamat and Muar. River banks,
bridges, tracks and the sea coast were watched and patrolled, and
hill-tops, and ridges were occupied tviih platoons and
valleys
artillery parties. The net result of all these measures was to stem
the tide of Japanese advance in this part of Malaya for at least
one sveefc, from 15 to 22 January 19-12. But it was achieved at a
tremendous cost, and the loss of men and material in Segamat
front would be dilTicuU to compute. But it is certain that there
was practical annihilation of the army in the Muar front and
reduction of battalions to a few companies in Srgamat area. The
Joss of equipment was no less shattering.
With such losses, some deterioration in morale was inevitable.
Some units were jumpy; some withdrew either before time or to a
more distant place than prescribed for them; a few men ran away,
either never to return or to rejoin their units much later, and almost
all were sick of svar in the existing drcumstanccs. But General
Gordon Bennett has testified to the high spirit of the men in hi*
remark that, On questioning several men, I found that the
fatigue and resultant depression is more evident among senior
officers than among the men, whose spirits are exceptionally high.
Also, this deterioration did not go so far as to induce them to quit,
and it was this determination to fight and keep on fighting until
the last man and last round or until it was wise to slop and retreat,
that enabled the whole army to gain ten days time for the Supreme
Commander to reorganise his forces for a better defence of Malaya
and Sin^apors Island.

r Smgafort Fell, p. t2T.

 CHAPTER X

The Last Week in South Malaya

Tire ncirr for johore

General Wavell reported tbc situation on 24 January 1942

to theCombined Chief's of Staff: Japanese obviously making
on whole front with object obtaining quick successes.
intense efforts
\Ve can only use our limited resources to check enemy as far for-
ward as possible by hard fighting taking ofiensive action whenever
possible. We shall incur heavy tosses on sea, land and air during
this period and further efforts will depend on their being made
good rapidly....Troops in Johore are being very hard pressed
by fresh Japanese divisions and haw had heavy losses but Japanese
losses also undoubtedly very heavy. We shall hold line Merting-
KJuang-Aycr HitamBatu Pahat as iong as possible but may be
forced back into Singapore island itself. Enemy numerical
superiority in air and our lack of suitable small craft make it
difiicuU to Slop enemy infiltration along coast. Reinforcements of
Australian niachine>gun battalion and Indian brigade due in
Singapore today and tomorrow, two brigade groups 16th Division
due three days later. If all these arrive safely situation should be
much easier. Enemys air offensive has been intense and air
losses on both sides considerable, unconfirmed report that Hurri-
canes shot dosvn twenty enemy bombers yesterday without loss.
Enemy has been reconnoitring and bombing aerodromes in Sumatra
to increasing cxtcnt..-.Gcncrally sve will keep on bolding and
hitting enemy as bard as our resources allow till time comes to
strike back. ^Vith adequate air we should be able to take consider-
able toll of his shipping. Enemy should not be able to replace
his air losses as we can and we should be able to build up gradually
and drive back his bases and rc-cstafalish those sve
air superiority
have lost. Next few months will be anxious and difficult but
have every hope of getting through them successfully
The 44th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived at Singapore
on 25 January 1942, and the 18th Division G^ss 53rd Brigade)
came to Singapore four days later, on 29January 1942. Australian
machine-gun battalion and reinforcements for the 18th Australian
Division reached Singapore on 23 January 1942, while drafts for
the III Indian Corps and No. 100 Indian Light Tank Squadron
were at Singapore on 29 January 1942. But according to General

tVavell'i Oespitei, Appendix A" p. 13.

276 CAMPAJONS IN SOirril-EAST ASIA 1911-42 UALAYA

Pcrdral, those which arrived on 23 and 25 January 1912 were unfit

or untrained for war. I dared not send it (44lli Indian Infantry
Brigade) into action at once on the mainland....Thc reinforcements
also included 7,000 Indian troops. They also were extremely
raw and untrained. To malce matters worse there sverc very
few non-commissioned officers among them and that was what
we most needed now in the Indian units....rrom Australia came
a machine-gun battalion and 2,000 rcinrorccmcnts....Excellcnt
material they were but not soldiers as yet
As stated by General lVa\-ell in bis situation report, the inten-
tion of Afalaya Command was to save Singapore as long as possible
from Japanese invasion and to deploy* the 18th Division accordingly.
A secondary purpose was to keep the string of aerodromes and
landing grounds at Kahang, Kluang and Koris intact with the
purpose of prc\-cnting the Japanese from doubling the scale of
their air attacks on the Singapore area and on the reinforcement
convoys as they came in. The one lateral road connecting these
three places rvas an important factor h the war in this large area.
As mentioned earlier, (he defence of the lateral road and south
Malaya was organised in three sectors, each held respectively by
the Wesiforce, Eastforce and the llth Indian DisHsion with an
osTraU control by the III Indian Corps. The principal function
of these three forces was to hold the Japanese army to the north
of Batu PahatMersing line and prevent any large-scale infiltra-
tions by the attackers to thesouthforsuch time as the defences of the
bland of Singapore had been effectively organised. The task
svas difficult, as the area ofobservation svas large and the defending
troops were both sveak in numbers and exhausted after a long and
continuous fighting retreat. The situation at no stage was any
better than critical, but in spite of heasy odds the Indian, British
and Australian troops were able to impose a delay of scsen daja
in the attack on Singapore Island, as also to save a part of the force
which could retreat into it and participate in its defence. The
stoiy of these cnidal soTit days isonc of many dbasten and losses,
but it has its bright spots also in the ficquenl display of heroism,
counter-attacks and the orderly withdrawal of the various units.
Howcs'cr, the narrative of the period &om 24 January to 31 January
b confused owing to lack of unity in the operations of the three
forces and occasional over-stepping of the main directions by
some battalions owing to the unexpected developments in the
situation at any place. The operations have therefore to be
dbcussed chronologically in (he three separate sectors.

* Tit WV a ff. p. 23%

 TIIE LAST WTZr. IX SOimi MALAVA 277

On 2t Januar), very litlle activity was in evidence on the

front but for a Japanese air attack on Ayer Hitam and a counter-
raid by the Royal Air Force on the Japanese troops holding the
bridge at Labis and the ml tanks at Muar. The 11th Indian
Division was straining e\-cry nenv to provide relief to tiic 15th
Indian Infantty Brigade and prevent Japanese landings at
Pontian Besar and Pontian Kechil. At the same lime planning
for the defence of Rengit and Benut was being pushed ahead.
The 9ih Indian Division was giving attention to the rcoccupation
of Paloh which had been lost by 2/10 Royal Garhwal Rifles on the
previous day. Major-General Gordon Bennett ordered the whole
of Uic 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade to re-establish position at
Paloh.

COU.VTER-ATTACK AT NtYOR

24 January 1912 vv.as an absolutely colourless day for the

British army, the only exception being the heroic fight on 5/11
Siklt at Niyor. When 2/30 Australian Battalion was attacked
at 1335 and 1505 hours by flAecn Japanese bombers at Ayer
Hitam and up and down the ro.id to Slmpang Rengam, the Royal
Air Force sent twcnt>-one fighters to defend, but, by then, the
Japanese aircraft had gone ofTand the weather also was unsuitable'.*
Eleven Vildebeesies and three Albacores, however, attacked the
Japanese troops on the bridge at Labb on the Segamat-Singapore
road vshiLit three othen bombed oil tanks left standing at Muar.
There was not mucJi activity on the Illh Indian Division
fronL The entire attention of its commander was directed to the
relief of the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade and to prcvxnt the
Japanese from landing at Ponli-in Besar and Pontian Kechil, and
cutting off the line of cummunic.itioas of the centra! and eastern
forces at Skudal. Rengit and. Benut received the greatest
attention in the planning of the defence of this coastal area. The
Japanese were in the meantime getting stronger on the cast flank
of the Malaya army and making its withdrawal rapidly (o the south
inevitable.
It u said Uiat fighting continued in the town of Batu Paliat
throughout Uib day (24 January), resulting in fatigue of the men
who had been on the move for several days without sleep. Their
morale was, however, undiminished, because they were told that
53rd British Brigade would come to their support witliin twenty-
four hours and further secure their line of communicarion with

SVVar Diary, Headquarters Malaya Cmunaad, 24 January 19^)2.

 TItE LAffT \S1EK Dt SOOTII HAI-\YA 279

from Brigade ordering us to abandon the original ohjecti\-c

and make for MS 416 on the railivay.* The intention was to
bring it on to the flank of the Japanese and thus rcliesx Uic otlier
unit from the strain of fighting. Unfortunately, this plan could
not be carried out in action. Oniog to Jungle and sssramp, the
adscnt of night in an unknown place, the presence of guns and
transport and the absence of maps, tbc commanding olllcer dedded
to continue his ads'ance to Niyor and thence to strike south topoint
MS 41C on the railway. In doing so his men came immediately
into contact srith the Japanese and a grim fight ensued until the
morning of the next day.

FURTItEIt WTntDRAWALS DECIDED

25 January 1912 was a day of a few important dedsions

fur the opposing sides
the British and the Japanese. The
former decided to wiihdrasv behind Mcning-Kluang-Aycr Hitam-
Batu Pahat line and as a eorotbiy to it to demolbh Uie airfields
at Kahang, Kluang and Batu Pahat; svhile tite latter resolved on
a determined action by continuing the fight even during Ujc night,
delis%ring the hardest blow at dass*n.
The Japanese point of riew was that the line which Ujc
British army was defending svas indeed the last stronghold of die
Singapore defence *a lifclme The best method of
driving that army behind that line was to give it to rest and to cut
the line of communication in Johore.
The Malaya Command too was keenly watdiing the
developments on the west coast, and the utmost that they could
hope for was to transfer Uic force at Batu Pahat to Pontian Kechil
and to let the 15th and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades, reinforced
by the 53rd British Infantry Brigade, hold the Pontian Kcchil-
SkudalJohore Bahru road against the Japanese penclrauon into
south Johore, as long as possible. At the conference of commanders
presided over by General Pcrcival at 1515 houn at Wcslforce
Headquarters (near Rengam) on this date, important decisions
were taken. Major-General Key reported that the force at
Batu Pahat had been heavily engaged all the morning and that
the coast road had been blocked near Senggarang. General
Gordon Bennett added that the situation at Kluang svas confused
but that the 9th Indian Division was holding the Kluang road
Junction and he believed the counter-attack carried out by the Sikhs
had been successful. The only matter therefore for consideration

6 W*f Diary, 5th BaltaHon (D.COJ He Silh, p. 15.

7 Enemy lu
ruUIcation No. 276, p.
 THE LAST >VEEC IS SOUTW WALAVA 281

made no licadway The 53rd British

Infantry Brigade occupied
Benut and Rengit wlhout opporitjon, and its forward unit, 6
Xorfollt, readied Scnggarang without any incident But "the
eventful move to Scnggarang ivas not shared by its tail,
which was ambushed eight hundred yards soutli of the salbgc.**
TIic Japanese had come between Scnggarang and Rengit from a
point on Batu PahatAyer Hitam road, and had pinned down
the Batu Pahat force to the north of Scnggarang until the arrange-
ments to cut the Pontian Kediil road were complete. It is
recorded that the ISth Indian Infantry Brigade could have been
on 25 January 1942 but Major-General Key
successfully ss-iUidraum
was not permitted to do so until the evening of the next day,
with tlic result that the brigade was endrclcd and practically
written off.
In central Johorc the Japanese launched an attack on 2/30
Australian Imperial Force Battalion under cover of mortars and
infantry guns. Tliit attack was however defeated. The point
of defence was the bridge ostr the Sungei Sembrong to the north
of Ayer Hitam. At 2000 hours Uie svithdrawal commenced.
2/2C Australian Imperial Force Battalion svent to Milestone 46
and2/30 Australian Imperial Force Battalion halted near Milestone
40. 2 Gordon svluch had taken the place of 2 Loyal (sent
to Singapore) had mosxd to Milestone 49. ^V'ith one company

of 2/30 Australian Imperial Force Battalion 2 Gordon remained

as the forward detachment of the Australian force. The 9th
Indian Didsion was again ordered to retreat along the railway,
whicli caused serious diOicuUies for the wheeled transport of the
dhnsion. Once again 5/1 1 Sikh made history on this day svith its
bayonets. It fought gloriously until noon, captured machine-
guns, malor-cydes, and more macbinc~guat before it withdresv
to Kluang. According to the war diary of the unit, " since 1400
hours on the 24th of January the Battalion had marched over
33 miles and had been in action for 18 hours. Our casualties were
40 including 3 gunnen; enemy casualucs Vbxrc conscrv'ativcly
esUraated at 150.. .This was a very heartening action. It gave
the men confidence and relieved all pressure on 22 Brigade and later
on 8 Brigade for a full 24 hours. On the 25th not a shot was fired
on their fronts Orders had mcansyhile been issued for a with-
drawal to Rcngam, and the divisional commander, who only a
few Hour before had been stressing the necessity of re-establishing

7J/ ll'ar fii p. 242. ..

'lIitory of 11th Indiui Divi^, VoL It (Ongwal), p. ^1
lA Diary of 5th Battalion (D.CO.) Siih, pp. l7-lo.
282 CAMPAIGNS LN SOUTn-EAJT ASIA 1941.42 MALAYA

the situation at Paloh, issued orden for bringing the 5/11 Sikh
back to its brigade at the earliest moment.
The battalion returned
by the same route as it had used in
advance, and rejoined the
its
brigade in the evening (about 1700 hours) uith sufficient time oiJy
for a meal and brief rest before joining in further withdrawals.
The whole brigade arrived at 0200 hours to a harbour area north
of Rengam. It was fortunate that as this srithdrawal began 2/18
Royal Garhtval Rifles Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters
Company rejoined the Brigade.
The 8lh Indian Infantry Brigade had a fairly quiet day.
Only 0 Company of 2/10 Baluch had some contact with the
Japanese near the aerodrome. During the afternoon the artillery
and transport thinned out, and at 1730 hours orders were given
for a general withdrawal of the brigade. 1/13 Frontier Force
Rifles held a position through which 3/17 Dogra and 2/10 Baluch
passed. After a night march of some nvclvc miles the brigade
(less 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles) spent the night m
a rubber estate
at Sayong Halt and 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles which was in Meng.
kibol area served as the outpost battalion covering the position
of the whole brigade to the south of it.*
In the eastern part of Johore svhich about this time
came at last into the limeBghi* (in Lieutcnant.General Percival's
words), this day too passed off sviihout any serious incident.
The Japanese continued theirprewureagaiast the Australian troops
in the area, compelling them gradually to fall back near Milestone
74 and Jcmaluang.* Presious to this retreat the bridge across the
Mersing was blovm up. Connected with these actions was the
srithdrawal of 2/9 Jat from Kahang aerodrome, which men as
early as 20 January 1942 had been advised to be demolished,
to Milestone 42 on the Jeinaluang-Kota Tinggi road. The role
of this battalion was to watch for the Japanese approach by tracks
from the cast and to prepare ambushes in ^Vang Tengah-Lubok
Pusang area. These movements svcrc ordered on account of
the change in the general policy of defending the eastern sector.
"
According to General Perdval "nie new defence centred round
Jcmaluang with Mersing held only as an outpost Moreover,
we had had to withdraw our advanced troops from Endau, a likely
landing place twcnt>' miles north of Mersing As a matter of
fact, the Japanese did land an airfield battalion on the night of
25/26 January 1942.
 THE LAST \SXEK IN* SOtrm SWIAVA 283

15th INDIAN LSTANTHV BRJCADC CVT OFF

26 January' 1912 was another day of misfortunes for the

Allies. Once again, the wxst coast area demanded the fint
attention of the Afalap Command. The problem there was to
withdraw the Batu Pahat force, now consisting of tlie British
Battalion, 6 and 5 Norfolk, 2 Cambridgeshire, B Battery of 155
field Jlcgimcnt, carriers, and much transport incJudingambuIance,
successfully to Rengit before the morning of 27 January 1942.
Unfortunately nothing could be done to .accomplish this great
purpose. The Japanese placed road blocks in at least six places
between Senggarang and Hcngit, posted detachments to the left
and the right of the coast ro.ad without being seen by any one
moving on the road and made reconnaissance of the svholc area
from the air. Tlieir idea svas to lock up the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade at Senggarang and to destroy all communications with it
from outside.
In the difficult t.asfc of withdrawal, the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade svas assisted by the 53rd British Brigade. The only
matter of ilMuck was that after 0600 hours the svireless com'
muaicaiion on which alone the coordinated movements depended,
ceased to function, and the substitute for it was by sending special
columns and aeroplanes through the Japanese occupied bits of
territory. The best example of the former method was Bancol
This column, consisting of a troop of armoured cars, four carriers
(tsvo of svhich were from 3/16 Punjab), a section of field battery, a
detachment of a field company and a number of ambulances and
led by Major Benham or336 Field Battery of 135 Field Regiment,
proceeded under the special orders of MajorGencral Key to
perform tsvo distinct tasks, siz. to open the road to Senggarang
and to inform Brigadier Challen that be should reach Rengit on
27 January 1942. But unfortunately thb special column was
destroyed svithm two minutes.* Howc\er, by the gallant efforts
of the commander, and driver of the carrier, (which belonged
to 3/16 Punjab) the commanding officer was able to pass through
all the Japanese road-blocks and reach Brigadier Challen some
time after 1400 hours. A second method of contacting the I5th
Indian Infantry Brigade devised by Major-General Key svas
by means of aircraft. The Royal Air Force had no aeroplane to
spare for this urgent task, but the Volunteer Air Force sent one.
This was a little hfotb capable of eighty miles per hour and hedge-
hopping at low level, both of which proved to be most annoying
to the Japanese dive-bombers. The pilot was not only able to reach

of II Indian Dlvutan, VL U (Ordinal), p. 419.

284 CAitPAICNS Df SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

Scnggarang and drop medical supplies to the brigade in good time

but also to come back safely to the Divisional Headquarten and
report *' that he had found Senggarang congested with transport
and British troops who had waved at him as he fleiv at a hundred
feet above the to>vn But all the efforts of Major-General Key
were ultimately of no avail. Brigadier Challen tried his utmost
to destroy and penetrate through the barriers of the Japanese
but not one of his several attempts succeeded. By afternoon,
therefore Brigadier Challen was faced svith a serious problem:
if be moved to fight his way through and save guns and vehicles,
men would be killed as at hfuar, but if he avoided battle and
saved his men he s^'ould lose his arms and vehicles. If he did
not dedde at once, the Japanese, who were strong between Seng-
gmsng and lUngit and svho had begun occupiing the road within
a mile south of Rengit, would attack the British force both in front
and in the rear. Secondly, he had been ordered to reach
Rengit on the foUcuving day. Rengit was eight miles away,
and too far for Brigadier Challen* force to reach by a night march,
and a night march should Indte rtpeddon of the disaster which had
overtalsn 2/9 Jat during its withdrawal through Kluang. Finally,
Brigadier Challen decided on the latter course; he decided to
destroy and abandon seven 25-pounders, eight anti-tank guns,
six armoured cars and all vehicles, to leave the wounded with the
Red Cross and to rejoin the division by a detour west of the road.
Hb brigade started its trek at 1815 houn. At OlOO hours on 27
January 1942 Ren^t was also evacuated hy- the detachment
which had originally consbted of A Company of 6 Norfolk, a
section of 336 Field Battery and D Company of 3/1$ Punjab, but
now contained only a handful of men belonging to 6 Norfolk and
Selangor Battalion, and the whole of the west coast road became
open up to Benut for the Japanese.
Oansequcotly, the situation faring the 11th Indian Division
on the night of 26/27 January 1942 was once more a black one.
The 15th In^an Infantry Brigade was apparently written off and
the 53rd British Infanto' Brigade reduc^ to 3/16 Punjab (less
one company in wildemcss) and 3 Cavalry (less a squadron with
the 15th Infantry Brigade also in wildemess). The danger to
the western sector had correspondingly increased, because it was
not only exposed as before on the coast but abo at strategic points
like Milestone 22 on the Pontian Kechil-Skudai road.
The fate of \VMtforcc on 27 January was no better than on
the day before. Lieutenant-General Gordon
Bennett appeared,
however, much less confident; Realizing the danger
that would

p. 459.
 TlfE LAST WttK. LH SOOTlt MALAYA 285

result shoutd the enemy land at Pontian Kcclill or should they

break through from Batu Pahat wa the coastal road, thus opening
the way for an uninterrupted approach to Singapore, I ordered
the 2/J9 and the 2/29 Battalionf which svere reorganising and
refitting after their hca\'y losses at Bakri, to be prepared to occupy
a position on Pontian Kechtl-Skudai road at short notice Later
the commander of the 27lh Australian Brigade requested authority
to withdraw 2 Gordons from a forward position to the area held
by 2/26 Australian Imperial Force Battalion, and this was granted
without question. According to Major Hyde thb svithdrawal
from the hIS 49 position (to MS 42) was a d.iy ahead of schedule.
Moreover a demolition iliat should hasc been blown at MS 49,
had not been efTcctcd The Japanese, however, did not seize
their advantage immediately.

SSTTlfORAWAL OF TltE 9Tlt IXDIA.V DIVBIOV

In Ute 0th Indian Division also, both the 8th and the 22nd
Indian Infantry Brigades were ordered to withdraw by successive
bounds along the railway, the former leading the way. The
arrangement was that the 22nd would deny the line astride the
railway at Milestone 437 up to 28/29 January, the 8th hold Sedenak
up to 30/31 January and the former Kulai up to 31 January/1
February. According to this time-table, 6th Indian Infantry
Brigade was astride the road and railway about four miles north
ofRcngam railway station; 1/13 Frontier Force Rilles was in the
outpost positions at Mengklbol; 3/17 Dogra and the Bahawalpur
State Forces were in the Rengam railway station area. At about
1100 hours, 1/13 Frontier force Rilles passed to a position about
m miles to the rear of 2/10 Baluch; but before withdrawing fought
*a successful action with the enemy, lolling thirty, dcstro>4ng
four motor cycles and capturing a mortar and two light machine-
guns However, by 1600 hours the Japanese had come incontact
with 2/10 Baluch; D Company was guarding the railway bridge
and all others were around the area. It was therefore quite
easy to disperse the Japanese with artillery fire. But they
penetrated the battalion area in darkness and fired on A Company
tlie rearmost of the companies during the night. The Commander
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade was not happy at the instructions
svhich he had received, because he realised the weakness of the
plan owing to the fact that the entire line of movement was exposed
to flank attack by the Japanese who were familiar with the tracks
2CG c.vup.MaM IN *ouTu*rAsr aha J91M2 jmi^va

and roadt of llic pUntationi. AccordJfl;^ in Idm, a poiitJon *outI>

of Layans Layan? wai tlie only tdialde pmhion, but he was not
{wrmitu-d to depart from the pmcribed route. He realied that
the poiltlon w.-w tactically bad Itul that order* permitted of no
alternative a* Brigade Jiad to keep north of a line Eait and WcJl
through railwTiy MS 435 until ICOO hours on 28 January.* 5/11
Sikh occupied the pouilon by tC30 hours. J-spaneie air activity
made the situation quite uncomfortable in the niijht. Mcans^hile,
in the words of the diariit of Uic battalion, '* laitc in the csTning
.amessage was received that es-erythtng on wheels had to Ise clear
of MS 435 by 1700 hours next day, and that Oth Brigade would
pass through m
about lh.it time. 22nd Brigade itself having got rid
of all transport isould isithdraw down the railway having held their
present ixnitions until 1030 hours on 20 J3nu.iry'. This meant
that wc were to fight for 24 houn in a position whiclt was agreed
to be tactically unsound, svliltoul any support, without carriers,
willinut mortars, sridi no reserve ammunition other than dumps,
and ivilhout any means of even evTntual hope of evacuating
wounded. Further, no sapper assistance was available for blocking
roads which in any case had to be left open until 1C30 houn on 27
January to let through transport and carriers of 8(h Brigade. AAer
this we vrere to withdraw 10 or IS miles (the posiUon which 8ih
Brigade was going to occupy was not then nor was it ci'er known
to us) still sviihout any supporting arms or means of ev'aeuatlon

of wounded Throughout the afternoon and all the next day

until ICOO houn when they had to be sent back in accordance with
orders, Uie carriers patrolled vide to bodi flanks and reported
ci-en more roads and link roads than lho<c showTi oo the map.**
These orden of General Gordon Bennett were intended to guard
against a possible flanking threat of the Japanese to the trunk road
so vital to the withdrawal to Singapore. Unfortunately, however,
they produced an erroneous impression in the minds of the
Indian troops, particularly in view of the earlier warning to deny
the lateral tracks to the Japanese until a staled hour*^.

TITP. rSO.Vr BCCtNS TO CRVMBLX

In the eastern sector, at the same time, it had been decided

to withdraw the 22nd Australian Imperial Force Brigade from
Mersing. 5VIien this was done, 2/18 Australian Imperial Force
Battalion was in possession of the area between Milestone 76 and
Milestone 74 on Mersingjemaluang road. As this area was most
 Tlir. LAST \VELR IN SOUTH MAtAVA 287

suitable for ambush, one was prepared therein, svith elaborate

artiheiy and mortar suppwt. It w mentioned that the Japanese
did make contact with Dritish patrols at about 1800 hours near
Afilestonc 76 and mored into the rubber estate to the west of the
road. They could have rome into contact with a company of
2/JO Australian Impcnal Force Battalion in that estate, but it
was a part of the ambush plan not to be discovered tijcrcin and so
nofhin;j happened. The hostilities commenced at 0115 hours on
27 January 1912 sshen another company, the one at Milestone 74,
contacted the Japanese. One hour later a third company, the one
at mile 74 w.ii also in toucli wiili the Japanese. These move-
ments of the Japanese prosrd to be extremely valuable for the
Australian force. They had entered tlic trap. At 0330 hours 2/10
Field Regiment and mortars opened their fire on the Japanese
more or less concentrated on the ridge, cast of the road near Mile-
stone 75. All the companies of 2/18 Australian Imperial Force
Battalion took part in the stormy attack and continued their fight
for nearly five lioun, until 0800 hours. As result, the Japanese
advance was clteckcd, and the Australian withdrawal was accelerat-
ed and c.inried out according to plan.
On 27 January 1012, the situation in the words of the
Supreme Commander was as follows: The fighting in Johore
continued to go badly, and I realised that there was danger that
the troops on the mainland would be destroyed before the reinforce-
ments (4-1ih Indian Infantry Brigade and remainder of 18th
Division) could disembark at Singapore and reach Johore. The
Jap.anese had made a fresh landing on the cast coast at Endau.
I judged that it would be better to withdraw the force from the
mainland into the island and continue the fight there rather
than that it should be ovcnvhelmed before the reinforcements
landed. On 27 J.anuaty I cabled to General Fcrcival giving him
discretion to withdraw into the island if he considered advisable.**
Tlie follosving was the actual cable: Primary objects are to gain
time and cause maximum loss to enemy. You must judge when
witlidrawal to island is necessary to avoid disorganisation and
unnecessary losses of men and material which may prejudice
defence of island, which you must be prepared to hold for many
months. You can only judge tone by keeping ivq,- chse watch
on battle. Good luck, am sure can trust your judgement. Kwp
me frequently informed .** General Pcrcival had been assessing
the whole situation quite independently of the
Supreme Com-
mander. To him the decisis-c factor was the disappearance of the
4 Waveir* D/jfdlJi, pp. 6-7 Pam 21.
iliid. Appendix *b. p. 13.
288 CAMPAIGNS IN SOimi-ZAST ASIA J9H-42 MAIAVA

ISlh Indian Infantry Brigade as a Rgbung force and the opening

of the v.TSt coast road to the Japanese. The collapse of that
sector had jeopardised the defence^l along the lineln southjohore.
In the \s-cstcm sector of the three brigades, 15th and
28th. Indian Inlantry Brigades and 53rd British Infantry Brigade,
the first had been disorganised, as mentioned earlier, and the
problem on 27 January was one of the sursns'al of indrvaduals. Of
those whosvent towards the coast, as many as two thousand** crowd-
ed at Ponggor and srtnt to Singapore by quiet nightly evacuations
by sea. There were minor evacuations from the mouths of the
Senggarang and Bata risers and from other scattered spots on the
seashore. At the same time those who wnt into the interior
of the country to the east of the road, reached Benut, where 3/16
Punjab (less one company) and a battery of 135 Field Regiment
asvaited the arriv'al of these unfortunate men. These included
a party of 6 Norfolk and the misstf^ company of 3/16 Punjab and
some of 2 Cambridgeshire and 5 Norfolk from Senggarang. It
is interesting to note that the Japanese did not in the least interfere

with the naval eA'acuadons and only threw grenades across the
river in the Sss^araog area. So far as the 53rd British Infanti}*
Brigade svas eoacemed, its main task was to mthdraw behind
the 28ih Indian Infantry Brigade. Brigadier Duke was given
discretion to destroy the bridge at Benut but be must hold the
village until the dawn of 28 January 19-12, awaiting the arrival
of the men of the ISlh Indian Infantry Brigade.
In IVcstforcc area withdrawals continued during the 27th-
The Japanese contacted 2/26 Australian Imperial Force Battalion
and infiltrated round its left fltnfc- Determined counter-attacks
Vi'err: latmchcd at them, but at about 1800 hours the battalion
withdrew from Milestone 46 to AIileone4IJ, to come on the right
of 2 Gordons- This uncovered the junction of the main and
Layang Layacg roads before all 9tb Division transport had complet-
ed its mos'c to the main road Isom Layang Layang, but the enemy
did not follow up 2f26tb Battalion suHiciently quickly as to inter-
fere.* The Japanese continued their aerial bombing on the 27th
Australian Brigade Group, paying particular attention to the field
artillery positions, but the Austradians changed the position of
guns as often as possible. The 8th Indian Infantry Brigade was in
contact with the Japanese at dawn, but there was no particular
pressure on it. At appraxzmatefy 1000 hours, 2{10 Bafoch with-
drew through 1/13 Frontier Force Rifies and look up positions
^tVar ZKuT. HeatSeoaiun Malaya CmnBaiai, 27 Jamtai7 1M2. 2140
7 Major E.FJ3. Hyue: AcouBt tt the Mataya Cuipajpi, m. 222-5. The
AutnlUa acesust ny* that the trithdrawal look place atis tbe Dimaa gaa
tracapm had ercDe thnwgii. Sec 270-71.
 Tire LArr \N*Eti: is sotmi UAijkVA 289

astride the railway just nortli of Rengam railway station. The

Baliawalpur Slate rorcc remained astride the main road on the left.
TTien at about 1200 hours jy]3 Frontier Force Rliles p.'uvd
through 2/10 Baluch and went back to a position which was two
miles away, astride the railtt-ay line. 3/17 Dogra stood on the left
cco-cring the Rcngam Simpang Rengam road. At about J300
hours the Japanese ground forces made contact simultaneously
with this brigade, especially 2/10 Baluch. There were some
casualties, some of svham had to be left behind. The Japanese
worked rapidly round the kft, and consequently the Bahawalpur
battalion and 2/10 Balucit were ordered out and a road bridge
was blosvn by the sappers and miners before leasing. The brigade
a.TU of withdrais'al was the railway, because by 1630 houn all
guns and * wheeb had been withdrawn and sent off by a
roundabout route to a place thirty miles behind. Everything essen-
tial for forty-eight hours had to be carried on the man.
Men were supplied >riih one hundred and eighty rounds each,
and all automatic magazines were filled and carried by hand.
TIic intention of the divisional commander was to send rations
up by rail on subsequent dayi, casualties being evacuated in the
same manner.
By 1900 hours the flth fodian Infantry Brigade concentrated
inarubberestate close to LayangLayang railway station, prepared
for a sliort rest before moving back again on the following
morning to positions through which the 22nd Indian Infantry
Brigade was to come. But at 2030 hours the Japanese artillery
opened long-range fire and the bivouac area was being shelled
by mortars tr.nnsportcd by rail. Brigadier Lay decided to move
back another two or more miles to the position whicli he was due
to occupy only the next morning. He informed the commander
of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade fay telephone tliat he was doing
so forthwith. It was a moonlit night and the brigade mored
back cons'enicntly. But in the words ofBrigadicr G.W.A- Painter,
this action scaled the fate of22nd Brigade. During the night tlic
enemy mowd in strength in MT
round the right flank where
numerous roads existed far clear of the position and occupied
Layang Layang unopposed, thus cutting the railway behind the
brigade ** \Vhcn the Sth Indian Infantry Brigade svithdresv
through the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade the Japanese followed
up closely, and 5/II Sikh which was covering the withdrawal
of J/I3 Frontier Force Rifles became engaged. But soon the situa-
3*
tion svas stabilised although all carriers had gone and only two

Bngadicr G.tV.A. Paioler : Personal amuot, pp. 24-25.

290 cAifPAicxs IX socrn-EAST asia 19'11-42 malaya

mortars had remained behind. At nightfall they dosed in towards

the railway and asked for permission to svithdraw gradually down
the road to Layang Layang. This was not given as the divisional
commander wanted them to withdraw slosvly down the railway
on to the brigade during the next day. It was then dedded that
they might w^thdra^^ to a position halfa mile south, and permission
WHS sought to send a company to hold Layang Layang. The latter
also was not agreed to. At 1950 hours the Japanese opened
mortar and machine-gun fire and finding none at Layang Laj'ang.
as time went on, they mossed from both flanks and occupied it,
missing the rear party of the 8lh Indian Infantry Brigade by less
than one hundr^ yards. 5/11 Sikh had the worst position in
all these changes in which it settled before midnight but had the
greatest difficulty in cstabliihing communication sdth the brigade,
sv-hich was eventually possible hooking in on the raihvay
telephone ivircs.
In the eastern sector 2/18 Australian Imperial Force Battalion
withdrew to positions in depth on the east coast road between
Ulu Sedili and Dohol. One company svas left in the rear of 2/20
Australian Imperial Force Battalion to cover its withdrawal. As
the Japanese were still recovering from the shock of the previous
day 2/20 Australian Imperial Force Baltabon enjoyed a quiet
day at jemaluang and withdrew in the evening to Milestone 29
area, about four miles north of Kota Tingqi, 2/18 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion also iritbdrew then.

THE 9th IStHAN DCVISIOX OECWATEd

28 Januar>' 1912 was remarkable for tivo inadents, one
the final decision to withdrasy the whole British army from the
mainland to the Island of Singapore and the other the tfisaster
to the 22nd Indian Infan^ Brigade. General \VavcU had left
the decision about the tinung of withdrawal to the
Malava
Command which came to the condusion on 28
Janua^ that
withdrawal without any further delay was necessary
to save the
situation. General ^Vavcll agreed to it and despatched
the foUnw
ing cable to the British Chiels of Staff.
"Perdval I
last night (28 January 1942) that after consulting
in Johore he had decided to withdraw to Singapore
January SO/JannaTr 31. I hav. .pprd
Japanese supenonty on ground and
^eijon.
m S Jew
Endan aarly n.ld.draal inaviabfc
httle loss
air and
^
darirabL
and disorganisation as possible .*
landin-
^
y*\S'Tyn DtspaH, Ap^ciidlx C p, 13,
 Tire LAST \\Txi: iw soimi malaya 291

TJic plan of withdrawal, which had been drawn up in detail

by the III Indian Corps *cn\isagcd a coordinated withdrawal
by night on all Tour routes with a final withdrawal to the island on
the night 303! January this was to be carried out rapidly
in MT. For the immediate ground defence of the Causeway
an outer and inner bridgehead were organbed. .Careful plans
were made for the anti-aircraft defence of the Causesvay and for the
convcj'ancc of troops, but not \-ehiclcs, by water craft as an alterna-
tive to the Causeway*'. Tlirce b.aitalions svith supporting arms
svere allotted for the defence of the outer bridgehead, and one
battalion {2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders), for the defence
of the inner bridgehead.
The second important des-elopment was the disaster ivhich
overtook the 9lh Indian Division on the railway front. First of
all Major-General Barstmv disappeared, whose body was later
found by the Japanese and then the n holc of the 22nd Indian
Inanlry Brigade svent into liquidation leaving only a fesv surv'ivors
to relate its fate.

All svas quiet in the camp of (he 8th Indian Infantry Brigade
on t!iemornlngof28januaryand the 22nd Tndianinfaniry Brigade
was expected to pats through during the night of 28/29 January
1812. t/nfortun.itely (he railway bridge between milestone
439 and milestone 440* in the south of Layang Layang, had been
blosvn up before time the previous night, and this was a severe
handicap to the withdrawal of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade,
besides snapping the wire which served as the only communication
between the two brigades at this tirae. At 0900 hours Major-
General Banfow, the commander of the 9th Indian Dhnsion,
passed up the railway line on a trolley to make contact with the
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, as it svas now out of touch with
the other brigade. He ordered 2/10 Baluch to occupy the
commanding ridge position which had not been done earlier and
then proceeded on the trolley up to the deomllshed bridge and
then walked across it At about half a mile furllier on and on
the railway embankment, they svere ambushed at close range.
Soon after their departure shots svere heard; and, later, the two
staff ofilcers arrived at 2/10 Baluch Regiment headquarters.
Tlicy reported that they had escaped, and they could say nothing
of Major-General Barslow svho had jumped on the opposite side.
It was presumed that he was shot dead.
The fate of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade was, equally
tragic. Its ordeal began on 20 January 1942 and ended on 2

93 A (ilsry ot 5th BatuUon (D.CO.) The Siib, p.2t, pan 15.

292 CAMPAIGNS LV SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

Fcbruar) 1942, thus lasting five days. Brigadier Painter had to

get back to Layang Layang according to the understandmg with
Brigadier Lay. He put forth bis best efforts in reaching it, from
morning till c^ening, through the swamp and jungle on the
ss-estem side of the railway. He failed. Meanwhile he learnt
that the 8lh Indian Infantry Brigade had gone back to Sedenak.
He decided to abandon Layang Layang as his objective and to go
to Sedenak through the jungle svest of the railway. Unfortunately
he lost his way and wandered in the forests for three days without
food and shelter. His responsibility was great. ?sot only was he
to lead the whole brigade, but he was also to carry the many
wounded on stretchers up the hills, over fallen trees, through
thorny bushes and across rasdnes and swamps. In the absence
of composes and maps the brigade reached a belt of open
coimtry and was lucky in coming across some Chinese guides.
With the help of one of these the brigade crossed to the east of the
railway. On 31 January it was able to find a hospital to leave
the wounded irilh a doctor and a fesv attendants. On 1 February,
the brigade broke up but some of the men were fortunate enough
to cross into Singapore Island during the night from points facing
the Naval Base.

rURTHER WTTHDaAWAlS

Elsewhere svithdrawal proceeded without any remarkable

incident. On the west coast road, 3/16 Punjab waited for the
blowing up of the bridge at Benut and, when it was done, withdrew
through 3 Cas'alry positions to an area behind, the S. Sanglang,
about eight miles south of Benut. 3 Cas'alry then passed
through to a position about one mile in the rear. About mid-
day the bridge over the S. Sanglang was blown and 3/16 Punjab
withdrew through the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade to the Bonider
position near hiilestone 22 on Fontian Kechll^kudai road, where
it was to cover the Gunong Pulai reservoir. 3 Casalry
rejoined the 28th Indian Iclantry Brigade. 2/2 Gurkha Rifles
saw approximately one thousand men of the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade, about two hundred Garhsralis (all that then remained of
the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade), and men of the 53rd British
Infantry Brigade, pass t^ogh them. The night was quiet; and
a part>* of twenty men mosed off to the water-works which
svere four miles from the main road with the dual role of linking
up with 1/14 Punjab and delayir^ the Japanese if they should
come down along one of the tracks leading from the north and
the water-works lo a point at Milestone 27 on the Pontian Kechil-

THE LAST WTJLK W SOim! MALAYA 293

Si'ud.TC road. 2/0 Gurldi.! Rida remafncd about a mi/e behind

the T
junction at Iontian KechH, Mth one comp.my fonsTird
of Uic Pontian Bc?ar river. 1/14 Punj.Tb covered the Pontian
Kcchil*Kukup road with one company to the can of 2/2 Gurkha
Rifles near the T
junction and another company at the Boulder
Position. The Japanese planet kept flyin5 over the track from the
PontianBesar water-works to Milestone 27 on the Pontian Kechil
Skudat road and caused apprehemion regarding the sccurit)* f
the brigades line of withdrawal. To render this line of communica-
tion more secure, 2/9 Jat which was at Milestone 0 on Johorc

Bahru Kota Tinggi road was sliiftcd to Milestone 29 on Pontian
Kechil-Skudai road uith its ro/c to prcticnt any parties of the
enemy from crossing the road and mosing southward between
inclusive 33 milestone to inclusis'c 29 milestone*.* However
its furtljcr orders sverc to move to Singapore after 28th Indian

Infantr)' Brigade had passed through to the area of 25 MS **

and the battalion mostd in motor transport for Singapore,** on the
following day at 2100 hours.
In the centre, Westforcc ssms none too happy, because * the
enemy is in such close contact*, and men svere fatigued.** The
Japanese attacked 2 Gordons at 0900 hours, 2/26 Australian
Imperial Force BattaUon at MOO hours and 2/30 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion at 1530 hours, the gap between 2
Gordons then in the fonvard position at Milestone and 2/30 4M
Australian Imperial Force Battalion at Milestone 40J being
one mile; their flanks resting on a thick jungle. By 1700 hours
the last of these three battilions sa\-cd 2 Gordons by a ba>'onet
attack and also took charge of the position involving an area
about a mile long. The whole brigade then vdlhdrcw by 2200
hours to the area between Milestone 30| and Milestone 27.
So far as the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade was concerned its
losing contact svith the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade compelled
the disTsional commander to mo\-c the troops on to the ground
covering tlie vital railway bridge** and to ascertain the situation
and clear up the position by capturing the high ground through
svhich the raihvay had made a cutting, at a mile south of Layang
Layang. D Company svhich was selected as a fighting patrol of
2/10 BalucJi moved forward along the raihvay, but before it could
reach the railway cutting it was fired on and took cover.
B Company was then sent ssith instructions to occupy the ground
*' War Diary, 2/9 Jaf, 27 January 1912.
28 Jaituary J942.
S3
54 Singstiori Ftll, ep. til., pp. I32<133.
SSCoIanetVV.A. Troll: Short account diiefly from die Q.side. p. 9.
294 cAMPAic.ss j,v sotrni*EAsr asia 19n-42 malaya

on the left side of the railway, the idea being that thh would help
the capture of the high ground by tlm company. B Company
started on its route at 1030 hours. But it was soon caught in
a ss>*amp. Besides, the jungle was %'ery tliick, control of men and
movement became diflicult, and the Japanese were in stronger
numbers than had been reported. It was not long before the
wounded and other men began to come back with Bren guns far
which they had no ammunition. B Company had consequently
to fall back and join A Company. For some time the situation
looked serious. But as good luck would have it the Japanese
did not immediately follosv up and when they did, they did not
press round the flanks as usual- Probably tlic ' going * was as
bad for them as it was for the Baluch Regiment. In the after-
noon, six bo.s of *303 ammunition arrived, and later, a further
consignment was received. But these were pracucally useless,
because in the late evening, orders for the usual withdrawal came,
and the brigade reached ^denak in the early hours of 29 January
1942, 4S4 Field Battery cosxring the brigade withdrawal. During
the afternoon the Bahass-atpur State Infantr)- had gone in advance
to Sedenak to protect the arlillcry and transport, ^\^len the
whole brigade and Field Battery troop reached Sedenak this
Indian State Infantry was sent ba^ to Kulai area. The troop
attached to 4$4 Field Battery also mos'ed back to this area soon
after.
In the east 2/18 Australian Imperial Force Battalion was dispos-
ed, by morning of 28 January 1942, in depth on the road between
Dohol and Mawai, less one company at Lombong l>'iag at the end
of a ade road running ofT to the west- Immediately behind this
battalion was 2/17 Dogra in the neighbourhood of Mawai cross-
roads with one company svalching Use mouth of the SedIU river.
There was no contact with Japanese ground troops but their aero-
planes were fairly activx, bombing the vacant Jemaluang area.
In the evening 2/18 Australian Imperial Force Battalion withdrew
through 2/17 Dogra and then, passing through 2/20 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion moved to Milestone 23 about three miles
south of Kota Tingp.
29 January 1942 was not sxmspicuous for any major event.
It was a day of coordinated withdrawal from all fronts. In the
wetem front the Japanese movements sscrc extremely puzzling.
There were any number of entrances into the British zone, and
they were mating use of most of them. The crowd at Ponggor
remained still to be evacuated. On this date one senior officer,
eighteen officers and four hundred and fifty other rants were
evacuated, and six hundred still remained there at the end of the
 THE LAST UTEK IN SOiml JIALAYA 295

day. Tlic Japanese were reported entering in rubber boats up

the Santi rir.
2/2 Gurkha Regiment was the fonvard baltaUon on die
west coast road area. The Japanese came into contact with a
platoon of D
Company of this battalion at 0930 hours. Two
Japanese c^Tlists dresv levef with the platoon position, and it svas
possible to catch them and take them pruoner. But svhen this
was attempted the J.ipancsc opened up maclimc-gun fire. Mlet
half an hour a hcav) concentration of the Gurkha's gun-fire svas
brought down on and around the position occupied by thcjapancsc.
In spite of this, the Jap.incse, whose strength ss-as about one
company, deployed some distance down the road, but were again
fired on by two platoons of D Company. There svas sporadic
Japanese fire on D Company's position during the morning, svhicli,
hosves'cr, caused no further casualties. The Gurkhas had the
support of four 4*5-Hosvitzers with A Company, and these gasc
continuous help by firing at rapid intcrs'als and plastering the
road and the scrub jungle In front of D Company. In the after-
noon the Japanese fire ceased entirely in front of D Company, but
one of their aeroplanes made a machine-gun attack on the Gurkha
position on Pontian Kechil, sviihout causing any damage, however.
At 1800 houn, 0 Company svithdrew from its position half a
mile north of Pontian Besar and passed through A Company,
which also Uicn withdrew, and the bridge at Pontian fiesar svas
blown up. Shortly after dark, this battalion arrived at Milestone 27,
sshich sva-s nine miles from Pontian Kechil, and took up its posi-
tions for tlic night. It may be added that when it passed Pontian
Kechil at IBIS hours, S/M Punjab covered it and came in rcscn'c
afterwards at .a point one mile behind milestone 27. 2/9 Gurkha
Regiment svas in position on the right of 2/2 Gurkha Regiment,
and 3 Cavalry and B Company of 1/14 Punjabsvas in the Rcsers'oir
Area.**
As had been expected, the Japanese had tried to outflank
the main British position by coming dosvn a track leading to the
Watcr-svorks, and D
Company platoon did some useful svork in
checking the Japanese mos'cment before svilhdrawing according
to plan and in conformity svitb the battalions srithdrawal The
details of this action svill not be irrelevant here. The action
opened at 1430 hours, svhen a platoon of 5/14 Punjab observed
some Japanese platoons moving eastsvards along a track three
hundred yards from the far bank of the river. Thereafter all
three platoons of company of 5/14 Rinjab were afforded fleeting

SS Colonel A.M.L. Ilarruon: Ilistery llth lodun Divisloa in Malays.

37 Hut.
296 CASIPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ^A 1941-42 MALAYA

targets as the Japanese passed eastwards or approached the

demolished bridges. Evidently things were piling up for the pla-
toon of 2/2 Gurkha Regiments D Company, which was holding
the pumping station to protect a track which took off via the
Gunong Pulai reservoir to the Skudai road. At 1600 hours,
two Japanese scouts approached the pumping station, and after
them came the main body of those scouts. As soon as these were
in sight and at two hundred yards range, the Gurkha platoon
opened fire, killed eight and scattered the rest of the Japanese. But
at 1630 hours the Japanese returned and attacked this platoon
with machine-gun and mortar fire, and by 1730 hours the attackers
numbered two companies. Time was now precious, because this
platoon, along with C Company of 5/14 Punjab, had been made
responsible for the protection of the north flank of the Brigade's
withdrawal up to 1830 hours, when the two were to withdraw
via the reservoir to Milestone 22- The platoon informed the
Punjabi company that it would try strictly to stick to the time-
schedule, but might not be able to hold out much longer. At
.

1745 hours, the Japanese outflanked the platoon astride the

track to the Reservoir but sverc still three miles from the Skudai
road. So the platoon sidestepped westivards to join G Company
of 5/14 Punjab, which was at Parit Lama, and they withdresv
together to 2/9 Jat'a position at Milestone 29 along a track.
At 2200 hours a squadron of 3 Cavalry reported that it was
being heavily attacked in the Reservoir Area and falling back
to the Caaieway.
The 53rd British Brigade and 2/9 Jat left for Singapore
after dark. On arrival there Brigadier Duke assumed command
of the original battalions, namely, 5 and 6 Norfolks and 2
Cambridgeshire. 3/16 Punjab, which contained barely one hund-
red men, and 2/9 Jat joined the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade.
In the Wcslforcc, during the day the Japanese were parti-
cularly active against 2/26 Australian Imperial Force Battalion
and 2 Gordons, both on the ground and in the air. During the
afternoon the Japanese penetrated the position occupied by 2/30
Australian Imperial Force Battalion. A counter-attack adjusted
matters very satisfactorily and the position became quiet again.
2/30 Australian Imperial Force Battalion mosed back to 25-milc
post during the late aficmoon, and 2 Gordons commenced their
withdraival after nightfall. IVhile 2/30 Ausinshan Imperial Force
BatuHon withdrew two mile* more to get nearer 2/2G Australian
Imperial Force Battalion which vras at 21-milc post, 2 Gordons
went as far back as 5 mile to take up its role as a bridge-head
force.
 THE LAST WEEK IN SOUTH SfALAYA 297

So far as the 8th Tndian Infantry Brigade ^vas concerned,

there was no great activity during the day. At Sedenak, 1/13
Frontier Force Rifles was fonvard astride the railway, 3/17 Dogra
stood on the right side and 2/10 fialuch faced both flanks. Trans-
port had been waiting and supplies were replenished. Part of
464 Battery remained to give support. But at 1700 hours the
Japanese struck at A Company of 2/10 BaJuch, which su/Tered
several casualties within half an hour, especially among men
moving about wth reserve ammunition. Immediately afterwards
the Japanese moving down the raihvay engaged 1/13 Frontier
Force Rifles, and one of their parties began to work round the
left of 2/10 Baluch. But as it was already time to withdraw in
accordance with the divisional orders, the brigadier decided
to pull out. 3/17 Dogra had a hard job in breaking off the fight,
but did so finally without undue casualties. 1/13 Frontier Force
Rifles followed suit and withdrew to positions about one and a half
miles behind on the railway line. 2/10 Baluch in turn passed
through 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles. Unfortunately this battalion
did not know that one company of I/I3 Frontier Force Rifles had
not come back when the Baluch withdrew. Most of this company
was temporarily lost, some rejoining the brigade later. As usual,
the Japanese did not follow up as darkness came on.
On arrival at Kulai at about 2200 hours the brigade halted,
and defensive positions were taken up during darkness, 2/lD
Baluch astride the railway >vith l/13FrontierForce Rifles echeloned
back on its right. Once again 464 Battery was in support. The
8th Indian Infantry Brigade rested tiU daylight of 30 January.
In the eastern sector* on 29January 1942, the forward troops
of Eastforcc comprised 2/17 Dogra which was covering the Mawai
cross-roads area. There was no contact with the Japanese ground
forces during the day. In the afternoon the detached company
at the Sedili Boom was withdrawn. Meamvhile 2/20 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion which was near milestone 29 (about
four miles north of Kota Tinggi) moved back through 2/18
Australian Imperial Force Battalion, which was at Miletsone
23, to the Tebrau area to be ready to take its place in the Johorc
Bridge-head force. When it was evening 2/17 Dogra fell back to
the line of the Kota Tinggi river and the bridge was blown. As
the last troops were withdrawing from Mawai, sounds of firing
were heard from the direction of the mouth of the Sekati river,
and it was probable that the Japanese landed there after the
company of 2/10 Dogra had left.

sS Major E.rj}. Hrde: Account of tlie Lblaym C2mpu:a. 29 Januarr 1942.

298 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 SfALAYA

EVACUATION OP THE MAINLAND

30 January 1942 was the last day of the struggle of the British
army on the mainland of Malaya. On the Skudai road, there
was patrol contact on the fronts of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles at Milestone
27 about 1000 hours, and of 3 Cavalry at the reservoir just before
1430 hours, which was the hour fixed for the start of the svith-
drawal- From dasvn, patrols ofA Company, D Company and head-
quarters company worked tvth 2/9 Gurkha Rifles and 3 Cavalr)*,
who were sending patrols on the right flank. All was quiet on
this front, although the sounds of fighting heard throughout
the mght from the direction of the main road were still coming.
But, os stated already, a slight disturbance started at about 1000
hours and the British artillery brought dosvn a hca%y barrage
on the road and neighbouring country. Later on io the morning,
additional small parties of Japanese tnx>p$ were seen Once again
by B Company of 2/2 Gurldia Rifles but were iBspcrsed as before
by the British artillerj'. Throughout the morning a Japanese
reconnaissance plane was circling o\'er the whole of Gurkha
position and preventing them from moving about. Shortly a/ler
midday, the brigadier announced the orders for the final with-
drawal from the mainland to the Island of Singapore. The
MalajTi Command had spared no attempts to find the 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade but had failed.** Meanwhile, General 4Savel],
who had proposed sTsiting Singapore with air Marshal Sir Richard
Pcirse** (iMr Chief of American BritUh Dutch and Australian
command and commander of the Allied Air Force), arrived
at Singapore onthudate, visited Johore, saw Gcnerak Perdval,
Heathand Gordon Bennett and discussed plans forthe withdrawal.*
It svas decided at this meeting that this ivitbdrawal could not be
delayed any loiter in the hope of recerveru^ the 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade in time to get on to Singapore Island before the
Causeway was blown up. 1430 hours was also fixed as the hour
when movements relating to withdranTil would begin in this sector.
In consequence of this derision, 2/2 Gurkha Rifles began the first
backward mosc cosxred by 2/9 Gurkha Rifles and the armoured
cars ofS Cavalry. The ss-iihdrawal was diWdcd into four stages, the
fust stage being Milestone 23 for A company, Milestone
23J for D
andH Companies, Milestone 24 for C Company and Milestone
24j for B Company. 2/9 Gurkha Rifles was in a similar position
on the road in the rear of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles. The withdrawal
 TItE LAST WEEK IN SOUTH MALAVA 299

of fonvard companies was accomplished without incident,

although the armoured cars of 3 Ga\'alry'had a successful encounter
with a party of the Japanese in the village at Milestone 27. The
morale of the brigade was excellent. A Company of2/2Gurl:ha
Rifles reached Milestone 23 at 1600 hours, and the second stage
of withdrawal began at 1700 hours. This ended at a position
between Milestone 19 and Milestone 18 just before dark. At
Milestone 22 a position, known as Bouidcr Position, had been
held by the companies of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles and 5/14 Punjab, and
here the battalions passed all brigade transport svhich had been
sent back during the previous night At 1900 hours it started
raining. But motor transport arrived to carry every one for all
the remaining miles up to Singapore. The third stage was carried
out exactly like the second, with companies taking up positions at
half mile intervals, so that from Milestone II to Milestone 20
there sverc troops at regular intervab guarding the road. Finally,
after thirty minutes halt, the companies embussed once again and
started on the fourth stage. This withdrawal started from Skudai
T junction and passed through Johore Bahru. There svas, fortuna-
tely, no Interference bj* the Japanese. There was a standing order
that Skudai corner must be denied to the Japanese until midnight
of this day, but the Japanese made no attempt to interfere svith the
withdrawal. The brigade tliereforc reached Singapore Island
about the midnight of 30/31 January 1942, 3 Cavalry acting as
rearguard with 344 Field Batteiy in support.
On the morning of 30 January 1942, IVcslforcc was disposed
north of Kulai as mentioned earlier. Owing to the convergence
of the main road and railway there, the 27th Australian Imperial
Force Brigade and 8th Indian Infantry Brigade were very near
each other. The Japanese aeroplanes were extremely active,
but most of their bombing and machine-gunning svas directed
against the artillery with the Indian brigade and the Australians
on the left. At lOOO hours, the order of withdrawal to Singapore
at the end of the day arrived. At 1330 hours it was discovered
that the Australians on the leA of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade
had gone back up to hfilestone 19 leaving the left flank of the
Indian brigade completely exposed. A and C Companies of
2/10 Baluch were therefore slightly wifhdrasvn and adjusted to
meet the situation. In the afternoon this battalion fell back
through I/I3 Frontier Force Rifles to take up a position on the
right of the Australian brigade, just north of Kulai railway station.
1/13 Frontier Force Rifles, Bahawalpur Stale Infantry and 3/17
"Dogra were then ordered to withdraw through 2/10 Baluch. As
these units reached the railway station area, the Japanese appeared
300 cAin>Aics'5 IN sot'm-itAST asia 1911-42 Malaya

in Kulai village on top of the brigade headquarters, ivhich was

also moNang back. It was the usual cj'clist force which had made
flanidng movement from the east. 1 /13 Frontier Force Rifles attack-
ed thejapanese with two companies and by dusk cleared the area.
With the 8th Indian lnfontr>' Brigade in this position,
volunteers were chosen to remain on the mainland and get into
contact with the lost 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade svith a Anew
to helping the men to readi the coast They svere given certain
secret signals and rendezvous on the coast of Johorc, opposite the
Singapore Island. But this party had no success in its mission
and ultimately rejoined Its brigade in Singapore.
As soon as it was dark, the 8ih Indian Inlantrj' Brigade and
the Australians commenced to withdraw. In the former 1/13
Frontier Force Rifles was followed by 3/17 Dogra and Bahawalpur
State Infantry, with 2/10 Baluch bringing up the rear- "ITie
Japanese shelled the road and tried to interfere with the withdrawal,
but without success. After a short march, the brigade embussed
and proceeded to Singapore.
In the eastern sector there was still no contact on 30 January
between Eastforte and the Japanese, and 2/17 Dogra had a quiet
day in its posidoas be)'ond the Kota Ttaggi river.
The following account by General Percival describes the end
of the w-iihdrawa!. The filial withdrawal aert^s the Causeway
on the night of 30*31 January was carried out wnihout inddent
and with little interfererce from the enemy's air force. By about
6 3.01. on 31 January all troops, except those in the bridgeheads and
those still missing, were track on Singapore Island. All w^re
weary. Many had been fighting, and withdrawing to fight
again, in an ediausling climate and cruel country for sescn weeks
on end and in the face of a powerful enemy equipped with ei*er)
adi:ant2 ge. The mist remarkable thing perhaps is that so many
of them were still full of fight after such an ordeak
" By 7 a.m. the 1st battalion of the outer bridgehead, the
Gordons, svas crossing the Causeway. Behind it came the inner
bridgehead, the ArgjUs, headed by their pipes. By 8 a.m.
Lieutenant'Colonel Stewart stepped ont of Johore on to the
Causeway, the last to do so. The Causeway, which was solidly
built, was se\-enty feet wide at the water line and wider Etefow iu
Its demolition presented certain technical difficulties. Neverthe-
a demolition had been successful!)' inserted in it by the Ro)'al
less,
Navy, and at 8*15 a.m. itwase^Iodrd. A moment later the water
was racing through a seventy-foot gap. The operations on the
mainland were at an end and llie battle of Singapore had begunV*'
4* 7b ttV ia Mtlafo, p, 249.
 CHAPTER Xr

The Battle of Singapore

TOPOORAPmCAL

At the beginning of 1942, Singapore was the gateway to

the Far East and the fifth largest port in the svorld. It ranked
with Pearl Harbour, Heligoland and Gibraltar as one of the four
modem impregnable fortresses- It was also the symbol of
the British Empire; with itspossession from 18I9and the expenditure
incurred in building the Xaval Base, meJudmg the famous floating
dock, the largest in the svorld, Britain had become the dominant
power in East Asia.
The Island of Singapore, oblong in shape, measures twenty-
seven miles from east to west and thirteen miles from north to
south and has an area of o\'er two hundred and twenty square
miles. On the north and west it is separated from the mainland
by the straits of Johore which at their narrowest point, namely
Putrl Narrows in the north-western corner of the Island, are seven
hundred yards tvide. It was connected to the mainland, however,
by a stone Causeway 1,100 yards long and wide enough to take
the railway and a broad road. As the straits were sufllciently
deep, the foundations of the Causeway were strong, broad-based
and much below the surface of the water. On the eastern side
of the Causeway, the straits sverc from 1, 100 to about 5,000 yards
svide, and could take the biggest vessels alloat as far as the Naval
Base.
There were numerous smaller islands which were intimately
connected with the development and defence of Singapore Island.
Pulau Ubin in the north-eastern part of the Island gave connection
to Kota Tinggi through the mouth of the Johore river. Pulau
Tekong lay almost covering the mouth of the Johore river, but
its importance was due to the existence of Pengerang Hill, a few
miles east, at the southern tip of the Johore mainland. Immedi-
ately south of Singapore Island lay Pulau Blakang Mati, Pulau
Brani and Pulau Bukum, of which the first was a military reserve
and the tWrd contained the Asiatic PetreAriim CoTrip<anya main
reserves of naval fuel, petrol and lubricating oils. There were
several other islands further south, but these were generally of
no use to the garrbon of Singapore.
At the time of Japanese invasion the population of the
Island was about 800,000 made up of 8,000 Europeans, 20,000
302 CAirTAlCN'S LN IOUTn*EA*T AHA 19J M2* ItAIAVA

^fa^aJs, 20,000 Indiaat and 700,000 C/ifn<*sc. Stn^aporci

prosperity ww
due to the export of rubber and tin, and shipping.
Communications tscre generally good. Tliere w.ts a nctwort of
good metalled roads and many unmctalled ones in the rubber
estates. But the interesting feature about all main roads was
that the)' radiated in all directions only from the city of Singapore.
Tire principal road was the Bukit Tlmah road which was in its
soutlicm half, a double track road ssith a canal in between. On
the sshole, this svas the only road from the south to the north
connecting the Island with the mainland. TJie main line of the rail*
ssay crosd the Johore Gausesvay and ran from north to south
in the centre of the Island as far at Singapore city and port.
The surface of the Islatsd is undulating, wills a number of
small hills var^-lng from seventy to Avc hundred and elgbty-onc feet
in height. Tlic highest of these, Bukit Tlmah, lies in the centre of
the Island, and with St is a group of hills called Bukit Mendai
about three miles north, and Pasir Panjang Ridge about three
miles routh. The latter u four nutes long and runs parallel Co the
coast about a few furlongs from U>e sea, from Pasir Panjang vslUge
to the western outsUru of Singapore city.
Apart from the built*up areas, Sirsgapore Island, like the
rest ofMalaya. was tluckly eosered byrubber and other planutioni
while on the northern and western coasts there were extensive
mangrove swamps. These swamps had, of recent j'ears, owing
to cxtenssVe works of drainage, lost much of their value at mUiur}'
obstacles. It is worthy of notice that while the western coastline
was full of creeks a few of which only were nav-igable, the eastern
and southern coastlines from Changi to Pasir Panjang were less
broken and more beautiful, with extensive sandy bches and
sxry Utile mangnn'c. Consequently, the sea edges of the former
area, which were not os-erlooked from any point inland, could not
be coiered by direct or observed fire, while those of the latter
were more or less perfectly defended by planned fire from the
interior.
The
centre of the Island contained the hlacRiichie, Peirce
and Seleiar reservoirs, and the munidpal catchment area, a large
jungle area traversed only by a few tracks. To the north, the
Naval Base reservation also covered a large traa of country.

OROANsaATlON OT DETBrCX

As
described earlier, the problem of defending Singapore
had received every careful thought and examination. The pre-
war Brfti'h appreciation was that the best locality for a defensive
 TIIE SATTIT. Of SmO.KPORE 303

positionwas that portion of land which lay between the Sungei

Kranji and the Sungei Turong. Hie v-iew then held was that the
most vulnerable beaches of the Island were those facing south
and east towards the open sea- The general lay-out of the defensive
plan was, therefore, formulated on these assumptions, and fixed
defences were constructed generally to meet this contingency.
But when the Japanese came from the north, it became evident
that the British preparations and plans would require readjust-
ment. These fixed defences had taken years to build, invoh'ing
much highly skilled labour and planning. It was therefore no
easy task to modify them to meet the unforeseen northern attack,
but the work was put in hand and was still in progress on the eve
of the Japanese invasion. Furthermore, the Japanese indifference
to swamps, however deep and thorny, gave an unpleasant shock
to the British commanders and Chiefs of Staff. New dbpositions
had therefore to be selected, obstacles built, and the troops put in
new positions as quickly as possible.
It was for tills reason that General WavcU was constantly
reminding General Percival of the strengthening of the north
side of the island and of allied tasks. The Chiefs of Staff in London
had, as already stated, given a list of particular measures to be taken
for the better defence of Singapore Island, and General Wavell
had reported that all those measures were being taken.' The
general outlook in the svhole of the south-west Pacific at the end
of January 1942 was pessimbtic and, although Mr- Churchill had
enjoined that the sv.nr must be fought up to the last bit of land in
the Island, and General Wavell in hb turn had Ordered Malaya
Command that it must fight for every foot of the Island, the opinion
of the High Command on the spot was that they could do no
more than try to defend Singapore Island and that the arri-
val of the air reinforcements promised might yet turn the scale
General Wavell made an estimate of the resources at hb
command for the defence of the Island. He wrote, much
depended on the ability of the garrison of Singapore Island to
make a prolonged resistant*. General Percival had the 18th
Britbh Division practically intact, the 8th Australian Divbion of
two brigades at good strength after arrival of reinforcements, and
the equivalent of some four or five brigades of mixed Britbh and
Indian InfanCry, besides local fbeces. la vhw of fhe siae of the
island thb force was obviously weak in numbers, but the enemy
could not employ large forces, and I considered that an active
defence should enable the island to be held for some time, for some
"ABDACOM, ep. eil.,pp. 34-3\iara 24(d).
* Wavell* Deapstch, pp. 7-e, pan 23. See also para 23.
301 cAiiPAiCNS IN foimi-t.\sr aux I9H-42 malava

and layers of barbed wire; and levcral anti-aircraft emplacements

surrounded tlie central pari of tle Island. After the blowing-up
nf the camcviay, the reiers'oirs sserc strongly defended on all sides.
TIic so-called "fortresses were built in the west from Ajer
15.sjau to south coast, In the north mKranJi area, the Xa\-alBasc
anil Sclctar area, and In ihe east around Loyang. Odicr
defended poslltnns Viith barbed wre entanglements were to the
west of Hill 437, to the south of Hill 327, to the east of Hill 105
in semicircle to the north ofBuIit htandai, and from Buhlt Timah
(Hill 531) to the south eastern end of tJie MacIUtchieResers'oir.
Machine-gun poiitioni sere canitnicted at all possible landing
places along the south coast from tlie Jurong to the Chanci. At
the last moment before the Japanese imasion of the Island the
entire coast facing Joliore State ssat fortified, and obstacles were
constructed on land and sea, with leartlilighti in various places.
Naturally, in these hurried preparations, some defects sere
noticeable. General Percival was not slow to rcalhc these, which
he hat listed as follows:
(I) land mines were unreliable, because

corrosion would set in quickly' In the humid dirruite of the Island

and Uiey would explode at any moment; (ii) much dependence
was placed on the comparatively mtirow neck of land between
Sunget Jurong and Sunget Kranji to oppose a landing the western
shores of the Island. Cut here the ground had been cleared
though no actual defences were consinieted until afteriheoutbreak
of war with Japan; (it!) no defences had been constructed on
the north and west coasts in the pre-war days, and only limited
defences tstre put up esxn after the war had started. The two
reasons for this stale of things were the high policy* governing the
protection of the Naval Base and the non-availability of funds for
such a work; (iv) the defence of the northern shore of Singapore
Island was delayed on onesidc by a scardtyof labourand compli-
cated on the other by the intersection of creeks and mangrove
swamps.
*
The ' Denial
The \Var Office in London had imtrucicd the Malaya
Command, somciimc in the third week ofJanuary 1942, to destroy
all t-aluable stocks to deny their possession to the Japanese.
General \Vavell sympathised with the Malaya Cemmand in their
unenviable position and a^ed that * you cannot fight and destroy
simulfancoitsly with 100 per cent el^cncy in both. After a
thorough dbcussion from every point of view the Chiefs of Staff

rnic, p. 2ecL
 TIIE BATTLE OP SINO.M>ORE 307

finally replied Uiat demolllion of the Xaval Base should be given

first priority and Fortress guas second priority. Other valuable

stores, equipment and irutallatiom should be destroyed on a
priority basis, but tlicir destruction should not be allowed to weaken
the defence.* General Percival adds that Ids plans tocarrj'out
this order were such tluat while actual execution of any denial was
to be done by men In administrative charge of it, the ordering
was reserved to himself, or, in any crisis, to the commander on
the spot. And so far as civil installations were concerned the
Director-General of CKnl Defence was made responsible for tlicir
destruction.

msposmoN* op the ajuiy

The disposition of the Gommonss-ealth army in the Island .

engaged the immediate attention of the Malaya Command.

Tlic basis of defence was, according to General fcrcival, that the
enemy must be prevented from landing, or, if he succeeded inland'
ing. that he must be stopped near the beaches and destroyed or
driven out by countcf'attack This required an " offensive
spirit*, which General Percival invoked in his instructions to
all formation commanden on 3 Februar}'. He wrote, All ranks
must be imbued with the spirit of attack. It is no good waiting
for the Japanese to attack first. The endcas-our of every soldier
must be to locate the enemy, and having located him, to close with
him *. This amounted to fighting the Japanese on the coast
perimeter wherewr they might land, svith the aid of mobile forces
generally and svith rcscn'cs in emergency. The general plan
therefore was to use strong and fresh units in the north-west and
north-cast, other units as rcscrs'c, and to leave no possible gaps
anysvhcrc. According to General Percival the last of these three
principles was the most difficult of all to be attained in practice.
The length of the coastline on the whole was between seventy-
two and eighty miles and there svcrc only 70,000 men on hand,
which amounted to less than a thousand for every mile without
any men in depth or in rcsers'c. Secondly, speed was the essence
of the Japanese plan, and they would not allow the defenders
to be reinforced by any means. * On land no more reinforcements
were available for some weeks,''* nor new weapons and equipment.
General Wavell considered the removal of fighter aircraft
to Sumatra and the rcorganisauon of Indian formations as an

8 * JJIDJCOM , efi. H/., p. 36, par* 24 (), ihc last lub-para.

s TJU IVar in Afairra, pp. 263-6i.
** tVaveKli Dupaiti, p. 5 para 25.
303 cAUPAlc^s solth-zast aka I4M2 ualaya

essential preliminary to the organisation of the general defence of

the Island. The wthdran-al of the troops from the mainland
exposed three out of the four aerodromes on the Island to artillery
fire. These were Tcngah, Sembawang and Selctar. The
increased scale ofJapanese air attack on aerodromes had already
necessitated the removal of the bomber squadrons to more secure
bases in Sumatra. To leaso fighters on the exposed aerodromes
in Singapore was to imdte their dcstractioa in a fw da>s. Hence
General Wavell ordered the withdrawal of the majority of the
fighters to Sumatra to protect the air bases there, which, with the
loss of Malasa, became absolutety \ital to the defence of the
remaining Allied possessions. The equivalent of one ^hter
squadron was kept in Singapore, to be reinforced, as occasion
demanded, by other fighters from Sumatra. This decision was
open to criticism as not only deprivii^ the land forces of protection
against air attacks but also dcmoraliiing the whole fighdng force
and the dsil populadon; but it was inesitable. The fighter
squadron retained on the Island (one Qight of eight Hurricanes
a^ another of eight BuOaloes) was based at Kallang (svithout
the advantage of obsen-ed artiUeiy fire), and to it svere added on
] Febniar)- 1942 fort>'*<Jgbr Hurricanes of the latest tj/pt,
although generallyspeaijagairrtioibrcements were only suifiaent
to replace vrastage.
So Car as Indian formations were concerned, they wtre
reorganised so that a small Corps Headquarters was retained
not only to control all Indian dniiions and brigades but also to be in
operational command of the Xorthem Area and in charge of the
domestic afilun .of the I2th antt 44tb Indian Infantry Brigades.
Further, remnants of the 9ili Indian Dis-ision were incorporated
srilh the 11th Indian Dhasion. The HI Corps was made up of
the 1 1th Indian Diviuoo and the I8th British Division. Thereafter
the defences of Singapore Island were organised in three areas,
together cos'ering the entire coastline of the Island.
three areas were as follows: * Details of the

(i) JiOTthem Ana, under HI Corps. Troops: 18th British

and litb Indian Divisiens. .^rea: from the Causesi^y eastwards
to Changi, i.c.eiclusis-eChangisiUageexdusheYan^ts-iUagc

iodusis-e Pa>-a Lebar s-iUagc-cxdum-e Pierce Reserroir exdush-e

Point 135 (7519) cxdush-e Woodlands. Dispositions: Right
18th British Division, with 54th Infantry Brigade on the right and
55lh Infantry Brigade on the left. Left Ilth Indian Division,
with 15th Indian Infantry Brigade on the right, 8th TnHian

'* TV IIV 0 J/stm. f 253

 niE BATTLE Of SLSOAFORZ 309

Infanlry Brigade in the centre and 28Ui Indian Infantry Brigade

on the left. After a few days, the 53fd British Infantry Brigade
occupied the right, and 15th Indian Infantry' Brigade went into
reserve.
(ii) IlVr/ern Arfit, under 8th Australian DKasion. Troops:
Australian Imperial Force* and +llh Indian Infantry Brigade.
Area: from the Causeway round the west coast to Sungei Jurong,
i.c. inclusive Woodlands mclusut Point 135 inclusive Bukit

Timah village inclusive Kampong Sungei Jurongexclusive:

Sungei Jurong incluslre Tanjong Balai. Dispositions: 27th
Australian Infantry Brigade (less one battalion)nn the right, 22nd
Australian Infantry Brigade in the centre, and iith Indian Infantry
Brigade on the left. One battalion of 27lh Australian Infantiy
Brigade sviih a machine>gun company and detachments from
administrative .and reinforcement units wa* in reserve.
(iii) SetdAmi Area, under Sing.ipore Fortress. Troops; 1st
and 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigades, Straits Settlements Volunteer
Force and Fixed Defence Units. Area: the southern coast from
Sungei Jurong to Clnangi, i.c. inclusive Changi village inclusive
Yan Kit village-exclusive Paya Lebar village inclusive road
junction 898143 inclusive Botanical Cardens inclusive Wai
Soon Gardensexclusive Bukit Timah vallage boundary of
Western Area. Inclusive also Pcngcrang, Tekong and Blakang
Mali island. Dispositions: ht Malaya Infantry Brigade on the
right, the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force in the centre (the
Singapore Town area), ,ind 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade on the
left (including Pcngcrang area and Tekong Isbnd).
(iv) Commntl Resmt: I2th Indian Infantry Brigade.
To supplement the above forces. General Pcrcival organised
the penonnel of all combatant administrative units to defend their
own establishments, and secondly, he organised a force of Chinese
Iiregularj, Dalfarce, to be placed as detachments under Area
Commanders for patrolling swampy area* and other forward
tasks. Anti-aircraft defences were reorganised with special
reference to the docks area. All artillery was to be co-ordinated
under a singJfc brigadier. Pulau Bukum svas to have a small
garrison from the Independent Company. All inhabitants were
to be cleared off the Sembilan Islands, which W'ould then be
'
denied * by fire to the Japanese. A beit half a mife deep on the
western and northern coasts was to be absolutely devoid of inhabi-
tants. Pcngcrang area was garrisoned by the penonnel of the
Fixed Defence Force and the Mysore (Indian) State Force batta-
lion. Pulau Tekong was defended by the personnel of the Fixed
Defence Force and 2/17 Dogra Regiment. Orders were issued for
310 C'^tPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASU 1941-12 MALAYA

ofEar patrols to be sent across tlie Straits regularly into South

Joborc to reconnoitre the Japanese dlspontions and ascertain
their intentions, while the Rojal Nasy arranged for its craft to patrol
the sea approaches to Singapore Island.
The defence plan had some weaknesses in it. The Island
was not uniformly defended on all sides, nor svas it a compact
and easily manageable unit of territory. Most of the soldicrr
svho fought aiul died for the Island had not seen it before nor
carried a correct idea of its defences. This lack of familiarity
with the terrain, inesatably reduced the effcctisTness of the defence.
Morcosxr, all the three sectors were thinly held, and there were
gaps, small and big, between coropaiucs, between regiments and
bctss-cen Command /\rcas, and there svere swamps, creeks and
jungles.
At this time there svas some discussion about the best method
of defending the coast. In the beginning it was considered that
the beaches should be held lightly with watchers supported by a
thin ride company, and that the rest of the force should be situated
ssell back from the sea to put in a massK'e counter-attack in the
esvntofa hostile hading. But the final dechioa svas to concentrate
the defending fortes right along the coast, and to repel the invaden
before the>* could secure a footing on the Island. Accordbg to
this scheme, the whole coastline was to be held b) a series ofplatoon
posts with beach-watchers and patrols, although it iasnK-ed srill
further di^rslons w-iihln each battalion. Moreover, the dcfenns'c
preparations were far from complete. The coastline had not
been fully wired and defended localities had sdll to be cons-
tructed. Owing to the fact that the whole area was WTrlooked
from the mainland and bombed from the air, mmements during
the day were cut to a minimum. Radons, wire, etc., had to be
carried overloi^distancesthrouehmangrm'e swamps. Motor trans-
port was meagre enough, and it was useless off the roads. Then
again, tides interfered with wiring and construction work. These
difficulties were, it appears, particularly acute in the sector held b\-
the 44lh Indian Iiffantry Brigade, but the 2Bth Indian Infantry-
Brigade also felt Ukewise.*
The position in respect of troops was none too satisfactory-
cither. The In^n brigades had suffered a bad in South
Malaya, and initially the intention appears to ha\-e been to alUow
them tisftt for tew, asnd teotgasasadon before being called upon
to face the brunt of Japanese offensive. The troops were tired
and no battalion was up to strength. A'cvcrthelets, from the s'cry

>Wf JXazr, VI GJL, 31 Jasskry tMZ-

 TIfE BATTLE OF flSOAPORE 311

beginning tlicy had man

the exposed areas of the island coast-
to
line. Tlic 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, widi iu three Punjab
battalions was allotted the defence of a stretch of the west coast,
approximately 15 miles in length, from cxclushx S. Bcrih to
S. Jurong. There were no prepared positions in the area except
a small fort at Pasir Laba with two six-inch guns and two 18-poun-
den. TJic line svas so long that ine\itably wide gaps were left
between company positions, covered Mih mangrove and timber
allowng easy infdtratlon to the Japanese. The force was oihcr-
svisc in good morale and practising countcr-olTcnsivc tactics.
Similar was the story of the other Indian brigade, tlie 28lh Indian
Infantry Brigade, with 1/14 Punjab, 2/2 and 2/9 Gurhh.-i as its
component uruls. Its area of allotment was the Karal Base, a
large and complicated area with homes, docks, roads and tlic
Semhawang aerodrome.
The situation of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade and die
I5th Indian Infantry Brigade was slightly difTcrent. WTicn tlic
12th readied T>r nail, it svas the sole resene of Malaya Command.
Its two battalions, 5/2 Punjab Regiment strengthened svith raw
recruits from India, and 4/19 Ilyderab.nd Regiment scarcely more
fortunate, were hardly in a fit condiUon to fight The only
battalion in any fighting condition in tins brigade was 2 Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders. The 13th Indian Infantry Brigade
Wiis deployed in Bidadari. It was the resen c of the III Corps,
and comprised three battalions (which had siutalned a series of
reverses), mixed with a fair percentage of half trained reinforce-
ments. Consequently, this brigade too carried no high ofiensivc
value. The 8th Indian Infantry Brigade svas the reserve of the

llth Indian Dhision in Nee Soon Sembawang area, consisting
of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles, 2/10 Baluch Regiment and 2/18
and 5/18 Ro>*al Garhwal Rifles combined.
A few changes in the oiganisation and administration of
the units became incritablc in view of the probability of the
Japanese invasion from the north-cast. 2/9 and 4/9 jat were
combined, after tlie former had separated from 1/8 Punjab, so that
the strength of the new Jat battalion was 15 British oflicers and
680 other ranks. It then joined the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade,'*
and experienced men were distributed among its companies. On
6 February 19 12, 5/1 1 Sikh was amalgamated for tactical purposes
with 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment, which, being only 150 strong,
was in a miserable plight. On the following day this combined
battalion was placed under the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, but

IS Wit Dury, 2/9 Jt, 4 February 1942.

312 CAMPAIGNS Dt SOLTll-EAW ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

this was cancelled on 8 Febniary 1942, and fresh orders svcrc issued
for it to join the 2nd Malax-a Infantry" Brigade in Changi area-**
3/17 Dogra Regiment which had lost much of its fighting \'alue on
1 1 January near Serendah, 7/6 Rajputana Rifles which had lost

everything in the Muar battle, and 1/8 Punjab which became

separated from 2/9 Jat, were also reorganised individually.

THE JAPANESE PREPARATIONS FOR DrtASlON

It is needless to observe that the Japanese intention was to

conquer the Singapore Fortress. The ins-asion of Singapore Island
svas in the logic of events the culmination of the campaign in
Malaya, and was carried out as quicUy as practicable. One
week of preparations was, of course, necessary to cross the straits
with men, munitions and equipment.
The assault on Singapore was to be carried out b) all the
three Japanese disnsions m the 25tk Amy, namely the Imperial
Guardi Dirisien, the Stfi Dirisitn and the 18th Dhisien. Each
disTsioR was organised for this attack mto two groups or wings,
svith a third group in reserve. Special engineer troops were also
allotted to each division for crossing the straits, apart from the
normal complement of transport, medical and signal units,'*
In the Japanese High Command, some officers thought that
the mere presence of the Japanese army would bring alwut the
fall of Singapore.'* But most of them feared that theBriiuh army
would literally resist to the last man. The battle of ideas between
these two schools started on 13 January in Kuala Lumpur and
ended on 31 January 1942. The Chief of Staff decided to accept
the latter view and laid down the following directive:
(a) The entire strength of the Japanese must be used for the
invasion.
(b) 1,000 rounds of ammunition must l>c provided for each
gvin.
(c) TTie old troops (now exhausted), fresh crack forces, and
Very Clever troops must be exploited, each in its own
way, to the utmost.
(d) There must be perfect economy and co-ordination in
the utiluation of moral and material resources, while
those of the British must be destroyed.
(c) The Brfllih must be also deceived about the Japanese
plan and the advantage of surprise must be obtained.

w Kirbjr.^VoodUifB, TitHw
Her Nb-Sty*, StaboDcrr OfEce, Lanfoi. m
Lmti Ojmtimt, tfi. at, ft SSt
7,
.(iSiut Appeaia
25 ';
 TTIE BATTLr. OF lINGAPORE 313

a prcliminar>' lo llic execution of this plan, the railroads

/\s
were quickly repaired, and steps were taken to mo\-e down men,
artillery, ammunition and other materials, Amons these sverc
their landinSMrnift, which consisted of steel barges, with a capadty
of forty men each. General Percn'al has noted tliat iliey were
brought o\-crland by road from Pontian Kccliil on the svesl coast
of Johorc."^ The plan of attack was decided upon by 31 January
1912, when all the force had assembled at Kluang. One group
was stationed in the dense forest east of Johore, another one along
the railway, while the third, svhich ccm'uted oF crack troops, vas
positioned in the rubber plantations to the rear of Johore. The
big guns, with 1,000 rounds per gun, were dcploj-ed on Johore
Bahru line, with manned balloons to obserse the effect of their
firing. Officer patrols were despatched to reconnoitre the Britbh
positions and the terrain and lo search the coastal strips. Abosc
all, the inhabitants ofJohore beach area sserc ordered to withdraw
into the interior within three da)'s, and none but the Japanese
were allowed in the forward sector thereafter.
The Japanese army and naval air forces were made to act
in close cooperation with the ground forces, day and night.
Their morale was vcr>' high, and they had carried out no less than
sixty attacks on Singapore from 29 December 1941, the targets
being air bases, aerodrome installations, the Kaval Base, gosTrn*
ment oflices, etc. The Japanese chronicle mentions that in
die rufiht attack on Kallang on 3) Januarj', they had shattered
lwent>-two scarclillghts, and in the one on Sembawang airfield,
they had destroyed all but four. It adds that in the attack during
the day on the same date on Sclctar airfield, the Japanese air force
shot dossTi thirteen out of the fifteen aircraft there, (thirteen Hurri*
cancs and two Buffaloes) ; and that on another date the same force
bombed an oil tank which blackened the island for several hours.
But the greatest preparation of all on the Japanese side
was the deceptive movement of their forces to the eastern side
ofjohorc State in order lo make the British believe that they would
be attacked on the north-eastern corner of the Island. As a result
of tliis deception, tlic Bridsh disposed a powerful defence force
in this part of the Island, while the Japanese kept up the feint
by creating heasy motor traffic on the roads leading to south-
east Johore. The Japanese deception plan fully succeeded in its
object as related later on.
Moreover, the Japanese brought up for the assault on Singa-
pore all the equipment and personnel they considered necessary.

tJTif War i/t Afalrra, p. 271.

314 CAMPAIGNS Df SOCTH-E-ASr ASIA 1&IM2 IfALAYA

Tbere were howitzen for masih-e bombardment

special 240-in.m.
of the Islands defences. Tanbs were secretly concentrated in
soQth Johorc, gnang the invaders a tremendous advantage oter
the death-trap carriers ** of the Xlala^'a Command. The
troops and the tacdcs employed against Singapore sstre cquaDy
carefully selected. The men were fresh, highly trained and full
of * clan They could wort their way rapidly and confidently
through ssramps and jtn^Ie. Their tactics were to approach
a defensne pondon at night, fee! their way round and through it
without attacJni^, and establish ambushes and road-blocis behind
the position- Then at dawn the defenders found themselves
cut and were compelled to turn about and attack the road-
blocks. But with daylight came the Japanese planes, Esombing
and strafing the .Allied troops and harming all movement-
Thcic tactics were no loi^r notd, but the defenders had still
to evolve successful counicr-mcasures against them,

TTIE ASSAtn-T BtGtSJ

The first few of February 1&42 were taken up by the

da^s
last minute preparations on either side. Only the Japianese
planes continued their bombing and machise-giuming attadts.
But gradually the number and tntensty of th^ attacks had
steppe up. Then, at 1800 hours on 5 February, Japanese
artillery suddenly opened a heaty barrage. The bombardment
is said to have been the heaticst concentration of fire ever

put in by the Japanese array. The gnas used were of all calibres,
but the main punch came from modCTn 2-10-in.m. howitzers, which
had been specially bnilt for this very purpose.'* The barrage was
special})' directed towards the area just sonth of the Causeway,
and was, therefore, considered only a feint, as the Malaya
Command was cons-iaced that the real atuck would come in further
east Howe\'er, the British artillery replied to the barrage, bnt
had gradually to slacken the fire as guns got knocked out anft
ammunition began to run short.
'^Vh^c this axtiUery' duel continued, a few Japanese patrol
boaU appeared in the channel on 7 February. And the same
night the Japanese started a surprise attack on Pulan Lubin.
Only about 400 Japanese troops were used in this atf.rV
was pressed on with \igour- At first the Mala)-a Command
considered it a feint, as it indeed was. But it res-ised its opinion
by the morning of 8 Fcbmary. The Japanese were still attacking

ijcfictem tant Ot*rC ma, p. SS.

 ntE BATTLE OP SINOAPORP. 315

Turiously and had secured a footing on Pulau Lubin Island. So

the defenden of Singapore opened a hca%y Iwmbardmcnt of Lubm.
Then, when the preparations wrre complete in ever)' detail and the
Brilisii attention was distracted towards I.ubin, the real Japanese
assault went in through the north-west sector of the Singapore
defences, held mainly by the Australians.
The stor>' of the Japanese assault at midnight of B February'
Is undoubtedly thrilling, and their ad%ance into the defended

positions against stiff Australian resistance is equally remarkable.

On 0 February, Japanese artillery bombardment and air attacks
rapidlymounted in intensity, until by the evening the Japanese
gum roared and lit Uie straits with brilliant flashes and their air

force dropped one hundred and ten tons of bombs, so as to hold

the British CommonwealUi forces in the Island absolutely spell-
bound. Tlic diary of General Gordon Bennett bean out this
statement clearly.'* During that morning, his headquarten was
very 8c%-crcly air-bliued; throughout the day the western part of
the Island was hcavilyshelfed and bombed; and during the evening
the bombardment increased in intensity until about 2300 hours
when it became almost unendurable and made the General sit
up in bed. General Percival also confirms this.** But this con-
tinuous barrage of bombs and artillery hre stopped abruptly at
sixteen minutes past midnight, when a green signal flare n.ished in
the sky to announce that the first group of the Japanese troops
had crossed and landed safely on the Island. Then, at twenty
minutes past midnight, a red signal Hashed to say that tlieir second
group also had landed safely. Of course, the guns supporting
these landings continued to fire furiously and filled the sky svilh
dazzling light.
The Australian battalions too had by this lime become alert
and convinced that llie J.-ipancsc had attacked the land on
their front, and Consequently they too started firing upon the
crossing-points, raising pillars of svatcr from the straits, sinking
many Japanese boats and killing many men. Then the battle
began on the Island itself. The Japanese soldien, with white
bands around their bodies and the ashes of their comrades-in-arms
in bags hanging from their necks, rushed the Australians, in spite
of concentrated fire of machine-guns and mortars, .and started
a hand-to-hand fight under the moonlit sky. The Japanese
chronicler proceeds to describe the idcissitudcs of the battle as
follows; Tlic Bridsh at once attempted a counter-attack
But the attack seems to have gone astray in tlic darkness and
316 CAMPAIGN? u: $0tmT*tA5T ASU I91M2 MAIAYA

confusion of the fighting; only one compart) of Aiutralian troop?

succeeded in rcachio" the Japanese position. Here a sharp hand-
to-hand fight took placcj and for a ??hl!e it looked as if the
Japanese might indeed be driven bark to their boats. But another
battalion came os cr in time, and from then on the attacken vere
never in any danger of losing ?hat they had gained.*'

BtAClMfE-VD ENLAXCUS

The Japanese had begun well- The 22nd Australian Brigade

though still fighting hard was badly mauled; almost a fourth
of the Island in the north-west had been occupied and the
Japanese had touched Bukit Timah in the heart of the Island. To
counter this lightning advance, the 12ih and 15th Indian Infantry
Brigades were placed under the Australian Cenerals command,
and the 4-llh Indian Infanir)' Brigade was ordered to fall back on
to the left of the Kranji position- because Tcngah aerodr o e, m
which had Isecn ably held by Jind Infantry,** and the Jurong road
sshich VAi their only line of communication, s*ere dirBCily
threatened. General Was'ell reponed that "the Bridsh forces
svithdrew under pressure to the general tine Sungei Kranji
BulimHong KjtSunger Jurong.**
fi/UBunJab vason the right ^nk of the 44 th Indian Infantry
Brigade and immediately to the left of 2/19 Amtralian Imperial
Force BattaL'on of the ^nd .Australian Imperial Forte Brigade.
At 2000 hours on 8 February, the Japanese shelling on the sector
of the 22nd Australian Imperial Force Brigade hit certain targets
in the sector of Punjab battalion, and for half an hotm it ''stood to
in rcserse. An attempted landing between Ayer Bajau and
Pasir Laba svas then dristn off hy its A
Company. Xinc
Japanese landing craft attempted to mo\T up by the S itn^ t Bajau
creek, but the) svere shot up b) A
Companjs post located at the
head of that creek. The mortars and machine-guns caught them
at short range and hit twu Japanese crafu while the remainder
made north up the coast. A C^pam-'s postal the head of Sungei
Telok reported later that they too had drhxn back six Japanese
boats with automatic weapons and, these boats went north across
Sungei Berih. At 2300 hours the 44th InH'ian Infantr) Brigade
informed 6/14 Punjab that the Japanese had effected a landing on

JjJwfir LmxJ p. 36^ cr^isa,

FiS, pa. It7.4a.
ASDAC^il , tf. at., p. 33,
S8,pan
pw.* 2S
2$ (ff). Tor tbs rf catspaita,
xanSsUe. Tbe nr (Sana eCC,'! aad 6at
bf Ac iBHS froa (U? ta iar, tan ibef appear
o be cAga mi i ay coneci {r a> tb^
 TJjr, RATTtE OF sr.-OAFORE 317

Uie AustralLin sector and ordered it to stand to B)* 0100

houn of 9 February 1912, ho\\e\xr, the battalion " stood ,
the men being loo wet and uncomfortable to sleep. The Japanese
shelling still continued, but at a reduced rate.
6/1 Punjab, another battalion of the 44th Indian Infantry
Brigade, had a different experience on 8 Febniary. In the after-
noon of that day, records its historian, we saw what appeared
to be the last British fighter ahotdowm into the sea, and before the
close of the day one company of Dalforcc arrived to act as beach
watchers under the command of B and Companies. But forD
tliesc two cnts, the regiment had a peaceful time .**
On 9 Fcbniarj the situation was ominous. The right
flank of the 44lh Indian Infanliy Brigade was in danger of being
completely curled up and the entire brigade being outflanked.
Information was coming to the brigade that the im-asion was
m-sking headway, but that the I2th and J5th Indian Infantrj'
Brigades, which were in reserve, would counter-attack. An
oflici.al message was receh-ed to say that the 22nd Australian

Brigade was still fighting, the autlicniicity of which was doubt-

ful. At 0630 Itoun 6/14 Punjab reported that the Japanese
were still shelling in the vidnity of Choa Cliu Kang village, which
was near C Company's are.v, and also that some Japanese troops
had penetrated into the mangrove opposite to A Companys posi-
tion. At 0900 hours, C Company reported Australian ssiUidrawal
on its right as there were stragglers coming into iu area, and at
the same time they heard sounds of fighting approaching Choa
Clm Kang village. Upon this D Company, then in reserve, was
asked at fifteen minutes notice to move. At 1000 hours, shelling
of the abenx village and C Companys position was reported, and
until f 130 houn, C Company maintained its position satisfactorily.
The Japanese who contacted it slipped out, but due to the jungle
in that area it Was diflicult to catch or even observe them. How-
ever, D Company was brought into action behind C Company to
connect up with 7/8 Punjab. Between 1300 and 1600 hours, the
progress of the Japanese was so rapid that they occupied Choa
Chu Kang village, pushed the Australians back and commenced
their own movement eastw.ard along the main road which would
h.avc cut oIT C and D Companies within a few hours. D Company
irilbdrew from Cbca Chu Kang vShgr, but also lost contact
with 7/8 Punjab.
At IGlO hours, the Brigade ordered the withdrawal of all
battalions eastward along the Jurong road to Milestone 11. While

I Ucut.-Coloiwl J- > Sainier: lluioty of 6ft I^lnJab, p. 10,

318 CAMPAIGN'S Ef SOUTn-EAST ASIA 1911-12 SIACAVA

this %vithdra\val was to commenceas soon as possible after darl:,

about 1900 hours, thInn5ng*out was to commence at 1830
hours. Atthe same Umc the Brigade Reserve svas increased to
three compamcs with an adequate number of vehicles, and
rifle
the fort at Pasir Laba was further strengthened by one platoon.
Later in the afternoon, about 1710 hours, svhen bombing was
more intense, the Brigade Headquarters ordered all battalions
to abandon their positions forthwith and withdraw east of the
Jurong TTver. 6/1 Punjab left its position at 1815 hours and
reached the destination at 2200 houn. It was fortunate in having
all its companies concentrated, and also in having good communica*
tions for them. The men of 6/14 Punjab, howc\'er, were miserable
in sc\eral wa^s. The route of withdrawal was south of Bukit
Choa Chu Kang, and they had three trucks to caiT> men and
material. At 1830 hours, one hundred and twenty Australians
arrived, and they were asked to join the rear part) on foot. A
company had to collect its water part) which svas in Ayer Bajau
before it could mo\'C back. Most men carried their bedding
besides their arms, a fesv among them doing it for eight miles
without a proper meal since the night before. At 2200 hours
the battalion reched its destination, which was not marked out
beforehand and which could not be prepared for a camp until
the next morning. It was also too dark to take note of casualties
and the snissing men. C and D Companies, which withdresv
together, had to fight a rear-guard action for the first few miles of
their journey. Officers and men of these companies were quite
tired when they arrived, and as men of all companies had practi-
cally no sleep in the previous night and were tired and hungry,
dl expt sentries and patrols lay dow-n to sleep. The only inddent
in 6/1 Punjab sector svas the destruction of the splendid post at
Taiyong Gul, which bad been held by A Company. It was a
searchlight and artillcr) observation post commanded by a gunner
Sergeant Major. The searchlights were the most powerful in the
world, and the other installadons were of an intricate and highly
technical nature ,** but orders to destroj* the post were given at
1800 hours on 9 February 1942.
Meanwhile, the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade had been
faring the Japanese forces, with a narrow sea in between. On

1 February, this brigade moved slightly to the left and came

within two hundred yards of the Causeway, and additional fire
support was prorided by twent>-four guns of Hertfordshire
Yeomanry and a battery of 22 Mountain Regiment, the eighteen

iJiU.
 TtlE BATTLE O? SINGAPORE 319

Vickcn machine-guns of A Company Manchester Regiment having

been allotted to 2/2 Gurkha on the extreme left A feeling of
tension was e%'er present in this brigade, affecting its spirit of
confidence. That was the strange setting for a front-line position
provided by the deserted Naval Base and the enormous magazines
with steel doors, bomb-proof corridors and earthen mounds
resembling hills. On 2 February the brigade moved two miles
inland close to the entrance to the Naval Base at Canberra Gate,
because the Japanese had bombed one of the large oil tanks, and
the headquarters of the brigade could not be kept anjivhcre near
it or any other oil tank in the area. The Japanese flew over
the brigade area several times in the day, disturbing the defensive
svorks svhich had to be carried out during the hours of daylight.
On 3 and 4 February, reinforcements arrived, battalions changed
their headquarters for tactical reasons, and 2/9 Gurkha took the
place of 1/14 Punjab which svent into reserve, making the right
flank also pretty strong.** In the evening of 4 February, the
Japanese artillery started registering on the naval ofliccs and
continued to fire shells and mortars intermittently, the next day
also. In fact they often flred duds only, on and around the brigade
position. Their large bombers proceeded over the head of this
brigade to Singapore. On 6 and 7 Fcbruar>, the Japanese, who
could sec every movement and action in thu brigade ana, gave
cause for anxiety by shelling 2/1 Gurkha's A Company area
immediately after Major-General Heaths visit. The brigade
was also depressed by the fact that gunners had only a limited
supply of ammunition and could not answer fire by fire. At
night on 7 February, the Japanese moved motor transports svith-
out any camouflage and abo * put up a large smoke screen which
drifted down the Johorc straits from East to West past ourposition.
Itwas not until midday onflFebruaiy, that the news of a Japanese
landing in the norlli-west comer of the Island was fully ^own.
However, reports about the Australian situation were extremely
hazy. The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade had no reason to be
panicky and rightly assumed that as long as the Australian force
svithstood its ground, its osvn position was not in danger. This
feeling seems to have persisted, although at about 1400 hours, the
Japanese opened a strong, continuous bombardment lasting one
and a half hours.

S FromSl January to 7 Febmary 1942. 1/14 IHmjab and 5/14 Punjab u-m amal^-
tnaled into one batulionFile No. C01IS39JH.
7 War Diary, 2/2 G.R., 7 February 1942.
320 C.^MPAlO^S L.' SOimi-RAST ASIA MStAYA

TiiK LOSS or Bincrr timaii

The 12th Inflian Infantry Brigade, In rcserst, had been put

at one hours notice from about 0|(K) hour* on 9 February*, but
no mm e v at ordered till 1 030 hours, svhen 2 Arg)'ll was ordered to
mo%-e by motor tramjxiri to Keai Hon^ \-ilIage, and the brigade
ittclf was placed, as already stated, under the command of
the Gih Australian Disiiion. Os5nif to the bombing of transport,
harbours and the battalion on the march, all men reached the
village rather tired and Iiarrted. and although they were only
850 in all, they occupied a defensKc position astride the road
just sscst of the \illage in the right sector Kranjojurong line,
popularly called the Neck. The Hnc of defence lay actually
betsseen Point 156 and Point 65, with armoured can down the
road and two 3* morian. There were a number of htghdesTl
attacks from the air, and during the afterno'in we were encourag-
ed to see some of our few remaining Hunicanes engaged in success-
ful dog-fights with enem^' aircrafu Our artillery wi
blazing away and shells were whistling m-erhead continuously V*
\Slnle these mmemcnls were taking place, the Japanese
had attacked on a front between the Causeway and the Kranji
at 1930 hours on 9 February-, and the Malaya Command was
constrained tocarr^'out a furtlicr withdrawal after midnight This
step created a gap between the position held b>' the 27th Australian
Imperial Forte Brigade and the newly formed KranJi-Jurong tine
m
and csiposed some important hill features erlooking the Causeway.
The defence line had fallen back to as far south as Bukit 'Ilmah
sillagc. The new plan of defence was to hold a perirncter which
included the Kallang aerodrome, the kfacRitchie and Peirce
reservoirs and the Bukit Timah area.**
Bukit Timah sillagc was situated strategically in the centre
of the island. Its capture would gi\-e the Japanese not only the
command of the north where a number of hillocks wcie situated
but also of the south as far at Pasir Panjang sillagc. Every
efTorl was made to strengthen this point and to hold the Japanese
at the Jurong-Kranji line. But their attack from the west could
not be checked, and it was found quite impossible even to delay
their progress towards Singapore Town. 10 February 1942 was
fixed by the Japanese for the attack on Bukit Timah. The
order was that the forces will attempt a night attack with bayonets
on the 10th to secure Bukii Timah Heights by dawn on 11th,
Kigensetju.** la other wsords, the Japanese army was asked to

HI# Dta p. 129.

Tki l> m p. 273.
**Eoem7 PuWjeatxin 278, p.
 Ti. baTtu: or iiNOAronr. 321

frlcl)falc Uic.innnrnar)*orihccofoiuli<mir the Emperor llmmu,

vrhieh fell on 1 1 IV hruar)', li)* conijuerlnij Bukit Ti'mah.

nte Jap.mr$c prftMue had apparently ranged ctmfudon anti

panic In omr ircton of ihr defence line, and M)mc of the defcndlnp
unitt vnihdrrw owinif to ilir eonttantly dclcrioratlnq tactical
iltuatlon. The 27ih Auttralian Imperial Force Brigade, holding
the left flank of the JHih Indian Infantrj' Bris;ade, withdrew to the
Nfarulai Road, \hile the 22nd AuMralian Imperial Force Brigade
retired to theBuUm area. Similarly 0/1 Ilmjaband tt Iwoeompa-
iiton Iunjah haltalnmt (0/11 and 7/B) fell hack to Panr
Panjang \itlage thus Irasing a rcriout pap in the -llth
Indian Infantry Brigaile area. The tmtts s^ere laler rent back
to their original forward pisiiiom and next day, 10 Februar)',
General WastII inld all troopc in hi* ortlcr of the day that
Singapore mtm l>e held to the last.*
On the rnorning of 10 FelmiarA-, the general defence situation
was as fiIlosss:-~

(1) In the ssciicrn sector sslilch svas the most Important'

of nil, the troops st'xxl in close tnudi niih >ne another. From
north to smith (ley ViTre the I2ih Indian Inlanfry Brigade, a part
of 22nd Australian Imperial Foree Brigade, the ISih Indian
Infanir)' Brigade .ind ilie -llih Indian Infantry Brigade. Behind
these tsere tmitiof the 29ili Australian Brigade.
(2) In the northern sector the v.estrrn area uas In a (lerilout
situation. The orsler in sshieh the troops in this area \sere
st.nlioned svas 27th Australian Im|)erial Force Brigade, 8ih Indian
Infantry and 28th Indian Infantry Brigade.
(3) The Brigade of the IRth British Division .and tliosc plac-
ed in the Changi .ire.T ssere taken out, as chiy vsorc on, to Biikit
TImah area and its eastern siihurlis to strengthen the line-
The Japanese sscight was first felt hy the 12th Indian Infrntry
Brigade. At first light on 10 February, -1/19 Hydcrab.id, att.nchcd
to this brigade, moved bark from its position to the left of Choa
Chu Kong Roatl at Milestone I2j, on Hill H5, sshich vv-is north-
ssest of Bukil Panjang Ro.sd junction. 2 Argyll, then near
Milestone 13, came under pressure very soon svhen some
troop* of the 2/21 Australian Battalion fell kick. Japanese di\x-
homhen had coirc hark O
the ftr^pasJe area ,tf runcise*. At 07-ia
hours the forward companies were in contact. There was heavy
firing by the Jap.nncse, .tnd at 0900 hours the fonvard trmps
withdrew. But the Japanese continued to fire from the ridge
in front and llircafened lo turn the Argyll right Bank. It then

S' \V diwy, 2/2 O. R., 10 Fsbnury

322 CAJIPAIOB EJ SOXmj-EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

became necessaiy to fall back behind the Sungei Peng Slang. Here,
this battalion made contact with 2/29 Australian Imperial
Force svhich scent into position cos'cring the road bridge and
the area to the south in the Kcat Hong Estate. A little later

a further ssiihdrawal svas made to Bukit Panjang sillage. The

battalion headquarters was established at the Public ^Vorks
Department quarries on the main road ; the two Marine compames
were kept in rcsenc and the two Argyll companies were disposed
on the re\-eTse slopes of Bukit Gombak. The bombing attacks
of the Japanese continued till late in the afternoon when the
position eased. Orders were then sent to withdraw the forsvard
companies and asvait the rnstructioos for a counter-attack on the
next day. The detachment of the Jind State Infantry, which had
presiously been stationed on Tengah aerodrome, mos-ed to posi-
tions on Bukit Panjang feature.
The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade began to arrn'e at its
porition north of the Jurong road, and near the headwaters of
the Jurong river, four miles west of Bukit Timah \illagc, from
the midnight of 9/l0 February and completed its move by about
0430 houn. Thh etubled the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade to
come into its own position to the left of the 15th Indian Iidantry
Brigade and south of the Jurong road. On the right flank of
the 15ih Indian Infantry Brigade was an Australian spedal resen-e
battalion, and on their left flank 6/1 Punjab of thc:44lh Indian
Infantiy'Brigade. Atabout 1030 hours this Australian unit whose
right flank, as a result of the withdrawal of 2/29 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion mentioned abosT, svas unprotected, fell
bai^ from the Bukit 'Hmah feature. To etn er the right flank of the
15th Indian Infantry Brigade, therefore, 3/16 Punjab mox^d up
immediately. But by 1 100 hours the forward positions of this
brigade came under heasy Japanese mortar fire. 6/1 Punjab,
which cosxred the road and was to the left of the brigade, gas-c
ground a little. As a consequence, b>- 1300 hours, the Japanese,
who were lapping round the fefi flank of the brigade, infiltrated
mto the rear of 6/1 Punjab. Consequently, at about 1430 hours,
this battalion mos'ed south creating confusion in the other batta-
lions of the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade and compelling the
whole brigade to move to Pasir Panjang by 1730 hours, and from
thence to hUlestone 10 on the Reformatory Road by nighu Thu
wholesale move was made through 2 Malaya Regiment, of the
lit Malaya Infantry Brigade, hotdiog the lower
parts of Sungei
Jurong and Sungei Pandan. A company of Dalforcc also was
in thu aru and a niiaU ikirnmh had taken place
between part
of the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade and that company
owing to
 Tire BATTLE OP SWCAPORE 323

each mutaking ehc other for ihc Japanese. ^V^Ih

the rapid
departure, however, of the 4^lh Indian Infantry Brigade, the I5th
Indian Infantry' Brigade found both iu flanks exposed. Hence
it svithdrew to positions between Milestone 9 and Milestone
8J on
the Jurong Road b>' about 1600 hours. The combined Jat Regi-
ment was on the right, north of the road, 3/16 Punjab astride the
road and the British battalion was in resersc in the rear. At a
position south of the road on a prominent hill feature svas a part
of tlic Australian special reser\-c battalion.
In the northern sector Brigadier Maxwell had srithdrass-n the
Australian troops for good reasons.** Taking advantage of this, the
Japanese started repairing tiic Causesvay and their patrols cstab-
lished themselves on Hill 95 by the morning of 10 February 1912.
Tlic withdrawal of tlic Australian troops had left the Causeway
practically undefended as 2/2 Gurkha witli only a company in
the STciniiy would be unable to rcsbt the Japanese mo\'c onwards
and artillery in Mandai Road could not be used unless alternative
positions were found for the guns. Moreover, the Bukit Timah
road svas open to the Japanese as die 27th Australian Imperial
Force Brigade held a position one mile east of hfandai Road
village, and h(ajor*General Key urged that brigade to move to
that village and block the road against Japanese advance. To
s.TVe the situation, the Qth Indi.Tn Infantry Brigade, moved north-
west to close the gap between the 27th Australian Imperial Force
Brigade and the 28(h Indian Infantry Brigade, and occupied
Han Kow, Bt. Sembawang and Marsiling Estates. But the
following plan was decided upon to deal svilh the immediate
situation:
(a) one platoon of B CJompany of 2/2 Gurklia was to
take up position on the Naval Base Road and near the Gausesvay
facing west; (b) a fighting patrol consisting of one platoon of B
Company w.is to proceed to Hill 95 to deal with any Japanese
troops in position there and to establish .a light machine-gun post
on the hill; (c) one company of 1/14 Punjab from the brigade
reserve was to take up a position on \Virclcss Telegraph Hill south
ofB Company's position; and (d) one officer and thirty men of the
Northumberland Fusiliers macJiinc-gun battalion were to form
a reserve platoon under command of B Company. The total
armament of these volunteers consisted of one tommy gun, and a
lew pistols apart from the usual tiffes.
Unfortunately the pUtoon suffered casualties soon after
and seemed unable to hold up the attacks on its front. There-
upon B Company was strengthened with a rifle platoon of

S* tVigmore i Tht Japantu Thrust, pp. 32841.

324 CAJfPAICKS IN MUrn-EAST ASIA 194M2 StALAVA

9 NorlhumbcrJand Fusilim and two light automatic sections of

5 Searchlight Battalion's detachment, and ordered to hold a trade
leading from Hill 125 to the headquarters of 2/2 Gurkha. It
was now 1000 hours. 5/14 Punjab had sent its G Company to
tjccupy Hill 95. Half an hour earlier, the 8lh Indian Infantry
Brigade too had started on a similar mission, supported by 135
Field Regiment. 1 /8 Punjab was iransfcned fVom the 8th
Indian
Infantry Brigade Command to dmsional reserve.
Once again, as in the case ofB Company platoon, bad luck
attended the company- of 5/14 Punjab ami the 8th Indian Infantry
Brigade. At 1000 hours 2/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles occupied
the Bt. Sembawang Elstate without opposiuon, but after that
hour not a word was received about the whole brigade to vshich
it belonged. Of 5/14 Punjab also there was no news at all.
Thereupon D
Company was sent with orders to occupy Hill 95
without delay, and 135 Held Regiment was asked to give support
company.
to this
Meanwhile two important events took place. The first
was that the llth Indian Division was ordered (o recotmoitre
the Peirce Reservoir area; it looked as though the " fight to the
last man was yet once again to prove an empty slogan .* The
second svas General IVavells visit to the front at noon and his
encouragement to olEcera and men of all ranks to keep on fighting
in spite of the critical situation.
At 1300 hours the entire situation still seemed to be confused.
^STiilc 2/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles s>-3S rvidcntly still fighting in the
Marsiling Estate, 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles in the Han Kow and
Bt. Sembawang Estates had met the Japanese and its forward
company was being sniped from Hill 95. The former battalion
had committed three companies to the aitacl:, ofwhich the forward
ones were pinned to the ground and sulTcrcd heavily, in close fight*
ing. One company of the battalion was in hand. 2/10 Baluch,
lil^ 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles, was dispersed in the dense bro^n
country. 5,'14 Punjab Regiment was still nowhere near HOI 95.
Fresh orders were, therefore, issued bv- the Divisional
Commander that the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade should be
prepared to attack Hill 95 with 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles if
5/14 Punj'abs atuck failed, and to attack the Marsiling Estate
at. dawn wiih. 2J10 Batweb vC the Gaibwak batXabon
proved un-
able to occupy it- Bath attacks were to be supported
by 135
Field Regiment. Later on this order was made obsolete
as 5/14
Punjab reported that it was impossible to attack Hill
95 owing to

niCfiory cf Uih Indian Dnirioti in A{ab)-a,

pp. 518-19.
 Tltr. 1S\TTLt or ilNOAPORE 325

the existence of an ob'lacJe mmlslljig of :i Jjjjjh iron paling fence

interlaced tviih barlxrd wire between Hill 125 and Hill 95.
Seeinjj that 2/IB Royal Garlmal Rifles svas losin;' heavily
and remained still in the Han Kow Estate, 1/13 Frontier Force
Rifles took up the position and duties of the Carliwal battalion.
By alwut 1300 hours, this unit began moving towards Hill 95 and
b) about 1700 houn, and after a preliminary artillery bombard*
ment, occupied it with no oppotiiion. During the c\tning, hosv-
es-cr, the company which captured the hill vacated it, probably
due to lack of ammunition. But luckily it was not taken up by
ibe Japanese during the night and hence J/I3 Ffonticr Force Rifles
was able to rcoccup)- it at first light on 1 February 1912.
1

In the position held by 2/2 Gurkba, llic Japanese made

an inflUrallon immediately to the south and close to B Company
headquarters. There svas a little sniping at this headquarters
but the Japanese could not be easily located. Minor adjustments
sscre made in the location of the platoons and machine-gun posts
of the battalion.
But the most e.xciling and important news of .all during
the day was * the welcome news that a counter-offeasis-c ss-as to
take place at dawn to oust the Japaiie*e from the Island.** TTie
chronicler of a Gurkha Regiment has recorded as follosvs Shortly
:

before dark, Colonel H.srrison, the General Staff Ofllccr (1) 11th
Division, visited the battalion headquarten sviih the ness-s that
severe fighting was in progress along the Bukit Timah road with the
enemy iKnetralion as far south as Bukit Timali village thereby
delaying the return of the Australians to their original positions
on our left. At the s-amc time he said that a big drive was being
organised for which all available Brilbh, Australian and Indian
troops would be employed sviili the object of sweeping in a north-
svcsterly direction to drisx all the enemy back into ihc sea. This
was the fint good news that we had heard thatday and gave grounds
for renewed cnnfldcnce that the situation would be restored.**
General Fercival has recorded that on his return to the
headquarters along ss-itb General Wavell at about 230 p.m., he
heard of the unsatisfactory' situation in front of Bukit Timah
village, svliich was viul to the defence
partly because it is an
important road junction, partly because there is direct observation
from the hills north.svcst of tfic village as far as Singapore Town
itself, and partly because of the important dumps and depots
which
lay to the east of it. To relieve the situation he asked General
Gordon Bennett to stage a counter-attack to re-establish the

Mltit., p. 521.
sstVar viary, 2/2 C.K., 10 Febreary 19*2-
326 CAMPA1G^ W SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 MALAYA

Kranji-Jurong line. Orders for this were issued smhout delay.

The coimtcr-attack svas to be made In three stages. The fint was
to seaue by 1800 hours the same evening the BuUtPanjang and
Bu3dt Gombak features. These tsvo hills lie a little west of the main
road north of Buldt Timah village and parts of them were already
held, so very little advance was necessary. The second and third
stages, which were to take place on the morning and afternoon
of the following day respectively, aimed at re-establishing Uic
Kranji-Jurong line This counter-attack was to be earned
out by the 12th Indian Infantry Bngade in the north, the I5lh
Indian Infantry Brigade in the centre and the 22nd Australian
Imperial Force Brigade In the south, with the 44th Indian Infantry
Brigade in rescr\e, all of them teing under General Gordon
Bennetts command. It was undentood that if this eountcr-
oHensive failed it would probablybcneccssary to withdraw the 18tb
British Divuioa and the llth Indian Division from the coast to
a perimeter aronnd Singapore Town.
The situation, however, worsened as e%Tmog approached.
At about 1600 hours General Perdval heard reliably that the
Japanese were approaching BuUt Timah village. He ordered at
once that the large reserve petrol depot east of the dtlage be
destroj'ed at 1800 hours. This svas done, and petrol burnt
furiously for two or three days. By dusk, the 12th Indian Infantry
Brigade was in position astride the main road south of Bukit
Panjang village according to plan for the cotmter-altack. But
by 2015 hours it was attacked from the svest of the village by the
Japanese, and for the first time their tanks made an appearance
on the island.
The 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was then covering the

Causeway ^Buiit Timah road from the west between Hill 145
(736197) and Bukit Gombak. It was subjected to mr attacks
durii^ the afternoon and the units lo the west of the Bukit Timah
road had shell and mortar fire also. In the evening at about
1800 hours, modifications became inevitable in the disposition
of troops. 4/19 Hyderabad on Hill 145 was directed to send one
company to the Bukit Panjang feature to link up vsith the Jind
Infantry and to the railway and tbemaiaroadlcading to the Cause-
way. 2 Argyll was withdrawn from the Bukit Gombak area to
the two sides of the Bukit Timah road in the vicinity of the level-
crossing near Milestone 9. But before 4/19 Hyderabad could
take up its nevv positions, Hill 145 was subjected
to a heavy
mortar fire, which caused the disintegration of this battalion in

TU Mar ia pp. 276-77.

pLAir \'ir
 Tin: BATTLE OF SINGAPORE 327

no time. At about 1915 houn, the commanding officer ordered

the men remaining with Jum to repair to the brigade headquarters
area, stationed near the junction of the main road wth another
leading to the Singapore Dair>' Farm. The Japanese troops
foUo^^'cd up the \rithdrawal and were engaged by a company
of 2/19 Australian Imperial Force Battalion co%cring the Buldt
Panjang village road junction- When success svas in sight, the
Japanese foiled it by bringing several tanb down the Choa
Chu Kang Hoad at about 2030 hours. No proious preparatiom
had been made to meet this new threat as neither tank obstacles
had been created nor was the detachment of4 Anti-Tank Regiment
attached to 4/19 Hydreabad available, having ssTthdrawn earh'er
to the Reformatory Road area. One company of 2/29 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion struggled hard to hold up the tanks
and put two of them out of action. As forward troops of the 12th
Brigade had already been withdrawn behind the 2/29 Battalion,
G andD Companies of this battalion were mo\'cdnearcr the cross-
roads, while B Company and the headequarters remained there
during the night only to withdraw' to the Race Course next morning
when they found themselves being pressed by the Japanese forces
mo%'ing on the main road to Bukit Timah village. Meanwhile,
at about 2200 hours, the commander of the 12tb Indian Infantry
Brigade finding an armoured vehicle halted on the Bukit Timah
Road opposite to his headquarten, which he discovered to be a
Japanese light tank, moved his headquarters back down the side
of the road. The Japanese tanks reached a road block which
2 Argyll had established across the main road. They were held
up some time which enabled part of the battalion to withdraw
down the road towards Bukit Timah village, the other half posi-
tioned cast of the road, remainingthcrefor thezught being unaware
of the withdrawal by the rest of the battalion. During the night
and the early hours of the morning of 1 1 February, the remnants
of the ill-starred 12th Indian Infantry Brigade withdrew to the south
of Bukit Timah village and were completely disorganised. The
Jind State Infantry in Bukit Gombak, successfully encountered
a Japanese push for a time, but ultimately withdrew across country
to Nomanton Camp. Before the day dawned on II February,
the Japanese tanks and infantry bad reached the Bukit Timah
a serious situation had now developed for
village road junction;
the British forces.

Futile coinfixR-ATTACKS

On 11 February, the positionsvascritical. The total

munber of
troops available to the 22nd Australian Brigade, which was to have
328 CAMPAIGNS IN SOOTIl'EAST ASIA 19tl-12 MALAVA

taken part in the countcr-ofTcnsivc was very small. Of the reserve

portions of this brigade also only some 150 men were left who svcrc
trying to re-form behind the Reformatory Road. The 44th Indian
Infantry Brigade was still holding a position about the Junction
of the Reformatory and Uiu Pandan Roads, but its strength had
been reduced to two battalions (6/1 and 6/14 Punjab, each with six
hundred men), and the headquarters and one company of 7/8
Punjab. There were some men from 3 Mixed Reinforcement Camp
also. Utter confusion prevailed in the area, and the suddenness
of Japanese attack had upset all the counter-offensive plans. The
position of troops on 1 1 February 1942 on the Reformatory Road
between Milestones and 8^ was as follows :7/8 Punjab onthe ridge
west of the road opposite iu junction with Uiu Pandan Road,
6/1 Punjab a little lower down the road and 6/14 Punjab near the
loop in the road at 7591 12, linking with 2 Loyals of the 1st Malaya
Infantry Brigade.
Of all the brigades which liad been ordered to counter-
attack at dawn of 11 February 1942, the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade was the only one ready on the Start Line, but it was comp-
letely isolated astride the Jurong Road at Milestone 9 with 3/16
Punjab on its right and the British Battalion on the left. The
Jat Battalion which had held the right flank of 3/16 Punjab was out
of touch with its brigade. The only other force on the forward
positions in addition to the 6/15th Indian Brigade was the small
Australian Reserve Battalion.
The Jat Regiment, a combination of 2/9 and 4/9 Jat, had
cncoimtered the Japanese force the previous day, one of its com-
panies being sent to silence a hostile mortar on Bukit Batok. Hill
220 was the objective of the Jat battalion, which it nearly attained,
but finding no sign of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, it decided
to move to the north of Bukit Timah village before that brigade-
Thus it was not available on the morning of 1 1 February to join the
15th Inifian Infantry Brigade to take part in the counter-offensive.
The fortunes of the other two battalions of the 15th Indian
Infantry Brigade were no better.* The flanks of ihe brigade were
exposed. To cover its left flank, the British battalion was moved to
the south of the road. To the left of the British battalion were some
220 men of the Australian Special Reserve Battalion in position. But
all communications to the rear ofthebrigade were
severed. At about
0530 hours, the Brigadier, realising the critical situation of his force
deaded to cancel the counter-attack which was due to begin one
hour later. However, at about 0730 hours, the Japanese attacked
 TME BATTLE OF SINGAPORE 329

3/16 Punjab on the northern side of the Jurong ^{.oad from the north-
west, and the British Battalion, on the otJier side of the road from the
south, south-west and west. The brigade commander thereupon
decided to withdraw to Bukit Timah village but his headquarters
being attacked simultaneously from the direction of the village,
he decided at 0930 hours to withdraw across country* in the soutli-
easterly direction to the Rcformatoiy' Road. The backward
movement was carried out in three columns, the British Battalion
on the west flank, the Australians in the centre and the Punjabi
units on the east flank. The troops faced constant fire from the
flanks and the rear, which compelled them to scatter and split up,
and when they repaired to the Reformatory Road, 3/16 Punjab
had only sixty men, the British Battalion only one hundred and
thirty men, and the Australian Reserve Battalion had only eighty
men. They were sent further back to refit and reorganise.
Thus had failed the counter-attack which had never
been launched as the Japanese did not allow any opening for attack,
ratlier, on the contrary, they had attacked fint everjsvhere and
penetrated deep into the Allied positions. The plan of counter-
ofTensive resulted also in the disintegration of two important bri-
gades, the I2th and the ISth Indian Infantry Brigades, svithout
delivering a single blow on the Japanese except in desperate
self-defence. General Pcrcival notes with sorrow that the 12th
Brigade, dedmated afteritsgallaniefrorts.ceasedtoexistasafonna-
tion, though parties of Argylls formed themselves into guerilla
bands and went on fighting .* Japanese records convey a better
picture of the battle leading to the annihilation of 12th and I5th
Indian Infantry Brigades. The fierce battle that raged in front
of the Bukit Timah heights was ado-or-die,hand-to-hand battle.*
Tbe noise of guns, the rumbling of tanks, the bombing of our air
force and the explosion of shelb made this a veritable hell of blood
and death. The strong pill-box positions on Bukit Timah Heights
were attacked over and over again in the midst of all this, but
they would not yield. A glorious hand-to-hand battle developed
in Ae midst of the abandoned enemy dead bodies and the dead
bodies of our comrades-in-arms
The f^ht for aerial supremacy reached its culmination on
10 February, svhen the fesv battered planes and their weary pilots
of the Royal Air Force were svithdrasvn finally from Singapore
to Sumatra. The men had been %hting against tremendous
odds for many weeks. Their will remained indomitable, but

War in Malaya, p. 278.

sS Tht
StEnemy Publicacioo No. 278, p. 220,
4/4W., pp. 222-25,
330 CAMPAIGNS D; SOUni-EAST ASIA 19tl-42 MALAVA

the battle had clearly gone against them. To continue tlic

unequal struggle with the few Hurricanes still remaining service-
able would only have invohxd the sacrifice of higlily trained men
and precious planes svithout alTecting materially tlie outcome of
tltc battle for Singapore.
11 February' 19'12, as shown already, was another miserable
day for llic Allied forces in the Island. General Perds'al
has given a picture of the crisis facing his command at the dawn
of this day. The enemys successful attack during the prcvjOTS
night had created se\-eral danger points. In the first place, a wide
gaphaddcsxloped between the Machitchic Reservoir and the troops
on the BukitTimah road. To fill this I sent up a composite force
from the reinforcement camps secondly, a strong attack was
launched shortly after daw-n against the rear of the 6th/15di Indian
Brigade from the direction of Bukit Umab village Then, Bukit
Timah tillage itself had fallen into the enemy* hands and a
conuter-attaekby Tomfotce, launched with the object of recapturing
the tillage, was held up on the line of the railway. Later in the
momlng a strong enemy attack developed against the 22iid
Australian Brigade, now reduced to a few hundred men only,
near the junedon of the Relbnnatory and Pandan roads *.*'
To this General Gordon Bennett has added the straggler
poslUon svhicb had become alarming in Singapore Town. Sex'eral
thousand soldiers ts-ere occupying the lower floors of the stouter
buildings, the position being quite beyond the control of the police.
Further, he has stated that he considered the rituadon too bad
for any remedy: I consider that the end is near and that it is
only a matter of da j-s before the enemy will break through info the
dty. I fear the consequences of the street fighting that sill ensue,
should that come to pass. There is no resbiance left on the island
and csTty enemy attack makes progress. His attacks arc nosv
concentrated against Tom Force on the east of Bukit Timah
road and against the left flank near the coast which is now held
by fortress troops tmder itajor-Gencral Keith Simmons
The Tom Force had been commissioned on 1 1 February to
proceed at first light. to mop up the enemy in the Bukit Timah
villageand retake the position previously occupied by 12 Brigade.'**
At 0630 hours all the battalions of this force njosed forward, but
when they reached the railway line the leading troops came under
smaJJ-arms fire and svere held up. On the right side contact was
made in the thick country astride the pipc-liae, with the result

War a Sta!^, p. 279.

> Sirgefen Fill, pp. IH^SS.
O1 NvTati\T of Tom
.
* I0/J2 FctTOiry IM2. p. 2.
332 CVilFAlCN-S t-S lOtmt'EAJT AMA 19n--42 K^LAYA

on gap m the Cauieway Vkhich the Japanetc failed to repair.

ihc
At die tame Usne, a project vrax fnitncd to recapture BuUt ranjang
^^ibge, in order to eate the prewure on the Euiut Timah Road,
but ie 27 Australian Imperial Force Brigade failed to make an^'
imprcision. The Bridih forcer vere fighting a losing battle.
Their tvocs sserc aggra%*atcd %hen at about OSOO houn the main
rcsert-c petrol depot, east of the Race Course, war ret on fire by
Japanese action and destrojed- HossoTr, the spirit of the
defenders was not yet broken and sshen the Japanese Commander*
in-Chief dropped a letter from the air demanding the surrender
They
of the fortress, h was treated ss-ith contemptuom silence.
had ansvicred svith a cmmter-attack m
place of a messenger.*
During the morning, once again, in order to form a second
line on Bulit Timah Road, Malaya Command ordered 4 Slraris
ScitlemenH Volunteer Force (tlic icservT battalion of the Straits
Settlements Volunteer Force Brigade bolding the Singapore Tovn-n
sector) to prepare and take up positions astride the Bukit Timah
and DuncamRoads on the general line LnmieRoad ^.\damRo3d,
sshich was to be the line of the final perimeter In this sector.
Tlie 44lh Indian Infantry* Brigade was subjected to tlcs*aitat*
ing air, artillery and mortar bombardmenL A third of the
brigade and half of the ruiA-is-ors of the 22nd Australian Imperial
Foree Brigade ssere Ulled or ssenmded. In the estniag the units
were so disposed as to extend tbeir line to Ayer Raja Road in order
to connect it \rith the lit Malaya Infantry Brigade on the IcfL
7/8 Ponjab faced north along the Ulu Pandan J^ad wth its right
astride the Refornutory Road. 6/14 Punjab M-as irs brigade
resersT. Its battalion headquarters was established near a track
east of Knoll 115. 6/1 Punjab took up a position kziost'n as the
Bracken, east of 6/14 Punjab. By estning the remnants of the
British Battalion of the 15ih Indian Infantry Brigade had come
under the command of this brigade and vere placed in reserve
just north of Hill 125. On the left of the 44th Indian Infanirj'
Brigade, Isl Mala)^ Infantry Brigade was reinforced by 5 Bedford*
shire and Herlfordslurt of the 55th British Infantry Brigade, and
a newly organised Royal Engineers Battalion held the Reformatory
Road &om the oil tanks to Fasir Panjang and the coast, thence to
Jaidine Steps.
By midday of 12 February, the front line in the south ran
apprarimately from the HU east of the Bubl Timah Rifle Range
on the right, along the line of the railway, then forward to the
junction of tJlu Pandan and Reformatory roads anH then south

1
Zatuii PclCeaaco Ko. 2J8; fb 231.
 THE BATTLE OF SLN'OAPOflE i3i

to a point on the coast north of Tasir Panjang village. The

position in the northern area was equally dilTlcuIt. Two attempts
to occupy Bukit Panjang village, one b> the combined 2/26 and
2/30 Australian Imperial Force BallaHom and the other by 2/10
Baluch had failed miserably, fn Ute ease of Australian Imperial
Force Battalions, not only was artillery support found not feasible,
but also the two battalions were out of toiicli svith each other
and the brigade headquarters except by liaison ofliccrs. And
in the ease of the Indian regiment, the Japanese had come between
this unit at .Milestone 13 and D Company of 2/30 AustraUan
Imperial Force Battalion at Milestone 131, and no effort of the
Indian regiment could drive the Japanese' away. Tlie Japanese
would not be driven out of Hill 95 either, and their inflltralion
through the rubber estates nortli of the Mandai Road threatened
to cut in behind the rear of the flth Indian Infantry Brigade in the
Woodlands Estate area. This infiltration also threatened the
important Kec Soon road junction. At about HOO hours,
Uicrcforc, this brigade began to withdraw in order to form a line
covering Sembawang acr<^rome and die A*ce Soon junction. I/I3
Frontier Force Rifles was attacked as it was in the process of ihinn*
ing out, but it managed to disengage and withdrew through 2/18
Royal Garhwal Rifles. Both these units Uicn fell back without
further incident by estate roads to Sembawang Aerodrome area.
2/10 Baluch on the Mandai Road withdrew at about 1700 hours
to the west of A'ce Soon road junction, which, during the day,
had been covered by 1/8 Punjab svhich had been sent fonvard
from Bidadari when the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade had been
ordered up to the Causeway area. By evening, the dispositions
of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade units were : right, 1/13 Frontier
Force Rifles svest of Sembawang Aerodrome; centre, J/JB Punjab
between excluding the south-western comer of the Aerodrome
and excluding Milestone II of the Mandai Road; left, 2/10
Baluch including Milestone II on the Mandai Road and along the
east edge of Sclctar Reservoir; in reserve, 2/18 Royal Garhwal

Rifles in area Hill 1 10 near Milestone 1 1 on the Nee Soon Naval
Base road. On Sembasvang Aerodrome was a company of
Kapurthala Stale Infantry, and 3 Cavalry (less one squadron)
was also in this area. On the left of 2/10 Baluch and south of
Sclctar Reservoir facing west was the Bahawalpur State Infantry.
The 28ch Indian Infantry Brigade, which was in the Naval
Base area and had been instructed to hold on to the last man and
to the last round, was quiet enough, in spite of Japanese bombing
and shelling on the Base. At about 1400 hours, however, 2/2
Gurkha Rifles heard about the withdrawal of its adjacent brigade
331 cvjirAtGNs IN 8oimi-t.r aua 1911-12 lUtAVA

from Hill 95 area and decided at once to vwing back iu left flank
in order to face wcit. Later in the afternoon, thb battalion was
ordered to withdraw cast to posIUoas Ixhind the New Cut. At
the same lime 2/9 Gurkha Rifles was to swing back its left flank
from the coast behind the upper portion of this waterway. More-
over, to catend the west front of Uus brigade to die south, orders
had been issued by the 1 Itli Indian Dh-ision for 2 Cambridgeshire
Regiment (less one company) of the 53rd Hritish Infantry Brigade
to move up to positions south of the Xaval Base liehlnd the water-
svay. Howcscr, while these dispositions were in the process of
being taken up, fresh orders arrnxd for the evacuation of the
Xas-al Base to lake place during the ensuing night.
So far as the ICth British Division was concerned the ordy
complete infantry batt.iUon was 5 Suffolk of the 51lh
British Infantry Brigade. The 55th British Infantry Brigade had
two companies of 5 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment
and two companies of 2 Cambridgeshire Regiment The Kapur-
thala State Infantry which was on Scleiar Aerodrome svas imncd
to the beach defences in front of it 125 ^knli-tank Regiment
(less a battery), which was organised for an infanli)* role, sras sent
south of Seletar Rifle Range to protect the divisions left flank,
along srith 289 Field Company Ro>'aI Engineers.
The Coastal sector from Fairy Bomt to Sungei Tampines,
svhicli had been held b) S/it Sikh until it went forth to Massy
Force, was taken over b}* 3/17 Dogra.
The principle behind all these moves was that the lllh
Indian Disidon should not become isolated and tt should also
secure the left flask of the 18ih British Division. As a preliminary
to this general close-up, the Corps of the Royal Engineers of the
11th Indian Division was ordered to demolish the cranes, docks,
pumping machinery, power-house, oU tanks and other Installations
in the Naval Base.
During the night of II/I2 February* 1912, the Ulh Indian
Dis-idon fell back to the line Sungei Simpang

Simpangvillage-
Sembawang Aerodrome Seletar Reservoir. According to American
British Dutch Australian Command, "at the end of these (all
fronts) operations the general line was Naval Base

N'ec Soon
Village ^Peirce Reservoir
Race Course Holland Road Road
Junction 7513Pasir Village.* Colonel Harrison has remarked

that "the zig-zag Line from MacRitchle Reservoir to the
Chinese High School, from the Chinese High School to Reformatory
School, and thence to Pasir Pai^ang, was no line of defence but

dSDACOit, tp. iL, p. S3, (pan 25, mb-pan J).

 tilE BATTLE OF SINCAPORE 333

a line of gaps-gaps behvccn fonnations, of gap-? within fonnatioa?

of dispened and in many cases isolated detachments in an area ill-
suited to a defensive battle. The troops were there, not by pre-
arranged planning, but because they found themselves there
owing to the force of events It may be due to this fact that
General Percival thought that the time had come to shorten and
clarify the range of the entire defence of the Island/
During the night of 11/12 February 1912 several important
moves took place. At midnight III Indian Corps, in charge
of the Northern Area, took over the command of all troops as far
left as the Bukit Timah Road inclusive, and the Western Area
included the Ulu Pandan Road. ThcNavalBase was evacuated
without interruption by the Japanese. Two companies of 1/8
Punjab simply disappeared, and the Japanese infiltrated into their
position. 1 Cambridgeshire Regiment of the 55th British Infantry

Brigade replaced 5/11 Sikh Regiment in Massy Force at the junc-

tion of Syme and Lornie Roads. There was Japanese activity
in the Singapore Golf Course area, in the course of which Murray
Force had accidentally fought with 4 SulToIk. 3/17 Dogra wai
ordered to move to Thompson Road and come under Massy
Force. On the Reformatory Road the British artillery carried out
considerable harassing and defensive fim. This did not, however,
prevent a certain amount of Japanese infUtration. To fdJ the gap
on the right of the 22nd Australian Imperial Force Brigade,
2 Gordon Highlanders moved from Tyersall Park to positions
commencing from a forward point near Pandan-Holland Roads
junction to Hill 115 (north of Holland Road), In the southern-
most area, held by the 1st Malaya Infantry Brigade, there was a
certain amount of Japanese patrol activity and a few Japanese
troops had also infiltrated into Buona Vista Ayer Raja Road
junction from where they sniped the whole of the next day.
Thursday, 12 February, opened wth a strong Japanese
attack, says General Percival, with tanks down the Bukit
Timah road there was a very real danger that the enemy
would break through on that front into Singapore Town, for we
had very little behind the front with which to stop him if he once
effected penetration In olherwords, theproblem of the Malaya
Command on this day was How shall the Japanese progress be
stopped and Singapore Town saved ?' The resources were extre-
mely scanty, scantier than ever. The units svould never know
what their individual strength was or could be. They reported

4T History of llth Indian Division in &lalaya, Vol. II, p. S3S.

4S Tht ti'ar in Mal/pa, p. 281.
nu
 ;

33G c-uiPMONj IN' soimt-tASi asxa ualava

as being an odd hundred or two, but a little later, when men detach*
cd or comidered lost rejoined, foW strength. As noticed already,
food, petrol, equipment and wcaiwns were getting in short supply.
At the same time Malaya Command's rcjiwnsibility was grow-
ing. The most Urgent task before it was to suit defence to the re-
sources available. The first measure in this dtrcciioti was the
shortening of the perimeter of defence and confining it to a fi\'C or
six miles radius round Singapore Tos%7i. In ccnsultation with the
Commander of Xorihcrn Area she sources of water supply were
included in this plan. There were three objects inTOlved in the
execution of this plan: The 11th Indian Diiiiion and the
(1)
remainder of the 18th British Infantry Division must cos-cr water-
supply points and link up with the ^uihcm Area at the riorth-
eastem point of Kalang aerodrome and hold the front held by
Massey Force. (2) Southern Area should withdraw from Changi
and the beaches cast of Kalang. (3) The vital point to be defended
was rite Bukit Timah comer la the north-ss-est. The general Uflc
of tWs perimeter was St. Patricks School on the south coast about
six imles from the centre of Singapore Tev.Tj (935U1) the junc-
tion of Maepherson and Pays Lebar Roads (898142)Btdadari
(8815)MacRitchie ReservoirRace Course the Reformatory
RoadPasir Panjang village. The ibranatfon boundaries were;
between Southern Area and III Indian Corp^ Maepherson Road
between 111 Indian Corps and the AustraliansBukit Timah
Road; and betss'een the Australians and Southern Area-
Aj'cr Raja Road. Sometimes these lines vicre not clearly
drawn and thus created confusion, but this could not be helped.
All moN'cs were to be completed by 13 February 1942, if they
could nof be done earlier. 2 Gordon Highlanders of the
2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade came under the Autralian Command
after mosing to Tycrsall Park. It wars intended that the Mysore
State Infantry on Pengcrang and 2nd Dogra on Tekong should be
withdrawn under ewer of darkness by the Navy on 13 Fcbimary,
but this never eventuated owing to the ships being sent awray from
Singapore on that night wilb selected personnel, whom it sv'as
suddenly decided to evacuate*.*"
The second series of measures was to warn the civil govern-
ment of the danger it was In. General Perdval writes that the
Governor and hlalaya Command had to several important
deoHons: One concerned the hlalayan Broadcasting Station
which was now less than a culc firom the front line. ^Ve decided
destroy it. Another concerned the stocks of currency

M ABDACOii ", Actonoi *f il:e NfUifa CaiopaisB, p. S57. See

,p. rt, p59. pan 25. *.pn 0).
 TilE BAtTtE Of sin6apore 33^

notes held b) the Treasury We

decided to destroy some of
the notes and to teep the rest Food and water were diminish*
ing in quantity rapidly because the formation of the shorter peri-
meter and withdrawal of troops near Singapore Town had brought
a very large number of individuals to share the limited stock of
these two necessities of life. As calculated on this date, food
reserves could last only one week and if the reserves with the units
and cml authorities were included they might hold on for a fesv
more days. \Vatcr was causing greater anxiety. Pearls Hill
reservoir near the General Hospital was empty and dry, and the
Fort Canning reservoir was being used up rapidly. In Singapore
Town, generally, water svas running to waste osving to brea^ in
the mains caused by Japanese bombing and sheUing. One
consequence of this was the fall in pumping pressures and failure
in the rise of svatcr to abos-e ground-floor levels. Lest public
morale and health should decline rapidly, water was supplied in
by organised parties, and from this date, 1 2 Febrvary 1 942,
carriers
Royal En^necr personnel and military personnel were called
in to assist the civil staff.
So far as petrol was concerned there was only one small dump
on the island, besides what tvas available in the vehicles themselves.
But fortunately there were the reserves of the Asiatic Petroleum
Company on the Fulau fiukum.
But on 12 February, further Japanese landings at Loyang,
west of Changi, were reported. This fact, as well as the shortening
of the perimeter, made III Indian Corps withdraw its headquarters
from Changi. There was no further development there.
The Japanese aim at this stage was the complete encirclement
of Singapore Town by a three-way pincer movement as well as by
an aerial and naval blockade. There were at least three zones
into which they had divided the whole area ^thc northern, around
the water reservoirs the central, east of the Race Course and the
; ;

southern, south-west of Singapore To\vn. After the evacuation

of the Naval Base, the Causeway was repaired and the Japanese
brought more men, more material and more tanks svith which they
could overwhelm the British army and bring the campaign to
an early end. The Japanese chronicler writes that they used
the German so-called spearhead method of attack; that is the
flghting was done by two columns which penetrated the British line
and then fanned out behind it, to the cast and west. The Tult
was that before the battle was over, they had broken the British
army up into a number of * islands of rcsbtance the principal

S' 77i tior in pp.

338 CMIPAJCKS LN SOUTH-EAST ASIA J9fM2 JfALAYA

Selctar,
ones of whicli were located at the Royal Air Force Base at
the fortress of Changi, the Wgh Ground northof the reservoir,
and
This last-named place.
the high ground around BuWtTlntah.
. .

was considerably aided by fire from the guns in the batteries off
the south coast The Japanese command at tliis stage

was completely decentralised, each regiment or column commander

changing the direction of his attack as he judged best in the circum-
stances. This created more confusion in the British army, with
the result that it soon collapsed as a fighting force.
In the northern area, 2jl0 Baluch, which was at Milestone
11 on tlie hlandai Road, opened fire at about 0730 hours on a party
of the Japanese moving towards Nee Soon and scattered it with
great cfiect. In order to fill up the gap on the right of this Baluch
umt, a field company of Sappers and Miners was put into the
line, but the Japanese pressed on and threatened Nee Soon road-
junction. 2/9 Gurkha Rifles was therefore called and ordered to
make a counter-attack and fill the gap in the line of the 8th Indian
Infantry Brigade. There was no artillery to support, and at the
same time the Gurkhas became accidentally engaged with 3 Field
Company and part of 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles. Consequently
the intended objective was not reached, but a line sufficiently
far advanced to stop temporarily the Japanese penetration, was
gsdned. IN'hile thu was going on, the 53rd Bridshlnfantry Brigade
and the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade moved back through Nee
Soon, the former to the south of the Sungei Selctar and the latter
to the west of the Scrangoon Road and north of the Sungei
Wiampoe. Atabout 1300 hours, three Japanese tanks came down
the Mandal Road to the Nee Soon cross roads and were knocked
out by 2/10 Baluch and a detachment of Bo Anti-Tank Regiment.
At about 1600 hours, the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade began to
withdraw to Bidadari area, and 5 Norfolk and 2/9 Gurkha Rifles
returned to their respective brigades.
The 53rd British Infantry Brigade withdrew further south
during the ensuing lught and occupied a position to the cast of
Peirce Reservoir fay Of 00 hours, with 2 Cambridgeshire on the right
and 5 Norfolk on the left, astride the Thompson Road. Each
of these battalions had one company as outpost. 2/30 Australian
Imperial Force Battalion was now in Ang Mo Kio village area,
serving as brigade reserve.
In the central zone the situation was getting somewhat
^
stabilised. The British line of defence in this zone was almost
a straight line from MacRilchie Reservoir (813155) to the curve

Uad Opttatwu, p. 37.


TIIE BATTtE OF SIXOaPORE 339

on the Sime Road (808148) from that cur\'c to a point west of

Adam Road (812145), and then almost parallel to Adam and
Farrcr Roads about a few hundred j'ards to their west. The
Japanese attack in this zone was in two places, v^z. the Golf Goune ,

and the Bukit Timah Road.

At 0800 hours the Japanese tanks attacked down the Bukit
Timah Road and forced Tom Force to withdrasv from the Race

Course village line to the line Adam ^Farrcr Road. At the same
time 5/11 Sikh Regiment moved loa point south of^Valton Park
where the Japanese aircraft had already appeared. Meanwhile,
3/17 Dogra had been ordered to withdraw from its sector on the
northeast coast of the Island and to occupy a position on the
Farrcr Road. But while these troops svcrc moving to their
respective positions it seems that troops, British and Australian,

were coming back in groups along the Bukit Timah Road .**
The situaUon on the flanks was not known. By 0930 hours all
troops bad passed to the general line Adam Fairer Road. But
all of them >vere soon subjected to very heavy bombing from
the air followed by intensive mortar and artillery fire and suffered
a number of casualties. At 1200 hours on 12 February,
I Cambridgeshire discovered a gap on its left, and similarly 5/11

Sikh complained of a gap on its left. As ilUIuck would have

it, two Japanese tanks appeared at 1230 hours on the Bukit Timah

Road, and half an hour later the AustraUans started bombarding

the position, but in the prevailing confusion as to what constituted
the front line, some bombs fell among the forward companies of
the British. Nothing could be done to stop this tragedy and so at
1 330 hours when these fbnvard companies had reported twenty-four

casualties they were withdrawn to an alteniati\'c position about

one hundred and fifty yards back.
The follosving was the disposition of the force in the central
zone at 1330 hours on 12 February.;
5/1 1 Sikh on the general Unc of the road leading to Ghasserian
Estate II.
18 Division Recce Battalion along the Adam Road.
4 Norfolk to the left of W
Division Recce Battalion.
3/17 Dogra on the Icftof 4 Norfolk.
1/5 Sherwood Foresters in the area of Hill 80.
4 StraitsSettlements Volunteer Forceinline of Mount Pleasant
Road.
1 Cambridgeshire in Adam Park area.

*5 A Diary of 5 BaiUlIon (D.G.O.) Tbe SSh Regiment, J2 February 1942.

MNote* on the Figbtingia Sing^iporelsbadtouiJi of ibeMicRitcbJeRfserroir, p. 2.
310 CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST AHA 19-11-42 MALAYA

of
4 Suffolk on the right oF I Cambridgeshire, south east
Singapore Golf Course.
Murray Force holding the Singapore Golf House.
During the aficmoon, about 1430 hours, 5/11 Sikh svith-
drew to a position on the Farter Road to the left of 3/17 Dogra.
Actually it svas to be placed some hundred yards east of the Adam
Road and north of the Bukit Timah Road, but the commander
of Tom Force took up positions from excluding road junction
south along the Farrer Road, with battalion headquarters and
reserve companies on Gluny Hilt. Tlierc was a gap on the left
of this regiment to the extent of about a thousand yards, beyond
which its patrols made contact sriih a company of 2 Gordon

Highlanders. This gap was most carefully patrolled day and

night. Fortunately, no attack developed against this sector on
12 February. " A little sniping, mortaring and artillery fire and
a grenade attack on the carrier patrol, which wounded two men,
were all that occurred
On the Golf Coune, Murray Force was being pressed through-
out the day, and it was counter-attacking with equal vigour. At
1700 houn, the Japanese compelled this force to withdraw. It
was then assigned the task of protecUng the Impounding Reservoir
at the ease end of MacRltchie Resersw, thence south on the line
Lomie and Stme Roads linking with 1 Cambridgeshire which was
in the Adam Park area. At 1800 hosirs, elements of the iBth
Bridsh Divisioa began to arrive from the north coast in the area

Sungei Kampines Sungei Seletar. They fonned a composite
force known as 4\'ells Force conristing of a company of 5 Bedford-
sHre and Hertfordshire and tw
companies of reinforcements for
the same British regiment and 1/5 Sherwood Foresters. In ^cw of
the danger of a Japanese attack across the GolfCoixise, a reserve
defence line was formed on the general line of Mount Pleasant
Road. 4 Norfolk went back to BO; 3/17 Dogra side-stepped
to the left along the Farrer Road replacing 5/11 Sikh which went
into reserve in the RafEcs College (8112) and Bukit Brown (8113)
areas.
In the southern zone, the Japanese were trying to get control
of strategic road positions, and the British withdrew to more
formidable points on the neighbouring hills. The withdrawal
^f Tom Force on the monung of 12 February had opened the
Reformatory Road to the Japanese, and at 0930 hours (12
February) the Japanese infantry dehussed near the Reformatory*
Pandan Road junction and pushed 7/8 Punjab back. Having

A Viaiy of 5th Eiiialajn p.Cia) The Sikh Resimmt. 12 Febiwy IW2.

THE BATTLE OF SLN'OAPOBE 341
342 CAMPAJCXS Vi SOimi-EASr ASIA 19tl*42 MAIAYA

cleared thU road junction, the Japanese moved dotra a water

course soudj of the Ulu Tandan Road and threatened to cut
through and separate 22rd Australian Imperial Force and 44th
Indian Infantry' Brigades. This was hos^rver prevented by the
British Battalion which was in the low ground between Hill 125
(7611) and Hill 115 (7712). But the Japanese gained strength
during the day and attacked the British positions on Pandan IV
area at 1915 hours. An hour later, as the Japanese were coming
round the left (lank of the British units a general withdrawal of
these units became necessary. The 22nd Australian Imperial Foree
Brigade pulled back accordingly, connecting wilh the IBlh Brinish
Division on the Farter Road and 5 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire
west of the Buona Vista Road. But this meant that shortly before

midiught the Ulu Pandan Holland Road junction lay open to the
Japanese.
A similar withdrawal was made bj* the 44th Indian Infantry
Brigade at OlOO hours of 13 February 1942. The entire day
of 12 February 1942 bad been quiet for this brigade, the British
Battalion had come back and joined it, and 1/5 Sherwood Foresters
had gone away. But the whereabouts of the Australians were not
blown to this brigade. At 2000 hours the units were situated

as follows: 6/1 Punjab in the area of square 7651 1 1, 7/8 Punjab
along the track running east of the loop of the Reformatory* Road
with brigade headquarters approximately one thousand yards
along the track going east from Ac Reformatory' Road. After 2200
hours Acre was a brigade conference at ivhich wiAdrawal was
arranged; but at 2400 hours when Ae Japanese shelled and attack-
ed Ac brigade headquarters it was ordered that this wiAdras%-al
must commence at 0130 hours at Ae latest. The brigade went
due souA up to Ae Ayer Raja Road, where orders were given to
move to Ae Buona Vista Road, where s'c took up a position facing
norA-west near where Ac road cuts Ae F.hLS. Railway and
immediately svest of Ae Tanglin Halt Railway Station.
On Ac front held by Ae Isl hlalaya Infantry Brigade,
Acre was stir but no activity woiA Ae name. In Ae momii^
Ac Japanese had crossed Ac Jurong river and pushed 1 Malaya
Regiment up to Ae Asiatic Petroleum DepoL But Acy did not
proceed any furAer, alAough Acy made Ae hlalayan battalion
nen-ous about infiltration from its rear. I Malaya Battalion
was, AereTore, slrengAencd by the addinon of a detachment caA
of 3 HeasT And-AirersA Battery, 2/4 Maclune-Gun Battalion, and
2 Loyals Gamer Section, all on Pasir Panjang village and Wdge

Lfcoieaiat D. SaSnWr: fCrtory of the 6/1 Punjab, p. 16.

 THE HATTIE Of SINGAPORE 343

areas. But to make the line more secure, 2 Ixiyals was ordered
to Jink up ssith the left ofS Bedfordshire and Hcrlfordsfurc, svhich
was slightly forward of the Hlh Indian Brigade between Hills
125 and 120 on the Buona Vista Road, and then it was to carry
the line across the Ajcr Raja Road at Milestone OJ towards the
Pasir Panjang Ridge. 2 ^^aIaya Battalion would then
continue the line along the northern slopes of that Ridge
to link up with 1 Malaya Battalion which still overlooked the
coast, svcit of the Reformatory Road. These withdrawals were
eventually completed by about 0300 hours on 13 February 1912,
the exception being 2 Loyals svhich did not move at all. The
g.ip between this unit and 5 Bedlbrdshirc and Hertfordshire was
hosvc\-cr filled by 31 Battery of 7 Coast Defence Regiment.

THE l_\ST 0.\YS l.*r SINGAPORE

Tlie account of Abdacom narrates the incidents
olTicial
of Friday, 13 February 1912, as followsi On the J3ih
enemy pressure from the north compelled a witlidrawal to the
MacRitdiie Reservoir afc.i. Further attacks developed in the
Paya Lebar area and in the west The whole of Singapore town
was by now within range of the enemys field battery, ^VhlIst
reiterating that he must light it out. as he was doing, it was suggest-
ed to General OiTicer Commanding Malaya that, after everything
humanly possible had been done, some bold and determined person-
nel might be given tlic opportunity to escape by small craft to
Sumatra.
"General Officer Commandii^ Malaya reported on I3th
February' that in addition to the whole town being within field
artillery range of the enemy, the troops were in danger of being
driven off their water and food supplies. His subordinate com-
manders considered that the troops already committed were too
exliausted citJicr to withsland a strong attack or to launch a
counter-attack. In these conditions it xvas unlikely that resistance
could last more than a day or two. His subordinate commanders
were unanimously of the opinion that the gain in time from prolong-
ing resistance would not compensate for the extensive damage and
heavy casualties which would occur in Singapore town. The
General Officer Commanding represented Uial a stage must come
when in the interests of Uic troops and the cml population further
bloodshed, which could sen e no useful purpose, should be averted.
He was carrying out the strict injunctions issued on the 1 0th to
fight to the last, but in view of the dreumstances now represented
he requested that giving him wrider discretionary powers should
be considered. In reply, the General Officer Commanding was
344 CAMPAIGN'S IS SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941*42 JfAtAVA

ordered to continue to inflict mwomuin damage on tbc enemy

for

as along as possible, by house to house fighting if necessary

The dasra of 13 February' found the lllh Indian Dhision
intact. During its fight on Singapore Island, it had, it is
true, been

practically left unmolested. No attack had been launched on

its front except down the Mandat road on the previous
day, and
even this attack, which had invoK'ed only 3 Field Company, 1/8
Punjab, 2/9 Gurkha Rifles and 2/10 Baluch, had not been pressed
home. But during the night of 12/13 February 1942, the 28lh
Indian Infantry Brigade had been heavily bombed for two hours
in its position at the IVireless Station and had suffered a number
of casualties. It was therefore moved to a position south of Brad-
dcll Road in Toa Payoh area north of the river IVTiampoe. Onij*
two battalions constituted the brigade after the transfer of 5/14
Punjab to the 8ih Indian Infant^ Brigade; 2/9 Gurkha Rifles
was on the right and 2/2 Gurkha Rifles was on the left of the front
In the rear of this brigade and north of Ballesticr Road, 3 Cas'alrj'
had been positioned.
The 8lh Indian Infantry Brigade occupied iu sector of the
new perimeter by noon. Its position was in an area from
MaePberson Road to about one thousand yards west of Serangoon
Road, facing north-north-west On the right was S/14 Punjab
on the line of small hill features along Pa>a Lebar Road. In
the centre and in the Bidadari Cemetery area, up to and including
Serangoon Road, was 2/10 Baluch. Forward and to the left
ofBraddeURoad and on the Biscuit Factory ridge was 1/13 Frontier
Force Rifles. In rcJcr>'c and behind 2/10 Baluch was 2/18 Royal
Gaihwal Rifles, in the southern portion of Bidadari Cemetcry-
At about 12-15 hours on 13 February, the Japanese patrols appeared
on the brigade front and comidetablc motor transport traffic wras
ohsened moving towards Paya Lebar s-illagc. T^ey had come
from the direction of Serangoon village and were probably tired.
They stopped at that village and, apart from some mortaring,
they kept quiet and allowed the Gurkhas alo some rest for the
remainder of the day.
So far as the HUt Indian Infantry Brigade was concerned,
it had arrived in its positions at about 0100
hours and bKouacked.
By first light the battalions had tmderstood their situation clearly.
They had their pwitions on the ri^i oC 5 BedOMdshirc and
Herlford'hire holding Buona Vista Hill
50 and also a composite
battalion of the Australians, and on the left
of a Royal En^cer
battabon. C'l4 Punjab was left forward,
6/1 Punjab right forward

*' ABDACOM 33M. pw 25, nb-paru U) ud (k).

 THE BATTLE OF SINGAPORE 345

and 7/8 Punjab m rc^en-e. Tlic day passed quietly. Tlic

Japanese aircrafts ucre howcwr very .active and flying loiv, but
there was not mucii sJicUing. At about ICOO hours the Japanese
atlacled the fonv.ird company ofS Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire
and drove it from Hill 50. The Bridsli battalion prepared a
coufiterati.ick, but abandoned il; inste.id it n-ithdresv from its
general position. This was apparently nccessar>' tneonformwith tlie
nithdranwl of the MalavTt Brigade on its iefi. But the Indian
brigade was not Informed of this until after 5 Bcdfonlshirc and Hert-
fordshire had actually vacated ttt position and left the formers left
fl.ink absolutely open to the Japanese. It svas lucky that, although
the Jap.sncjc engaged this brigade svith mortar fire, they did not
press their attack. Meanwhile, the brigade commander, being
totally tinasvare of this danger, svas at this moment planning the
routine night patrolling with the adjacent Australian battalion
headquarters, and co-onrlmating the general defence arrangements
of his brigade position. But when he saw Use danger of
the new situation he immediately issued preliminary orders
for withdrawal. Forward positions sscrc to be vacated by 2100
hours, and ssitlidnsva! to commence at 2230 hours. The route
was the railway line for C/I Punjab and the pipe-line for 6/14 and
7/0 Punjab; the British battalion of the 15ih Indian Infantry
Brigade was to co%-er the vsithdrawal. The rallying point was
IflGth mile on the railway line and (he Xock Sen Brick IWks on

the Alexandra Road, where guides svould lead all to the final
destination. All batmlions met togcthcf at 0130 hours on 14
February 1912, and cwry regiment svas told that their final
destination svas Afount F.cho near the Jap.inesc GolfLinks. They
reached this place at about 0100 hours and came under the
command of Southern Area. All accounts show that this was
a nice place promising foo<l and rest. The dispositions were .is
fbllosvs; on (he right and south slopes of the Japanese Golf Course
and Mount Echo, 6/1 Punjab; on the south'.castcrn slopes of
.Mount Echo, 7/8 Punjab; and on the north slopes, 6/14 Punjab.
The British battalion was centrally placed on Mount Echo.
On 13 Februar}', the 18tb British Division was disposed from
(cxclusu'c) Woodlclgh cross-roads to (inclusive) Double Road.
The Chinese High School was the limit in the latter area. It had
a five-mile front, and there had been much mixing of units as a
result of the piecemeal withdrawal from beach defences. The
only event worth noting on (his long front was the withdrawal
of the 53rd British Infantry Brigade from south of Nee Soon to
its position in the main perimeter on the Braddcll Road in
consequence of Japanese attacks from 0400 hours to 1100 hours
34G aMiPAiGNs IN $oimi-t.\sT ASIA 194M2 >ialaya

on day. Another incident was the rejoining of 2/30 Australian

this
Imperial Force Battalion with its parent unit, the Cth Australian
Imperial Force DK-ision in Tjersall P.\rk area. Otherwise, apart
from the Japanese shelling and mortaring and losv-lcs'el air-
craft attacls, the I8th British Dlriiion enjoyed a rjulet day. There
were three Indian units also in this division, w-
5/1 1 Sikh, 3/17
Dopra and the Kapurthala State Infantry. The Siths were
subjected to considerable Japanese mortar and artillery fire, toidcs
bombing from the air. But the wont of all Uieir experiences
was die shell fire from theBritisharoIIeryin error which practically
wiped out one platoon. At 1700 hours the battalion was rel^rd
by Sufiblks and 3/17 Dogra and thereafter moNTd into brigade
reserve on Rallies Hill.** 3/17 Dogra ride-stepped to the left on the
Farrcr Road and Kapmthala State Infantry mos-ed further behind
the Wth British Brigade Headquarters. Bciweco the left flack
of 3/17 D^ra and the right (lank of the Cth Australian Imperial
Force Division there was a gap of about lOOO yards, which was to
some extent neutrall<<d by the fact that the t ighi of the Australian
line ran forward from the Farrer Road in a westerly direction
forming thereby a salient with the line held bv- the 18lh British
Division-
The main Japanese oflemivc <nj 13 February 1912 developed,
however, along the Pash Panjang Ridge on the left of the genera!
Island defence. Here (he Japanese which had (ought
in the Mersing area and later taken part in the initial attack
against Singapore Island, came into action- After two hours of
heavy shelling and mortaring, it attacked the Malaya Regiment
which was holdiog this fcaiurt. The latter fought magniSceaUy
in spite of suffering very heavy losses. By the afternoon the
Japanese had reached the Cap which was an important position
where the Buona Ms(a Road crossed the Ridge. Further north
the Japanese gained another local success. After dark all British
forward troops fell back, under orders, to positions covering the
important Alexandra area, in which were situated the Main
Ordnance Depot, the .Mexandra Ammunition Magazine, the
Miliury Hospital and other installatioiis.
As the s^nglehold on Singapore Town incrcasctl, the
agory became intolerable. There was obviously no use further
fighting.
^
The Governor stressed the dangers which would
result if Singapore with its large
population was suddenly deprivTd
of Its water supply" Major-General
Key, who was consnUed
by Malaya Command on capitnlatkm or a sxmuluneous advance

wPertn^.
^ PjTaSoo ^ZCO
tJr^sSA, p. la*. p*,,
s.
Tke Sai, tJ reirorr I9tt
 T>rE or sl^GAPf)Ja: 3^7

on all fronts as a d>in,i gesiurc *

told his commander that If
rarly capitulation was inevitable it should take place while
the Japanese soldiery* could l)t: controlled bj* their Commander.**
General Cordon Jlennett write*: ** During the daj' I sent a cable to
the Australian Prime Minister adsising of the seriousness of the
jx)sition and telling hint that the Australian Imperial Force had
formed a perimeter on svhich it would stand to the last. In the
event of other formations falling back and allosving the enemy
to enter the city behind u, I advised that it was my intention
to surrender to avoid any further needless loss of life".' TIjc
situation svas bad enough to desenc being reported to tlie Govern-
ment of Australia, but It is reprcltablc that this cable should have
been sent without the krosviedge of Malaya Command. Gene-
ral Percival considered this j nuntt extraordinar) prccedvre*'.
He writes Xo doubt he (Gordon Bennett) was perfectly entitled
to communicate srith his osvrj Prime Minister but surely not to
inform him of an intention to surrender in certain circumstances
when he had not even communicated that intention to his osvn
superior ofliccr.*
By H February, the position in Singapore svas desperate. It
had been encircled by sea, land and air, and no reinforcements could
come in. Due to infiliraiion, units were cut olTand held up isola- m
ted pockets and ammunition svas diminishing. Abos-e all, water
supply was causing anxiety. At the most, it would last for forty-
eight hours, but it might be available only for tsseniy-four houn.
^S^lal would happen to the people after the water supply ceased?
Every one could give his oss-n anssver. Encirclement and infiltra-
tion and Afth column activities had ssorsened the situation. The
responsibility of the British army and government for the lives of
the innocent and helpless mass of humanity that had taken shelter
in Singapore city was sveighing heavily on General Pcrcis'al. So he
l>cgan to presf his superior authorities to allow him to take the
obvious step to avoid further bloodshed. Here is a summary of
the efforts of the Malaya Command: Later on the Hth the General
Ofliccr Commanding Malaya reported that osvjng to extensive
damage to the mains the water supply sras limited to a maximum
of-48, orpossibly only 24 hours. If the enemy captured the pump-
rng sfatfon, which he was Oteti attacking, the period nouJd be
further reduced. Thai had now become the governing factor,
because the prospect of coping uith a million civilians svithout
water had produced an entirely nesv situation. He stated that he
348 C.\MPMGN5 IN SOUnt'EAST ASIA 194I'-42 MAl-WA

wai watching dcsclopments and fighting on, hut he might fii^

In reply to this
it ncccssarv- to talc an immediate decision-

message orders s^ere issued to the General OITiccr Commanding

troops
that in all places sshcrc a sufficiency' of ater esisted^ for the
they mmt go on fighting. The Cosenvor of the Straits Settlements
informed the Colonial Office that he had represented to the General
Officer Commanding the danger of pestilence resulting
from
dcpris'ation of svatcr a million people concentrated sWthin a
for
radius of three miles. Officer Commanding made a
The General
further representation lines and in reply was told tliat
on the abose
his gallant stand was sersing a purpose and it must be continued
.**
to the limit of endurance
The progress of war on 14 February, ssas incomidcrable,
but significant. The Japanese aliacl dcs eloped at the cast end of
MacRilchie Renoir, but the situation was restored bj' a counter-
attack by the 28ih Indian Infantry Brigade. By the estmng,
however, the pressure was so great that the forward troops were
pushed back to the line Mount PleasantHill 130south west of
BuVit Brown Crossroads at Bukit Timab .\dam Road, on which
the situation was for the moment stabilbed. Also various areas in
Singapore Town were bombed and shelled throughout the day,
which led to some large fires and coiutderable damage to the water
supply line whtchtheengineersweremaLingfranticefforts torepair. ^
Early in the momtr^. IVelisforee was drivTn from Hill 105 at the
east end ofMacRicchie Reservoir, and the left flanl ofS Cambridge*
sWreof the 53rd British Infantry Brigade wavalsodriv'cnin. These
left a big gap between Hill SO and Hill 00 into which the Japanese
penetrated in the morning and pressed the rear of the British
brigade. To restore the situation and fill the gap, 2/2 Gurkha
Rifles,which was behind this brigade, was ordered to mo\-c up
on the left of the brigade and occupy Hill 75 north of Grave Hill.
At the same time the gap between the left of 2 Cambridgeshire
and the right of6 Norfolk was filled by moving the reserve companv
of 5 Norfolk into a position south of the Braddcll Road, facing
north-wesL 2/2 Gurkha Rifles failed to reach Hill 75 because they
were unable to identify the hill in the absence of a map or a guide.
But the Gurkhas occupied a feature slightly behind HUl 73, from
where they were able to fulfil the task of blocking the 1200->-ard
gap between Hill 90 and Kill 80. 2'9 Gurkha Rifles.the remaining
battalion of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade, also mosed from
titc area of the Wireless Station (some way
to the sscst of the

^AD.tCOif' FP- St-*2, pBa 25, tub-fan <OJ.

fa p. 40, , ub-psn
W tharr. 2
,
IS
(SJ.
Mnarr
 THE hattle or sixoapore 3J9

Scrangoon Road) to the Pineapple racior>' (on the cast side of the
road). I Jter it uas shifted further south to Bondamocr to protect
the headquarters of the lllh Indian Division.
At dawn on this date the forward battalions of the Cth
Indian Infantr>- Rrigade were dug in behind wire after hours of
arduous labour. The morning passed quietly in the 1 1th Indi.in
Division area, apart from conllnuom shelling. Occasional bomb-
ing also took place, in the course ofwhidi 2/9 GurUia Rifles brought
down one aeroplane in flames. The efiect of this stray incident
has l)cen described as one of delight svhfch svas almost pathetic.
During the previous night, the Japanese had been active on the
front of 2/10 Baluch from the side ofP.iya I.cbar, and in the early
morning it was found that the three forsvard companies had dis-
appeared, prob.ibly by being surrounded and captured. 2/lR
Royal Garhwal Rifles which was in reserve was ient fonvard to fill
the gap, which it occupied without opposition. In view of the
reports that the Japanese were moving south on the Paya I.cbar
Road and e.rst of it, and also tit onlcr to form .i more satUfactory
link with the Jamcsforce, 3 Cavalry was tent in the after*
noon to the area of Maepherson and Pay.i J^bar road June*
tion on the right of 5/H Punjab. The remn.ints of 3/16
Punjab, alwui fifty in all, sverc also placed under the 8th Indian
Infantry Brigade, and diey arrived in their position In the evening,
where they were in reserve in the AlkafT Garden area under the
command of 5/14 Punjab. In the meantime reports had been
arriving that since noon the Japanese were pressing forward at
the junction of 5/14 Punjab and the 2nd Malaya Infanlr> Brigade.
The Division Commander ordered 3 Cavalry- and Kapurlhala State
Infantry to form a defensive flank along the southern boundary
of the Paya Debar airfield. This combined unit got the impression
initially that there was needless alarm about the security of the for-
ward localities of the 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade and only minor
inilhralions had taken piacc. But two hours later the Japanese
renewed their attack in this area, and the right forvvard locality
of 5/M Punjab wms captured. This was howeser rc-occnpicd by
an immediate counter-attack. Unfortunately, the Japanese infil-
trated at the same time through J Manchester Regiment of the 2nd
Malaya Infantry Brigade and rendered u almost helpless. An
S.O.S. arrived from this battalion at 3 Cavalry headquarters which
sent two squadrons and restored the situation somehow. These
squadrons returned at midnight only after being relieved by a
company of a Malayan battalion. They had sustained ten casualtie.s.
Meanwhile, a Japanese tank approached the road*block
at the junction of the Paya Debar and Afaepherson Roads.
350 CAMPAIGNS IN SOirm-EAST ASIA 19iM2 MALAYA
was
85 Anti-Tant Regiment stationed at that point
it successfully unW
to face the situation and 5/U Punjab defended
forced the tani to mUi-
a troop of 272 /\nti-tank Battery came and
efforts were wing
draw. But it was now csident that the Japanese
should be check-
directed at or about the Faya Lebar Airfield svhich
ed before they assumed aspect. The Commander o
a formidable
ni Indian Corps therefore ordered four carriers of 3
Cavalry- w
covered by
carry out a raid on the Japanese in the huge area
Tech Hock village, Faya
Gcylang Serai, Malaya Settlement,
1 1 th
Lebar village and ^Vood!cigh. ^Vhcn the commander of the
Division protested, he was over-ruled. The result of t is
Indian
but one
adventure in Japanese-infested country was the loss of all

carrier. In the evening the Divisional Commander visited

me
were at their re*pcctivc
8th Indian Infantry Brigade. All troops
minor
posts, and the pressure on 5/14 Punjab had died down to
sniping. During the night, however, B Company of this regiment
repulwd a strong attack after a grenade battle of half an hour s
duration. About midnight, ! Manchester Regiment
began
^

machine-gunning the 8ih Indian Infantry Brigade, but realised the

mistake soon after. The 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade wiihdjw*
during this awful night to the Kalang Switch and left the right
flank of the llth Indian Division to be guarded by the precarious
strength of the combined 3 Cavalry and Kapurihala State Infantry
formation and the covering fire of the machine-^ns of
I Manchester Regiment.

On all other fronts 14 February 1942 was marked by the usual

fighting. The Japanese main thrust was once again against the
western front of ihe Southern area. Here very heavy fighting at
close quarters went on throughout the day in which the Loyal
Regiment and the Malaya Regiment distinguished themseh-es.
At the end of the day the British troops had Wen driven back by
GiQman
the weight of the attack to the line Alexandra Barracks
Kcppcl Golf Course. Further north, the Japanese reached the
vMexandra Hospital area as stated earlier, but were prevented from
making further progress by 5 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire and a
composite Royal Engineers unit.
On the front held by the 18lh British Dh-uion, 1 Cambridge-
shire continued to hold its position west of the Adam Road sphere
ithad shown great determination in resisting the Japanese attacks
during the last three day3. To the right of this battalion the
Japanese developed a strung attach, supported by artillery and
tanks at aWut 1800 hours, and succeeded in advancing nearly
a mile until they were held up by defences along the line of the
Mount Pleasant Road. A deep dent in the British line was thus
 TJir. hattix or siNCAtoRr. 351

created. ^VclUrorcc recaptured 105 east of MacRitcIiic

Hill
Re5cn.oir, .nnd 4 Suffolk which had l)ccn attacked by lankr on the
Sime and 7>irnlc Roadi mjhdrcw to the Afount P/easanl area
for rcocRanbation. Hut parlies of iJic Japanese also penetrated
as far .as the Mount Pleasant Road durin;* the day, occupying n
niimlwr of houses which, despite several counter-attacks !>>
4 Suffolk, were never properly cleared of the Japanese.
TJic part played by 5/1 1 Sikh in the British Division zone may
l>e descrilwd here. At 0930 hours, on receipt of orders from the
brigade headquarters, this battalion moved north of the Bukit
Timah Road to deal with a supposed bre.ik-through by the
Japanese. Tliis report proved to be incorrect. The battalion was
then ordered to hold a line from the .\founc Pleasant Road and
along south of Bukit Bros^-n to the Kheam Hock Road with tsvo
companies, the remainder of the battalion lJng in the brigade
resersc about half-w-ny between the Bukit Timah Road and Bukit
Brown. A portion of 6 Norfolk svas to the sscsl of the battalion
headquarten and on the left of the forward companies facing
north, and a little Iteyond were the Foresters, while details of the
Reece Battalion and machine-gunners ucre along the .\fount
Pleasant Road. The position here was, and continued to be,
nebulous. Patrols were sent out to obtain a clear picture of the
situation but they suffered casualties and brought no information
of value, r urther, a few more casualties occurred from the Japanese
artillery and mort.ir fire. About 1730 hours this double ilre
started again, continued for twenty minutes, stopped for three
minutes and commenced again. Suspecting some sinister purpose
in this sort of firing, the resent companies were ordered to stand
to, and as they sverc moving into position fire was opened on the
haltalion hcadquarleis by three light machine-gun groups at
close range. Thereupon the battalion cleared the ridge svith a
few casualties. The Japanese svithdrew in haste, but the Sikhs
came under very hcasy small-arms fire from their own troops in
the rear. This was of course due to confusion in this part of the
front on account of the svitbdrasval of a number of troops and of
the formation of a new line of defence along the Mount Pleasant
Road by the brigade. The brigadier svas told that the Sikhs had
been cut up and was not in/brmed of their ignorance of ihe new
line formation. ^Vhcn he learnt this, he ordered the delivery
of nesvs at once to the forward companies south of Bukit Brown,
and they svithdrew to their allotted place in the new line. At
2100 hours, finding no trace of Japanese troops in the \4cinity,
the trtxjps were ordered back, and the line svas re-formed
by dawn.
 J9il-42 MALAYA
352 CAMPAIGNS IN SOLTIl-EAST ASIA

the eastern front of the Southern

Area there
On
WalcKaB=mcnbolwn ManchotcrandJapancsedM^
1

Throughout tho day thore tot fauly >>'"7; '"S

Built Tiinah hills,
selected areas, directed from the ssh^^h
attacks horn the air, to
replied smartly. There tsere also
the EtitUh could male no enectite
rep y.
r,7,n,.
svrites that our light anti-aiterart
guns 1'='' "t'
aiiciaft, ssnth S""!
ets on this day as the Japanese
ss ere brought
dossn, hut
them, svete dyrngat low altitudes. Several
getung short .
our rcscvNCS of Bofors ammunition %hcrc now
reported that one
Before da^hn on 15 rcbmary 1912, it was
surrendered to we
company of 2/10 Baluch had gone ox-cr and
Japanese, as the result of a clever trick; three
Huropean ofheers
in Australian uniforms, it seems,
approached the troops ana
declared that surrender of Singapore had been agreed to, 2 "^
ih
they should go across to the Japane^: lines and capitulate,
seated
Baluch company fell for the trap. These men were seen
bombarded
on a hill south of Paya Lebar, and 135 Field Regiment
rcmatndCT
the hill during the day. The Japanese attacked the
Baluch with mortar fire In the morning, but without much
of 2/10
effect. * Petrol Hill in
5/14 Punjab sector was captured by
w*
the
Japanese, but 3/16 Punjab re<occupied it before noon. In
the mortars of 1/13 P'rontier Force Rifles dispersed a
afternoon,
Japanese battalion massing In front of it, and at 1500
Japanese tanks and lorries approaching the Paya Lebar airfield
were halted by a troop of 272 Anti-Tank Balter). During^ the
day, 3 Cavalry was in contact with the Japanese in the xndniiy

of the Paya Lebar Maepherson Roads junction.
The 4-lih Indian Infantry Brigade suffered heas) losses on
15 February. The Japanese attacked incessantly on this day
1 Malaya Infantr)' Brigade which was to the left of 44 lh Indian

Infantry Brigade, and inflicted heavy casualties on all its un5ts

especially 2 Loyal RcgimenL The line of defence fell back to the

east end of Alexandra Depots area Mount Wasliington
cast
end of Kcppel Golf links. In the strenuous fighting, the 44th
Indian Infantry Brigade could not C-scape puruslOTCnt. Japanese
shelling and mortaring on the high ground to the left and rear of
the brigade caused heavy losses of men. The huts, constructed
of dried palm fronds, caught fire and men inside them were burnt
to ashes. There were small calibre shells, about 37-inch and with
high velocit)-, popularly described as whiz S-bangs which caused
more confusion among men of the units. There was an occasion

1 7b UV a p- 290.
Plate IX
 mE BATTLE OF SINGAPORE 353

when the Japanese, with machine-guns and mortars in position,

sscrc cigiu iiundrcd yards from this brigade. Wesvcrc able to
turn our 3*mch mortars on to this target ", writes the war-diarist,
but could get no artillery fire, as apparently, there was none
auaiJable. It was becoming obvious that as the day went on our
situation would become worse rather than better But by 1730
Jiours tJie Japanese shelling decreased considerably; by J800
hours orders to cease offensive action except on being attacked
an<I to maintain the present position svere receisTd by the 44lh
Indian Infantry Brigade; and at about 2000 hours an order
proclaimed that terms of capitulation were being negotiated and
all arms and ammunition were to be stacked and counted.
3/17 Dogra and 5/11 Sikh Regiments remained in their
positions on the Farrer Road and m Bukit Brown area respectively.
The latters war-diarist has recorded that at about 1200 hours

a car with a white flag passed through along the Bukit Timah
Ro.id and we learnt that terms svere being sought
During the night of 14/15 February 1942, the Japanese
infantry infiltrated in all sectors of the J6ih British Division front
and also succeeded in getting a fooling on the Mount Fleasant
Ridge. The lack of an organised reserve made iidifTicuUtodeal
with these pockets of penetration. Nevertheless, local counter-
attacks were staged, and some of the lost positions on Mount
Pleasant Ridge were regained.
In this connection the activities of 2/2 Gurkha Rifles
deserve some notice. Briefly, this battalion did not at once
occupy Hill 75 which had been assigned to it on the presTous day.
It was asked early in the morning to remain where it was, pending
the arrival of the Brigade Conim.inder. Later when he came,
owing to deterioration in the situation of the 53rd British Infantry
Brigade on the right, the battalion was asked cither to occupy
Hill 75 or to go the right side of the brigade to help. While
preparations were made for reconnoitring a position on the right
flank, the commander ordered the unit verbally to move to Hilf
75. A little later low-flying Japanese planes began to come over
the area again. But on this occasion tliey were engaged by small
arms fire, and one company opened heavy Light Machine-Gun
and rifle fire at a ground target which was suspected to be a fifih-
cofumn group. " A curious phenomenon seen on severat occasions
during these last few days was a silent stream of red Ughts, similar
to red tracer, shooting into the air from within our positions. Pre-
sumably they were fired by fifth columnists and were an indication
3j4 CAMPAIGNS tN SOtmt-EAST AHA 19tl-12 MM-SVA

whatCN'cr 'vat
to enemy air or artillery. The wapoit, or it

that discharged them, svas soundless *V*

On the afternoon of 15 February', the Gurkhas ssrrc motm?
up to occupy Hill 75. But in the middle of this mo%e, a message
follows:
arrh-ed from the 53rdBritixhlnrantry Brigade. It ran as
proceeded to Japanese Headquarters at 1130 hourt-
An emlssaiy
At 1600 hours troops under command u-ill cease fire but remain
all
in present pwitiorts. If attacked b> the enemy after 1600 hourt
wal
the ofGcer or in command of the parly concerned
N.C.O.
raise the t%hite flag. There svill be no destruction of
arms or
equipment but alt secret papers, codes and ciphers will be destroyed.
ISater and rations must be conserved. All money will be burnt .
The commanding ofliccr was satisfied with the genuineness of
message, which bewildered eser^'onc in the unit. But at 1000
hours fire did not cease as expected, and both sides continued
hostilities. Firing did not cease entirely until 2100 houn. At
about 1700 hours the battalion commander issued an order for
collecting all arms and ammuntuon in a central dump and for
the closing in of all companies close to Battalion Headquarters-
Arrangements were made for sentries and also for raising white
flags at battalion headquarters and b\- companies when the
Japar.e.se arrived. But no deselopmcnts took place, so all ssent
to sleep and rcre only on the next day.
There was little Japanese aettvit)* against the 8lh Australian
Imperial Forec Disision also on this day, except for some shelling
and air action. During the morning there was some pressure
on the front of 2/26 AuttraUan Imperial Force Battalion on the
Farter Road. During the afternoon ihere were signs of the
Japanese preparing to make a thrust in a northerly direction from
the Alexandra end of the Ayer Raja Road against the south-weatcm
face of the Australian perimeter. But by ev-emng no attack had
been launched.
On the eastern side of the Southern Area, the Japanese
arrived in Kampong Eiinos early on the morning of this day. This
led to the rcorgaiusation of defence with a \iew to stabhising it
from the Reclamation ground in the airport area up to the Kalang
switch line on the west bank of the Sungei Kalang. The situation,
however, remained basically the same.

The Cepllulatua
story of the capitulation has been narrated in more or
.
less idenQcal words bn- all Lisioriam of the war in Malaya. There
Wir tJiy. irz OIL, 13 Fctnivy IM2.
 THE BATTLE OF SLN'CAPORE 355

was a coi^crcncc of commanders at Fort Canning at 0930 hours

on 15 February. The Director-General of Chil Defence, the
Inspector-General of Police and a Staff O/Ticer of Northern Area
had been insnted and were present at the meeting. Each gave his
own account of the situation, and ifalaya Command gave a sum-
mary of the whole, and permitted a discussion on the general
situation. Dieutcnant-Gcncral Heath stressed water-shortage for
the Indian troops in his corps. The plight of the civil population
was fully analj'sed and noted. The question svas put: Shall wc

counter-attach? Or, shall we capHviale?' The formation

commanders were unanimously of the opinion that, in the existing
circumstances, a counter-attack was impracticable. Some of them
also doubted the British ability to resist another determined attack
of the Japanese and pointed out its consequences on the crowded
population in the town. Capitulation was, therefore, silently and
sadly, decided on.
The Supreme Commander of Souih-^\cst Pacific, General
IVavelJ, had telegraphed to Malaya Command, that When
you are fully jatisfied that this (defence) is no longer possible I
give you discretion to cease rcsbtance*. In reply and as a result
of the commanders conference, General Pcrcival notified General

Wavell of the decision to cease hostilities.

General Yamashita svanted General Pcrcival to come per-
sonally and offer the surrender uncondition.illy. The latter,
accompanied by Brigadier-Generals Torrance and Newbigging
and Afajor Wilde, the interpreter, went to the Ford Automobile
Factory at 1840 hours (late by an hour and ten minutes). The
Japanese General entered the room Five minutes later and shook
hands with the Britbh General, whose face was swollen red and
eyes were bloodshot*. The following questions and
answers were then noted:
General Yamashita (pointing to the written terms) I will
stop fighting if these unconditional terms are accepted. I want
some simple questions answered. Just anssser Yes or No.
General Pcrcival ^Yes.
Y Have you any Japanese Prboners-oMVar?
P None.
Y Any Japanese?
P They were all sent to India. Their safely is in the hands of
the Indian Government.
Y Have you any intention of surrendering unconditionally?
Yes or No?
P I would like to defer any answer until tomorrow morn-
ing.
 CAMPAICSS IX soimi-EAsr asia 1941-42
ulaya
356

Y Tomorrow morning? What do you mean? all

Is that
forces ss-ill make an attack tonight.

I would like to liavT until 2330 hours Japan

r In* that ease,

continue
Y 2330 hours? In that case the Japanese forces ssill

attacking until then.

P (Xo aruwer).
Y Is that all right? Yes or Xo?
P Yes.
In that case I will stop fighting at 2200 hours
Japan tunc.
Y
I will send 1,000 guards into
Singapore City to pohcc
the cit\' tonight. It that all right?
P Yes. _
.

Y If these terms are broken, 1 launch a general attaev

upon the city tonighc
I would like to have the safety
oF British and Australian
P
troops remaining in Singapore guaranteed.
Y Be at complete ease about that point
The unconditional surrender was signed at 1950 hours.
The terms of this surrender are not known from any oflicial
record. General Percival has given them from memory.
They
were as under:
(a) There must be uncondiiianal surrender of all military
forces (Army, Xavy and Force) in the Singapore
Area.
(b) Hostilitiesmust cease at 2030 hours local Umc or 2200
hours Japanese time.
(c) All troops must remain in position occupied at the
cessation of hostilities pending further orders.
(d) All weapons, military equipment, ship*, aeroplanes and
iccrel documents must be banded over to the Japanese
Army intact
(c) In order to pres-ent looting and other disorders in
Singapore Town during the temporary withdrawal of
all armed forces, a force of 100 British armed men to be
left temporarily in the Town area until rcUesTd by
the Japanese.
Of all the terms Uie fourth was the one which was most
disappoindng to the Japanese. They got none of the stores,
veapons and documents of value, as they had been dcstrosed
already under orders. General Yamashita acquiesced in the
result of British action. Tbc war ceased at 2030 hours local time
punctoally.
 THE BATTLE OF SINGAPORE 357

COXCLITSION

General Yamaihita did not permit his force to enter Singa-

pore Town. On the contrar>' he sent it out of Singapore Island
on the next day. He treated all prisoners with consideration and
permitted them to be at case and to enjoy freedom in eating and
drinking. Records are full of e.xpressions of surprise at the Japanese
clemency after capitulation. But, those who tried to escape from
the clutches of the Japanese were severely punished.
Thus ended the campaign in Malaya, thirty days earlier
than even the Japanese had dared to hope. There can be no
minimising the disaster. The casualties in Malaya ran to:
British 38,496, Indian G7,340, Australian 18,490, and local
Volunteer troops 14,382, giving a grand total of 138,708, of which
more than 130,000 were prisoner* of war. The loss in prestige
and morale was c\"en greater. In fact the fall of the impregnable
fortress " exploded the myth of white supremacy in the cast, and
it only remained for the resultant myth of Japanese invincibility
to be exposed before the colonial peoples of south-east Asia could
arise and claim their own. But these developments lay still in
future. For the moment, the Japanese were triumphant. Apart
from Hong Kong and Malaya, Indian troops were fighting in
defence of British interests In Borneo also, and their story may
be briefly told before winding up this account of disasters in
succession.

fsKirl/y 1 TIuWerAgainaJapat, P- Sf}

Sarawak and Borneo
 CHAPTER Xir .

Japanese Attack on Sarawak

Apart from the invasions of Hong Kong and Xfalaya

described in the preceding chapters, the Japanese altaclccd the
Philippines, Borneo, Java and Sumatra also svithin a few sveeis of
the outbreak of hostilities in South-East Asia. In all that vast
region, desperate fighting was in progress from December 1941
onwards. The defenders were the Americans, the Filipinos,
the Dutch and the Indonesians, but a lone battalion of the Indian
army also fought the Japanese on the island of Borneo in this region.
It is necessary to relate its story before concluding this study of
i
the inidal campaigns against the Japanese in South-East Asia.

SARAWAK, THE tJlKD AM> ITS PEOPLE

Lying just north of the Equator, the whole of British and

Dutch Borneo covered an area of nearly 289,000 square miles, of
which the state of Sarawak occupied roughly 50,000 square miles
along the north-west coast. The slate had a well defined boundary
to the cast, determined by the watershed of the Iran mountains,
but a less obvious frontier in the south where the ground was
broken up by a number of irregular hill ranges. The coastline bet-
sveen Kuching and Miri was mostly losv and fiat, allowing a certain
amount of cultivation. Much of the coastal area, hosvever, in
Sarawak and the rest of Borneo was swampy and malarious.
Inland, the Jungle svas dense and prolific. There Mere no
railways, and only a few roads existed in the immediate neighbour-
hood of small towns. The main roads radiating from Kuching
ran cast to Fending, four miles away, north-west to Matang and
south to Serian, which was situated at a distance of forty miles.
A road led to the svest also which passed through Bau and terminat-
ed at Krokong. Hence, svith the exception of diflicult tracks,
the only means of communication in most parts of the island was
by the streams and rivers svhich flowed in all directions from the
central mountain ranges. The largest river was the Rejang while
the Baram ranked second. The Rejang was navigable for vessels
up to 800 tom as far inland 160 miles approximately, and
the Baram for about 100 miles, but there was a formidable
bar at the mouth of the river. Some of the other rivers had rapids
in their upper reaches, and even the lightest of craft required
skilful handling while approaching them. The wider rivers also
362 CAMPAJCN-SINSOimr-EASTASrA 19H-t2 SARAWAK & BORNFO

provided seaplane anchorages and, in the counc of

first-class

operations, Royal Air Force planes made several landings at Sin-

tang' on the Kapocas river nearly 200 miles inland.
In spite of the equatorial position of Sarawak the climate
in many parts of the hills and interior regions might almost be
described as temperate. Around the coast, however, and in the
low-lying marshy districts extending about 200 miles inland, the
atmosphere was dense, humid and inclined to be oppressive.
Temperatures remained fairly constant throughout the year, about
et" by day and 72 by night. Rainfall, too, varied little from
one month to another, and the annual rainfall ranged from
HO to 1 70 inches. The north-cast monsoon blowing from October
to March brought heavy rainfall and bad weather down the coast,
but in some areas the wettest months were between April and
Ociobcr, as in India. The coastline was not subject to the
t^-phoons, so frequent off the China coast, but the aftcr-enects of
these were usually felt in the form of a heavy ground swell and
bad visibtlit)' lasn'ng scs<ral daj's.* Low morning mists extended
over coastal areas causing great inconvenience to shipping and
aircraft.
The population was estimated at about 500,000, mainly
Malay's and such indigenous peoples as I>>ab, Kenyahs, Kayans
and Muruis. But there was a large immigrant Chinese eomrauniry
which was mainly settled n the Rcjang delta. The Malays were
found mainly in the coastal regions and their language was the
lingua franca of the State. There was a clearly marked division
of trades and professions among the different nallonab'ties as in
other parts of the East. The merchant and artisan (especially
carpentry) classes were mainly composed of the Chinese, svbo
aLso made first-class agriculturists, water-carriers and coob. The
^^alays were fishermen and woodsmen, and they supplied the bulk
of the domestic servants. The small Indian shopkeeper and
dhobi or washerman were to be found throughout the State.
*

The various important nationalities, m the main, preserved their

national dress.

Airi^llurf, InJinlruj end Trade

The is suitable for cultivation, and wherever
coastal area
possible sago and pepper, the chief agricultural products, were
grown- Rubber plantadon had steadily grown in importance

Se Map
tKme P- 3I-
Lxcci OperaucQ) ia S*nvfk a"l EonMo. p, 7.
A. M. HviDMi gH- the populaticn i 6.00,000 in 1933 (A
.1farr, p, 277).
 JAPANESE ATEACK OX S.VR.\WAK 3G3

during recent years and nsliing was an important indusliy. The

interior of the countr)- was devoid of organised agriculture and
the
natives resorted to "shifting culfivat/on
The vast mineral resources of Sarawak sscrc not fully tapped.
Prior to the outbreak of war, the S.-(rawak Oilfields Ltd. had success,
fully storied the important oilfteldt at Afiri .and JJ.-ilong in the
Baram From Miri, the oil was pumped to the Lutong
District.
refinciyon the coast, " fmm which loading-lines ran out to sea
as there ss-erc no deep-water u)ian*e$ at Lutong and no ocean-
going vessels could come alongside.* Gold had been successfully
worked out from the qu.artz reefs .nt Dau on the Sarasvat ris-cr and
antimony had been discovered in the same area. Sapphires of
good quality were found in abundance in the mountain streams
in the interior hut they were loo sm.ill to have much commercial
STilue. Coal had also been iound in several ph-ices especially
near Selantik along the Kelingkang range.
Prior to the war, S-arawak carried on a substantbl export
trade mainly through Singapore. According to Dudley Stamp,
the total value of expsiris came to3,000,000 in I93G* outof which
half was yielded by rubber. Other items of export were kerosene
and crude oil, bcnacnc, sago flour, pepper and fish.

llUlaiy
Prior to 1039, Sarawak formed part of ilie State of Brunei
ruled by the Raja Mucta Kasaint. A rebellion broke out in 1639
against the tyranny of the ruler and the rapacity of his officials.
The ruler, unable to subdue the rebels with his limited forces,
asked a retired Britidi Officer of the Indian Army, James Brooke,
for .asdstance. Brooke h.ii been aptly called a counicr-
buccanccr . He was professionally engaged in suppressing piracy
with his own bo.its and crew. As a reward for his help in subduing
the rebels, the Raja of Brunei gare him 5arasvakon2l Septem-
ber 18U. James Brooke thus became the first white Raja of the
territories. Tsvo years later Brooke with the help of Captain
(afterwards Admiral Sir Henry) Kcppel expelled the Dyak and
Malay pirates from the Saribas and Batang Lupar rivers, and crush-
ed the naval forces of the notorious Lanun pirates, ssho had long
been " the scourge of the seas.
In 1857 the Chinese rebelled against the authority of Raja
Brooke. They sacked Kuching and temporarily succeeded in
establishing their authority over Sarawak; Raja Brooke narrowly
escaping with his life. His nephew Charles quickly organised a
364 CAMPAIGNS IN SOtmt-P-^ST ASU SARAWAK & BORNEO

force ofMalap arwl Dyaks and with its help suppressed the insurrec-
tion. The first Raja died in 1868 and was succeeded by his
nephess'. Under an agreement of 1888, Sarawak was recognised
as an independent State under Great Britains protectorate, and
Sir Charles Johnson Brooke was formally recognised as Raja
of Sarawak by King Edward VII in 190-4. He was succeeded by
his eldest son, Charles Vj*ner Brooke, in 1917, who continued to
control the destinies of the State till the outbreak of svar agairut

Japan in 1941.

Gerernnunl and Adminutralicn

Until September 1941 shen the centenary of the rule of
Brooke was alcbratcd, Sarawak was ruled as an absolute monarchy.
The people had no voice in their own governance. The Raja was
assisted by a Supreme Council of sei'en which consisted of the
three most important European officiab and four nominated
Malay magistrates. In addition to this, there was a General
Council (Council of Negri) coiubtiogofalwut a hundred members
drawn largely from the principal tribes of the State. This council
met once every three ^ears and therefore could not exercise any
control os'er the day to day administration of the country'. The
civil service carried on the enure administration, the senior members
of which were Englishmen while the natlres could only aspire to
junior posts.
At the time of the centenary celebrations (19-24 September
1941) the ruler, Raja Sir Charles Vyncr Brooke, promulgated
the fir constitution of the State, under which the Supreme Council
became the executh-c council and the Council of Negri the sole
legislath'c authority*. Soon after, the Raja left for a holiday in
Australia and did not return till war broke out. His absence was
keenly felt by the population because Sarawak needed strong
leadenhip, wluch he alone could provide. His infiuence ,
according to LieuL-Gcneral Percival, based on a hundred yean
of family tradition, would hare been far greater than that of a
newly appointed council

StraUgu Importance
Eren a cursory glance at a map of the Far East would show
the commanding position of Borneo within the East Indies
aTtbopelago. It cwtrtd the appreothes to Singapore and Malaya
by the South China Sea, and control of its coastline was essential
for any drive towards Java, Australia and New Guinea. Occupy-

* Ti* iliUfo, p. 94.

 JAPANEJE ATTACK OS SARA\VAK 3G5

ing a* lliry did the wJioJc north-ueit coastline of Borneo, the

states of Sarawak and Rnitici and British North Borneo were clearly
posiu'oned lo rcccn-e the first blow from the Japanese. Nor could
the potential value of these countries as bases for further ag^ssion
on the part of the Japanese be I'lpiored. Besides the three reason-
ably good harbours of Kuching, Victoria (Labuan Island) and
Sandakan (Brithh North Borneo), first class seaplane and submar-
ine ancliorages could be found In the many riven and Inlets
which intersected the coastline. Several aerodromes and land-
ing grounds, too, though incapable at that time of taking licav^
bombers, could be used srith cfiect as fighter bases and could
undoubtedly be enlarged to accommodate hearicr planes if
required-
Bomeo might for strategic reasons be aptly called part
of the outer defences of Mala>-a lu sscstern part was within
easy striking distance of bomber aircraft from Nfalaya and m'cc
versa. Jt could therefore have been of immense use to the ^Vlles
if it could be retained by them, but neither the British nor the

Dutch had then sufficient resources to hold it.

APPRf.aATlO.SS ASD PL.\NS

Tilt Prt-uar ConsuOaliens

The outbreak of World War II in September 1939, as has
been discussed earlier, found the Allied powers without a definite
plan for the defence of their possessions in the Far East Between
September 1939 and the entry ofjapan into the war in December
1941, the Allies had enough time to prepare to meet the expected
threat from Japan. A number of conferences were held during
this period but when Japan actually struck, the Allies were not in
a position to offer either a determined or a prolonged resistance.
The main reason for their inadequate preparations is to be found
in the fact that, as already mentioned, Britain did not have
sufficient resources in money and material to defend properly all
the far-flung parts of her vast empire.
The esUblishment of General Headquarters, Far East, in
Nosrmbcr 1940, and the conferences between the British, the Dutch
and the American representatives for defending their possessions
in the Far East, have already been mentioned. In the Singapore
Conference of October 1940, the possibilities of the Japanese
attempting to sciac bases in British Borneo were also discussed
and it was felt that without command of the seas, it would be
extremely difiicult to defend these strategic points. The Conference
should be
thought that a cover of not more than 200 planes
36G cvmp.mons in sourn-EVSTAaA 194142 Sarawak & Borneo

rovidfd for ihc protection

of Dutch and British Borneo, although
resources theRoyal Air Force was not in a position
Tsilh the existing
commitment in British Borneo or elsewhere out-
to undertake any
dde Malaya- The Dutch were assigned the important task of
nroviding local
defences throughout the Netherlands East Indies,
arrived at on the recommendation of the Chiefs
rim decision was
contained in their Fat EesUm Appreciation (also known as
d' Staff
dated IG October 1940, in whicli they
'raclical Apprtdnlhn)
\ otc
The Dutch authorities should be pressed to provide addi-
and anti-aircraft defences used in the NEI and in
tional troops
narticular, to station
some units in Borneo".
The Conference also gave earnest consideration to the
'

supplies of aviation spirit from Borneo

maintenance of essential
nd the' Dutch East Indies (o Australia and New Zealand. In
was not possible for the Mites to protect the
oa'C howocr,
it

^ilRclds by adequate force, because of the rcquirtmenis of war

? piher important theatres, they had an oil denial scheme for putt-
I _ oil installations at Miri and Seria out of action before the

Tmanese troops could land there. The Dutch also bad a similar
denial scheme for Bali^apan and Tarakan if their capture
oil
hecamc of the Dutch scheme were not avail-
incsdtable, but details
when Conference met.
*1^*
able
In their TctlUal Appredalin the Chiefs of Stall laid down
requirements for the defence of British Borneo,
the tuinimum
Brunei and Sarasvak against Japanese attack. It was estimated
that a force of
one brigade of three battalioru vnih one battery
to the existing local forces would be suflicicni to rejl
in addition
jnv attack. It was also assumed by the Chiefs of Staff that units
jtlcipalins in Borneo would be ofa high standard, organised and
equipped in accordance svilb British ^Var Establishments. The
"
term brigade svas specifically defined and it was
used to indicate
consisting of :
a formation
(1) Infantry Brigade Headquarters,
(2) Infantry Brigade
Signal Section,
(3) Brigade Anti-tank Company of nine .\nti-tank Guns,
(4) One Field Regiment Royal Artillery (25-Pounder Gun
Howitzers),
(5)One Anti-tank Battery, Royal Artillery,
(6)One Field Company Royal Fusiliers, and
(7) The necessary administrative units.
.\ppcndbc B of the Sir^pwMC Defence Conference Report con-
mined obsers-a lions on the defence of air bases in British Borneo and
the Miri and Seria oilfields. Out of the two aerodromes at Kuching
\ycsseUon, it was recognised that
the latter might not be held
 JAPANFJt ATTACK ON SAR,V\VAK 367

.7 drJennincd ijltarii:. It w-at therefore decided to hold

Kuching onl), vtherc the natural diOicuIties make a sca-borna
landing in force Improbable The defence of this area was con-
fined lo the protection of the
aerodrome and guarding (he river
approach. was estimated that Urn would require defence by
It
one company and one machine-gun platoon.
'f/ie Miri-Scr/a area, extending for about lO miles in length,
presented greater di/Iicultics, since the nature of the terrain made
it possible for an invader to land anywhere along the coast.
At
the time the appreciation ss-as written there were no local forces in
Brunei and Sarawak except the Saraw'ak police ssbich could act
only against saboteurs. It was ufsderstood, howes-cr, that if
dctachmcnit of Imperial troops were stationed in Sarawak, the
police could assist them tn repelling any external attack. For
the proper defence of the area a large force was necessary which
was not likely to be available. It was therefore recommended
h.i I the role of l)ic garrison there would be to gain su/Jic/ent t/we

for (lie oil denial scheme to be carried out should that become
necessary. The strength of the garrison to be stationed m
this
area was csiim.tted at two companies.
Four months after die Sing-iporc Conference, Anglo-Dutch*
Australian conversations were held in Singapore during February
J9IL This conference emphasised the necessity of collective
action against Japanese aggression and agreed to the principle of
mutual reinforcement, (he Dutch undertaking to provide sub-
marines for operation in the South China Sea. The principles
on which sea communications would be defended were outlined,
and emphasis w.7S laid on the importance of making the passage
of the Mortbem line of (he Dutch possessions as diflicult as possible
for the Japanese In the event of an attack on West and East
Borneo, all available Dutch naval forces were (o be concentrated
for action in the Strait of Macassar and Allied air forces were to
attack the Japanese from die aerodromes in Borneo. The possibi-
lity of the United States intervening actively on the Allied side
was considered, and it was esUmalcd that, if the United Suies

of America intervened, Japan would be forced lo adopt a defen-
sive strategy and abandon her major <.xpcdltiont to the south
The Allied conferences and agreements after February 19M also
kept under constant reviesv the problem of defending Borneo.

2/15 Punjab lo Sarawak

In November 1910, shortly after its arrival in Singapore, 2/15
Punjab had been ordered to send detachments amounting to
one company to Miri and Kuching
in Sarawak. C Company
370 cAJtPAios's IN socrn-EAsr ASL^ 194M2 Sarawak & Borneo

a total battalion $trcm5ih of 1,075 all ranks. Together Vr-ith the

four State forces, Sarfor (all Indian and local State forces In
Sarawak and Brunei) in May 1911 numbered 2,SG3 olTiccrs and
oilier ranks.
On the arris'al of 2/15 Punjab at Kuching in May 1911,
Licui.'Colonel Lane, Officer Commanding Sarfor immediately
ordered an extenshx reconnaissance of boih ibe Kuching and Miri
areas. The role of the troops in the Kuching area had been to
provide cover for destruction parties and if possible to retain the
aerodrome for die use of Allied aircraft, failing which, to deny
its use to the Japanese as a last rcsott. But such a static defence
was wholly inconsisicnl with the topography of the country round
Kuching with its many river approaches and poor communications.
UeuL-Colonel Lane ^crelbre decided to prepare plans lor mobile
defence.

Plan A
A plan of action (known as Plan A *) was consequenUy
prepared with a vdew to providing mobile defence in conjunction

with the four Sarawak State forces the Sarawak Coastal Marine
Service (S.C.M.S.), Sarawak Rangers (S.R.), Sarawak Armed
Police (S.A.?.) and Sarawak Volunteer Force (S.V.F.). The
object of the plan was to ensure the holding of the landing ground
at Kuching, for as long at possible, and to hold off the Japanese
till the denial schemes could be carried out and all important

facilities destroyed.
The plandivided the whole of the Kuching area into eight
sectors for purposes of defence, but since the plan w as not uldma-
lely given cfiect to, details may not be of much use here. The
role of the Slate forces was definitely defined. The Sarawak
Coastal Marine Service vvas to maintain a close watch from the
coast on slupping and aircraft movements and to give information
to the garrison commander. It was provided with river launches
vvhichwcrc to patrol the coast to prevent secret infiltration and give
early information of hostile landings or advance. To the Sarawak
Rangers was assigned the role of providing observation and

harassment platoons in the Mangrovx Kila belt north of the
Matang Road and east of Rock and Simmangan Roads. The
Sarawak Armed Police was to provide local protection to civilian
demolition parties. On completion of this role they were to come
into reserve for line of communication protection along the
Bau
Road. .Miscellaneous dudes were assigned to the Sarawak Volun-
teer Force. lu Engineer Company was to aid in the carrying
out cif demoUuon roles, road and bridge maintenance or
desinic-
 JArASrXr. ATTACK O.V SARAWAK 371

tUm ", Arid W'ortOiop Comp^my ta opcrntc in (w'o por-

jifiri* c.m nml of tltr Saran-nk river. The .\fotor Transport
Company was aslcd (o assist in the mos'cment of mobile companies
of (lie 2/15 Punjab.
2/15 Punjab w.as also jjiven dcHnitc rol<?s afonp with the Sara-
s%ak State forces. Its rifle companies were to operate in specifically
assiRnccI sub-areas of tlir main I'cndinK-Kuclung area while the
"specialist" platoons in ireadqiiartcrs Company svcrc all to be
used to the fullest advantage. A pin-boat platoon was to operate
in conjunction with Sarawak Co.astal Marine Service. Nforcover,
tlic IC-pounder platoon was to cover the Moeratabas in front
of Pending ssillt two gum mounted at Biawak. Another two
gum at Bint.twa were to cover the area of the Sarawak river about
Lintang. The 3* mortar platoon (consisting of six mortars) svas
to support the gun positions with two mortars to each gun area
and the balance of two mortars was to be held in rcsersc at the
Rare Course.
Such in brief was Plan "A". Its object was to strike " the
enemy as early as possible on the rivers, forcing him if possible
into the swamps, engaging him by Mobile Forces in bis advance
to llicaerodrome Later, if the Japanese advance could not
be halted by these means, the aerodrome could be demolished and
die whole force withdrawn in small parties Into the hillsandjunglcs
from where by guerilla action the Japanese in the Kuching area
could be harassed nndprevemed from using the landing ground."
On 27 May 1911, before the Plan had been completed, a
change of battalion commander look place. LicuL*Colonel
Peppers (2/15 Punjab) took over from Liciit..Coloncl Lane as
Officer Commanding Troops.
/Jamn Visils
On
28 June 1911, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Robert Brookc-
Popham, Commandcr-in-Chicf Far East, visited Kuching and gas'c
his approval to the operational Plan *A". As no liaison with the
Netherlands East Indies troops had so far been possible, he flew
to Singkawang II aerodrome and met the Dutch Air Commander
who was toprovidc air support for operations in the Kuching area.'*
Apart from this visit no staff officer from Headquarters Singapore
came to Kuching from November 1940 to September 194L
Headquarters Was therefore out of touch with the local situation

Line'i Report, p. 18.

UrV.
SingkiwngIIrrodtt>me wa -aeutrfihoriV ificr the b^innin? of oowa-
tJona, and with the oreeption of a tmall air aitaeb on Tapane ihippfngofT Kothing,
no air ruppori trhtiMcver avaitaWe for "'SARfOR
372 CO.IPAICX$ IN SOtmi-EATT ASIA I9tl42 SARAWAK 8: BORNEO

in Sara^Nak and OMng to the fact that much delay had occurred
in the ietUement of vsme urgent problems between Sarawak and
Singapore, it was agreed to send Ueut.Colonc! Lane to Singapore
to clarify the situation.
Ueut'CoIoncJ Lane visited Singapore towards the end of

August with a snew to eradicate some of the erroneous ideas
that ss'cre pres'alcnt at the Headquarters. H visit original})* sclie-
duled to last only three days continued for a period of ten dap by
ssWch time most of the urgent problems were disposed of. 7110
\Tsit ssas a success and a staff officer who accompanied Licut.-
Colonel Lane back to Kuchii^ was able to get a first hand know-
ledge of the defence problems in Sarawak. He was fully put into
the picture as to the forces limitations and requirements before
his return to Singapore.
The value of close liaison th the Dutch does not appear to
have been realised by Headquarters Singapore and wbenesvr
broached hy Officer Commanding Troops Sarawak, it was put off
as long as possible. iMten it eventually took place in September
,1941, it led to exchange of much s-aluaWc information, although
the strategic situation in Sarawak appeared somewhat gloomy
to the Dutch. In any case the Dutch knew for the first time
s\hat the actual situation in Sarawak Was. Unfortunately a return
visit planned by UeuL-Colonel Peppers never materialised with the
result that neither he nor Lieut-Colouel Lane (who had again
taken otter as Officer Commanding Troops) fully realised
the tme nature of the situation in Dutch North-West Borneo**
until after the battalion had actually ssiihdrawn from Sarawak.

Chatigt in Diftnct Plan

At the Conference betsveen British and Dutch nulitary
olEcen in Kuclung in September 1941, the British Intelligence
Officer, who had been described at a man of vast military
experience and svith a knowledge of the Japanese, their strategy-
and tactics probably equalled by few other Europeans in the Far
East,* expressed the belief that Kuching could not be held by
the forces available to Sarfor if the Japanese landed between
3,000 and 4,000 troops supported from the air and sea. In view
of the clear strategic importanoe of Kuching and the facilities
offered b)* it as a base for operations against Singapore and the
Netherlands Eiast Indies, he anticipated that the Japanese force
was likely to be far larger. Due to the paudt>- of troops available
for defence and uncertainty of air and naval support, it was fell

Rupert CO OpEraaom a Saemtk tai DtMb Bmca, p. 2i.

MiW, p. 28.
 JAPA.VEfB ATTACK OS SARA^VAK 373

that to fspeclsucccssforcwnamatterorhourswas wishrul thin-

iing".'^ This opinion coniirmedtite fears preWousfy entertained by
the SccrctaryforDcfence.Sarawak. The Sarawak State Government
was now convinced that a successful defence of clilier Kuching
town or of the aerodrome was out of the question without sub-
stantial reinforcements. Unless the available troops were reinforc-
ed, the production of elaborate defence plans might be a matter
of mere defences on paper". A copy of the minutes of the
Conference was sent to Headquarters Singapore where, Lieut.-
Coloncl Lane claimed, they were suppressed and certain remarks
were changed so as to give "an unw'arranicd tenor of optimism
The Stale Government, on the contrary, had urged that cither
reinforcements be sent by Headquarters Singapore or all British
Bmpire troops be wilhdrasvn from the State forthwith.
Fully realising dial the former of these alternatives was not
likely to be accepted by Headquarters Singapore, in view of beav>'
militar) commitments in other theatres of war, and fearing that
the State forces might be ordered to non-co-operate should the
inhabitants of KucJjing be compromhed by an attempt to defend
the town (as in Plan "A"), the Olliccr'in-Chargc of troops in
Sarawak was forced much against his will to consider a complete
change of plan. A fresh plan (Plan B) as a result was draivn up
and, though it offered little hope of success, it had finally to b
adopted,

Plan "ii"
The new plan, contrary to Plan A, was based on static defence.
Troops and stores were (o be concentrated within the 3j mile peri-
meter of the aerodrome to ensure its demolition, but no serious
effort was to be made to halt the Japanese advance north of Kuch-
ing. AsSirRobertBrookc-Popham putit, " The only place ivhich
it was decided to hold was Kuching, the reason for this being not

only that Uicre was an aerodrome at that place, but that its
occupation by the enemy might give access to the aerodromes in
Dutch Borneo at the north-western end of the island, these
aerodromes being only some 350 nules from Singapore, i.e. much
nearer than any in South Indo-China
.' Although Labuan
was an important cable and wireless station, no attempt was
made to defend it against the Japanese.
The new plan svas inherently defective and pregnant ivi^
dangers which were obvious to the local commander- Static
defence in a limited area exposed the troops to the danger of being
374 CAMPAICXS IS SOtTlI-KAST ASIA 19U.42 SARAWAK & BORNRO

surrounded and cut oIT from outside help and bcini; s)-stcmati-
cally bombed out of existence with no A. A. defences to defend
them, shelled with no baitcncs to give ansss-er and surved by the
enemy at will. Moreover, in the new plan Uic Stale forces
could not be fully cmplo>cd since die Rangen were trained only
as guerilla troops and it was difficult to sec what the Coastal
Marines and Armed Police could do under the plan. UcuL-
Gencral Pcrcival, General Officer Commanding Nlalaya, visited
the garrison on 28 Xovember 19-11, and signified hir approval
to Plan B though he was fully informed of the very meagre chances
of its success. He also seems to have had some misgivings about
it. He writes, I left the country* with a sense of great s^Tnpathy
for the people but vsith an uneasy feeling that all vvas not well and
with a feeling of frustration that one could do so little to put
things right.*
Thus, only ten d.tyi before the outbreak of war with Japan,
and after six months spenlin fruitless planning, a scheme of defence
ivas prepared ttkich ttholly out of harmony uich the lexsom of
warfare in the past two >ears. A static defence, without depth,
of a limited area, imperfectly prepared, could hardly withstand
the attacks of a hostile force supreme in the air and numerically
superior in all other respects. Such a defence could not last more
than a few days.
According to this plan, all stores of food, ammunition and
petrol were brought within ihe perimeter of the aerodrome.
But at the outbreak of war on 8 December, despite the extremely
hard work put in by Empire and State troops, little progress had
been made with the defences. When the Japanese eventually
attacked just over a fortnight later, there were still no concrete
pllUboxes or dug-outs, no anti-tank or shrapnel mines and but a
few slit trenches surrounded by a double-apron barbed wire fence.
In the circumstances it is not surprising that within four days
a quarter of 2/15 Punjab had been lulled or captured, while the
rest of the battalion had to be withdrawn wearily to Dutch Xorth-
NS'est Borneo.

OFBKATIOXS AT SERIA ATTO SnRl

The two defence plans, dbeussed earlier, had reference to

the protection of Kuching and its aerodrome onl>. They did
not envisage the defence of the oilfields in Scria-Miri, which were
of great strategic value, since their acquisition by the Japanese

rjjBe't Rrpott, p. 28
Tit nv M p. 94.
 JAPANESi: ATTACK ON SARAWAK 375

would have appreciably enhanced tlieir oil resources. The large

oilfield at Serin in the State of Brunei along svaili die Miri oilfield
in Sarawak, Ted the refinery' at Lutong. The Seria oilfields were
Comparatively new and were in the process of development before
the outbreak of war with Japan.
Tile defence of liie Seria*Miri area was greatly complicated
by tlic distance mters'cning between the two oilfields and the pau-
city of troops. The road connecting the two oilfields, 32 miles
apart, was incapable of being used by mechanical transport owing
to obstacles provided by rivers and its closeness to the beach which
afforded good landing grounds for Uic invader. The oilfields,
therefore, were almost impossible to defend against a determined
attack with ifie resources available. Consequently, it was dedded
to destroy the oilfields before they were captured by the Japanese.
Under inslruclioas received from die British Government in August
1941, a denial scheme was prepared *with the object of making
it impossible for the enemy to obtain oil from the fields at least for

an extended period The responsibility for successfully carrying

out Uie demolition scheme devolved upon the army. It was no
mean responsibility considering the exposed situation of the
oilfields.
Before the outbreak of war, a partial denial scheme was
brought into cfTcct by reducing the output of the oilfields by about
Seventy per cent. Steps were also taken to remove the surplus
machinery to Singapore. The Miri oilfields were closed dotvn in
September and all the flosving svells at Seria were completely
blocked. Early on the morning of 8 December 1941, orders were
rcccisrd for the further destruction of all oilfields and installations
.and by the evening of die same day the demolition work had
almost been completed. The breakage of engines, furnaces and
pumping machinery was followed by the bJotving up of the sea
loading lines and the destruedon of subsidiary plants. The entire
work was carried out in a most expeditious manner. According
to Genera) Perdva), The damage done to the Sarawak oilfields
was certainly among die most successful of those organised under
the scorched earth policy The next day the Miri landing ground
was rendered unusable for hostile aircraft. In Seria all necessary
demolitions irerv carried out by the eiening of 9 December and
all military personnel there moved to Lutong where they arrived
zi about 2300 hours on the lOth. From Lutong they left for

19 Tht H'm in Mtfara, p. 16C. AcconUnsioJipAnae accounu it appean that they

toped to obuin about 500 uma of oil ftoro finion Boneo during the finf year of thrfr
occupation and the target figure* for the fcooad and lubscqumt yean were to depend
upon developing conditioea.
a The Was in Mal^e, p. 166.
376 CMIPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST AMX 19U-42 SARAWAK &. BORNEO

Miri to await e\-acuation by sea to Kuching. During the

week there was some air acUvitj' os'cr Miri. Japanese rcojnnais-
sance planes flew o\-er the area on ses-cral occasions but they
made no attempt to interfere with the work of the demolition parties.
On 13 December all military personnel svere assembled
at Miri and during the night of 13/14 December, the whole party
sailed for Kuching in H.M.^ Upis, H.M.S, Maimuna
and S.S. Skinai. A Japanese bomber, svhich bombed and
strafed the Upit on her journey- south, was successfully driven
off by small-arms fire. Little damage was caused to the ship,
but Major A.1V.D. Slatter (Officer Commanding Troops, Miri
and Scria) and three Indian other ranks were killed in the engage-
ment. Nlajor Slatter set a magnificent example to his men by
climbing to the exposed bridge of the ship and personally firing
an anti-tank Bren gun (whose crew were wounded) until he was
killed. The three ships after this engagement reached Kuching
safely. The company of the 2/15 Punjab from Miri thus rejoined
the rest of the battalion at Kuching.
The destruction of the oilfields had been completed just in
time to save them from falling intact into Japanese hands, for
at 0330 hours on 16 December, the Japanese landed at Scria and
immediately took possession of the demolished oil installations in
the locality. At the same time Japanese na\'a) forces appeared in
strength iMfore Miri. Ten warships and a tanker were sighted
off Miri and Lutongon 16 December, and were the object of an
immediate attack by Allied bombers. The first attack launched
on 17 December by 6 Glenn Martins and 5 Buffaloes of the Jselhcr-
lands East Indies Air Force fromSingkawaog was a failure, but
another attack the same day from Samiuwkoa was parttally
successful. One of the bombers scored a direct hit on a Japanese
destroyer.

ADt RAm ON KV'CHINO

The Japanese air force reacted vigorously to the Allied

attacks againstUieir shipping. On 19 December, about 15
Japanese bombers attacked Kuching loss-n and aerodrome.
Flying at an altitude of about 15,000 feel, well out of the reach of
small-STmt fire, the Japanese planes launched an attack on the
landing ground but only succeeded in producing a few small
craters on the runway. A seaplane which followed the bombers
caused <ome damage to the Koya) Air Force barracks by dis-c
bombing attacks. In the town of Kuching, a petrol dump svas

JAPANESE ATTACK OK JARAU'AK 377

SCI on fire b>- the bombers. CKiiiam suffered approximately 100

casualties.
Tlic raid svas prob.-ibly carried out with Uic object ofascertairi'
in^ svhether there were any anti-aircraft defences and to find out
how quickly, if at all, Allied fighters could prosidc cover to the
defenden of Kuching. Although little material damage svas
caused, the propaganda \-alue of the raid was immense, demonstrate
as it did the complete Japanese mastery of the air and the irubility
of Headquarters Singapore to prmidc even a single plane for the
defence of Kuching and Sarass-at. It also emphasised the futility
of concentrating all troops and stores within Use aerodrome peri-
meter; but it sv.as too late In the day to consider any change in the
defence plan.
Tlie raid led to tvide scale es'acuatron of flic civilian popula-
tion from the tosvn. I^abour, difficuU to obtain otliersvise, was
now impossible to procure. All sorts of rumours were current
and it svas widely bcUed that thcjap.'mcsc were about to attack

the town In force. The government met the situation calmly and
coumgcouily, but all its e/TorU to suitam morale were jneifectivc.
There some desertions from tlic local State forces and the
sserc
morale of the .\falaya troop was specially low.
Meansvhile a strong note svas sent to Headquarters Singapore
on the failure of the Allied air force to come to the rescue of the
defenden, but their reply was to ilie effect iliat many towns in
England had to face air-raids without any air support and Kuching
might also has-e to face a similar ordeal. Sue Headquarters
failed to appreciate the vast diflereacc between a town in England
and the capital of the State of Sarasvafc, espedally in relation to a
naUve population and the native forces svavering between support
for the government or possibly the enemy It was now clear
to the officers commanding the troops in Kuching that the promise
of air support was an empty one and could not be implemented.

THE srrUATioN on 22 uecejiber 1941

On 22 December 1941, " Sarfor was disposed as follows:

2/15 Punjab
Battalion Headquarters ^Batu Lintang Camp
A Company (less one platoon at Bukit Siolj Pending,
with orden to withdraw to the western
perimeter of the aerodrome when attacked.
B Company along the north-east jscrimeter of the
aerodrome.

Lane's Report, p. 34.


378 C-\JIPAJGNS IX SOimi-EAST ASIA 1911-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO

C Company (lessoneplatoonnorthof the Malang Road)

along the north perimeter of the aerodrome.
D Company along
the south perimeter of the aerodrome.
E Company in the south-west perimeter arc of the aero-
drome.

Iftadquarlm Companr
(1) Gunioal platoon, in conjunctions with Sarawal: Coastal
Marine Service and Sarawak Rangers, was to supply
information of Japanese movements and to harass them
within the nctsvork of rivers north of Ruching.
(2) Carrier platoon had one section at Pending, one section
at the landing ground near Batu Kilang junction, one
secuon between Kitang and Penrisan junctions, and
another section in Batu IJniang Camp.
(3) \ZPoundeT and 3* mortar detaehmenls at Bintasva and
Biasvak. Two 3* morurs were at Pending, while another
two were kept in reserve.
(4) Suh'\taehint-gun platoon, one section at Bukit Siol; tsvo
sections at Pending; the remainder at the aerodrome.

Foret Headquirtert
This svas located at about 700 yards north-west of Batu
Lintang Camp.

Sarawak Coastal ^fanne Serriet and .^rozra^ Rangers

They ssere svorldng in dose conjunction svilh the Punjab
gunboat plalcmn north of Kuching, the main role assigned
to them being that of coastal patrol work and obsers-ation.

Sarawak VelunleeT Force and Sarawak Armed Police

The Sarawak Volunteer Force had been mobilised as far as
ptwsible, but lack of umTorms, equipment, ammimition and
stores made a full-scale mobilisation impossible The
Sarawak Armed Police were also mobilised and w ere ready to
mo\'e to battle stadons within the aerodrome defences.
In spite of e\ciy effort made to complete the defences at
Kuching aerodrome, when (he Japanese attacked, there were no
concrete pill-boxes or dug-outs and the number of slit trenches was
not large.** Preparations for road and bridge demolitions, however
had been for the most part completed.

^nu, p. 36.
 KUCHING AREA
SHOWmS DtSPOSmONS or *SARrOR*ON Dtc.t94l &UNE OFV^
 jAPANwr. ATTACK OS' SARA\\'AK 379

JAPANKE tASU AT KUaHNO

At ICOO hour* on the eveninj of 23 December 19}!,

alxiut
a J.pane<c conwy wa*
siqhtrd ofTG. Santufwn?, nev^s of whicli
wa* rcpftried m
ITeadrjuariers Singapore immediately. Two
houn later, contrar>' to ail defence pfans and prctiou* wtructlons,
orders came through for the immediate dettrucUon of the aero-
drome. Another mctsaifc from Singapore received shortly after-
w.irds conveyed Uie somevshat lardy news tltat an Allied reconnais-
sance plane had sighted the convoy nearly 100 miles norih*wc$l
of Kuching at OSOO hours of the same day.'* Wliy Kuching was
not informed of this for nearly 16 hours is by no means clear. It
is probable tliat the delay was slue to some communication
difllculUes. Jleforc arriv.sl in S.'intubnng, however, the J3p.snesc
convoy was attaclccd by Dutch submarines, which reported having
sunk or dls.ibled one tanker and three transport ships. But
there is no esideiice to show svhether this sva* before or after
the sighting by our reconnaissance aircraft referred to above .**
Immcdiatclyupon receiptof the order todcsiroy the landinggroimd.
Officer Comm.indlng the troops in Sarawak was convinced that
it could not under any circumstances be used by the Allies as

an advanced operational base. He .also felt that even after destruc-

tion, the use of the aerodrome could not be denied to the Japanese
for any Icngtli of time, as was originally contemplated under
3J.in " B * mentioned earlier.

Taking Into full consideration all the relevant factors of the

critical situation svilh which Lieut.-CoJonel J^ne was confronted,
he sent an urgent message to Singapore pointing out that since
all troops and stores were concentrated ssilhin die perimeter of the
aerodrome, it svas too late to change back to mobile defence. He
alto fclt fh.Tt it u'.as useless to sacrifice his men for defending
the airfield, and proposed, Uicrefore, at 2030 hours (23 December),
that he should Ijt gisrn permission to wilJidrasv as soon as possible
via Bau into Dutch North-West Borneo. General Pcrcival, on
receipt of this signal at 1305 hours on 24 December, immediately
replied to the effect that Ucuf.-Colonel Lane should fight as
Jong as possible near Kuching and then act in the best interests
of Dutch West Bamed as s whole.
In the meantime, during Ihe night of 23/24 December, the
demolition of aerodrome landing strips and the Royal Air Force
Direction Finder had been completed without interruption from

S AccordbR to perch-l (tt'flf in Af<il>>r*.p. 169) the wnvoy conriitfd of nine Japa-
new wanhim and (ramnorU.
tl'er in Mataja, p. tC9.
360 CA>tPAlCNS IN SOtmr-EAST AOA 19 Jl-42 SA1lA^^AK & BORNEO
the Japanese. Acih'c patrolling took place during the whole
night but no contact on land wa* made n-ilh the Japanese.
At first light of 24 December, eight Japanese ships were
obsers'cdat aechorbetsveen theSibuLaut and Santubong estuaries.
From the number of ships in the convoy, it was estimated that the
Japanese strength was betiveen 3,000 and 4,000-** Till 0900 hours
they did not taltc any action, but then twenty Japanese landing
craft srere seen approaching the Santuboog river- After landing
the troops, the Japanese assault boats went up the Santubong
river. The small gunboat platoon of 2/15 Punjab fought a withdra-
wal action near linta:^ from where they retreated b>' stages up
the Kuap river to the aerodrome without suffering any loss.
By 1100 hours the Japanese gunboau reached Lintang and
shortly afterwards the Bintawa 16-poonder gum'and 3' mortars
opened fire, riniing four Japanese craft outrighfl before being
surrounded and completely destro>xd by Japanese landing parties.
At about the same time the reserve section of earners was nahed
from the aerodrome to reinforce Pending.**
By the morrung of 24 December, it was clear that The
Japanese occupation of Sarawak was only a matter of dap. As
already mendoned. General Fererval also gas-e tmpbed permisuon
that morning for a withdrawal. Et-ents mo\Td quickl}' there-
after, as related below.
The Japanese started landing troops on the north flanlf of
the Sarawak rher about midday after advancing through the
jungle, and, during the afternoon more Japanese troops landed
on the north and south banks of the Sarawak riser. Kuching
town was captured at 1630 hotirsand the Japanese flag was hoisted
on the Astana, the residence of His Highness the Raja. From
the Pending area A Company' of the Punjab Regiment was
withdrawn to the aerodrome according to a pre-arranged plan and
was in position there by 2400 hours. The Coinpan>s platoon
at Bukit Stol, after being scvTiely dhebombed earlier in the day,
was hcasily ambushed** at the Kuching suspension bridge svest of
the town and all but three of the platoon were either killed or
captured fay the Japanese.
At Biawak, three more Japanese landing craft ucrc sunk b^-
)8-poundcr and 3' mortar fire belbre the Punjabis s*ere withdrawn
from the area; but Japanese lan^n^ continued and at, about
1700 hours th^- made first contact with the aerodrome defences.

*SL>iie'i Rncrt, p. 37.

n<^3S.
*rTbe jipasae troofa he saibnhed tha plalooa mc wtarine Suxwak
CuHtabalarr uaArm as a cisfune (Sse Lanes Report, p. 39;.
 JAPANESE ATTACK ON SARA^VAK 38{

Dutch bombcn operating from Singkawang JI aerodrome,

attacked Japanese ships at anchor in the Santubong estuary in the
course of the evening. As a result one ship, which probably carried
munitions, was reported blosvn up. Throughout the night of24/25
December, intermittent firing took place in the area of the acro-
{Iromc as the Japanese carefully felt their way around the eastern
and ^vestern sides of tlie perimeter without laimching any major
attack. It was becoming more and more apparent that they
intended first to cut off all escape routes and then destroy the
besieged force at leisure.

KUCHtNO EVACUATED

With the dawn of Christmas day, there was a lull in the firing,
but Japanese troops continued their encircling movement. Since
the danger of being totally cut off was grosving every hour, the
remaining personnel of A Company with their guns were sent
to hold the vital ferry crossing of the Saraw^-Kiri river at
Batu Kitang. Aerial reconnabsance kept the Japanese fully in*
formed of all these moves but the morning passed quietly with
little interference from them.

At 1300 hours on 25 December a conference of oIBcers took

place at battalion headquarters where the whole position was
discussed again. It svas derided to withdraw to Dutch West
Borneo, the withdrawal commencing at l&OO hours. The
withdrawal plan in brief svas
Headquarters Company and E Company to withdraw to Batu
Kitang at 1800 hours ; Band D Companies to commence retreat
along the same route half an hour later, while C Company, svhich
was assigned the role of fighting a rearguard action, was to take an
easterly short cut through the jungle on to the Batu Kilang road.
The destination of all the companies was Bau.
In the early afternoon, shortly after Licut.Colonel Lane had
issued orders for the withdrawal of " Sarftr , heavy firing was
heardfrom thcdircction of the ferry at Batu Kitang and the force
commander, fearing that Japanese troops were already astride his
escape route, ordered the withdrawal to commence immediately.
Hcadqaarfers Catnpaity coi'ercd by carriers led the withdrawal
at 1530 hours, and met with no opposition ih>m the Japanese.
D Company was fired upon just before reaching Batu Kitang
road. B and C Companies had to face the full bnmt of the
Japanese attack and were cut off from the rest of the troops while
still in the aerodrome area. Of these two companies, only one
platoon of B Company succeeded in rejoining the main body of
382 CAitPAlCSS I.S* SOUTII-EAST ASIA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO
the batulion by 1700 houn. The remainder, totalling 4 ofUcen,
6 Viceroys Commusioned Officers and some 230 Indian Other
Hanks, were cither killed or taken prisoner.
At the Batu Kitang feny, trouble developed after firing had
broken out in the vlcinit)*. The result of this was that all local
*
inhabitants fled into the jungle, Icas-ing the feny' on the far side
of the ssvift-flos'.-ing stream *. Subsequently, ferrying had to
be carried out in small native firahii, a slow and tedious task,
but by 1900 hours all except the ctn-ering troops had crossed
the ri\er and svere on their w ay to Bau. All vehicles left on the east
bank of the river were rendered useless and similarly all heasy
wcaporu were denied to the Japanese. D Company was put into
position on hillocks that covcreil the immediate approaches to the
ferry and the carrier platoon was asked to render the company'
all possible aid in lu alloted task. At this juncture the Japanese
launched a second attack sshjch cut off temporarily the rearguard
of the baUaUon coosUdng of the officer'in-^arge and about 180
personnel. But the party managed to escape south tow-ards
Landeh on the Sarats ak river and, after a forced march of nearly
60 miles through dense jungle with little food and water, the party
e%-entually rejoined the battalion at Singkaw ang 11 aer^rome on
31 December.
Meanwhile, the main body of the battaUon bad to march cner
the
Batu Kitang Bau Road which was, according to Lieut.-
Colonel Lane, in an extremely poor condition .* After a short
hah at Simawan, the troops proceeded to Bau svhere they nttended
to pass the rughL The \illage, howrs^r, prtnTd to be unsuitable as
a halui^ place and the srithdrasval was conuuued as far as a gold-
mine just short ofKrokong where the whole part) w-as assembled
by 0300 hoars on 26 December. There were so'eral false alarms
during this rapid withdrawal, but no Japanese troops were actually
encountered.

Lane'i Rrpcrt.p.'ll.
 CHAPTER xrrr

Operations in Dutcli North-West Borneo

2/15 PUNJAB ENTER DUTCH BORNEO

Sarawak thus passed into Japanese hands, but its defenders

continued the fight in, Dutch Borneo. At daybreak on 26 December
1941, after a brief rest at the gold*mine, the column of Indian and
State troops mod on to Krokong, just beyond the gold-mine.
ThecovcringforceatBauwasvkitlidras\'n,andthc rick and wound-
ed were moved ahead of the marching troops. At Krokong the
track came to an end and a foot-wide foot-bridge across the
Sarawak river rendered impossible the carrying of mechanical
.Iramport and heavy equipment. These were therefore effectively
destroyed before the column proceeded further.
From Krokong most of the Sarawak Rangers returned to
their homes " in view of their agreement to serve in Sarawak only,
and in the best interests of their property and families. Only
two memben of the force chose to remain with the Punjabi battalion
through Dutch West Borneo and in the later mov'es to South Borneo.
English officers with the State forces, however, chose to serve with
the battalion and were sent on ahead from Krokong to trace a
route and make arrangements with Dyak villagers for food and
accommodation. Henceforth Sarfor ceased to exist as a com-
bined Indian/Sarawak State force and 2/15 Punjab, now leis than
800 men strong, carried on alone,
A narrow but fairly good fool-path ran from Krokong to
Scrabak via Duyoh, which afforded a well-covered line of withdra-
wal through rough cultivation and jungle. By nightfall on 26
December, the troops reached Serabak without incident. The
following day they crossed into Dutch North-\Vcst Borneo and
passed through thickly wooded country as far as Djagoi Babang.
^VTien the Allied troops crossed this village they were safe from
the Japanese threat of cutting off their withdrawal route, from the
north-cast, but danger still lurked for them from the south-east.
The track from Risau to Silooas was wide enough to allow troops
to move in file, but heavy rain had made the passage muddy and
diflicult. After crossing the riser Koemba, about 80 yards wide,
in growing darkness, the party halted for the night at Silooas where
they were met by a Dutch patrol from Bengkajang. The latter
were fully informed about the situation in Sarawak which had
resulted in the withdrawal of the battaUon, and the slrenglh of the
Japanese forces. It was also explained to the Dutch that due
38-1 CAUPAICNa IX SOLTII-E-IST ASIA 1941-42 SASUWAK &, BORXEO

to bad tracts, ibe Japanese vs ere most unlikely to closely follow

the retreating Allied troops.
On the morning of Sunday, 28 December, the battalion
resumed joumc)' towards Sanggau roadhead which was about
its

twentv' miles away. They* reached Satatok at 1330 hours where

they originally intended to pass the night on information from
the Dutch that the place afforded sulRcicnt accoimnodatjon. Con-
trary to the expectations, the battahoa, finding only
Coolie
lines at the village, decided to continue the journey in an
impending r^nitorm, which soon rendered the road muddy.
This delayed the inarch of the troops and they could not reads
the banks of the Tanggi rher opposite Sanggau until the early
hours of the morning of the 29th. Due to some nusunderstandlng
with the Dutch outpost commander, the troops had to wail many
hours before they were eventually allowed to cross over, and by
midday all were comfortably' installed in the evacuated Royal
/\ir Force barracks of Sm^awang fl aerodrome.
At daybreak on 29 Decembn a code message was sent to
Headqoanen Singapore regarding the action in Kuching and
withdrawal to Sanggau. Tt was suggested that the unit be vtith-
drawn from Dutch Borneo.
During the afternoon, all European women and children
(who appear to have accompanied the column during its with-
drawal!, remamiog State &rcc personnel and surplus regular
personnel (with the excepdon of three Sarawak Volunteer Force
ofHcers and one Sa^3^^'ak Rangers' OSicer) were sent to Pontianak
for evacuadon to Java. After a long delay, the party' w-ashsally

evacuated on 25 January 1942 only two days before the capture
of the tOMTi by the Japanese.
On the morning of 30 December, Lieut.-CoIonl Lane,
offtccr-in-charge cf the troops, paid a visit to the Dutch territcrial
commander (Lt.-CoL Man) at Sampau anrf fully acquainted
Umwith the situation, but the latter did not volunteer any
informadon regarding the locadon and cumber of his troops. It
was dedded that Allied troops should remain at Sanggau until
4 January 1942, by which time it was hoped that the troops would
be thoroughly rested and reorganised.
SfOnCAXOATtOX or the battaliox
The following dsy, Captsia Cbjtpniaii sad the reaissader
of the rearguard which had been cut off at Batu Kitang ferry
 01i:rat!0.vs In* dutch nortii-\v*est borkeo 385

rejoined the battalion in an exhausted condition. On the same day,

an order was received from Headquarten Singapore placing 2/15
Punjab under Dutch command. TTie next day, a Dutch Lieut.-
Colonel, Gertmans, arrived from Java to assume with Lieut-Colonel
Mars the Joint command of British and Dutch forces in West
Borneo. Lieut.-Golonel Gertmans was assigned the task of training
the forces for guerilla warfare while Licut.-Co!onel Mars svas to
prepare for a static defence of Singkawang 11 aerodrome and
the Sanggau roadhead. The joint command arrangements worked
most unsatisfactorily for, as Licut.-Co!onei Lane remarks in his
account of operations, the force was placed at the disposal of
both of them and as a result svas receiving separate orders for

separate plans from both sometimes involving sending the same
body of troops to two places simultaneously.*
Meanwhile the reorganisation of the battalion was going
ahead. Nearly 300 casualties bad been suffered in tbe action
at Kuching; B and C Companies {less one platoon), one
platoon A Company (less three men), two sections of
Company, one 18-poundcr section and one 5' mortar detachment
had prosed a total loss. The remainder of the battalion, number*
ing 783, svas divided into four hfono-class companies: A
(Sikh), B (Punjabi Muslims), C (Khattak) and D (Jat)
armed only with rifles, Bren guns and sub-machine-guns since
all mechanical transport and hcasy equipment had to be abandon-
ed earlier at Krokong during the course of withdrawal from Kuch-
ing. Weapons and ammunition manliandled from Kuching to
Sanggau consisted of 603 rifles, 21 Bren gum, 21 sub-machine-guns,
2 Lewis guns, 2 Browning machine-guns taken from a crashed
Dutch plane, 31 revolvers, 54 hand-grenades and about 53,000
rounds of small-arms ammunidon.
OPEBATIOSS NORTH-EAST OF SANCCAO

By 4 January1942, the reorganisation of the 2/15 Punjab

Battalion svas complete, D
Company less one platoon, with one
sub-machine-gun section and a few Dutch troops in support, was
sent to Silooas to patrol the area as far north as Djagoi Babang
and generally to delay the Japanese advance as long as possible.*
B Company took vp static posiiiomal the Sanggau roadhead while
A Company assumed responsibility for
the defence of Singkawang
If aerodrome where the remainder of the battalion was held in
reserve.

lamts Report, p. 46. ^

SAcconiine to Laae.tbcDateh ifitrauoa to male SJoou a bate lor Tuenlla
Krokong track towardt tbe tnotxr (p. 45).
action along tbe
33G CA^fPAlCNS IN SOCTH*EAST ASIA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO

On6 January-, a Japanese party, some 30 stronsj the fint

Japanese troops to cross the Sarawak Dutch Xorth-^Vest Borneo

Frontier svas reported to be in Saratok, about 6 miles north-
Babang. The next day one platoon A Company
east of Dja^oi
Babang under orders to patrol from there tou-ards the
ssas sent to
Sarawak border. Two days later at about 1830 hours a strong
Japanese attack forced the Punjabi platoon to ss-ithdraw three
mifes south of Babang. Remlbrcemcnts, consisting of one platoon
D Company, sserc immediately rushed to stabilise the position
south of ^bang. In a surprise counter-attack, the Punjabi
platoons succeeded in inflicting some casualties on the Japanese
on 10 January- But it was only later during the course of the day
when the other platoon and a section of sub-machine-guns arrived
from Silooas that the position was evantually stabilised about 2i
mites soutli of Djagoi Babang.
During the next sscek. the Japanese were content to hold their
position at Djagoi Babang while their troops \ere being reinforced
steadily. At the same time Indian troops patrolled vigorously
bettvecR RLsau and Babang, maiataming contact with the Japanese.
Or 12 January', a frontal attack was launched by these troops
with the object of regaining Babang but they failed to achieve their
object due to the failure of Dutch troops to deliver the pres'iously
planned flanking attack Sirauluneously. ^^'hen contact was made
by the Indian troops viih the Dutch tl^e days later, the latter were
*
10 miles behind the British outpost line Captain Cnwlaad
was of the opinion that Babang could bas-e been retaken up to 1
January, but not after that date since the village had been heavily
reinforced by the Japanese.
In the meanUme, the Japanese announced on 1 1 January
1942 that a stale of war existed between them and the Netherlands
East Indies, because of the hostile attitude of the Netherlands
Government in aiding the enemies of Japan since the outbreak
of the war of Greater East Asia . The Japanese obviously hoped
to prevent any concerted Allied action by delaying the declaration
of war but they were disappointed becatisc the Dutch struck at
once. Tarakan, an island off the east coast of Borneo and an oil
centre, was the first important Dutch possession to fall to the
Japanese on 12 January after the oil-denial scheme had been
carried out-
ASlth Babang as their base of operations, the Japanese felt
that they could safely outflank the defenders to the south of it and
carry on their thrust towards Silooas. The Indian troops found

> Linci Rrport, p. .

 OPERATIONS IN DUTCH ^ORTII-^VEST BORNEO 387

dicmiclves in danger of being cut ofT b>' the Japanese, and their
commander, therefore, obtained permission from Licut-Colonel
Gertmans on 16 January to w-itfadratv h three platoons from their
tulnerable position south-west of Djagoi Babang to the secondary
roadhead of Silooas. A
platoon of C Company had been sent to
reinforce Silooas on 14 January and on the evening of the 16th
the ivhole party too): up defensii-e positions along the line of the
Koemba river. On 17 January', the Dutch troops were svithdrasvn
under orders from Lieut-Colonel Gertmans from Silooas to Setatok
and the Indian troops were left behind to hold the village. At
about 0900 hours the same day, the Japanese, hating successfully
crossed the river, launched an attack on both the flanks of the
hastily prepared defence line. The attack bn the right flank was
repulsed, the Japanese suflering heavy casualties, but on the left
they broke through in strength. This necessitated an immediate
tvithdrawal of Indian troops. By the follosring day all the four
platoons had reached Saoggau, iO miles south of Silooas via
Setatok. From Sanggau, in view of their exhausted condition,
these troops were sent to Beogkajang fora short rest,*
During the period 4>!8 January, Captain Crostand had
twice pressed for reinforcements to be sent to Silooas if it was intend-
ed to hold the Japanese north of Sanggau, but these requests were
turned down in view of the inability of the commander to spare
troops which were urgently required for other tasks. As large
parries of men from the battalion had been cmplo>'ed in repairing
the motor-road between Sampau and Singkawang II, it had only
been possible to send (wo platoons from A and C Gompam'cs and
these had proved altogether insufficient for the task of repelling the
Japanese attack.
There was a lamentable lack of co-operation between the
Dutch commander and the olficcr-m-chargc of 2/15 Punjab.
DispositionsofDutch troops were never disclosed to the latter. The
declared policy of the Dutch was to fight to the last man, but in
reality they appeared to be always planning to withdraw into
the interior without making any determined attempt to check the
invaders. The Dutch even refused. It is alleged, to supply 2/15
Punjab with arms, ammunition and clothing.
.Meanwhile at SJngiasyaiJg JI aerodrome the demolition of
landing strips, stores and barracks had commenced immediately
after thenews of the evacuation of Silooas was received. These
demolitions were completed by 20 January.

wuUkaucl
J Licut-Colonel Laiie{OC iroops) on 19 Jinu*ry tad Linit.-Colon'l
Rc-Tiionjpoo itmporarily ssximni coEtmand of the Punjab Reyiment.
SLuief Report, p. S6.
330 cAil^Al^.^s ix sot*TU-E.Ksr a.\ I9U*42 Sarawak & Borneo

nit iANCCAU ACTION

Al this juncture, ljeul.*Co1onel Lane Uxk into omsiilfration
the po'Mhility of the Japanese malint; a landing on the s^est coast
in \'icv.- of their naval and air superiority sihilc limultaneously
presrint: Sanpeau from t!ic north. Therefore, in order to astiid
encirclement, he drew up a secret plan for the e\-acuation of
Indian troops to Java or Malaya from Dutch Borneo. In the eseni
of the Japanese eaplurinp the coastal areas, it was proposed to niosr
the battalion to Pankalanboon and Sampil in South Borneo.
Tliese two ports were selected bccaine thc\ were farthest away
from the Japanese threat. But ssiih U>c arrrs-al ofa Dutch liaison
officer from Java, this, plan was abandoned and fresh plans were
discussed and drawn up for the defence of the Sans^au roadhead.
In accordance with these new plans, dhpositiortt of rroops were
as follows:
A Company- Singkawang II aerodrome
B Compac)' Sanggau roadhead and astride the
(plus two tub-macliine- Sanggu*Momone toad,
gun sections)
C Company One platoon at Sanegau. Two pla>
tooftstna lay*back positionone mile
south of Kandasan.
D Company One platoon at Sangsjau. Two pla-
toons at Loemar.whcrewas also sta-
tioned the Headquarters Company.
Battalion Head- Kandasan wsUt a liaison oITicer at
quarters Sani^au.
Supporting Dutch troops consisted of one platoon X'ickers
machine-guns and two light tanks at Sanggau; 80 men al Kandasan
80 men at Ledo; and Force Headquarters at Locmar.
In rcspon'C to Iclegrattu from the commander of the battalion,
a British liaison officer from the General Headquarters Far East
in Java visited the Indian and Dutch headquarters on 24 and
25 Januarj'. He stressed the futility of further resistance In Dutch
Borneo and, at the same time, urged that the battalion should be
withdrawn to an operational theatre where its services would be
more useful.
Reports of increasing Japanese acmity in the Silooas-Setalok
area were at this time being received from patrols of the Indian
battalion. On 25 January, Paling, 2| miles north-east of Sanggau,
was occupied in force by Ac Japanese. It was Acrefore decided
to dislodge Aem from Ac village the next day by means of a
counter-attack. A Company attacked Ac Japanese positions,
but could not achieve much success. The first line of Uic Japanese
 orr.RATjON5 IX Dt^rai xoRTit*wtrr BORXto 389

IrcncJjfi waj cap!ii/fd afltr a vif^orout anault, but the iniu'al ad-
x-antape could not be pfc.Med liomc because of the inability of
the Dutch ln>oi>t lo carry out a simtillaneous flanldng attack.
'HieDutch troops whoic task wa* to cut off tlie Japanese rear,
tmfrtunatcly ran into an ambush and their commander was killed.
The remnants of the troops appear lo have vithdrasvn into the
junfilc but they sserr never seen afterxeards. So after inflicting
some cauialticjon the Japanese troops, the Indian troops sserc
.iho forced to svithdraw.
Tlic same cxeniiig, foltoxsing up Uiis sviilsdrawal, about
200 Japanese troops attacked and drox'e out the Indian platoon
defending Segundai, on the right flank of tlic Sanggau position.
The Japanese vscrc not sIoh to take advantage of this success, and
at 0700 houra on 27 January, they hiunclted .i Scrj* strong
attack on the Sanggau position from ^gundai. At the same lime
a Japanese party was sent soutliwards ssiUi the object of outflanking
the aerodrome.
By 0900 hours the ]>usiiiun of the Indian troops became
critical, and an immediate srithdraw.al was ordered by force
hendquarten to I.edo, 10 miles souUi'West on the Sambas river.
A Company and tlic C Company platoons which were dis
{Xned around the aerodrome, successfully dueng.sged dsemseh'cs,
from the Japanese and ilse former safely reached Ledo. C
Company successfully held the ridge knosro as Dyak Farm,
rox-ering the road unUf all troops had passed ifirough, and then
xrilhdrcw acrens Uie Samb.xs rix'er to Ledo. One platoon of B
Company and the D Company platoon also managed to escape,
though the latter suffered heaxily xvhilc svillidrawing with B
Company Headquarters Utrough Uie jungle to the west of the
road. Tlic remahung ts>o platoons of B Company svcrc
cut off from the rest of the b.xltaUon by the Japanese and found
escape Impossible. With Ujc Japanese attadung from both cast
and west of Sanggau, Subedar Faramurz Khan, Commander
of the platoons and sccond-in*command of B Company,
exhorted his men to fight to the last. He himself set a fine example
to his troops by hU exemplary brax-ery, and the gallant party
continued to fight till laic in tlic afternoon against tremendous
odds. It xvas only when its ammunition xvas exhausted that
the party agreed to surrender. Japanese reports later gave their
own casualties as amounting to betsveen 400 and 500 men killed
or svounded. Of the Indian troops (approximately only
three managed to escape. The remainder were never seen again.

7 TJicre it * rtporl ihal the Indian prinaen were cruelly done lo death by the
inrorialrd Japancae trooya, but !t ha* not been torroborated.
390 cAitrMCNs IN sornt-r.\yr ASIA 19H-12 Sarawak & Borneo
By the fning of 27 January, the Indian battalion IeJ
t\NO platoons of B Company had managed to reach Ledo.
Bridges between Sanggau and Ixdo were blown up by Dutch
engineers under eos-er of Indian troops, and posiiions for the night
svcrc ocaipicd on the high ground west and soulh-wcit of I^-edo
with battalion headquarters at Sansak. Tlie Dutch troops at
Ledo had in the meanwhile svitltdrawn to Bengkajang.

JAPAStSK LANDtNCS OX THE SVEST COAST

Meanwhile on 24 January, a reconnaissance plane ostr the

Kuching area had reported a large concentration of small rraft in
the is-aicnsMys around the town. This Jed to the inference that the
Japanese contemplated an attack on Bermangkat and the aero*
dromes in the Singkaw-ang ! area.* Steps were at once taken to
block the Sambai riser at Pcrmangtal and pres-iously prepared
dctnolUions were carried out The extreme shortage of troops,
howcNTr, presented active defence measures being braughi into
elTect.
The threatened Japanese landing at Permangkat took place
in strengUi on the night of 27/28 January. Ads-ancmg nonh-east
and south from Permangkat the Japanese quickly captured
Sambas, Singkaw-ang I, Mampawah and Pontianak. meeting little
resistance from the few Dutch troops in the area. On the monung
of 28 January, the Indian troops were ordered by Lieut-Colonel
Mars to clear the Japanese from the coastal area. Since no
mechanical transport vs as as-ailablc to execute this 'amazing
manoeusTc,* the tbstance to the coast alone being 100 miles,
Licut.-Coloncl Ross-Thompson was unable to comply soih this
order. He pointed out that since the Japanese troops were already
advancing from Singkawang I lossards Bengkajasg, it was in the
interest of Uie remnants of the Dutch and Indian troops to stop
them on the road so that the line of withdrawal might not be
cutoff. It was decided inpursuanceofthisplan to send a company
to reinforce the Dutch troops bolding Penaring Pass, 10 miles
west of Bengkajang.'*
C Company was despatched to Penaring, while two
platoons of D Company were sent to reinforce the Dutch
troops holding the Medjalin road, south-west of Bcngkajang. One
platoon of B Company was sent ahead to hold the Mandor-
Sidas Ridge and to ccr\-er any Japanese advance from Pontianak
 opERA-novs IN Dirrai xortii-utst eorneo 391

along the Pontianak-Xgabang Road until A Company arrived

to reinforce iL Battalion headquarten was moved temporarily
to Bengkajang,
Tfie Dutch company at Penaring willidrcw immediately
on tlic arrival of C Company at HOO hours. On 28 January
lljc Dutch commander (old the company commander that he had

orders from Licut.*Coloncl ^fars to withdraw Ibrlhssdih. The

willidrawal of the Dutch troops was a great setback and in their
absence tlic role allotted to G Company proved to be beyond its
strcngdi.
The Penaring position svas admirably suited for defence.
To the west the road, running through an exposed cutting widi
open ground on either side, made anything in the nature of a frontal
attack wclNnigh impossible. But, with only a single company
for defence, the (lank of the position could not be sufliciently protect-
ed. Under die circumstances, the utmost tliat was expected of
this small force svas to delay the advance of Uic Japanese for a
few hours.
At about H30 hours on 28 January the advance guard of
(he Japanese, estimated at approximately two companies, was seen
approaching on bic>'des. Waiting until the foremost Japanese
troops sverc len than 1 50 yards away, C Company opened fire
inflicting considerable casualtiej on them. Throughout the afier-
noon and early evening the company held the position. But
the Japanese, bringing up strong reinforcements for their flanking
parties, Uircatened to encircle the Penaring position and made
it untenable by 1930 hours. The action was therefore broken
off to enable Dutch engineers to destroy bridges along the road.
The company witlidrcw in order about 2030 hours to a second
position five miles nearer Bengkajang.
Here the company was joined by a platoon of D Company
and a platoon of Dutch troops who arrived in front of the position
at about 2230 Jiours, and the combined force using sub-machine-
guns and liand grenades inflicted heav)* casualties on the Japanese.
Attempts by the latter to move olT Uic road resulted in their being
bogged down in rice-fields covered by light machine-guns. Un-
fortunately at tills stage the Dutch platoon witlidrcw wdtliout
sHfljrifnt cause, Jeavittg a weak spot in one of the defence sccton.
Tlic Japanese were not slow to exploit Uus point of vantage and
after bringing down heavy and acrurate mortar fire, broke through
the resulting gap at 2345 hours. This necessitated a further
withdrawal by Indian and Dutch troops, and during the early
hours on 29 January Uie last troops passed Uirough Bengkajang
on their way south towards Ngabang. By 1300 hours the whole
392 C-MIPAIGNS IS SOimi-EAST AlIA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO

battalion levs A Company, had reached Ngaban?. A Company

conlmued to hold until 1900 hours a pOTiuon one mile -west of
Sidas on the Mandor road, in order m
emer tlie uithdrawal of
posdblc stracRlen.
During the e%'enimj of 29 Januaiy', die o/Ticcf commanding
the Indian iroopr ^>ent to see the Dutch commander at Sosok, who
informed him that Indian troops should hold Xgabang while die
Dutch would hold the line Tajan-Soiok- The British commander
felt that it was cas>- to b>-pass the Ngabang position by a track
leadii^ south-south-east from Singkawang II aerodrome to the
Dutch position at Sosok. It was Anally agreed that Xgabang
should ^ lightly held until the Indian troops could occupy Sanggau
on the Kapoeas river in strength. Therefore A Company*
left immediately for Sanggau which it reached by dawn of the 30Ut
and took up positions, covering the approach to the ris'cr. B
and D Companies continued to hold Xgabang, while C
Company look up cosxring positions on the Xgabang-Sanggau
Road.
Later, on the morning of the 30tb, the battalion's stores and
equipment arrived at Sanggau. At the same time a reriain amount
of transport, food etc., were obtained from the Dutch, whose
nath*e troops in the area, it H alleged, deserted in large numben
due to intermiuent aerial reconnaissance by the Japanese, and
whose discipline under threat from the air was almost negligible.
AmmuniUon lor the troops was now down to " an average
of 60 rounds per rifle and one filled magazine per LMG
with no
reserves. The men were thoroughly exhausted by continuous
inarching and fighting rince 25 December, while their clothing
and boots were worn out.
Thus, at the end of January 1942, two companies of Uic
Indian battalion held Xgabang; one company was positioned
between Xgabang and Sanggau, and the fourth company, together
with battalion headquarters and all supplies, was in the Sanggau
area. The battalion was not destined to fight another major
action with the Japanese, but further hardships in the shape of a
long and gnielUng march through the almost uncbartcred hinter-
land of ^uth Borneo had still to come.

WmiDRAVVAt TO SOUTH BORA'EO

Secret Plan ef \Villjlterj:at

On 31 January 1942, Licut.-Coloncl Ros-Thompson paid

a visit to licuL-Coloncl Man
at the Dutch headquarters and
expressed his intention of vnthdrawing his battalion to South
 OPERATIONS IN' DOTCII NORTH-WEST BORNEO 393

Borneo. The Dutch commnndcr produced a counter-plan svhich

envisaged the svithdrawal of battalion headquarters and one
company to Sinlang, one company to Semitau, and two companies
toSckadau.hut tJiis plan was notapprosed by Lieut-ColonelRoss-
Thompson. He felt that the Dutch plan was a " clc\-er mos-c to
draw the enemy after British troops and facilitate a dear get-away
of Dutch troops to Ketapang, a harbour on the west coast,
since Dutch suppUes existed on the general line Sanggau-Kctapang,
and not on the line Sanggau-Sekadau-Sintang. He therefore
decided to break aiva)' from the Dutch and follow a secret plan
prepared by LicuL-Goloncl Lane, earlier in the month. This
plan svas to has'c been executed in the event of a possible collapse
in North-West Borneo and a successful Japanese landing on the
west coast.
According to the plan now adopted by the British commander,
the Indian battalion was divided into two columns which were
to make theSr iyay south across country to SampJt and Pangkahn-
boon. In case the Japanese had already occupied these two ports
before the two columns reached their respective destinations, the
battalion had instructions to divide itself into groups of 50 men
each and disperse into the interior of the island. General Head-
quartersFarBast was informed of this plan as early as 14 January
and fis'C Sarasvak Volunteer Force Officers were recalled ixom
Pontianak to reconnoitre routes and possible food dumps between
Bengkajang and Nangapinoh.
After his return to Sanggau /rom the Dutch headquarters, the
ofiiccr commanding Indian troops proceeded b>' car to Sekadau.
Here a meeting ofo/hcers took place and final details of the jungle
march were svorked out. From Sekadau, Licut.-Colonel Ross-
Thompson accompanied by some officers proceeded further to
Sintang to meet the Dutch Resident. The latter gave much
useful information for the proposed march.
Orders were issued to Indian troops to start thinning out on
31 January and to svithdraw by daylight of 1 February. All
the sick considered incapable of undertaJdng the proposed march
were sent by lorry to Sintang at fiist from where they svere later
moved by boat to Poertisibau up the Kapoeas river. C
Company marched out of Ngabang and took up positions
covering the Kapocas river between Sanggau and the ferr>',
svhilc headquarters company safeguarded the south bank of the
ferr>'. B and D Companies passed through about midday
to Sekadau and at about 1800 hours G Company followed
them and proceeded straight to Nangapinoh, Almost the endre
battalion with A Company as rearguard reached Blimbing

394 cAsrp-uoNs JN soirni-E.\sr asia 19H-42 Sarawak &. Borneo

ferr> on the night of 2/3 Febniar)'. The road as far as this ferry
was in an extremely poor condiUon and the troops had to cross
sc^cral weak bridges e\'cry two or three miles.
The battalion reached Xangaptnoh on 3 February where it
spent the s\hoIe day complcdng all necessary preparations for the
march." At Xangapmoh it Wss divided info two columns of about
equal strength, each consisting of three parties os under:
JVesl Colims
This had 9 ofheers, 8 Viceroys Commissioned Ollicers and
344 other ranks svith Major Milligan in command and comprising,
A Company
B Company
Part of Headquarters Company.

East Column
10 ollicers, 5 Viceroys Commissioned Officers and 349 other
ranks with Ijcul.-ColonclRoss-Thompsonin command, comprisingof
G Company
D Company
Remainder of Headquarters Company.
Tht Blitz Part;
In addition to the West and East columns, a blitz party

consisting of two officers and four other ranks was formed to make
for Sampit with all speed to contact General Headquarters Java
by wireless or any other means available. Should it not be possible
to make contact at Sampit, the party was given instructions to
cross over to Fangkalanlmn wireless station, and if that method
also failed, to requisition a boat and sail to Java with nesvs of
the battalions whereabouts.
This party left on the es-ening of 3 February and after
tras'cllingmost of the svay in ris-cr craft down the Mendawi and
Mcntaja rivers, arrived at a place about four miles north of Sampit
on 14 February. A Chinese trader at this place told the party
tliat the Controleur at Sample had left by boat on the I2th, two
days earlier, after destroying the wireless station and other public
works. They were also told that the nalh-e officer had gone to the
mouth of the rivTr to meet the Japanese to arrange for terms of
truce. This statement was corroborated by three other traders
who had jmt relumed from Sampit while the convcrsau'on was tak-
ing place." It was thcndeddcd to make (or Pangkalanboon
"On tiieiunc <ty two tram Java bmW at StnUng aoJ UfuL-Colootl
t.ane wM by boat there for evacMtioQ. Unfbrtunatrty he amvrd at OCOO boon
cn S Felmiaryju*t SO minute* afw* the planr* left aril, despite repeated reqoeiu
to Java llradquartn* ftir asotbrr plane, noDe arriied,
Lajie'i Report, p. SS.
 OPERATIONS !N DUTCH NORTll-^VEST BORNEO 395

via Scmbooloo where Uic party had furtJier proof of die confusion
in the Dutch civil administration caused by Japanese landing.
The party reached Pangkalanboon on 19 February after
an arduous march of over 100 miles in five days, and from tJierc
they were able, through the wireless set of the Dutch military
commander, to contact British Headquarters Java. The news of
the whereabouts of the battalion had already reached Java a fort-
night earlier from the seaplanes that had landed at Sintang. Tlic
blitz party was ignorant of this.

East Column
On 3 February, LieuL-CoIone! Ross-Thompson explained
to his men the necessity of withdrawal to South Borneo and the
dangers inherent in a march over unchartcred and unfamiliar
terrain. They were told that there was no means of carrying all
those who fell sick, who would have to remain behind in the nearest
village. The other dangers of the trip were also mentioned: short
rations, unfriendly natives, and the possibility, even probability,
of the Japanese reaching the destination before them. '* Men were
offered the choice of marching south or remaining behind, but with
one voice they all volunteered to go.
At dawn on 4 February, East Column left Nangapinoh with
G Company in the lead, following nearly the same route as
that already taken by the blitz party. The column reached
the headwaters of the Sercojan river on 8 February after a very
difiicult march
*'
mostly through very heavy sandy mud and thick
jungle.** Here the column was told that it was difficult to go down
the river in boats because there were too many bad rapids. It
was therefore decided to cross to the Mendawi river. The leading
party reached the river on 13 February where it halted for three
days to build rafts. During the journey, food was scarce and
only a little rice could be purchased from any village which they
met en route. All the three parties were at this stage within a
few miles of one another, although marching separately. Wth
the rafts completed, the column took to the water and for three
days drifted and paddled its way down this very difficult river
full of ledges, fallen trees and rocky rapids.'* Though no one
was drowned during this period, a total of 5 1 rifles and 2 Bren guns
was lost by the column.
A short distance above Moera Sinamang village on the
Mendawi river, on 19 February, a number of boats were obtained,
396 CAMPAIGNS IN SODTH-EASr AOA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO

and in these the journey was continued to a point some 12 miles

east of the sallagc. From here the column crossed to the Mentaja
rh'cr, C Company dragging one boat along with it, and on
large rafts proceeded without incident as far as Kuala Kawaijan.
licuL-Colonel Ross-Thompson who, with his headquarters part)',
was the first to reach Kuala Kawaijan, carried straight on to
Sampi4 which he reached on \ March. On arrhal there, he
immediately sent up two motor laundics to meet the remainder of
the column. D Company was ordered to halt at Kota Best
between Kuala Kawaijan and Samph to help the local auihorides
to maintain law and order while C Company and the head-
quarters party continued to the junction of ^fentaja and Sampit
ris-eis, some 18 miles south of Sampit \Tllage.

Tlie Headquarters party and C Company assembled in

the junction area on 6 March, and had been in their new position
only one day when Japanese troops were reported to have landed
some nine miles downstream from a large ship. A platoon of C
Company \thich teas sent to tm'ustigatc the report soon contacted
the Japanese and was pushed back b>' them under heavy small*
arms and 2* mortar fire. As the column had insufficient amrauni*
tkm to cany on the action, Lieut-Colonel Ross-Thompson decided
to withdraw* to Sampit. For a large number of troops the 18*
mile march to Sampit along a clay path made catremely slippery*
by continuous rain, on top of (be month's march throagh the jungle
on reduced rice diet, proved too much* and, out of a total of
five officers, 3 \jccr<rys Commisuoned Officers and 183 Indian
Other Ranks, 2 \nceroys Commissioned Officers and 102 Indian
Other Ranks failed to reach Sampit, for the most part falling out
into native houses on the way.
The same night (7/8 March}, the remnants of C Companj*
and Headquarters party set off upstream in motor launches, collect-
ing D Company at Kota Be?i ea rsate. The column reached
Kuala Kawaijan on 10 Nfarch where 30 other men were reported
missing and search parties failed to find them. The party then
marched through the jungle on a compass bearing for five daj's
and came out near Rantaupoulet on the Seroejas river. At this
place the first news from IVest Column was received in the form of
a brief message stating that the Netherlands East Indies had
surrendered to the Japanese.
The column marched to Pandau on the rigbr itank of the
.\roet river and Ucut-Coloncl Ross-Thompson went ahead b)*
fast boat to Pangkalanboon. Boats were sent up and the whole

4/Jii, p. 5S.
 OPERATJOVJ IS m*TCII ^OR^I-^^EST BORXEO 397

battalion wa? acm!)led in Kenamboi on 29 March pending die

arrival of Japanese troops prepared to accept (heir surrender.

U'fsl Column
The diFicuIdcs encountered b>- M.ijor Milligan and hU
column in theirmarch from Kangapinoh to Kenamboi were nearly
in all respect? die same as those experienced by the East Column.
Wdi little more than half the distance of the latter to cover, how-

ever, ^fajor .Milligan was able to reach his desdnation much

earlier,
Jxraving Xangapinoh in separate parties on 5/6 Februarj*,
the complete column marched overland via Mangat and Koempai
to die Seroejan river. The route via .Mangat was fairly clear of
vegetation at first but l.itcr changed l/ jungle paths. ITic officer
commanding the column cy cled to Koca Bahru ahead of his men to
get information regarding die best route over the hills. From die
.sourceof the Seroejan river, the column rafted as far as Bancau-
poulct over fifty miles of river through many rapids. In one of
these a boat craihed on the rod which resulted in the drowning of
four Sikhs of A
Company. From Raniaupoulet the column
crossed overland in Pandaii where h met a Dutch patrol from
Pangkalnnboon. A and B Companies marched overland to
Krabau where dicy boarded motor boats, and on 24 February
the last of die column reached Kenamboi where food was available.
The marches of both F.ast and 'Vest Columns were almost
wholly non-operadonal, yet each was in itself a tribute to the train-
ing, discipline and high morale of2/I5 Punjab. Through die thick
jungle and almost uncharted territory of SouUi Borneo, in a wet
and humid climate, on short rations and with but a meagre hope
of escape at the other end, the men had kept going wiUi a large
number of arms and much ammunition, thereby showing great
courage and exemplary devodon to duty. As Eieut.-Colonel
Lane remarks in his summing up of the Column's achievements,
The endurance and dcterminalfon of die men of both Column?
especially diose who were sufTcringfrom malaria and dysen-
tery'. .... .was worthy of the highest praise".*^ General Pcrcival
described the wilhdraw.il as a feat of endurance which assuredly
will rank high in the annals of warfare*.'
Just before die arrival of the WcstCofumnmPangtaianboon,
an ofiiccr from General Headquarters paid a visit to Kotawaringin
to the south-west of Kenamboi and gave orders for its defence by
Indian troops. He emphasised that Indian troops could not be

s Lanc'i Report, p. 55.

* War in p. 173.
353 CAUPAlCXS LN SOUni-tAST AHA 19n42 SARAWAK & EORNtO
e%'aaiaicd from South Borneo and their future role was to hold the
aerodrome lightly and form ihemwhcj into guerilla bands to
harass the Japanese in the KoUH-aringin-Panglcalanboon area.
The entire force svas to li\-e upon supplies procured on the spot.
The Indian Dutch
troops were to be assisted in their task by a
force coTuisting of 25(3men armed s-i(h rifles and light machine
guns. On day the column reached KcnambcH a small ship
the
arrisxd from Java with a fair amount of food, cloiWng and ammuni-
tion- The food was suflident for about a month's ration-

OPE31ATIOXS KtSKSSlIERK IS" DITTCII BORStO

Japanese forces were suDcing at Indian and Dutch

^S'hile
forces in ^Vest Borneo, Dutch parriions along the eastern coast
were being uinUarly engaged bj* strong Japanese landing parties.
W'e have alreaxij" noted elseuherr the capture ofTarakan
by the Japanese on 12 January 1942- By-pasdng the important
Samarinda aerodrome the Japancje sailed south towards Ballk-
papan. On 23 January, a large Japanese invasioa fleet vos sighted
oil North-East Borneo beading sooth through the Macassar Strait-
The cotTvos* M-as successfully attaelred by Dutch medium bombers
basedonSamarindaandhltson stxshlpswere claimed. American
and Dutch submarines and a surface force cosuisting of tv%-o
American croisen and four destro)ers also mflicied severe tones
on the Japanese. It h esdmated that their losses came to fivT
Of six ships nmk and mairv* others damaged.* Yet The Battle
of ^lacassor Strait did not prevent the Japanese from taking
Balikpapan, but Oicj* were stalled there for some time.**
The town was set on fire b) the Dutch defenders and when
the Japajuse occupied it they fbotid only a Tnatt of smoking mins,
so thorough had been the scorched earth tactics. The
Dutch gaiTUoa slowly viihdrew ue3ts*-ard5 in the direction of
Samarinda and the Japanese made little attempt to follow up the
Dutch withdrasvaL
From Balikpapan, the Japanese began a long and determioed
osorland advance to the south-west which even tually enabled
them to occupy- Bandjermasia on lO February, and to land south of
Sampit less than a month later. .As has already been related.
East Column which had armed in the area only a day previous!)'
was forced to ledre, leavix^ the Japanese in ui^isputed possession
ofevery main town on the cast coast from Sandakan to Sampit.

Cjry
*S Oa 2f Jaacary, a
Asacnoa tca^icn tfjc rvo
s &
^
. in'.w >--1

*7V 1 f7 DazatKr IMJ to Ai^ Y<rt. IS13.

 opr.RAnoNs IN Dtrrat isoRTH-wtsr Borneo 399

CAPITfLATlON

The first intimation of a general surrender in the Netijerlmds

Kasl Indies was received at Tangkalanboon on 8 Marcli in the
form ofa hroadeau message from the Dutch Ccinmiandcr.in-Chicf,
Java, staling that all organised resistance in the Netherlands East
Indies had ceased. On
Uic morning of the next day, a proclama-
lion came over the radio from Ncrom (Datavia) calling upon all
Allied forces in tlic NeUicrlands East Indies to lay down their
arms and surrender unconditionally.
Confronted ssith this order and the threat of renewed fighting
if hh troopi continued their rciiitanrc to the Japanese, and after
a conference with the Dutch Commander and Controlcur of
Pangknlanboon, Major Mith'gan decided to comply. Receipt
of instructions was acknowledged drough the Dutch radio station
to Headquarten Java at 0930 hours on 9 March. It was realised
by all officers that esxn if the Ncrom broadc-ost was a htufT the
terms stipulating tliat all denial and destruction was to cease
appeared suspicious in view of the declared 'scorched earth"
policy of the Uuich^thcre was no alternatisx left but to surrender.
The threat ofreprisab, especially upon prisoners of war at Kuching
aerodrome and on the native population of Borneo, was considered
too great to warrant further rcsbtance.
The possibility of rcuring into the jungle individually or in
small parlies was coruidcred at lengdi, but Majoi Milligan decided
that the chances of more than a handful sm^iving such conditions
as would have to be faced in the jungles of Borneo were too small
to make such a step worthwhile. Arms and ammunition were
already in short supply and Bitic food could be obtained in the
interior regions. These factors pointed to the untvisdom of such
a course being followed.
TIic decision to lay down arms was made known to all ranks
on parade in the late afternoon on 9 March. Lieut-Coloncl Lane
arrived at Pangkalanboon the same evening to resume command
of the battalion. After waiting at Sintang for another plane tp
arrive*' until 18 February, by which timelhejapanescwcrcrcportcd
to be only a six hours journey away, LieuL-Coloncl Lane had left
For Nangapinoh. From there, he, in company with two Dutch
and six Indian soldiers, had made his way south via Kota
officials
Bahru to Pangkalanboon.
Between 2 March and 3 April there tvas a lot of diseusdon
among British and Dutch officers as regards the surrender decision.

'Lanc'i Rfporl, p. 5C.

 K

APPENDIX A

Garrison in Hong Kong

Orpkr or Battu: xcLtrot.vc A.vcfLMRV U.vrTS

(v\) 7/A Dtcmirt 1911

t:ins\ 0 UMA>n
i. G.O.C.-Major-CcneralC.M.MaUby, M.C.
>tAJ.MA.SD aofc Uoiratllfr C, WalJn
5 Rajpiit . . LicuL'Coloncl Cadoj^an-Rawlwon
2/H Punjab .. fJctic-CoJonrl Kidrf
2 Rwal .Srolt . . IJ^uL-CoInnei ANTiilr

Bor. .. llrijpidier J.K. I-awwn

J MiddIfcJ: Ijcot.CoIn/rl Slrwaft, M.C.
\Vinn!p; Orrn.-i*
dlcn . . . . UrMUColond J.1..R. SuirUITe
Ro)*a} of
Canada . . l.iPML*Colone| W. J. Homr, M.C.

roRTP.rsi moor*

J////. .SfainUnd Jirigad/

No. 1 Cm, HKVDC
Cliinc'c (NiicJcui) Coy
1 nnd2 Mmniys, I HKResiHKSIOV
22 Field Coy, RK
llon^ Ktng Island
No*. 2, *1, 6 and 7 Coyi HKVDC-ColoncI Ro*c
R and 12 Coast Regiment*, RA
5 AA Regiment, RA
3 and 4 Med IRys 1 IIK Rcgt HKSRA
965 DcfBty, RA
40 Held Coy, RE

StcnfeuHers Islt
No. 3 Coy, HKVDC
(Jl) 15/A DKmber 1941

cniNA cojuiAND . . . . Major-Gcncral Maltby

102 CAMTAJONI IN SOUTH-r AST AIA J94J-42 lArAU'AK (t TORNF-O

FAST INT Rnr. .. HriKadicf Wallii

5 Kajpul
lineal Rifles of Canstta
1$ and 1) " Coys 1 Middx
wtsT isr tot .. .. Brigadier r^w>n
2/H Tunjah
Winnipeg Grrnadiers
2 Royal Scots

rORTREiS TROOK
OfOieuiutsl'mcdin** (A) FORTRT^S TROOPS*' alxAt:
1 UK Regi HKSRA sai dirided into Rail and West
Groups, R;\, each Group svorking in close conjuncUon Vkith
ils respective Bdc HQ..
5s*fM. I and 2 Coy* HKVnC, in the Hastem Sector,

SNCre commanded partly by Brigadier WallLi and partly by

Ft. HQ.
Remaining Units, together ssilb '* A , " C and Z
Coys 1 Middx, all came directly under command of Ft. HQ.
 APPEM)IX B

Copy of Propaganda Leaflets dropped by

tlic Japanese over Hong Kong
You Brituh Xationalit
Be awakened Immediately to Uic actual situation of Uic
world f

of Imperial Troops arc already advanced to India,

and the Jilting Sun Fhgi arc already (lying in such major cities
of the Far East at Nfanila, Batavia, Bangkok, Singapore, Rangoon,
etc. The cry for co-prospcrily is raised all over the whole of those
areas. In Europe Uie German army has occupied Moscow the Red
capital, its violent attacks threatening to extend to the Ural regions.
London, the British c-apical, is in a most perilous situation. The
American Iaci/ic Fleet, whi^ has been leading the camp of demo-
cracies, has been heasily damaged by the Japanese Navy and
is now solely devoted to the defence of its own countiy. You
Briiisli oHicers and men who are encamped in Hong Kong and
Kowloon I Stop continuing to offer futile resistance sritbin the
narrowly limited areas without the knowledge of the changed
international situation. Your strategic establishments are sure
to collapse before the serious attacks
panic-stricken citizens
^ the Imperial Army. You
on the solitary island in helpless isolationl
In order to save Kowloon and Hong Kong from the scene
of mutual slaughter of human lives and also to avoid die loss of
your fadicrs, husbands and children as well as your properties,
bring pressure upon the government authorities to deliver Hong
Kong and Kosvloon without bloodshed and resistance. W'e
firmly believe you will choose tliis wise measure without fail.
SHOULD YOU DESTROY THE IMPORTANT
ESTABLISHMENTS AND MATERIALS IN HONG KONG
AND KOWLOON IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR UTILI-
ZATION BY THE IMPERIAL ARMY. AFTER THEIR
OCCUPATION THE JAPANESE ARMY WILL SURELY
ANNIHILATE ALL BRITISH NATIO.NALS IN RETALIA-
TION.

To Chinese emigrants in Hong Kong.

all
Commander of the Japanese Army.
Now army tlghdy sieged Hong Kong where
die Japanese
you Ih'c and where you accumulate your wealth, and the occupa-
tion of Hong Kong by die Japanese Army close at hand. But
401 CVMPAlONi IS 50UTII*8.T AtIA 194M2 lARAWAk & BORSFO

^%hal llic Japanese Army loni; for ti not tlje dcslniction of your
li\T^ and properties or of lion;; Koni; but the dcitructlon of the
influence of the r.nsjlish.
}lut if )ou iet the Kns;lMi to rcsiit in \ain l>eing uteti ai
their tool and run away Rivinj* up your houses and property, all
your properties will be rubbed by the mob and Uie white, and still
more the Japanese Army also ssill be forced to desircry your Uvn
sviili the Honq Kontj Island. You should trust to Use faiUs of the
Japanese Army and let the British surrender to U>e Jjp.tnese
Army glsing up their resistances, and wail for Use Japanese Army
protecting your properties by your os*n hands. When reached,
the Japanese Army would assure you of your Uses am! properties;
moreoNTr, ssould assert to help your prosperities in future.
 APFEMJIX C 405

I9H

DF.CFjtoER

Command

Battle

//Q,.

of

Order
 APPENTJIX D

The Japanese a5tli Army

Brief Order of Battix 8 Deceuber 1911

licuL-Gcncml T, Yamashiu, the C.-in*C- of the 25^ Anr^,
had under hU command the Imperial Guards Division (LieuC-
Gcneral T. Xhhimura^, the 5fA Division (Ucut.-Ccneral T, Matsui),
and the 18;A Division (Lieut.*General R- Mutaguchi,) as the
principal formations. Tlic 5S/A Division was also assigned to
the 25{A Amj originally, but was not actually included in lieuC-
General Vamashitas force. He also had a Tank Group of four
tank regiments, an Independent Anti-Tank Battalion and eight
independent anti-tank companies, an independent Mountain
Artillery Regiment, two Hca\y Reid Artiller> Regiments and a
Heavy Field Artillery* Battalion, three Mortar Battalions, and
proportion of Engineer, Signal units, etc. The Transportation and
other Line of Communicadoa units alone numbered ever $6,000
men, and the total of Japanese troops earmarked for Malaya was
1,25, 103 men vilth 7,320 vehicles and 11,516 horses, though the

members actually landed In hfataya fell far short of these figures.
A Japanese Tank Regiment, the Jsl for example, consisted
of 37 medium tanks and 20 light tanks organised into a regimental
headquarters, three medium tank companies and one light tank
company, with a regimental munition train. A medium tank
company bad ten medium and two light tanks, the light tank
company had ten light tanks, and the regimental muniuon train
had five medium and three light tanks. The regimental head-
quarters had two medium and one light tank. The medium
tanks (16 tons] were armed with one 57 gun and two 7*7 mm mm
light machine guns each: a light lank (6 tom] contained one 37
mm gun and one 77 mm machine gun.
A
Japanese Division contained three or four regiments
plus a reconnaissance regiment or cavalry battalion, with the usual
complement of artillery, en^neer, signal, transportation, ordnance
and medical units. An Infantry regiment comisted of three
battalions.

For dni! Kirby, S. VVoodbnnt ; 71r M'of Ainiia Jap^, Vol. I Apprada 15;
lirt Xlijaiy'i ScaikuHT* Ofiice, London I9S7.
 APPENDIX E

Order of Battle 8 Ind. Inf. Bde,

7 December 194 J.

Bdc. H.Q.. and Sig. Sec.

Employment PI.
73 Fd. Bty. R.A. (5 Fd. Rcgt. R.A.)
272 A/Tk. Biy. R.A.
21 Mtn. Bly. (less one See.)
DcL Hong Kong and Singapore Rcgt. R.A.
19 Fd. Coy. R Bombay S. and M.
2/lOlh Baluch Rcgt.
2/12l.hF.F. Rcgt.
l/I3thF.F. Rifles
Dogra Regt.
3/1 7th
One Coy. Malaya Rcgt
1st Hyderabad Inf. I.S.F.
Mysore Inf. I.S.F.
Two M.G. Pli. P.ihangBn. (Volunteers)
One Coy. Kclantam Vols.
Fd. Amb.
8 Ind. Inf. Bdc. Tpt. Coy.
43 Reserve M.T. Coy. (Malaya)
One Labour PI.
 APPENDIX F
Order of the Day Issued on the 8th
December 1941
Japans action today gKts the tignal Tor the Empire Naval,
Army and Air Forces and those of their Allies, to go into action
with a common aim and common ideah.
^S'c arc ready. We have had plenty of seaming and our
preparations arc made and tested. U'c do not forget at
this moment the years of patience and forbearance in s^hich we
ha\c borne, ssith dignity and discipline, the petty insults and
insolences inflicted on us by the Japanese in the Far East. We
know that those things \ere only done because Japan thought
she could take advantage of our supposed sscakness. Now, when
Japan herself has dedded to put the matter to a stenter test, she
will fuld out that she has made a grievous mistake.
We arc confident Our defences arc strong and our weapons
evident kVTiaiever our race, and \*hether we arc now in our
natisc land or has-c come thousands of miles, we have one aim
and one only. It Is to defend these short*, to destroy such of
our enemies as may set foot on our soil, and then, finally, to cripple
the power of the enemy to endanger our ideals, our possessions and
our peace,
^Vhal of the enemy? We see before us a Japan drained
for years by the exiiausting claims of her wanton onslaught on
China. We see a Japan whose trade and industry have been
dislocated by these years of reckless adventure that, in a mood
of desperation, her Government has flung her into war under the
delusion that, by stabbing a friendly nation in the back, she
can gain her end. Let her look at Italy and what has happened
since that nation tried a similar base action.
Let us all remember that we here in the Far East form part
of the great campaign for the preservation in the world of truth
and justice and freedom; confidence, resolution, enterprise and
devotion to the cause must and will inspire every one of us in the
fighting services, while from the civilian population, Malay,
Chinese, Indian, or Burmese, we expect that patience, endurance
and serenity which is the great virtue of the East and which will
go far to ass/sc fhedgfttingmea to gain finaf and compfetc victory.

R. BROOKE-POPILVU O. l_\YTON,
Air Chief Marshal, Vice-Admiral,
Coramandcr-in-Chief, Far East. Commandcr-in-Chief, China.
 AVFESDIX G

Malaya Command Operation Instruction

No.
Ref. Jfap JOHORE and SINGAPORE 1/25,000.

1. Enemy
attacked Western Area in strength 9 Februar>'
and succeeded in penetrating to the EAST of aerodrome.TEXGAH
A party of the enemy is reported to have blocked the rd HOXG
KAH
VILLAGE 6917 rd June 6313 in rear of 44 Ind. Inf. Bde.
2. A.I.F. MALAYA Jiave been ordered to trididratv to and
hold the line S. KRAXJI-BULEM VILLAGE 6919S. JUROXG.
6/15 Bde has been placed under comd. of A.LF. MALAYA
3. Should it be impossible to bold the enemy on the line
mentioned in para 2 above, G.O.C. Malaya intends to withdraw
to an inner posn on which die final battle for SIXGAPORE svill
be fought.
4. General line of this inner posn will be:
West Bank of KALLAXG riv'cr in 8711 thence WEST of
the inundated area in 8611,8612 and 8712 to MT. 8814 VERXOX
XORTH of PIERCE RESERVOIR 8118-HUl 581 in 7616
WEST OF BUKITTfMAK VILLAGE 7515pt. 105 in 7412
SOUTH
PASIR PAJ^AXG VILLAGE 7-109 thence along the
ROCHORE
coast of SIXGAPORE ISLAND to WEST Bank of
RIVER PULAU BLAKAVG MATI, PULAU BRANT,
in 8710.
PULAU TEKOXG and the defended perimeter of Per^crang
will also be held.
5. This posn will be divided into three areas
NORTHERN AREA .. Comd ..Comd 3 Ind. Corps
Tps . .3 Ind Corps of II Ind. Divand
18 Div.
SOUTHERN .AREA . . Comd ..Comd Southern Area'^ {Major
General KEITH SIMMONS)
Tps , . cxisdng garrison of Southern
Area.
WESTERN AREA .. Comd.. Comd A.I.F. .MAL/\VA
NOTEAllocation of 12 Ind. Inf. Bde and 44 Ind. Inf. Bde will
be decided later. At least one of these formations will
be in Comd Rcscrs'C.
6. BOUND/ARIES
The defended area defined in para 4 above will be divided
into sectors by boundaries as follows:
410 C.KMPAIG.S5 IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORNEO
Dtkufn 3 Ini. Cerpt and A.I.F. Incl. Electric Transmis-
Moii Line 7716incl SUISS RIFLE CLUB 7715 incl rd junc
780143incl BUKIT TIMAH RDrdjunc 838117.
Biltiten 3 Ind. Corps and Southern Area. Incl 3 Ind. Corps
MACPHERSOX RDSERAXGOOX Rdcxcl FARRER PARK
rdjunc 838117.
Incl Southern Area track
BrUveen A.I.F. and Southern Area.
750107AYER RAJA RD
ALEXANDRA Rdrd junc 809092-
incl
rd June 8I2I02 GRANGE Rd incl rd junc 827102
cxcl rd junc 829108
cxcl rd junc 838117.
Comd Southern Area 'vill be responsible for defence of
PUL.au BL.\KANG M ATI, PUL.AU BRANT, PULAU TEKONG
and PENGER\NG.
7. Reconnaissances of Areas will be carried out at once
and the plans for the mosement offormauons into the areas allott-
ed to them will be prepared. Formations will arrange tn mosr
back and locate in their nets' areas units located in their present
areas which arc under command of Mala>a Command.
S. C-'LA.D. is-ill remain responsible to G.O.C. Malaya for
A.A. Defences.
9. II.^. of G.O.C. Malaya will be located at Fort Cannini;
(Battle mselher with H.Q,. Southern Area.
10. Administrative adjustments which can be made now
to fjt in with the .ilyn eoryanixadon will be put in hand immediately.
11. ACK.

Lieut-Cbloncl
for BrigadffT,
.Adv. H.<i.M.C. General Staff, Malaya Command.
10th February, 1912.


APPE^^)IX H
Japanese Units and their Commanders in
Soutli-'East Asia.
{ThitlUt is supplitd bj UiitorUat Ditision, Dtjtnct Agtncj,

Tokjt, Japan)

IIONC KOS'C

Units and their commanders cntfaRcdin the Honjj Kong Operations:*

23rd Army
(ht.-pen. Talashi Sakai)
38 DiWjion 228i (Col. Sadashichi Doi)
(Lt.'gen. Tadayoshi Sano) 229i (Col. Kyozaburo Tanaka)
230i (Col. Toshishige ShnJj)

ualaya
Principal units and their commanders engaged in the
Malaya Operations :

South Area Army

(C-in*G Gen. Hisaichi Terauchi)

3 Ait ulvUien
(U.-gen. Michio Susawara)

ip. cJ. C
1. Rmya Jttutsguchi] Tikunu (Ll Takuro Matfui")
Nahimim)
1

23 i. D 9 i.B
(Maj.-gen.
. tlirrnhi T^umi) Hidckidii Saburo Kawa.
Sueiura}

(Maj.-pau 4U (C JJJ (C^.

1 Takim Totu Ot Ttunahiko
KobjysAi) Watanabc)
42i (C

XteinrMuke OLs)
^ (CbL Tadwj Ai 2li (Cot.
Nariyothj
Yofiiro OintfO*) klai^a)
4Gi ICd, Kenun Kokuihi)
50i (Col. HMeo Ivrakuro)

Note Unlu tncIcxH with |" *re lt>e which look part in cperaiionj in Bomro;
accorHingly took no part in eprraUont in Mataya.
Unlu CTicIrted with [r^
ihow wWeh wrr mfaged in u"d duty in
r.I.C., tnd had not taken part in epnatlMij in Malaj-a.
412 CAMP \tOSS IS* SOirrit-t ASTANA 1941-42 SARAWAK & BORSTO
Areas of opcralioas of Japanese Units in Malaya:*
(i) Unit which landed atPatani ami ilicncc operated toward*
K. Kangsar through Grik:
Ando Detachment (Cdr. Col, Tadao Ando, 42 Inf. Regt.)
42i
TK Co. 1

Recon Co. 1

At htry. 1

FA 1

Eng 1

Others
(ii) Unit w'liich landed at Kota Bharu and occopJed Kuantan
after advancing south along the east coast
Takutni Detachment (Cdr. Maj-gen. Hiroshi Takumt, Cdr.
23i.B)
23iB H<i*
56i
M/V btry. I

Eng. Co. I

Others
(in) Units embarked at Lumut (I Jan. 1912) and landed at
Telok Anon>~
Watatube Detachment (Cdr. Col Tsunahiko Walanabe,
Cdr. Ill)
Hi (Main body)
FA btry. !

Eng. Co. 1

Marine Eng. Co 1

Others
(tv) Undermentioned unit was expected
to occupy the Kuantan
Airfield after landing there at the
end of January 1942.
But suspended landing at Kuantan a* Takumi Detach-
it

ment came just then from Kota Bharu in the north.

(Koba Detachment landed at Kota Bharu and reached Kuantan
by land, thence it advanced to Endau and Mersing.)
Koba Detachment (Cdr. Coh Hiroshi Koba, Cdr. 55i)
55i (less 1 bn)

MA btry. I

BRITISH BORA-CO
Kawaguchi Detachment
Maj.-gcn. Kiyotake Kawaguclu
35 Inf. Brig. Hqs. 124 InT. Regt. and others
Note: This unit was under the command of the 18th Disssion
but it separately engaged in the operations in British Borneo,
 Apncnmx n 413

jyVTCSI BORNEO
Sakapuchi Delachmcni
Maj-gcn. Shizuo Sakaguchi.
Inf. Brig. Hqn., 146 Inf. Rcgt., a Field ^\rtillcr} batta-
lion anil f>iber.
Note: This unit was under the command of the 5Gth Division
but it scpannlely look part in the operations in Dutch
Borneo.
 ninLiOGRi\piiY

The volume of llie Ofllcial Hutory of tlie Indian

present
--Vmed Torers in ihr Second World War is mainly based on the
ofliclal documents collected in the C.1,S. Historical Section,
Ministry of Defence, India. Among these the first place goes to
the War Diaries of the various Indian Units which look part in
the campaigns against Japan in Hong Kong, Malaya, Sarawak
and Dutli West Borneo. The Despaiclics written by the difier*
eni military commanders soon after the completion of the opera-
tions entrusted to ihnn are our next important source of infor-
mation, They reveal not only the details of the operational acti-
vities but also the lines of high policy* and facts of adminiitraiive
organisation. In addition, a number of 'Appreciations* and
Reports completed either during the course of war or after
the completion of various plans and operations have also received
due attention. The class of the sources designated as Personal
Accounts and Narratives and the Unit Histories' have also been
found useful in presenting an overall account of the respective
campaigns.
Since these original sources were amply available, the
secondary* published sources have been depended upon to a
minimum. A selected Ibt of alt these sources, both original
as well as published, is given below*:

WAR DIARIES
War Diaries of the units that took part in the campaigns
againstJapan in Hong Kong, Malaya, Sarawak and Dutch West
Borneo, and particularly of the following;
General HQ, Far East, HQ Malaya Command, HI Indian
Corps; 9ih Indian Division; 12di, I5th, 22nd and 28th Indian
Infantry Brigades; I37th and !55th Field Regiments. Also War
Diaries of the smaller units comprised in the above.

DESPATCHES
1. Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brookc-Popham,
GCVO, KCB, CMC, DSO, AFC, Cbmmander-in-Chief in the
Far East, on Operatlev in IheFarEtut from 17 October 1910 to 27
December 1911. (Published in the Supplement to the London
Gazette of Tuesday, the 20th January, 1948).
2. Desptch by Major-Gencu^ a NL Maltby, MC, late GOC,
British Troops in China, on Opentloru in Hong Kong from S to
 BtBUOCRAl^nV 415

25 December 1941. (Publulied in the Supplement to the

London Gazette of Tuesday, the 27ih Jaiiuar), 1948).
3. Dcsp.itch by Lieut-General A.E. Percival, CB, DSO, OBE,
formerly GOC Malaya on Operations oj Malaga Command,
from 8 December 1941 to 15 Febmary 1942. (Published in the
Second Supplement to tlic London Gazette of Thursday; tlic
26th February 1948).
4. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavcll GCB, CMG, MC,
on Operations in Seulh-Ueit Pacific from 15 January to 25
February, 1942.

APPRECIATIONS AND REPORTS.

1. Singapore Defence Conference Report, 1940.
2.
ABDACOM ^An Odicial Account of events in the South.
West Pacific Command, Jan.-Fcb. 1942.
3. ADB Conversations; Report Office of the Commanderdn*
Chief, China Station, 27th April 1941.
4. Chiefs of Staff Appreciation of (he Situation in the Far Easb
IG August 1940.
5. The Kuantan Operations By Captain D.G. Russell-Roberts.
C. Preliminary Report on Canadian Participation in the Hong
Kong Operations,
7. A Report on Operations in Sarass'ak and Dutch Borneo by
Colonel C.M. I^anc.
8. Report by Sir Paul Maltby, Air Vice- Marshal (Published in
Siippierrient to the I..ondon Gazette, the 26th February 1948).

PERSONAL ACCOUNTS r\ND NARRATIVES

1. Narrative of Thom Force, Singapore, 10/12 February 1942.
2. War Record of the 6th Bn. 1st Punjab Regt by Lt. CoL J.D.
Satntcr.
3. Narrative on Operations in Malaya, I939-I9I2, by Lt. Col.
J.G. Frith.
4.
Operations in Malaya, 1941.42 An account by Lt Col. E.L.
Wilson HafTcnden.
3. Account of the Malaya Campaign, by 5fajor E.P.D, Hyde.
6.
The Malayan Campaign (Nov. 1941 to Feb. 1942) Precis of
a lecture given by Licut.-Gcncral Sir I.csvis Heath KBE, CB,
CIE, DSO.
UNIT HISTORIES
1. History of 11 Ind. Division in Malaya, by Colonel A. 5f. L.
Harrison.
41G cwiPAir.ss IX wjnni f\st asu, 19n*t2

2. The War in lIotK KoncS/H Punjab Rr:;imcnt, 3 to 25

December, 194!
3. War Diar^' and XarratKr of Ea?! Infanry Eriaadc and
Attached Trosp? b> Biic. C. Walli*.
4. War Diar>' and 2ya^Ta^i^e-^^^nland Irfaniry Bricadc and
afMfhed Troops by B/ie.C. Wallti.

PUnUSHED WORKS
1. An?ut Rose; Il'Aa Diet Ft^htag
2. Bennett II.G. ; U'hj SingapeteFefl
3. Churchill : Hat Val, It
77.tS<fTid U'orlJ
4. Japarjte land Operatiiit {From Japanese Sourto) from Decern*
ber 8, 191! to June 8, 1912, Military' Inicllejrence Service,
War Department, Wa'hmi;;ton I9{2.
5. Kirby, S. Woodbum: The liar Asoinil J9t<n, Vol. I
6. Pereiva!: TAe It'ar m .Ua/ara.
7. Tie liar tnfA Ja/a/t, Pt. f. Xew Yotk, 1915.
Printin? OfTice).
8. \^^^TOO^c: Tkt JapaKtit Thruit.
 :

INDEX
AIjrrtSiniT bcroUne #i. 4J; un>irr 53rd Brigade; eom'j isnicr UW&ire,
ihrnfirt ,
Irwn 44 200; Japanrv- Infantry and tanks
ABD4COM;3f3 attack on. 270; anots {5ih tnlun
ADA Coft&trfttc: Kf, 101 Infantry Britrtde in the wiilidrawa!.
AW Stir; Japans Ro>{
ir raJfl t, 122; K5i, procfrds to Siniapore, 2W,
AifForcrtvafuatfd rrom,M6;.Utieri%vith> $ft also 207.9, 277-81, 283-4,288.
cfnwafrrom. IC9;JapannrtanV]*t, 170 292, 309, 332, 334. 338. 3J8,
Atan: 2/1 Curilia Rillrt in. 148; Ji]kaiw 3534
Infantry inriltratta i, iSi 54ttt I nlutry Brigade: 334
AiKtnlujjAinjy {Aintralian Imfwrlaircrrr): 55ih iriansiy Rngade; SJ-M
8ih Australoa Di t lalon ; 2'30 A ti<>nlian 2 Argyll and Suiitrtland Hghlanden;
Riiu)K7n rMm, 348; alio 104, Japanese attack the forti-anl com.
117, 233, 234, 303-4. 3(f. 320. 334 pany of 182; at Babng. 189; fa
tSih OA-tson: 2738 also 18f. t&i. 18S-9, 191, 201, 200,
?2nd Uriicaijr-; 249. 273, 22<5, 300. 3IC. 218.311,320-21.320
17. 321, 32G.7. 330.1, 335. 342 5 Gedfbnldiire and Hertfordshirr: 332,
27ih Brwle: 118. 254. 2W. 285. 2S8. 331. 340. 34^5, 350
299. 3U9. 320-21, 323, 333 1 Camfjndgeshin-: 339-40, 330
29ih Br^lr; 321 2 CambfWlg^tT: 283. 2f38, 296, 334,
2/18IUiu!ion; 2I1G-7. 290. 294. 297 333, 348
2/19RiiuJi:2C2. 273. 2B5, 318, 327 5ih I^ie Of Connaughu Own BaMa-
2/20 BituJWi: 290. 29j, 297 Item: 223
2/2}aitu}K3R;32) 2 rsido; JJ6. 281. 285, 283. 293,
IUtul*on: 249. 254, 281. 285. 288,
2/20 290, 331. 3354J, 340
293. 290. 333. 354 t Leimirr; 140. 142, 159, 160-2; 104.
2/29 |tatu!n! 255. 200. 201.3. 207. 3. 1IW9, 172, 174-5, 190, 200,
285. 322, 327, 331 255
2/30 Ba'ulKm; 249. 254. 200.277, 281. 2 UnaU; IIC, 205.210,281.928,3-43
293, 290, 333. 338, 340 1 AUnchntcT- 110,350.352
Ayff Jfiuuns Japan*** iir.faM at, 277 I.Middlnn; 38. 51.54.96,05
3 Nfgn Semlrilan: 244, 240
'
8in/>}* fa Mlumo); dett/oyrd m action. 283 4 SorfrJk: 339
Bantow, Majrv-Cttvral. A. C. (Comman. 5 Koribik; 271. 283, 288,290.338, 348
<W 9ih Indian Driiiinfi); 134, 260; CNoffoJk: 3U>. 2650. 270, 278,
death or, 291 281. 283-4. 288, 296, 348, 351
llitu Bshat Srtriqr: 270; opcniicmtal, 271.3; 9 .Vertbum^Iand rtailicn! 324
fu^btin^ thmifhout the day at, 277 2 Boval Sorts; 23, 26-31, 34. 3G, 38,
limham, Alajnr (Commander, B*aeoHl 5S^, SB. 61, 03
talks allmted to, 283 2 S-Unzor: 244-0
IVnnrit. LicuL.Onml If. Gocdon: in 4 Suflb/ltj: 331. 335. 340, 351
Mtbya, 117; 45ih Inilian InTantr) 9 Sufibiki: 334
Brigade romrs tmdrr, 234; decktrs iv 2 Surreys: 116, 143, 160, 164-5, 108-9,
rrinforce Bakri and Haiti {\iha( 172, 174, 176-9, f, 255
200; reinforces Muar Sector. 202; Brookr-Po^Sam, Air Otirf Sir
nrdm 22nd Indian InCinCry Brigade KohJnfCorontanderdn-Ciief Far East/
10 re-estabbsh position at Rdoh, 277; riecidrs bot to order opention Matador,
couoiersjflemjse at BuVii Tlra^ t>4, 120; irnlaced by Ceneral Sir Henry-
32945; fornis a perimeter of aft Austra- I^Twnall as Commander-in-Clief Far
lian forces, 331; ahlef U> Australian fist, 196; rijiti Kuching and gives hi
Prune Minuter and informs his fnien- appnt^ to the Operational Han A*,
a surrender, 347; snr aM
233, 371;v^ If>3, 105

239-6, 246, 257-8, 267, 273, 281, EttnikHJl;27.29

266,321. 330 Bokit Tmah: the Joss cf. 320-7; Kverc
BUnja front: 28lh Indian Infantry Brigade fighliog at, 325; Allied coimier oBerw
at, 198; Japanese sueem ai, 202 sne ar, 32S^; Japanese tanks and
Rond, LinilXieneral .Sir lionrl (COC labniry at, 327; Allied futile counter-
Afaiayai: appreciation for tlir defence attack at, 327-31; Japinese acetimt of
ofMalayal^,84 the lt tie at, 329
British Army:
18ih Division: 268, 273, 287. 3-!, Canadun Army:
308, 321, 32G, 33f. 334, 336, 339. Winnipeg Crmadiert: 28-9, 34.
342, 349-6, 350, 353 38, 95, 58, 61, 65
 5

m CAUPAtONS TN* SOUTH FAST ASU, 1941-42

iirpcniJiV, I5ri?ad.<T (CoromanACT 28tf

H.IG
Indun Infantry Brigade): plaenl in Gny, &lajor C. E.: 23, 5
commarvl of I5th Indian InLiniry Bri- Grik toad: Japanetr ait^k
gadf alJD. 159, adu for rrinfoTemimt* contjngmt of, l8a.J2; i
from Cth Indian Infantry Brigade, IW; Garun: the liallle at, 170-9
r alK. 143. ie2, IH, 168. 175-7 ... . .
Castle Peak Roail: operaliosu along. 26 Itmsoil. Colonel : 325 ......
,
ClialJen, Brigadier: taker charge of )StJ Hea<h,Leut.-CetKTalSirLevn (Coniinand
Indian Infantry Brigade, 2a0; alarmed IH Indian Corpi):
III Cortr': asnanei rwpor rwm-
hy the growing tiirat to hia forcn st bili(y for louth and tan Johore, 246;
BaSu I^bat Sector, 271; faced with Mitar Sector cossunaiid conicr under,
senoui problem, 284 265; vtsiu 2/1 Gurkha companv area,
r7/.,f.T (giijvh^t): CO 319; ttresei water tbcniges far Indian
CommiM. Ljeot.-Coliiel: awanl of Vieloria tmopiia hucsvpi, 355; ire also 214
Cro to, 232 lleailier MiU: 27
HKVDC: 31, 48, 50-3, (43. 63. 65
Daltiree:322 Holme* Feme: eoii^jrued of. 179; under
Utfenee Plaits: lUlied Defence rians In cananasKl of 2Blh Inslian Infantry
South-East Ana, 5-7: for Ifo^ Ka>4, Brigade. 162
12; for Malaya, 93-1 18; (be Slngaporr, Hong Kiing. topography, area ail popuLi-
30^10; for Sarawak, 36M; nan A, tlon, &I0: adriunisuation, 10; early
370; lian 'B, 373 history, 11-12; defence icheines for.
Devils Peak; fighung In, 34dJ; Japanese 12-14; forca in. 14-15; air power
dii-r-hornhsig at, 35; .'Vllied wididrawal 13-16, Naval defmee of, 16; diEcultire
from, 35-6 in she de&nre of. 17: Briihls lsus>p
DaUxe, Geeml (GOC^-isv-C, Milaya):Ap(- disporitioni in, 13-3Q; Japanese auack
reeianonof 1933 bv, 93-4; ut alsu ttb and the Ibrea in. 22i titiual attack on,
Om Jeie (Canadian Ship): 15 23-4; repeated Japanese hombing of.
D.ikr. Bngadvr (CooiMnder S3nl BriiisK 31; end of the lint phate of the
Bngalle}: asutiya enoimand of 5 asat campaign Ibr. 37; peace oBer and
C NorfulkJ and 2 Cambridgeihire, 296; tefuu by the Covemcr of, 37; cUiperi-
srt also 2u5. 2S8 iioa of Allied troops in. 38; JapuM
Duncan. Brigadier (Conunander 45ih Indian boetbardinni and fifth eolutna activi-
Infantry Bngaile);arrivei at Singapore, ties in. 40-42; Japanese landing in,
234s killed ut Murar aeunn, 263; arr 436; fighting lo ine eastern ha^ of,
also 253 966; 6mting in the \Vetiem sector.
Dutch Noftb*5Vest Borneo: 2/15 Pitajiah in. 58-W: nirrendeT of. 67-9
381; Japartne Und tn the wetl coast oC
393-2; opcratiORi elsewhere la, IndianAssttv
capittdatioD of, 3 til Corps: estabUshs in Kuala Lasm-
pur, 118; withdraws from Kuala
East -Vfrican Division 18ih: 197 Lumpur, 233 rrurea to Jobore area,
1
Lau Crlumn: comtmsing of, 391; Lieut.- 249; dirpoaitlon of the fcieTnations of,
dikmei Row-Thompson explains she 290; plan Ibr the withdrawal of
n.ceintv lor the withdrawal ofi 393; .\Ih^ forrei fmos Malaya to Singa-
leaves Nassgxpigids. 395; awe Xm- s pxe by, 291: wathdrawa Headquar-
liffietijiies faced by ters to Changi, 337; str also 105. 161,
165, 181, 183. 190. 192, 199, 203.
207, 209, 220. 2336, 249. 256.
273. 275, 230, SOB. 311. 335. 350
EasdbTce: 254,256, 273, 297 9dL Division: in Malaya, 117, di^xm-
Utrin (destroyer): 119 tion of, 255; withdrawal of 2856.
EnemMler (destroyer) : 1 1 dtsasters and liquidaticiD cf. 290-2,
Eiptta (destroyer); 115 see also 105. 188, 197, 211, 230, 234,
239, 247, 249, 257, 277, 279, 2BI,
raramun Khan. Subedar; sets fisie example 288. 308
to hu tnxgif bv his biavt sy, 383 liih DvBam. ready fur operaikm
FtTnpUni, S. S. (Canadian Ship): 19 Matador, 139, mikr tii to occupy
FMSVF (Federated Malaya Stales Vrftiotrer Jitra poutsoD. |39; eot fit for funhrr
Force): 153, 231, 233, 246, 249 operation, 180, takes Krobcol under
enmmand, ISO; immediate role of
Garrett, Brigadier (Gsnsnander ISth Iialiaa 184, 15th Indian Ififsnuyundo the
l^ntry Brigade): 148, 151, 199 cceiund of, 187; Japanese threaten
Gwonana, Colonel (Dutch): atngised the tfw ctanxniinicatiosi of, 2 1 1 ; di^iositson
task of training the bees for guerilSa of,213;lie3vy ca<uaIllesto,220,Ma)ca--
warfsst,3S5 Ca>cTal Key takes the cosnsnarrl of.
 isntx 419

rahit Rfjntnerit allotled to, 215; dlsaaler

250; dLqwuon of. 25i: lUiu m of, 255: l-cav-v
lo, 218; e rprticd
under ihe commanil of. 260; rrwidef Ujmbin* attack by Japanew on, 3:
i 5lh Imllin
Iftfanlrv Bnifade,
rrllef lo
r a! 143. 147. 165. 172. I7.
277; rrowfwitrr, 182-3. 155. 187, 195-200.
*rra 324; w
!> 105. 116-10. 13?,
10^.
i;&80,
2n2W5^, 200. 210-11. 213. 215,
153. 158-U. 170. 173-9. iai-2. 233. 240. 242, 216-7, 249-
23fij23tM . 219.
20J. 205, 214. 231. 30 255. 279, 230. 292-3,309,311,
271,
244-7. 249. 254, 256-;. 2C8, 318-9. 321, 323, 333. 333,343
32b,
273 277. 220, 254. 3Cfl, 311, 416 InCintry BrifaiU: ntrurs at
334. 333.344, 349-50 .Singapnre.iTS; Japaneic air.artiil^-
6ih Infintrr BriCTde: IJMO.
HW, nvilot bomlardment on, 332;
and
100.1, 105. 172, 174-eO.
102. 8j.
witltdrat.al Iry, 312; julfm h^y
15h Iwlun
196; oimbinal wO*
Infjntry Brieade, 190 ,

8ih Infantry llri?*3e: j

tan 123; pfimarv ^a^k . I2a, _oi-
porillont of. 125-3'J:

\So0>rer. 2'>* 234; noivy t-

153; at rrar^turd In
vithtlnv.-! to Kltuna. 270; 235 240-7, 250, 255, 25741,
260-3,
ot Kluant ar by. 270; 265,267-9, 292
from .NtaUya. 297; ai rrvr>t to M* , . .
Bahaalmir State Infanlnt
.

Irwlian Dn-bion,
324; dbpotition of ibc
bad lufk
J\U
unit* ol, 3W.
I
250 '78 285, 289. W
wiDvlraual to {lljdafi aa. SM.
d.viuonat toinfrundm
W. ^300. 311. 32. 333, 338,
344,
alto 188. 211. 239i2^35j^2^.
252 283. 2Clt-93. 2^>. 2^300.
319.352 _
321. 323,331,344.310 ^il?Km.23C. 256, 29l, 297,
I2lh InJani7 Bri<ades
IWVl. tinder iS< eornmand of lUh
of-
Initan Dimiofl. l91idi*posi,<i'to
20Cs liw in<i] in. f.{.Xk*aM
for, 200; - tne m Ti S sssf^i'awjht
213: lananeae dive-bornben net. 242; come* under
Tn Jai-nrte
tlri of.321;Ja|noi^
326; aa to e*i
" .112n'.*R^90 "
aN- 1// abo 137, 170, 178^. *'221^7, 229-32 2W, 2fi-9-70, 278. Ml
156^90, 192. I'XbO. 202.
240-7,
^-2^
3084)9,
II 214-15. 235. 210,
321-S. 333,33a,
3ri,3l6-l7,320.327-0 . Til. M9-300. 311.
J5ili InCanlry Dngade!
NUbva, 117: 6lh Tnd'", *'^"*1? l.I-IS. 131. ]M.
.;.r'R^^<3 'J"
Bneade come ""der, J8.
'
Indian Infantry
new 15lh Indian
and called the
180 lW-7. 2036,
Infantry Bri|rad<. ^^i7^'^i77J
ChaUm lakn che comfiiaitd of.^b

311, 319, 323-5, 333, 311,

4. 148, lOVI.
103. 172. 47^.
207,
177 179-00 152. 185, 199, 205,
271,
ijt;2S-2S,3.fA..m
-rat 2ti.7 249, 255. 260, 265.
273l277-9,*28l,2ea.292.
316-7, 321-3, 326, 39,
332, 345 '^Slfi".'311.'i2WlV
rTn al
22nd Infantry Bticade:
Malaya, 117;
lo,
w3.'a.'*iir2is
311-2,
Kluang. 270; diaailtn 255*, 2fl2, 234, 293, 296,
htmidalion of. 291;
2?78. 231. 239. 255,
267-9, 277-8,
.,2^1.11 255. 253. 260-3, 3M, 328
281 285,209,298,300
23th RfVdct ''1^r.'V2!.?.i6?'ijf;i32:209:
the command of, 185, 153
 421
TNDEX

defeflce of, 370: .\ir Chief

Manhal
the feterat
Tivlufi Di^mon rfuriii?
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham at. J/i;
Dutch
rrom, 169 corferencc of British and
ohorr: 70; rtUtion v-lih IlMWhCr(wn.80 Military oIRem at. 372; Plan
B
the fiaht for. 275-7; Upanrte
alt^ Japanew: air-
for die drfroce of. 373;
on, 281; Cenrral Ua^rll
t,
on. 376-7; Japanete land
a^t.

r^i//T{tlcro)cf);1 15 3JJ.
379-81; fall of to Japanese,
Allied esaruation of, S8I-2
<ai T^ aeroclfome: J.pan^
aluck on. 23-4! Ho5l I.aromaldand: Japanete land at,
31
c\aeuaO-* ftom. 29 command of
Lane Ueot.-Colonrl: take*
!iapurthala Slate Insanity: 334
K.p.r: AIM .i*i 2m
Sarfoe.
Pui'Jal-
370; mobile
ST*"^rr
defence of
f.'.'.,'
live poiitionl at. 205;
V*^*''oiVt4 ^wak by. 370; tovUiu Singa^,
2C3:^llil withdrawal from 21^14 372; order*
withdraw from
.Sirfor
Krf.h: J.p..n.
AU.^
dtia.ten at. 15^2; iituat.on at. Kuchin?. 381 ;
w rXa
Iraiiui troom J*'*
388. arrive*
178-9 from Dutch Borneo by, meoaee
AW. 368 aT^itkalanlMon S99;.end.
Keith Simmom, Mapr-General: 3W Oilumn m .uirmdrr, 400;
m^t 331-5
KclanUn: liiuaiion in, *23; war Har * .

Btigadr u, atv>
123-38; 8ih Indian Ififantrv
in. 123; atiaekon the aefpdroro at.
132; Allied withdrawal
8ih Indian Infantry Bripde
from, 133;
evaeoa-

Sp? tmm-J
ESf A.h. iKi
'

^54; rK:
lei from, 185; ut aim 73,
78
Inlsnirv iW,
Crijade,
Indian
Key. Ma or-Cenerali take* ofdeo alto 162. 176, z69,
2^ . .
Dnwon. 2W: occupation of,
ihe llih Iftdian
Pi. BaJoh U>an? Uyand: japanew
33fd Brit^e to reoceupv
and Bt.Telandok. 26Wi. <*' t.,^A*T 8 r.l Si, Cir,: 118 IK ,

Malay* eommand on
130. 279.
346; ut *1*0 131. 133-4,
284, 323
Kidd, LJit,-Colonel; 33 65l JP-
!nm, bomtorim,.;
Kota nhariii ,1^:
Allied wildidrawal from, 136.
frti**ef* nd Ue-
nne lUltleihip,
froymal, 147 .n:^

^rihViSi<
;
Krian'ri'twrAwid
179: llih Indian
"S^rawi
Divuion withdraw*
ss s "'""5*
IT"
in Che aouth of. I* ' population I
in.
of. 181. g. railway*
Divhiofl to hold the line
iapaneae patrol aelivily ai, loj im
fol' f8-?Lr;:^i7p?;
Krohcot: operation* of. 152-0; :
commatitf
153; ceae to be under the
157: *Ban
of lllh Indian Divison.
eommand of lli^
come* under the
Indian Diviuoo, 9*-98. Qi;. Sinjtaporr
183 ; under the ^T'S^s^^ihdrw
froii K^I!h!

1^" p'Kr* Ki
liliBS
the

mTAir^.
ri^ih, ,t coait of,

"quin^o^ *
iid Vinforccmcnts
Si 2281 J.p.n~ "'i;
in 229- end of the
Operation* ai.ij.- }2ij^*a"'raid*''M the aerodrome*
Norih-eajt of.
122; war in the
 tSDEX 423
*nd the Jt>inoe. 193; fjy oJumn
196; rdnforcenjent conTOy arrive at,
ctwue, ,t, 190; demolition rf
234, 250; 44tl Indian Infantry
fand*e oms, 199
. Brigade at, 275; topognphy of, 301;
rcrlu: btitet lighting *t, 138
Pfemangiat; i*f*nae Zaniiuig it, 390
otganmuon of defence at, 302-5;
groeral defctw\-e tncaairej at, 303-
^mpf.
^ Admiral Sir Torn: 115. 119
'A': object of, 370-1
PIn B: Generai PerovaJ'* Jperova) to,
574;rl373
6; denial policy in, 306-7; da-
poudon of the Commonwealth army
to, 307-12; defence otganued in
^ three fcneii for, 303-9; weakness in
Pi>.7JJ. Gaienil Sir Hary: IK the dama plan of, 310; Japanese
^mt/WaUi. H.M.S.5 113, I preparation for the imrxsion of,
Punjab inn:27
312-14; Japanese asauli begirj at,
Sii'lS; Japanese landing at. 313;
^wlioson, Ucy|.^onl C: 33. <6 general dtfence situation on 10
Rtftitt, Battle ^uaefi nini by the rcbrti^ in, 321-7; Japanoc aim
.
Japanne tirenTt, 149; tn atao US to encsicle the town of. 337; Allied
Croup Capiaios 196
R>er,

K
last days in, 3(3-54; Allied desperate
Ricliforcc;
245 o at, M7; capttuJjtitro of Allied
Rose, ColonelU. B.: becomes eommioder in. 354-6
oT IVerf Brigade: 58 SUa(, S, Ship; 376
Kadbrce: 245 Singapore Defence Conference, October
KMi-TIiompMn, Cinii.-Colonel (Com* 1940: reviews the entire iimalion in
Blander E^l Column); vuits liewl'.
tie Far East, 97-8; paaibiljiia of
Colonel Man, 392j expliint the Japanrae attempt to setae bases at
neeeairy he the inehdra>ral of Earf Bniiih Borneo, and ditcussion arrived
Goliwin, 395; deeidea to vritMravr at. 365-6
to Sampit. 396; set aln 393-4 Singkawang II aerodrome: SS5. 387-8,
592
Sangjtau: openiietu north^t of, SaS-?; SlaiMr, Major, AW.D.s 376
the aetioft at, 58(190, dirpoutlon of Slaa RJstri Allied tout at, 214-15; the
troops a^ 388; Japanese attack <m toe of the area at, 218-20
and oeeupatfon of, 389 Stanley area; Jananee cut the water
harawaki (he land and its people, 961-2; supply in, 62; Japanese olfenave at
climate and population of. 362; aodcapucre of, 66
aariculiure, Industna and trade in, Stewarv Dt^adjcT 1. McA-' 19^ 3J4, 220
362-3; early history of, 363-4; Sioaecutten Isia^: SI
Coveftunent and sdrairustratuio fa, Swvttenhain Fort; 77, 2IJ, 214-15, 236
364; sira^ic impoeUnee of, 364-5;
Appreciations ai^ plans for (be Tactical Appretiadon by the Chiefs of
defmee of, 365-8; 2/15 Punjab Staff. ^
proceeds to, 367-9; Plan 'A (or Taikoo: operations east and west of, 47-50
(he definsce of, 370-1; liasion visits TaipoRoad-'24-6
in, 371-2; Plan * 8 foe the defeoce TakaiAi Sakai, fjeuL-Gtsaal (Japanese):
of, 373
Sandwich (ope^ion): object of, 103 Tanjong Malixn; Japanese bombing and
u, 577S; withdraws
Sarfor: disposiiioo Enacbine-gunmng at, 215
fram Kuejung, 381-3; ceases to
exist as a combined lodUn/Sarawak
State (urre, 333
Seeamat: important Allied conlercnce at, 302
235; General (k'avcK sc. 249; AOied TesCpTorce: 245
.j. attackon and Japanese land in
...i-v
withdrawal from, 26^70 TIiailaDd:
Selby, ungauiei: i/u
oeioy, Brigadier; (70, air, 242
219, ava Siogora and Patani, 121
Seria- mmliora at. '374.5; denial acbemc Hioinaa, Sir Shenton (Covemor and ICsh
in, 375; Japanese landing at, 376 C m
oia issioner of Malaya)! becoroa
Shingmuo R^bft27-8

Appreciation by G^ Tom^r
drawal
eomn^oned
of.
f^.
340; al 339
with-

Percival fir the defence of, 93;

General Dobble's ApweeiaStm of
,
To|U Goi^ a*pae): ISew Japinoe
C^jmet u^er, 3
1933 for the defence Ob 93; FivW sf
'
S;
Maltby at. 50-2
J95; Air Vice Marshal
1,
424 CAMPAIGNS m SOUTH EAST ASIA, I94M2
Winchij Gap: advene p(iioB for the Sinyapore to the iut, 321; vpiu
defence of, 63; Japaneie occupation batde {root at Singapore, 324; sivea
of, 66; He a1y> 62, 68 Malaya Command diKtetka to
^Vallu, Brigadier: appreciation of the cease resistanee, 355 . .

aimation at Tytam Cap by, 5(^1, Wot Brigade: rote of, 58; dispecitio&i of,

new plan of attack by, 57; attacki 65 _

Japanese podtiom sm capturo West Gottnnn: comprising of, 394; dim*
Endge HJl, 50-60; indrpaidTOl eultiei experieneirf by du^vrith-
command rf Stanley area by, 62; drawal, 307; arriva at Kenambqi,
counter-attack near Stanley prison, 397; lieuL-CcJonel banes
66; (irdcn ceasefire {or Stanley force, about the achievements of, 397
67; ttt also, 27. 30. 36, 33, 47 Westfortc: dispedtion oC, 254; 45th IndiM
Washington Convaiations: 99 Infantry Brigade and 53rd British
Wavell, General Sir Archibald P: ai Brigade amse under the command
Supreme Commands of the Amov- at, 266; withdrawal of, 288; enemy
can-Britlsb-Outch-Australian area, in ctoae contact of, 293; see also
196; propoul to withdraw lit 246-7, 249, 254, 273, 279-80
Indian Corps to Jobore, 233; new Wcllslbrce: 340, 343, 351
plan by, 235; visia Kuala Liunpur, \Vng Nei (Sung Cap: engagements at
238; confusion and half hearted and tapancae ocoipaDon of, 52:
move of troops eliminated by the attack by Winnipeg Gmadiers on,
plaa of, 239; meets Lieut-Gaeral 61; Japanese Local Headquarters
Ileath and Major-General Gordon and oganiring centre at. 64
Bennett at S'gamat, 249; g^tetal
aurvey of the situation m
fitalaya Yamashia, General 0apaneK Com-
by, 2C3; torets Generah Berchr^ man^-in-Quef): ustroduea w
Ileath and Keith Simraoai, 268; ampluUous stnidng force, 197;
reports south htalaya aituation to arrugea two drririens to march to
Cmbined Qii^ at Staff, 275: Ipob, 202; wasuCenenl Fereival M
agrees to the withdrawal of ADud cease wneoaHy and offer furresiler
fnrers born hfafaya to Singapore, unconditionally, 355; quotions by,
298; cftimata the reaourcei tot the 355
ddimee of Singapore, 303; cympa- Yoog Feng; 267
tfahea with Klalaya Gemmaad, $06; Young. Sir Mark (Governor. Hong Kong):
removes fighter airerafi to Stunaera 37
and reorgmlies liwiiaa (bruaiiaas,
307-8; oraen alt ih* troops to hold 2ianpei Mans SbimaiLinit. (Japanese}: 46