Crminal Law Jurisprudence

NOTES ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
Atty. Jerome J. Jarales

Cagayan de Oro City
FELONY
Question 1: What is the classification of the felony where the imposable

penalty is a fine of Php40,000.00?
A: Light felony only. Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or
the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines
Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No.
3815, Otherwise Known as The Revised Penal Code, as Amended, 29 August
2017, provides:
Section 1. Article 9 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised
Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.
Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in
accordance with Article 25 of this Code.
Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their maximum period are correctional in accordance
with abovementioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty
thousand pesos (40,000) or both is provided.
Section 2. Article 26 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. A fine,
whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be
considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred
thousand (1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000) but is not less than
Forty thousand pesos (40,000); and a light penalty, if it be less than
Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT
Question 2: Distinguish instigation from entrapment.

A: Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the
other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an
accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise
not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in
the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate
the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes;
thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where
law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted.
But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been
said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is
a "trap for the unwary criminal." [See People v. Jeffrey Hirang, GRN
223528, Jan 11, 2017]
SELF DEFENSE
Question 3: In invoking self-defense, what is the test to prove presence

of unlawful aggression?
A: The presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be
an imagined or imaginary threat. [Antonio A. Sombilon v. People, GRN
177246, September 25, 2017]
Question 4: What are the elements of unlawful aggression?

A: The accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. [Antonio A.
Sombilon v. People, GRN 177246, September 25, 2017]
Question 5: What are the kinds of unlawful aggression?

A: Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary,
but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as
if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his
hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. [See Antonio A. Sombilon v.
People, GRN 177246, September 25, 2017]
CONSPIRACY
Question 6: What is the focus of inquiry to determine if the accused

conspired with the main perpetrators of the crime?
A: To determine if an accused conspired with the principal by direct
participation, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt
acts of accused before, during and after the commission of the crime by
the principal by direct participation. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused
were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of
the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent
any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or
purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused
is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as
to its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy.
In the absence of conspiracy, accused is responsible only for the
consequences of his own acts. [See People v. Roberto Esperanza
Jesalva, GRN 227306, Jun 19, 2017]
Question 7: Under the same facts, may the accused be considered

principal by indispensable participation or an accomplice?
A: The accused can neither be considered a principal by indispensable
cooperation nor an accomplice in the crime charged. The cooperation
that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. Thus, to be liable either as a
principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice, the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation. In this case, nothing in the records shows that accused
knew the main perpetrator of the crime was going to commit the said
crime, thus creating a doubt as to accused's criminal intent.
Indeed, absent any evidence to create the moral certainty
required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial
court's finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of
proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of
any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The
hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and
must be consistent with all of them. Moral certainty, not mere
possibility, determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. [See
People v. Roberto Esperanza Jesalva, GRN 227306, Jun 19, 2017]
Question 8: Compare and contrast Conspirators and Accomplices

A: Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know
and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the
criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to
cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan
and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
[People v. Betty Salvador, et al, G.R. No. G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013,
citing an old case]
COMPOSITE CRIME
Question 9: What is a composite crime?

A: A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is
composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal
impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law,
and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand,

and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand.
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by
law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses
is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other.
For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination
of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is
that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period.
A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a
light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or
compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
For example, the felony of rape with homicide is a composite
crime. [See People v. Edmundo Villaflores, GRN 184926, Apr 11, 2012]
COMPLEX CRIME
Question 10: What is complex crime?

A: As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or
interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft
which violates the right to property), a complex crime constitutes a
violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts,
each of which is a simple crime in itself. Since only a single criminal
intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are
considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the
correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or
ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or
more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is
only one criminal liability. (The complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is
different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different
criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the
accused incurs criminal liability. The latter category is covered neither
by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of
crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a
single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more
crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more
conveniently termed as component crimes.
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well
as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.
Question 11: In the complex crime of estafa through falsification of

document, how should the component crimes thereof be treated?
A: In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to
consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there
may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents),
both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability. That is the
concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes,
they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification
of public document requires that the elements of both estafa and
falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa
may be determined and considered independently of that for
falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally
liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from
the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would
disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and
spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly
disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality,
as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material
plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be
punished individually. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de
Carungcong, GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Question 12: What is the rule as regards subsidiary penalty?

A: R.A. 10159, enacted on April 10, 2012, amended Article 39 of RPC,
thus:
Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. If the convict has no property with
which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of
one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate
prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of
conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or
arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine
referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the
sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year,
and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit
shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and
shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than
prision correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by
confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed
duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the
preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as
those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may
have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him
from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.
(As amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which lapsed into law on
April 21, 1969.)
CIRCUMSTANCES MODIFYING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Question 13: What is the effect of the presence of mitigating

circumstances if the offender took advantage of his public position in
committing the crime?
A: Nothing. Under Article 62 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,
When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
Apparently, the intention of the law is to curb graft and
corruption in the government.
Question 14: Does it mean that the privileged mitigating circumstance

of minority may no longer be appreciated if the offender took
advantage of his public position in committing the crime?
A: No. minors do not and are not eligible for holding public positions
and hence, could not possibly commit a crime taking advantage of such
position.
Question 15: Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others
when they had an argument that soon became heated, causing the
former to leave the group and punctuating his leaving with the warning
that he would be back "to sweep them," the vernacular for killing the
others (Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo). Shortly thereafter,
Macaspac returned to the group wielding a knife, immediately
confronted and directly taunted Jebulan ( Ano?), and quickly stabbed
the latter on the chest, and then fled. May the aggravating
circumstances of treachery be appreciated under the facts of this case?
A: No. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute treachery. He
did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument
between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to
sweep them" had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending
lethal assault. [People v. Roprigo Macaspac, GRN 198954, Feb 22, 2017]
Question 16: Was the killing attended by the aggravating circumstance

of Evidence premeditation?
A: No. Macaspac's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of
Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo marked the time of his
resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group with the knife
manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others.
The first and second elements (l) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime of
evident premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of
this circumstance that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Was the lapse of time between the determination and execution -a
matter of three minutes, based on the records -sufficient to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the
group with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to
reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the
execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the. crime. As
such, the third requisite [the lapse of a sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act] was absent.
The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily
established only if it could be proved that the defendant had ample and
sufficient time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination
of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation and reflection,
following his plan to commit the crime. In other words, the qualifying of
premeditation can be taken into account only when there had been a
cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in the
accomplishment of the criminal act. But when the determination to
commit the crime was immediately followed by execution, the
circumstance of premeditation cannot be legally considered. [People v.
Roprigo Macaspac, GRN 198954, Feb 22, 2017]
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE
Question 17: Will good conduct allowance partially extinguish criminal

liability of a person who is not yet convicted of a crime but is under
preventive imprisonment?
A: Yes. With the passage of RA 10592, criminal liability is extinguished
partially by conditional pardon, by commutation of the sentence, and
for good conduct allowance which the culprit may earn while he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. 10592, good conduct allowance
can only be granted only to prisoners convicted by final judgment and
not to detention prisoners, and only to those convicts who are actually
serving sentence in jail, not to those on conditional pardon, parole, or
destierro. With the amendment of Art. 94, RPC, by R.A. 10592, good
conduct allowance will now be appreciated even while the accused is
only a detention prisoner.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592, AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98
AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, provides:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term
of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the
following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same

disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in
writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment
for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the
offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual
period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided,
however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any
stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from
the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment."
xxxx
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is
extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while
he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
xxxx
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. The good conduct of any
offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to
Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of
good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good
behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be
allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one
to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service
time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to
the above allowances for good conduct.
xxx
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. A deduction of one
fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-
fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner
chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the
existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this
Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
xxx
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. Whenever lawfully
justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good
conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
Section 6. Penal Clause. Faithful compliance with the provisions
of this Act is hereby mandated. As such, the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment, a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and
perpetual disqualification to hold office shall be imposed against any
public officer or employee who violates the provisions of this Act.
Note 1: Under the old law, the convict for the first to the second year of
imprisonment is entitled only allowed five days for each month of good
behavior; during the third to fifth year, he is allowed eight days for each
month of good behavior; then up to the tenth year, he is entitled to ten
days for each month of good behavior, and during the eleventh and
succeeding years, he is entitled to fifteen days for each month of good
behavior.
The amendment further grants the convict good conduct allowance of
15 days for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service, a grant
or privilege not allowed under the old law. More importantly, the
appeal of the accused cannot and does not operate to deprive him of
the good conduct allowance.
Note 2: Prior to the enactment of R.A. 10592, only the prisoner who
escaped from penal institution under the conditions laid down in Article
98 and 158 can be granted special time allowance for loyalty. It was
opined that such rule is unfair, unjust, and did not conform to the spirit
of the law as it encouraged prisoners to escape in order to benefit from
the law. With the present amendment, prisoners are now encouraged
not to escape under the foregoing circumstances with the grant of two-
fifth reduction of the term of their sentence.
Note 3: The mere fact of detention does not automatically entitle the
prisoner to time allowances, which is given depending on his behavior
while being incarcerated. However, once granted either by the Director
of the Bureau of Correction, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, or the Warden of the Provincial, district,
municipal, or city jail, the same cannot be revoked.
CIVIL INDEMNITY, MORAL AND EXEMPARY DAMAGES
Question 18: What is the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages to be imposed upon a convict?
A: In People v. Irenio Jugueta, GRN 202124, Apr 5, 2016, the amount of
civil indemnity, as well as moral and exemplary damages, to be
imposed was summarized as follows:
I. For those crimes like Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,

Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion

perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00
b. Moral damages 100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
ii. Moral damages 75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
b. Attempted:
ii. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:
above-mentioned:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
attempted:
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

above-mentioned:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime
committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed,
as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery
with Rape, Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with Arson,
Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with
Homicideor Carnapping with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide,
Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape,
Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and
sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the

same as the above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to
reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

above-mentioned:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the

same as the above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise

be dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether
fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the
incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise
apply, and that for every additional rape committed, whether against
the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the
same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified
rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty
consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those
crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death
under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not

alleged in the Information, in addition to the above mentioned
amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of
50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; 30,000.00 for
frustrated; and 20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion

perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of
those who died are entitled to the following:
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention,
the following shall be awarded:
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of

burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of
50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
CRIMES AND PENALTIES
HEINOUS CRIMES
Question 19: What are the crimes considered to be heinous under the
law?
A: Under Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
these crimes are considered heinous and are punishable with the death
penalty:
1. Treason [Art. 114];
2. Qualified Piracy [Art. 123];
3. Qualified Bribery [Art. 211-A],
4. Parricide [Art. 246],
5. Murder [Art. 248],
6. Infanticide [Art. 255],
7. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention [Art. 267],
8. Robbery with Violence against and Intimidation of Persons
[Art. 294],
9. Destructive Arson [Art. 320],
10. Rape [Art. 266-A],
11.Plunder [R.A. 7080],
12.Certain provisions of R.A. 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
later amended as R.A. 9165], particularly:
a. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 4],
b. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution, and/or Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 5],
c. Maintenance of a Den, Dive, or Resort [Sec. 6],
d. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or controlled
precursors [Sec. 8],
e. Section 11 [Possession of Dangerous Drugs [Sec. 11 more
than 10 grams],
f. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous
Drugs or are Sources thereof [Section 16],
g. Unlawful Prescription of Drugs [Section 19],
h. Misappropriation, Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or
Employee for Misapplication, or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 27],
i. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence [Sec. 29].
Note, however that R.A. 9346, subsequently prohibited the imposition
of death penalty, and thus reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua
for those punished under the Revised Penal Code, and to life
imprisonment for those punished under special penal laws.
DIRECT ASSAULT
Question 20: How is the crime of direct assault committed?

A: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition";
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
"shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance."
Under the second form of direct assault, the following elements must
be present, to wit:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a)
is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising. [See Nestor Guelos et al. v. People,
GRN 177000, Jun 19, 2017]
THEFT and ROBBERY
Question 21: What is apoderamiento?

A: It means "Unlawful taking". Apoderamiento is the taking of personal
property without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of
the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Section
3 G), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. [People v.
Jesusano Arcenal, GRN 216015, Mar 27, 2017]
Question 22: What is animus lucrandi?

A: It means intent to gain. Animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is
presumed from the unlawful taking of the personal property. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain.
The accuseds act of fleeing with anothers personal property showed
his intent to gain. That it was later abandoned does not negate his
intent. [People v. Jesusano Arcenal, GRN 216015, Mar 27, 2017]
Question 23: If robbery is committed by several malefactors in a motor

vehicle on a public highway, does it automatically follow that highway
robbery was committed?
A: No. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor
vehicle on a public highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in
band, not highway robbery or brigandage under Presidential Decree
No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the
malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of
committing that crime. [Ramon Amparo v. People, GRN 204990, Feb 22,
2017]
VAGRANCY AND PROSTITUTION
Question 24: If a person is apprehended in flagrante delicto committing

the act of pimping, what is the penalty imposable by law?
A: None. RA No. 10158, March 27, 2012, AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING
VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF ACT NO.
3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, provides:
SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby,
amended to read as follows:
Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. For the purposes of this article,
women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guity of any of the offenses covered by this
article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Twenty thousand pesos (20,000), and in case of recidivism, by arresto
mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000), or both, in the discretion of the
court. (As amended by RA 10951, Aug 29, 2017)
SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. All pending cases under the
provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior
to its amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this
Act.
SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. All persons
serving sentence for violation of the provisions of Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act
shall be immediately released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That
they are not serving sentence or detained for any other offense or
felony.
HOMICIDE and MURDER
Question 25: A and V were out drinking along with others when they
had an argument that soon became heated, that caused A to leave the
group. As he left, A warned the group saying, Hintayin nyo ako d'yan,
wawalisin ko kayo. Three minutes later, A returned to the group with a
knife. He immediately confronted V and directly taunted him to a fight,
after which A quickly stabbed V on the chest. After stabbing V, A left.
What crime was committed by A?
A: A committed homicide. Neither treachery nor evident premeditation
attended the killing. When the victim was alerted to the impending
lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between him and
the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former,
treachery cannot be appreciated as an attendant circumstance. Also,
when the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed by its
execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the
crime is homicide, not murder. [People v. Roprigo Macaspac, GRN
198954, Feb 22, 2017]
RAPE
Question 26: The accused had sex with AAA when she was 19 years of
age. When she was 14 years old AAA had her neuropsychiatric
examination which revealed that her Intelligence Quotient was 42 and
her level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation.
Also, she had a mental age of a five-year-and-eight-month-old child.
AAA underwent another mental status examination with another doctor
before being presented as a witness. The examination revealed that she
had a "mild degree of mental retardation." AAA "belonged to sub-
average intellectual with an IQ of 70." Although AAA was already 19
years old at that time, her mental age was that of a child aged five to
seven years. Did the accuseds carnal knowledge of AAA amount to
rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code?
Answer: Yes. Rape is committed when the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 266-A be present. The conditions under Article
266-A should be construed in the light of one's capacity to give
consent. One's capacity to give consent depends upon his or her
mental age and not on his or her chronological age.
If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below
12, the accused remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the
sordid acts. The reason behind the rule is simply that if sexual
intercourse with a victim under 12 years of age is rape, it must thereby
follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a
child below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape. [People
v. Edgar Allan Corpuz, GRN 208013, Jul 3, 2017]
Question 27: When the victim is 22 years of age but has a mental age
of 4-5 years old, would the act of accused in having sex with the victim
amount to statutory rape?
A. No. Accused cannot be convicted of Statutory Rape under Article
266-A, paragraph l(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said provision is
the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an
accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove:
first, the age of the victim; second, the identity of the accused; and last
but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
victim.
The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age.
If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason"
notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person
under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose
mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d), should still be designated as
simple rape under paragraph l(b). [People v. Jonathan Baay, GRN
220143, Jun 7, 2017]
Note, however, that the case of People v. Rodolfo Deniega, GRN

212201, Jun 28, 2017, teaches a different doctrine, thus:
It is settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes
statutory rape. In People v. Quintas, this Court held that if a mentally-
retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than
12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph
1(d) and not paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC. In holding as
such, the Supreme Court differentiated the term "mentally-retarded" or
"intellectually disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and
"demented" as used under Article 266-A, paragraphs 1(b) and 1(d) of
the RPC. The Court ruled that:
xxx
The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or
madness. A person deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that
affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his
or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and give consent.
The term, "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a
mental condition called dementia. Dementia refers to the deterioration
or loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking, and
social condition, which impairs one's independence in everyday
activities.
We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual
disability," had been classified under "deprived of reason." The terms,
"deprived of reason" and "demented", however, should be
differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually
disabled." An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived
of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be
credible witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the
physical age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has
an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative to his
or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment, he or she
does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal independence
and social responsibility."
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal
mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a
person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are
considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not
yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them
the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving
sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's
capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to
an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but
by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is
"twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation
should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if
he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if
intellectual disability is established. xxx [See People v. Rodolfo Deniega,
GRN 212201, Jun 28, 2017]
Question 28: The accused is charged with the crime of Rape committed
against his step-daughter. He claims that he should not be convicted
because the prosecution failed to prove the employment of force,
threat, or intimidation under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
He insists that only when "the offended party is either under 12 years of
age or is demented" that the elements of force, threat or intimidation
may be dispensed with. Since AAA was already 15 years old at the time
of the alleged rape, the prosecution should have proven that the
incident was accompanied by force, threat, or intimidation. Is the
contention valid?
A: No. Moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape
committed by a close-kin. In rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.
Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed for rape
to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over his
daughter suffices.
The issue regarding the need to prove actual force or intimidation
becomes superfluous since it was established that the accused was the
common-law partner of the victim's mother. Furthermore, apart from
his moral ascendancy over the victim, it is apparent that he also had
physical advantage over her. Given all these reasons, the victim was left
without any other choice but to succumb to his sordid acts.
Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and
there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person
may react aggressively, while another may show cold indifference. Also,
it is improper to judge the actions of children who are victims of
traumatic experiences "by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. [People v. George Gacusan, GRN
207776, Apr 26, 2017]
Question 29: What is the probative value of the sweetheart theory as

defense in rape cases?
A: The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the
absence of strong corroboration. This is because the mere fact that the
accused and the victim were lovers should not exculpate him from
criminal liability for rape. An allegation of a "love relationship" between
the parties, even if found to be true, does not eliminate the use of force
to consummate the crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent.
It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal
intercourse through force or intimidation. Even granting that the
accused and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact alone would
not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to
have sex against her will. From a mere fiancee, definitely a man cannot
demand sexual submission and, worse, employ violence upon her on a
mere justification of love. A man can even be convicted for the rape of
his common-law wife. [See People v. Carlito Claro, GRN 199894, Apr 5,
2017]
Question 30: Is the rule against sweetheart defenses absolute?
A: No. It is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual
sexual intercourse interposed by the accused. [See People v. Carlito
Claro, GRN 199894, Apr 5, 2017]
Question 31: At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 2006,
AAA, a housemaid, received a text message from the accused asking if
they could meet. He was then working as a security guard near AAA's
place of work. AAA accepted his invitation and met with him in Augusto
San Francisco Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, where they boarded a passenger
jeepney bound for Rizal Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Arriving in Sta.
Cruz, they entered a Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue and ordered
food. They later on went to a nearby Aroma Motel. According to AAA
she was raped by the accused while inside said motel. Accused denied
having committed the crime charged, insisting that they were lovers. Is
the accused guilty of the crime of rape?
A: No. It must be noted first and foremost that the accused and AAA
were adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse. The
established circumstances-their having agreed to go on a lovers' date;
their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board
the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together;
their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the
motel without the complainant manifesting resistance; and their
entering the designated room without protest from her -indicated
beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lovers'
date in bed inside the motel. Although she claimed that he had held
her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing
that she resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to enter
the motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him
towards the motel, and to have entered it without hesitation. What she
did not do was eloquent proof of her consent. [People v. Carlito Claro,
GRN 199894, Apr 5, 2017]
Question 32: The prosecution was able to prove that AAA suffered
bruises and abrasions on her left breast and on her right hand which
tend to prove that there was force employed by the accused on her.
The people thus argue that based on the medico-legal findings of
bruises and abrasions on AAA, it can be concluded that she had been
subjected to some "bodily harm" by the accused to force himself on
her. Is the argument tenable?
A: No. That the medico-legal examination turned up with the findings
of abrasions on AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did
not necessarily mean that the accused had applied force in the context
of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion was, therefore, too
sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality
between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the
demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the
mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude the
giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and
contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the
partners to each other's lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our
minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse resulted from
consensuality between them. [People v. Carlito Claro, GRN 199894, Apr
5, 2017]
Question 33: Appellant contends that while AAA alleged that she was
raped many times in 1999 when she was 8 years old, it was shown by
the medico-legal report however that she had only one laceration in
her hymen which was at 6 o'clock position and deeply healed; and that
there is a possibility that this laceration could have been done by any
other male person aside from appellant since the actual genital
examination was only done in 2005 when the victim was no longer
living with the appellant under the same roof. Is the contention
tenable?
A: No. It is settled that laceration is not an element of the crime of
rape. The absence of lacerations does not negate rape. The presence of
lacerations in the victim's vagina is not necessary to prove rape; neither
is a broken hymen an essential element of the crime.
Accordingly, what is crucial is that AAA's testimony meets the test
of credibility, which serves as the basis for appellant's conviction.
Notably, PSI Cabrera, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, in his cross examination, had clarified
that it is possible that a person being raped or a hymen, or a vagina
being penetrated by a penis would create a laceration at the same spot
just like a lightning hitting on the same spot. Therefore, AAA's
straightforward testimony that appellant had raped her twice is not at
all negated by a finding of only one laceration in her hymen. We have
been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims
especially in sensitive cases of rape, as no young girl would concoct a
tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and
undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.
[People v. Ludigario Belen, GRN 215331, Jan 23. 2017]
Note: The Supreme Court has also held that "hymenal lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration.
And when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established. [See People v. Rommel Ronquillo, GRN 214762, Sep 20,
2017]
Question 34: In a case for rape, the prosecution was able to establish
that accused was an 18-year old man who had sexual intercourse with
"AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However,
there was no evidence to prove that accused used force, threat or
intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that
accused and his 14-year old companion named Meneses are her good
friends. Thus, she frequented the house of accused. At around 7:00 p.m.
of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of accused and
chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up
to about 11 p.m. when she took a nap, there is no showing that accused
or Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her.
Is the accused guilty of rape?
A. No. The prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused by presenting evidence that would establish the
elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force,
threat or intimidation.
In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or
intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the
element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking.
The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually
employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do
so is fatal to its cause.
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate
the purposes which the accused had in mind. On the other hand,
intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at
that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear
caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or
accused employed force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim
was ever made that accused physically overpowered, or used or
threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening words to
"AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the table
nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere
product of her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife
was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot
even ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an
effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented
nor described in court. [People v. Juan Richard Tionloc, GRN 212193,
Feb 15, 2017]
Question 35: It was established that when AAA felt something painful
minutes during their sexual intercourse she tried to resist by moving
and repositioning her body. Did her resistance result to the crime of
Rape being committed against her?
A: No. Three things are clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, accused
never employed the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her;
second, "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when accused
asked her to have sex with him; and, third, accused did not act with
force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest pain and
tried to move during their sexual congress.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not,
and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of
accused's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual
congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as
an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's
sexual advances.
Resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to
resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman
defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was
sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment accuseds
evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to
convict a man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving
him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent
and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in
the middle and charged him with rape. [People v. Juan Richard Tionloc,
GRN 212193, Feb 15, 2017]
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
Question 36: May a person be convicted with the complex crime of

Forcible Abduction with Rape if it is shown that the primary objective of
the accused is to rape the abducted woman?
A: No. There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the
primary objective of the accused is to commit rape. [People v. Sandy
Domingo, GRN 225743, Jun 7, 2017]
Question 37: The prosecution was able to prove the elements of

forcible abduction under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, as
follows: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd
designs. It was further proven that the woman was raped by her
abductor as it was actually the main purpose of the accused in
abducting her. What crime was committed in this case?
A: The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that
occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted
woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is
demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the
accused should be convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of the
victim was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in
abducting her was to commit the rape. Where the main objective of the
culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal
knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape. [People v. Sandy
Domingo, GRN 225743, Jun 7, 2017]
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
Question 38: What are the elements of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom?
A: In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish
the following elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person;
[second,] he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived
another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or detention was
illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
[People v. Elmer Avancena, et al, GRN 200512, Jun 7, 2017]
Question 39: Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention may be committed by any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty. If the kidnapping was committed by agents of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, what is the crime committed?
A: Even if the accused were employed by the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, detaining any private person for the purpose of
extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as
within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious
illegal detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for
any criminal act. [People v. Elmer Avancena, et al, GRN 200512, Jun 7,
2017]
ESTAFA
Question 40: Anita M. Capulong and her husband executed a

promissory note, postdated checks, and a deed of chattel mortgage
whereby they mortgaged their Isuzu truck in the amount of
P700,000.00 in favor of Francisca P. de Guzman. Later, they successfully
induced thru false representation, said Francisca P. de Guzman to lend
back to them the vehicles Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt under the pretext that they would use said documents in
applying for additional loan and to show said documents to somebody
interested to buy said truck. Once the accused had in possession of said
documents, they concealed the said CR and OR thereby preventing
Francisca P. de Guzman from registering said chattel mortgage with the
Land Transportation Office. Thereafter, the accused replaced the motor
of subject truck with a different one. As a result, de Guzman was unable
to register or foreclose the said chattel mortgage with the LTO because
the motor number of the mortgaged truck indicated in the chattel
mortgage was already different from the number of the new motor
installed in said truck. After trial, Anita was convicted of the crime of
Estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 3(c) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Anita contends that she could not be convicted of Estafa because
the OR and CR of the vehicle are not the documents contemplated by
law pertaining to evidence of indebtedness. According to her Article
315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC requires that the document removed,
concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of indebtedness so as to
cause prejudice. Is Anita correct?
A: Anita is not correct. On the contrary, Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of
the RPC does not require that the documents or papers be evidence of
indebtedness. Indeed, there is no limitation that the penal provision
applies only to documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 315, paragraph 3
(c) of the RPC merely penalizes the removal, concealment or
destruction of documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness,
still Anita cannot be acquitted. The promissory note, the chattel
mortgage, and the checks that she executed are not the only proof of
her debt to De Guzman.
In a chattel mortgage of a vehicle, the OR-CR should be
considered as evidence of indebtedness because they are part and
parcel of the entire mortgage documents, without which the
mortgage's right to foreclose cannot be effectively enforced.
With the concealment of the OR-CR, Anita's act certainly caused a
positive injury to De Guzman. The absence of the OR-CR practically
rendered useless the chattel mortgage. Since the mortgage could not
be properly registered with the LTO, the right to foreclose the truck
could not be exercised. Anita made it difficult for De Guzman to collect
the unpaid debt as the latter would be forced to file a collection suit
instead of conveniently going through the foreclosure proceedings. It is
of judicial notice that, as opposed to a civil case for sum of money, a
foreclosure of mortgage involves much less time, effort and resources.
[Anita Capulong v. People, GRN 199907, Feb 27, 2017]
Question 41. What are the two essential elements in the crime of Estafa?
A: Fraud and injury are the two essential elements in every crime of
estafa.
The elements of estafa in general are:
1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.
The first element covers the following ways of committing estafa:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
2. By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts;
3. Through fraudulent means.
The first way of committing estafa is known as estafa with abuse

of confidence, while the second and the third ways cover by means of
deceit. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are as follows:
a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means
b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.
c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with
his money or property because of the fraudulent act or fraudulent
means.
d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
[Anita Capulong v. People, GRN 199907, Feb 27, 2017]
Question 42: What is syndicated estafa?

A: The crime known as syndicated estafa is set forth and penalized by
Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which reads:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa
or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a
syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or
farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the
penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
In essence, syndicated estafa is but the commission of any kind of

estafa under Article 315 of the RPC (or other forms of swindling under
Article 316) with two (2) additional conditions: one, the estafa or
swindling was perpetrated by a "syndicate" and two, the estafa or
swindling resulted in the "misappropriation of money contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, samahang
nayon(s), or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public."
NOTE: Under RA 7659, the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the

offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized / syndicated crime group means a group of two or
more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for the purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
Question 43: What are the elements of syndicated estafa?

A: The elements of syndicated estafa are:
1. Estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316
of the Revised Penal Code is committed;
2. The estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate; and
3. The defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
The penalty for syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689 is
significantly heavier than that of simple estafa under Article 315 of the
RPC. The penalty imposable for simple estafa follows the schedule
under Article 315 and is basically dependent on the value of the
damage or prejudice caused by the perpetrator, but in no case can it
exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment. Syndicated estafa however, is
punishable by life imprisonment to death regardless of the value of the
damage or prejudiced caused. [Jose Rizal Lemo, et al. v. The Hon.
Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devandera, et al., GRN 192925, Dec 9,
2016]
Question 44: The Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC II) is a

cooperative engaged in the distribution and transmission of electric
power to certain parts of the Batangas province. Some members-
consumers of BATELEC II filed a complaint accusing eight members of
the board of directors of having committed the crime of syndicated
estafa. It was alleged that the said board members (petitioners) acted in
conspiracy, and as a syndicate, to defraud BATELEC II by way of the
highly irregular and anomalous contracts, the implementation of which
have led to the misappropriation of millions and millions of pesos worth
of funds of BATELEC II. Will the complaint for syndicated estafa
prosper?
A: No. In order to commit the crime of syndicated estafa, the estafa
must be committed by a "syndicate" as contemplated by the law. The
perpetrators of estafa must not only be comprised of at least five
individuals but must have also used the association that they formed or
managed to defraud its own stockholders, members or depositors. In
other words, only those who formed [or] manage associations that
receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the
contributions can commit syndicated estafa.
Hence, for a group of purported swindlers to be considered as a
syndicate under PD No. 1689:
1. They must be at least five (5) in number;
2. They must have formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative,
"samahang nayon," farmer's association or any other corporation or
association that solicits funds from the general public;
3. They formed or managed such association with the intention of
carrying out an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme
i.e., they used the very association that they formed or managed as
the means to defraud its own stockholders, members and depositors.
In the present case, what is lacking on the part of the petitioners
is the third standard. Petitioners do not constitute a syndicate under PD
No. 1689, as they never used BATELEC II as a means to defraud its
members. To satisfy the third standard, it must be established that the
purported swindlers used the very association they formed or managed
to defraud its members. Since the association contemplated by PD No.
1689 must be one that "solicit[s] fund from the general public," it
follows that the fraud committed through such association must pertain
to its receipt of contribution or solicitation from its stockholders,
members or the public. Such kind of fraud is evidently missing in the
case at bench.
There is, however, a more fundamental reason why the charge
against petitioners should fail. The petitioners, under the circums
tances, could not even be considered to have committed simple estafa
under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC.
The first two (2) elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the
RPC do not exist by the factual circumstances of this case. The first
element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC is that the offenders
must have received money, goods or other personal property (a) in
trust (b) on commission (c) for administration or (d) under any
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same.
This element is absent in this case since petitioners did not receive any
of the funds of BATELEC II as such. Petitioners, despite their collective
authority as directors to authorize expenditures for BATELEC II, do not
have juridical possession over the funds of the cooperative. They simply
do not have any right over such funds that they can set up against
BATELEC II.
The second element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC
requires that there must be misappropriation or conversion of the
money or property received by the offender or a denial on his part of
such receipt. This element was not established in this case. [Jose Rizal
Lemo, et al. v. The Hon. Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devandera, et
al., GRN 192925, Dec 9, 2016]
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Question 45: Art. 332 of the RPC provides that No criminal, but only
civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives
by affinity in the same line; 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters
and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption
established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Cite examples of cases involving relatives by affinity covered by
Art. 332.
A: In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it
has been held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law,
stepparents and adopted children. By virtue thereof, no criminal liability
is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against
his stepson; by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;
by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson; by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather; by the accused who swindles
his sister-in-law living with him; and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.
Question 46: For purposes of Art. 332, is the relationship by affinity

(which was created between the husband and the blood relatives of his
wife as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her
husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the
marriage which created such relationship by affinity? In other words, if
marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood
relatives of ones spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the
death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
A: No. Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives
of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation
resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship
by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by
death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between
the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply
coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its
duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage
that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by
affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity
continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving
issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the
living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that

relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of
the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.
Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of
one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where
statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the
tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is
not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of
the two views, we hold that the second view is more consistent with the
language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of
jury disqualification and incest. On the other hand, the continuing
affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend
to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory
cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives
by affinity in the same line is couched in general language. The
legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of ones
living child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of
a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-
law) can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and
strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social institution are
policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the
solidarity of the family. Congress has also affirmed as a State and
national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. In
this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony
and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not affected
by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is
more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting
criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in consonance with
the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed
innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of
lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused
and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of
an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed
through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory
cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more
favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the
continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, we
hold that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving
spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the
death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity.
Question 47: Does the same principle apply to relatives by affinity

covered by Art. 11 on defense of relatives, Art. 13 on mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed
against ones relative, and Art. 20 on accessories to a crime, of the
Revised Penal Code?
A: Yes. The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of
defense of ones relatives under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against ones relatives under Article 13 of the same Code
and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under
Article 20 also of the same Code. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales
Vda. de Carungcong, GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 48: Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
A: No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with
the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the
felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable
language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply
where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong,
GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 49: Mediatrix G. Carungcong, as the administratrix of the

estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong,
filed a complaint for Estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a
Japanese national. It was alleged that Sato induced Manolita to sign a
special power of attorney for the purpose of settling her taxes, but the
SPA turned out to be a document in which Manolita granted her
daughter Wendy the authority to sell Manolitas properties in Tagaytay.
In the Information, Sato was charged with a crime designated therein as
Estafa. Is he entitled to the benefits of Art. 332, RPC?
A: No. The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However,
the averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed
by attributing to Manolita statements other than those in fact made by
her. Sato was able to convince Manolita to sign and thumbmark the
SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of Satos
representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and
thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark,
therefore, served as her conformity to Satos proposal that she execute
a document to settle her taxes.
By inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for
the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of
Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed
and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it
pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and
everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when
she was made to sign the SPA.
The allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that
was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents
(particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not
simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause
provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
[Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong, GRN
181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 50: The accused argued that ultimately it is the crime of estafa
for which he would be convicted if proven. Considering that the
accused could not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, he
argues that he should also be absolved from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. Is
the argument correct?
A: No. True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public document is required for a proper
conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document, as held by the Supreme Court in an earlier case. It means
that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the
falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the
crime of estafa.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its
right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain
family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined
with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. Thus, the action provided under the said provision
simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members
and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public
document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public
dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender
resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de
Carungcong, GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 51: If under the same case, Sato instead directly induced
Manolita to sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in
favor of third parties, would he be allowed to avail of the benefit of Art
332.?
A: Yes. When the offender commits in a public document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of
the same Code. The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the
Information show that the falsification of public document was
consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita
who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with
her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution
of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato
later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties
sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or
prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as
no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the
time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document
was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
The situation is different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor
or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been
caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the
document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would
only have been the simple crime of estafa. On the other hand, absent
any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her
signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA),
the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.
[Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong, GRN
181409, Feb 11, 2010]
PREMATURE MARRIAGE
Question 52: What is the penalty imposable on a woman who

committed the crime of premature marriage undefr Article 351 of the
revised Penal Code?
A: None. RA No. 10655, March 15, 2015, AN ACT REPEALING THE CRIME
OF PREMATURE MARRIAGE UNDER ARTICLE 351 OF ACT NO. 3815,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, provides:
SECTION 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the
Family Code on paternity and filiation, Article 351 of Act No. 3815,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, punishing the crime
of premature marriage committed by a woman, is hereby
repealed.
LIBEL
Question 53: On March 12, 2004, petitioner filed a criminal complaint

for estafa against Nezer D. Belen, Sr. With the submission of the parties'
and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for
resolution. Subsequently, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed petitioner's
complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). Petitioner furnished
copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary
of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a
sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
San Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on August 27,
2004. ACP Suega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the
Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen, the son of Nezer who is the
respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the
motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City.
Perusal of the motion shows that petitioner used the following
words and phrases to wit: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the
Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumptions were tarnished in silver
ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted
frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5)
"moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7)
"manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility
of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft of any
intellectual ability and mental honesty."
Aggrieved, ACP Suega-Lagman filed against petitioner a
criminal complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations in the
Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify) before the OCP of
San Pablo City.
In his defense, petitioner argues that he could not be convicted of
libel because of the absence of the element of publication
contemplated by law. Is petitioner correct?
A: No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it
has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it
has been written. A communication of the defamatory matter to the
person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may
wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion
he has of himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. In the
same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope
addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender
parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person
other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous communication
knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before
reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The
publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact
that the immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that
there is reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or
seen by third persons. [Medelarnaldo B. Belen v. People, GRN 211120,
Feb 13, 2017]
Question 54: Petitioner contends that in serving and filing the Omnibus
Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not intend to expose it to
third persons, but only complied with the law on how service and filing
of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the said
motion by Michael, the duly authorized representative and son of the
respondent in the estafa case, as well as the two staff of the OCP -
Flores and Enseo - did not constitute publication within the meaning of
the law on libel because they cannot be considered as "third persons to
whom copies of the motion were disseminated." Is the argument valid?
A: No. In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus
Motion to third persons, but only complied with the law on how service
and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the
defamatory statements in it were made known to someone other than
the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the
motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to
expect that persons other than the one defamed would be able to read
the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with
the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent
in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in
Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is
not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record
when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his act,
petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and
service of his Omnibus Motion.
The Omnibus Motion although contained in a sealed envelope
was addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, San Pablo City. As
such, the accused fully well knows that the sealed envelope will be
opened at the receiving section, and will be first read by the staff of the
Office before the private complainant gets hold of a copy thereof. In
fine, the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to the private
complainant - the person [to] whom it is written, but passed through
other persons in the Office of the City Prosecutor. At the time the
accused mailed the sealed envelope containing the Omnibus Motion
addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, he knew that there exists
not only a reasonable but strong probability that it will be exposed to
be read or seen by third persons.
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of
publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a communication
of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the
Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and
representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is
clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suega-Lagman.
[Medelarnaldo B. Belen v. People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
Question 55: Petitioner further argues that there is no publication as to

Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had read
the contents of the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner insists that they were
both legal recipients as personnel in the OCP where the motion was
addressed and had to be filed. Stating that the absence of publication
negates malice, petitioner posits that he could not have intended to
injure the reputation of ACP Suega-Lagman with the filing of the
Omnibus Motion since it was never published, but was sent to its legal
recipients. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a
public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a
duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, such communication does not amount to publication."
Is the argument tenable?
A: Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of the
administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and Enseo
cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal
of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suega-Lagman from the
preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to
the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions filed with the OCP of
San Pablo City to the proper recipients. [Medelarnaldo B. Belen v.
People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
Question 56: Petitioner next avers that the alleged defamatory
statements in his Omnibus Motion passed the test of relevancy, hence,
covered by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication. He
asserts that the statements contained in his motion are relevant and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry, as they were used only to highlight
and emphasize the manifestly reversible errors and irregularities that
attended the resolution rendered by ACP Suega-Lagman. Is
petitioners contention valid?
A: Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade. A communication is
absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has
acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by
parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of
judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the
witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said
proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant
to the issues, and the answers are responsive to the questions
propounded to said witnesses.
The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are
considered privileged is not only because said pleadings have become
part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to the
undeniable fact said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and
assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of
issues ventilated before the courts for proper administration of justice
and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be
supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of which would be
under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all
improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. In fine, the
privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration
of justice.
The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory
tenor and the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry. Sarcastic, pungent
and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from
the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are
absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues. As to the degree of
relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory
matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to
which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in
relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that a matter
alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need not, in any case, be
material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, it must be
legitimately related thereto or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of
the trial. What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to
favor the writer, and the words are not be scrutinized with microscopic
intensity, as it would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communication.
The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the
OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa
complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of
relevancy.
The statements he made are neither relevant grounds for a
motion for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for
disqualification. Such diatribes pertain to ACP Suega-Lagman's honor,
reputation, mental and moral character, and are no longer related to
the discharge of her official function as a prosecutor. They are devoid of
any relation to the subject matter of petitioner's Omnibus Motion that
no reasonable man can doubt their irrelevancy, and may not become
the subject of inquiry in the course of resolving the motion.
Petitioner should bear in mind the rule that the pleadings should
contain but the plain and concise statements of material facts and not
the evidence by which they are to be proved. If the pleader goes
beyond the requirements of the statute, and alleges an irrelevant
matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege. The reason for this is
that without the requirement of relevancy, pleadings could be easily
diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of the
issues in litigation and pervaded into a vehicle for airing charges
motivated by a personal rancor. Granted that lawyers are given great
latitude or pertinent comment in furtherance of the causes they uphold,
and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some
infelicities of language, petitioner would do well to recall that the Code
of Professional Responsibility ordains that a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper. After all, a lawyer should conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
use only such temperate but strong language in his pleadings or
arguments befitting an advocate.
Question 57: Petitioner furthermore argues that the test of relevancy

should be liberally construed in his favor, especially because "in the
information for libel, there was no allegation of irrelevancy or
impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause" or the subject
of the inquiry, the estafa complaint in I.S. No. 04-312. Is petitioners
submission meritorious?
A. There is no merit in petitioner's theory that the test of relevancy
should be liberally construed in his favor. It bears emphasis that while
the relevancy of the statement is a requisite of the defense of absolutely
privileged communication, it is not one of the elements of libel. Thus,
the absence of an allegation to the effect that the questioned statement
is irrelevant or impertinent does not violate the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As
the party raising such defense, petitioner has the burden of proving
that his statements are relevant to the subject of his Omnibus Motion.
For its part, the prosecution only has to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of all the elements of libel as defined in Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition status or
circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of
such imputation at a natural or juridical person; and (5) tendency to
cause the dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
Question 58: Relying on jurisprudential precedence, petitioner insists on
the liberality in his favor considering that the libelous remarks were
contained in an an appropriate pleading denominated as omnibus
motion for reconsideration and for disqualification of the investigating
prosecutor. Is the argument correct?
A: Petitioner's reliance on People v. Andres is misplaced. In that case,
the Supreme Court sustained the trial court in dismissing the libel case
on a mere motion to quash in this wise:
When in the information itself it appears, as it does in the
present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is
contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the
privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need to wait
until trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question
of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned imputations
appear, as they seem, in this case, to be really pertinent and
relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on
complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which
defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's
interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become
evident that the fact thus alleged in the information would not
constitute an offense of libel.
As has already been said by this Court: "As to the degree of
relevancy or pertinency necessary to make an alleged defamatory
matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter
to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that
no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety."
Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court
committed reversible error in this case in finding that the
allegations in the information itself present a case of an
absolutely privileged communication justifying the dismissal of
the case. Note that the information does not contain any
allegation of irrelevancy and impertinency to counteract the
quotations from the motion for reconsideration in question.
In stark contrast to People v. Andres, even on the face of the

allegations in the information, the defamatory statements in petitioner's
Omnibus Motion fail the test of relevancy in order to be considered an
absolutely privileged communication, because they are neither relevant
grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid or justifiable reasons
for disqualification of ACP Suega-Lagman. [Medelarnaldo B. Belen v.
People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
Question 59: Petitioner moreover argues that the reliance of the court
on the statements or opinions of ordinary witnesses like Michael, Flores
and Enseo is contrary to Sections 48 and 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, because they are incompetent to testify on whether the
statements against ACP Suega-Lagman in the Omnibus Motion
constituted malicious imputations against her person. Is the contention
meritorious?
A: No. As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the
facts testified to. Opinion evidence or testimony refers to evidence of
what the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute,
as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves.
In this case, however, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo
barely made a conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statements
in petitioner's Omnibus Motion, but merely testified on their own
understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People, the Court stated the twin rule for the
purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous: (1) that construction must be adopted which will give to the
matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered; and (2) the published matter alleged to libelous must be
construed as a whole. "In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of
the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered
explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be from the words used in the
publication." As the persons who, aside from ACP Suega-Lagman, had
also read the Omnibus Motion, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores
and Enseo are competent to testify on their own understanding of the
questioned statements, and their testimonies are relevant to the trial
court's determination of the defamatory character of such statements.
[Medelarnaldo B. Belen v. People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
Question 60: In cases involving vehicular mishaps, when is a person

presumed negligent such that he should be held liable under the law?
A: Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if, at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the
road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. If,
after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that
he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed
so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop
if necessary. This rule is consistent with Section 41(a) of Republic Act
No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The
driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line
of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding
in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and is
free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
[S/Sgt. Cornelio Paman v. People, GRN 210129, Jul 5, 2017]
PROBATION LAW
Question 61: May an accused who was convicted of a crime and

sentenced to a non-probationable penalty avail of the benefits of
probation if upon appeal his sentence is reduced to a probationable
penalty?
A: Yes. Republic Act No. 10707, November 26, 2015, AN ACT
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE PROBATION LAW OF 1976, AS AMENDED, provides:
SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is
appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through
the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be
allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision
before such decision becomes final. The application for probation
based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court
where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable
penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has
since been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants
where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants may
apply for probation by submitting a written application and
attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of
conviction.
The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed, suspend
the execution of the sentence imposed in the judgment.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of
probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which
already imposes a probationable penalty.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term
of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
SEC. 2. Section 9 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this
Decree shall not be extended to those:
a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six (6) years;
b. convicted of any crime against the national security;
c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one
(1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
SEC. 3. Section 16 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order
the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the
offense for which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be
furnished with a copy of such order.
OTHER UPDATES:
Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of
Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines
Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act
No. 3815, Otherwise Known as The Revised Penal Code, as Amended,
29 August 2017, provides:
Section 1. Article 9 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised

Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.
Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in
accordance with Article 25 of this Code.
Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are correctional in accordance with
abovementioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of

which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty
thousand pesos (40,000) or both is provided.

follows:
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. A fine,
whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be
considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred
thousand (1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000) but is not less than
Forty thousand pesos (40,000); and a light penalty, if it be less than
Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
Section 3. Article 114 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 114. Treason. Any Filipino citizen who levies war against
the Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed Four million pesos
(4,000,000).
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of

two (2) witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the
accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits act of

treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by
reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed Four
million pesos (4,000,000).

follows:
Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty.

The conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be
punished respectively, by prisin mayor and a fine not exceeding Two
million pessos (2,000,000), and prisin correccional and a fire not
exceeding One million pesos (1,000.000).
follows:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the

service of those legally obtained. In addition to the liability attaching
to the offender for the commission of any offense, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding (200,000) shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed
his authority or use unncessary severity in executing the same.
Section 6. Article 136 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
6968, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup detat,

rebellion, or insurrection. The conspiracy and proposal to commit
coup detat shall be punished by prisin mayor in its minimum period
and a fine which shall not exceed One million pesos (1,000,000).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall

be punished respectively, by prisin correccional in its maximum period
and a fine which shall not exceed One million pesos (1,000,000) and by
prisin correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Four
hundred thousand pesos (400,000).
Section 7. Article of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 140. Penalty for sedition. The leader of sedition shall suffer
the penalty of prisin mayorin its minimum period and fine not
exceeding Two million pesos (2,000,000).
Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prisin

correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding One
million pesos (1,000,000).

follows:
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. Persons conspiring to

commit the crime of sedition shall be punished by prisin correccional
in its medium period and a fine not exceeindg Four hundred thousand
pesos (400,000).

follows:
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. The penally of prisin correccional

in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding Four hundred
thousand pesos (400,000) shall be imposed upon any person who,
without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite
others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or
upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions
of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal
such evil practices.
follows:
Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and
similar bodies. The penalty of prisin correccional or a fine ranging
from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(400,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or
fraud, prevents the meeting of Congress or of any of its committees or
subcommittees, Constitutional Commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or
board.
follows:
Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings. The penalty of arresto

mayor or a fine from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
disturbs the meetings of Congress or of any of its committees or
subcommittees. Constitutional Commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board,
or in the presence of any such bodies should behave in such manner as
to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it.
follows:
Art. 147. Illegal associations. The penalty of prisin correccional

in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000) shall be imposed upon the
founders, directors, and presidents of associations totally or partially
organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable
under this Code or for some purposed contrary to public morals. Mere
members said associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. Any persons who, without a public

uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority of any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on ocasion of such performance, shall
suffer the penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays
hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be
present, the penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum period and a
fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall be
imposed.
follows:
Art. 149. Indirect assaults. The penalty of prisin correccional in

its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One
hundred thousand (100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the
aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of
any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.
follows:
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its

committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutionial Commissions, its
committees, subcommittees or divisions. The penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000), or both such fine and
imprisonment, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been
duly summoned to attend as a witness before Congress, its special or
standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional
Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or
before any commission or committee chairman or member authorized
to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse to obey such
summons, or being present before any such legislative or constitutional
body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or to
answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents,
or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the
exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
person who shall induce disobedience to summons or refusal to be
sworn by any such body or official.
follows:
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or

the agents of such person. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of
the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in
authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the
performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a

serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from Two
thousand pesos (2,000) to Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) shall be
imposed upon the offender.
follows:
Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order;
Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance.
The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or
establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public performances,
functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included
in the provisions of Article 131 and 132.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons

causing any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character.
The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumutuous if

caused by more than three (3) persons who are armed or provided with
means of violence.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
in any meeting, association, or public place, shall make any outcry
tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display
placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed Forty thousand
pesos (40,000) shall be imposed upon these person who in violation of
the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with
pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.
follows:
Art. 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlwaful

utterances. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine ranging from
Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who by means of printing, lithography, or any other
means of publication shall publish or cause to be published as news any
false news which may endanger the public order, or cause dausage to
the interest or credit of the State;
2. Any person who by the same means, or by words, utterances or

speeches shall encourage disobedience to the law or to the constituted
authorites or praise, justify, or extol an, act punished by law;
3. Any person who shall maliciously publish or cause to be published

any official resolution or document without proper authority or before
they have been published officially; or
4. Any person who shall print, publish, or distribute or cause to be

printed, published, or distributed books, pamphlets, periodicals, or
leaflets which do not bear the real printers name, or which are
classified as anonymous.
follows:
Art. 155. Alarms and scandals. The penalty of arresto menor or

a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40,000) shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any
firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm
or danger;
2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari
or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public
tranquility;
3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged
in any other nocturnal amusements, shall disturb the public peace; or
4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any

disturbance or scandal in public places: Provided, That the
circumstances of the case shall not make the provisions of Article 153
applicable.
Section 20. Article 163 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4202, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins. Any
person who make, imports, or utters false coins, in connivance with
counterfeiters, or importers, shall suffer:
1. Prisin correccional in its minimun and medium periods and a fine

not to exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000), if the
counterfeited coins be any of the coinage of the Philippines.
2. Prisin correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed

Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000), if the counterfeited coin be
currency of a foreign country.
follows:
Art. 164. Mutilation of coins; Importation and utterance of

mutilated coins. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed Four hundred thousand pesos
(400,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall mutilate coins
of the legal currency of the Philippines or import or utter mutilated
current coins, or in connivance with mutilators or importers.
follows:
Art. 166. Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents

payable to bearer; Importing, and uttering such false or forged notes
and documents. The forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes
or certificates or other obligations and securities payable to bearer and
the importation and uttering in connivance with forgers or importers of
such false or forced obligation or notes shall be punished as follows:
1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to

exceed two million pesos (2,000,000), if the document which has been
falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of the
Philippines.
The words obligation or security of the Philippines shall mean all

bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank notes, coupons,
Philippine notes, treasury notes, fractional notes, certificates of deposit,
bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers
of the Philippines, and other representatives of value, of whatever
denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of
Congress.
2. By prisin mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed

one million pesos (1,000,000), if the falsified or altered documents is a
circulating note issued by any banking association duly authorized by
law to issue the same.
3. By arresto mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed one
million pesos (1,000,000), if the falsified or counterfeited document
was issued by a foreign government.
4. By prisin mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed

Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000), when the forged or altered
document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign bank duly
authorized therefor.
follows:
Art. 167. Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not

payable to bearer. Any person who shall forge, import or utter, in
connivance with the forgers or importers, any instrument payable to
order or other document of credit not payable to bearer, shall suffer
the penalties of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding one million two hundred thousand
pesos (1,200,000).
follows:
Art. 170. Falsification of legislative documents. The penalty of

prisin correccional in its maximum two hundred thousand pesos
(1,200,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without proper
authority therefor alters any bill, resolution, or ordinance enacted or
approved or pending approval by either House of Congress or any
provincial board or municipal council.
follows:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or

ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prisin mayor and a fine not to
exceed One million pesos (1,000,000) shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his of
position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:
1. Counterfeiting or using any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding

statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which

changes its meaning;
7 issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a

copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including
in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof

in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister

who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding
paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of
such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
follows:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified

documents. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than One million pesos
(1,000,000) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document;
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent
to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article; and
3. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial

proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in
the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this
article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
follows:
Art. 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or

service, etc. The penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisin correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his

profession, shall issuee a false certificate; and
2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit of

service, good conduct or similar circumstances.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any private

person who shall falsify a certificate falling within the classes mentioned
in the two (2) preceding subdivisions.
follows:
Art. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or

implements for falsification. The penalty of prisin correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed One million
pesos (1,000,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall make
or introduce into the Philippines any stamps, dies, marks, or other
instruments or implements intended to be used in the commission of
the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the
preceding section of this Chapter.
Any person who, with the intention of using them, shall have in his
possession any of the instruments or implements mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree
than that provided therein.
follows:
Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name. The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
publicly use a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading the execution of a judgment or causing damage.
Any person who conceals his true name and other personal
circumstances shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not to
exceed Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
follows:
Art. 180. False testimony against a defendant. Any person who

shall give false testimony against the defendant in any criminal case
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if the defendant in said case shall

have been sentenced to death;
2. The penalty of prisin mayor, if the defendant shall have been

sentenced to reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua;
3. The penalty of prisin correccional, if the defendant shall have been

sentenced to any other afflictive penalty; and
4. The penalty of arresto mayor, if the defendant shall have been

sentenced to a correctional penalty or a fine, or shall have been
acquitted.
In cases provided in subdivisions 3 and 4 of this article the offender

shall further a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000).
follows:
Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendant. Any

person who shall give false testimony in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum
period of prisin correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000), if the prosecution is
for a felony punishable by an afflictive penalty, and the penalty of
arresto mayor in any other case.
follows:
Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases. Any person found guilty
of false testimony in a civil case shall suffer the penalty of prisin
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed One million
two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000), if the amount in controversy
shall exceed One million pesos (1,000,000), and the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), if the amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount
or cannot be estimated.
follows:
Art. 187. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or

merchandise made of gold, silver, or other precious metals or their
alloys. The penalty of prisin correccional or a fine ranging from Forty
thousand pesos (40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000),
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly import
or sell or dispose of any article or merchandise made of gold, silver, or
other precious metals, or their alloys, with stamps, brands, or marks
which fail to indicate the actual fineness or quality of said metals or
alloys.
Any stamp, brand label, or mark shall be deemed to fail to indicate the
actual fineness of the article on which it is engraved, printed, stamped,
labeled or attached, when the test of the article shows that the quality
or fineness thereof is less by more than one-half karat, if made of gold,
and less by more than four one-thousandth, if made of silver, than what
is shown by said stamp, brand, label or mark. But in case of watch cases
and flatware made of gold, the actual fineness of such gold shall not be
less than more than three one-thousandth than the fineness indicated
by said stamp, brand, label, or mark.
Section 34. Article 201 of the same Act, as amended by Presidential

Decree Nos. 960 and 969, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions

and indecent shows. The penalty of prisin mayor or a fine ranging
from Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (200,000), or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly

contrary to public morals;
2. a. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge

in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
b. Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,

exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence,
lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet
traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public
ordere, morals, and good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts; and
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
follows:
Art. 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. For the purpose of this article,

women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guity of any of the offenses covered by this article
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty
thousand pesos (20,000), and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor
in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000), or both, in the discretion of the court.
follows:
Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. Revelation

of Secrets. In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty
of prisin correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from
Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or any
person duly authorized to represent and/or assist a party to a case who,
by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the
secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or any

person duly authorized to represent and/or assist a party to a case who,
having undertaken the defense of a client or having received
confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the
defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of
his first client.
follows:
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses.
The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium period to prisin
mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand
pesos (40,000) to Two milion pesos (2,000,000), or both, shall be
imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to

furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or
settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall enter
into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use
of any other scheme, to defraud the Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other
imposts, shall be guilty of any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different

from or larger than those authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any

sum of money collected by him officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or

otherwise things or objects of a nature different from that provided by
law.
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative
Code shall be applied.
follows:
Art. 215. Prohibited transactions. The penalty of prisin

correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from Forty
or both, shall be imposed upon any appointive public officer who,
during his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in
any transaction of exchange or speculation within the territory subject
to his jurisdiction.
follows:
Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer.

The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty
or both, shall be imposed upon a public officer who directly or
indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business in which
it is his official duty to intervene.
This provision is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private

accountants who, in like manner, shall take part in any contract or
transaction connected with the estate or property in appraisal,
distribution or adjudication of which they shall have acted, and to
guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their
wards or estate.
No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption

of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation
does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
2. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if

the amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (40,000) but
does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000).
3. The penalty of prisin mayor in its maximum period to reclusion

temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than
One million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000) but does not
exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (2,400,000).
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum

periods, if the amount inolved is more than Two million four hundred
thousand pesos (2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four
hundred thousand pesos (4,400,000).
5. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the

amount inolved is more than Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight hundred thousand
pesos (8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the toal value of the property
embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public

funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal uses.
follows:
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. Any

public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom by
resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to
render account to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor
and who fails to do so for a period of two (2) months after such
accounts should be rendered shall be punished by prisin correccional
in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos
(40,000) to One million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000), or
both.
follows:
Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts

before leaving the country. Any public officer who unlawfully leaves
or attempts to leave the Philippines without securing a certificate from
the Commission on Audit showing that his accounts have been finally
settled, shall be punished by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging from Forty
thousand pesos (40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000,
or both.
follows:
Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property.

Any public officer under obligation to make payment from Government
funds in his possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be
punished by arresto mayor and a fine from five (5) to twenty-five (25)
percent of the sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by
competent authority to deliver any property in his custody or under his
administration, shall refuse to make a delivery.
The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing:
Provided, That it shall not be leas than Ten thousand pesos (10,000).
follows:
Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents.

Any public officer who shall remove, destroy or conceal documents or
papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000), whenever serious damage shall have been
caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium

period and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), whenever the damage caused to a third party or to the
public interest shall not have been serious.
In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special

disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual disualification shall
be imposed.
follows:
Art. 227. Officer breaking seal. Any public officer charged with
the custody of papers or property sealed by proper authority, who shall
break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties
of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, temporary
special diqualification and a fine not exceeding Four hundred thousand
pesos (400,000).
follows:
Art. 228. Opening of closed documents. Any public officer not

included in the provisions of the next preceding article who, without
proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed
papers, documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor, temporary special disqualification and a fine
not exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000).
follows:
Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Any public officer

who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official
capacity, shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which
he may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the
penalties of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four
hundred thousand pesos (400,000) if the revelation of such secrets or
the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the
public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prisin correccional in its
minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand (100,000) pesos shall be imposed.
follows:
Art. 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual.

Any public officer to whom the secrets of any private individual shall
become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets,
shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two
follows:
Art. 231. Open disobedience. Any judicial or executive officer

who shall openly refuse to execute the judgment, decision or order of
any superior authority made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the
latter and issue with all the legal formalities, shall suffer the penalties of
arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period, temporary special disqualification in its maximum
period and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000).
follows:
Art. 233. Refusal of assistance. The penalties of arresto mayor

in tits medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period,
perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000), shall be imposed upon a public officer who,
upon demand from competent authority, shall fail to lend his
cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public
service, if such failure shall result in serious damage to the public
interest, or to a third party; otherwise, arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum perioods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand
pesos (100,000) shall be imposed.
follows:
Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. The penalty of arresto

mayor or a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having
been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without
legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
follows:
Art. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of prisin

correccional in its medium period to prisin mayor in its minimum
period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
overdo himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention
prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments not
authorized by the regulations, or by inflicting such punishments in a
cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to

obtain some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be
punished by prisin mayor in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000), in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage.
follows:
Art. 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. Any person

who shall assume the performance of the duties and powers of any
public or employment without first being sworn in or having given the
bond required by law, shall be suspended from such office or
employment until he shall have complied with the respective formalities
and shall be fined from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to One
follows:
Art. 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers. Any

public officer who shall continue to exercise the duties and powers of
his office, employment or commission, beyond the period provided by
law, regulation or special provisions applicable to the case, shall suffer
the penalties prisin correccional in its minimum period, special
temporary disqualification in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000).
follows:
Art. 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. The penalties of

prisin correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000), shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall
encroach upon the powers of the legislative branch of the Government,
either by making general rules or regulations beyond the scope of his
authority, or by attempting to repeal a law or suspending the execution
thereof.
follows:
Art. 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. Any public

officer who, before the question of jurisdiction is decided, shall continue
any proceeding after having been lawfully required to refrain from so
doing, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
One hundred thousand pesos (100,000).
follows:
Art. 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial
authority. Any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One
follows:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall

knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking
the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000).
follows:
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and

dispensing of abortives. The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be
imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or
midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill,
shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician

shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not
follows:
Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. Any person who shall
inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the preceding
articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten
(10) days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same
period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with
the manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or under
circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, in addition to the
penalty of arresto mayor, a fine not exceeeding Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000) shall be imposed.
Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offenders parents,
ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or
persons in authority, shall be punished by prisin correccional in its
minimum and medium periods: Provided, That in the case of persons in
authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such
persons.
follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime

of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries

which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) days
to nine (9) days, or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos

(40,000) and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries
which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work nor require medical assistance.
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five

thousand pesos (5,000) when the offender shall ill-treat another by
deed without causing any injury.
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion

temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who shall
commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the
place for the perpetration of the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or

detained within three (3) days from the commencement of the
detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before
the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be
prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
follows:
Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. The penalty of arresto mayor and a

imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized
by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain
another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.
follows:
Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. The penalty

of prisin correccional and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand
pesos (100,000) shall be imposed upon anyone who shall induce a
minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or the persons
entrusted with his custody.
If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two (2)
preceding articles shall be the father or the mother of the minor, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand
pesos (40,000), or both.
follows:
Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. The penalty of arresto mayor

and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall
be imposed upon anyone who shall abandon a child under seven (7)
years of age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.
When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the
culprit shall be punished by prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been in danger
only, the pnealty shall be prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
The provisions contained in the two (2) preceding paragraphs shall not
prevent the imposition of the penalty provided for the act committed,
when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.
follows:
Art. 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his

custody; Indifference of parents. The penalty of arresto mayor and a
imposed upon anyone who, having charge off the rearing or education
of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other
persons, without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his
care or in the absence of the latter, without the consent of the proper
authorities.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the parents who shall neglect
their children by not giving them the education which their station in
life requires and financial condition permits.
follows:
Art. 278. Exploitation of minors. The penalty of prisin

correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen (16) years
of age to perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength,
or contortion.
2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver,

wild-animal tamer or circus manager or engaged in a similar calling,
shall employ in exhibitions of these kinds children under sixteen (16)
years of age who are not his children or descendants.
3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next

preceding paragraph who shall employ any descendsant of his under
twelve years (12) years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any

capacity with the care of a child under sixteen (16) Years of age, who
shall deliver such child gratuitously to any person following any of the
callings enumerated in paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant
or beggar.
If the delivery shall have been made in consideration of any price,

compensation, or promise, the penalty shall in every case be imposed
in its maximum period.
In either case, the guardian or curator convicted shall also be removed

from office as guardian or curator; and in the case of the parents of the
child, they may be deprived, temporarily or perpetually, in the
discretion of the court, of their parental authority.
5. Any person who shall induce any child under sixteen (16) years of
age to abandon tthe home of its ascendants, guardians, curators or
teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned
in paragraph 2 hereof, or to accompany any habitual vagrant or
beggar.
follows:
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. Any private person

who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latters will shall be
punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000).
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the

penalty shall be prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000).
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who
shall enter anothers dwelling for the purpose of preventing some
serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third
person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other
public houses, while the same are open.
follows:
Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. The penalty of arresto menor

or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40,000), or both, shall
be imposed upon any person who shall enter the closed premises or
the fenced estate of another, while either or both of them are
uninhabited, if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser
has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.
follows:
Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of
his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the
threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even
though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose.
If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by
two (2) degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty

shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (100,000), if the threat shall not have been made
subject to a condition.
follows:
Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in

its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos
(40,000) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such
weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another
with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts
shows that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat: Provided,
That the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the
provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not
constituting a felony.
Art. 286. Grave coercions. The penalty of prisin correccional

and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall
be imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall,
by means of violence, threats, or intimidation, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of

suffrage, or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any
religious act, or to prevent him from exercising such right or from so
doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
follows:
Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of

violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the
value of the thing, but in no case less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(15,000).
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto

menor or a fine ranging from One thousand pesos (1,000) to not more
than Forty thousand pesos (40,000), or both.
follows:
Art. 288. Other similar coercions; (Compulsory purchase of

merchandise and payment of wages by means of tokens. The penalty
of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (40,000)
to One hundred thousand pesos (100,000), or both, shall be imposed
upon any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation
who shall force or compel, directly or indirectly, or shall knowingly
permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by such firm or
corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or
commodities of any kind.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay
the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him, by means of
tokens or objects other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines, unless expressly requested by the laborer or employee.
follows:
Art. 289. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of

combination of capital or labor through violence or threats. The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Sixty thousand pesos
(60,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, for the purpose of
organizing, maintaining or preventing coalitions of capital or labor,
strike of laborers or lock-out of employers, shall employ violence or
threats in such a degree as to compel or force the laborers or
employees in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work, if the
act shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
follows:
Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence.

The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000) shall be imposed upon any private individual who in order to
discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and
reveal the contents thereof.
If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000).
This provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or person

entrusted with the custody of minors with respect to the papers or
letters of the children or minors placed under their care or custody, nor
to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.
follows:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of

arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000) shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant
who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master
and shall reveal such secrets.
follows:
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prisin

correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (100,000) shall be imposed
upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the
owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter.
follows:
Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or

edifice devoted to worship. Any armed person who shall commit
robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value
of the property taken shall exceed Fifty thousand pesos (50,000), and
if
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the
robbery was committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public

authority.
Or if
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following

circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of

locked or sealed furniture or receptacle.
2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced

upon outside the place of the robbery.
When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property
taken exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000), the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the
value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000).
When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property
taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (50,000), they shall suffer
the penalty prescribed in the two (2) next preceding paragraphs, in its
minimum period.
If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an

inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious
worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this
article shall be imposed.
Section 80. Article 302 of the same Act, as amended by Commonwealth

Act No. 417, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private

building. Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a
building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article
299, if the value of the property taken exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000), shall be punished by prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is
present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended
for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys,
picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or

receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding

paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.
When the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (50,000), the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
In the cases specified in Articles 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, and 302 of
this Code, when the property taken is mail matter or large cattle, the
offender shall suffer the penalties next higher in degree than those
provided in said articles.
follows:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished

by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if

the value of the thing stolen is more than One million two hundred
thousand pesos (1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million two
hundred thousand pesos (2,200,000); but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one (1) year for
each additional One million pesos (1,000,000), but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum

periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than Six hundred
thousand pesos (600,000) but does not exceed One million two
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium

periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than Twenty
thousand pesos (20,000) but does not exceed Six hundred thousand
pesos (600,000).
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its

minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over Five
thousand pesos (5,000) but does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(20,000).
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over Five hundred
pesos (500) but does not exceed Five thousand pesos (5,000).
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value

does not exceed Five hundred pesos (500).
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos

(20,000), if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value
of the thing stolen does not exceed Five hundred pesos (500). If such
value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine of not exceeding Five

thousand pesos (5,000), when the value of the thing stolen is not over
Five hundred pesos (500), and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.
follows:
Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and

National Museum. If the property stolen be any property of the
National Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000), or both, unless a higher penalty should be provided under
other provisions of this Code, in which case, the offender shall be
punished by such higher penalty.
follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights
in property. Any person who, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or
shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition
to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall
be punished by a fine from fifty (50) to one hundred (100) per centum
of the gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than Fifteen
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from Forty

thousand pesos (40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (100,000)
shall be imposed.
follows:
Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. Any person who

shall alter the boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or
estates, or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the
same, shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Twenty thousand pesos (20,000), or both.
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No.
818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished
by:
1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period to

prisin mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
Two million four hundred thousand pesos (2,400,000) but does not
exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (4,400,000), and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional Two million pesos (2,000,000); but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
2nd. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium

periods, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred
thousand pesos (1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin

correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (40,000) but does not exceed One million two
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such

amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (40,000): Provided,
That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the
following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value

which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even
though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,

money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party

in blank, and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to
the prejudice of the offended party or any third person.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,

influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to

his art or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without

prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may
deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an

obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) clays from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prime facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished
by:
1st The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the

amount of fraud is over Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight hundred thousand
pesos (8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
2nd. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium

periods, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred
thousand pesos (2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four
3rd. The penalty of prisin mayor in its maximum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos
(1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand
pesos (2,400,000).
4th. The penalty of prisin mayor in its medium period, if such amount
is over Forty thousand pesos (40,000) but does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (1,200,000).
5th. By prisin mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not
exceed Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a

gambling game.
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any
court record, office files, document or any other papers.
follows:
Art. 318. Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of
not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this Chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make
forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public
in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor or
a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40,000).
follows:
Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any person who

shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of public functions, or
using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or spreading any infection
or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the property of
the National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry,
waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by
the public, shall be punished:
1. By prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the

value of the damage caused exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000);
2. Bv arresto mayor if such value does not exceed the abovementioned

amount but is over Forty thousand pesos (40,000); and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (40,000).
Section 88. Article 329 of the same Act, as amended by Commonwealth

Act No. 3999, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the

next preceding article shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of

the damage caused exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000);
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value

is over Forty thousand pesos (40,000) but does not exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000); and
3. By arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than Forty thousand pesos (40,000), if the
amount involved does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (40,000) or
cannot be estimated.
follows:
Art. 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or

paintings. Any person who shall destroy or damage statues or any
other useful or ornamental public monument, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period.
Any person who shall destroy or damage any useful or ornamental

painting of a public nature shall suffer the penalty of arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40,000), or both such fine
and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
follows:
Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for

another and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. The
simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall
be punished by prisin mayor and a fine of not exceeding Two hundred
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall
conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to cause such child
to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the

duties of his profession or office. shall cooperate in the execution of any
of the crimes mentioned in the two (2) next preceding paragraphs, shall
suffer the penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of
temporary special disqualification.
follows:
Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel

committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition,
or any similar means, shall be punished by prisin correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from Forty thousand
pesos (40,000) to One million two hundred thousand pesos
(1,200,000), or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.
follows:
Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such

publication for a compensation. The penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine from Forty thousand pesos (40,000) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (400,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents,
spouse, child, or other member of the family of the latter, or upon
anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a
compensation or money consideration.
follows:
Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course

of official proceedings. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of Forty
or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager of a
newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with
the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and
reputation of said person, even though said publication be made in
connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration
of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have
been mentioned.
follows:
Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto

mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its minimum
period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos
(20,000).
follows:
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prisin correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) to One hundred
thousand pesos (100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not
of a serious nature. the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (20,000).
follows:
Art. 364. Intriguing against honor. The penalty of arresto

menor or fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (20,000) shall be
imposed for any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish
the honor or reputation of a person.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by

reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an

act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be
Less than Five thousand pesos (5,000).
A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40.000) and censure shall
be imposed upon any person, who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which
case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the

Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prisin correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing

or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in

those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give.
Section 98. Separability Clause. Should any provision of this Act be

declared invalid, the remaining provisions shall continue to be valid and
subsisting.
Section 99. Repealing Clause. All laws, executive orders, or

administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Act are hereby amendedj, repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 100. Retroactive Effect. This Act shall have retroactive effect to
the extent that it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence
by final judgment.
Section 101. Transitory Provision; Applicability to Pending Cases. For

cases pending before the courts upon the effectivity of this Act where
trial has already started, the courts hearing such cases shall not lose
jurisdiction over the same by virtue of this Act.
FINAL NOTE: These updates are intended only to boost the morale of
the students and to give them the sense of confidence knowing that
they are fully apprised of the most recent developments in criminal law.
GOOD LUCK!

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NOTES ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW

Atty. Jerome J. Jarales

Question 1: What is the classification of the felony where the imposable

Question 2: Distinguish instigation from entrapment.

Question 3: In invoking self-defense, what is the test to prove presence

Question 4: What are the elements of unlawful aggression?

Question 5: What are the kinds of unlawful aggression?

Question 6: What is the focus of inquiry to determine if the accused

Question 7: Under the same facts, may the accused be considered

Question 8: Compare and contrast Conspirators and Accomplices

Question 9: What is a composite crime?

There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand,

Question 10: What is complex crime?

Question 11: In the complex crime of estafa through falsification of

Question 12: What is the rule as regards subsidiary penalty?

CIRCUMSTANCES MODIFYING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Question 13: What is the effect of the presence of mitigating

Question 14: Does it mean that the privileged mitigating circumstance

Question 16: Was the killing attended by the aggravating circumstance

GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE

Question 17: Will good conduct allowance partially extinguish criminal

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same

CIVIL INDEMNITY, MORAL AND EXEMPARY DAMAGES

I. For those crimes like Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of

CRIMES AND PENALTIES

Question 20: How is the crime of direct assault committed?

THEFT and ROBBERY

Question 21: What is apoderamiento?

Question 22: What is animus lucrandi?

Question 23: If robbery is committed by several malefactors in a motor

Question 24: If a person is apprehended in flagrante delicto committing

HOMICIDE and MURDER

Note, however, that the case of People v. Rodolfo Deniega, GRN

Question 29: What is the probative value of the sweetheart theory as

Question 36: May a person be convicted with the complex crime of

Question 37: The prosecution was able to prove the elements of

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

Question 40: Anita M. Capulong and her husband executed a

The first element covers the following ways of committing estafa:

The first way of committing estafa is known as estafa with abuse

Question 42: What is syndicated estafa?

In essence, syndicated estafa is but the commission of any kind of

NOTE: Under RA 7659, the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the

Question 43: What are the elements of syndicated estafa?

Question 44: The Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC II) is a

PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Question 46: For purposes of Art. 332, is the relationship by affinity

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that