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Abstract
This article considers Ricoeurs intended task of bridging the gap between Memory,
History, Forgetting (2000) and Time and Narrative (1983-85). Accordingly, we explore the
levels that interweave representation as object (how social agents represent their actions)
and representation as (historical) narrative (how historians represent what the social
agents represent of their present). We analyze how the way in which the social agents
represent their actions bends both memory and forgetting. Thereafter, we develop the
thesis that the way historians represent what the social agents represent of their present
should bind memory and forgetting together as well. Eventually, the engagement
between representation as object and representation as narrative allows us to propose
new figures of memory-forgetting involvement on the side of narrative: one-dimensional
memory-forgetting; scalable memory-forgetting; and displaceable forgetting. These
figures correspond to the ones Ricoeur proposes on the side of the object: forgetting and
blocked memory; forgetting and manipulated memory; and commanded forgetting:
amnesty.
Rsum : Cet essai considre la tche que Ricoeur envisage de combler l'cart entre
Mmoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli (2000) et Temps et Rcit (1983-85). En consquence, nous
explorons les niveaux qui entretiennent la reprsentation en tant quobjet (comment les
agents sociaux reprsentent leurs actions) et la reprsentation en tant que rcit
(comment les historiens reprsentent ce que les agents sociaux reprsentent de leur
prsent). Nous analysons comme la faon dont les agents sociaux reprsentent leurs
actions plie la fois la mmoire et l'oubli. Par la suite, nous dveloppons la thse
correspondante selon laquelle la faon dont les historiens reprsentent ce que les agents
sociaux reprsentent de leur prsent galement plie ensemble la mmoire et l'oubli.
Finalement, l'engagement entre la reprsentation en tant qu'objet et la reprsentation
en tant que rcit nous permet de proposer de nouvelles figures de l'implication de loublie
et la mmoire du ct du rcit : mmoire-oubli unidimensionnel ; mmoire-
oubli chellable; oubli dplaable. Celles-ci correspondent aux figures que Ricoeur
propose du ct de l'objet : l'oubli et la mmoire empche ; L'oubli et la mmoire
manipule ; et loublie command : lamnistie.
Mots-cls: Paul Ricoeur, histoire, rcit, mmoire, oubli.
1
Introduction
In Time and Narrative (hereafter TN1)1, Ricoeur declares that Narration [] implies
forgetting (hereafter MHF)3 admits that, not only memory, but forgetting as well, is
necessarily associated with historical narrative, but this association is a lacuna in his
oeuvre:
to say nothing of my gaze directed back now over a long lifeRflexion faite (looking
back)it is a question here of returning to a lacuna in the problematic of Time and
Narrative and in Oneself as Another, where temporal experience and the narrative
operation are directly placed in contact, at the price of an impasse with respect to
memory and, worse yet, of an impasse with respect to forgetting, the median levels
between time and narrative.4
This article answers to a single question: is it possible to deepen the relationship between
MHF and TN1? Accordingly, our major intent is to understand how memory and forgetting
MFH provides a clue that abridge the alleged lacuna. In fact, the narrative effort involves
what Ricoeur calls the dialectic of representation5 that binds together the two meanings
of historical representation. On the one hand, representation as object (how social agents
represent their actions) and, on the other, representation as historical narrative (how
One can say in the first place that the historian seeks to represent to himself the past
in the same way social agents represent the social bond and their contribution to this
bond to themselves, in this way making themselves readers of their existing and their
acting in society, and in this sense historians of their own present. 6
MHF develops the representation as object (how social agents represent their actions)
through an inspection about the involvement of memory and forgetting. Social agents
2
produce a historical representation that is basically the limits set between memory and
forgetting. Ricoeur describes this involvement according to three figures: Forgetting and
Amnesty.
It is our aim to filling out the lacuna between MHF and TN1 through the development of
historians represent what the social agents represent of their present). Thereby, we
develop this involvement according to three more figures: (4) one-dimensional memory-
forgetting; (5) memory and scalable memory-forgetting; and (6) displaceable forgetting.
In Memory, history, forgetting Ricoeur binds the representation as object (how social
agents represent their actions) to the mutual involvement between memory and
forgetting7. Two chapters in Ricoeurs 642-page-long book gather together the two sides
of the historical involvement between memory and forgetting. Ricoeur approaches the
MHFs third part. Ricoeur develops this chapter in three sections: Forgetting and the
Effacing of Traces8, Forgetting and the Persistence of Traces9, and The Forgetting of
Recollection: Uses and Abuses 10. This last section is subdivided into three figures of
recollection retrieve three figures of memory previously presented in MHFs firs part:
3
Blocked Memory14, Manipulated Memory15, and Obligated Memory16. Thereby, the
second chapter (The Exercise of Memory: Uses and Abuses 17) develops the historical
Overwriting Kants Dialects of Pure Reason, we obtain a suitable version for the Ricoeurian
antithetic [forgetting], for which one does not need to ponder or to lay artificial snares,
but rather into which reason [memory] falls of itself and even unavoidably.18 The
Differently from Kants First Critique, though, the memory-forgetting involvement does
not refer to pure conditions of reason, but to practical conditions that relates
...the specter of a memory that would never forget anything 19 and replaces it with a
memory, and could memory have to negotiate with forgetting, groping to find the right
measure in its balance with forgetting?20 This question receives accordingly a dialectical
response: forgetting can be so closely tied to memory that it can be considered one of
Forgetting: Amnesty24) are the weights for the representation as object (how social
agents represent their actions) to draw out its historical balance. We will henceforth
4
inspect the figures of the memory-forgetting according to Ricoeur in order to detail their
object
its release. When dealing with memory in the pathological-therapeutic sense, the issue of
impairment of memories arises because of the existence of shocking events that lead to
the unhealthy repetition of traumatic scenes. The work of mourning must be carried
A similar process goes on with historical mass events. As with great funeral celebrations,
the assumption is that in the fundamental structure of collective existence, violence acts
acts may be deemed glorious by some, but belittled by others. Their celebration, by
annulling the memory of the other, leaves wounds open, in need of a cure. 26 At this level
It is also in the border between personal and collective representaiotn that one can speak
5
object overlaps into ideology28. The phenomenon of ideology, according to Ricoeur, can
be observed in three layers which depict the memory-forgetting uses and abuses:
distortions of reality, the legitimation of the system of power, and the integration of the
common world.29 Ideology can act legitimately either as a silent constraint exerted on the
authority of the current status or power, as its justification. At the same time, what
(fuite), the expression of bad faith and its strategy of evasion which results in a wanting-
not-to-know.30
The ideological avoidance is in fact a dissimulated forgetting that can be contrasted and
The imperative of memory imposes itself as a federating force inasmuch as in all the
virtues that it wrests from the closed-circuit of the self with itself. The duty of memory is
the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self.31 , as long as We
are indebted to those who have gone before us.32 It is the duty towards the victims.33
The commanded forgetting then becomes the arbitrary measure that promotes justice
from amnesty, the political instrument that aims to establish civic peace from the
suspension of ongoing processes and judicial proceedings. Ricoeur reminds us of the fact
that amnesty bears a phonetic and semantic proximity to amnesia and the denial of
memory promotes the erasing of crimes likely to protect the future from the errors of
the past.34
6
The next step we must take is to understand how the involvement of memory-
forgetting emerges in historical narrative, since the memory and forgetting are the
it was due to the mediating function of the narrative that the abuses of memory were
made into abuses of forgetting. In fact, before the abuse, there was the use, that is the
unavoidably selective nature of narrative.36
division of a social place, a practice and the construction of a text.37 Ricoeur proposes a
a) documentary phase: I shall call the documentary phase the one that runs from
explanation/understanding phase the one that has to do with the multiple uses of the
connective because responding to the question why?: Why did things happen like that
c) representative phase: Finally, I shall call the representative phase the putting
The representative phase develops the narrative effort of the historiographical operation
and its role is unifying the two other phases: in this sense, representation in its narrative
aspect [] does not add something coming from the outside to the documentary and
7
explanatory phases, but rather accompanies and supports them.41 The representative
phase or historical narrative gives back the involvement between memory and forgetting,
object: how historians represent what the social agents represent of their present 43. In
The key element that embeds the representation as object and representation as
the term. Tragedy is the most well-defined product in narrative terms, because it is the
something intelligible and therefore something specific. 45 The narrative depends totally
on the emplotment as its essence; the plot drives the reproduction of action without
neglecting its practical realism that allows the reader or viewer to recognize him or herself
in the representation: By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought
together within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action. 46 Most of all,
developing a plot allows harmony to prevail over dissonance, for it produces the
discordant concordance47 that gives unity to the temporal dispersion of events when a
story is narrated. But emplotment the victory of unity over the dispersion. It requires that
social and cultural context. 48 When emplotment and intentionality fuse at the heart of
8
historical representation, the narrative accomplishes a mimetic act. In fact, mimesis
details and organizes the narrative effort in three parts (mimesis I, II and III).
(how social agents represent their actions in consciousness) are: (1) Forgetting and
Blocked Memory,49 (2) Forgetting and Manipulated Memory50 and (3) Commanded
Forgetting: Amnesty51. Our aim, henceforth, is to develop three more figures of the
historians represent what the social agents represent of their present). Explicitly, we are
narrative
surrounds them and guarantees vital resources for their mode of being. According to
Ricoeur, these symbolic structures differentiate action from the mere physical
movement.52 Symbols are active as far as they are interpreters of the world of action,
enabling it to be almost text, meaning that symbols provide the rules of meaning as a
9
classroom, for example, everyone immediately understands that if pupils raise their
hands, this means they would like to make a comment or ask a question related to the
content of the lesson. These symbolic automatisms are the most basic acts of
emplotment54.
that the agent establishes to reach the purposes of an action. 55 Ricoeur summarizes the
present and a present of the present.56 The multidimensional character of time in the
level of narrative is explained from the perspective of the present. It is presentness. The
presentness. It means that the past present (document) is recovered by the historian as a
living past. The historical narrative recreates a past that is alive like the present of the
At this mimetic level, the presentness that intelligible symbolic structures offer might as
portrayed presentness. In fact, this failure means that the multidimensional structures of
presentness shrink to present. The present of the present forgets the present of the past
and the present of the future. Reciprocally, the present of the present only remembers
the present of the present. The narrative failure of mimesis described in this section is
10
understood as one-dimensional memory-forgetting and it is the fourth figure to form
memory-forgetting involvement.
Mimesis II is the center of the narrative effort, because it relates directly to the
development of the plot, as Ricoeur puts it.57 Its centrality renders an integrating role
operation; its performance involves three mediation tasks back and forth in order to that
The first task concerns the articulation between event and historical narrative. When the
event takes place in the plot, it becomes an integrated unit with an intelligible whole.59
such as agents, ends, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results, etc. 60. In
its turn, the third task of emplotment is to mediate between pre-figured time and
refigured time through temporal resources of its own.61 Together, these three tasks
accomplish the most original and dynamic aspect of mimesis II, because they make the
irreversible order and the urge that are characteristic of human actions. As Ricoeur points
Besides these three tasks, two other elements also help configure the narrative act which
is characteristic of the development of the plot in mimesis II: schematism and tradition.
Schematism of imagination is the link created between the author/historian who creates
the emplotment, and the reader. The productive imagination64 enables the narrative
11
configuration to be passed on to the reader; once his/her imagination schematized
something narratively, they can reenact the action in the plot. Tradition, in its turn, refers
to cultural heritage, once emplotment can be qualified and recognized through the
various literary genres that perform the link between the emplotments designer and
reader through cultures paradigms. Tradition allows new genres of narrative to arise,
be it for the configuring of emplotments that are recognized by the canon, or for
experimental emplotments that aspire to it. Finally, mimesis IIs schematism and tradition
launch mimesis II towards its limits, given that they already act as preparation for the
forgetting. The focus on unity, to which schematism and tradition concur, tends to make
events more or less significant, depending on the profile that the unity of emplotment
acquires for concrete, specific and dated historiographical operations The memory-
the shifts the scale in the narrative. Scalable memory-forgetting is the fifth figure of
Mimesis III is the intersection of the configured world by emplotment and the world in
which effective action is exhibited and displays its specific temporality. It means, that the
mimesis cicle is concluded at the intersection between the world of text and the world
12
of the reader or listener.65 The refiguration involves the problem of reference66 as the
narrative must be embedded in the horizon of the world in which the reader is situated.
In fact, only history can claim a reference inscribed in empirical reality, inasmuch as
historical intentionality aims at events that have actually occurred. 67 The emplotment
provides the reader with the re-enactment of the experienced world. The reconfiguration
sheds the readers present references on a new light and provides her/him provides the
reader with the re-enactment of the experienced world. Accordingly, in mimesis III, the
problem of memory-forgetting emerges as the flexible limits between past and present
references. The refiguration act allows that these limits are displaced according to the
mutual implications of past and present for the reader. Displaceable memory-forgetting
The following table plots the six figures of memory-forgetting according to their main
features.
FORGETTING INVOLVEMENT
13
agents represent their 3) commanded forgetting reconciliation and forgiving
actions) (amnesty)
REPRESENTATION AS
5) Scalable memory- shifts on conceptual
NARRATIVE (how
forgetting approach (micro to macro
historians represent
scales or vice-versa)
what the social agents
6) Displaceable memory- transposition of the limits
represent of their
forgetting between past and present
present)
In the next, and last part, we will resume the six figures to emphasize their paired
correspondence.
a) First pair: forgetting and blocked memory (first figure) and one-dimensional
In MHF, the unhealthy repetition of a traumatic events turns into an accessible memory
of a past trauma when it is recalled. This process emphasizes the reproduction of the
trauma, a compulsion to repeat that makes memory ill. In this case, forgetting can be both
14
an unhealthy repetition that prevents individuals to enact the memory of a past trauma
and collect traces of the event that cannot be forgotten (the unforgettable).
In mimesis I, the configuring act of emplotment is possible to the extent that the human
only the present of the present, so that historical narrative sticks to presentness.
In short, presentness of a past event that remains present in the one-dimension memory
official history. Forgetting thus may also take the form of censorship that edits memory,
so that the involvement between remembering and forgetting determines the control of
the status quo. Alternatively, forgetting in this instance can become a legal act, as in the
case of judicial and political amnesties. Ricoeur affirms that in the forgetting promoted by
manipulated memory,
The resource of narrative then becomes the trap, when higher powers take over this
emplotment and impose a canonical narrative by means of intimidation or seduction,
fear or flattery. A devious form of forgetting is at work here, resulting from stripping
the social actors of their original power to recount their actions themselves. 68
15
Respectively, in mimesis II, when emplotment includes historical narrative, one of the
and out, the meaningful unity of narrative dislocates the focus on historical events
accordingly. For instance, the first generations of Annales historians and traditional
Marxist historians understood historical meaningful unity respectively as total history and
dialectical totality. On the contrary, their successors of the Annales third generation and
similarly, changed the meaningful unity from historical totalities to experienced local
events. In any case, the reach larger or smaller historical scale - of what the
historiographical operation should grasp may produce conceptual shifts on the what is
basically on memory gaps in their rivals historical narrative. Actually, it is not uncommon
to find claims that the oppositions theoretical choices may in some degree be
Brazil, a debate about Brazilian slavery took place between old-school Marxian historians
and new-leftist cultural historians. The former charged the latter of having purged slavery
relatively autonomous agents from the point of view of their daily experience: the slave
16
had his subjectivity refurbished as the volunteered agent of his reconciliation with
vice-versa), which change the scales of memory in historical narrative - may have as its
counterpart the forgetting that arises with manipulated memory gaps in memory
justice from amnesty, the political instrument that aims to establish civic peace from the
III, the refiguration act allows that the limits between past and present are displaced
according to the mutual implications of narrated past and readers reference in their living
the narrative has as its counterpart the reconciliation and forgiving that the commanded
The next table plots the figures of memory-forgetting involvement in pairs to emphasize
17
FIGURES OF MEMORY- COUNTERPARTS
FORGETTING
INVOLVEMENTS PAIRS
1) forgetting and presentness of a past event that remains present in the one-
memory-forgetting
manipulated memory macro scales or vice-versa), which change the scales of memory in
5) Scalable memory- historical narrative - may have as its counterpart the forgetting
to ideological bias.
forgetting
Final remarks
18
The memory-forgetting figures as products of historical narrative this article proposes do
represent their actions) and as narrative (how historians represent what the social agents
represent of their present). According to this dual framework, three figures of the
Ricoeurs MHF: forgetting and blocked memory (first figure); forgetting and manipulated
memory (second figure); and commanded forgetting (third figure). Afterwards, three new
(sixth figure). We still developed the correspondence between these six figures in pairs
(the first and the fourth; the second and the fifth; and the third and the sixth). This
figure) and scalable memory-forgetting (fifth figure) confront each other. The
The myth of Lethe, the river of forgetting, illustrates the long history of forgetting that
complements memory paradigms, according to Weinrich71. This myth reminds us that the
19
occurrence of forgetting can be found throughout the Western literary tradition: in the
Odyssey, Homer gets lost in mystical lands, having forgotten his real duty, which is to
recommend that Virgil remembers them once he returns from the realm of the dead; etc.
Forgetting, in these cases, is an act that works on the basis of objectives that are enshrined
in memory.
1
Paul Ricoeur, Temps et Rcit, vol. 1 (Paris: Seuil, 1983) [original French publication]. All references are from
the English translation: Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
2
Ricouer, TN1, PDF EM INGLS SEM PAGINAO
3
Paul Ricoeur, La memoire, l'histoire, l'oubli (Paris: Seuil, 2000) [original French publication]. All references
are from the English translation: Paul Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and
David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
4
Ricoeur, MHF, preface.
5
Ricoeur, MHF, 227.
6
Ricoeur, MHF, 232.
7
Ricoeur, MHF, 137.
8
Ricoeur, MHF, 418-426.
9
Ricoeur, MHF, 427-442.
10
Ricoeur, MHF, 443-456.
11
Ricoeur, MHF, 444-448.
12
Ricoeur, MHF, 448-452.
13
Ricoeur, MHF, 452-456.
14
Ricoeur, MHF, 69-80.
15
Ricoeur, MHF, 80-86.
16
Ricoeur, MHF, 86-92.
17
Ricoeur, MHF, 56-92.
18
Immanuel Kant, The critique of pure reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998): 460.
19
Ricoeur, MHF, 413.
20
Ricoeur, MHF, 413.
21
Ricoeur, MHF, 426.
22
Ricoeur, MHF, 444-448.
23
Ricoeur, MHF, 448-452.
24
Ricoeur, MHF, 452-456.
25
Ricoeur, MHF, 78.
26
Ricoeur, MHF, 78.
27
Ricoeur, MHF, 444ff.
28
Ricoeur, MHF, 82.
29
Ricoeur, MHF, 81.
30
Ricoeur, MHF, 449.
20
31
Ricoeur, MHF, 89.
32
Ricoeur, MHF, 89.
33
Ricoeur, MHF, 89-91.
34
Ricoeur, MHF, 455.
35
Ricoeur, MHF, preface.
36
Ricoeur, MHF, 448.
37
Michel de Certeau. The writing of history (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
38
Ricoeur, MHF, 136.
39
Ricoeur, MHF, 136.
40
Ricoeur, MHF, 136.
41
Ricoeur, MHF, 238.
42
Ricoeur, MHF, 235.
43
Ricoeur, MHF, 232.
44
Aristotle, Poetics, in: Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 23, trans. W.H. Fyfe (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1932). Available at:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1:1450b
(accessed Nov 28 2016).
45
Ricoeur, TN1, 171.
46
Ricoeur, TN1, IX.
47
Ricur, TN1, 73.
48
Paul Gyllenhammer, Paul R. Ricoeur's theory of narrative as a reformulation of Husserl's notion of
intentionality. PhD thesis. Marquette University, 2000. Available at:
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations/AAI9991605 (accessed Dec 01 2015).
49
Ricoeur, MHF, 444-448.
50
Ricoeur, MHF, 448-452.
51
Ricoeur, MHF, 452-456.
52
Ricoeur, TN1, 55.
53
Ricoeur, TN1, 58.
54
Ricoeur, TN1, 54.
55
Ricoeur, TN1, 59.
56
Ricoeur, TN1, 180.
57
Ricoeur, TN1, 65.
58
Ricoeur, TN1, 65.
59
Ricoeur, TN1, 65.
60
Ricoeur, TN1, 65.
61
Ricoeur, TN1, 65.
62
Ricoeur, TN1, 66.
63
Ricoeur, TN1, 178.
64
Ricoeur, TN1, 68.
65
Ricoeur, TN1, 72.
66
Ricoeur, TN1, 77.
67
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 82.
68
Ricoeur, MHF, 448.
69
Hlio Rebello Cardoso Jr., Narratives and Totalities as an issue in historiography, Histria (Revista).
Histria (Sao Paulo), v.13, (1994): 177-184; Hlio Rebello Cardoso Jr., Historians and detectives: Holmes-
Ginzburg's conjectural-semiotic method and Dupin-Veyne's serial method, Storia della Storiografia, n. 44
(2003): 3-20.
70
71
Weinrich, Lethe: the art and critique of forgetting.
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