ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v.
COMMISSION ON visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in
ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD,
JR.
G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015, EN BANC
(PERALTA, J.)
Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio
Caballeros certificate of candidacy (COC) on the ground
of false representation. It was alleged that Caballero was
actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for
mayor. Caballero argued that he already took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and has renounced his Canadian
citizenship.
Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballeros COC for
failure to comply with the one year residency requirement,
reasoning that Caballeros naturalization as a Canadian
citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of
origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero insisted that the
requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification
of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the
period of residence in the place where he seeks to be
elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his
constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that
his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to
his election is a substantial compliance with the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.
RULING:
Yes. The term residence is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence,
that is, the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired
by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.
In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was
born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes.
Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and
became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. This holds true in Caballero's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent
Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
Moreover, it was held that Caballeros retention of his
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not automatically
make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He
must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes
as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the
time he made it as such.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province
of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May
26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were
both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority and registered himself
as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public
elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization
takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes
his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss
of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
VILLABER vs. COMELEC
Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R.
Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the
First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to
disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of
candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged
that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified
to run for any public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber
disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude, which would disqualify Villaber as a candidate
for and from holding any public office.
Held:
COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code that any person who has been
sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he
has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he
was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3
term limit rule)
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995
elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation
in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an
election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring
the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and
void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was
proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent
timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the
ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the
same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of
office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although
he was later unseated before the expiration of the term,
should be counted as service for one full term in computing
the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution
granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the
COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly
elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his
assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service
of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit
for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioners
assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as
service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely
a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue:
WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of
applying the three-term limit for elective local government
officials.
Held:
No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three
years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May
1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
ABUNDO VS. COMELEC
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA,Respondents.
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Petitioner
Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of
municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms
as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007
term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one
year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections
where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the
formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-
term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position
of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division
affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by
COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served
for three terms.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of
Service
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been
Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest
grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was
declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption
in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not
serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to
said position. During the pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not
serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or
break in his service because prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Marquez v COMELEC
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province
of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the
reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for
being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for
ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of
Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State
of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his
arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged flight from that
country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from
the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed
without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of
respondents CoC on account of the candidates
disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of
Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted
quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be
facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading
a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive
from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC
and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for,
and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local
office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a
Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and
considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181).
However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity
in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is
so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither
expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to
it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite
finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a
fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed
the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts,
is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC
for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails
COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the
votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either
disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due
course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots
or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010
elections.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010,
Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be
counted in her favor.
However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844.
The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice- Mayor of
Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the
voting:\
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1
Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-
Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of
Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-
nine (39) votes, Casimira contends thatshe would have
clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had
the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for
Aurelio to her votes
.
ISSUE:
With the adoption of automated election system in our
country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of
the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system
wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by
shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen
candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the
candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the
ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been
cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
was still included or printed in the official ballots on
election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance
candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the
bona fide candidate?
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all
disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69
(nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation
shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run forthe office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate" are not
among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving
money or material consideration to influence or corrupt
voters or public officials performing electoral functions,
election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or
making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40
of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a
petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition
to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy
(COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by
different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition
ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section
68" petition. They are different remedies, based on
different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x
xx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one
hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancela CoC can only be grounded
on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in
Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly
be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she
remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose
CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section
78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered
a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes
cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC
was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast
for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due
course be considered stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such under a final judgment was
applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the
name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the
same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared
on the ballots on election day because while the
COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin
Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for
reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after
the election. We said that the votes for candidates for
mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC
Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes
and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies
actually made the will of the electorate determinable
despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential
nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to
count them in favor of the bona fide candidate
notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such
was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings
against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably
exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the
similarity of names that affects the voters will and
frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in
Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly
because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the
elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof
through newspaper releases and other forms of notification
on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse
effect on the voters will was similarly present in this case,
if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots
with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on
the line for Representative - over five thousand - which
have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots
being more than sufficient to overcome private
respondents lead of only 453 votes after the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long
before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have
been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner.
COMELECs changing of the rule on votes cast for
nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of
significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to
private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in
Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective
of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the
will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns
the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where
the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having
a number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by
the mere presence of another candidate with a similar
surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC
increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While
political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by
advising the electorate to write the full name of their
candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated
voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections
will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of
candidates
What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent
failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant
circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844
to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by
enumerating those changes brought about by the new
automated election system to the form of official ballots,
manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the
substantial distinctions between manual and automated
elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes
cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the
rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines
that these find no application in the case at bar because the
rules on appreciation of ballots apply only to elections
where the names of candidates are handwritten in the
ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206666, 21 January 2015, (Leonardo-De Castro
J.)
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that
He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President but
was opposed by three petitions seeking for his
disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs
were denied by Comelec en banc. Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10,
2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against former President Estrada before the COMELEC
because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC,
Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estradas right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second
highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for
the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and
praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and
be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.
Ruling:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is
that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estradas rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardons text. The pardoning power of
the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article
VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if
we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him While it may be apparent that the
proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty.
In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
DOMINADOR JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, EN BANC (Abad, J.)
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26,
1973. He migrated to Australia in
1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35,
he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his
brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he
was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship,
executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance
with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return,
Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village
where he lived. He applied for registration as a voter in the
Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay
Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos name in the COMELEC
voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos name from the official voters list.
MTC denied Erasmos petition.
He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTCs. On
November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply
with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed to
comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos
won the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year
residency requirement
RULING:
Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was
Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his
birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City to
Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that
country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he
came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in
his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
Mendoza v COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor
of Bataan province a number of times:
a) 1986 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by
former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988
b) 1988 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election
in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and served up to
1995
d) 1995 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate
of candidacy for the same post in the May 2001 regular
elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek
to declare respondent Romans election as governor of
Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art.
X, 8 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor
following the recall elections be included in determining
the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
Held:
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an
incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance
of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term
before the proscription can apply, providing for only one
exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the
office. If involuntary severance from the service which
results in the incumbents being unable to finish his term of
office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates one term for purposes of applying
the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of
the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a
recall election should not also be held to be one term in
reckoning the three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is
unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who
only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local
official following the recall election could be considered to
have served a full three-year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials
from serving for more than three consecutive terms
because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such
interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June
28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent
Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue
of a recall election held in 1993, should not be
counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election
on that day was actually only his third term for the same
position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term,
because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short
the elected officials service to less than nine years and
shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent
monopoly of political power should be balanced against the
need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the
present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the
votes cast.
Socrates v Comelec
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto
Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995,
1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-
term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same
mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates
ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term,
Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election
held, Hagedorn run for the formers unexpired term
as mayor. Socrates sought
Hagedorns disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE:
WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term
limit rule
HELD:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two
parts. The first part provides that
an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interruptscontinuity of service
and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms,

an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a
fourth term, The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the same office following the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A
subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer
animmediate reelection after the three consecutive terms;
and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he

became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over
his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September

24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private
citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in
the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition.