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Pointers
in
Political
Law
2017
BAR
EXAMS
By
Professor
Victoria
V.
Loanzon
with
the
assistance
of
Atty.
Clemente
L.
Reyes
IV
and
Atty.
Allan
Pamis
ADVISORY:
In
reading
this
material,
please
pay
particular
attention
on
cases
penned
by
Justice
Bersamin.
I.
Preliminary
Considerations
1.
What
is
the
concept
of
the
supremacy
of
the
Constitution?
Answer:
The
Constitution
is
the
fundamental
law
of
the
land.
A
constitution
is
the
body
of
rules
and
maxims
in
accordance
with
which
the
power
of
sovereignty
are
habitually
exercised.
(Cooley)
The
supremacy
of
the
Constitution
mandates
that
all
enactments
of
Congress,
all
issuances
emanating
from
the
executive
branch
and
private
contracts
must
conform
to
the
provisions
of
the
Constitution
in
all
respects.
In
Manila
Prince
Hotel
v.
Government
Service
Insurance
System,
the
Court
held:
The
fundamental
conception
in
other
words
is
that
it
is
a
supreme
law
to
which
all
other
laws
must
conform
and
in
accordance
with
which
all
private
rights
must
be
determined
and
all
public
authority
administered.
Under
the
doctrine
of
constitutional
supremacy,
if
a
law
or
contract
violates
any
norm
of
the
constitution,
that
law
or
contract
whether
promulgated
by
the
legislative
or
by
the
executive
branch
or
entered
into
by
private
persons
for
private
purposes
is
null
and
void
and
without
any
force
and
effect.
Thus,
since
the
Constitution
is
the
fundamental,
paramount
and
supreme
law
of
the
nation,
it
is
deemed
written
in
every
statute
and
contract.
2.
Enumerate
the
three
basic
parts
of
the
1987
Constitution.
Answer:
The
1987
Constitution
has
the
following
parts:
1. Constitution
of
Liberty
which
provides
for
the
Bill
of
Rights
2. Constitution
of
Government
which
provides
for
the
government
organization
and
the
functions
of
the
government
bureaucracy.
3. Constitution
of
Sovereignty
which
provides
for
the
methods
of
amendment
and
revision
of
the
Constitution.
4. A
constitution
provides
for
a
framework
of
government;
identifies
basic
structures
of
government
and
assign
their
respective
powers
and
duties;
and
establishes
principles
upon
which
the
government
is
founded
and
its
relationship
to
its
constituents.
3.
Enumerate
the
rules
which
must
be
observed
in
interpreting
the
Constitution.
Answer:
The
Court
gave
the
following
rules
in
the
interpretation
of
the
Constitution:
1. Verba
legis:
whenever
possible,
the
words
in
the
Constitution
must
be
given
their
ordinary
meaning
except
when
technical
terms
are
employed.
2. Ratio
legis
et
anima:
the
words
in
the
Constitution
should
be
interpreted
in
accordance
with
the
intent
of
the
framers.
3. Ut
magis
valeat
quam
pereat:
the
Constitution
must
be
interpreted
as
a
whole.
(Francisco
v.
House
of
Representatives,
2003)
II.
The
State:
Sovereignty
and
Amending
the
Constitution
1.
A
majority
of
the
incumbent
members
of
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives
want
to
introduce
changes
in
the
Constitution.
What
are
the
available
options
by
which
the
Philippine
Constitution
can
be
amended
or
revised?
Answer:
The
Constitution
maybe
amended
or
revised
in
the
following
ways:
(1).
Congress,
Art.
XVII,
Sec.
1:
By
Congress
as
a
constituent
assembly
upon
a
vote
of
of
all
its
members.
The
constituent
assembly
may
introduce
revisions
to
the
constitution.
1
|
P a g e
(2).
Constitutional
Convention,
Art.
XVII,
Sec.
3:
By
2/3
vote
of
all
members
of
Congress
call
a
constitutional
convention
or
by
a
majority
vote
of
all
its
members,
submit
to
the
electorate
the
question
of
calling
such
convention.
The
constitutional
convention
may
likewise
introduce
revisions
to
the
constitution.
PLEASE
TAKE
NOTE
THAT:
(1).
The
Congress
has
legislative
power
which
is
plenary
in
nature
but
the
power
to
amend
the
Constitution
is
not
included.
It
is
within
the
constituent
power
of
the
people
which
has
been
duly
delegated
to
Congress
when
it
convenes
itself
as
a
constituent
assembly.
Congress
continues
to
exercise
its
legislative
body
even
it
has
already
been
convened
as
a
constituent
assembly.
(Gonzales
v.
COMELEC
(1967))
(2).
The
Court
upheld
the
power
of
Congress
to
enact
the
implementing
details
of
the
constitutional
convention
provided
the
same
do
not
clash
with
any
specific
provision
of
the
Constitution
sought
to
be
amended.
(Imbong
v.
COMELEC
(1970))
2.
Disgruntled
by
the
persistent
scheme
of
the
members
of
Congress
to
insert
pork
barrel
funds
in
the
General
Appropriations
Act,
a
number
of
civic
minded
citizens
rallied
the
electorate
to
introduce
amendment
to
the
Constitution
to
address
this
concern.
What
is
the
appropriate
method
to
introduce
such
amendment?
Answer:
The
qualified
citizens
may
resort
to
Peoples
initiative
under
Section
2
of
Art.
XVII.
Said
section
provides:
Upon
petition
of
at
least
12%
of
the
total
number
of
registered
voters,
of
which
every
district
must
be
represented
by
at
least
3%
of
the
voters
therein.
This
may
only
be
done
once
every
five
years.
3
Distinguish
between
amendment
and
revision.
Answer:
Revision
broadly
implies
a
change
that
alters
a
basic
principle
in
the
constitution,
like
altering
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
or
the
system
of
checks-and-balances.
There
is
also
revision
if
the
change
alters
the
substantial
entirety
of
the
constitution,
as
when
the
change
affects
substantial
provisions
of
the
constitution.
On
the
other
hand,
amendment
broadly
refers
to
a
change
that
adds,
reduces,
or
deletes
without
altering
the
basic
principle
involved.
Revision
generally
affects
several
provisions
of
the
constitution,
while
amendment
generally
affects
only
the
specific
provision
being
amended.
(Lambino
v.
COMELEC,
505
SCRA
160)
4.
What
are
the
two
steps
in
the
amending
process?
Answer:
There
are
two
steps
in
the
amendatory
process:
(1)
proposal,
and
(2)
ratification.
5.
What
are
the
two
tests
developed
by
the
Court
to
determine
if
a
change
in
the
Constitution
is
an
amendment
or
a
revision?
Answer:
The
Court
has
developed
the
two-part
test:
the
quantitative
test
and
the
qualitative
test.
The
quantitative
test
asks
whether
the
proposed
change
is
"so
extensive
in
its
provisions
as
to
change
directly
the
'substantial
entirety'
of
the
constitution
by
the
deletion
or
alteration
of
numerous
existing
provisions."
In
quantitative
test,
the
Court
examines
only
the
number
of
provisions
affected
and
does
not
consider
the
degree
of
the
change.
(Lambino
v.
COMELEC,
505
SCRA
160)
6.
Discuss
the
manner
by
which
amendments
and
revisions
to
the
Constitution
may
be
ratified.
Answer:
In
case
of
amendments
proposed
by
Congress
or
a
Convention,
Art.
XVII,
Sec.
4,
paragraph
1:
Ratification
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
conducted
by
COMELEC
which
shall
be
held
not
earlier
than
60
days
nor
90
days
after
the
approval
of
the
amendment
or
revision.
In
case
of
amendments
proposed
through
initiative,
Art.
XVII,
Sec.
4,
paragraph
2:
Ratification
by
a
majority
of
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
which
shall
be
held
not
later
than
60
days
nor
later
than
90
days
after
certification
by
COMELEC
of
the
sufficiency
of
the
petition.
7.
May
a
party
seek
judicial
intervention
in
amending
the
Constitution?
Answer:
Yes:
The
Supreme
Court
may
exercise
judicial
review
over
any
matter
relative
to
the
process
of
amending
or
revising
the
Constitution.
(Lambino
v.
COMELEC,
505
SCRA
160)
2
|
P a g e
8.
How
is
sovereignty
exercised
by
the
Filipinos?
Answer:
The
right
to
suffrage
is
a
manifestation
of
the
exercise
of
sovereign
powers.
The
Constitution
has
also
vested
in
the
Filipinos
to
participate
in
referendum,
plebiscite,
the
process
of
recall
at
the
local
government
level
and
enacting
laws
through
peoples
initiative.
III.
A.
The
State:
The
National
Territory
and
UNCLOS
1.
What
are
the
elements
of
a
state?
Answer:
The
elements
of
a
state
are:
territory,
people,
sovereignty
and
government.
2.
Enumerate
the
legal
instruments
and
laws
which
define
the
Philippine
territory.
Answer:
Article
I,
1987
Constitution
defines
the
National
Territory
of
the
Philippines.
The
following
subsequent
treaties
and
laws
define
the
national
territory
as
well:
(1).
Treaty
limits:
Treaty
of
Paris,
Art.
III
(2).
Treaty
between
Spain
and
U.S.
concluded
at
Washington
on
November
7,
1900
and
that
between
U.S.
and
Great
Britain
on
January
2,
1930
(3).
Method
of
determining
baselines
under
R.A.
No.
3046,
June
17,
1961,
R.A.
No.5446,
September
8,
1968;
and
R.A.
No.
9522(
Philippine
Archipelagic
Baselines
Law)
,
March
10,
2009,
using
the
straight
line
approach
(4).
P.D.
No.
1596,
June
11,
1978
which
delineated
other
territories
over
which
the
Philippines
has
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction
(5).
Two
Hundred-Mile
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
under
P.D.
No.
1599,
June
11,
1978
3.
Petitioner
Magallona
assailed
the
constitutionality
of
R.A.
No.
9522
on
two
principal
grounds,
namely:
(1)
RA
9522
reduces
Philippine
maritime
territory,
and
logically,
the
reach
of
the
Philippine
states
sovereign
power,
in
violation
of
Article
1
of
the
1987
Constitution,
embodying
the
terms
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris
and
ancillary
treaties,
and
(2)
RA
9522
opens
the
countrys
waters
landward
of
the
baselines
to
maritime
passage
by
all
vessels
and
aircrafts,
undermining
Philippine
sovereignty
and
national
security,
contravening
the
countrys
nuclear-free
policy,
and
damaging
marine
resources,
in
violation
of
relevant
constitutional
provisions.
Are
the
arguments
of
Petitioner
Magallona
tenable?
Answer:
No,
the
arguments
of
Petitioner
Magallona
are
not
tenable.
R.A.
9522
is
a
statutory
tool
to
demarcate
the
countrys
maritime
zones
and
the
extended
continental
shelf
under
UNCLOS
III
and
not
to
delineate
the
Philippine
territory.
UNCLOS
III
has
nothing
to
do
with
the
acquisition
(or
loss)
of
territory.
It
is
a
multilateral
treaty
regulating,
among
others,
sea-use
rights
over
maritime
zones
(i.e.,
the
territorial
waters
[12
nautical
miles
from
the
baselines],
contiguous
zone
[24
nautical
miles
from
the
baselines],
exclusive
economic
zone
[200
nautical
miles
from
the
baselines]),
and
continental
shelves
that
UNCLOS
III
delimits.
The
use
of
the
framework
of
the
Regime
of
Islands
to
determine
the
maritime
zones
of
the
Kalayaan
Island
Group
and
the
Scarborough
Shoal
is
not
inconsistent
with
the
Philippines
claim
over
the
subject
territories
as
well
as
claims
over
Sabah.
The
provisions
of
R.A.
9522
are
compliant
with
UNCLOS
III
and
do
not
violate
the
rights
of
the
Philippines
over
its
internal
waters.
4.
As
a
signatory
of
UNCLOS,
may
the
Philippines
seek
legal
relief
on
its
claim
as
a
coastal
state
against
another
signatory
to
the
agreement?
Answer:
A
party
to
UNCLOS
may
avail
of
three
remedies,
to
wit:
(1).
Article
279.
Obligation
to
settle
disputes
by
peaceful
means
(2).
Article
280.
Settlement
of
disputes
by
any
peaceful
means
chosen
by
the
parties
(3).
Article
286
of
UNCLOS
provides
that
subject
to
Section
3,
any
dispute
concerning
the
interpretation
or
application
of
this
Convention
shall,
where
no
settlement
has
been
reached
by
recourse
to
Section1,
be
submitted
at
the
request
of
any
party
to
the
dispute
to
the
court
or
tribunal
having
jurisdiction
under
this
Section.
The
Philippines
filed
an
arbitration
case-
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
v.
The
Peoples
Republic
of
China-
to
challenge
Chinas
nine-dash
line
claim
in
the
South
China
Sea.
3
|
P a g e
On
October
29,
2015,
the
Permanent
Court
of
Arbitration
ruled
that
it
has
jurisdiction
on
the
Philippines
case
questioning
the
legality
of
Chinas
enormous
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea.
The
Philippines
case
is
anchored
on
the
1982
Convention
which
allows
coastal
states
the
right
to
manage,
explore
and
exploit
areas
within
its
200-nautical
mile
exclusive
economic
zone.
It
also
tackles
the
status
of
certain
maritime
features
in
the
South
China
Sea
(which
the
Philippines
calls
the
West
Philippine
Sea)
and
the
maritime
entitlements
they
are
capable
of
generating,
and
the
lawfulness
of
certain
actions
by
China
in
the
South
China
Sea
that
are
alleged
by
the
Philippines
to
violate
the
UNCLOS.
The
Philippines
said
Chinas
assertion
of
having
indisputable
and
historical
claims
that
extends
beyond
what
is
allowed
by
the
UNCLOS
infringes
on
the
countrys
maritime
jurisdiction
and
prevents
it
from
exercising
its
right
under
the
convention.
5.
What
are
the
significant
pronouncements
of
the
Permanent
Court
of
Arbitration
in
its
July
12,
2016
ruling?
Answer:
The
Permanent
Court
of
Arbitration
"concluded
that,
as
between
the
Philippines
and
China,
there
was
no
legal
basis
for
China
to
claim
historic
rights
to
resources,
in
excess
of
the
rights
provided
for
by
the
Convention,
within
the
sea
areas
falling
within
the
'9-dash
line.'
The
tribunal
said
that
"all
of
the
high-tide
features
in
the
Spratly
Islands
(including,
for
example,
Itu
Aba,
Thitu,
West
York
Island,
Spratly
Island,
North-East
Cay,
South-West
Cay)
are
legally
"rocks"
that
do
not
generate
an
exclusive
economic
zone
or
continental
shelf."
6.
What
are
the
maritime
zones
of
the
U.N.
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Seas,
April
30,
1982
which
are
pertinent
to
the
claim
of
the
Philippine
government?
Answer:
The
following
provisions
of
UNCLOS
are
relevant
to
the
claim
of
the
Philippine
government:
(1).
Internal
waters
of
the
Philippines
consist
of
waters
around,
between
and
connecting
the
islands
of
the
Philippine
Archipelago,
regardless
of
their
breadth
and
dimensions,
including
the
waters
in
bays,
rivers
and
lakes.
No
right
of
innocent
passage
for
foreign
vessels
exists
in
the
case
of
internal
waters.
(Harris,
Cases
and
Materials
on
International
Law,
5th
ed.,
1998,
p.
407).
(2).
Contiguous
zone
is
the
zone
contiguous
to
the
territorial
sea
and
extends
up
to
twelve
nautical
miles
from
the
territorial
sea
and
over
which
the
coastal
state
may
exercise
control
necessary
to
prevent
infringement
of
its
customs,
fiscal,
immigration
or
sanitary
laws
and
regulations
within
the
territory
or
territorial
sea.
(Article
33
of
UNCLOS)
(3).
Territorial
Sea
extends
up
to
twenty-four
nautical
miles.
(4).
Extended
Continental
Shelf
extends
up
to
150
nautical
miles.
(5).
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
is
the
zone
extending
up
to
200
nautical
miles
from
the
baselines
of
a
state
over
which
the
coastal
state
has
sovereign
rights
for
the
purpose
of
exploring
and
exploiting,
conserving
and
managing
its
natural
resources,
whether
living
or
non-living,
of
the
waters
super
adjacent
to
the
seabed
and
of
the
seabed
and
subsoil
and
with
regard
to
other
activities
for
the
economic
exploitation
and
exploration
of
the
zone.
(Articles
56
and
57,
UNCLOS)
PLEASE
NOTE
THAT
-
Under
UNCLOS,
however,
warships
enjoy
a
right
of
innocent
passage
when
a
portion
of
the
territorial
water
of
the
coastal
state
is
used
for
international
navigation.
Article
42(2)
of
UNCLOS
provides
that
there
shall
be
no
suspension
of
innocent
passage
through
straits
used
for
international
navigation.
The
right
of
the
coastal
state
to
suspend
the
same
requires
that
the
coastal
nation
must
publish
the
same
and
without
any
publication,
it
cannot
insist
to
suspend
the
use
of
such
body
of
water.
A
claim
that
suspension
of
innocent
passage
is
necessary
for
national
security
may
be
cited
by
the
coastal
state.
Upon
the
other
hand,
if
a
war
ship
delayed
its
right
of
innocence,
the
same
may
justified
under
Article
18(2)
of
UNCLOS
if
the
delay
was
caused
by
rendering
assistance
to
persons
or
ship
in
distress.
PLEASE
NOTE
THAT
-
Flag
state
means
a
ship
has
the
nationality
of
the
flag
of
the
state
it
flies,
but
there
must
be
a
genuine
link
between
the
state
and
the
ship.
(Article
91,
UNCLOS)
Flag
of
convenience
refers
to
a
state
with
which
a
vessel
is
registered
for
various
reasons
such
as
low
or
non-existent
taxation
or
low-operating
costs
although
the
ship
has
no
genuine
link
with
that
state.
(Harris,
ibid.
p.425)
4
|
P a g e
7.
May
a
foreign
military
vessel
sail
through
the
territorial
waters
of
the
Philippines?
Answer:
As
a
general
rule,
a
foreign
military
vessel
cannot
enter
the
territorial
waters
of
the
Philippines.
The
rule
is
not
absolute.
In
a
decided
case,
the
Court
held
that
when
the
US
Embassy
in
the
Philippines
requested
diplomatic
clearance
for
USS
Guardian
"to
enter
and
exit
the
territorial
waters
of
the
Philippines
and
to
arrive
at
the
port
of
Subic
Bay
for
the
purpose
of
routine
ship
replenishment,
maintenance,
and
crew
liberty
in
conformity
with
the
provisions
of
the
Visiting
Forces
Agreement,
it
was
covered
by
the
exception
to
the
general
rule.
(Arigo
v.
Swift)
8.
Is
the
Bangsamoro
Juridical
Entity
considered
a
political
subdivision
and
therefore
a
part
of
the
Philippine
territory?
Answer:
No.
The
Bangsamoro
Juridical
Entity
is
not
a
political
subdivision
within
the
contemplation
of
the
Constitution.
However,
the
areas
covered
under
the
BJE
are
part
of
the
Philippine
territory.
BJE
is
more
in
the
nature
of
an
associative
state
under
public
international
law
and
it
can
eventually
gain
statehood.
The
Court
held
that
no
province,
city,
or
municipality,
not
even
the
ARMM,
is
recognized
under
our
laws
as
having
an
associative
relationship
with
the
national
government.
Indeed,
the
concept
implies
powers
that
go
beyond
anything
ever
granted
by
the
Constitution
to
any
local
or
regional
government.
It
also
implies
the
recognition
of
the
associated
entity
as
a
state.
The
Constitution,
however,
does
not
contemplate
any
state
in
this
jurisdiction
other
than
the
Philippine
State,
much
less
does
it
provide
for
a
transitory
status
that
aims
to
prepare
any
part
of
Philippine
territory
for
independence.
(Consolidated
Petitions:
Province
of
Cotabato
v.
G.R.P.,
G.R.
No.
208566,
October
14,
2008)
III.
B.
The
State:
People
1. Who
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines?
Answer: The
following
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines:
1. Those
who
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
the
adoption
of
this
Constitution;
2. Those
whose
fathers
or
mothers
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines;
3. Those
born
before
January
17,
1973,
of
Filipino
mothers,
who
elect
Philippine
Citizenship
upon
reaching
the
age
of
majority;
and
4. Those
who
are
naturalized
in
the
accordance
with
law
(Section
1,
Article
IV)
2.
How
may
one
become
a
naturalized
Filipino
citizen?
Answer:
An
alien
may
become
a
Filipino
citizen
by:
1. Filing
a
Petition
for
Naturalization
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
under
the
provisions
of
C.A.
143.
2. Filing
an
application
for
reacquisition
of
Philippine
citizenship
under
R.A.
9225.
3. Filing
a
local
bill
with
Congress
for
grant
of
Philippine
citizenship.
3.
What
is
the
rule
on
a
claim
of
Philippine
citizenship?
Answer:
A
person
claiming
Philippine
citizenship
has
the
burden
of
proof
to
establish
such
claim.
In
the
case
of
In
re:
Vicente
Ching,
the
Court
held
that
Philippine
citizenship
can
never
be
treated
like
a
commodity
that
can
be
claimed
when
needed
and
suppressed
when
convenient.
One
who
is
privileged
to
elect
Philippine
citizenship
has
only
an
inchoate
right
to
such
citizenship.
As
such,
he
should
avail
of
the
right
with
fervor,
enthusiasm
and
promptitude.
One
must
choose
Philippine
citizenship
within
a
reasonable
period
which
has
been
construed
as
within
three
years
upon
reaching
the
age
of
majority.
4.
May
a
former
Filipino
citizen
seek
to
be
elected
into
public
office?
Answer:
Yes.
A
former
Filipino
seeking
an
elective
public
office
may
be
a
candidate
provided
that
he
has
perfected
his
reacquisition
of
Filipino
citizenship
on
the
day
of
election.
(Frivaldo
v.
COMELEC,
257
SCRA
727)
5
|
P a g e
5.
How
is
Philippine
citizenship
construed
under
the
Philippine
electoral
process?
Answer:
The
right
to
govern
by
virtue
of
a
mandate
from
the
people
is
not
absolute.
The
Court
held
that
the
will
of
the
people
as
expressed
through
the
ballot
cannot
cure
the
vice
of
ineligibility,
especially
if
they
mistakenly
believed,
as
in
this
case,
that
the
candidate
was
qualified.
Obviously,
this
rule
requires
strict
application
when
the
deficiency
is
lack
of
citizenship.
If
a
person
seeks
to
serve
in
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
he
must
owe
his
total
loyalty
to
this
country
only,
abjuring
and
renouncing
all
fealty
and
fidelity
to
any
other
state.
(Frivaldo
v.
COMELEC,
257
SCRA
727)
6.
May
one
who
has
been
repatriated
as
a
Filipino
citizen
and
continues
to
use
his
foreign
passport
still
qualify
for
an
elective
public
position?
Answer:
A
candidate
for
a
political
position
who
repatriated
himself
as
a
Filipino
citizen
but
who
continues
to
use
his
American
passport
is
deemed
not
qualified
to
run
for
an
elective
position.
The
passport
is
indicative
of
ones
citizenship.
(Macquiling
v.
COMELEC,
July
2,
2013)
7.
Pillos
filed
a
Petition
to
Deny
Course
to
Cancel
the
Certificate
of
Candidacy
of
Agustin
for
lack
of
residence.
In
his
pleading,
Agustin
raised
as
a
matter
of
defense
his
reacquisition
of
Philippine
citizenship
to
establish
his
claim
of
residence.
Pillos
was
able
to
obtain
certification
from
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
that
Agustin
used
his
U.S.
passport
for
his
travel
to
Hawaii.
Is
Agustin
qualified
to
run
as
Mayor?
Answer:
While
Agustin
filed
a
valid
CoC,
the
use
of
his
USA
passport
after
his
renunciation
of
foreign
citizenship
rendered
him
disqualified
from
continuing
as
a
mayoralty
candidate.
(Arsenio
Agustin
vs.
Commission
on
Elections
and
Salvador
Pillos
,
G.R.
No.
207105,
November
10,
2015,
Bersamin,
J.
)
8. What are the best proofs of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?
Answer: The best proofs are: Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance.
(Arsenio Agustin vs. Commission on Elections and Salvador Pillos, G.R. No. 207105, November
10, 2015, Bersamin, J. )
9. Assume a situation where there is a seeming conflict as to availment of rights of a Filipino
citizen under an international agreement and a Philippine law, which would prevail, the
domestic law or the international agreement?
Answer: In Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion (343 SCRA 377), the Court speaking through
Justice Melo, said that the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the
vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.
The Court upheld a citizen's basic due process rights against the government's ironclad duties
under a treaty.
10. What is the citizenship of a foundling abandoned on the footsteps of a church in Iloilo?
Answer: As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
Poe-Llmanzares v. COMELEC (March 8, 2016) found no intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides
that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires
the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."
11. What is the rule on the treatment of foundlings under domestic adoption laws?
Answer: Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is
6
|
P a g e
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code
which
provides
that
"[l]aws
relating
to
family
rights,
duties,
status,
conditions,
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
on
citizens
of
the
Philippines
even
though
living
abroad."
Adoption
deals
with
status,
and
a
Philippine
adoption
court
will
have
jurisdiction
only
if
the
adoptee
is
a
Filipino.
(Ellis
and
Ellis
v.
Republic,
117
Phil.
976
(1963))
III.
C.
The
State
and
the
Concept
of
State
Immunity
1.
What
is
state
immunity?
Answer:
State
immunity
is
a
shield
which
the
state
enjoys
and
may
claim
in
the
event
a
suit
is
filed
against
it.
Section
3
of
Article
XVI
provides
that
the
state
cannot
be
sued
without
its
consent.
While
the
doctrine
appears
to
prohibit
only
suits
against
the
state
without
its
consent,
it
is
also
applicable
to
complaints
filed
against
officials
of
the
state
for
acts
allegedly
performed
by
them
in
the
discharge
of
their
duties.
The
rule
is
that
if
the
judgment
against
such
officials
will
require
the
state
itself
to
perform
an
affirmative
act
to
satisfy
the
same,
such
as
the
appropriation
of
the
amount
needed
to
pay
the
damages
awarded
against
them,
the
suit
must
be
regarded
as
against
the
state.
2. What
are
the
two
theories
which
govern
the
application
of
the
concept
of
state
immunity?
Answer:
There
are
two
conflicting
concepts
of
sovereign
immunity,
each
widely
held
and
firmly
established.
According
to
the
classical
or
absolute
theory,
a
sovereign
cannot,
without
its
consent,
be
made
a
respondent
in
the
courts
of
another
sovereign.
According
to
the
newer
or
restrictive
theory,
the
immunity
of
the
sovereign
is
recognized
only
with
regard
to
public
acts
or
acts
jure
imperii
of
a
state,
but
not
with
regard
to
private
acts
or
acts
jure
gestionis.
(Holy
See
v.
Rosario,
G.R.
No.
101949,
1
December
1994,
238
SCRA
524,
535)
3.
Cite
instances
when
the
state
gives
its
consent
to
be
sued.
Answer:
Manner
by
which
consent
is
given:
(1).
Express
consent
(a)
General
law;
or
(b)
Special
law
(2).
Implied
consent
(a)
When
the
State
commences
litigation,
it
becomes
vulnerable
to
a
counterclaim;
(b)
State
enters
into
a
business
contract
in
the
exercise
of
its
proprietary
power;
(c)
When
it
would
be
inequitable
for
the
State
to
invoke
immunity;
and
(d)
When
the
state
exercises
it
power
of
eminent
domain.
4.
When
is
a
suit
against
the
state?
Answer:
When
a
suit
is
against
the
state:
A
suit
is
against
the
State
regardless
of
who
is
named
the
defendant
if:
(1).
It
produces
adverse
consequences
to
the
public
treasury
in
terms
of
disbursement
of
public
funds
and
loss
of
government
property.
(2).
It
cannot
prosper
unless
the
State
has
given
its
consent.
5.
When
is
a
suit
not
against
the
state?
Answer:
When
not
against
the
state
A
suit
is
not
against
the
State:
(1)
When
the
purpose
of
the
suit
is
to
compel
an
officer
charged
with
the
duty
of
making
payments
pursuant
to
an
appropriation
made
by
law
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff
to
make
such
payment,
since
the
suit
is
intended
to
compel
performance
of
a
ministerial
duty;
(2)
When
from
the
allegations
in
the
complaint,
it
is
clear
that
the
respondent
is
a
public
officer
sued
in
a
private
capacity;
and
(3)
When
the
action
is
not
in
personam
with
the
government
as
the
named
defendant,
but
an
action
in
rem
that
does
not
name
the
government
in
particular.
6.
Can
a
private
party
make
a
government
entity
liable
on
a
contract
which
that
private
party
executed
with
another
private
party?
7
|
P a g e
Answer:
No.
Under
the
principle
that
the
state
cannot
be
sued
without
its
consent,
a
third
party
cannot
hold
a
government
entity
liable.
The
government
entity
is
a
stranger
to
the
contract
between
the
two
private
parties.
(Department
of
Agriculture
v.
NLRC,
227
SCRA)
7.
The
University
of
the
Philippines
(U.P.)
signed
a
contract
with
Stern
Builders
Company
(SBC)
for
the
expansion
of
Arts
and
Sciences
Building
in
its
Los
Banos
campus.
U.P.
failed
to
pay
the
full
balance
of
its
obligation
to
SBC.
SBC
filed
a
civil
suit
against
U.P.
to
collect
the
outstanding
balance
under
its
contract
with
U.P.
and
also
asked
for
award
of
damages.
The
trial
court
allowed
the
garnishment
of
funds
of
U.P.
from
its
depository
bank
to
cover
its
outstanding
obligation
to
SBC
as
well
awards
of
actual
damages
of
5,716,729.00,
moral
damages
of
10,000,000.00
and
attorneys
fees
of
150,000.00
plus
1,500.00
per
appearance.
Was
the
order
of
garnishment
proper?
Answer:
No.
Trial
judges
should
not
immediately
issue
writs
of
execution
or
garnishment
against
the
Government
or
any
of
its
subdivisions,
agencies
and
instrumentalities
to
enforce
money
judgments.
They
should
bear
in
mind
that
the
primary
jurisdiction
to
examine,
audit
and
settle
all
claims
of
any
sort
due
from
the
Government
or
any
of
its
subdivisions,
agencies
and
instrumentalities
pertains
to
the
Commission
on
Audit
(COA)
pursuant
to
Presidential
Decree
No.
1445
(Government
Auditing
Code
of
the
Philippines).
(University
of
the
Philippines
v.
Hon.Dizon
and
Stern
Builders,
679
SCRA
54
(BERSAMIN,
J.)
8.
What
is
the
primary
reason
why
government
funds
may
not
be
subject
of
garnishment
and
execution?
Answer:
The
universal
rule
that
where
the
State
gives
its
consent
to
be
sued
by
private
parties
either
by
general
or
special
law,
it
may
limit
claimants
action
"only
up
to
the
completion
of
proceedings
anterior
to
the
stage
of
execution"
and
that
the
power
of
the
Courts
ends
when
the
judgment
is
rendered,
since
government
funds
and
properties
may
not
be
seized
under
writs
of
execution
or
garnishment
to
satisfy
such
judgments,
is
based
on
obvious
considerations
of
public
policy.
Disbursements
of
public
funds
must
be
covered
by
the
corresponding
appropriation
as
required
by
law.
The
functions
and
public
services
rendered
by
the
State
cannot
be
allowed
to
be
paralyzed
or
disrupted
by
the
diversion
of
public
funds
from
their
legitimate
and
specific
objects,
as
appropriated
by
law.(
Republic
v.
Villasor,
G.R.
No.
L-
30671,
November
28,
1973,
54
SCRA
83,
87)
9.
SBC
argued
that
U.P.
is
precluded
from
questioning
the
award
of
damages
since
the
same
has
become
final
and
executory
and
in
keeping
the
doctrine
of
immutability
of
judgment,
the
same
can
no
longer
be
appealed.
U.P.
appealed
the
award
on
equitable
grounds
since
there
was
no
proper
service
of
the
copy
of
decision
on
its
General
Counsel
stationed
in
Diliman
campus
since
the
decision
was
served
in
Los
Banos
campus.
As
between
SBCs
and
U.P.s
legal
positions
which
would
prevail?
Answer:
The
doctrine
of
immutability
of
a
final
judgment
has
not
been
absolute,
and
has
admitted
several
exceptions,
among
them:
(a)
the
correction
of
clerical
errors;
(b)
the
so-called
nunc
pro
tunc
entries
that
cause
no
prejudice
to
any
party;
(c)
void
judgments;
and
(d)
whenever
circumstances
transpire
after
the
finality
of
the
decision
that
render
its
execution
unjust
and
inequitable.
U.P.s
legal
argument
is
covered
by
the
exception
of
the
doctrine
immutability
of
judgment.
Equity
jurisdiction
aims
to
do
complete
justice
in
cases
where
a
court
of
law
is
unable
to
adapt
its
judgments
to
the
special
circumstances
of
a
case
because
of
the
inflexibility
of
its
statutory
or
legal
jurisdiction.
(University
of
the
Philippines
v.
Hon.
Dizon
and
Stern
Builders
Corporation,
679
SCRA
54
,
BERSAMIN,
J.)
10.
What
is
the
distinction
between
suability
and
liability
of
the
state?
Answer:
Suability
depends
on
the
consent
of
the
state
to
be
sued
while
liability
relies
on
the
applicable
law
and
the
established
facts.
The
circumstance
that
a
state
is
suable
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
it
is
liable;
on
the
other
hand,
it
can
never
be
held
liable
if
it
does
not
first
consent
to
be
sued.
Liability
is
not
conceded
by
the
mere
fact
that
the
state
has
allowed
itself
to
be
sued.
When
the
state
does
waive
its
sovereign
immunity,
it
is
only
giving
the
plaintiff
the
chance
to
prove,
if
it
can,
that
the
defendant
is
liable.
(Municipality
of
San
Fernando,
La
Union
v.
Firme,
G.R.
No.
L-52179,
April
8,
1991,
195
SCRA
692,
697
cited
in
U.P.
v.
Hon.
Dizon)
8
|
P a g e
11.
Can
a
government
counsel
be
held
personally
liable
for
damages
through
a
counterclaim
while
defending
the
interest
of
the
state?
Answer:
No.
A
public
officer
may
not
be
held
liable
for
the
counterclaim
by
one
of
the
accused
when
he
performs
his
duties
in
good
faith.
(Chavez
v.
Sandiganbayan,
193
SCRA
282)
12.
May
private
individuals
bring
a
suit
against
the
Commander
of
a
warship
of
the
United
States
of
America
for
its
grounding,
salvaging
and
post-salvaging
operations
which
cause
and
continue
to
cause
environmental
damage
to
the
marine
resources
of
the
Philippines
in
violation
of
environmental
laws
of
the
country?
Answer:
Yes.
The
Court
can
relax
the
procedure
rules
when
the
petition
raises
a
matter
of
transcendental
importance.
The
Court
held
that
the
liberalization
of
standing
first
enunciated
in
Oposa,
insofar
as
it
refers
to
minors
and
generations
yet
unborn,
is
now
enshrined
in
the
Rules
which
allows
the
filing
of
a
citizen
suit
in
environmental
cases.
The
provision
on
citizen
suits
in
the
Rules
collapses
the
traditional
rule
on
personal
and
direct
interest,
on
the
principle
that
humans
are
stewards
of
nature.
(Bishop
Arigo
et
al
v.
Scott
H.
Swift
et
al.)
13.
What
is
rule
on
the
immunity
of
foreign
states
from
the
jurisdiction
of
domestic
courts?
Answer:
In
the
case
of
Minucher
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
the
Court
expounded
on
the
immunity
of
foreign
states
from
the
jurisdiction
of
local
courts,
as
follows:
The
precept
that
a
State
cannot
be
sued
in
the
courts
of
a
foreign
state
is
a
long-standing
rule
of
customary
international
law
then
closely
identified
with
the
personal
immunity
of
a
foreign
sovereign
from
suit
and,
with
the
emergence
of
democratic
states,
made
to
attach
not
just
to
the
person
of
the
head
of
state,
or
his
representative,
but
also
distinctly
to
the
state
itself
in
its
sovereign
capacity.
If
the
acts
giving
rise
to
a
suit
are
those
of
a
foreign
government
done
by
its
foreign
agent,
although
not
necessarily
a
diplomatic
personage,
but
acting
in
his
official
capacity,
the
complaint
could
be
barred
by
the
immunity
of
the
foreign
sovereign
from
suit
without
its
consent.
Suing
a
representative
of
a
state
is
believed
to
be,
in
effect,
suing
the
state
itself.
The
proscription
is
not
accorded
for
the
benefit
of
an
individual
but
for
the
State,
in
whose
service
he
is,
under
the
maxim
-
par
in
parem,
non
habet
imperium
that
all
states
are
sovereign
equals
and
cannot
assert
jurisdiction
over
one
another.
The
implication,
in
broad
terms,
is
that
if
the
judgment
against
an
official
would
require
the
state
itself
to
perform
an
affirmative
act
to
satisfy
the
award,
such
as
the
appropriation
of
the
amount
needed
to
pay
the
damages
decreed
against
him,
the
suit
must
be
regarded
as
being
against
the
state
itself,
although
it
has
not
been
formally
impleaded.
14.
Can
China
National
Machinery
&
Equipment
Corp.
(CNMEG)
claim
that
it
is
immune
from
suit
since
it
is
acting
as
an
agent
of
the
government
of
China
and
the
contract
for
the
North
Railway
Project
is
covered
by
an
Executive
Agreement?
Answer:
Absent
any
certification
from
the
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs,
CNMEG
is
presumed
to
be
neither
a
government
entity
nor
an
agent
of
the
government
of
China.
Even
on
the
assumption
that
it
is
a
government
entity,
the
restrictive
application
of
state
immunity
is
proper
when
the
proceedings
arise
out
of
commercial
transactions
of
the
foreign
sovereign,
its
commercial
activities
or
economic
affairs.
Stated
differently,
a
State
may
be
said
to
have
descended
to
the
level
of
an
individual
and
can
thus
be
deemed
to
have
tacitly
given
its
consent
to
be
sued
only
when
it
enters
into
business
contracts.
It
does
not
apply
where
the
contract
relates
to
the
exercise
of
its
sovereign
functions.
CNMEG
is
engaged
in
a
proprietary
activity.
To
be
considered
an
executive
agreement,
the
following
three
requisites
provided
under
the
Vienna
Convention
must
nevertheless
concur:
(a)
the
agreement
must
be
between
states;
(b)
it
must
be
written;
and
(c)
it
must
be
governed
by
international
law.
CNMEG
cannot
invoke
immunity
from
suit
since
the
railway
project
is
purely
a
commercial
undertaking
since
not
all
the
requisites
of
an
executive
agreement
are
present.
(China
National
Machinery
&
Equipment
Corp.
(Group)
v.
Santamaria,
665
SCRA
189
(2012))
15.
Can
an
employee
of
the
Asian
Development
Bank
invoke
diplomatic
immunity
as
a
defense
to
dismiss
charges
of
acts
of
slander
by
another
co-employee?
9
|
P a g e
Answer:
No,
an
employee
of
the
Asian
Development
Bank
cannot
invoke
diplomatic
immunity
because
the
grant
of
such
immunity
is
not
absolute
and
is
limited
only
in
relation
to
ones
official
duties.
Section
45
of
the
Agreement
between
the
Philippines
and
the
Asian
Development
provides:
Bank,
Officers
and
staff
of
the
Bank
including
for
the
purpose
of
this
Article
experts
and
consultants
performing
missions
for
the
Bank
shall
enjoy
the
following
privileges
and
immunities:
x
x
x
immunity
from
legal
process
with
respect
to
acts
performed
by
them
in
their
official
capacity
except
when
the
Bank
waives
the
immunity.
The
immunity
mentioned
therein
is
not
absolute,
but
subject
to
the
exception
that
the
acts
covered
must
be
done
in
"official
capacity.
Slandering
a
person
could
not
possibly
be
covered
by
the
immunity
agreement
because
Philippine
laws
do
not
allow
the
commission
of
a
crime,
such
as
defamation,
in
the
name
of
official
duty.
(Liang
v.
People,
323
SCRA
692
(2000)
355
SCRA
125
(2001))
16.
Is
government
bound
by
the
mistakes
of
lawyers
in
a
land
registration
case?
Answer:
In
a
decided
case,
the
Court
reiterated
that
[a]s
a
matter
of
doctrine,
illegal
acts
of
government
agents
do
not
bind
the
State
and
the
Government
is
never
estopped
from
questioning
the
acts
of
its
officials,
more
so
if
they
are
erroneous,
let
alone
irregular.
This
principle
applies
in
land
registration
cases.
Certainly,
the
State
will
not
be
allowed
to
abdicate
its
authority
over
lands
of
the
public
domain
just
because
its
agents
and
officers
have
been
negligent
in
the
performance
of
their
duties.
Under
the
regalian
doctrine,
all
lands
of
the
public
domain
belong
to
the
State,
and
the
State
is
the
source
of
any
asserted
right
to
ownership
in
land
and
charged
with
the
conservation
of
such
patrimony.
(Heirs
of
Reyes
v.
Republic,
529
Phil.
510,
520-521
(2006),Land
Bank
of
the
Philippines
v.
Republic,
567
Phil.
427
(2008);
Republic
v.
Lao,
453
Phil.
189
(2003);
Spouses
Morandarte
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
479
Phil.
870
(2004);
Spouses
Palomo
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
334
Phil.
and
Reyes
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
356
Phil.
605,
624
(1998)
cited
in
Republic
v.
Spouses
Benigno,
G.R.
No.
205492,
March
11,
2015)
17.
Spouses
Ramos
sued
the
Air
Transportation
Office
(ATO)
for
non-payment
of
the
portion
of
their
property
which
ATO
had
been
utilizing
in
Loakan
Airport.
ATO
moved
to
dismiss
the
suit
upon
the
claim
that
it
is
immune
from
suit.
Is
the
claim
of
ATO
proper?
Answer:
No.
The
Court
held
that
ATO
is
an
agency
of
the
government
not
performing
a
purely
governmental
or
sovereign
function,
but
was
involved
in
the
management
and
maintenance
of
the
Loakan
Airport,
an
activity
that
was
not
the
exclusive
prerogative
of
the
State
in
its
sovereign
capacity.
Hence,
the
ATO
had
no
claim
to
the
States
immunity
from
suit.
Furthermore,
the
doctrine
of
state
immunity
cannot
be
used
as
a
shield
to
defeat
a
valid
claim
for
compensation
arising
from
the
taking
without
just
compensation
and
without
the
proper
expropriation
proceeding
being
first
resorted
to.
(AIR
TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE
v.
SPOUSES
DAVID
AND
ELISEA
RAMOS,
GR
No.
159402,
February
23,
2011,
Bersamin,
J.)
IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. In the event the Bangsamoro Basic Law is enacted into law, may the Philippine flag be
changed?
Answer: Yes but not by mere law but by amendment or revision of the Constitution. The
Philippine flag is specifically described under Section1 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
2. Can the President recommend to Congress to change the countrys name, national anthem
and government seal?
Answer: Yes. The countrys name, national anthem and government seal may be changed by
law provided the same is submitted to the people for ratification. (Art. XVI, Sec. 2).
3. May the President as Commander-in-Chief be held liable for the death of police officers in an
encounter with the National Peoples Army under the principle of command responsibility?
10
|
P a g e
Answer:
No.
The
principle
of
command
responsibility/
chain
of
command
will
only
apply
when
the
President
acts
as
Commander-in-Chief
of
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
(Art.
XVI,
Sec.
4,
Art.
XVI,
Sec.
5,
Art.
XVIII,
Sec.
24).
The
Philippine
National
Police
is
not
part
of
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines.
4.
In
view
of
the
growth
of
cable
television
industry
in
the
country,
some
foreign-owned
broadcast
media
would
like
to
engage
business
in
the
Philippines
and
register
under
Philippine
laws.
Is
this
legally
possible?
Answer:
No.
The
Constitution
provides
that
ownership
and
management
of
mass
media
shall
be
100%
Filipino
owned
(Art.
XVI,
Sec.
11(1)).
5.
Adorable
Advertising
Company
is
a
company
owned
by
Mexican
nationals.
Can
it
be
allowed
to
engage
in
advertising
business
in
the
Philippines?
Answer:
No.
The
Constitution
provides
that
ownership
of
advertising
companies
shall
be
70%
Filipino
owned
(Art.
XVI,
Sec.
11(1),
Art.
XVIII,
Sec.
23).
6.
Can
Congress
enact
a
law
which
would
require
the
ratification
of
a
treaty
signed
by
the
President
and
concurred
in
by
two
thirds
vote
of
the
Senate?
Answer:
Yes.
Section
25
of
Article
XVIII
of
the
Constitution
provides
that
a
treaty
which
would
require
the
establishment
of
foreign
military
bases,
the
presence
of
foreign
military
personnel
and
installation
of
equipment
of
a
foreign
military
power
allows
Congress
to
enact
the
law
which
require
the
ratification
of
the
treaty
by
a
majority
vote
of
the
electorate.
7.
What
is
the
nature
of
agricultural
land
to
be
covered
under
the
agrarian
reform
program
within
the
contemplation
of
the
framers
of
the
Constitution?
Answer:
The
Constitutional
Commission
never
intended
to
include
lands
used
for
raising
livestock
and
poultry,
and
commercial,
industrial
and
residential
lands
within
the
coverage
of
the
Agrarian
Reform
Program
of
the
Government
is
already
settled.
In
Luz
Farms
v.
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
(192
SCRA
51),
the
Court
pointed
this
out:
The
transcripts
of
the
deliberations
of
the
Constitutional
Commission
of
1986
on
the
meaning
of
the
word
agricultural
clearly
show
that
it
was
never
the
intention
of
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
to
include
livestock
and
poultry
industry
in
the
coverage
of
the
constitutionally-mandated
agrarian
reform
program
of
the
Government.
Thus,
a
lot
inside
the
poblacion
should
be
presumed
residential,
or
commercial,
or
non-agricultural
unless
there
is
a
clearly
preponderant
evidence
to
show
that
it
is
agricultural.
V.
GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
(including
Principles
of
Public
International
Law)
AND
STATE
POLICIES
1.
John
Williams
is
a
member
of
the
U.S.
Armed
Forces
participating
the
Balikatan
exercises
under
the
Visiting
Forces
Agreement
(VFA).
Peeved
by
the
attitude
of
Pedro
Reyes,
a
Filipino
waiter,
in
a
local
bar
in
Olongapo
City,
he
hit
him
and
Reyes
fell
on
the
ground
which
accidentally
caused
his
death.
Can
John
Williams
be
criminally
held
under
Philippine
laws?
Answer:
Yes.
In
Nicolas
v.
Romulo,
Daniel
Smith
was
tried
and
convicted
of
rape
under
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
John
Williams,
a
military
officer
of
U.S.
government
contingent
participating
in
the
Balikatan
military
exercises
must
face
trial
before
the
Philippine
courts
for
a
crime
committed
under
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
2.
What
is
the
nature
of
the
Visiting
Forces
Agreement?
Answer:
The
Visiting
Forces
Agreement
(VFA)
is
a
treaty.
As
held
in
BAYAN
(Bagong
Alyansang
Makabayan)
v.
Exec.
Sec.
Zamora,
the
VFA
was
duly
concurred
in
by
the
Philippine
Senate
and
has
been
recognized
as
a
treaty
by
the
United
States
as
attested
and
certified
by
the
duly
authorized
representative
of
the
United
States
government.
The
VFA
is
an
agreement
which
defines
the
treatment
of
United
States
troops
and
personnel
visiting
the
Philippines
to
promote
common
security
interests
between
the
US
and
the
Philippines
in
the
region.
It
provides
for
the
guidelines
to
govern
such
visits
of
military
personnel,
and
further
defines
the
rights
of
the
United
States
and
the
Philippine
government
in
the
matter
of
criminal
jurisdiction,
movement
of
vessel
and
aircraft,
importation
and
exportation
of
equipment,
materials
and
supplies.
11
|
P a g e
3.
Does
EDCA
suffer
from
any
constitutional
infirmity?
Answer:
As
it
is,
EDCA
is
not
constitutionally
infirm.
As
an
executive
agreement,
it
remains
consistent
with
existing
laws
and
treaties
that
it
purports
to
implement.
The
admission
and
presence
of
U.S.
military
and
civilian
personnel
in
Philippine
territory
are
already
allowed
under
the
VFA,
the
treaty
supposedly
being
implemented
by
EDCA.
What
EDCA
has
effectively
done,
in
fact,
is
merely
provide
the
mechanism
to
identify
the
locations
in
which
U.S.
personnel
may
perform
allowed
activities
pursuant
to
the
VFA.
As
the
implementing
agreement,
it
regulates
and
limits
the
presence
of
U.S.
personnel
in
the
country.
Both
EDCA
and
the
Terms
of
Reference
of
the
VFA
authorize
the
U.S.
to
perform
the
following:
(a)
participate
in
training
exercises;
(b)
retain
command
over
their
forces;
(c)
establish
temporary
structures
in
the
country;
(d)
share
in
the
use
of
their
respective
resources,
equipment
and
other
assets;
and
(e)
exercise
their
right
to
self-defense
The
new
EDCA
would
grant
American
troops,
ships
and
planes
rotational
access
to
facilities
of
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
but
not
permanent
bases
which
are
prohibited
under
the
Philippine
Constitution
-
with
the
result
of
reducing
response
time
should
an
external
threat
from
a
common
adversary
crystallize.
4. What
are
restrictions
imposed
by
the
Constitution
in
the
exercise
of
the
diplomatic
powers
by
the
President?
Answer:
Although
the
Chief
Executive
wields
the
exclusive
authority
to
conduct
foreign
relations,
this
power
must
still
be
exercised
within
the
context
and
the
parameters
set
by
the
Constitution,
as
well
as
by
existing
domestic
and
international
laws.
There
are
constitutional
provisions
that
restrict
or
limit
the
President's
prerogative
in
concluding
international
agreements,
such
as
those
that
involve
the
following:
a.
The
policy
of
freedom
from
nuclear
weapons
within
Philippine
territory;
b.
The
fixing
of
tariff
rates,
import
and
export
quotas,
tonnage
and
wharfage
dues,
and
other
duties
or
imposts,
which
must
be
pursuant
to
the
authority
granted
by
Congress;
c.
The
grant
of
any
tax
exemption,
which
must
be
pursuant
to
a
law
concurred
in
by
a
majority
of
all
the
Members
of
Congress;
d.
The
contracting
or
guaranteeing,
on
behalf
of
the
Philippines,
of
foreign
loans
that
must
be
previously
concurred
in
by
the
Monetary
Board;
e.
The
authorization
of
the
presence
of
foreign
military
bases,
troops,
or
facilities
in
the
country
must
be
in
the
form
of
a
treaty
duly
concurred
in
by
the
Senate;
and
f.
For
agreements
that
do
not
fall
under
paragraph
5,
the
concurrence
of
the
Senate
is
required,
should
the
form
of
the
government
chosen
be
a
treaty;
5. May
a
treaty
concurred
by
the
Senate
be
a
subject
of
ratification
by
the
people?
Answer:
Under
Section
25
of
Article
XVIII
of
the
Constitution,
an
agreement
-
the
subject
of
which
is
the
entry
of
foreign
military
troops,
bases,
or
facilities
-
is
particularly
restricted.
The
requirements
are
that
it
be
in
the
form
of
a
treaty
concurred
in
by
the
Senate;
that
when
Congress
so
requires,
it
be
ratified
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
people
in
a
national
referendum
held
for
that
purpose;
and
that
it
be
recognized
as
a
treaty
by
the
other
contracting
State.
6.
If
an
ambassador
of
a
foreign
country
is
found
liable
under
Philippine
laws,
how
will
he
be
tried?
Answer:
The
Supreme
Court
shall
exercise
original
jurisdiction
over
cases
affecting
ambassadors.
(Sec.5
(1),
Art.
VIII).
In
this
particular
case,
the
Supreme
Court
becomes
a
trier
of
facts
and
law.
7.
Only
independent
states
may
become
subjects
of
public
international
law.
Characterize
an
independent
state.
Answer:
The
existence
of
a
state
is
a
function
of
recognition
in
a
community
of
nations.
The
Court
said
that
a
state
is
required
in
line
with
Pound's
formulation
that
it
be
a
politically
organized
sovereign
community
independent
of
outside
control
bound
by
penalties
of
nationhood,
legally
supreme
within
its
territory,
acting
through
a
government
functioning
12
|
P a g e
under
a
regime
of
law.
(Elements
of
a
state:
people,
territory,
government
and
sovereignty).
(Collector
of
Internal
Revenue
v.
Campos
Rueda,
42
SCRA
23)
8.
May
citizens
belatedly
ask
that
treaty
provisions
be
reviewed
covering
the
Reparations
Treaty
between
U.S.A.
and
Japan
since
the
same
overlooked
the
damages
they
sustained?
Answer:
No.
Relations
between
nations
may
be
jus
gentium
(governed
by
the
law
of
nations)
and
jus
inter
gentis
(agreement
between
nations).
The
Court
cannot
interfere
with
or
question
the
wisdom
of
the
conduct
of
foreign
relations
by
the
Executive
Department.
Accordingly,
we
cannot
direct
the
Executive
Department,
either
by
writ
of
certiorari
or
injunction,
to
conduct
our
foreign
relations
with
Japan
in
a
certain
manner.
The
Supreme
Court
adopted
ICJs
ruling
in
Barcelona
Traction
that
within
the
limits
prescribed
by
international
law,
a
State
may
exercise
diplomatic
protection
by
whatever
means
and
to
whatever
extent
it
thinks
fit,
for
it
is
its
own
right
that
the
State
is
asserting.
Should
the
natural
or
legal
person
on
whose
behalf
it
is
acting
consider
that
their
rights
are
not
adequately
protected,
they
have
no
remedy
in
international
law.
(VINUYA
v.
ROMULO,
G.R.
No.
162230,
12
August
2014,
Bersamin)
9.
May
the
President
be
compelled
by
the
Supreme
Court
to
accede
to
the
request
of
the
petitioners
to
demand
a
public
apology
from
Japan?
Answer:
No.
The
Court
concluded
that
the
State
is
the
sole
judge
to
decide
whether
its
protection
will
be
granted,
to
what
extent
it
is
granted,
and
when
will
it
cease.
Since
the
Constitution
has
entrusted
to
the
Executive
Department
the
conduct
of
foreign
relations
for
the
Philippines.
Whether
or
not
to
espouse
petitioners'
claim
against
the
Government
of
Japan
is
left
to
the
exclusive
determination
and
judgment
of
the
Executive
Department.
The
Court
cannot
interfere
with
or
question
the
wisdom
of
the
conduct
of
foreign
relations
by
the
Executive
Department.
The
Court
held
that
a
mandatory
injunction
will
not
lie
since
it
requires
the
performance
of
a
particular
act.
Hence,
it
is
an
extreme
remedy
to
be
granted
only
if
the
following
requisites
are
attendant,
namely:
(a)
The
applicant
has
a
clear
and
unmistakable
right,
that
is,
a
right
in
esse;
(b)
There
is
a
material
and
substantial
invasion
of
such
right;
and
(c)
There
is
an
urgent
need
for
the
writ
to
prevent
irreparable
injury
to
the
applicant;
and
no
other
ordinary,
speedy,
and
adequate
remedy
exists
to
prevent
the
infliction
of
irreparable
injury.
The
Court
cannot
issue
a
writ
requiring
the
President
to
act
in
a
specific
manner
on
any
matter
affecting
the
countrys
foreign
policies.
(Vinuya
v.
Executive
Secretary
(G.R.
No.
162230,
April
25,
2010
and
August
13,
2014,
BERSAMIN,
J.
penned
the
decision
in
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration)
10.
May
the
COMELEC
deny
the
petition
of
Ang
Ladlad
to
participate
in
the
party
list
system
on
moral
grounds?
Answer:
No,
the
COMELEC
must
cite
specific
provisions
under
the
Party
List
Law
to
disqualify
Ang
Ladlad
from
participating
under
the
party-list
system.
The
Constitution
likewise
guarantees
equal
opportunities
to
public
service
without
discrimination.
(Ang
Ladlad
LGBT
Party
v.
Commission
on
Elections,
618
SCRA
32)
11.
May
Congress
infringe
on
the
religious
beliefs
of
individuals
in
the
medical
profession
as
well
as
spouses
in
the
enforcement
of
the
Reproductive
Health
Law?
Answer:
No.
The
enactment
of
a
law
which
infringes
on
the
religious
beliefs
of
individuals
in
the
medical
profession
as
well
as
spouses
violates
the
constitutional
principle
of
separation
of
church
and
the
state
under
Section
6
of
Article
VI
as
well
as
Section
5
of
the
Bill
of
Rights.
12.
Does
the
VAWC
law
violate
the
equal
protection
clause?
Answer:
The
VAWC
law
is
constitutional
and
does
not
violate
the
equal
protection
clause.
The
law
is
intended
to
protect
the
rights
of
women
and
children
in
keeping
with
Section
12
of
Article
II
as
well
as
Section
14
of
Article
XIII.
The
equal
protection
clause
has
the
following
elements:
(1).
the
distinction
must
be
substantial;
13
|
P a g e
(2).
the
classification
must
be
germane
to
the
purpose
of
the
law;
(3).
the
classification
must
apply
not
only
to
existing
conditions;
and
(4).
the
classification
must
apply
to
all
members
of
the
same
class.
(Garcia
v.
Hon.
Drilon,
699
SCRA
352)
13.
Can
the
Supreme
Court
still
reverse
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
affirmed
by
Court
of
Appeals
which
annulled
the
marriage
of
Liberty
Albios
to
Daniel
Fringer,
an
American
citizen,
on
account
of
immigration
fraud?
Answer:
Yes.
The
Court
reversed
the
finding
of
the
lower
courts
that
the
marriage
between
Albios
and
Fringer
was
contracted
in
jest.
The
Court
concluded
that
Albios
and
Fringer
had
an
undeniable
intention
to
be
bound
in
order
to
create
the
very
bond
necessary
to
allow
the
respondent
to
acquire
American
citizenship.
Only
a
genuine
consent
to
be
married
would
allow
them
to
further
their
objective,
considering
that
only
a
valid
marriage
can
properly
support
an
application
for
citizenship.
There
was,
thus,
an
apparent
intention
to
enter
into
the
actual
marriage
status
and
to
create
a
legal
tie,
albeit
for
a
limited
purpose.
Genuine
consent
was,
therefore,
clearly
present.
The
Constitution
safeguards
the
sanctity
of
marriage.
(Section
12,
Article
II
and
Article
XV,
1987
Constitution).
(Republic
v.
Albios,
G.R.
No.
198780,
October
16,
2013,
Mendoza,
J.
)
14.
Is
biotechnology
covered
by
the
protection
of
the
Constitution?
Answer:
Yes.
Biotechnology
is
a
multi-disciplinary
field
which
may
be
defined
as
"any
technique
that
uses
living
organisms
or
substances
from
those
organisms
to
make
or
modify
a
product,
to
improve
plants
or
animals,
or
to
develop
microorganisms
for
specific
uses."
Its
many
applications
include
agricultural
production,
livestock,
industrial
chemicals
and
pharmaceuticals.
The
Court
in
the
case
of
International
Service
for
the
Acquisition
of
Agri-
Biotech
Applications,
Inc.
v.
Greenpeace
Southeast
Asia
(Philippines)(G.R.
No.209271,
8
December
2015)
said
that
genetically
modified
crops
affect
the
environment
in
many
ways
such
as
contaminating
non-GMO
plants,
creating
super
weeds
and
super
pests,
harming
non-target
species,
changing
soil
microbial
and
biochemical
properties,
and
threatening
biodiversity.
Applying
the
Precautionary
Principle,
the
Court
required
the
government
to
install
the
necessary
protocols
to
ensure
compliance
with
the
constitutional
guarantee
of
the
people
to
good
health
and
the
right
to
a
balanced
ecology.
(Sections
15
and
16
of
Article
II,
1987
Constitution)
15.
The
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
appealed
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
which
ruled
that
the
property
of
Berenguer
located
in
a
poblacion
was
not
covered
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Land
Reform
Law.
On
the
part
of
Berengeur,
he
argued
the
presence
of
livestock
does
not
necessarily
make
his
property
agricultural
in
nature.
Is
a
parcel
of
land
dedicated
to
livestock
raising
covered
by
the
Comprehensive
Land
Reform
Law?
Answer:
No.
The
Court
held
that
the
Constitutional
Commission
never
intended
to
include
lands
used
for
raising
livestock
and
poultry,
and
commercial,
industrial
and
residential
lands
within
the
coverage
of
the
Agrarian
Reform
Program
of
the
Government.
The
Court
also
concluded
that
a
lot
inside
the
poblacion
should
be
presumed
residential,
or
commercial,
or
non-agricultural
unless
there
is
a
clearly
preponderant
evidence
to
show
that
it
is
agricultural.
(Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
vs.
Berenguer,
614
SCRA
499,
G.R.
No.
154094
March
9,
2010,
Bersamin,
J.)
16.
What
is
the
basis
of
the
implementation
of
the
agrarian
reform
program?
Answer:
Section
4,
Article
XIII,
of
the
Constitution
has
mandated
the
implementation
of
an
agrarian
reform
program
for
the
distribution
of
agricultural
lands
to
landless
farmers
subject
to
the
payment
of
just
compensation
to
the
landowners,
viz:
Section
4.
The
Sate
shall,
by
law,
undertake
an
agrarian
reform
program
founded
on
the
right
of
farmers
and
regular
farmworkers,
who
are
landless,
to
own
directly
or
collectively
the
lands
they
till
or,
in
the
case
of
other
farmworkers,
to
receive
a
just
share
of
the
fruits
thereof.
To
this
end,
the
State
shall
encourage
and
undertake
the
just
distribution
of
all
agricultural
lands,
subject
to
such
priorities
and
reasonable
retention
limits
as
the
Congress
may
prescribe,
taking
into
account
ecological,
developmental,
or
equity
considerations,
and
subject
to
the
payment
of
just
compensation.
In
determining
14
|
P a g e
retention
limits,
the
State
shall
respect
the
rights
of
small
landowners.
The
State
shall
further
provide
incentives
for
voluntary
land-sharing.(Land
Bank
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Veronica
Nable,
G.R.
No.
176692,
June
27,
2012,
Bersamin,
J.)
17.
What
are
the
factors
to
be
considered
in
the
determination
of
just
compensation
under
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Program?
Answer:
The
Congress
has
required
that
any
determination
of
just
compensation
should
consider
the
following
factors,
namely:
(a)
the
cost
of
the
acquisition
of
the
land;
(b)
the
current
value
of
like
properties;
(c)
the
nature,
actual
use
and
income
of
the
land;
(d)
the
sworn
valuation
by
the
owner;
(e)
the
tax
declarations;
(f)
the
assessment
made
by
government
assessors;
(g)
the
social
and
economic
benefits
contributed
to
the
property
by
the
farmers
and
farmworkers
and
by
the
Government;
and
(h)
the
fact
of
the
non-payment
of
any
taxes
or
loans
secured
from
any
government
financing
institution
on
the
land.
(Land
Bank
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Veronica
Nable,
G.R.
No.
176692,
June
27,
2012,
Bersamin)
18.
What
is
just
compensation?
Answer:
Just
compensation
means
the
equivalent
for
the
value
of
the
property
at
the
time
of
its
taking.
It
means
a
fair
and
full
equivalent
value
for
the
loss
sustained.
All
the
facts
as
to
the
condition
of
the
property
and
its
surroundings,
its
improvements
and
capabilities
should
be
considered
(Export
Processing
Zone
Authority
vs.
Dulay
149
SCRA
305
[1987]
cited
in
LBP
v.
Nable,
supra).
19.
Under
what
circumstances
may
Petitioner
ask
the
Supreme
Court
to
review
the
findings
of
facts
of
the
Court
of
Appeals?
Answer:
To
review
the
factual
findings
of
the
CA
only
when
the
Supreme
Court
has
a
compelling
reason
to
do
so,
such
as
any
of
the
following:
1.
When
the
factual
findings
of
the
CA
and
the
RTC
are
contradictory;
2.
When
the
findings
are
grounded
entirely
on
speculation,
surmises,
or
conjectures;
3.
When
the
inference
made
by
the
CA
is
manifestly
mistaken,
absurd,
or
impossible;
4.
When
there
is
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
the
appreciation
of
facts;
5.
When
the
CA,
in
making
its
findings,
went
beyond
the
issues
of
the
case,
and
such
findings
are
contrary
to
the
admissions
of
both
appellant
and
appellee;
6.
When
the
judgment
of
the
CA
is
premised
on
a
misapprehension
of
facts;
7.
When
the
CA
fails
to
notice
certain
relevant
facts
that,
if
properly
considered,
will
justify
a
different
conclusion;
8.
When
the
findings
of
fact
are
themselves
conflicting;
9.
When
the
findings
of
fact
are
conclusions
without
citation
of
the
specific
evidence
on
which
they
are
based;
and,
10.
When
the
findings
of
fact
of
the
CA
are
premised
on
the
absence
of
evidence,
but
such
findings
are
contradicted
by
the
evidence
on
record.
(cited
in
Land
Bank
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Veronica
Nable,
G.R.
No.
176692,
June
27,
2012,
Bersamin)
20.
Several
employees
of
Pinakamasarap
Seasoning
Company
(PINA)
participated
in
an
illegal
strike.
This
prompted
PINA
to
file
a
complaint
to
declare
them
as
striking
employees
and
to
have
lost
their
employment
status.
However,
the
NLRC
ultimately
ordered
their
reinstatement
after
finding
that
they
had
not
abandoned
their
work
by
joining
the
illegal
strike.
Are
the
employees
entitled
to
backwages
for
the
period
of
the
strike
upon
their
reinstatement?
Answer:
No.
The
Court
held
that
conformably
with
the
long
honored
principle
of
a
fair
days
wage
for
a
fair
days
labor,
employees
dismissed
for
joining
an
illegal
strike
are
not
entitled
to
backwages
for
the
period
of
the
strike
even
if
they
are
reinstated
by
virtue
of
their
being
merely
members
of
the
striking
union
who
did
not
commit
any
illegal
act
during
the
strike.
(Escario
et
al.
vs.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission
(Third
Division),
631
SCRA
261,
G.R.
No.
160302
September
27,
2010,
Bersamin,
J.)
21.
What
is
the
effect
of
disallowance
of
an
expenditure
under
the
General
Appropriations
Act?
15
|
P a g e
Answer:
No
money
shall
be
paid
out
of
the
Treasury
except
in
pursuance
of
an
appropriation
made
by
law.
A
violation
of
this
constitutional
edict
warrants
the
disallowance
of
the
payment.
However,
the
refund
of
the
disallowed
payment
of
a
benefit
granted
by
law
to
a
covered
person,
agency
or
office
of
the
Government
may
be
barred
by
the
good
faith
of
the
approving
official
and
of
the
recipient.
(Brenda
Nazareth,
Regional
Director,
Department
of
Science
and
Technology
Regional
OfficeNo.
IX
vs.
Hon.
Reynaldo
Villar,
Hon.
Juanito
Espino
Jr.
(CHR
Commissioners)
and
Dir.
Khem
Inok,
G
.R.
No.
188635,
January
29,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.)
22.
What
is
the
coverage
of
the
Magna
Carta
for
Scientists,
Engineers,
Researchers,
and
other
Science
and
Technology
Personnel
in
the
Government?
Answer:
Republic
Act
No.
8439
(R.A.
No.
8439),
otherwise
known
as
the
Magna
Carta
for
Scientists,
Engineers,
Researchers,
and
other
Science
and
Technology
Personnel
in
the
Government
provides
for
certain
benefits
to
covered
employees
in
the
use
of
savings,
priority
shall
be
given
to
the
augmentation
of
the
amount
set
aside
for
compensation,
bonus,
retirement
gratuity,
terminal
leave,
old
age
pensions
of
veterans
and
other
personal
benefits
x
x
x.
(Brenda
Nazareth,
Regional
Director,
Department
of
Science
and
Technology
Regional
OfficeNo.
IX
vs.
Hon.
Reynaldo
Villar,
Hon.
Juanito
Espino
Jr.
(CHR
Commissioners)
and
Dir.
Khem
Inok,
G
.R.
No.
188635,
January
29,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.)
23.
What
is
augmentation
within
the
contemplation
of
R.A.
No.
8439?
Answer:
Augmentation
is
a
requisite
to
make
payments
for
benefits
under
R.A.
8439.
This
means
that
presidential
approval
is
necessary
in
accordance
with
the
provision
of
the
1987
Constitution.
Therefore,
the
acts
of
the
agency
in
using
its
savings
to
pay
the
said
benefits
without
the
said
presidential
approval
are
deemed
illegal.
R.
A.
No.
8439
was
enacted
as
a
manifestation
of
the
States
recognition
of
science
and
technology
as
an
essential
component
for
the
attainment
of
national
development
and
progress.
The
law
offers
a
program
of
human
resources
development
in
science
and
technology
to
help
realize
and
maintain
a
sufficient
pool
of
talent
and
manpower
that
will
sustain
the
initiative
for
total
science
and
technology
mastery.
In
furtherance
of
this
objective,
the
law
not
only
ensures
scholarship
programs
and
improved
science
and
engineering
education,
but
also
affords
incentives
for
those
pursuing
careers
in
science
and
technology.
Moreover,
the
salary
scale
of
science
and
technology
personnel
is
differentiated
by
R.
A.
No.
8439
from
the
salary
scales
of
government
employees
under
the
existing
law.
In
the
funding
of
current
activities,
projects,
and
programs,
the
general
rule
should
still
be
that
the
budgetary
amount
contained
in
the
appropriations
bill
is
the
extent
Congress
will
determine
as
sufficient
for
the
budgetary
allocation
for
the
proponent
agency.
24.
What
is
the
exception
to
the
rule
on
augmentation
of
budget
out
of
savings?
Answer:
The
only
exception
is
found
in
Section
25
(5),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution,
by
which
the
President,
the
President
of
the
Senate,
the
Speaker
of
the
House
of
Representatives,
the
Chief
Justice
of
the
Supreme
Court,
and
the
heads
of
Constitutional
Commissions
are
authorized
to
transfer
appropriations
to
augment
any
item
in
the
GAA
for
their
respective
offices
from
the
savings
in
other
items
of
their
respective
appropriations.
25.
What
is
the
nature
of
the
power
of
the
Commission
on
Audit
(COA)
as
an
independent
constitutional
entity?
Answer:
The
COA
is
endowed
with
sufficient
latitude
to
determine,
prevent,
and
disallow
the
irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive,
extravagant,
or
unconscionable
expenditures
of
government
funds.
It
has
the
power
to
ascertain
whether
public
funds
were
utilized
for
the
purposes
for
which
they
had
been
intended
by
law.
The
"Constitution
has
made
the
COA
the
guardian
of
public
funds,
vesting
it
with
broad
powers
over
all
accounts
pertaining
to
government
revenue
and
expenditures
and
the
uses
of
public
funds
and
property,
including
the
exclusive
authority
to
define
the
scope
of
its
audit
and
examination,
to
establish
the
techniques
and
methods
for
such
review,
and
to
promulgate
accounting
and
auditing
rules
and
regulations"
26.
What
are
the
two
types
of
due
process?
Answer:
The
two
types
of
due
process
are:
substantial
due
process
and
procedural
due
process.
16
|
P a g e
27.
What
are
the
elements
of
due
process?
Answer:
The
elements
of
due
process
are
the
right
to
notice
and
the
right
to
be
heard.
28.
What
is
the
essence
of
due
process
in
administrative
proceedings?
Answer:
The
observance
of
fairness
in
the
conduct
of
any
investigation
is
at
the
very
heart
of
procedural
due
process.
The
essence
of
due
process
is
to
be
heard,
and,
as
applied
to
administrative
proceedings,
this
means
a
fair
and
reasonable
opportunity
to
explain
ones
side,
or
an
opportunity
to
seek
a
reconsideration
of
the
action
or
ruling
complained
of.
Administrative
due
process
cannot
be
fully
equated
with
due
process
in
its
strict
judicial
sense,
for
in
the
former
a
formal
or
trial-type
hearing
is
not
always
necessary,
and
technical
rules
of
procedure
are
not
strictly
applied.
(Vivo
v.
PAGCOR,
709
SCRA
276,
G.R.
No.
187854
November
12,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.)
29.
How
is
due
process
satisfied
in
administrative
cases?
Answer:
Due
process
is
satisfied
when
a
person
is
notified
of
the
charge
against
him
and
given
an
opportunity
to
explain
or
defend
himself.
In
administrative
proceedings,
the
filing
of
charges
and
giving
reasonable
opportunity
for
the
person
so
charged
to
answer
the
accusations
against
him
constitute
the
minimum
requirements
of
due
process.
(Ledesma
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
541
SCRA
444
cited
in
Vivo
vs.
PAGCOR)
30.
In
an
administrative
proceeding,
is
a
party
allowed
to
seek
judicial
intervention
by
praying
for
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
to
enjoin
his
dismissal
as
President
of
an
educational
institution?
Answer:
Yes,
provided
that
the
plaintiff
submits
evidence
establishing:
(a) a
present
and
unmistakable
right
to
be
protected;
(b)
the
acts
against
which
the
injunction
is
directed
violate
such
right;
and
(c)
a
special
and
paramount
necessity
for
the
writ
to
prevent
serious
damages
In
the
absence
of
a
clear
legal
right,
the
issuance
of
the
injunctive
writ
constitutes
grave
abuse
of
discretion
and
will
result
to
nullification
thereof.
Where
the
complainants
right
is
doubtful
or
disputed,
injunction
is
not
proper.
The
possibility
of
irreparable
damage
sans
proof
of
an
actual
existing
right
is
not
a
ground
for
a
preliminary
injunction.
(Barayuga
v.
Adventist
University
of
the
Philippines,
655
SCRA
640,
G.R.
No.
168008
August
17,
2011,
Bersamin,
J.)
31. What is considered a ministerial act?
Answer: An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the
officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty. (Cudia v. PMA
SUPERINTENDENT (G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, Peralta, J.)
32. Is a cadet of the Philippine Military Academy entitled to due process in the proceedings
before its Honor Committee?
Answer: Yes, a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests to life, liberty, and property. Thus, disciplinary
proceedings conducted by its Honor Committee must be done within the bounds of procedural
due process.
For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.
For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.
33. Is a cadet entitled to counsel during the disciplinary proceedings against him?
17
|
P a g e
Answer:
There
is
nothing
in
the
1987
Constitution
stating
that
a
party
in
a
non-litigation
proceeding
is
entitled
to
be
represented
by
counsel.
The
assistance
of
a
lawyer,
while
desirable,
is
not
indispensable.
A
party
in
an
administrative
inquiry
may
or
may
not
be
assisted
by
counsel,
irrespective
of
the
nature
of
the
charges
and
of
the
respondent's
capacity
to
represent
himself,
and
no
duty
rests
on
such
body
to
furnish
the
person
being
investigated
with
counsel.
34.
What
is
the
nature
of
disciplinary
proceedings
conducted
by
the
Honor
Committee
of
PMA?
Answer:
The
proceedings
of
the
Cadet
Honor
Committee
can,
for
purposes
of
the
Due
Process
Clause,
be
considered
a
governmental
activity.
35.
What
is
the
rule
governing
the
institution
of
action
for
issuance
of
writ
of
sequestration
of
assets
acquired
during
the
martial
law
years?
Answer:
Section
26,
Article
XVIII
of
the
Constitution
mandates
that
if
no
judicial
action
has
been
filed
within
six
(6)
months
after
the
ratification
of
the
1987
Constitution,
the
writ
of
sequestration
shall
automatically
be
lifted.
(PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION
(POTC)
and
Philcomsat,
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
REPUBLIC
(PCGG),
G.R.
No.
174462,
February
10,
2016)
36.
What
is
the
effect
if
no
action
is
instituted
by
the
government
against
parties
presumed
to
possess
assets
which
have
been
illegally
acquired?
Answer:
In
the
case
at
bar,
there
was
no
judicial
action
filed
against
POTC
and
PHILCOMSAT.
There
has
never
been
any
appropriate
judicial
action
for
reconveyance
or
recovery
ever
instituted
by
the
Republic
against
POTC
and
PHILCOMSAT.
The
government
will
lose
the
right
to
recover
questioned
assets
of
the
two
companies.
37.
What
is
the
effect
of
an
action
where
only
the
stockholders
of
POTC
and
PHILCOMSAT
were
impleaded
in
an
action
before
the
Sandiganbayan?
Answer:
Failure
to
implead
POTC
and
PHILCOMSAT
is
a
violation
of
the
fundamental
principle
that
a
corporation
has
a
legal
personality
distinct
and
separate
from
its
stockholders;
that,
the
filing
of
a
complaint
against
a
stockholder
is
not
ipso
facto
a
complaint
against
the
corporation.
The
basic
tenets
of
fair
play
and
principles
of
justice
dictate
that
a
corporation,
as
a
legal
entity
distinct
and
separate
from
its
stockholders,
must
be
impleaded
as
defendants,
giving
it
the
opportunity
to
be
heard.
The
failure
to
properly
implead
POTC
and
PHILCOMSAT
not
only
violates
the
latters'
legal
personality,
but
is
repugnant
on
POTC's
and
PHILCOMSAT's
right
to
due
process.
"[F]ailure
to
implead
these
corporations
as
defendants
and
merely
annexing
a
list
of
such
corporations
to
the
complaints
is
a
violation
of
their
right
to
due
process
for
it
would
in
effect
be
disregarding
their
distinct
and
separate
personality
without
a
hearing."
As
already
settled,
a
suit
against
individual
stockholders
is
not
a
suit
against
the
corporation.
(PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION
(POTC)
and
Philcomsat,
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
REPUBLIC
(PCGG),
G.R.
No.
174462,
February
10,
2016)
38.
What
is
the
constitutional
guarantee
to
due
process
in
judicial
proceedings
involving
ill-
gotten
wealth
during
the
martial
law
years?
Answer:
While
sequestration
is
the
means
to
revert
the
amassed
ill-gotten
wealth
back
to
the
coffers
of
the
government,
there
is
need
to
safeguard
the
protection
of
property
rights
from
overzealousness.
Sequestration
as
statutorily
and
constitutionally
recognized
is
not
permanent.
It
must
be
lifted
when
the
law
and
proven
facts
warrant,
or
when
the
purpose
has
been
accomplished.chanr
V.
SEPARATION
OF
POWERS
AND
THE
PRINCIPLE
OF
CHECKS
AND
BALANCES
THE
ESSENCE
OF
DEMOCRACY
AND
REPUBLICANISM
1.
What
is
the
prevailing
rule
for
the
Court
to
take
cognizance
a
suit
which
challenges
the
constitutionality
of
a
law
or
a
governmental
act?
Answer:
T
he
prevailing
rule
in
constitutional
litigation
is
that
no
question
involving
the
constitutionality
or
validity
of
a
law
or
governmental
act
may
be
heard
and
decided
by
the
Court
unless
there
is
compliance
with
the
legal
requisites
for
judicial
inquiry,
namely:
(a)
there
must
be
an
actual
case
or
controversy
calling
for
the
exercise
of
judicial
power;
18
|
P a g e
(b)
the
person
challenging
the
act
must
have
the
standing
to
question
the
validity
of
the
subject
act
or
issuance;
(c)
the
question
of
constitutionality
must
be
raised
at
the
earliest
opportunity
;
and
(d)
the
issue
of
constitutionality
must
be
the
very
lis
mota
of
the
case. (Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1
(2013),
Bersamin,
J.)
2.
What
is
"the
moot
and
academic
principle
in
the
exercise
of
the
power
of
judicial
review?
Answer:
"The
moot
and
academic
principle
is
not
a
magical
formula
that
can
automatically
dissuade
the
Court
in
resolving
a
case."
The
Court
will
decide
cases,
otherwise
moot,
if:
first,
there
is
a
grave
violation
of
the
Constitution;
second,
the
exceptional
character
of
the
situation
and
the
paramount
public
interest
is
involved;
third,
when
the
constitutional
issue
raised
requires
formulation
of
controlling
principles
to
guide
the
bench,
the
bar,
and
the
public;
and
fourth,
the
case
is
capable
of
repetition
yet
evading
review.
(Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1
(2013),
Bersamin,
J.)
3.
What
is
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers?
Answer:
The
principle
of
separation
of
powers
refers
to
the
constitutional
demarcation
of
the
three
fundamental
powers
of
government.
In
the
celebrated
words
of
Justice
Laurel
in
Angara
v.
Electoral
Commission,
it
means
that
the
"Constitution
has
blocked
out
with
deft
strokes
and
in
bold
lines,
allotment
of
power
to
the
executive,
the
legislative
and
the
judicial
departments
of
the
government.
To
the
legislative
branch
of
government,
through
Congress,
belongs
the
power
to
make
laws;
to
the
executive
branch
of
government,
through
the
President,
belongs
the
power
to
enforce
laws;
and
to
the
judicial
branch
of
government,
through
the
Court,
belongs
the
power
to
interpret
laws.
The
principle
of
separation
of
powers
and
its
concepts
of
autonomy
and
independence
stem
from
the
notion
that
the
powers
of
government
must
be
divided
to
avoid
concentration
of
these
powers
in
any
one
branch;
the
division,
it
is
hoped,
would
avoid
any
single
branch
from
lording
its
power
over
the
other
branches
or
the
citizenry.
(cited
in
Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1
(2013),
Bersamin,
J.)
4.
How
is
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
violated?
Answer:
Broadly
speaking,
there
is
a
violation
of
the
separation
of
powers
principle
when
one
branch
of
government
unduly
encroaches
on
the
domain
of
another.
US
Supreme
Court
decisions
instruct
that
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
may
be
violated
in
two
(2)
ways:
firstly,
"one
branch
may
interfere
impermissibly
with
the
others
performance
of
its
constitutionally
assigned
function";
and
"alternatively,
the
doctrine
may
be
violated
when
one
branch
assumes
a
function
that
more
properly
is
entrusted
to
another.
In
other
words,
there
is
a
violation
of
the
principle
when
there
is
impermissible
(a)
interference
with
and/or
(b)
assumption
of
another
departments
functions.
(cited
in
Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1
(2013),
Bersamin,
J.)
5.
What
is
the
principle
of
non-delegability
of
legislative
power?
Answer:
As
an
adjunct
to
the
separation
of
powers
principle,
legislative
power
shall
be
exclusively
exercised
by
the
body
to
which
the
Constitution
has
conferred
the
same.
In
particular,
Section
1,
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution
states
that
such
power
shall
be
vested
in
the
Congress
of
the
Philippines
which
shall
consist
of
a
Senate
and
a
House
of
Representatives,
except
to
the
extent
reserved
to
the
people
by
the
provision
on
initiative
and
referendum.
Based
on
this
provision,
it
is
clear
that
only
Congress,
acting
as
a
bicameral
body,
and
the
people,
through
the
process
of
initiative
and
referendum,
may
constitutionally
wield
legislative
power
and
no
other.
This
premise
embodies
the
principle
of
non-delegability
of
legislative
power,
and
the
only
recognized
exceptions
thereto
would
be:
(a)
delegated
legislative
power
to
local
governments
which,
by
immemorial
practice,
are
allowed
to
legislate
on
purely
local
matters;
and
(b)
constitutionally-grafted
exceptions
such
as
the
authority
of
the
President
to,
by
law,
exercise
powers
necessary
and
proper
to
carry
out
a
declared
national
policy
in
times
of
war
or
other
national
emergency,
or
fix
within
specified
limits,
and
subject
to
such
limitations
and
19
|
P a g e
restrictions
as
Congress
may
impose,
tariff
rates,
import
and
export
quotas,
tonnage
and
wharfage
dues,
and
other
duties
or
imposts
within
the
framework
of
the
national
development
program
of
the
Government.
(Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1
(2013),
Bersamin,
J.)
6. What
is
the
nature
of
the
grant
of
rule-making
powers
granted
to
administrative
agencies?
Answer:
The
grant
of
the
rule-making
power
to
administrative
agencies
is
a
relaxation
of
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
and
is
an
exception
to
the
non-delegation
of
legislative
powers.
Administrative
regulations
or
"subordinate
legislation"
calculated
to
promote
the
public
interest
are
necessary
because
of
"the
growing
complexity
of
modern
life,
the
multiplication
of
the
subjects
of
governmental
regulations,
and
the
increased
difficulty
of
administering
the
law."
(cited
in
Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1,
Bersamin,
J.)
7. What
is
the
item-veto
power
of
the
President?
Answer:
The
fact
that
the
three
great
powers
of
government
are
intended
to
be
kept
separate
and
distinct
does
not
mean
that
they
are
absolutely
unrestrained
and
independent
of
each
other.
The
Constitution
has
also
provided
for
an
elaborate
system
of
checks
and
balances
to
secure
coordination
in
the
workings
of
the
various
departments
of
the
government.
A
prime
example
of
a
constitutional
check
and
balance
would
be
the
Presidents
power
to
veto
an
item
written
into
an
appropriation,
revenue
or
tariff
bill
submitted
to
him
by
Congress
for
approval
through
a
process
known
as
"bill
presentment."
The
Presidents
item-veto
power
is
found
in
Section
27(2),
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution
which
reads
as
follows:
Sec.
27.
x
x
x.
x
x
x
x
(2)
The
President
shall
have
the
power
to
veto
any
particular
item
or
items
in
an
appropriation,
revenue,
or
tariff
bill,
but
the
veto
shall
not
affect
the
item
or
items
to
which
he
does
not
object.
(Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
710
SCRA
1,
Bersamin,
J.)
8. What
are
the
three
branches
of
government?
Answer:
Three
branches
of
government:
the
Legislative
Department,
the
Executive
Department
and
the
Judicial
Department.
(Araullo
vs.
Aquino
III,
728
SCRA
1,
G.R.
No.
209569
July
1,
2014,
Bersamin,
J.)
9. What is judicial supremacy?
Answer: When the Court is called upon to resolve two conflicting claims of the two other
branches of government, the Court is just called upon to apply the relevant law or interpret the
applicable law to the case. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014,
Bersamin, J.)
10. Can the courts resort to judicial legislation?
Answer: No, the courts cannot resort to judicial legislation. The courts cannot enact laws since
this would violate the principle of separation of powers. However, judicial decisions become
part of the law of the law.
General Rule: Only Congress can enact laws.
Exception to the Rule: Congress can delegate law-making powers (ex. local government units)
and rule-making powers (ex. IRR formulated by administrative agencies).
11. Can the Court still take cognizance of the case which questioned the constitutionality of the
DAP program of President Aquino after it was withdrawn and has become moot and
academic?
Answer: Mootness is not an excuse for the Court not to take cognizance of the case: The case is
not moot and academic even if the President has terminated the DAP. The fact that huge public
funds have been allocated, disbursed, or utilized by reason or on account of the challenged
executive acts gave rise to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication. ( Araullo vs.
Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014, Bersamin, J.)
12. What
are
the
appropriate
remedies
to
challenge
the
constitutionality
of
DAP?
Answer:
Certiorari,
Prohibition,
and
Mandamus
are
proper
remedies
to
assail
the
constitutionality
of
DAP.
Since
certiorari
and
prohibition
are
large
in
scope
and
the
issues
20
|
P a g e
involved
the
limitations
of
the
Executives
spending
power,
the
said
remedies
are
proper.
(Araullo
vs.
Aquino
III,
728
SCRA
1,
G.R.
No.
209569
July
1,
2014,
Bersamin,
J.)
13. What
is
the
effect
of
Petitioners
withdrawal
of
its
application
for
land
registration?
Answer:
The
Petitioners
withdrawal
of
its
application
for
land
registration
has
rendered
the
case
moot
and
academic.
A
case
becomes
moot
and
academic
when,
by
virtue
of
supervening
events,
the
conflicting
issue
that
may
be
resolved
by
the
court
ceases
to
exist.
There
is
no
longer
any
justiciable
controversy
that
may
be
resolved
by
the
court.
This
court
refuses
to
render
advisory
opinions
and
resolve
issues
that
would
provide
no
practical
use
or
value.
Thus,
courts
generally
"decline
jurisdiction
over
such
case
or
dismiss
it
on
ground
of
mootness."
Moldexs
manifestation
stating
its
withdrawal
of
its
application
for
registration
has
erased
the
conflicting
interests
that
used
to
be
present
in
this
case.
Respondent's
Manifestation
was
an
expression
of
its
intent
not
to
act
on
whatever
claim
or
right
it
has
to
the
property
involved.
Thus,
the
controversy
ended
when
respondent
filed
that
Manifestation.
(REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
MOLDEX
REALTY,
INC.
G.R.
No.
171041,
February
10,
2016)
14. Can
the
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
deputize
other
legal
officers
of
government
departments,
bureaus,
agencies
and
offices
to
assist
it
in
representing
the
government
in
court
cases?
Answer:
Yes.
The
power
of
the
OSG
to
deputize
legal
officers
of
government
departments,
bureaus,
agencies
and
offices
to
assist
it
in
representing
the
government
is
well
settled.
The
Administrative
Code
of
1987
explicitly
states
that
the
OSG
shall
have
the
power
to
"deputize
legal
officers
of
government
departments,
bureaus,
agencies
and
offices
to
assist
the
Solicitor
General
and
appear
or
represent
the
Government
in
cases
involving
their
respective
offices,
brought
before
the
courts
and
exercise
supervision
and
control
over
such
legal
officers
with
respect
to
such
cases."
But
it
is
likewise
settled
that
the
OSGs
deputized
counsel
is
"no
more
than
the
surrogate
of
the
Solicitor
General
in
any
particular
proceeding"
and
the
latter
remains
the
principal
counsel
entitled
to
be
furnished
copies
of
all
court
orders,
notices,
and
decisions.
(REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED
BY
THE
LAND
REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY
vs.
RAYMUNDO
VIAJE,
ET
AL. January
27,
2016,
G.R.
No.180993)
15. Cite
the
exceptions
to
the
rule
on
mootness.
Answer:
Exceptions
to
the
rule
on
moot
and
academic
cases:
(1)There
is
a
grave
violation
of
the
Constitution;
(2)The
case
involved
a
situation
of
exceptional
character
and
was
of
paramount
public
interest;
(3)
When
the
constitutional
issue
raised
required
the
formulation
of
controlling
principles
to
guide
the
Bench,
the
Bar,
and
the
public;
and
(4)
When
the
case
was
capable
of
repetition
yet
evading
review.
16. Do
petitioners
have
legal
standing
to
sue
both
as
taxpayers
and
as
citizens?
Answer:
Legal
Standing
to
Sue
as
a
Taxpayer
and
as
a
Citizen:
Considering
that
the
issue
involves
the
expenditure
of
public
funds
(as
taxpayers)
and
the
case
is
of
transcendental
importance
(as
citizens),
the
petitioners
do
have
a
legal
standing
to
raise
the
issues
before
the
Court.
17. What
is
a
public
expenditure?
Is
DAP
an
appropriation?
Answer:
A
public
expenditure
must
comply
with
the
constitutional
requirement.
Article
VI,
Sec.
29
of
the
Constitution
provides
[n]o
money
shall
be
paid
out
of
the
Treasury
except
in
pursuance
of
an
appropriation
made
by
law.
DAP
is
not
an
appropriation.
It
is
a
program.
18. What
are
savings
under
the
General
Appropriations
Act?
Answer:
Savings
would
include
any
programmed
appropriation
in
the
GAA
free
from
any
obligation
or
encumbrance,
which
are:
(1)
Still
available
after
the
completion
or
final
discontinuance
or
abandonment
of
the
work,
activity
or
purpose
for
which
the
appropriation
is
authorized;
21
|
P a g e
(2)
From
appropriations
balances
arising
from
unpaid
compensation
and
related
costs
pertaining
to
vacant
positions
and
leaves
of
absences
without
pay;
and
(3)
From
appropriations
balances
realized
from
the
implementation
of
measures
resulting
in
improved
systems
and
efficiencies
and
thus
enabled
agencies
to
meet
and
deliver
the
required
or
planned
targets,
programs,
and
services
approved
in
the
GAAs
at
a
lesser
cost.
19. What
are
the
phases
of
the
Philippine
Budget
Cycle?
Answer:
Philippine
Budget
Cycle
consists
of:
(1) Budget
Preparation
(2)
Budget
Legislation
(3)
Budget
Enforcement
(4)
Accountability
20. What
is
budget
augmentation?
Answer:
The
term
augment
means
to
enlarge
or
increase
the
allotment
for
an
item
in
the
GAA
wherein
the
current
appropriation
for
the
said
item
is
deficient.
21. Who
are
the
public
officers
authorized
by
the
Constitution
to
augment
their
budget
out
of
savings?
Answer:
Public
Officers
authorized
to
augment
from
savings
are:
(1).
President
(2).
Senate
President
(3).
Speaker
of
the
House
(4).
Chief
Justice
of
the
Supreme
Court;
and
(5).
Heads
of
the
CSC,
COMELEC,
and
COA.
(Sec.
25(5),
Art.
VI,
Constitution)
22. What
is
the
operative
fact
doctrine?
Answer:
A
legislative
or
executive
act
is
presumed
to
be
constitutional
such
that
when
it
is
declared
void
for
being
unconstitutional
does
not
give
rise
to
any
right
or
obligation
but
it
may
produce
legal
effects
prior
to
being
declared
as
unconstitutional.
23. Will
the
operative
fact
doctrine
apply
to
the
implementation
of
DAP?
Answer:
Yes.
The
Court
recognized
that
the
result
of
the
DAP
and
its
related
issuances
could
not
be
ignored
and
be
undone.
The
Court
also
declared
that
the
doctrine
of
operative
fact
is
not
confined
to
statutes
and
rules
and
regulations.
The
doctrine
can
be
invoked
only
in
situations
where
the
nullification
of
the
effects
of
what
used
to
be
a
valid
law
would
result
in
inequity
and
injustice.
24. Does
the
Department
of
Justice
exercise
judicial
function
in
determining
probable
cause?
Answer:
No,
the
determination
of
probable
cause
does
not
involve
any
judicial
function.
Consistent
with
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
enshrined
in
the
Constitution,
the
Court
deems
it
a
sound
judicial
policy
not
to
interfere
in
the
conduct
of
preliminary
investigations,
and
to
allow
the
Executive
Department,
through
the
Department
of
Justice,
exclusively
to
determine
what
constitutes
sufficient
evidence
to
establish
probable
cause
for
the
prosecution
of
supposed
offenders.
(Ampatuan,
Jr.
vs.
De
Lima,
695
SCRA
159,
G.R.
No.
197291
April
3,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.)
25. Is
judicial
intervention
possible
in
the
conduct
of
preliminary
investigation?
Answer:
Yes.
By
way
of
exception,
however,
judicial
review
may
be
allowed
where
it
is
clearly
established
that
the
public
prosecutor
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion,
that
is,
when
he
has
exercised
his
discretion
in
an
arbitrary,
capricious,
whimsical
or
despotic
manner
by
reason
of
passion
or
personal
hostility,
patent
and
gross
enough
as
to
amount
to
an
evasion
of
a
positive
duty
or
virtual
refusal
to
perform
a
duty
enjoined
by
law.
(Ampatuan,
Jr.
vs.
De
Lima,
695
SCRA
159,
G.R.
No.
197291
April
3,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.
)
22
|
P a g e
26. May
the
Court
intervene
in
the
prerogatives
reserved
by
the
Constitution
to
the
Executive
branch?
Answer:
The
Constitution
has
entrusted
to
the
Executive
Department
the
conduct
of
foreign
relations
for
the
Philippines.
Whether
or
not
to
espouse
petitioners
claim
against
the
Government
of
Japan
is
left
to
the
exclusive
determination
and
judgment
of
the
Executive
Department.
The
Court
cannot
interfere
with
or
question
the
wisdom
of
the
conduct
of
foreign
relation
by
the
Executive
Department.
(
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
Vinuya
vs.
Romulo,
732
SCRA
595,
G.R.
No.
162230
August
12,
2014,
Bersamin,
J.)
27. What
is
Qualified
Political
Agency?
Answer:
Qualified
Political
Agency
is
also
known
as
the
alter
ego
doctrine.
Under
this
doctrine,
all
executive
and
administrative
organizations
are
adjuncts
of
the
Executive
Department,
the
heads
of
the
various
executive
departments
are
assistants
and
agents
of
the
Chief
Executive,
and,
except
in
cases
where
the
Chief
Executive
is
required
by
the
Constitution
or
the
law
to
act
in
person
or
the
exigencies
of
the
situation
demand
that
he
act
personally,
the
multifarious
executive
and
administrative
functions
of
the
Chief
Executive
are
performed
by
and
through
the
executive
departments,
and
the
acts
of
the
secretaries
of
such
departments,
performed
and
promulgated
in
the
regular
course
of
business,
are,
unless
disapproved
or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive,
presumptively
the
acts
of
the
Chief
Executive.
(Runkle
vs.
United
States
[1887],
122
U.
S.,
543;
30
Law.
ed.,
1167;
7
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.,
1141;
see
also
U.
S.
vs.
Eliason
[1839],
16
Pet.,
291;
10
Law.
ed.,
968;
Jones
vs.
U.
S.
[1890],
137
U.
S.,
202;
34
Law.
ed.,
691;
11
Sup.
Ct.,
Rep.,
80;
Wolsey
vs.
Chapman
[1880],
101
U.
S.,
755;
25
Law.
ed.,
915;
Wilcox
vs.
Jackson
[1836],
13
Pet.,
498;
10
Law.
ed.,
264.)
28. Can
the
doctrine
of
qualified
political
agency
be
invoked
by
a
collegial
body?
Answer:
The
doctrine
of
qualified
political
agency
could
not
be
extended
to
the
acts
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
TIDCORP
despite
some
of
its
members
being
themselves
the
appointees
of
the
President
to
the
Cabinet.
Under
Section
10
of
Presidential
Decree
No.
1080,
as
further
amended
by
Section
6
of
Republic
Act
No.
8494,24
the
five
ex
officio
members
were
the
Secretary
of
Finance,
the
Secretary
of
Trade
and
Industry,
the
Governor
of
the
Bangko
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas,
the
Director-General
of
the
National
Economic
and
Development
Authority,
and
the
Chairman
of
the
Philippine
Overseas
Construction
Board,
while
the
four
other
members
of
the
Board
were
the
three
from
the
private
sector
(at
least
one
of
whom
should
come
from
the
export
community),
who
were
elected
by
the
ex
officio
members
of
the
Board
for
a
term
of
not
more
than
two
consecutive
years,
and
the
President
of
TIDCORP
who
was
concurrently
the
Vice-Chairman
of
the
Board.
Such
Cabinet
members
sat
on
the
Board
of
Directors
of
TIDCORP
ex
officio,
or
by
reason
of
their
office
or
function,
not
because
of
their
direct
appointment
to
the
Board
by
the
President.
Evidently,
it
was
the
law,
not
the
President,
that
sat
them
in
the
Board.
(Manalang-Demigillo
vs.
Trade
and
Investment
Development
Corporation
of
the
Philippines
(TIDCORP),
692
SCRA
359,
G.R.
No.
168613
March
5,
2013,
Bersamin,
J.)
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
1. May a taxpayer file an action to compel Congress to enact a law making the use of marijuana
for medical reasons legal?
Answer: No. The writ of mandamus will not lie because this violates the principle of separation
of powers. It is discretionary on the part of Congress to consider bills which its judgment will
serve the public. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. (Sec.1, Art. VII). There
is no legally demandable right to compel Congress to make such law.
2. What are the tests of a valid delegation of power?
Answer: The two tests of a valid delegation of powers are: the completeness test and sufficient
standard test.
23
|
P a g e
3.
Is
legislative
power
exclusively
vested
in
Congress?
Answer:
No.
R.A.
No.
6735
provides
for
Initiative
and
Referendum
for
citizens
to
participate
in
law
making.
4.
What
is
the
principle
of
bicameralism?
Answer:
It
is
a
mechanism
for
compromising
differences
between
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives.
By
the
nature
of
its
function,
a
Bicameral
Conference
Committee
is
capable
of
producing
unexpected
results
which
sometimes
may
even
go
beyond
its
own
mandate.
(Tolentino
v.
Secretary
of
Finance)
5.
Can
a
candidate
convicted
of
libel
still
qualify
for
an
elective
position?
Answer:
Libel
is
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude.
Moral
turpitude
is
defined
as
everything
which
is
done
contrary
to
justice,
modesty,
or
good
morals;
an
act
of
baseness,
vileness
or
depravity
in
the
private
and
social
duties
which
a
man
owes
his
fellowmen,
or
to
society
in
general.
Although
not
every
criminal
act
involves
moral
turpitude,
the
Court
is
guided
by
one
of
the
general
rules
that
crimes
mala
in
se
involve
moral
turpitude
while
crimes
mala
prohibita
do
not.
Conviction
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude
is
a
disqualification.
Conviction
must
be
final
and
executory.
(TY-DELGADO
v.
HRET
and
PICHAY,
G.R.
No.
219603,
January
26,
2016,
Bersamin,
J)
6.
Will
the
Writ
of
Mandamus
lie
to
unseat
a
disqualified
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives?
Answer:
Yes.
In
VELASCO
v.
BELMONTE,
JR.
et
al.
(G.R.
No.
211140,
January
12,
2016),
Writ
of
Mandamus
may
lie
to
remove
an
incumbent
member
of
Congress.
The
Court
based
the
issuance
of
the
Writ
of
Mandamus
on
the
following
grounds:
1. Cancellation
of
COC
(not
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
resident
of
the
district);
and
2. Infirmity
if
oath
taking
(oath
taking
took
place
in
the
residence
of
the
Speaker
of
the
House)
7.
Enumerate
the
parties
which
may
participate
in
the
party
list
system.
Answer:
The
following
can
participate
in
the
party-list
system:
national
parties,
regional
parties
and
sectoral
parties
or
organizations.
(Lokin,
Jr.
Commission
on
Elections,
621
SCRA
385,
G.R.
Nos.
179431-32,
June
22,
2010,
Bersamin,
J.)
8. What is the rule on election of party-list?
Answer: The party list is the one voted and not the nominee. The accredited party list must
submit five (5) nominees.
9. What are the grounds for substitution of nominees in a party list?
Answer: The following are the grounds for substitution: death of nominee, incapacity of the
nominee and withdrawal of nominee. (Lokin, Jr. Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, G.R.
Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010, Bersamin, J.)
10. What are the inviolable parameters to determine the winners in the party-list elections?
Answer: The following are the parameters:
(1). Twenty percent allocation rule;
(2). Two percent threshold vote rule;
(3). Three seat limit rule; and
(4). Proportional representation rule. (BANAT v. COMELEC, 586 SCRA 210)
11. Does Congress have oversight powers and functions of Congress?
Answer: The exercise of oversight powers and functions of Congress is intrinsic in the
constitutional grant of legislative powers and integral to the system of checks and balances.
12. What are the categories of oversight and legislative powers?
Answer: The following are the categories of oversight and legislative powers?
24
|
P a g e
(1).
Legislative
scrutiny
(2).
Legislative
investigation
(3).
Legislative
supervision
13.
Aahon
Party
List
sought
to
be
accredited
as
a
party
list.
The
members
of
Aahon
are
males
and
females
which
have
different
sexual
preferences.
The
COMELEC
denied
their
accreditation
based
on
biblical
passages.
Is
the
denial
of
COMELEC
proper?
Answer:
No.
In
Ang
Ladlad
v.
COMELEC
(G.
R.
No,
190852,
April
8,
2010),
the
Court
held
that
accreditation
is
done
solely
by
COMELEC.
The
Court
said
that
under
the
countrys
system
of
laws,
every
group
has
the
right
to
promote
its
agenda
and
attempt
to
persuade
society
of
the
validity
of
its
position
through
normal
democratic
means.
It
is
in
the
public
square
that
deeply
held
convictions
and
differing
opinions
should
be
distilled
and
deliberated
upon.
The
OSG
argues
that
since
there
has
been
neither
prior
restraint
nor
subsequent
punishment
imposed
on
Ang
Ladlad,
and
its
members
have
not
been
deprived
of
their
right
to
voluntarily
associate,
then
there
has
been
no
restriction
on
their
charter
or
association.
The
Court
said
that
the
moral
objection
offered
by
the
COMELEC
was
not
a
limitation
imposed
by
law.
Thus
it
held:
To
the
extent,
therefore,
that
the
petitioner
has
been
precluded,
because
of
COMELECs
action,
from
publicly
expressing
its
views
as
a
political
party
and
participating
on
an
equal
basis
in
the
political
process
with
other
equally-qualified
party-list
candidates,
we
find
that
there
has,
indeed,
been
a
transgression
of
petitioners
fundamental
rights.
OTHER
RULINGS
ON
PARTY
LIST
SYSTEM:
BANAT
V.
COMELEC,
592
SCRA
294:
The
Constitution
provides
that
Congress
shall
not
have
more
than
250
members
unless
Congress
provides
otherwise
and
out
of
the
total
number
of
incumbent
members
not
more
than
20%
shall
come
from
the
party
list.
Of
the
party
list
members,
each
party
list
shall
be
entitled
to
a
maximum
of
three
seats.
Paglaum
v.
COMELEC,
694
SCRA
477
(2013):
Sectoral
representation
need
not
be
limited
to
the
poor
or
marginalized
group;
extent
of
national
membership;
performance
in
party
list
election
process.
Abang
Lingkod
v.
COMELEC:
Proof
of
track
record
is
not
necessary
for
purposes
of
accreditation.
PGBI
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
190529,
April
29,
2010.
The
COMELEC
has
the
power
to
delist
a
party
list
on
two
grounds
under
Section6
(8)
of
R.A.
7941.
Magdalo
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
190793,
June
19,
2012.
The
registration
of
political
parties
does
not
involve
administrative
liability
as
it
is
only
limited
to
the
evaluation
of
qualifications
for
registration
14.
A
group
of
public
school
teachers
instituted
an
action
before
the
Supreme
Court
to
question
the
veracity
of
the
entries
to
the
congressional
journal
regarding
the
passage
of
the
law
on
grant
of
additional
allowances
of
public
school
teachers
for
poll
duty
in
the
forthcoming
May
2016
elections.
They
alleged
that
the
law
signed
the
President
reflected
a
lesser
amount
that
what
has
been
reported
in
the
media.
Will
the
action
of
the
public
school
teachers
prosper?
Answer:
No.
The
courts
may
not
go
behind
the
legislative
journals
to
contradict
their
veracity.
U.S.
v.
Pons,
34
Phil.,
729-735
(1916)
JOURNAL
ENTRY
RULE
VS.
ENROLLED
BILL
THEORY
Morales
v.
Subido,
27
SCRA
131
(1969):
An
omission
at
the
time
of
enactment,
whether
careless
or
calculated,
cannot
be
judicially
supplied
however
much
later
wisdom
may
recommend
the
inclusion.
Astorga
v.
Villegas,
56
SCRA
714
(1974):
The
Court
held
that
that
the
enrolled
bill
theory
is
based
mainly
on
"the
respect
due
to
coequal
and
independent
departments,"
which
requires
the
judicial
department
"to
accept,
as
having
passed
Congress,
all
bills
authenticated
in
the
manner
stated."
Thus
it
has
also
been
stated
in
other
cases
that
if
the
attestation
is
absent
and
the
same
is
not
required
for
the
validity
of
a
statute,
the
courts
may
resort
to
the
journals
and
other
records
of
Congress
for
proof
of
its
due
enactment.
15.
A
newly-elected
member
of
the
Senate
proposed
a
tax
measure
which
would
effectively
reduce
the
tax
impositions
on
salaried
employees.
Is
the
proposal
valid?
25
|
P a g e
Answer:
No.
All
appropriations
bill
must
emanate
from
the
House
of
Representatives
and
the
executive
branch
has
no
power
to
transfer
one
budget
for
another
purpose
for
which
it
was
originally
intended.
(Demetria
v.
Alba,
G.
R.
No.
L-45129,
March
6,
1987)
Tax
laws
(Art.
VI,
Sec.
28,
Art.
XIV,
Sec.
4(3)).
All
tax,
tariff
and
other
revenue
bills
must
originate
in
the
House
of
Representatives
but
the
Senate
may
introduce
amendments.
Demetria
v.
Alba,
G.R.
No.
L-45129,
March
6,
1987:
no
cross
border
transfer
of
funds;
all
appropriations
bill
must
emanate
from
the
House
of
Representatives
and
the
executive
branch
has
no
power
to
transfer
one
budget
for
another
purpose
for
which
it
was
originally
intended.
Belgica
v.
Ochoa,
G.R.
No.
208493,
November
19,
2013:
limitations
on
the
power
to
enact
appropriation
bills
16.
Two
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives
figured
in
a
brawl
during
the
heated
deliberation
on
the
passage
of
the
bill
legalizing
marijuana.
The
incident
was
a
subject
of
media
coverage.
Delfin
Rosario,
a
taxpayer,
asked
the
Ethics
Committee
of
the
House
of
Representatives
to
discipline
two
members
of
Congress.
Will
his
action
prosper?
Answer:
Yes.
Each
house
may
determine
the
rules
of
proceedings,
punish
its
Members
for
disorderly
behavior,
and
with
the
concurrence
of
two-thirds
of
all
its
members,
suspend
or
expel
a
member.
A
penalty
of
suspension,
when
imposed,
shall
not
exceed
sixty
days.
17.
May
the
President
restrict
the
attendance
of
the
members
of
the
Cabinet
in
congressional
hearings?
Answer:
No.
This
will
violate
the
principle
of
checks
and
balances.
Senate
of
the
Philippines
v.
Ermita,
488
SCRA
1:
The
President
cannot
clip
the
powers
of
the
legislative
branch
by
restricting
the
attendance
of
officers
and
other
officials
of
the
executive
branch
from
appearing
in
congressional
hearings
in
the
exercise
of
the
constitutionally-
mandated
power
to
conduct
inquiries.(referring
to
Section
21
of
Art.
VII)
Neri
v.
Senate
Committees.
The
executive
branch
may
invoke
executive
privilege
in
matters
covered
by
a
legislative
hearing
and
may
even
decline
attendance
or
responding
to
queries
if
the
same
is
not
carried
out
in
aid
of
legislation.
18.
May
the
House
of
Representatives
consider
simultaneously
several
complaints
for
inclusion
in
the
Articles
of
Impeachment?
Answer:
Yes..
Congress
may
look
into
separate
complaints
against
an
impeachable
officer
and
consider
the
inclusion
of
matters
raised
therein
in
the
adoption
of
the
Articles
of
Impeachment
to
be
forwarded
to
the
Senate
as
the
impeachment
tribunal.
The
Court
has
repeatedly
held
that:
Impeachment
is
the
most
difficult
and
cumbersome
mode
of
removing
a
public
officer
from
office.
It
is,
by
nature,
a
sui
generis
politico-legal
process
that
signals
the
need
for
a
judicious
and
careful
handling
as
shown
by
the
process
required
to
initiate
the
proceeding;
the
one-year
limitation
or
bar
for
its
initiation;
the
limited
grounds
for
impeachment;
the
defined
instrumentality
given
the
power
to
try
impeachment
cases;
and
the
number
of
votes
required
for
a
finding
of
guilt.
(Gutierrez
v.
House
of
Representatives,
G.
R.
No.
Feb.
15,
2011.
See
also
Francisco
v.
House
of
Representatives,
on
one
year
rule)
VOTES
IN
IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS
A
majority
vote
of
the
members
of
the
Committee
on
Justice
of
HOR
is
necessary
for
consideration
of
its
report
in
a
plenary
session.
(Sec.
3(2),
Art.
XI)
A
vote
of
at
least
1/3
of
all
members
of
the
HOR
is
necessary
to
either
affirm
a
favorable
resolution
with
the
Articles
of
Impeachment
or
override
its
contrary
resolution.
A
verified
complaint
or
resolution
of
impeachment
filed
by
1/3
of
all
members
of
the
HOR
shall
constitute
the
Articles
of
Impeachment.
Two
thirds
vote
of
all
members
of
the
Senate
is
necessary
to
convict
the
impeached
public
officer.
Gutierrez
v.
HOR,
Feb.
15,
2011:
consideration
of
two
complaints
as
basis
Francisco
v.
HOR,
415
SCRA
44:
initiation
of
a
complaint
for
impeachment
Chief
Justice
Corona
v.
Senate
of
the
Philippines
et
al.,
G.R.
No.200242,
July
17,
2012:
The
power
of
judicial
review
includes
the
power
of
review
justiciable
issues
in
impeachment
proceedings.
26
|
P a g e
VII.
THE
EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
1.
May
the
tarsiers
of
Loboc,
Bohol
bring
an
action
in
court
to
nullify
a
service
contract
executed
by
the
Secretary
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources
and
a
100%
owned
Japanese
company?
Answer:
Stirctly
speaking,
only
natural
and
juridical
persons
may
be
allowed
to
plead.
However,
in
Resident
marine
mammals
of
Tanon
Strait
joined
in
and
represented
herein
by
human
beings
Gloria
Estenzo
Ramos
and
Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio,
in
their
capacity
as
legal
guardians
and
as
responsible
stewards
of
God's
creations
v.
Secretary
Angelo
Reyes
et
al(G.R.
No.
180771,
April
21,
2015),
the
Court
allowed
the
resident
mammals
of
Tanon
Strait
as
petitioners
provided
that
the
action
is
brought
in
the
nature
of
a
citizen
suit
with
natural
persons
acting
as
their
legal
guardians
and
as
friends
for
being
stewards
of
creation.
Under
the
Rules
of
Procedure
in
Environmental
Cases,
a
citizen
suit
is
encouraged
for
the
protection
of
the
environment.
This
provision
liberalizes
standing
for
all
cases
filed
enforcing
environmental
laws
and
collapses
the
traditional
rule
on
personal
and
direct
interest,
on
the
principle
that
humans
are
stewards
of
nature.
The
terminology
of
the
text
reflects
the
doctrine
first
enunciated
in
Oposa
v.
Factoran,
insofar
as
it
refers
to
minors
and
generations
yet
unborn.
2.
In
the
action
filed
by
the
stewards
of
the
Bohol
tarsiers,
can
the
respondents
claim
that
their
approval
of
service
contract
pertaining
to
oil
exploration,
which
requires
presidential
approval,
amounts
to
approval
of
the
president
under
the
doctrine
of
qualified
political
agency?
Answer:
No.
The
Court
reiterated
its
ruling
in
Joson
v.
Torres.
In
this
case,
the
Court
explained
the
concept
of
the
alter
ego
principle
or
the
doctrine
or
qualified
political
agency
and
its
limit
in
this
wise:
Under
this
doctrine,
which
recognizes
the
establishment
of
a
single
executive,
all
executive
and
administrative
organizations
are
adjuncts
of
the
Executive
Department,
the
heads
of
the
various
executive
departments
are
assistants
and
agents
of
the
Chief
Executive,
and,
except
in
cases
where
the
Chief
Executive
is
required
by
the
Constitution
or
law
to
act
in
person
or
the
exigencies
of
the
situation
demand
that
he
act
personally,
the
multifarious
executive
and
administrative
functions
of
the
Chief
Executive
are
performed
by
and
through
the
executive
departments,
and
the
acts
of
the
Secretaries
of
such
departments,
performed
and
promulgated
in
the
regular
course
of
business,
are,
unless
disapproved
or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive
presumptively
the
acts
of
the
Chief
Executive.
The
Court
further
reiterated:
As
this
Court
has
held
in
La
Bugal,
our
Constitution
requires
that
the
President
himself
be
the
signatory
of
service
agreements
with
foreign-owned
corporations
involving
the
exploration,
development,
and
utilization
of
our
minerals,
petroleum,
and
other
mineral
oils.
This
power
cannot
be
taken
lightly.
xxx
it
must
be
shown
that
the
government
agency
or
subordinate
official
has
been
authorized
by
the
President
to
enter
into
such
service
contract
for
the
government.
Otherwise,
it
should
be
at
least
shown
that
the
President
subsequently
approved
of
such
contract
explicitly.
None
of
these
circumstances
is
evident
in
the
case
at
bar.
3.
The
President
granted
Mr.
Estrada
pardon.
Mr.
Estrada
was
elected
Mayor
of
Manila.
Alicia,
a
registered
voter
of
Manila
questioned
the
grant
of
pardon
alleging
the
text
of
the
pardon
appears
to
be
conditional
and
therefore,
Mr.
Estrada
is
not
qualified
to
hold
the
post
of
Mayor.
Is
the
position
of
the
registered
voter
tenable?
Answer:
No.
The
1987
Constitution,
specifically
Section
19
of
Article
VII
and
Section
5
of
Article
IX-C,
provides
that
the
President
of
the
Philippines
possesses
the
power
to
grant
pardons,
along
with
other
acts
of
executive
clemency,
to
wit:
Section
19.
Except
in
cases
of
impeachment,
or
as
otherwise
provided
in
this
Constitution,
the
President
may
grant
reprieves,
commutations,
and
pardons,
and
remit
fines
and
forfeitures,
after
conviction
by
final
judgment.
There
can
be
no
other
conclusion
but
to
say
that
the
pardon
granted
to
Mr.
Estrada
was
absolute
in
the
absence
of
a
clear,
unequivocal
and
concrete
factual
basis
upon
which
to
anchor
or
support
the
Presidential
intent
to
grant
a
limited
pardon.
He
was
granted
an
absolute
pardon
that
fully
restored
all
his
civil
and
political
rights,
which
naturally
includes
the
right
to
seek
public
elective
office,
the
focal
point
of
this
controversy.
The
wording
of
the
pardon
extended
to
former
Mr.
Estrada
is
complete,
unambiguous,
and
unqualified.
(Risos-Vidal
v.
COMELEC)
Please
note
that
the
only
instances
in
which
the
President
may
not
extend
pardon
remain
to
be
in:
(1)
impeachment
cases;
(2)
cases
that
have
not
yet
resulted
in
a
final
conviction;
and
(3)
cases
involving
violations
of
election
laws,
rules
and
regulations
in
which
there
was
no
27
|
P a g e
favorable
recommendation
coming
from
the
COMELEC.
Congress
cannot
in
any
way
delimit
the
pardoning
powers
of
the
President.
Grant
of
amnesty
requires
the
consent
of
Congress.
4.
Can
the
President
of
the
Philippines
declare
a
state
of
war?
Answer:
No.
The
Constitution
provides
that
only
Congress
may
declare
the
existence
of
a
state
of
war.
*Note
that
Congress
cannot
even
declare
a
state
of
war
but
can
only
recognize
its
existence
under
the
Constitution.
Please
relate
this
with
the
renunciation
of
war
as
an
instrument
of
national
policy.
The
Philippines
renounces
war
as
an
instrument
of
national
policy:
In
the
field
of
public
international
law,
the
law
of
war
has
two
dimensions:
justifications
to
engage
in
war
(jus
ad
bellum)
and
the
limits
to
acceptable
wartime
conduct
(jus
in
bello
or
International
Humanitarian
Law).
As
a
humanitarian
concern,
the
laws
of
war
address
declarations
of
war,
acceptance
of
surrender
and
the
treatment
of
prisoners
of
war;
military
necessity
(use
of
an
attack
or
action
intended
to
help
the
military
objective
and
use
of
proportional
and
excessive
force
to
endanger
civilians(,
along
with
distinction
(careful
assessment
as
to
who
are
combatants
and
the
civilians)
and
proportionality(
the
legal
use
of
force
whereby
belligerents
must
make
sure
that
harm
caused
to
civilians
or
civilian
property
is
not
excessive
in
relation
to
the
concrete
and
direct
military
advantage
anticipated
attack
anticipated
by
an
attack
on
military
objective;
and
the
prohibition
of
certain
weapons
that
may
cause
unnecessary
suffering.
The
laws
of
war
should
mitigate
the
consequences
of
war
by:
Shielding
both
combatants
and
non-combatants
from
unnecessary
suffering;
Ensuring
that
certain
fundamental
human
rights
of
persons
who
fall
into
the
hands
of
the
enemy,
particularly
prisoners
of
war,
the
wounded
and
sick,
and
civilians,
are
protected;
and
endeavouring
that
peace
is
restored.
VIII.
THE
JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT
1.
What
are
the
requirements
before
the
Court
may
exercise
the
power
to
check
an
act
of
a
coequal
branch
of
government?
Answer:
The
Courts
power
to
check
an
act
of
a
coequal
branch
of
government
must
abide
by
the
stringent
requirements
for
the
exercise
of
that
power
under
the
Constitution.
Demetria
v.
Alba
and
Francisco
v.
House
of
Representatives
cite
the
"pillars"
of
the
limitations
on
the
power
of
judicial
review
as
enunciated
in
the
concurring
opinion
of
U.S.
Supreme
Court
Justice
Brandeis
in
Ashwander
v.
Tennessee
Valley
Authority.
Francisco
redressed
these
"pillars"
under
the
following
categories:
1.
That
there
be
absolute
necessity
of
deciding
a
case;
2.
That
rules
of
constitutional
law
shall
be
formulated
only
as
required
by
the
facts
of
the
case;
3.
That
judgment
may
not
be
sustained
on
some
other
ground;
4.
That
there
be
actual
injury
sustained
by
the
party
by
reason
of
the
operation
of
the
statute;
5.
That
the
parties
are
not
in
estoppels;
and
6.
That
the
Court
upholds
the
presumption
of
constitutionality;
2.
What
are
the
three
functions
of
judicial
review?
Answer:
The
three
functions
of
Judicial
Review
are:
(a).
Checking
when
the
Court
looks
into
possible
abuses
of
each
branch
of
government
and
the
review
of
decisions
of
lower
courts
and
other
tribunals;
(b).
Legitimizing
when
the
Court
looks
into
constitutionality
of
laws
and
its
application;
and
(c).
Symbolic
when
the
Court
looks
into
issues
although
they
have
become
moot
and
academic
to
help
guide
the
bench,
the
bard
and
the
public.
3.
Under
what
circumstances
may
the
Court
disturb
the
findings
of
administrative
tribunals
and
lower
courts?
Answer:
Under
normal
circumstances,
S.C.
will
not
disturb
the
findings
of
facts
of
administrative
tribunals
and
the
trial
courts.
However,
S.C.
may
review
findings
of
facts
the
lower
courts
under
recognized
exceptions:
when
the
conclusion
is
a
finding
grounded
entirely
on
speculation,
surmises
or
conjectures;
when
inference
made
is
manifestly
mistaken,
absurd
or
impossible;
where
there
is
abuse
of
discretion;
when
judgment
is
based
on
28
|
P a g e
misapprehension
of
facts,
when
the
findings
of
facts
are
conflicting;
when
the
Court
of
Appeals,
in
making
its
findings,
went
beyond
the
issues
of
the
case
and
the
same
is
contrary
to
those
of
the
trial
court;
when
findings
of
fact
are
conclusions
without
citation
of
specific
evidence
on
which
they
are
based;
when
the
facts
set
forth
in
the
petition
as
well
as
in
the
petitioners
main
and
reply
briefs
are
not
disputed
by
the
respondents;
and
when
the
findings
of
fact
of
the
C.A.
are
premised
on
supposed
absence
of
evidence
and
contradicted
by
evidence
on
record.
4.
May
lower
courts
also
exercise
the
power
of
judicial
review?
Answer:
Yes,
as
a
general
rule,
all
courts
can
exercise
judicial
review.
5.
What
is
the
effect
of
declaration
of
unconstitutionality
of
a
statute?
Answer:
Under
Civil
Code,
Art.
7,
a
statute
is
void
when
declared
unconstitutional.
All
prior
acts
prior
to
the
declaration
may
produce
legal
effects.
6.
What
are
Moot
Questions?
Answer:
As
a
general
rule,
a
matter
is
moot
if
further
legal
proceedings
with
regard
to
it
can
have
no
effect,
or
events
have
placed
it
beyond
the
reach
of
the
law.
Normally,
courts
will
defer
to
acting
on
a
matter
that
has
become
moot
and
academic.
However,
where
matters
of
transcendental
importance
arise,
the
Court
render
a
resolution
to
give
guideposts
to
the
bench,
bar
and
the
public
if
a
similar
matter
should
arise
in
the
future.
7.
What
is
Political
Question
Doctrine?
Answer:
In
Baker
v.
Carr,
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court
explained
the
political
question
doctrine
in
this
wise:
"Prominent
on
the
surface
of
any
case
held
to
involve
a
political
question
is
found:
(1)
a
textually
demonstrable
constitutional
commitment
of
the
issue
to
a
coordinate
political
department;
(2)
or
a
lack
of
judicially
discoverable
and
manageable
standards
for
resolving
it;
(3)
or
the
impossibility
of
deciding
without
an
initial
policy
determination
of
a
kind
clearly
for
non-judicial
discretion;
(4)
or
the
impossibility
of
a
court's
undertaking
independent
resolution
without
expressing
lack
of
the
respect
due
coordinate
branches
of
government;
(5)
or
an
unusual
need
for
unquestioning
adherence
to
a
political
decision
already
made;
(6)
or
the
potentiality
of
embarrassment
from
multifarious
pronouncements
by
various
departments
on
one
question.
The
political
question
doctrine
could
be
read
narrowly
or
more
broadly.
Read
narrowly,
the
political
question
doctrine
should
be
invoked
only
when
the
issue
presented
to
the
Court
is
one
that
"has
been
textually
committed
to
another
branch
of
government."
That
is,
if
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
made
clear
their
intention
that
the
judiciary
not
resolve
a
particular
question
of
constitutional
interpretation,
that
determination
must
be
respected.
More
broadly,
the
political
question
doctrine
might
be
invoked
when
there
is
a
lack
of
judicially
manageable
standards
to
decide
the
case
on
the
merits,
when
judicial
intervention
might
show
insufficient
respect
for
other
branches
of
government,
or
when
a
judicial
decision
might
threaten
the
integrity
of
the
judicial
branch.
(Baker
v.
Carr,
1962)
8.
What
does
the
Court
approach
an
issue
involving
a
political
question?
Answer:
In
Marcos
et
al.
v.
Manglapus
et
al.(G.R.
No.
88211
September
15,
1989),
the
Court
said
that
when
political
questions
are
involved,
the
Constitution
limits
the
determination
to
whether
or
not
there
has
been
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
the
official
whose
action
is
being
questioned.
If
grave
abuse
is
not
established,
the
Court
will
not
substitute
its
judgment
for
that
of
the
official
concerned
and
decide
a
matter
which
by
its
nature
or
by
law
is
for
the
latter
alone
to
decide.
9.
What
is
locus
standi?
Answer:
The
question
of
locus
standi
or
legal
standing
focuses
on
the
determination
of
whether
those
assailing
the
governmental
act
have
the
right
of
appearance
to
bring
the
matter
to
the
court
for
adjudication.
They
must
show
that
they
have
a
personal
and
substantial
interest
in
the
29
|
P a g e
case,
such
that
they
have
sustained
or
are
in
immediate
danger
of
sustaining,
some
direct
injury
as
a
consequence
of
the
enforcement
of
the
challenged
governmental
act.
10.
What
is
material
interest?
Answer:
"Interest"
in
the
question
involved
must
be
material
-
an
interest
that
is
in
issue
and
will
be
affected
by
the
official
act
-
as
distinguished
from
being
merely
incidental
or
general.
Clearly,
it
would
be
insufficient
to
show
that
the
law
or
any
governmental
act
is
invalid,
and
that
petitioners
stand
to
suffer
in
some
indefinite
way.
They
must
show
that
they
have
a
particular
interest
in
bringing
the
suit,
and
that
they
have
been
or
are
about
to
be
denied
some
right
or
privilege
to
which
they
are
lawfully
entitled,
or
that
they
are
about
to
be
subjected
to
some
burden
or
penalty
by
reason
of
the
act
complained
of.
The
reason
why
those
who
challenge
the
validity
of
a
law
or
an
international
agreement
are
required
to
allege
the
existence
of
a
personal
stake
in
the
outcome
of
the
controversy
is
"to
assure
the
concrete
adverseness
which
sharpens
the
presentation
of
issues
upon
which
the
court
so
largely
depends
for
illumination
of
difficult
constitutional
questions."
11.
What
is
a
taxpayers
suit?
Answer:
A
taxpayer's
suit
concerns
a
case
in
which
the
official
act
complained
of
directly
involves
the
illegal
disbursement
of
public
funds
derived
from
taxation.
Here,
those
challenging
the
act
must
specifically
show
that
they
have
sufficient
interest
in
preventing
the
illegal
expenditure
of
public
money,
and
that
they
will
sustain
a
direct
injury
as
a
result
of
the
enforcement
of
the
assailed
act.
12.
When
may
the
legislature
be
considered
a
proper
party
in
a
case?
Answer:
The
legal
standing
of
an
institution
of
the
Legislature
or
of
any
of
its
Members
has
already
been
recognized
by
the
Court
in
a
number
of
cases.
What
is
in
question
here
is
the
alleged
impairment
of
the
constitutional
duties
and
powers
granted
to,
or
the
impermissible
intrusion
upon
the
domain
of,
the
Legislature
or
an
institution
thereof.
In
the
case
of
suits
initiated
by
the
legislators
themselves,
the
Court
has
recognized
their
standing
to
question
the
validity
of
any
official
action
that
they
claim
infringes
the
prerogatives,
powers,
and
privileges
vested
by
the
Constitution
in
their
office.
IX.
CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
1.
Torres
questioned
the
order
of
dismissal
issued
by
the
Civil
Service
Commission.
She
alleged
that
CSC
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
employees
of
the
Philippine
National
Red
Cross.
Is
her
contention
tenable?
Answer:
No.
As
ruled
by
this
Court
in
Liban,
et
al.
v.
Gordon,
the
PNRC,
although
not
a
GOCC,
is
sui
generis
in
character,
thus,
requiring
this
Court
to
approach
controversies
involving
the
PNRC
on
a
case-to-case
basis.
As
discussed:
A
closer
look
at
the
nature
of
the
PNRC
would
show
that
there
is
none
like
it
not
just
in
terms
of
structure,
but
also
in
terms
of
history,
public
service
and
official
status
accorded
to
it
by
the
State
and
the
international
community.
There
is
merit
in
PNRC's
contention
that
its
structure
is
sui
generis.
It
is
in
recognition
of
this
sui
generis
character
of
the
PNRC
that
R.A.
No.
95
has
remained
valid
and
effective
from
the
time
of
its
enactment
in
March
22,
1947
under
the
1935
Constitution
and
during
the
effectivity
of
the
1973
Constitution
and
the
1987
Constitution.
As
correctly
mentioned
by
Justice
Roberto
A.
Abad,
the
sui
generis
character
of
PNRC
requires
us
to
approach
controversies
involving
the
PNRC
on
a
case-to-case
basis.
In
this
particular
case,
the
CA
did
not
err
in
ruling
that
the
CSC
has
jurisdiction
over
the
PNRC
because
the
issue
at
hand
is
the
enforcement
of
labor
laws
and
penal
statutes,
thus,
in
this
particular
matter,
the
PNRC
can
be
treated
as
a
GOCC.
(MARY
LOU
GETURBOS
TORRES
v.
CORAZON
ALMA
G.
DE
LEON,
in
her
capacity
as
Secretary
General
of
the
Philippine
National
Red
Cross
and
THE
BOARD
OF
GOVERNORS
of
the
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
RED
CROSS,
National
Headquarters,
G.R.
No.
199440,
January
8,
2016,
Peralta,
J.)
30
|
P a g e
2.
Are
funds
of
the
Boy
Scouts
of
the
Philippines
subject
to
audit?
Answer:
Yes.
The
BSP
is
a
public
corporation
or
a
government
agency
or
instrumentality
with
juridical
personality
which
does
not
fall
within
the
Constitutional
prohibition
in
Art.
XII,
Section
16.
Not
all
corporations,
which
are
not
government
owned
or
controlled,
are
ipso
facto
to
be
considered
private
corporations
as
there
exists
another
distinct
class
of
corporations
or
chartered
institutions
which
are
otherwise
known
as
public
corporations.
These
corporations
are
treated
by
law
as
agencies
or
instrumentalities
of
the
government
which
are
not
subject
to
the
tests
of
ownership
or
control
and
economic
viability
but
to
different
criteria
relating
to
their
public
purposes/interests
or
constitutional
policies
and
objectives
and
their
administrative
relationship
to
the
government
or
any
of
its
departments
or
offices.
(BOY
SCOUTS
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
COA
(G.R.
No.
177131,
2011)
3.
Can
a
public
officer
claim
reimbursement
for
personal
medical
expenses
and
other
travelling
costs?
Answer:
No.
COA
may
disallow
expenses
which
do
not
pass
the
public
purpose
test
(claims
for
executive
check-up,
basic
monthly
allowances,
reimbursement
for
gasoline
allowance,
etc.)
Any
disbursement
of
public
funds,
which
includes
payment
of
salaries
and
benefits
to
government
employees
and
officials,
must
(a)
be
authorized
by
law,
and
(b)
serve
a
public
purpose.
As
understood
in
the
traditional
sense,
public
purpose
or
public
use
means
any
purpose
or
use
directly
available
to
the
general
public
as
a
matter
of
right.
The
public
servant
has
the
burden
to
proof
to
establish
that
use
of
public
funds
is
related
to
the
discharge
of
his
official
functions.
(RAMON
R.
YAP
v.
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT
(G.R.
No.
158562,
2010)
4. The
COA
en
banc
denied
the
petitioner's
request
for
exclusion
from
liability
involving
the
acquisition
of
several
parcels
by
the
RSBC.
The
COA
en
banc
also
denied
her
motion
for
reconsideration.
Is
there
grave
abuse
of
discretion
on
the
part
of
the
COA
in
rendering
its
assailed
decision?
Answer:
None.
The
Court
finds
no
grave
abuse
of
discretion
on
the
part
of
the
COA
in
rendering
its
assailed
decision,
which
disregarded
the
petitioner's
defense
that
she
had
no
knowledge
of
the
above
transaction,
or
of
the
two
versions
of
the
deed
of
sale,
prior
to
her
post-audit,
or
that
the
payments
for
the
lots
were
made
long
before
she
signed
"verified
correct"
after
completing
the
post-audit
process
and
finding
the
supporting
documents
to
be
complete,
or
that
she
did
not
benefit
from
the
transaction
in
any
way.
It
is
well
to
be
reminded
that
the
exercise
by
COA
of
its
general
audit
power
is
among
the
mechanisms
of
check
and
balance
instituted
under
the
1987
Constitution
on
which
our
democratic
form
of
government
is
founded.
Article
IX-D,
Section
2(1)
of
the
1987
Constitution
provides
that
the
COA
has
"the
power,
authority,
and
duty
to
examine,
audit,
and
settle
all
accounts
pertaining
to
the
revenue
and
receipts
of,
and
expenditures
or
uses
of
funds
and
property,
owned
or
held
in
trust
by,
or
pertaining
to,
the
Government,
or
any
of
its
subdivisions,
agencies,
or
instrumentalities,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations
with
original
charters."
5. Zamboanga
City
Water
District
(ZCWD)
is
a
government-owned
controlled
corporation
(GOCC).
COA
issued
Notices
of
Disallowance
for
ZCWD's
various
payments.
These
covered
the
disbursements
made
during
the
tenure
of
then
General
Manager
Juanita
L.
Bucoy.
This
included
salary
adjustments
of
the
Bucoy.
COA
said
that
the
Board
of
Director
had
no
authority
to
approve
such
adjustments.
Was
COA
action
proper?
Answer:
Yes.
ZCWD's
contention
that,
pursuant
to
Section
23
of
P.D.
No.
198,
as
amended
by
R.A.
No.
9286,
the
BOD
has
the
discretion
to
fix
the
compensation
of
the
GM
is
misplaced.
As
held
in
Mendoza
v.
COA,
unless
specifically
exempted
by
its
charter,
GOCCs
are
covered
by
the
provisions
of
the
Salary
Standardization
Law
(SSL).The
salary
increase
of
GM
Bucoy,
including
the
corresponding
increase
in
her
monetized
leave
credits,
was
properly
disallowed
for
being
in
excess
of
the
amounts
allowed
under
the
SSL.
(ZAMBOANGA
CITY
WATER
DISTRICT,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT,
January
26,
2016,
G.R.
No.
213472)
31
|
P a g e
6. May
the
Commission
on
Elections
be
compelled,
through
a
writ
of
mandamus,
to
enable
the
Voter
Verified
Paper
Audit
Trail
system
capability
feature
for
the
2016
Elections?
Answer:
Yes.
The
inaction
of
the
Commission
on
Elections
in
utilizing
the
VVPAT
feature
of
the
vote-counting
machines
fails
to
fulfill
the
duty
required
under
Republic
Act
No.
8436,
as
amended.
Article
XI(C),
Section
2
of
the
1987
Constitution
empowered
the
Commission
of
Elections
to
"enforce
and
administer
all
laws
and
regulations
relative
to
the
conduct
of
an
election."
One
of
the
laws
that
the
Commission
on
Elections
must
implement
is
Republic
Act
No.
8436,
as
amended
by
Republic
Act
No.
9369,
which
requires
the
automated
election
system
to
have
the
capability
of
providing
a
voter-verified
paper
audit
trail.
The
law
is
clear.
A
"voter
verified
paper
audit
trail"
requires
the
following:
(a)
individual
voters
can
verify
whether
the
machines
have
been
able
to
count
their
votes;
and
(b)
that
the
verification
at
minimum
should
be
paper
based.
There
appears
to
be
no
room
for
further
interpretation
of
a
"voter
verified
paper
audit
trail."
The
paper
audit
trail
cannot
be
considered
the
physical
ballot,
because
there
may
be
instances
where
the
machine
may
translate
the
ballot
differently,
or
the
voter
inadvertently
spoils
his
or
her
ballot.
(BAGUMBAYAN-VNP
MOVEMENT,
INC.,
AND
RICHARD
J.
GORDON,
AS
CHAIRMAN
OF
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP
MOVEMENT,
INC.
v.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
G.R.
No.
222731,
March
08,
2016)
7.
The
Board
of
Directors
(the
Board)
of
petitioner
MNWD
passed
a
resolution
granting
the
payment
of
accrued
COLA
covering
the
period
from
1992
to
1999
in
favor
of
qualified
MNWD
personnel.
COA
disallowed
payment
of
back
payment
of
COLA
for
failure
of
MNWD
to
submit
the
documents
to
support
the
claim.
Was
the
disallowance
proper?
Answer: Yes.
The
Court
finds
that
the
back
payment
of
the
COLA
to
MNWD
employees
was
rightfully
disallowed.
Pertinent
to
the
issue
is
Section
12
of
the
SSL,
which
provides
that
the
consolidation
of
allowances
in
the
standardized
salary
as
stated
in
the
cited
provision
is
a
new
rule
in
Philippine
position
classification
and
compensation
system.
Integration
of
employees
benefits
is
the
rule
rather
than
the
exception.
Therefore,
COAs
action
was
proper.
(METROPOLITAN
NAGA
WATER
DISTRICT,
VIRGINIA
I.
NERO,
JEREMIAS
P.
ABAN
JR.,
AND
EMMA
A.
CUYO,
v.
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT,
G.R.
No.
218072,
March
08,
2016)
XI.
BILL
OF
RIGHTS
1.
The
Sandiganbayan
denied
the
Petition
for
Bail
of
JPE
because
the
crime
charged
against
him
is
Plunder
and
the
prosecution
has
indicated
that
the
evidence
of
guilt
is
strong.
JPE
filed
a
Petition
for
Certiorari
before
the
Supreme
Court.
Will
the
action
filed
by
JPE
before
the
Supreme
Court
prosper?
Answer:
Yes,
the
action
will
prosper.
In
all
criminal
prosecutions,
the
accused
shall
be
presumed
innocent
until
the
contrary
is
proved.
The
presumption
of
innocence
is
rooted
in
the
guarantee
of
due
process,
and
is
safeguarded
by
the
constitutional
right
to
be
released
on
bail;
and
further
binds
the
court
to
wait
until
after
trial
to
impose
any
punishment
on
the
accused.
(Enrile
vs.
Sandiganbayan
767
SCRA
282,
G.R.
No.
213847,
Bersamin,
J.)
2. What
factors
did
the
Court
consider
in
the
grant
of
bail
to
JPE?
Answer:
The
Court
considered
JPEs
social
and
political
standing
and
his
having
immediately
surrendered
to
the
authorities
upon
his
being
charged
in
court.
His
surrender
indicates
that
the
risk
of
his
flight
or
escape
from
this
jurisdiction
is
highly
unlikely.
The
fragile
state
of
his
health
also
presents
another
compelling
justification
for
his
admission
to
bail.
Sadly,
the
Sandiganbayan
did
not
recognize
all
these
foregoing
factors
when
it
denied
the
grant
of
bail
to
JPE.
3.
Aside
from
criminal
proceedings,
what
other
circumstance
would
merit
the
grant
of
bail?
Answer:
The
national
commitment
to
uphold
the
fundamental
human
rights
as
well
as
value
the
worth
and
dignity
of
every
person
has
authorized
the
grant
of
bail
not
only
to
those
charged
in
criminal
proceedings
but
also
to
extraditees
upon
a
clear
and
convincing
showing:
(1)
that
the
detainee
will
not
be
a
flight
risk
or
a
danger
to
the
community;
and
(2)
that
there
exist
special,
humanitarian
and
compelling
circumstances.
32
|
P a g e
Relate
this
to
the
Courts
rulings
in
Hongkong
SAR
v.
Hon.
Olalia
and
Munoz
and
Govt
of
the
U.S.A.
v.
Hon.
Purruganan
and
Jimenez
4. Lai
filed
a
Petition
before
the
Supreme
Court
alleging
that
he
was
denied
due
process
specifically
the
right
to
fair
trial
when
Judge
Elumba
refused
to
inhibit
himself
during
the
trial
despite
the
fact
that
he
was
the
prosecuting
fiscal
when
the
information
was
filed.
Will
Lais
Petition
prosper?
Answer:
Yes,
Lai
was
denied
fair
trial.
It
is
not
disputed
that
the
constitutional
right
to
due
process
of
law
cannot
be
denied
to
any
accused.
The
Constitution
has
expressly
ordained
that
"no
person
shall
be
deprived
of
life,
liberty
or
property
without
due
process
of
law."
An
essential
part
of
the
right
is
to
be
afforded
a
just
and
fair
trial
before
his
conviction
for
any
crime.
Any
violation
of
the
right
cannot
be
condoned,
for
the
impartiality
of
the
judge
who
sits
on
and
hears
a
case,
and
decides
it
is
an
indispensable
requisite
of
procedural
due
process.
(Lai
vs.
People,
761
SCRA
156,
G.R.
No.
175999,
Bersamin)
5. What
is
the
rationale
behind
the
need
for
an
impartial
judge?
Answer:
The
Court
has
repeatedly
and
consistently
demanded
'the
cold
neutrality
of
an
impartial
judge'
as
the
indispensable
imperative
of
due
process.
As
a
judge,
Elumba
must
not
only
be
impartial
but
must
also
appear
to
be
impartial
as
an
added
assurance
to
the
parties
that
his
decision
will
be
just.
An
accused
expects
go
to
a
judge
who
shall
give
him
justice.
The
Court
said
that
a
judge
has
both
the
duty
of
rendering
a
just
decision
and
the
duty
of
doing
it
in
a
manner
completely
free
from
suspicion
as
to
its
fairness
and
as
to
his
integrity.
The
law
conclusively
presumes
that
a
judge
cannot
objectively
or
impartially
sit
in
such
a
case
where
there
is
a
seeming
cloud
of
doubt.
6. Will
the
disqualification
of
Judge
Elumba
automatically
result
to
the
acquittal
of
Lai?
Answer:
No,
the
disqualification
does
not
automatically
result
to
the
acquittal
of
Lai.
To
restore
the
right
to
fair
trial
of
Lai,
the
proceedings
held
against
him
before
Judge
Elumba
and
his
ensuing
conviction
should
be
nullified
and
set
aside.
However,
the
case
should
be
remanded
to
the
RTC
for
a
partial
new
trial
to
remove
any
of
the
prejudicial
consequences
of
the
violation
of
the
right
to
due
process.
The
case
shall
be
raffled
to
a
Judge
who
is
not
otherwise
disqualified
like
Judge
Elumba
under
Section
1,
Rule
137
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
7.
Gacal
filed
an
administrative
case
against
Judge
Jaime
I.
Infante
to
whose
court
a
murder
case
was
raffled.
He
accused
Infante
with
gross
ignorance
of
the
law,
gross
incompetence,
and
evident
partiality.
The
judge
failed
to
set
a
hearing
before
granting
bail
to
the
accused
and
for
releasing
him
immediately
after
allowing
bail.
Will
the
administrative
case
filed
by
Gacal
against
Judge
Infante
prosper?
Answer:
Yes,
the
case
will
prosper.
Bail
hearing
is
mandatory.
Despite
the
fact
that
the
accused
never
filed
a
petition
for
grant
of
bail,
due
process
requires
a
hearing
be
held
before
bail
is
granted.
Judge
Infante
betrayed
his
gross
ignorance
because
the
accused
is
charged
with
murder,
a
crime
punishable
by
reclusion
perpetua
and
is
a
non-bailable
offense.
Judge
Infante
apparently
acted
as
if
the
requirement
for
the
bail
hearing
was
a
merely
minor
rule
to
be
dispensed
with.
(Gacal
vs.
Hon.
Infante,
658
SCRA
535,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-
04-184,
Bersamin,
J.)
8. What
is
the
purpose
of
conducting
a
hearing
before
bail
is
granted?
Answer:
The
Court
has
in
a
decided
case
said
that
although,
in
theory,
the
only
function
of
bail
is
to
ensure
the
appearance
of
the
accused
at
the
time
set
for
the
arraignment
and
trial.
In
practice,
bail
serves
the
further
purpose
of
preventing
the
release
of
an
accused
who
may
be
dangerous
to
society
or
whom
the
judge
may
not
want
to
release.
Therefore,
a
hearing
upon
notice
is
mandatory
before
the
grant
of
bail,
whether
bail
is
a
matter
of
right
or
discretion.
9. May the right against unreasonable search and seizure be waived?
Answer: Yes, the right against unreasonable search and seizure may be waived.
In Esquillo v. People, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Esquillo. The Court held
that Esquillos acts showed she waived her right to question her arrest. The acts included the
fact that she did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment as well
33
|
P a g e
as
the
inadmissibility
of
evidence
acquired
on
the
occasion
thereof.
She
raised
these
issues
for
the
first
time
only
on
appeal
before
the
appellate
court.
By
such
omissions,
she
is
deemed
to
have
waived
any
objections
on
the
legality
of
her
arrest.
(ESQUILLO
v.
PEOPLE,
G.R.
No.
182010,
Majority
Opinion)
`10.
When
may
law
enforcers
resort
to
stop
and
frisk
search
and
seizure?
Answer:
Justice
Bersamin
in
his
Dissenting
Opinion
in
Esquillo
v.
People,
reminds
us
that
police
officers
must
not
rely
on
a
single
suspicious
circumstance.
There
should
be
"presence
of
more
than
one
seemingly
innocent
activity,
which,
taken
together,
warranted
a
reasonable
inference
of
criminal
activity.
The
Constitution
prohibits
"unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.
Certainly,
reliance
on
only
one
suspicious
circumstance
or
none
at
all
will
not
result
in
a
reasonable
search.
Section
2
of
the
Constitution
provides
that
the
right
of
the
people
to
be
secure
in
their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
of
whatever
nature
and
for
any
purpose
shall
be
inviolable,
and
no
search
warrant
or
warrant
of
arrest
shall
issue
except
upon
probable
cause
to
be
determined
personally
by
the
judge
after
examination
under
oath
or
affirmation
of
the
complainant
and
the
witnesses
he
may
produce,
and
particularly
describing
the
place
to
be
searched
and
the
persons
or
things
to
be
seized.
11.
Is
stop
and
frisk
search
and
seizure
allowed
in
the
prosecution
of
a
crime?
Answer:
Yes,
this
is
allowed.
This
is
found
under
Section
5
(a),
Rule
113
of
Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure.
For
the
exception
in
Section
5
(a),
Rule
113
to
operate,
this
Court
has
ruled
that
two
(2)
elements
must
be
present:
(1)
the
person
to
be
arrested
must
execute
an
overt
act
indicating
that
he
has
just
committed,
is
actually
committing,
or
is
attempting
to
commit
a
crime;
and
(2)
such
overt
act
is
done
in
the
presence
or
within
the
view
of
the
arresting
officer.
(Miclat
v.
People,
G.R.
No.
176077,
Peralta,
J.)
12. Enumerate
acceptable
instances
when
a
search
and
seizure
may
conducted
without
a
search
warrant?
Answer:
The
general
rule
is
a
search
may
be
conducted
by
law
enforcers
only
on
the
strength
of
a
valid
search
warrant
is
settled.
The
same,
however,
admits
of
exceptions,
viz:
(1)
consented
searches
(malls,
schools,
hotels);
(2)
as
an
incident
to
a
lawful
arrest;
(3)
searches
of
vessels
and
aircraft
for
violation
of
immigration,
customs,
and
drug
laws
(human
smuggling,
smuggling
of
taxable
goods,
drugs);
(4)
searches
of
moving
vehicles
(COMELEC
checkpoints,
PNP
checkpoints,
hot
pursuit);
(5)
searches
of
automobiles
at
borders
or
constructive
borders
(checkpoints
in
areas
under
Martial
Law);
(6)
where
the
prohibited
articles
are
in
"plain
view;"
(7)
searches
of
buildings
and
premises
to
enforce
fire,
sanitary,
and
building
regulations
(protection
of
public
health
and
safety);
and
(8)
"stop
and
frisk
operations
(searches
conducted
at
airports
and
harbors
prior
to
boarding)
13.
Under
what
circumstances
may
law
enforcers
invoke
the
plain
view
doctrine?
Answer:
Objects
falling
in
plain
view
of
an
officer
who
has
a
right
to
be
in
a
position
to
have
that
view
are
subject
to
seizure
even
without
a
search
warrant
and
may
be
introduced
in
evidence.
The
plain
view
doctrine
applies
when
the
following
requisites
concur:
(a)
the
law
enforcement
officer
in
search
of
the
evidence
has
a
prior
justification
for
an
intrusion
or
is
in
a
position
from
which
he
can
view
a
particular
area;
(b)
the
discovery
of
evidence
in
plain
view
is
inadvertent;
(c)
it
is
immediately
apparent
to
the
officer
that
the
item
he
observes
may
be
evidence
of
a
crime,
contraband
or
otherwise
subject
to
seizure.
The
law
enforcement
officer
must
lawfully
make
an
initial
intrusion
or
properly
be
in
a
position
from
which
he
can
particularly
view
the
area.
In
the
course
of
such
lawful
intrusion,
he
came
inadvertently
across
a
piece
of
evidence
incriminating
the
accused.
The
object
must
be
open
to
eye
and
hand
and
its
discovery
inadvertent.
(cited
in
Miclat
v.
People,
Peralta,
J)
14.
Dela
Cruz
was
an
on-the-job
trainee
of
an
inter-island
vessel.
He
frequently
travelled,
"coming
back
and
forth
taking
a
vessel.
Dela
Cruz
was
at
a
pier
of
the
Cebu
Domestic
Port
to
34
|
P a g e
go
home
to
Iloilo.
While
buying
a
ticket,
he
allegedly
left
his
bag
on
the
floor
with
a
porter.
It
took
him
around
15
minutes
to
purchase
a
ticket.
Dela
Cruz
then
proceeded
to
the
entrance
of
the
terminal
and
placed
his
bag
on
the
x-ray
scanning
machine
for
inspection.
The
operator
of
the
x-ray
machine
saw
firearms
inside
Dela
Cruzs
bag.
Dela
Cruz
was
then
arrested
and
informed
of
his
violation
of
a
crime
punishable
by
law.
He
was
also
informed
of
his
constitutional
rights.
Did
the
petitioner
waive
his
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures?
Answer:
Yes.
In
cases
involving
the
waiver
of
the
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures,
events
must
be
weighed
in
its
entirety.
The
trial
courts
findings
show
that
petitioner
presented
his
bag
for
scanning
in
the
x-ray
machine.
When
his
bag
went
through
the
x-ray
machine
and
the
firearms
were
detected,
he
voluntarily
submitted
his
bag
for
inspection
to
the
port
authorities.
The
Constitution
safeguards
a
persons
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.
A
warrantless
search
is
presumed
to
be
unreasonable.
However,
this
court
lays
down
the
exceptions
where
warrantless
searches
are
deemed
legitimate:
(1)
warrantless
search
incidental
to
a
lawful
arrest;
(2)
seizure
in
"plain
view";
(3)
search
of
a
moving
vehicle;
(4)
consented
warrantless
search;
(5)
customs
search;
(6)
stop
and
frisk;
and
(7)
exigent
and
emergency
circumstances.
(ERWIN
LIBO-ON
DELA
CRUZ
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
January
11,
2016,
G.R.
No.
209387)
15.
Assuming
that
there
was
no
waiver,
was
there
a
valid
search
and
seizure
in
this
case?
Answer:
Yes,
there
was
a
valid
seizure
and
seizure.
There
is
a
reasonable
reduced
expectation
of
privacy
when
coming
into
airports
or
ports
of
travel.
Persons
may
lose
the
protection
of
the
search
and
seizure
clause
by
exposure
of
their
persons
or
property
to
the
public
in
a
manner
reflecting
a
lack
of
subjective
expectation
of
privacy,
which
expectation
society
is
prepared
to
recognize
as
reasonable.
Such
recognition
is
implicit
in
airport
security
procedures.
With
increased
concern
over
airplane
hijacking
and
terrorism
has
come
increased
security
at
the
nations
airports.
(ERWIN
LIBO-ON
DELA
CRUZ
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
January
11,
2016,
G.R.
No.
209387)
16.
Cite
instances
where
intrusions
to
privacy
were
done
on
the
bag
of
Dela
Cruz?
Answer:
The
first
point
of
intrusion
occurred
when
petitioner
presented
his
bag
for
inspection
to
port
personnelthe
x-ray
machine
operator
and
baggage
inspector
manning
the
x-ray
machine
station.
With
regard
to
searches
and
seizures,
the
standard
imposed
on
private
persons
is
different
from
that
imposed
on
state
agents
or
authorized
government
authorities.
The
Bill
of
Rights
does
not
govern
relationships
between
individuals;
it
cannot
be
invoked
against
the
acts
of
private
individuals.
The
Philippine
Ports
Authority
was
subsequently
given
police
authority
through
Executive
Order
No.
513.
The
second
point
of
intrusion
was
when
the
baggage
inspector
opened
petitioners
bag
and
called
the
attention
of
the
port
police
office
The
port
personnels
actions
proceed
from
the
authority
and
policy
to
ensure
the
safety
of
travelers
and
vehicles
within
the
port.
At
this
point,
petitioner
already
submitted
himself
and
his
belongings
to
inspection
by
placing
his
bag
in
the
x-ray
scanning
machine.
The
presentation
of
petitioners
bag
for
x-ray
scanning
was
voluntary.
Petitioner
had
the
choice
of
whether
to
present
the
bag
or
not.
He
had
the
option
not
to
travel
if
he
did
not
want
his
bag
scanned
or
inspected.
X-ray
machine
scanning
and
actual
inspection
upon
showing
of
probable
cause
that
a
crime
is
being
or
has
been
committed
are
part
of
reasonable
security
regulations
to
safeguard
the
passengers
passing
through
ports
or
terminals.
A
third
point
of
intrusion
to
petitioners
right
to
privacy
occurred
during
petitioners
submission
to
port
security
measures.
This
court
should
determine
whether
the
requirements
for
a
valid
waiver
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
were
met.
The
Constitution
safeguards
a
persons
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.
A
warrantless
search
is
presumed
to
be
unreasonable.
17.
What
is
chain
of
custody?
Answer:
Chain
of
Custody
means
the
duly
recorded
authorized
movements
and
custody
of
seized
drugs
or
controlled
chemicals
or
plant
sources
of
dangerous
drugs
or
laboratory
equipment
of
each
stage,
from
the
time
of
seizure/confiscation
to
receipt
in
the
forensic
35
|
P a g e
laboratory
to
safekeeping
to
presentation
in
court
for
destruction.
Such
record
of
movements
and
custody
of
seized
item
shall
include
the
identity
and
signature
of
the
person
who
held
temporary
custody
of
the
seized
item,
the
date
and
time
when
such
transfer
of
custody
were
made
in
the
course
of
safekeeping
and
use
in
court
as
evidence,
and
the
final
disposition.
(cited
in
People
v.
Climaco,
G.R.
No.
199403,
Carpio,
J.)
18.
What
is
the
purpose
of
the
chain
of
custody?
Answer:
In
Malillin
v.
People,1[22]
the
Court
explained
the
importance
of
the
chain
of
custody:
Prosecutions
for
illegal
possession
of
prohibited
drugs
necessitates
that
the
elemental
act
of
possession
of
a
prohibited
substance
be
established
with
moral
certainty,
together
with
the
fact
that
the
same
is
not
authorized
by
law.
The
dangerous
drug
itself
constitutes
the
very
corpus
delicti
of
the
offense
and
the
fact
of
its
existence
is
vital
to
a
judgment
of
conviction.
Essential
therefore
in
these
cases
is
that
the
identity
of
the
prohibited
drug
be
established
beyond
doubt.
Be
that
as
it
may,
the
mere
fact
of
unauthorized
possession
will
not
suffice
to
create
in
a
reasonable
mind
the
moral
certainty
required
to
sustain
a
finding
of
guilt.
More
than
just
the
fact
of
possession,
the
fact
that
the
substance
illegally
possessed
in
the
first
place
is
the
same
substance
offered
in
court
as
exhibit
must
also
be
established
with
the
same
unwavering
exactitude
as
that
requisite
to
make
a
finding
of
guilt.
The
chain
of
custody
requirement
performs
this
function
in
that
it
ensures
that
unnecessary
doubts
concerning
the
identity
of
the
evidence
are
removed.
19.
What
are
the
ostensible
objectives
of
resorting
to
a
"stop-and-frisk"
practice
also
known
as
Terry
Search?
Answer:
A
stop-and-frisk
serves
a
two-fold
interest:
(1)
the
general
interest
of
effective
crime
prevention
and
detection,
which
underlies
the
recognition
that
a
police
officer
may,
under
appropriate
circumstances
and
in
an
appropriate
manner,
approach
a
person
for
purposes
of
investigating
possible
criminal
behavior
even
without
probable
cause;
and
(2)
the
more
pressing
interests
of
safety
and
self-preservation
which
permit
the
police
officer
to
take
steps
20.
The
Constitution
has
enshrined
the
family
as
a
basic
autonomous
social
institution
under
Sections
12
and
13,
Art.
II
and
Art.
XV-
The
Family.
May
Congress
intrude
into
this
basic
social
institution?
Answer:
The
Court
has
recognized
that
under
Art.
52
of
the
Civil
Code,
marriage
is
not
a
mere
contract
but
an
inviolable
social
institution.
In
Imbong
v.
Ochoa
(April
8,
2014),
the
Supreme
Court
upheld
the
constitutionality
of
the
RH
Bill
as
a
valid
exercise
of
police
power.
21.
What
other
issues
were
resolved
by
the
Court
in
Imbong
v.
Ochoa?
Answer:
The
following
issues
were
resolved
by
the
Court:
A.
Issue
on
Right
to
Privacy:
Section
23(a)
(2)
(i)
of
the
RH
Law
intrudes
into
martial
privacy
and
autonomy
and
goes
against
the
constitutional
safeguards
for
the
family
as
the
basic
social
institution.
Particularly,
Section
3,
Article
XV
of
the
Constitution
mandates
the
State
to
defend:
(a)
the
right
of
spouses
to
found
a
family
in
accordance
with
their
religious
convictions
and
the
demands
of
responsible
parenthood
and
(b)
the
right
of
families
or
family
associations
to
participate
in
the
planning
and
implementation
of
policies
and
programs
that
affect
them.
The
RH
Law
cannot
infringe
upon
this
mutual
decision-making,
and
endanger
the
institutions
of
marriage
and
the
family.
B.
Issue
on
violation
of
Freedom
of
Religion:
The
provision
which
obliges
a
hospital
or
medical
practitioner
to
immediately
refer
a
person
seeking
health
care
and
services
under
the
law
to
another
accessible
healthcare
provider
despite
their
conscientious
objections
based
on
religious
or
ethical
beliefs
violate
the
religious
belief
and
conviction
of
a
conscientious
objector.
They
are
contrary
to
Section
29(2),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution
or
the
Free
Exercise
Clause,
whose
basis
is
the
respect
for
the
inviolability
of
the
human
conscience.
C.
Issue
on
violation
of
Equal
Protection
Clause:
Excluding
public
health
officers
from
being
conscientious
objectors
(under
Sec.
5.24
of
the
IRR)
also
violates
the
equal
protection
clause.
There
is
no
perceptible
distinction
between
public
health
officers
and
their
private
36
|
P a g e
counterparts.
In
addition,
the
freedom
to
believe
is
intrinsic
in
every
individual
and
the
protection
of
this
freedom
remains
even
if
he/she
is
employed
in
the
government.
D.
Issue
on
Right
of
the
State
to
impose
Penalties:
Using
the
compelling
state
interest
test,
there
is
no
compelling
state
interest
to
limit
the
free
exercise
of
conscientious
objectors.
There
is
no
immediate
danger
to
the
life
or
health
of
an
individual
in
the
perceived
scenario.
While
penalties
may
be
imposed
by
law
to
ensure
compliance
to
it,
a
constitutionally-protected
right
must
prevail
over
the
effective
implementation
of
the
law.
22.
What
are
the
elements
of
freedom
of
religion?
Answer:
Freedom
of
religion
includes
the
right
to
believe
and
the
right
to
profess
ones
belief.
23.
What
is
the
non-establishment
clause
under
the
constitutional
guarantee
of
freedom
of
religion?
Answer:
The
Constitution
provides
in
Article
III,
Section
5
that
"[n]o
law
shall
be
made
respecting
an
establishment
of
religion,
or
prohibiting
the
free
exercise
thereof."
At
bottom,
what
the
non-
establishment
clause
calls
for
is
"government
neutrality
in
religious
matters.
(Ang
Ladlad
v.
COMELEC)
24.
What
is
benevolent
neutrality?
Answer:
Benevolent
neutrality
recognizes
that
government
must
pursue
its
secular
goals
and
interests
but
at
the
same
time
strive
to
uphold
religious
liberty
to
the
greatest
extent
possible
within
flexible
constitutional
limits.
Thus,
although
the
morality
contemplated
by
laws
is
secular,
benevolent
neutrality
could
allow
for
accommodation
of
morality
based
on
religion,
provided
it
does
not
offend
compelling
state
interests.
25. Can
professors
of
law
claim
that
their
allegations
against
a
justice
of
the
Supreme
Court
for
plagiarism
was
protected
by
free
speech?
Answer:
No.
In
a
decided
case,
the
Court
held
that
the
right
to
criticize
the
courts
and
judicial
officers
must
be
balanced
against
the
equally
primordial
concern
that
the
independence
of
the
Judiciary
be
protected
from
due
influence
or
interference.
In
cases
where
the
critics
are
not
only
citizens
but
members
of
the
Bar,
jurisprudence
has
repeatedly
affirmed
the
authority
of
this
Court
to
discipline
lawyers
whose
statements
regarding
the
courts
and
fellow
lawyers,
whether
judicial
or
extrajudicial,
have
exceeded
the
limits
of
fair
comment
and
common
decency.
The
accusatory
and
vilifying
nature
of
certain
portions
of
the
Statement
exceeded
the
limits
of
fair
comment
and
cannot
be
deemed
as
protected
free
speech.
(RE:
LETTER
OF
THE
UP
LAW
FACULTY
ENTITLED
RESTORING
INTEGRITY:
A
STATEMENT
BY
THE
FACULTY
OF
THE
COLLEGE
OF
LAW
ON
THE
ALLEGATIONS
OF
PLAGIARISM
AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT,
A.M.
No.
10-10-4-
SC,
2010)
26.
What
is
the
theory
behind
freedom
of
expression?
Answer:
T]he
theory
of
freedom
of
expression
involves
more
than
a
technique
for
arriving
at
better
social
judgments
through
democratic
procedures.
It
comprehends
a
vision
of
society,
a
faith
and
a
whole
way
of
life.
The
theory
grew
out
of
an
age
that
was
awakened
and
invigorated
by
the
idea
of
new
society
in
which
man's
mind
was
free,
his
fate
determined
by
his
own
powers
of
reason,
and
his
prospects
of
creating
a
rational
and
enlightened
civilization
virtually
unlimited.
It
is
put
forward
as
a
prescription
for
attaining
a
creative,
progressive,
exciting
and
intellectually
robust
community.
It
contemplates
a
mode
of
life
that,
through
encouraging
toleration,
skepticism,
reason
and
initiative,
will
allow
man
to
realize
his
full
potentialities.
It
spurns
the
alternative
of
a
society
that
is
tyrannical,
conformist,
irrational
and
stagnant.
(THE
DIOCESE
OF
BACOLOD
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
205728,
January
21,
2015)
27.
What
tests
are
normally
applied
in
cases
involving
freedom
of
speech,
expression
and
of
the
press?
Answer:
The
following
tests
may
be
applied:
OBrien
Test
on
Content-Neutral
Restrictions:
Social
Weather
Station
v.
COMELEC,
357
SCRA
504
(2001)
(simple
public
disclosure
of
survey
results)
Miller
Test
on
Indecent
Speech:Soriano
v.
Laguardia,
587
SCRA
79
(safeguard
community
values
and
morals)
Roth
Test
on
Obscenity:
Gonzales
v.
Kalaw-
Katigbak,
137
SCRA
717
(Movie
Classification)
37
|
P a g e
Clear
and
Present
Danger
Test:
David
v.
President
Gloria
Macapgal
Arroyo
and
Bayan
Muna
v.
Ermita,
and
IBP
v.
Mayor
Atienza
(Freedom
of
Assembly)
Please
note:
A
limitation
on
the
freedom
of
expression
may
be
justified
only
by
a
danger
of
such
substantive
character
that
the
state
has
a
right
to
prevent.
Unlike
in
the
"dangerous
tendency"
doctrine,
the
danger
must
not
only
be
clear
but
also
present.
"Present"
refers
to
the
time
element;
the
danger
must
not
only
be
probable
but
very
likely
to
be
inevitable.
The
evil
sought
to
be
avoided
must
be
so
substantive
as
to
justify
a
clamp
over
one's
mouth
or
a
restraint
of
a
writing
instrument.
28.
May
a
person
who
voluntarily
surrendered
invoke
the
Miranda
rights?
Answer:
No.
A
person
may
only
invoke
the
protection
of
Miranda
Rights
if
his
liberty
is
restrained
by
law
enforcers.
Miranda
Rights
will
apply
only
if
the
following
elements
are
present
1. One
must
be
in
the
custody
of
law
enforcers;
2. One
must
be
under
investigation
for
a
commission
of
an
offense;
and
3. The
information
sought
is
testimonial
in
nature.
29.
What
is
the
exclusionary
rule
governing
an
extrajudicial
confession?
Answer:
Infraction
of
the
rights
of
an
accused
during
custodial
investigation
or
the
so-called
Miranda
Rights
render
inadmissible
only
the
extrajudicial
confession
or
admission
made
during
such
investigation.
"The
admissibility
of
other
evidence,
provided
they
are
relevant
to
the
issue
and
is
not
otherwise
excluded
by
law
or
rules,
is
not
affected
even
if
obtained
or
taken
in
the
course
of
custodial
investigation."
(Ho
Wai
Ping
v.
People,
G.R.
No.
176229,
October
19,
2011)
30.
De
Leon
was
charged
with
Grave
Oral
Defamation
before
the
MeTC.
Upon
arraignment,
De
Leon
entered
a
plea
of
not
guilty.
The
MeTC
found
De
Leon
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
Grave
Oral
Defamation.
The
verdict
being
unacceptable
to
him,
De
Leon
filed
his
Notice
of
Appeal.
The
RTC
issued
the
Order
directing
De
Leon
to
file
his
appeal
memorandum.
De
Leon,
however,
failed
to
comply.
For
his
failure
to
file
the
same,
the
RTC
issued
another
Order
dismissing
his
appeal.
De
Leon
then
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration,
which
was
granted
by
the
RTC
in
its
Order.
De
Leon
filed
his
appeal
memorandum
and
argued,
among
others,
that
the
MeTC
decision
lacked
the
necessary
constitutional
and
procedural
requirements
of
a
valid
decision.
Question:
Did
the
Decision
of
the
MeTC
fail
to
include
the
facts
and
the
law
upon
which
the
decision
was
based?
Answer:
No.
There
was
no
breach
of
the
constitutional
mandate
that
decisions
must
express
clearly
and
distinctly
the
facts
and
the
law
on
which
they
are
based.
The
CA
correctly
stated
that
the
MeTC
clearly
emphasized
in
its
decision,
the
factual
findings,
as
well
as
the
credibility
and
the
probative
weight
of
the
evidence
for
the
defense
vis--vis
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution.
The
MeTC
presented
both
the
version
of
the
prosecution
and
that
of
the
defense.
De
Leon
was
not
left
in
the
dark.
He
was
fully
aware
of
the
alleged
errors
of
the
MeTC.
The
RTC,
as
an
appellate
court,
found
no
reason
to
reverse
the
decision
of
the
MeTC.
(ENRIQUE
G.
DE
LEON,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
and
SPO3
PEDRITO
L.
LEONARDO,
Respondents. January
11,
2016,
G.R.
No.
212623)
31. What is transactional immunity?
Answer: Government may enter into an agreement to grant immunity provided grantee will
become a state witness.
There are two kinds of statutory criminal immunity available to a witness: transactional
immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the
scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction to which the testimony relates. In contrast, by
the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her
particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution. (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 202, 2005)
32. If one has been convicted for violation of an ordinance, may be held accountable again
under a national law?
38
|
P a g e
No.
Requisites
of
Double
Jeopardy
(Ivler
v.
San
Pedro,
G.R.
No.
172716,
November
17,
2010):
1. Identity
of
the
elements
of
the
crime
committed
as
set
forth
in
the
information.
2. Accused
has
entered
his
plea.
3. Prosecution
and
the
defense
have
presented
evidence.
4. The
court
has
ruled
on
the
merits.
33.
What
is
the
rule
on
demurrer
to
evidence?
Answer:
In
People
v.
Sandiganbayan,
the
Supreme
Court
explained
the
general
rule
that
the
grant
of
a
demurrer
to
evidence
operates
as
an
acquittal
and
is,
thus,
final
and
unappealable.
The
demurrer
to
evidence
in
criminal
cases
is
"filed
after
the
prosecution
had
rested
its
case,"
and
when
the
same
is
granted,
it
calls
"for
an
appreciation
of
the
evidence
adduced
by
the
prosecution
and
its
sufficiency
to
warrant
conviction
beyond
reasonable
doubt,
resulting
in
a
dismissal
of
the
case
on
the
merits,
tantamount
to
an
acquittal
of
the
accused.
(People
v.
Dante
Tan
G.R.
No.
167526,
July
26,
2010)
34.
What
is
the
extent
of
the
interest
of
a
prvate
party
in
a
criminal
case?
Answer:
It
is
well-settled
that
in
criminal
cases
where
the
offended
party
is
the
State,
the
interest
of
the
private
complainant
or
the
private
offended
party
is
limited
to
the
civil
liability.
Thus,
in
the
prosecution
of
the
offense,
the
complainant's
role
is
limited
to
that
of
a
witness
for
the
prosecution.
If
a
criminal
case
is
dismissed
by
the
trial
court
or
if
there
is
an
acquittal,
only
the
OSG,
and
not
the
private
offended
party,
has
the
authority
to
question
the
order
granting
the
demurrer
to
evidence
in
a
criminal
case.
(Bangayan,
Jr.,
v.
Bangayan,
G.R.
No.
172777,
October
19,
2011)
35.
May
the
state
appeal
an
acquittal?
Answer:
It
has
been
consistently
held
that
in
criminal
cases,
the
acquittal
of
the
accused
or
the
dismissal
of
the
case
against
him
can
only
be
appealed
by
the
Solicitor
General,
acting
on
behalf
of
the
State.
The
private
complainant
or
the
offended
party
may
question
such
acquittal
or
dismissal
only
insofar
as
the
civil
liability
of
the
accused
is
concerned.
The
exception
where
the
acquittal
may
be
questioned
based
on
denial
of
the
State's
right
to
due
process
can
be
found
in
Galman
v.
Sandiganbayan
(1986)
Exception,
when
invoked:
Lejano
v.
People,
G.R.
Nos.
176389
and
176864,
January
18,
2011:
To
reconsider
a
judgment
of
acquittal
places
the
accused
twice
in
jeopardy
of
being
punished
for
the
crime
of
which
he
has
already
been
absolved.
There
is
reason
for
this
provision
of
the
Constitution.
In
criminal
cases,
the
full
power
of
the
State
is
ranged
against
the
accused.
36.
CTRM,
an
office
under
the
National
Economic
Development
Authority
(NEDA),
held
a
meeting
in
which
it
resolved
to
recommend
to
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
the
lifting
of
the
suspension
of
the
tariff
reduction
schedule
on
petrochemicals
and
certain
plastic
products,
thereby
reducing
the
Common
Effective
Preferential
Tariff
(CEPT)
rates
on
products
covered
by
Executive
Order
(E.O.)
No.
161
from
7%
or
10%
to
5%
starting
July
2005.
May
the
CTRM
be
compelled
by
mandamus
to
furnish
the
petitioner
with
a
copy
of
the
minutes
of
the
meeting
based
on
the
constitutional
right
to
information
on
matters
of
public
concern
and
the
States
policy
of
full
public
disclosure?
Answer:
No.
Section
28
of
Article
II
of
the
1987
Constitution
provides
that
subject
to
reasonable
conditions
prescribed
by
law,
the
State
adopts
and
implements
a
policy
of
full
public
disclosure
of
all
its
transactions
involving
public
interest.
Section
7
of
Article
III
of
the
1987
Constitution:
The
right
of
the
people
to
information
on
matters
of
public
concern
shall
be
recognized.
Access
to
official
records,
and
to
documents,
and
papers
pertaining
to
official
acts,
transactions,
or
decisions,
as
well
as
to
government
research
data
used
as
basis
for
policy
development,
shall
be
afforded
the
citizen,
subject
to
such
limitations
as
may
be
provided
by
law.
In
Senate
of
the
Philippines
v.
Ermita,
executive
privilege
is
properly
invoked
in
relation
to
specific
categories
of
information,
not
to
categories
of
persons.
What
should
determine
whether
or
not
information
was
within
the
ambit
of
the
exception
from
the
peoples
right
to
access
to
information
was
not
the
composition
of
the
body,
but
the
nature
of
the
information
sought
to
be
accessed.
In
case
of
conflict,
there
is
a
need
to
strike
a
balance
between
the
right
of
the
people
and
the
interest
of
the
Government
to
be
protected.
In
the
case
above
(Mario
Sereno
vs
CTRM),
the
39
|
P a g e
need
to
ensure
the
protection
of
the
privilege
of
non-disclosure
is
necessary
to
allow
the
free
exchange
of
ideas
among
Government
officials
as
well
as
to
guarantee
the
well-considered
recommendation
free
from
interference
of
the
inquisitive
public.
(MARIO
JOSE
E.
SERENO,
EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
OF
THE
ASSOCIATION
OF
PETROCHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
INC.
(APMP),
vs.
COMMITTEE
ON
TRADE
AND
RELATED
MATTERS
(CTRM)
OF
THE
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
(NEDA), February
1,
2016,
G.R.
No.
175210)
37.
What
are
the
elements
that
would
allow
issuance
of
Writ
of
Mandamus
under
the
right
to
information?
Answer:
Two
requisites
must
concur
before
the
right
to
information
may
be
compelled
by
writ
of
mandamus.
(1)
the
information
sought
must
be
in
relation
to
matters
of
public
concern
or
public
interest;
and
(2)
it
must
not
be
exempt
by
law
from
the
operation
of
the
constitutional
guarantee.
38.
Petitioner
entered
said
land
without
the
knowledge
or
consent
of
respondents,
without
properly
initiating
expropriation
proceedings,
and
without
any
compensation
to
respondents-
landowners.
Because
of
said
transmission
lines,
respondents
alleged
that
they
could
no
longer
use
their
land
as
part
of
a
subdivision
project
as
originally
intended,
which
ultimately
caused
financial
loss
to
their
family.
Respondents
filed
a
complaint
against
petitioner
and
its
officers
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Naga
City
(RTC).
Respondents
demanded
the
removal
of
the
power
lines
and
its
accessories
and
payment
of
damages,
or
in
the
alternative,
payment
of
the
fair
market
value
of
the
affected
areas
totaling
26,000
square
meters
of
respondents'
land
at
P800.00
per
square
meter.
The
trial
court
included
inflation
rate
in
the
determination
of
inflation
rate.
Question:
Did
the
Court
commit
an
error
when
it
included
the
inflation
rate
of
the
Philippine
Peso
in
determining
the
just
compensation
due
to
respondents?
Answer:
Yes.
The
formula
for
determination
of
just
compensation
to
landowners
does
not
include
the
factor
for
inflation
rate,
as
inflation
is
properly
accounted
for
through
payment
of
interest
on
the
amount
due
to
the
landowner,
and
through
the
award
of
exemplary
damages
and
attorney's
fees
in
cases
where
there
was
irregularity
in
the
taking
of
property.
39.
Santos
owned
three
(3)
parcels
of
agricultural
land
devoted
to
corn.
In
1984,
the
subject
lands
were
placed
under
the
government's
Operation
Land
Transfer
Program.
Finding
the
valuation
unreasonable,
Santos
filed
an
action
before
the
trial
court.
The
RTC
directed
the
LBP
to
submit
a
revaluation
for
Lands
1,
2,
and
3
in
accordance
with
the
factors
set
forth
under
Republic
Act
(RA)
No.
6657
otherwise
known
as
the
"Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law
of
1988.
The
trial
court
imposed
a
12%
on
the
unpaid
just
compensation
for
Land
3.
Question:
Whether
the
RTC
acted
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
holding
LBP
liable
for
twelve
percent
(12%)
interest
on
the
unpaid
just
compensation
for
Land
3.
Answer:
No,
the
RTC
did
not
act
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
holding
LBP
liable
for
twelve
percent
(12%)
interest
on
the
unpaid
just
compensation
for
Land
3.
With
respect
to
the
award
of
twelve
percent
(12%)
interest
on
the
unpaid
just
compensation
for
Land
3,
the
Court
finds
untenable
the
LBP's
contention
that
the
same
was
bereft
of
factual
and
legal
bases,
grounded
on
its
having
promptly
paid
Santos
the
initial
valuation.
Interest
is
imposed
if
there
is
delay
in
the
payment
of
just
compensation
to
the
landowner
since
the
obligation
is
deemed
to
be
an
effective
forbearance
on
the
part
of
the
State.
Such
interest
shall
be
pegged
at
the
rate
of
twelve
percent
(12%)
per
annum
on
the
unpaid
balance
of
the
just
compensation,
reckoned
from
the
time
of
taking,
or
the
time
when
the
landowner
was
deprived
of
the
use
and
benefit
of
his
property
such
as
when
title
is
transferred
to
the
Republic,
or
emancipation
patents
are
issued
by
the
government,
until
full
payment.
40
|
P a g e
40.
What
is
just
compensation?
Answer:
Just
compensation
is
defined
as
the
full
and
fair
equivalent
of
the
property
taken
from
its
owner
by
the
expropriator.
It
has
been
repeatedly
stressed
by
this
Court
that
the
true
measure
is
not
the
taker's
gain
but
the
owner's
loss.
The
word
'just"
is
used
to
modify
the
meaning
of
the
word
"compensation"
to
convey
the
idea
that
the
equivalent
to
be
given
for
the
property
to
be
taken
shall
be
real,
substantial,
full,
and
ample.
41.
What
is
an
out-of-court
identification/Police
Line-Up?
Answer:
Out-of-court
identification
is
conducted
by
the
police
in
various
ways.
It
is
done
thru
show-ups
where
the
suspect
alone
is
brought
face
to
face
with
the
witness
for
identification.
It
is
done
thru
mug
shots
where
photographs
are
shown
to
the
witness
to
identify
the
suspect.
It
is
also
done
thru
lineups
where
a
witness
identifies
the
suspect
from
a
group
of
persons
lined
up
for
the
purpose
x
x
x
In
resolving
the
admissibility
of
and
relying
on
out-of-court
identification
of
suspects,
courts
have
adopted
the
totality
of
circumstances
test
where
they
consider
the
following
factors,
viz:
(1)
the
witness'
opportunity
to
view
the
criminal
at
the
time
of
the
crime;
(2)
the
witness'
degree
of
attention
at
that
time;
(3)
the
accuracy
of
any
prior
description
given
by
the
witness;
(4)
the
level
of
certainty
demonstrated
by
the
witness
at
the
identification;
(5)
the
length
of
time
between
the
crime
and
the
identification;
and
(6)
the
suggestiveness
of
the
identification
procedure.
42.
For
allegedly
stoning,
hitting
and
stabbing
Rodolfo
M.
Lebria
(Rodolfo),
the
petitioners
together
with
their
co-accused,
Boyet
Ibaez
(Boyet)
and
David
Ibaez
(David),
who
have
remained
at
large,
were
charged
with
the
crime
of
frustrated
homicide.
During
the
arraignment,
Ronald
and
Bobot
were
assisted
by
Atty.
Bibiano
Colasito,
who
was
selected
as
their
counsel
de
officio
only
for
that
occasion.
At
his
arraignment,
Emilio
appeared
with
the
assistance
of
Atty.
Antonio
Manzano
(Atty.
Manzano),
who
was
then
appointed
by
the
trial
court
as
counsel
de
oficio
for
all
the
accused.
In
the
pre-trial
conference
that
followed,
Atty.
Manzano
appeared
for
the
petitioners.
Atty.
Manzano
was
informed
that
the
trial
for
the
presentation
of
prosecution
evidence
was
set
on
June
18,
2003.
Petitioners
alleged
that
they
were
deprived
of
their
right
to
counsel.
Question:
Whether
the
petitioners
were
deprived
of
their
constitutionally
guaranteed
right
to
counsel.
Answer:
No.
There
was
no
denial
of
right
to
counsel
as
evinced
by
the
fact
that
the
petitioners
were
not
only
assisted
by
a
counsel
de
oficio
during
arraignment
and
pre-trial
but
more
so,
their
counsel
de
oficio
actively
participated
in
the
proceedings
before
the
trial
court
including
the
direct
and
cross-
examination
of
the
witnesses.
Mere
opportunity
and
not
actual
cross-
examination
is
the
essence
of
the
right
to
cross-examine.(RONALD
IBAEZ,
EMILIO
IBAEZ,
and
DANIEL
"BOBOT"
IBAEZ
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
January
27,
2016,
G.R.
No.190798)
43.
The
Prosecutor
charged
petitioner
with
Reckless
Imprudence
Resulting
to
Multiple
Serious
Physical
Injuries
and
Damage
to
Property
Upon
being
arraigned,
the
petitioner,
with
the
assistance
of
his
counsel,
pleaded
not
guilty
to
the
Information
in
this
case.
Trial
ensued.
However,
after
the
initial
presentation
of
evidence
for
the
petitioner,
he
resigned
from
his
employment
and
transferred
residence.
His
whereabouts
allegedly
became
unknown
so
his
new
counsel
did
not
present
him
as
a
witness.
The
RTC
rendered
its
Decision
in
absentia
convicting
the
petitioner
of
the
crime
charged.
The
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed
the
conviction.
Question:
Whether
or
not
the
RTC
and
the
CA
erred
in
denying
the
motion
for
new
trial
or
to
re-open
the
same
in
order
to
allow
the
petitioner
to
present
evidence
on
his
behalf.
Answer:
No.
The
Court
finds
that
no
errors
of
law
or
irregularities,
prejudicial
to
the
substantial
rights
of
the
petitioner,
have
been
committed
during
trial.
The
holding
of
trial
in
absentia
is
authorized
under
Section
14(2),
Article
III
of
the
1987
Constitution
which
provides
that
after
arraignment,
trial
may
proceed
notwithstanding
the
absence
of
the
accused
provided
that
he
has
been
duly
notified
and
arraignment,
trial
may
proceed
notwithstanding
the
absence
of
the
accused
provided
that
he
has
been
duly
notified
41
|
P a g e
and
his
failure
to
appear
is
unjustifiable.
It
is
established
that
notices
have
been
served
to
the
counsel
of
the
petitioner
and
his
failure
to
inform
his
counsel
of
his
whereabouts
is
the
reason
for
his
failure
to
appear
on
the
scheduled
date.
Thus,
the
arguments
of
the
petitioner
against
the
validity
of
the
proceedings
and
promulgation
of
judgment
in
absentia
for
being
in
violation
of
the
constitutional
right
to
due
process
are
doomed
to
fail.
44.
Cite
instances
when
the
freedom
of
movement
may
be
restricted.
Answer:
The
following
instances
illustrate
that
the
freedom
of
movement
may
be
restricted.
Gudani
v.
Senga:
the
power
of
the
President
as
Commander
in
Chief
was
sustained
in
restraining
officers
from
testifying
before
the
Senate.
Fr.
Roberto
P.
Reyes
v.
Gonzalez:
Writ
of
Amparo
will
not
lie
to
overcome
a
Hold
Departure
Order.
The
Writ
of
Amparo
was
intended
to
address
the
intractable
problem
of
extrajudicial
killings
and
enforced
disappearances.
OCA
v.
Judge
Ignacio
B.
Macarine,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-10-1770,
July
18,
2012.
The
Court
may
impose
travel
restrictions
on
judges.
Marcos
v.
Sandiganbayan:
humanitarian
a
persons
right
to
travel
is
subject
to
the
usual
constraints
imposed
by
the
very
necessity
of
safeguarding
the
system
of
justice.
In
such
cases,
whether
the
accused
should
be
permitted
to
leave
the
jurisdiction
for
reasons
is
a
matter
of
the
courts
sound
discretion.
OTHER
RELEVANT
RULINGS
ON:
FREEDOM
OF
ABODE
AND
FREEDOM
OF
MOVEMENT:
THE
RIGHT
TO
CHOOSE
ONES
DOMICILE;
RIGHT
TO
TRAVEL.
Marcos
v.
COMELEC:
the
surviving
spouse
has
the
right
to
choose
her
residence
other
than
the
conjugal
home.
Aquino
v.
COMELEC:
a
lease
contract
is
not
conclusive
proof
of
length
of
residence
to
meet
the
requirements
to
run
for
public
office.
Villavicencio
v.
Lukban:
the
Mayors
order
that
some
170
individuals
be
put
in
custody
and
be
dispatched
to
Davao
City
for
work
is
a
valid
subject
of
a
writ
of
habeas
corpus.
Freedom
of
abode
is
guaranteed
for
ours
is
a
government
of
laws
and
not
of
men.
45.
Lolita
is
a
flight
attendant
who
has
exceeded
the
prescribed
weight
of
the
airline
company.
Despite
repeated
warnings,
she
failed
to
meet
the
prescribed
weight
and
was
accordingly
dismissed
by
the
airline
company.
She
filed
an
action
before
the
NLRC
for
illegal
dismissal
because
she
was
denied
the
equal
protection
of
the
law.
Will
the
action
prosper?
Answer:
No.:
The
claim
of
denial
of
the
equal
protection
clause
may
only
be
invoked
against
the
state.
(Ysaregui
v.
NLRC
and
PAL)
Other
relevant
rulings
on
equal
protection
clause:
Garcia
v.
Hon.
Drilon
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
179267,
June
25,
2013.
R.A.
9262
does
not
violate
the
equal
protection
clause
for
the
following
reasons:
the
classification
rests
on
substantial
distinctions;
the
classification
is
germane
to
the
purpose
of
the
law;
and
the
classification
is
not
limited
to
existing
conditions
only
and
apply
equally
to
all
members.
Biraogo
v.
The
Philippine
Truth
Commission
of
2010
et
al.,
G.R.Nos.192935
and
193036,
December
7,
2010:
E.O.
is
unconstitutional
for
singling
out
President
Arroyos
administration
only.
46.
What
are
the
standards
of
review
employed
by
the
Court
for
constitutionally
protected
rights?
Answer:
The
Standards
of
Review
are:
Deferential
or
Rational
Basis
Scrutiny
which
establishes
a
rational
connection
to
serve
legitimate
state
interest;
Middle
Tier
or
Intermediate
Scrutiny:
Challenged
classification
serves
important
an
important
state
interest;
and
Strict
Judicial
Scrutiny:
Burden
is
on
the
state
to
prove
that
classification
achieves
a
compelling
state
interest.
42
|
P a g e
47.
As
counsel
of
a
complainant,
how
will
ensure
that
you
can
obtain
a
valid
search
warrant?
The
Supreme
Court
has
consistently
held
that
the
validity
of
the
issuance
of
a
search
warrant
rests
upon
the
following
factors:
(1)
it
must
be
issued
upon
probable
cause;
(2)
the
probable
cause
must
be
determined
by
the
judge
himself
and
not
by
the
applicant
or
any
other
person;
(3)
in
the
determination
of
probable
cause,
the
judge
must
examine,
under
oath
or
affirmation,
the
complainant
and
such
witnesses
as
the
latter
may
produce;
and
(4)
the
warrant
issued
must
particularly
describe
the
place
to
be
searched
and
persons
and
things
to
be
seized.
(HPS
Software
and
Communication
Corp.
and
Yap
v.
PLDT,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
170217,
170694,
December
10,
2012)
48.
While
serving
the
search
warrant,
the
law
enforcers
sensed
that
more
unclicensed
firearms
were
kept
in
the
locked
cabinets.
They
forced
open
the
cabinets
and
true
enough
several
high
powered
firearms
were
seized
but
were
not
covered
by
the
warrant.
Can
the
accused
move
for
the
exclusion
of
the
seizure
of
the
firearms
not
covered
by
the
search
warrant?
Answer:
Yes.
In
People
v.
Nunez,
the
Court
held
that
the
seizure
of
items
not
particularly
described
in
the
search
warrant
for
violation
of
the
Dangerous
Drugs
Act
of
1972
must
be
returned
to
the
accused
unless
they
are
illegal
and
will
be
destroyed
by
the
state.
UNILAB
v.
Isip:
Plain
view
doctrine
will
not
apply
when
the
following
cannot
be
proved:
prior
intrusion
must
be
legal;
officer
must
discover
the
incriminating
evidence
inadvertently;
and
the
object
must
be
immediately
apparent.
Exceptions:
search
incident
to
a
lawful
arrest
(in
flagrante
delicto,
hot
pursuit
and
escaped
prisoners),
search
of
moving
vehicles,
plain
view
doctrine
and
airport
searches;
and
all
circumstances
set
forth
in
the
Rules
in
Criminal
Procedure.
XI.
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
AND
THE
CONCEPT
OF
LOCAL
AUTONOMY
1.
One
of
the
salient
features
of
the
Constitution
is
the
recognition
of
the
autonomy
of
local
governments
under
Section
25
and
Art.
X.
What
are
the
political
subdivisions
under
Section1
of
Article
X?
Answer:
The
following
are
the
territorial
and
political
subdivisions
of
the
Philippines:
provinces,
cities,
municipalities
and
barangays
as
well
as
the
autonomous
regions
of
ARMM
and
CAR.
2.
What
are
the
mandatory
requirements
to
create
a
local
government
unit?
Answer:
Factors
to
be
considered
in
the
creation
of
local
government
unit:
(1).
Population
to
be
authenticated
by
the
National
Statistics
Office
(now
Philippine
Statistics
Authority);
population
must
be
actual
and
certification
can
only
be
issued
by
the
Chief
Statistician
(Aldaba
v.
COMELEC,
2010);
(2).
Income:
Average
of
two-year
of
the
local
government
unit
to
be
certified
by
the
Department
of
Finance.
Note
that
all
treasurers
of
all
local
government
units
are
appointed
by
the
Secretary
of
Finance.
The
share
of
the
local
government
in
the
IRA
is
included
in
the
computation
of
income.
(Alvarez
v.
Guingona,
1996)
(3).
Land
Area:
Area
must
be
contiguous
except
for
provinces
comprising
of
islands.
The
land
area
must
be
authenticated
by
the
Land
Management
Bureau
of
the
DENR.
(Navarro
v.
Ermita,2011),
where
the
Court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
constitutionality
of
Dinagat
as
a
province
despite
the
fact
that
it
did
not
meet
the
prescribed
2,000
square
meter
area.
It
is
impossible
to
achieve
the
minimum
area
requirement
since
the
province
of
Dinagat
is
composed
of
islands
and
cannot
be
contiguous.
Rule
on
creation
of
local
government
units
and
additional
congressional
districts:
a
plebiscite
is
required
in
the
creation
of
local
government
units
but
not
in
the
creation
of
additional
congressional
districts.
Sema
v.
COMELEC:
The
ARMM
Legislative
Assembly
cannot
create
provinces
and
the
grant
of
such
power
under
the
ARMM
Organic
Act
is
deemed
unconstitutional.
It
is
not
a
valid
delegation
of
power.
The
creation
of
local
government
units
in
provinces,
cities,
municipalities,
and
other
political
subdivision
is
a
congressional/legislative
prerogative
while
the
creation
of
barangays
shall
be
done
by
local
ordinances
in
cities
and
provinces
(for
component
cities
and
43
|
P a g e
municipalities)
through
the
Sangguniang
Panglungsod
and
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
as
the
case
may
be.
League
of
Cities
of
the
Philippines
v.
COMELEC
(2010).
In
upholding
the
legality
of
the
creation
of
additional
16
cities,
the
Court
held
that
Congress
may
apply
the
revised
requirements
in
a
new
law
during
the
pendency
of
the
approval
of
all
the
bills
creating
such
new
local
government
units.
3.
How
are
boundary
disputes
among
local
government
units
resolved?
Answer:
Jurisdiction
of
boundary
disputes:
Regional
trial
courts
exercise
original
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
in
involving
a
MUNICIPALITY
and
an
independent
component
city.
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
exercises
original
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
involving
two
municipalities
of
the
same
province.
Joint
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
exercises
original
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
involving
two
municipalities
of
the
different
provinces.
Sangguniang
Panlungsod
exercises
original
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
involving
two
barangays
of
the
same
city.
Joint
Sangguniang
Panlungsod
exercises
original
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
involving
two
barangays
of
two
different
cities.
The
regional
trial
court
exercises
APPELLATE
jurisdiction
over
boundary
disputes
among
local
government
units.
4.
May
a
barangay
order
the
closure
of
streets
in
a
private
subdivision?
Answer:
Yes.
In
the
case
of
Sun
Valley
Homeowners
Assn.,
Inc.
v.
Sanggguniang
Barangay
of
Sun
Valley
(July
2011),
Petitioner
wants
the
Court
to
recognize
the
rights
and
interests
of
the
residents
of
Sun
Valley
Subdivision
but
it
miserably
failed
to
establish
the
legal
basis,
such
as
its
ownership
of
the
subject
roads.
Section
21
of
the
Local
Government
Code
requires
the
passage
of
an
ordinance
by
a
local
government
unit
to
effect
the
opening
of
a
local
road.
The
Court
held
that
the
subject
provision
can
have
no
applicability
to
the
instant
case
since
the
subdivision
road
lots
sought
to
be
opened
to
decongest
traffic
in
the
area
-
namely
Rosemallow
and
Aster
Streets
-
have
already
been
donated
by
the
Sun
Valley
Subdivision
to,
and
the
titles
thereto
already
issued
in
the
name
of,
the
City
Government
of
Paranaque
since
the
year
1964.
The
Court
also
noted
that
the
action
of
the
Petitioner
was
premature
for
failure
to
exhaust
administrative
remedies
because
the
issues
presented
before
which
could
have
been
resolved
by
the
Mayors
office.
Barangay
Sindalan,
San
Fernando,
Pampanga
v.
C.A.
(2007):
The
Court
also
held
that
no
public
funds
may
be
used
to
construct
an
access
road
which
would
benefit
solely
the
residents
of
a
newly-developed
subdivision.
City
of
Manila
v.
Chinese
Community
(1919):
A
local
government
may
not
takeover
a
property
for
expansion
of
a
public
street
when
such
property
(cemetery)
already
serves
a
public
purpose.
MMDA
v.
Bel-Air
Village
Homeowners
Assn.,
Inc.:
MMDA
cannot
require
the
opening
of
certain
streets
inside
a
private
subdivision
since
it
cannot
make
an
ordinance
because
it
has
no
rule-making
powers.
The
opening
of
a
street
is
a
way
of
regulating
use
of
property.
Therefore,
MMDA
cannot
also
validly
exercise
police
power.
Sanggalang
v.
IAC
(176
SCRA
716):
Through
the
enactment
of
an
ordinance
which
has
reclassified
Jupiter
St.,
Bel
Air
Village,
the
local
government
may
allow
the
use
of
former
residential
lots
along
the
street
for
commercial
purposes.
Albon
v.
Mayor
Fernando:
No
public
funds
may
be
spent
for
the
upgrading
of
private
subdivision
roads
unless
they
are
turned
over
to
the
local
government
unit.
5.
May
a
local
government
unit
reclassify
the
use
of
land
which
would
violate
the
provisions
of
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law?
Answer:
The
local
government
has
authority
to
reclassify
lands
but
not
when
such
reclassification
violates
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law.
The
exception
to
this
general
rule
is
when
the
local
government
unit
had
already
reclassified
the
subject
land
before
the
effectivity
of
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law.
Buklod
ng
Magbubukid
sa
Lupaing
Ramos,
Inc.
v.
E.MM.
Ramos,
Inc.
(2011):
The
ordinance
reclassifying
the
land
in
question
shall
prevail
over
the
opposition
of
the
Petitioner.
The
Court
44
|
P a g e
held
Section
3(c),
Chapter
I
of
the
CARL
further
narrows
down
the
definition
of
agricultural
land
that
is
subject
to
CARP
to
"land
devoted
to
agricultural
activity
as
defined
in
this
Act
and
not
classified
otherwise.
The
CARL
took
effect
on
June
15,
1988.
To
be
exempt
from
the
CARP,
the
subject
property
should
have
already
been
reclassified
as
residential
prior
to
said
date.
The
ordinance
was
enacted
prior
to
the
effectivity
of
CARL.
Davao
New
Town
Development
Corp.
v.
Spouses
Espino
et
al
(2013):
The
Court
held
that
the
subject
property
had
been
reclassified
as
non-agricultural
prior
to
June
15,
1988;
hence,
they
are
no
longer
covered
by
R.A.
No.
6657.
6.
May
a
zoning
ordinance
prevail
over
a
restriction
in
the
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
which
the
Ayala
Alabang
Homeowners
Association
seeks
to
impose
on
the
property
owner?
Answer:
No.
The
annotation
at
the
back
of
TCT
No.
149166
covering
the
subject
property
provides:
PE-222/T-134042
-
RESTRICTIONS
-
The
property
cannot
be
subdivided
for
a
period
of
fifty
(50)
years
from
the
date
of
sale.
The
property
shall
be
used
exclusively
for
the
establishment
and
maintenance
thereon
of
a
preparatory
(nursery
and
kindergarten)
school
which
may
include
such
installations
as
an
office
for
school
administration,
playground
and
garage
for
school
vehicles.
x
x.
The
Court
held
that
the
above
restriction
limits
the
use
of
the
subject
property
for
preparatory
(nursery
and
kindergarten)
school,
without
regard
to
the
number
of
classrooms.
The
Court
affirmed
the
judgement
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
which
ordered
the
Petitioner
to
cease
and
desist
from
the
operation
of
the
Learning
Child
School
beyond
nursery
and
kindergarten
classes
with
a
maximum
of
two
classrooms
with
the
MODIFICATION
that
(1)
the
two-classroom
restriction
is
deleted,
and
(2)
the
current
students
of
the
School
of
the
Holy
Cross,
the
Learning
Child
School's
grade
school
department,
be
allowed
to
finish
their
elementary
studies
in
said
school
up
to
their
graduation
in
their
Grade
7.
The
enrolment
of
new
students
to
the
grade
school
shall
no
longer
be
permitted.
7.
The
local
government
of
Manila
enacted
an
ordinance
which
granted
ABC
Corporation
to
operate
a
jai
alai
in
the
City
of
Manila.
The
newly-elected
Mayor
refused
to
grant
a
business
permit
to
ABC
Corporation
on
the
ground
that
the
ordinance
cannot
prevail
over
a
Presidential
Decree
which
required
that
the
grant
of
franchise
to
operate
jai
alai
is
invested
in
the
Games
and
Amusement
Board.
ABC
Corporation
asked
the
Manila
RTC
to
issue
a
writ
of
mandamus
ordering
the
newly-elected
Mayor
to
issue
the
business
permit
to
ABC
Corporation.
As
judge,
will
you
issue
the
writ?
Answer:
No.
Lim
v.
Pacquing,
240
SCRA
649:
Former
Chief
Justice
Puno
in
his
Dissenting
Opinion
in
this
1995
case
said
that
the
exercise
of
police
power
is
not
without
limit.
He
said
that
while
it
is
the
prerogative
of
the
State
to
promote
the
general
welfare
of
the
people
thru
the
use
of
police
power;
on
the
opposite
end
is
the
right
of
an
entity
to
have
its
property
protected
against
unreasonable
impairment
by
the
State.
Courts
accord
the
State
wide
latitude
in
the
exercise
of
its
police
power
to
bring
about
the
greatest
good
of
the
greatest
number.
But
when
its
purpose
is
putrefied
by
private
interest,
the
use
of
police
power
becomes
a
farce
and
must
be
struck
down
just
as
every
arbitrary
exercise
of
government
power
should
be
stamped
out.
8.
When
may
the
exercise
of
police
power
may
be
questioned?
Answer:
In
MMDA
v.
Bel-Air
Village
Assn.
(328
SCRA
836),
the
Court
held
that
where
is
there
is
no
explicit
grant
of
power,
a
government
agency
cannot
exercise
police
power.
The
Court
said:
Clearly,
the
MMDA
is
not
a
political
unit
of
government.
The
power
delegated
to
the
MMDA
is
that
given
to
the
Metro
Manila
Council
to
promulgate
administrative
rules
and
regulations
in
the
implementation
of
the
MMDAs
functions.
There
is
no
grant
of
authority
to
enact
ordinances
and
regulations
for
the
general
welfare
of
the
inhabitants
of
the
metropolis.
9.
The
municipality
of
Teresa,
Rizal
enacted
an
ordinance
which
sought
the
expropriation
of
a
property
upon
which
it
will
build
an
evacuation
center
as
part
of
its
Disaster
Preparedness
Program.
The
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
disapproved
the
ordinance.
May
the
municipality
still
exercise
the
power
of
eminent
domain
despite
the
disapproval
of
its
proposed
ordinance?
Answer:
Yes.
The
exercise
of
the
power
of
eminent
domain
is
a
power
delegated
by
Congress
to
political
subdivisions.
45
|
P a g e
Moday
v.
C.
A.
268
SCRA
586:
The
Court
reiterated
the
limitations
on
the
power
of
eminent
domain
are
that
the
use
must
be
public,
compensation
must
be
made
and
due
process
of
law
must
be
observed.
The
Supreme
Court,
taking
cognizance
of
such
issues
as
the
adequacy
of
compensation,
necessity
of
the
taking
and
the
public
use
character
or
the
purpose
of
the
taking,
has
ruled
that
the
necessity
of
exercising
eminent
domain
must
be
genuine
and
of
a
public
character.
Government
may
not
capriciously
choose
what
private
property
should
be
taken.
10.
Iloilo
City
initiated
expropriation
proceedings
against
Spouses
Espinosa.
During
the
pendency
of
the
case,
the
city
government
and
the
property
owner
agreed
to
settle
the
case
through
a
compromise
agreement.
The
Court
approved
the
compromise
agreement
between
the
parties.
Before
fully
paying
for
the
property,
the
city
government
questioned
the
compromise
agreement
arguing
that
it
was
not
the
court
which
fixed
the
just
compensation.
Is
the
argument
of
the
city
government
valid?
Answer:
No.
A
compromise
agreement
is
valid
since
it
has
the
effect
of
a
ruling
on
the
merit.
The
city
government
is
also
precluded
to
question
such
ruling
of
the
trial
court
because
it
voluntary
submitted
itself
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
(City
of
Manila
v.
Alegar
Corporation
et.
al.
June
25,
2012)
Public
Purpose
Housing
for
the
poor:
Ortega
v.
City
of
Cebu,
602
SCRA
601
(2009)
Taking
for
a
cultural/historical
purpose:
Manosca
v
C.A.,
G.R.
No.
106440,
January
29,
1996
Taking
is
not
justified
when
a
similar
facility
within
the
vicinity
already
serves
the
same
purpose:
Masikip
v.
Pasig
City,
497
SCRA
391(2006)
Just
Compensation
Principal
criterion
to
determine
just
compensation
will
be
the
character
and
use
of
the
land
at
the
time
of
taking:
Tinio
et
al.
v.
NAPOCOR,
G.R.
160923,
January
24,
2011
Compensation
based
on
R.A.
6657
is
required
in
the
determination
of
just
compensation
if
the
property
is
covered
by
CARP:
LBP
v.
Ferrer
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
172230,
February
2,
2011
Recognition
of
Fair
Market
Value
will
form
part
of
the
basis
of
just
compensation:
EPZA
v.
Estate
of
Salud
Jimenez,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
188995,
August
24,
2011
Interest
rate
on
just
compensation
is
6%
per
annum:
Apo
Fruits
Corp.
et
al.
v
LBP,
G.R.
No.
164,
October
12,
2010
Reconveyance
If
government
does
not
use
the
property
for
an
unreasonable
period
of
time
for
the
public
purpose
it
acquired
the
property,
the
property
owner
can
ask
for
reconveyance
of
the
same.
If
there
is
unreasonable
delay
(5
years)
of
payment
of
just
compensation,
the
property
owner
can
ask
for
possession
of
property
until
just
compensation
is
fully
settled.
XII.
LAW
ON
PUBLIC
OFFICERS
AND
PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
1.
Whether
a
barangay
official
has
the
power
and
duty
as
a
public
officer
for
summarily
abating
the
basketball
ring,
which
she
considers
as
a
nuisance?
is
this
an
abatement
of
a
nuisance
per
se?
Answer:
No,
an
abatement
of
a
public
nuisance,
the
same
was
done
summarily
while
failing
to
follow
the
proper
procedure.
Prevailing
jurisprudence
holds
that
unless
a
nuisance
is
a
nuisance
per
se,
it
may
not
be
summarily
abated.
The
power
to
order
the
demolition
of
a
nuisance
per
se
rests
on
the
Mayor.
(NATIVIDAD
C.
CRUZ
and
BENJAMIN
DELA
CRUZ,
vs.
PANDACAN
HIKER'S
CLUB,
INC.,
January
11,
2016,
G.R.
No.
188213)
2.
Molina
was
a
subject
of
an
administrative
investigation
for
letter
entitled
Is
it
True.
The
letter
maligned
the
GSIS
General
Manager
Garcia.
The
respondent
sought
the
dismissal
of
the
charge
on
the
ground
of
its
being
baseless;
and
requested
the
conduct
of
a
formal
investigation
by
an
impartial
body.
He
was
ever
found
to
have
committed
grave
misconduct
and
was
he
given
a
60-day
suspension.
The
respondent
instituted
in
the
Court
of
Appeals
a
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
to
46
|
P a g e
challenge
the
legality
of
the
Memorandum
which
found
him
guilty
of
grave
misconduct
.
The
CA
promulgated
its
assailed
decision
nullifying
the
Memorandum
issued
by
Garcia.
Garcia
appealed
the
C.A.
decision.
Question:
Is
Molina
guilty
of
grave
misconduct?
Answer:
No.
Misconduct
in
office,
by
uniform
legal
definition,
is
such
misconduct
that
affects
his
performance
of
his
duties
as
an
officer
and
not
such
only
as
affects
his
character
as
a
private
individual.
To
warrant
removal
from
office,
it
must
have
direct
relation
to
and
be
connected
with
the
performance
of
official
duties
amounting
either
to
maladministration
or
willful,
intentional
neglect
and
failure
to
discharge
the
duties
of
the
office.
Moreover,
it
is
"a
transgression
of
some
established
and
definite
rule
of
action,
more
particularly,
unlawful
behavior
or
gross
negligence
by
a
public
officer."
It
becomes
grave
if
it
"involves
any
of
the
additional
elements
of
corruption,
willful
intent
to
violate
the
law
or
to
disregard
established
rules,
which
must
be
established
by
substantial
evidence."
The
record
contains
nothing
to
show
that
the
respondent's
act
constituted
misconduct.
The
passing
of
the
letter
to
Caretero
did
not
equate
to
any
"transgression"
or
"unlawful
behavior,"
for
it
was
an
innocuous
act
that
did
not
breach
any
standard,
norm
or
rule
pertinent
to
his
office.
Neither
could
it
be
regarded
as
"circulation"
of
the
letter
inasmuch
as
the
letter
was
handed
only
to
a
single
individual
who
just
happened
to
be
curious
about
the
paper
the
respondent
was
then
holding
in
his
hands.
(WINSTON
F.
GARCIA,
IN
HIS
CAPACITY
AS
PRESIDENT
AND
GENERAL
MANAGER
OF
THE
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE
SYSTEM
(GSIS)
vs.
MARIO
I.
MOLINA, January
11,
2016,
G.R.
No.
165223
3.
Petitioners
are
all
charged
as
co-conspirators
for
their
respective
participations
in
the
anomalous
Priority
Development
Assistance
Fund
(PDAF)
scam.
The
Ombudsman
issued
the
assailed
144-page
Joint
Resolution
dated
March
28,
2014
finding
probable
cause
against,
inter
alia,
Reyes,
Janet
Napoles,
and
De
Asis
of
one
(1)
count
of
Plunder,
and
against
Reyes,
Janet
Napoles,
De
Asis,
and
the
Napoles
siblings
for
fifteen
(15)
counts
of
violation
of
Section
3
(e)
of
RA
3019.
Accordingly,
separate
motions
for
reconsideration
were
timely
filed
by
Reyes,
Janet
Napoles,
the
Napoles
siblings,
and
De
Asis.
Question:
Did
the
Ombudsman
and/or
the
Sandiganbayan
commit
any
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
rendering
the
assailed
resolutions
ultimately
finding
probable
cause
against
petitioners
for
the
charges
against
them.
Answer:
No.
Once
the
public
prosecutor
(or
the
Ombudsman)
determines
probable
cause
and
thus,
elevates
the
case
to
the
trial
court
(or
the
Sandiganbayan),
a
judicial
determination
of
probable
cause
is
made
in
order
to
determine
if
a
warrant
of
arrest
should
be
issued
ordering
the
detention
of
the
accused.
The
Court,
in
People
v.
Castillo,
delineated
the
functions
and
purposes
of
a
determination
of
probable
cause
made
by
the
public
prosecutor,
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
trial
court,
on
the
other.
.
(JOHN
RAYMUND
DE
ASIS,
v.
CONCHITA
CARPIO
MORALES,
IN
HER
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
AS
OMBUDSMAN,
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
AND
SANDIGANBAYAN)
4.
What
are
the
two
types
of
determination
of
probable
cause?
Answer:
There
are
two
kinds
of
determination
of
probable
case:
executive
and
judicial.
The
executive
determination
of
probable
cause
is
one
made
during
preliminary
investigation.
It
is
a
function
that
properly
pertains
to
the
public
prosecutor
who
is
given
a
broad
discretion
to
determine
whether
probable
cause
exists
and
to
charge
those
whom
he
believes
to
have
committed
the
crime
as
defined
by
law
and
thus
should
be
held
for
trial.
Otherwise
stated,
such
official
has
the
quasi-
judicial
authority
to
determine
whether
or
not
a
criminal
case
must
be
filed
in
court.
Whether
or
not
that
function
has
been
correctly
discharged
by
the
public
prosecutor,
i.e.,
whether
or
not
he
has
made
a
correct
ascertainment
of
the
existence
of
probable
cause
in
a
case,
is
a
matter
that
the
trial
court
itself
does
not
and
may
not
be
compelled
to
pass
upon.
The
judicial
determination
of
probable
cause,
on
the
other
hand,
is
one
made
by
the
judge
to
ascertain
whether
a
warrant
of
arrest
should
be
issued
against
the
accused.
The
judge
must
satisfy
himself
that
based
on
the
evidence
submitted,
there
is
necessity
for
placing
the
accused
under
custody
in
order
not
to
frustrate
the
ends
of
justice.
If
the
judge
finds
no
probable
cause,
the
judge
cannot
be
forced
to
issue
the
arrest
warrant.
(JOHN
RAYMUND
DE
ASIS,
v.
CONCHITA
CARPIO
MORALES,
IN
HER
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
AS
OMBUDSMAN,
PEOPLE
OF
THE
47
|
P a g e
PHILIPPINES,
AND
SANDIGANBAYAN)
5.
Twelve
new
positions
were
created
by
a
local
government
but
no
ordinance
was
enacted
to
fund
the
newly-created
positions.
Subsequently,
the
Mayor
sought
approval
of
an
ordinance
which
would
allow
the
persons
occupying
the
newly-appointed
positions
to
draw
their
salaries.
A
taxpayer
filed
an
action
against
the
Mayor
before
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
Will
the
case
prosper?
Answer:
No.
Whatever
defect
there
may
have
been
in
the
approval
of
unappropriated
positions
was
cured
subsequently
by
the
creation
of
said
position
and
the
revalidation
of
respondents
appointment.
That
appointment
was
ultimately
approved
by
the
Civil
Service
Commission
thus
giving
it
finality.
The
Court
reiterated
that
elementary
is
the
rule
that
the
findings
of
fact
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
are
conclusive
when
supported
by
substantial
evidence
and
are
accorded
due
respect
and
weight,
especially
when
they
are
affirmed
by
the
CA.
It
is
only
when
there
is
grave
abuse
of
discretion
by
the
Ombudsman
that
a
review
of
factual
findings
may
aptly
be
made.
(TOLENTINO
v.
Mayor
LOYOLA
et.
al.
(G.R.
No.
153809,
2011).
NATIONAL
ARTIST
VIRGILIO
ALMARIO
v.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(G.R.
No.
189028,
January
16,
2013).
There
is
grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
an
act
is:
1)
done
contrary
to
the
Constitution,
the
law
or
jurisprudence
or
2)
executed
whimsically,
capriciously
or
arbitrarily,
out
of
malice,
ill
will
or
personal
bias.
6.
Congress
enacted
the
General
Appropriations
Act
(GAA)
which
included
a
provision
allowing
the
President
to
distribute
a
lump
sum
amount
to
all
members
of
the
legislative
branch.
The
GAA
allowed
the
President
to
prescribe
the
criteria
for
the
distribution
of
such
amounts
needed
by
the
members
of
Congress.
Special
requirements
were
allowed
at
the
congressional
district
level.
May
Pedro
Reyes
and
other
taxpayers
question
the
constitutionality
of
the
subject
provision
of
the
GAA?
Answer:
Yes.
The
provision
violates
the
principle
of
checks
and
balances.
This
principle
in
constitutional
law
where
there
is
a
system-based
regulation
that
allows
one
branch
to
limit
actions
of
another
branch
in
keeping
with
the
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers.
(Consolidated
Petitions:
Belgica
et.
al.
v.
Executive
Secretary
et.
al.,
G.R.No.
208566,
Alcantara
et.
al.
v.
Drilon
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
208493,
and
Nepomuceno
et.
al.
v.
Pres.
Aquino
et.
al.,
G.R.
No.209251,
Nov.
19,
2013)
7.
Is
the
case
subject
to
judicial
review?
Answer:
Yes,
there
is
a
question
raised
on
the
constitutionality
of
the
provision
of
PDAF
in
the
General
Appropriations
Act.
This
is
a
justiciable
issue.
8.
Do
the
petitioners
have
legal
standing
to
sue?
Answer:
Yes,
as
taxpayers
there
are
qualified
to
raise
the
issue
of
the
constitutionality
of
PDAF.
As
taxpayers
they
stand
to
suffer
material
injury
because
the
funds
covered
under
the
General
Appropriations
Act
come
from
revenues
collected
from
taxpayers.
9.
Was
there
a
violation
of
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers?
Answer:
Yes,
the
executive
branch
encroached
upon
the
power
of
the
legislative
branch
when
it
determined
how
the
PDAF
will
be
distributed.
The
legislative
branch
also
exercised
the
power
of
implementation
when
it
identified
priority
projects
in
their
jurisdiction.
10.
Was
there
a
violation
of
the
principle
of
checks
and
balances
in
the
implementation
of
the
projects
under
PDAF?
Answer:
Yes,
it
deprives
the
President
of
his
item
veto
power
under
the
constitution
Section
27(2),
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution
because
the
appropriations
are
general
(lump
sum)
instead
of
being
itemized.
11.
Was
there
violation
of
the
principle
of
non-delegability
of
legislative
power?
Answer:
Yes,
the
legislative
branch
allowed
the
executive
branch
to
define
the
parameters
as
to
how
the
PDAF
can
be
availed
of
by
the
members
of
Congress.
The
Department
of
Budget
and
Management
provided
for
a
menu
where
the
funds
may
be
spent.
48
|
P a g e
12.
Was
there
a
violation
of
the
constitutional
provision
on
political
dynasty?
Answer:
While
portions
of
the
PDAF
were
meant
to
enhance
the
continued
stay
in
power
of
incumbent
politicians,
the
constitutional
provision
prohibiting
political
dynasty,
the
same
is
not
self-executing.
To
date,
Congress
has
not
enacted
a
law
to
put
the
provision
into
effect.
Thus,
there
is
no
violation
of
the
constitutional
provision.
13.
Was
there
a
violation
of
the
principle
of
local
autonomy?
Answer:
Yes,
when
the
incumbent
members
of
Congress
dictated
which
projects
would
be
implemented
at
the
local
level
without
the
participation
of
the
local
government
units,
it
violated
the
essence
of
local
autonomy
under
Article
X
of
the
Constitution.
14.
Congress
enacted
a
law
which
created
the
Philippine
Competition
Commission
(PCC)
under
the
supervision
of
the
Secretary
of
Finance.
Without
awaiting
the
appointments
of
the
Chairman
and
the
four
Associate
Commissioners
of
the
PCC,
the
Secretary
of
Finance
published
the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations
of
the
PCC.
Is
the
act
of
the
Secretary
of
Finance
proper?
Answer:
No.
The
act
of
the
Secretary
of
Finance
violated
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers.
He
should
have
first
allowed
the
President
to
appoint
all
the
five
members
of
PCC.
15.
How
law-making
power
is
delegated?
Answer:
Congress
may
validly
delegate
law-making
power
by
allowing
administrative
agencies
to
formulate
suppletory
rules
(filling
in
details
to
ensure
enforcement
of
the
law)
and
contingent
rules
(ascertaining
the
facts
to
bring
the
law
into
operation)
16.
The
President
reorganized
the
Office
of
the
Press
Secretary.
In
the
process
some
of
the
employees
were
given
new
assignments.
The
affected
employees
questioned
the
reorganization
arguing
that
it
violated
their
security
of
tenure.
Is
the
legal
argument
of
the
affected
employees
tenable?
Answer:
No.
EIIB
v.
Zamora
(July
10,
2001).
The
Court
held:
It
having
been
duly
established
that
the
President
has
the
authority
to
carry
out
reorganization
in
any
branch
or
agency
of
the
executive
department,
what
is
then
left
for
us
to
resolve
is
whether
or
not
the
reorganization
is
valid.
In
this
jurisdiction,
reorganizations
have
been
regarded
as
valid
provided
they
are
pursued
in
good
faith.
Reorganization
is
carried
out
in
good
faith
if
it
is
for
the
purpose
of
economy
or
to
make
bureaucracy
more
efficient.
Pertinently,
Republic
Act
No.
6656
provides
for
the
circumstances
which
may
be
considered
as
evidence
of
bad
faith
in
the
removal
of
civil
service
employees
made
as
a
result
of
reorganization,
to
wit:
(a)
where
there
is
a
significant
increase
in
the
number
of
positions
in
the
new
staffing
pattern
of
the
department
or
agency
concerned;
(b)
where
an
office
is
abolished
and
another
performing
substantially
the
same
functions
is
created;
(c)
where
incumbents
are
replaced
by
those
less
qualified
in
terms
of
status
of
appointment,
performance
and
merit;
(d)
where
there
is
a
classification
of
offices
in
the
department
or
agency
concerned
and
the
reclassified
offices
perform
substantially
the
same
functions
as
the
original
offices,
and
(e)
where
the
removal
violates
the
order
of
separation.
17.
Considering
that
the
positions
of
the
Deputy
Ombudsman
and
the
Special
Prosecutor
are
provided
in
the
Constitution.
May
the
President
relying
solely
on
his
judgment
remove
them
from
office?
Answer:
The
Court
held
that
the
Office
of
the
President
has
the
power
to
discipline
and
even
dismiss
the
overall
deputy
Ombudsman
and
the
other
deputies
provided
under
the
Constitution
as
well
as
the
Special
Prosecutor.
The
Court
said
that
the
Ombudsman
is
vested
with
broad
investigative
and
disciplinary
powers.
These
powers
include
the
scrutiny
of
all
acts
of
malfeasance,
misfeasance,
and
nonfeasance
of
all
public
officials,
including
Members
of
the
Cabinet
and
key
Executive
officers,
during
their
tenure.
Under
Section
12,
Article
XI
of
the
1987
Constitution,
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
is
envisioned
to
be
the
protector
of
the
people
against
the
inept,
abusive,
and
corrupt
in
the
government,
to
function
essentially
as
a
complaints
and
action
bureau.
This
constitutional
vision
of
a
Philippine
Ombudsman
practically
intends
to
make
the
Ombudsman
an
authority
to
directly
check
and
guard
against
the
ills,
49
|
P a g e
abuses,
and
excesses
of
the
bureaucracy.
As
the
Ombudsman
is
expected
to
be
an
activist
watchman,
the
Court
has
upheld
its
actions,
although
not
squarely
falling
under
the
broad
powers
granted
it
by
the
Constitution
and
by
R.A.
No.
6770,
if
these
actions
are
reasonably
in
line
with
its
official
function
and
consistent
with
the
law
and
the
Constitution.
Gonzales
III
v.
Office
of
the
President
at
al/
Bareras
Sulit
v.
Ochoa
et
al
(2014)
18.
May
the
President
appoint
a
Justice
of
the
Supreme
Court
when
an
election
ban
is
in
effect?
Answer:
Yes.
Midnight
appointments:
The
outgoing
President
must
refrain
from
filling
vacancies
to
give
the
new
President
opportunity
to
consider
names
in
the
light
of
his
new
policies
especially
so
when
he
ran
on
a
platform
approved
by
the
electorate.(
Art.
VII,
Sec.15)
De
Castro
v.
JBC,
G.R.
No.
191002,
March
17,
2010:
This
case
questioned
the
power
of
the
President
to
appoint
the
Chief
Justice
during
the
prohibitive
period.
The
S.C.
held
that
the
appointment
of
the
members
of
the
judiciary
is
not
covered
by
the
prohibition
on
midnight
appointments.
Power
of
Removal:
For
appointees
who
serve
at
the
pleasure
of
the
President,
they
may
also
be
removed
if
there
is
loss
of
trust
and
confidence
in
them.
Other
public
servants
may
be
removed
for
cause
provided
for
by
law.
19.
May
the
representative
of
the
Committee
of
Justice
of
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives
simultaneously
represent
the
Congress
in
the
Judicial
and
Bar
Council?
Answer:
No.
The
Congress
is
entitled
only
to
one
representative
in
the
JBC
and
not
one
for
each
from
the
House
of
Representatives
and
the
Senate.
(Chavez
v.
JBC)
Recent
rulings
related
to
the
JBC:
Villanueva
v.
JBC
(2015):
A
first
level
trial
court
must
await
a
5-year
period
before
he
can
be
promoted
as
RTC
judge.
The
Court
sustained
the
power
of
the
JBC
to
prescribe
rules
in
the
screening
of
qualified
candidates
to
the
judiciary
to
ensure
that
only
men
of
proven
competence,
integrity,
probity
and
independence
will
be
appointed
to
the
bench.
Jardeleza
vs.
Chief
Justice
Sereno
and
JBC
(2015):
Having
been
denied
due
process,
Jardeleza
should
be
included
in
the
list
of
nominees
to
be
appointed
as
justice
of
the
Supreme
Court.
An
issue
about
his
integrity
was
raised
in
the
selection
process
but
Jardeleza
was
never
given
the
opportunity
to
be
heard
to
overturn
the
allegation
against
him.
20.
With
the
recently
SAF
44
incident,
a
newly-elected
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives
proposed
that
Congress
amend
the
Philippine
National
Police
to
include
for
confirmation
the
Chief
PNP
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Is
the
proposal
valid?
Answer:
No.
Article
VII,
Section
16
of
the
1987
Constitution
reads:
"The
President
shall
nominate
and,
with
the
consent
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments,
appoint
the
heads
of
the
executive
departments,
ambassadors,
other
public
ministers
and
consuls,
or
officers
of
the
armed
forces
from
the
rank
of
colonel
or
naval
captain,
and
other
officers
whose
appointments
are
vested
in
him
in
this
Constitution.
He
shall
also
appoint
all
other
officers
of
the
Government
whose
appointments
are
not
otherwise
provided
for
by
law,
and
those
whom
he
may
be
authorized
by
law
to
appoint.
The
Congress
may,
by
law,
vest
the
appointment
of
other
officers
lower
in
rank
in
the
President
alone,
in
the
courts,
or
in
the
heads
of
departments,
agencies,
commissions,
or
boards.
Sarmiento
v.
Mison,
156
SCRA
549
(1987):
Appointment
of
Bureau
of
Customs
Commissioner
does
not
need
confirmation
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Tatad
v.
Commission
on
Appointments,
G.R.
No.
183171,
August
11,
2008:
With
the
resignation
of
the
nominee,
there
is
no
longer
an
actually
justiciable
controversy.
21.
Gregorio,
a
police
officer,
was
charged
for
violation
of
the
VAWC
law
and
an
administrative
complaint
was
likewise
filed
against
him
before
the
Peoples
Law
Enforcement
Board.
Can
Gregorio
move
for
the
dismissal
of
the
criminal
case
against
him
due
to
the
pendency
of
his
administrative
complaint
before
the
PLEB?
Answer:
No.
In
administrative
proceedings,
procedural
due
process
has
been
recognized
to
include
the
following:
(1)
the
right
to
actual
or
constructive
notice
of
the
institution
of
proceedings
which
may
affect
a
respondents
legal
rights;
(2)
a
real
opportunity
to
be
heard
personally
or
with
the
assistance
of
counsel,
to
present
witnesses
and
evidence
in
ones
favor,
and
to
defend
ones
rights;
(3)
a
tribunal
vested
with
competent
jurisdiction
and
so
constituted
50
|
P a g e
as
to
afford
a
person
charged
administratively
a
reasonable
guarantee
of
honesty
as
well
as
impartiality;
and
(4)
a
finding
by
said
tribunal
which
is
supported
by
substantial
evidence
submitted
for
consideration
during
the
hearing
or
contained
in
the
records
or
made
known
to
the
parties
affected.
(Acuzar
v.
Jarolan
and
Apresa
PLEB,
G.R.
No.
177878,
April
7,
2010)
XIII.
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
AND
EDUCATION,
SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY,
ARTS,
CULTURE
AND
SPORTS
1.
What
is
social
justice?
Answer:
Calalang
v.
Williams,
70
Phil.
726
(1940).
In
this
case
the
Court
defined
social
justice
in
this
wise:
Social
justice
is
"neither
communism,
nor
despotism,
nor
atomism,
nor
anarchy,"
but
the
humanization
of
laws
and
the
equalization
of
social
and
economic
forces
by
the
State
so
that
justice
in
its
rational
and
objectively
secular
conception
may
at
least
be
approximated.
Social
justice
means
the
promotion
of
the
welfare
of
all
the
people,
the
adoption
by
the
Government
of
measures
calculated
to
insure
economic
stability
of
all
the
competent
elements
of
society,
through
the
maintenance
of
a
proper
economic
and
social
equilibrium
in
the
interrelations
of
the
members
of
the
community,
constitutionally,
through
the
adoption
of
measures
legally
justifiable,
or
extra-constitutionally,
through
the
exercise
of
powers
underlying
the
existence
of
all
governments
on
the
time-honored
principle
of
salus
populi
est
suprema
lex.
Note:
The
precept
of
social
justice
is
interlinked
with
the
exercise
of
police
power.
In
the
same
case,
the
Court
further
said
that:
Social
justice,
therefore,
must
be
founded
on
the
recognition
of
the
necessity
of
interdependence
among
divers
and
diverse
units
of
a
society
and
of
the
protection
that
should
be
equally
and
evenly
extended
to
all
groups
as
a
combined
force
in
our
social
and
economic
life,
consistent
with
the
fundamental
and
paramount
objective
of
the
state
of
promoting
the
health,
comfort,
and
quiet
of
all
persons,
and
of
bringing
about
the
greatest
good
to
the
greatest
number.
2.
Will
the
writ
of
habeas
data
lie
against
an
academic
institution?
Answer:
In
Viveres
and
Suzara
v.
St.
Theresas
College-Cebu
City,
the
Court
held
that
the
writ
of
habeas
data
will
not
lie
since
the
respondent
school
is
not
in
the
business
of
collecting
data.
The
Court
upheld
the
right
of
the
school
not
to
allow
its
students
to
graduate
for
violating
the
standing
policy
of
the
school
on
wearing
immodest
apparel
and
having
their
photographs
posted
in
social
media.
3.
Does
the
school
have
the
power
to
suspend
its
students?
Answer:
In
Miriam
College
v.
CA
348SCRA
215,
the
Court
held
that
the
school
has
the
power
to
suspend
students
for
use
of
vulgar
language
in
the
schools
official
organ.
The
Court
upheld
the
right
of
a
school
to
prescribe
rules
governing
discipline
of
students.
University
of
San
Agustin
v.
CA
270
SCRA
761:
The
Court
held
that
their
students
are
governed
by
the
rules
set
forth
in
the
student
handbook.
The
failure
of
students
to
meet
the
academic
standards
set
in
the
Student
Handbook
is
a
ground
for
disciplinary
action.
Ateneo
v.
Capulong
222
SCRA
643.
The
Court
upheld
the
authority
of
the
school
to
suspend
students
who
were
alleged
to
have
participated
in
a
hazing
activity
which
resulted
to
the
death
of
one
of
its
students.
In
this
case,
the
Court
took
the
occasion
to
say
that
it
is
the
national
government
that
shall
provide
the
overall
policy
on
education
to
meet
national
goals.
The
discipline
of
students
pursuing
legal
career
is
a
matter
which
exacts
rigid
scrutiny.
XIV.
ELECTION
LAW
1.
What
are
the
remedies
available
to
disqualify
a
person
from
running
in
an
electoral
race?
Answer:
There
are
two
remedies
available
under
existing
laws
to
prevent
a
candidate
from
running
in
an
electoral
race.
One
is
by
petition
for
disqualification,
and
the
other
by
petition
to
deny
due
course
to
or
to
cancel
his
certificate
of
candidacy.
In
Fermin
v.
Commission
on
Elections,
the
Court
has
differentiated
the
two
remedies
in
the
following
manner:
[A]
petition
for
disqualification,
on
the
one
hand,
can
be
premised
on
Section
12
or
68
of
the
OEC,
or
Section
40
of
the
LGC.
On
the
other
hand,
a
petition
to
deny
due
course
to
or
cancel
a
CoC
can
only
be
grounded
on
a
statement
of
a
material
representation
in
the
said
certificate
that
is
51
|
P a g e
false.
The
petitions
also
have
different
effects.
While
a
person
who
is
disqualified
under
Section
68
is
merely
prohibited
to
continue
as
a
candidate,
the
person
whose
certificate
is
cancelled
or
denied
due
course
under
Section
78
is
not
treated
as
a
candidate
at
all,
as
if
he/she
never
filed
a
CoC.
Section
78
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code
states:
Section
78.
Petition
to
deny
due
course
to
or
cancel
a
certificate
of
candidacy.
-
A
verified
petition
seeking
to
deny
due
course
or
to
cancel
a
certificate
of
candidacy
may
be
filed
by
the
person
exclusively
on
the
ground
that
any
material
representation
contained
therein
as
required
under
Section
74
hereof
is
false.
The
petition
may
be
filed
at
any
time
not
later
than
twenty-five
days
from
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
certificate
of
candidacy
and
shall
be
decided,
after
due
notice
and
hearing,
not
later
than
fifteen
days
before
the
election.
(Arsenio
Agustin
vs.
Commission
on
Elections
and
Salvador
Pillos
,
G.R.
No.
207105,
November
10,
2015,
Bersamin,
J.
)
2.
May
a
proclaimed
candidate
in
a
congressional
seat
ask
the
Court
to
enjoin
the
election
protest
filed
against
him
before
the
House
of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal?
Answer:
No.
This
violates
the
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers.
The
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers
is
a
principle
of
government
under
which
three
separate
branches
of
government
are
empowered
to
carry
out
functions
without
interference
or
encroachment
from
another
branch.
Angara
v.
Electoral
Tribunal,
63
Phil.
139,
158
(1936):
The
Court
cannot
interfere
with
an
independent
body
like
the
Electoral
Tribunal
under
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers.
It
is
premature
for
the
Court
to
exercise
its
power
of
judicial
review
until
after
the
tribunal
has
terminated
its
proceedings.
How
principle
is
violated:
interference
and
assumption
to
another
branchs
functions
often
referred
to
as
encroachment
3.
When
can
the
House
of
Representative
Electoral
Tribunal
take
jurisdiction
over
an
election
contest?
Answer:
The
HRET
may
take
cognizance
of
any
matter
raised
by
a
losing
candidate
related
to
the
election,
returns
and
qualifications
(ERQ)
as
soon
as
the
COMELEC
proclaims
the
winning
candidate
and
the
latter
shall
have
taken
his
oath
as
a
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives.
Please
take
note
of
the
following
rulings
on
the
three
electoral
tribunals
enshrined
in
the
Constitution:
Reyes
v.
COMELEC
and
Tan,
G.R.
No.
207264,
June
25,
2013:
To
be
considered
a
member
of
Congress,
there
must
be
concurrence
of
the
following
requisites:
a
valid
proclamation;
a
proper
oath;
and
assumption
to
duty.
Absent
any
of
the
foregoing,
the
COMELEC
retains
jurisdiction
over
said
contest.
Duenas
v.
HRET,
593
SCRA
3166:
HRET
has
the
competence
to
examine
questioned
ballots;
a
resolution
signed
by
the
majority
of
the
members
is
sufficient.
Vinzons-Chato
v.
HRET
and
Panotes,
G.R.
No.
199149,
January
22,
2013:
digital
images
are
functional
equivalent
of
the
paper
ballots
Martinez
v.
HRET,
G.R.
No.
189034,
January
11,
2010:
nuisance
candidates;
mockery
of
election
process
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET):
composed
of
3
Justices
of
the
Supreme
Court
to
be
designated
by
the
Chief
Justice
and
6
members
of
the
Senate
based
on
proportional
representation;
the
Senior
Justice
acts
as
the
Chairman.
House
of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal
(HRET):
composed
of
3
Justices
of
the
Supreme
Court
to
be
designated
by
the
Chief
Justice
and
6
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives
based
on
proportional
representation;
the
Senior
Justice
acts
as
the
Chairman.
Jurisdiction
of
Electoral
Contests
before
the
SET
and
the
HRET:
All
matters
pertaining
to
the
election,
returns
and
qualifications
of
a
member,
including
issues
involving
citizenship
and
appreciation
of
ballots.
Pimentel
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
178413,
March
13,
2008:
Once
COMELEC
has
proclaimed
the
winner,
it
loses
jurisdiction
on
all
issues
involving
the
election,
returns
and
qualifications
of
a
member
of
the
Senate;
the
losing
party
must
file
the
protest
before
the
SET.
Legarda
v.
de
Castro:
Petitioner
can
no
longer
pursue
her
election
protest
because
she
run
for
the
Senate
during
the
pendency
of
the
case
and
after
having
been
proclaimed
winner
in
the
senatorial
race,
she
took
her
oath.
To
allow
her
to
pursue
the
case
will
result
to
absurdity.
She
52
|
P a g e
cannot
be
Vice
President
(executive
branch)
and
be
Senator
(legislative
branch)
at
the
same
time.
This
will
result
into
incompatibility
of
offices.
Note:
As
members
of
the
PET,
the
justices
of
the
Supreme
Court
are
triers
of
facts
and
law
and
parties
may
seek
relief
to
the
Supreme
Court
if
they
are
not
satisfied
with
the
findings
of
the
SET.
4.
If
members
of
the
Senate
and
party
list
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives
are
proclaimed
by
the
COMELEC,
what
body
undertakes
the
canvass
of
votes
and
proclamation
of
the
President
and
the
Vice
President?
Answer:
Congress
acts
as
the
Board
of
Canvassers
in
presidential
election.
Pimentel
v.
Joint
Committee
of
Congress,
G.R.
No.
163783,
June
22,
2004.
The
Congress
is
a
continuing
body
and
must
fulfil
its
constitutional
mandate
to
conduct
the
presidential
canvass
of
votes
even
it
if
is
in
recess.
The
Senate
shall
convene
in
joint
session
during
any
voluntary
or
compulsory
recess
to
canvass
the
votes
for
President
and
Vice-President
not
later
than
thirty
days
after
the
day
of
the
elections
in
accordance
with
Section
4,
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution.
Lopez
v.
Senate,
G.R.
No.
163556,
June
8,
2004:
Senate
is
a
continuing
body
only
on
this
matter
and
committee
hearings
and
not
to
consider
bills.
5.
Can
a
losing
candidate
as
kagawad
of
a
barangay
file
an
election
protest?
Answer:
Yes.
The
Municipal
Trial
Courts
have
jurisdiction
over
election
contests
involving
elective
positions
at
the
barangay
level.
A
party
not
satisfied
with
the
ruling
of
the
trial
court,
may
file
an
appeal
before
the
COMELEC.
A
division
of
the
COMELEC
is
assigned
to
review
the
appeal.
If
parties
are
not
satisfied
with
the
ruling
of
the
Division,
they
can
file
an
appeal
before
COMELEC
en
banc
and
parties
may
ask
the
Supreme
Court
en
banc
to
review
the
decision
of
the
COMELEC
en
banc.
Please
note
that
all
decisions
of
the
Civil
Service
Commission,
the
Commission
on
Elections
and
the
Commission
on
Audit
may
be
reviewed
by
the
Supreme
Court
en
banc.
6.
In
case
of
vacancy
in
the
Office
of
the
President,
is
a
special
election
necessary?
Answer:
No.
Section
9
of
Article
VII
provides
that
in
such
an
instance,
the
President
shall
nominate
a
Vice-President
from
among
the
members
of
the
Senate
and
House
of
Representatives
who
shall
assume
the
office
upon
confirmation
by
the
majority
vote
of
all
members
of
both
Houses
of
Congress
voting
separately.
XV.
PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
1. Is
the
non-submission
of
the
EDCA
agreement
for
concurrence
by
the
Senate
violates
the
Constitution?
Answer:
No.
The
EDCA
need
not
be
submitted
to
the
Senate
for
concurrence
because
it
is
in
the
form
of
a
mere
executive
agreement,
not
a
treaty.
Under
the
Constitution,
the
President
is
empowered
to
enter
into
executive
agreements
on
foreign
military
bases,
troops
or
facilities
if
(1)
such
agreement
is
not
the
instrument
that
allows
the
entry
of
such
and
(2)
if
it
merely
aims
to
implement
an
existing
law
or
treaty.
EDCA
is
in
the
form
of
an
executive
agreement
since
it
merely
involves
adjustments
in
detail
in
the
implementation
of
the
Mutual
Defense
Treaty
and
the
Visiting
Forces
Agreement.
These
are
existing
treaties
between
the
Philippines
and
the
U.S.
that
have
already
been
concurred
in
by
the
Philippine
Senate
and
have
thereby
met
the
requirements
of
the
Constitution
under
Art
XVIII,
Sec
25.
Because
of
the
status
of
these
prior
agreements,
EDCA
need
not
be
transmitted
to
the
Senate.
(Saguisag
vs.
Ochoa,
Jr. 779
SCRA
241,
G.R.
No.
212426,
G.R.
No.
212444
January
12,
2016)
2.
The
Philippine
Constitution
has
several
provisions
on
respect
for
human
dignity
and
human
rights
(Art.
II,
Sec.
11,
Art.
III,
Sections
17-19,
and
Art.
XVI,
Sec.
5(2)).
Is
the
Philippine
government
a
signatory
to
any
international
agreement
on
human
rights?
Answer:
Yes.
The
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
(UDHR)
is
a
declaration
adopted
by
the
United
Nations
General
Assembly
as
an
offshoot
of
the
aftermath
of
World
War
II.
The
International
Bill
of
Human
Rights
consists
of
the
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights,
the
53
|
P a g e
International
Covenant
on
Economic,
Social
and
Cultural
Rights,
and
the
International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights
and
its
two
Optional
Protocols.
In
a
strict
sense,
the
Declaration
is
not
treaty
but
it
has
been
considered
as
a
constitutive
document
for
the
purpose
of
defining
fundamental
freedoms
and
human
rights.
3.
A
number
of
Filipinos
are
considered
economic
migrants.
What
efforts
has
the
government
done
to
ensure
the
protection
of
Overseas
Filipino
Workers?
Answer:
The
Philippines
is
a
signatory
to
the
International
Convention
on
the
Protection
of
the
Rights
of
All
Migrant
Workers
and
Members
of
Their
Families.
This
instrument
is
multilateral
treaty
governing
the
protection
of
migrant
workers
and
families.
Concluded
on
18
December
1990,
the
Convention
entered
into
force
on
1
July
2003
after
the
threshold
of
20
ratifying
States
was
reached
in
March
2003.
The
Committee
on
Migrant
Workers
(CMW)
monitors
implementation
of
the
convention,
and
is
one
of
the
seven
UN-linked
human
rights
treaty
bodies.
4.
What
other
rights
do
Overseas
Filipino
Workers
enjoy?
Answer:
In
Nicolas-Lewis
v.
COMELEC,
the
Court
held
that
the
holding
of
the
2004
elections
had,
as
the
OSG
pointed
out,
indeed
rendered
the
petition
moot
and
academic,
but
insofar
only
as
petitioners
participation
in
such
political
exercise
is
concerned.
The
broader
and
transcendental
issue
tendered
or
subsumed
in
the
petition,
i.e.,
the
propriety
of
allowing
duals
to
participate
and
vote
as
absentee
voter
in
future
elections,
however,
remains
unresolved.
Observing
the
petitioners
and
the
COMELECs
respective
formulations
of
the
issues,
the
same
may
be
reduced
into
the
question
of
whether
or
not
petitioners
and
others
who
might
have
meanwhile
retained
and/or
reacquired
Philippine
citizenship
pursuant
to
R.A.
9225
may
vote
as
absentee
voter
under
R.A.
9189.The
Court
resolved
the
poser
in
the
affirmative.
The
Court
held
that
those
who
retain
or
re
acquire
Philippine
citizenship
under
Republic
Act
No.
9225,
the
Citizenship
Retention
and
Re
Acquisition
Act
of
2003,
may
exercise
the
right
to
vote
under
the
system
of
absentee
voting
in
Republic
Act
No.
9189,
the
Overseas
Absentee
Voting
Act
of
2003
pursuant
to
Sec
2
of
Article
V
of
the
Constitution
which
mandates
that
Congress
shall
provide
a
system
for
absentee
voting
by
qualified
Filipinos
abroad.
5.
What
is
the
nature
of
a
tax
treaty?
Answer:
In
negotiating
tax
treaties,
the
underlying
rationale
for
reducing
the
tax
rate
is
that
the
Philippines
will
give
up
a
part
of
the
tax
in
the
expectation
that
the
tax
given
up
for
this
particular
investment
is
not
taxed
by
the
other
country.
6.
How
is
double
taxation
eliminated
in
a
tax
treaty?
Answer:
In
order
to
eliminate
double
taxation,
a
tax
treaty
resorts
to
several
methods.
First,
it
sets
out
the
respective
rights
to
tax
of
the
state
of
source
or
situs
and
of
the
state
of
residence
with
regard
to
certain
classes
of
income
or
capital.
The
second
method
for
the
elimination
of
double
taxation
applies
whenever
the
state
of
source
is
given
a
full
or
limited
right
to
tax
together
with
the
state
of
residence.
In
this
case,
the
treaties
make
it
incumbent
upon
the
state
of
residence
to
allow
relief
in
order
to
avoid
double
taxation.
Power
of
Taxation:
rule
on
taxation:
must
be
uniform
and
equitable;
Congress
to
evolve
a
progressive
system
of
taxation-
The
Constitution
does
not
really
prohibit
the
imposition
of
indirect
taxes
which,
like
the
VAT,
are
regressive.
What
it
simply
provides
is
that
Congress
shall
"evolve
a
progressive
system
of
taxation."
The
constitutional
provision
has
been
interpreted
to
mean
simply
that
"direct
taxes
are
.
.
.
to
be
preferred
[and]
as
much
as
possible,
indirect
taxes
should
be
minimized."
(E.
FERNANDO,
THE
CONSTITUTION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
221
(Second
ed.
(1977)
(Tolentino
v.
Secretary
of
Finance,
1995).
YMCA
v.
Collector
of
Internal
Revenue,
33
Phil.
217(1916):
taxpayer
has
burden
of
proof
to
claim
tax
exemption
Quezon
City
v.
ABS-CBN,
G.R.
No.
166408,
Oct.
6,
2008:
LGUs
have
power
to
collect
local
franchise
tax
Del
Mar
v.
PAGCOR,
346
SCRA
484
(2000):
only
Congress
has
the
power
to
grant
franchise
Nursery
Care
Products
Corporation
v.
Treasurer
Acevedo:
elements
of
double
taxation
Tanada
v.
Tuvera,
136
SCRA
27(1985):
effectivity
of
laws
54 | P a g e
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