TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA

PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE

RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,

oppositors-appellants.

Jul25

FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December
11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted
to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July
27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in satisfaction of her
legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez en nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining two-
third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez

(a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among
principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free
portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas
usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived
the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as
provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda,
violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz
Building between widow and appellants violates testators express will
to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the
widow[1]and over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators
widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate
cannot be made where it will run counter to the testators express will.
The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno
dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate.
To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired
her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is
not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also,
according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to
accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according
to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that
such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir
originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed
on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact
the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of
the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be
subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe
usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
land of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply
to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition
by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of
a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS
over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor
of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free
portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski
with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez

Palacio v. Ramirez (1982) Abad Santos, J.

Petitioner-Appellee: Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez, Maria
Luisa Palacios (administratrix)
Oppositors-Appellants: Marcelle D. vda. de Ramirez, et al.
(oppositors); Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (legatees)
First Heir: Wanda de Wrobleski
Second Heirs: Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

Brief Facts: The testator instituted Wanda as first heir, and Juan and
Horacio as second heirs in a fideicommissary substitution. Juan and
Horacio are strangers to Wanda.

Ratio: A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related

in the first degree to the second heir.

FACTS:
1. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain in 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate
by the CFI of Manila in 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate.
2. In 1966, Palacios submitted a project of partition. Jose Eugenios
property is to be divided into two parts.
 One part shall go to Marcelle (Jose Eugenios French widow who
lives in Paris) en pleno dominio" 1 in satisfaction of her legitime;
the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad".2
Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda
de Wrobleski (Jose Eugenios Austrian companion who lives in
Spain).
3. Jorge and Roberto (Jose Eugenios grandnephews) opposed the
project of partition on the following grounds:
(a) The provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with
respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct
are invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived
the testator;
(b) The provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863, CC;
(c) The grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in
favor of Wanda, an alien, violates Sec. 5, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution; and
(d) The proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz
(Escolta) Building between Marcelle and the appellants violates
the testator's express will to give this property to them (Jorge and
Roberto).
4. Lower court approved the project of partition. Jorge and Roberto
appealed.

ISSUES:
1.Whether the 1/3 usufruct over the free portion in favor of Marcelle is
valid [NO]
2.Whether the fideicommissary substitution in connection with
Wandas usufruct over 2/3 of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo and
Horacio is valid [NO]
3.Whether Wandas usufruct is valid [YES]

RATIO:
1. NO. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of
Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct of 1/3 of the
estate in her favor. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled
1
Freehold.
2
In bare ownership.
 to of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime and which is
more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have
any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testators intention, seeing as the
latters dispositions even impaired Marcelles legitime and tended to
favor Wanda.
Appellants here also questioned the legality of the vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to Marcelles usufruct.
However, since Marcelle is not entitled to any usufruct, the
question has become moot.

2.NO, the said fideicommissary substitution is void.

Appellants: The substitution in its vulgar aspect is void because
Wanda survived the testator.
SC: Dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar
substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept
the inheritance as provided in Art. 859, CC. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
Appellants: The substitution in its fideicommissary aspect is void.
SC: The appellants are correct for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo and Horacio) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863, CC validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
The fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one
generation or degree from the fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit
the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and
867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners."
3.YES, Wandas usufruct is valid.
Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution: Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
 The Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which
enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, the Court upheld the usufruct in
favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of
title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

DISPOSITION: The estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered

distributed as follows:
1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime;
1/2 thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez.

(1) Ineffective Fideicommissary Substitutions

Art. 867. The following shall not take

effect:
(1)Fideicommissary substitutions which
are not made in an express manner,
either by giving them this name, or
imposing upon the fiduciary the
absolute obligation to deliver the
property to a second heir;
(2)Provisions which contain a perpetual
prohibition to alienate, and even a
temporary one, beyond the limit fixed
in article 863;
(3)Those which impose upon the heir the
charge of paying to various persons
successively, beyond the limit
prescribed in article 853, a certain
income or pension;
(4)Those which leave to a person the
whole or part of the hereditary
property in order that he may apply or
invest the same according to secret
 instructions communicated to him by
the testator. (785a)

Art. 868. The nullity of the

fideicommissary substitution does not
prejudice the validity of the institution of
the heirs first designated; the
fideicommissary clause shall simply be
considered as not written. (786)

c. Effect

Art. 862. The substitute shall be subject

to the same charges and conditions
imposed upon the instituted heir, unless
the testator has expressly provided the
contrary, or the charges or conditions are
personally applicable only to the heir
instituted. (780)

d. When Extinguished

9. Testamentary Dispositions
a. In General

Art. 871. The institution of an heir may

be made conditionally, or for a certain
purpose or cause. (790a)

Condition any future and uncertain fact or event on the

happening of which a juridical act is made to depend.
Recognizing the testators right to his property and the free
disposition thereof, insofar as the compulsory heirs are not
prejudiced, it is only logical that he should be empowered to impose
conditions upon those whom he may desire to favor. It is only the
legitime of compulsory heirs that the testator must fully respect and
which he cannot subject to conditions.
In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.

Art. 872. The testator cannot impose

any charge, condition, or substitution
whatsoever upon the legitimes
prescribed in this Code. Should he do so,
the same shall be considered as not
imposed. (813a)

The precept of this article is but a necessary consequence of the

very nature of legitime.
The legitime goes to the compulsory heir by operation of law and
not by the will of the testator; hence it cannot be subject to the
freedom of the latter to impose encumbrances, conditions and
substitutions.
Encumbrances, conditions, or substitutions of any kind, imposed
upon the legitime, do not affect the right of the compulsory heir.
They are simply disregarded and considered as not written.
The prohibition imposed by this article upon the testator, however,
applies only with respect to testamentary dispositions. It has no
application to acts inter vivos.
The testator is allowed to forbid the partition of the estate for a
period not exceeding 20 years; and this power to prohibit division
applies to the legitime. (Art. 1083)
VDA. DE KILAYKO v TENGCO

207 SCRA 600; March 27, 1992

FACTS: Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in

the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, who
later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The
probate court declared the will probated and appointed
Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.

- Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the

probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs,
devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project
of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and
usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties
respectively assigned to them, and ordered the Register of
Deeds to effect the corresponding transfer of properties.

- Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate

proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares
which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her.
The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to Eustaquia
certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation
credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal
properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any
 other person in her last will and testament. The heirs executed
an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating
their co-ownership over the inherited land.

- Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant.

- Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint

administrators of her intestate estate.

- On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in

pars. 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were
allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, CelsaL. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the testate
estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others
that a substitute administrator be appointed.

- The intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion, alleging

that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate
estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had
long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought
to be enforced are null and void. The Court denied the motion to
reopen the testate proceedings.

- Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint for recovery of

ownership and possession of real property against the joining
administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares.

- The joint administrators filed the present petition. Petitioners

contend, among others, that the claim of petitioners over the
properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had
inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary
substitution of heirs. Petitioners claim that said provisions of the
will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code,
they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

ISSUES

1. WON the independent action for reconveyance should

prosper.

2. WON petitioners are the conditional substitute heirs of

Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares

HELD

1. NO

Ratio

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased

person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be
corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final,
its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

Reasoning

Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the

authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within
the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the
same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the
estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as
when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution
and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.- The
facts show that the petitioners recognized the decree of
partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the
fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the
partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for
reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be
allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment
and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of
land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation
that the inclusion was affected through improper means or
without petitioners knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under
the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition.

- Moreover, when petitioners. moved for the reopening of the

testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree
 of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was
already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty
days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely
appeal having been filed by them.- The only instance where a
party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be
for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order
already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposedof.

2. NO

Ratio

When a testator merely names an heir and provides that if

such heir should die a second heir also designated shall
succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The
substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or
simple substitution under Art.859 of the Civil Code but it
shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the
testator.

Reasoning

Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution

in paragraphs 10 and11 of her will, the substitution can have no
effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been
satisfied. The allegation of the joint administrators that
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament
conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of
the Civil Code is baseless as said paragraphs do not impose
upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor
of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs
be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.-
In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the
testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of
heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved
 unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the
circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit
the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.

Austria v. Reyes Digest

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was
given to the respondents, alll have been declared by the former as her
legally adopted children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It
was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The
opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition

alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the
respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance
with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as
heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the
institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for
the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the
institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the
institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs
will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1)
the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false,
and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy
is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will
shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate as in this case
Austria vs. Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079 | 1970-02-27
By: Karen P. Lustica

Facts: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CIF of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners. This opposition was dismissed
and the probate of the will was allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents all of
whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.

More than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was
appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedents will,
notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging
in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al.,
had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents
mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

Issue: WON the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was false

Held: YES.

Ratio: Article 850 of the Civil Code which reads, The statement of a false cause for the institution of an
heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites
must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must
be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

From the use of the terms, sapilitang tagapagmana (compulsory heirs) and sapilitang mana (legitime),
that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrixs belief that under
the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the
respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime
takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to
name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes
should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the
petitioners own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she
executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedents will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of
guesswork or uncertain implications.

The phrases, mga sapilitang tagapagmana and sapilitang mana, were borrowed from the language of
the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract
object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate
other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for
legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the
respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latters children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined
her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for
her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the
petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance,
then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy
a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Dispositive: The present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

Crisologo vs Singson

Facts:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death deathwhether this
happens before or after that of Donya Leona's deathConsolacion's share shall belong to the
brothers of the Donya Leona.

Issue:

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Held:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of
heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o f ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain
a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary
rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the
brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death
whether this happens before or after that of the testatrixher share shall belong to the brothers
of the testatrix.

Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.It is of the essence of a

fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve
and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon the happening of a particular event.

The last will of the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the
substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place
upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.