G.R. No.

203372, June 16, 2015

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.

Facts of the Cases

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-
Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.ch
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments and the
next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

Appointments

G.R. No. 203372

The paper evidencing Atty. Velicaria-Garafils appointment as State Solicitor II at the OSG was dated 5 March
2010.There was a transmittal letter dated 8 March 2010 of the appointment paper from the Office of the
President (OP), but this transmittal letter was received by the Malacaang Records Office (MRO) only on 13
May 2010. There was no indication as to the OSGs date of receipt of the appointment paper. On 19 March
2010, the OSGs Human Resources Department called up Atty. Velicaria-Garafil to schedule her oath-taking.
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil took her oath of office as State Solicitor II on 22 March 2010 and assumed her position
on 6 April 2010.

G.R. No. 206290

The paper evidencing Atty. Venturanzas appointment as Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City
was dated 23 February 2010. It is apparent, however, that it was only on 12 March 2010 that the OP, in a letter
dated 9 March 2010, transmitted Atty. Venturanzas appointment paper to then Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Alberto C. Agra. During the period between 23 February and 12 March 2010, Atty. Venturanza,
upon verbal advice from Malacaang of his promotion but without an official copy of his appointment paper,
secured clearances from the Civil Service Commission (CSC),Sandiganbayanand the DOJ. Atty. Venturanza
took his oath of office on 15 March 2010, and assumed office on the same day.

G.R. No. 209138

The paper evidencing Villanuevas appointment as Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of
the CDA was dated 3 March 2010. There was no transmittal letter of the appointment paper from the OP.
Villanueva took her oath of office on 13 April 2010.

The paper evidencing Rosquitas appointment as Commissioner, representing Region I and the Cordilleras, of
the NCIP was dated 5 March 2010. Like Villanueva, there was no transmittal letter of the appointment paper
from the OP. Rosquita took her oath of office on 18 March 2010.

G.R. No. 212030

The paper evidencing Atty. Tamondongs appointment as member, representing the private sector, of the
SBMA Board of Directors was dated 1 March 2010. Atty. Tamondong admitted that the appointment paper was
received by the Office of the SBMA Chair on 25 March 2010 and that he took his oath of office on the same
day. He took another oath of office on 6 July 2010 as an act of extra caution because of the rising crescendo of
noise from the new political mandarins against the so-called midnight appointments

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and
revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments.

ISSUE

1) Whether petitioners appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and

2) Whether EO 2 is constitutional.

HELD

THE Supreme Court affirmed the Executive Order issued by President Benigno Aquino III against the midnight
appointments made by his predecessor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo..

In the matter of Cheloy Velicaria-Garafil vs Office of the President, Dindo Venturanza vs the Office of the
President, Irma Villanueva and Francisca Rosqueta vs Court of Appeals and Office of the President and Edie
Tamondong vs Court of Appeals and Executive Secretary, the Court voting 8-6 dismissed the petition and
declared as null and void the appointments of petitioners to the post they occupied, high courts Information
Chief Atty. Theodore Te said at a press conference.

The high court said Executive Order No. 2 issued by Aquino is constitutional in its entirety, especially as to its
definition of midnight appointments and its recall, revocation and withdrawal of midnight appointments.

EO No. 2, which was issued on Aug. 4, 2011, recalled, withdrew and revoked about 800 appointments made by
Arroyo two months before the 2010 elections.
Among these appointments are of that of the petitioners.

Velicaria-Garafil was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General while Venturanza was
appointed as city prosecutor of Quezon City. On the other hand, Villanueva was appointed as Administrator for
Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority while Rosqueta was named
Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples. Tamondong was appointed member of the
Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.

Under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

For purposes of the 2010 polls, the high court said the cut-off date for valid appointments was March 10, 2010
while March 11, 2010 was the reference date for midnight appointments.

About the petitioners, the high court said they failed to provide proof showing that their appointments were made
prior to March 11, 2010.

The petitioners have failed to show their compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers have indeed been issued before the period covered by the
appointment ban, the high court said.

The high court also took note of the fact that petitioners themselves admitted that they took their oaths of office
during the period of the appointment ban.

Dominador Aytona vs Andres Castillo

4 SCRA 1 Political Law Appointing Power Midnight Appointments
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his
term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado
Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he
appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was
validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments were
scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert
the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue
office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment
can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the
upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a
person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was
grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered
but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court

140 SCRA 22 Law on Public Officers Ad Interim Appointment
In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for Administration
in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Estebans appointment was ad interim in nature (because at
that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he
later discovered that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then
requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III
instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service
Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate
Court reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term ad interim as
used in the Philippines does not literally translate to temporary. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment
is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:
an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period
has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely
temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.
In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board
issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad
interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them. If confirmed, the appointees term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at
bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this
confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his
appointment was extended but only as an extension of temporary appointment.

IN RE MATEO A. VALLENZUELA AND PLACIDO VALLARTE, 298 SCRA 408

Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His Excellency the President
under the date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The
appointments were received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998. The referral was made in view of
the serious constitutional issue concerning said appointments arising from the pertinent antecedents.

The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998. The meeting had
been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio Chairman, to discuss the question raised by some
sectors about the "constitutionality of *** appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in light of the
forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading
as follows:
"SEC 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."

Your Excellency, Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President: he "shall not make
appointments" within the period mentioned, and since there is no specification of which appointments are
proscribed, the same may be considered as applying to all appointments of any kind and nature. This is the
general rule then, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions" as to which "temporary
appointments" may be made within the interdicted period "when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety." As the exception makes reference only to "executive" positions, it
would seem that "judicial" positions are covered by the general rule.

On the other hand, Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, requires that any vacancy in the Supreme Court "shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." Unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy
is not specifically imposed on the President; hence, it may be inferred that it is a duty shared by the Judicial and
Bar council and the President.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACT: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Renato S. Puno by May17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10,2010.These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a
list of at least three nominees prepared byte Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically consideredfor the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the
incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could
have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy hasoccurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another
part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires thePresident to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE : Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments tof ill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary .Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4.(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15,Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only
to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd t assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all
kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof

Peter John Calderon vs Bartolome

Carale
208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees Requiring COA Confirmation Cannot
Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman
and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the
CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the
confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715
should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for
the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first
group). With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase
and other officers required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has
significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed
in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides
in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador
Mison
156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers Requiring Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons
appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by
the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of
Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to
be confirmed by the COA.

Mary Concepcion-Bautista vs Senator

Jovito Salonga
72 SCRA 150 Political Law Appointments Commission on Human Rights Security of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting
Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista
permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to
submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a
letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as
chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento
vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin
as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautistas
appointment as ad interim.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on
his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at
the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to
confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in
the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation
of the COA because they are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint. The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR
is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature
and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the
participation of the COA. Thus, Corys act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is
done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latters
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was
the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad interim. Since the position
of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR
are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may
be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional.
Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of
7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and with the observance of due process.

Teresita Quintos-Deles vs Commission

on Constitutional Commissions
177 SCRA 259 Political Law Appointment of Sectoral Representatives
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for
women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently
scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition
against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the
concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not
require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups,
to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group
abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. All
other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard
is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution.

Cecilio Rafael vs Embroidery and

Apparel Control & Inspection Board
21 SCRA 336 Political Law Appointments When Not Bypassed by a Law
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of
Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and Apparel
Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but
the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while
Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that the members of the
EACIB can only be appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution;
that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified
offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the
constitutional power of the President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of
the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the
need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the
limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads. They
are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as an ex officio
member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to specify that the representatives should come
from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry and the National
Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus perform
functions which have a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into
embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in RA
3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.

Vicenta Oliveros-Torre vs Flores Bayot

58 SCRA 272 Political Law Appointments Appellate Jurisdiction of the President Rule on Next-in-
Rank
Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both fighting over the position as the Chief Drug
Inspector (CDI) of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Both are more than qualified.
Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as she was the Supervising Drug
Inspector and even at that point she is also contesting the position with Capistrano. Capistrano went on
leave and Torre was appointed as the acting CDI.
When Capistranos leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torres appointment until Capistranos
return. The said office was given due course by the Office of the President. Barros then filed a protest
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) claiming that she has the right to the office because she was
next in rank. CSC initially declared Barros to be the rightful person to the contested position. Torre then
relinquished her office to Barros but Torre appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier decision.
Barros appealed to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive Secretary (Office of the
President). Through Under Secretary Flores Bayot, the Executive Secretary granted the appeal by Barros
and the CSC decision was reversed. Torre appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Office of the
President cannot review and reverse the decision of the CSC regarding appointments; she argued that
under the Civil Service Act the decision of the CSC Commissioner shall be final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse
decisions promulgated by the CSC when it comes to appointments.
HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 37 of Act
4007, the President as department head can review, modify or revoke decisions or actions of the chiefs of
bureaus, offices, divisions or service under his department as well as exercise the power expressly vested
by law in such chief or head of the bureau, office, division or service. The appellate jurisdiction of the
President on disputed appointments is also expressly affirmed by Sec. 693 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides that
A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the Auditor General, may apply for,
and the Commissioner of CSC shall render, a decision upon any question as to whether a position is in
the unclassified or in the unclassified civil service, or whether the appointment of any person to a
classified position has been made in accordance with law, which decision, when rendered, shall be final
unless reversed by the President of the Philippines on appeal.
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction on the President, he can at
any time by virtue of his power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices, expressly
vested in him by the 1935 Constitution, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu
propio without need of any appeal from any party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the President over executive
departments, bureaus, offices and services, should be limited to a review of administrative acts, not to
decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service on contested appointments; this untenable for the law
makes no distinction as to what administrative acts and the acts of the CSC where there is no distinction
made by law, the Court must not distinguish.

Jesus Armando Tarrosa vs Gabriel

Singson
232 SCRA 553 Political Law Appointments Congress Cant Expand the Appointing Power of the
President
Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by then president
Fidel Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment and he argued that
Singson cannot perform such position without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa
invoked Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is
subject to the confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

Rodulfo Niere vs Court of First

Instance of Negros Occidental
54 SCRA 165 Political Law Appointments Residual Power to Appoint
La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of the same city (La
Carlota). Quiambaos appointment was pursuant to the Decentralization Act (effective January
1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the position of the city engineer must be filled in by the appointment of
the President. Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so he filed a quo warranto case
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the
City Mayor who should appoint the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.
HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which authorizes the mayor
thereof to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the deliberations in Congress when La Carlotas charter was
being drafted revealed that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exclude the position of city engineer
from among those local officers whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlotas charter, is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this
prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article
7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall nominate all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for; because when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be
appointed, the appointment must be made by the President (residual power of appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President. Consequently, any
diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal.

Recess. Thirty days before the next regular sessions, the Congress shall have its compulsory recess or adjournment.
But each House can adjourn for a voluntary recess provided that the consent of the other House is obtained if the
adjournment is for three days or to any other place than that to which the two Houses are sitting.

Adjournment
A putting off or postponing of proceedings; an ending or dismissal of further business by a court, legislature, or public offici
aleither temporarily or permanently.
If an adjournment is final, it is said to be sine die, "without day" or without a time fixed to resume the work. An adjournmen
t isdifferent from a recess, which is only a short break in proceedings.
In legislatures, adjournment officially marks the end of a regular session. Both state and federal lawmakers vote to determ
inewhen to adjourn. The exact timing depends upon multiple factors such as work load, election schedules, and the level
ofcomity among lawmakers. Because a session can end with unfinished legislative business, adjournment is commonly us
edas a means of political leverage in securing or delaying action on important matters. In the U.S. Congress, where the si
ngleannual legislative session usually ends in the fall, the president may call an adjournment if the House and Senate can
notagree upon a date.

Article VII, Section 10, Subsection 4 of our Constitution, which provides:

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs The Director-

General
487 SCRA 623 Political Law Control Power of the President
This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the countrys
id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-
General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes
upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the
president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID
system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are
required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President
may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also
mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this
constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government
and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420
does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation
is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

97 Phil. 143 Political Law Control Power Revised Administrative Code Supervision
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and
concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to
investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the
latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the
executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control,
direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may
order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who
shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a
mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered
him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been
granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as
agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring
upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government
for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article
7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in
the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office,
and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious,
he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the
officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds
nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of
municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondanos office. If the
issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in
this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the
governor must suspend a mayor not because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the
power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.