CAVEAT: Read FULL TEXT.
Roque, who is respondents
Re: Letter of the UP Faculty
(This is an indirect contempt case but the issues were basically
about the propriety of the SHOW CAUSE ORDER.- so ambot)
Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel for the petitioners
therein filed, 1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the
fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens
human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms; and,
2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was
plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of
the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit the
arguments laid down in said decision. Thereafter, an ethics
committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged
plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent
their respective letters to the Supreme Court.Due to this, the
faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement
(Restoring Integrity Statement), which alleged plagiarism
against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not only as an
established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted
online and at the Colleges bulletin board and was submitted
to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show
Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily
explain why they should not be disciplined as Members of
the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
(3) Yes. With respect to good faith, respondents
allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del
Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the
expression of respondents staunch belief that Justice Del
Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this
Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution.
No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness
of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the
courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the
courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In
re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with
more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya
case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language,
which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court
for "proper disposition."
Whether or not respondents views regarding the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly
immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and
conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly
threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it
highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the
discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt
of Justice Del Castillo.
As for the claim that the respondents noble intention
is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the
plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity.
For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Courts
consideration, why was the same published and reported in the
media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more
plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by
the general public and designed to capture media attention as
part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial
ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed
in the Vinuya case by Atty.
colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a
lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court,
particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter
of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the
Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance,
were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the
Court. These facts have been widely publicized.
This Court takes into account the nature of the
criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on
the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside
the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or
from individuals whose personal or other interests in making
the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or
ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary
and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would
have a grave implication on legal education in our country.
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common
Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith,
be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13,
to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the
administration of justice.
RESOLUTION of the ADMINISTRATIVE CASE:
These 35 respondent law professors are reminded
of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of
justice and warned that the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Sereno, J: Ordering the 37 respondent members of the UP Law
Faculty to show cause in this indirect contempt case is like
ordering the little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no
clothes to explain why he should not be crucified for his public
observation.
The subject UP Law Faculty members have been prematurely
adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such prejudgment
should be reversed simply for expressing what they believed
was the truth. There may have been exaggeration in the UP
Law Faculty's process of expression, but this tempest is nothing
that the Supreme Court has not similarly weathered in the past
and faced with equanimity.
With all due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the
Court to seek revenge against those who, in their wish to see
reform in the judiciary, have the courage to say what is wrong
with it.
Indirect contempt is committed in any of the acts enumerated
in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The majority
Resolution, which is the written charge required by said rule,
fails to cite which particular mode of committing indirect
contempt appears to have been violated. It is axiomatic to due
process that the accused be informed specifically of the charge
against them. A proceeding for indirect contempt is criminal in
nature; thus, adherence to due process is more stringently
required of this Court.
From the Book:

In the case of In re Kelly[3][3] that any publication, pending a
suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers
of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending
to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of
court and is punishable. (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19,
2010)
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL
S. SORREDA
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005
FACTS:
In a letter[1] to the Chief Justice dated February 21,
2005, with copies thereof furnished all the Associate
Justices of the Court and other government entities,
RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda, who identified himself as member, Philippine
Bar, expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable
outcome of and the manner by which the Court
resolved the 10 cases filed by him recounting therein
and alleging circumstances surrounding the dismissal on
February 7, 2000[2] of the very first case he filed with
the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.
Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty.
Sorreda had previously written a letter[3] dated April 2,
2001 addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all
the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the
Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court
comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally
execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the
majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the
land. It is the action not of men of reason or those
who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and
tyrants from whom might is right. I say, shame on
the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors
throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could
not justify.
Reacting, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated
August 14, 2001,[4] required Atty. Sorreda to show cause
why he should not be properly disciplined for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court
by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous
derogatory language against it. In response to the
show cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2)
more letters to the Court dated December 2,
2001[5] and June 16, 2002,[6] arguing for the propriety of
his action and practically lecturing the Court on his
concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional
Law. Court merely noted said two letters.
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices
offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again
went on a rampage in his letter of February 21, 2005
again maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices,
portion of it as follows:
Where did the Court get such brazenness, such
shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that
the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence
clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men
are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on
the corrupt, and the bar to become like Frodo in the
fight against societys evils in your public speeches and
writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same
evils when hidden from public view. Are all these
rulings in the ten cases not the clearest manifestation
that the supreme magistrates have bought into the
What-are-we-in-power-for mentality?
In an en banc Resolution[11] dated March 15, 2005, the
Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its
Justices.
By way of compliance to the second show cause
order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of May 10, 2005[12],
again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, states
that he does not see the need to say any more
because the cause has already been shown as clear
as day in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding
that [T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the
instant matter swiftly and decisively. While admitting
the great seriousness of the statements and
imputations I have leveled against the Court, he dared
the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will
be upheld by the Supreme Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty
of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his
letters addressed to the court.
HELD: YES. Atty. Noel S. Sorreda is found guilty both of
contempt of court and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility amounting to gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar.
(Books Ruling: BAR 2012) Unfounded accusations or
allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or
to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading.
Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the
contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or
contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers
oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda
has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice.[24] No less must this be and
with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest
court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice
and democracy.
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not
to his client but to the administration of justice, to
which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified
nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice.
Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle
to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court,
is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point
out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with
error. But, certainly, this does not give him the
unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and
bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the
Court is duty-bound to act to preserve its honor and
dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.