Civil Liability in case of Estafa An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where

the preponderance of the established facts so warrants

G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In
order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but
also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not
only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty to acquit him......xxx

The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to
obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or
postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would
not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25

The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is
punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of
the notice of dishonor.

The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated check
the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting
over the telephone, thus: xxx

Gilbert Wagas.30

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to
somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1wphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray
confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and
expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud
Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Caada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to
him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Caada was then acting on behalf of Wagas,
the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Caada had been acting for Wagas. This
lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not
reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone
conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for
purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had
with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the
person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice
recognition or any other means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to
the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity
with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have
sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be established by the callers self-identification, coupled with
additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged,
internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to
the caller.34

Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According
to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue,
and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was
had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of
such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible.
However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller.
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it had
been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through
Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought
to elicit from him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as
follows:xxxxx

It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui
negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the
burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the
commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.
That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed
to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused,
being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of
the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of
the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction.42

There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the
person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the
accuseds constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he
is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was
legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold
him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality
of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the
ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181658 August 7, 2013

LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, vs. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and
November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5 for the
exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the
Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.

xxxxI

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN
ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.36

Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any private party but
is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that
perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be
compensated and that there is no private person injured by the crime.

Petitioner argues that the CAs invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice Regalado in
his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the criminal case in order to
intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved
the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime
of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of
right, may still intervene because he was one of the offended parties.

Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent in this case
despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage as she herself did not
allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage
that may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for the damage caused38 and indemnification for
consequential damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may
intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or
any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all
proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the
public prosecutor alone.40

On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the
perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a
stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant
to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.41

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very
person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory
that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in
or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission.43

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under
Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in
the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as
"the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of
Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public
offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to
whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty
or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that
corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under
the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the
accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy,
subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHIs property and
its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondents personal
credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board
Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-
ordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondents timely
discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this
Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public
or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended
party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to
intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of
demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.48

In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the
corporations Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders
Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondents
testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the
ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and
ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and
ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC
ruling.

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to actively
participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the
law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a
crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State
whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of
the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any
damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that
since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors,
who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed
and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from
the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have
it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to
establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a
separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the
private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case
Nos. 352270-71 CR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED
and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.