CERTIFICATE OF STATEMENT

JOHN W. EISENHAUER
23795 WOODLAND DR
WATERTOWN, NY 13601

Opening Comments
Ladies and gentlemen of the ZBA, thank you for the opportunity to speak this evening. It is
with due concern that I address the board regarding this appeal of interpretation and the
potential violation of New York State Penal Law, Article 175 due to False Written Statements
provided to this board by the appellant at the November 1, 2017 hearing.
First, I want to reinforce with you that, whatever you may decide regarding this appeal, you
will be setting a precedent for the entire Town of LeRay. That said, please take the time to
thoroughly evaluate the evidence in front of you and the code holistically to make a well-
informed and legally supportable decision that youd be willing to make in the future in all
similar cases regardless of the applicant, the neighborhood, and so on. This body has 62 days
to make a decision on this matter. You should take this time to ensure that you have all of the
information required to make a fully informed decision. There is substantial evidence that
26369 NYS Rte 283 ceased use for auto repair as of April 22, 2016 and that the claims and proof
to the contrary provided by the appellant at the November 1, 2017 meeting are false.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that this parcel ceased any use, that is it was vacant
and abandoned, prior to the enactment of the Town code in 2014. As you work through this
appeal, please keep in mind the following intent, purposes, and definition from the Town of
LeRay Code:

The Town of LeRay Zoning Code was written to protect existing development while providing
some control of growth so that future development will not be a detriment to the Town and its
residents. Among its purposes are:

- To conserve property values;

- To promote the general welfare and best interests of the Town; and,
- To protect the character stability and satisfactory interrelationships of residential,
commercial, agricultural, recreational and open space areas of the Town.

It is also important to ensure an understanding of the term abandoned as defined in Section

158-6 of the Town Code, to wit:

The lawful use of any structure or land having ceased for a period of 12 consecutive months
or longer shall be termed "abandoned."

Now to address the specifics:

1. The property owner during the period in question (April 22, 2016 until July, 2017)
states that the property was vacant and secured for over one year:
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 The claims in Mrs. Sweets statement, provided to this body by the appellant, are false. I have
discussed this issue with M&T Bank, and they advised that they revert ownership of bank-
owned properties back to the investor, in this case Bayview Loan Servicing. I sent a query to
Bayview on November 6, 2017 asking if such an agreement exists and/or if they ever lease back
REO properties. Kevin Jonas, First Vice President for Bayview Loan Servicing replied as follows
(enclosure 1):
My asset manager was able to research your questions and speak with our vendor who
handled this property.
1) The property was vacant and secure on 4/22/2016 when the broker first visited the
property after the Foreclosure sale. Notes indicate it was vacant until the auction sale
and there is an inspection report from our property preservation vendor dated March
2017 that showed the property as vacant.
2) The property was vacant throughout the listing period and while the property was with
the auction company, Hudson & Marshall. No lease was provided or in effect on this
property during our period of ownership.
Mr. Jonas stated in a follow-on e-mail:
Should we be needed will convey the same information to the town we gave you.
Based on these statements, it appears that the proof for the appeal of interpretation,
including Mrs. Sweets statement, the invoices, and the three statements from individuals,
were all fraudulent. Bayview Loan Servicing has expressed a willingness to communicate this
directly to the Town, so if you require that level of certification, please feel free to call Mr.
Jonas at (305) 631-6303 or (305) 322-0649.
2. Certified records from County and State contradict claims made in Mrs. Sweets
statement concerning licensure for both the business name, the location, and the
time period.
A search of County records reflects no doing business as filing for Auto Clinic of NNY at the
NYS Rte 283 location. Rather, the address listed for this business concern in the only DBA found
for it in the Jefferson County system is from December 21, 2010 with an address at 23465
Graham Road, Watertown, NY (enclosure 2). The only other records for Auto Clinic of NNY in a
search of Jefferson County records reflects a Certificate of Discontinuance of Business filed on
March 15, 2013 (enclosure 3) and a Creditor Judgment filed on October 31, 2013 (enclosure 4).
These certified government records clearly invalidate the appellants false proof that Auto Clinic
of NNY was an ongoing business concern past March of 2013 or that it was ever established as a
lawful business on the premises at 26369 NYS Rte 283, Watertown, NY.
Furthermore, Upstate Automotive, owned by Terry Gibson, was the most recent business that
I could find operating an auto repair facility at the address in question under the facility number
7104194 which expired on May 31, 2013 (enclosure 5).
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 Thus, the self-authenticating evidence available to us supports our observations that the lot in
question ceased lawful use as an auto repair facility prior to the enactment of the Town of
LeRay Zoning Code in 2014. Therefore, under current code, there is no preexisting use of this
nonconforming lot under the use auto repair or any other automotive use and all site plan
approvals, special use permits, and use/area variances should be required as such.
3. The invoices and supporting uncertified customer statements provided by the
appellant are likely fraudulent and otherwise do not meet the NYS standards for
invoices for Motor Vehicle Repair shops; thus, they should not be accepted as proof
of any activity on the site.
The invoices that were submitted to the ZBA at the November 1, 2017 hearing are likely
fraudulent and should not be used as a basis for any decision supporting the appellants claims.
The self-authenticating evidence provided above should cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
invoices provided. Further casting doubt are the following facts:
a. The invoices are not cashed out, thus there is not evidence that this work was ever
done other than uncertified/unnotarized statements from the supposed clients.
b. The invoices are oddly out of sequence based on dates of service. Computer-
generated invoices generate invoice numbers sequentially, so this casts further
doubt.
c. The invoices do not meet the statutory requirements set by DMV for auto repair
shop invoices [see NYS Motor Vehicle Repair Shop Regulations, Part 82, Paragraph
82.5(c)] which are as follows (emphasis added):
i. The name, address, and facility number of the repair shop;
ii. The date of the invoice;
iii. The date the vehicle was presented to the repair shop for services;
iv. A list of all parts supplied, and labor performed, including the cost for each
such part and labor;
v. A notation indicating the status of any part used which is not new and of at
least original quality;
vi. The odometer reading on the vehicle at the time it was left with the repair
shop and the odometer reading at the time the invoice was prepared;
vii. A promised date of delivery if any such date was given;
viii. The name of the customer, year, make, and plate number and/or vehicle
identification number of the vehicle;
ix. The terms and time limit of any guarantee for the repair work performed;
x. A description of the problem reported by the customer; and,
xi. The repair shop registration number.
Given the above discussion, the invoices and uncertified/unnotarized customer statements
should be disregarded as any level of proof of use of the facility during the time period in
question.
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 4. Certified/notarized affidavits/statements based on eyewitness accounts from
nearby residents support that the property was vacant and abandoned for four
plus years.
Several community residents have provided notarized statements attesting to the fact that the
facility ceased use as an auto repair facility and appeared vacant and abandoned for various
periods up to four plus years. Notarized statements are considered self-authenticating
evidence and should carry more weight than any unnotarized statements upon which doubt
may be cast as to the authenticity of both content and signatory.
5. Site Plan revocation versus General Special Use Permit requirements.
The issue in front of the ZBA today is in regard to site plan approval. It should be noted that
the one year standard considered here is in regard to the revocation of the site plan and is
covered under the code in Section 158-146. However, the permitted use the appellant is
seeking is a special use as defined by the code within a Mixed Use District and would thus
require a Special Use Permit. Special Use Permits are addressed in Chapter 158, Article XVI of
the Zoning Code. More specifically, I direct your attention to Section 158-126, General
standards governing special uses, paragraph C, to wit:
Preexisting special uses. Any use lawfully established prior to and lawfully continuing in
existence on the date of adoption of this chapter, and which is located in a district in which the
special use is permitted under the terms of this chapter shall be deemed a conforming use
without further action, application or review, unless a preexisting special use permit expires, or
unless such use ceases to continue for a period of more than six consecutive months.
Based on the disproven proof provided by the appellant at the earlier hearing, it is apparent
that, even if there was a preexisting use prior to the 2014 enactment of the code, which is
doubtful as discussed above, such special use ceased to continue for a period of more than six
consecutive months as the period from August 2016 through June 2017 (when she claims to
have talked to the Town, but had yet to apply for a permit) is a 10-month period. Thus, the
special use for which applied should not be deemed a conforming use without further action,
application or review, but rather the appellant must seek a new special use permit for the now
terminated pre-existing special use which includes site plan approval. Furthermore, as the
Planning Board has determined, an area variance is required as the lot size is nonconforming for
the special use and per Section 158-135, Nonconforming lots of record, it requires an area
variance since it does not otherwise satisfy all applicable provisions of Chapter 158 of the code
given the nonconforming setbacks, impervious surface coverage, buffer zones, etc.
Therefore, regardless of your decision on the current appeal of interpretation, the appellant
still requires a special use permit and area variance for her desired use. This would mean
another appeal to the ZBA following a five-day notice of public hearing (Town Law, section 267-
a(10)) to the County Planning Board prior to the public hearing of the area variance appeal in
addition to a SEQRA review by the ZBA. The ZBA must also allow the County 30 days to reply.
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 Closing Statement
Given that the Sweets moved to Florida in late 2013, the subsequent inactivity at the site in
question, government records, and other substantial evidence, a reasonable person would
conclude, based on the entire record in front of you, that the building had been abandoned and
any use for automotive repair had been discontinued prior to current code filing in 2014. The
appellant has not provided truthful, substantial, factual, certifiable evidence to prove
otherwise, whereas those supporting the site plan revocation have in terms of certified
affidavits, property owner statements, certified government records disproving the appellants
proof, and other substantial evidence. Therefore, this appeal of interpretation should be
denied. Furthermore, the Zoning Enforcement Officer must enforce Section 158-148 A. which
states No building or structure shall be erected, or use instituted, or use reinstituted once
discontinued, until a zoning permit has been issued therefor, as well as, Section 158-148 G.
which states, Any administrative use having ceased for a period of 12 months or longer shall
be termed abandoned and may not be reinstituted without applying for and being granted a
zoning permit, at which time such use shall be required to conform to this chapter.

____________________________________

JOHN W. EISENHAUER
23795 Woodland Dr
Watertown, NY 13601

State of New York)

)SS:
County of )

On this, the________day of __________, 20____, before me a notary public, the undersigned officer,
personally appeared________________________, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the
same for the purposes therein contained.

In witness hereof, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.

___________________________
Notary Public

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