AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY v. THOMAS G. AQUINO, GR No.

170516,
2008-07-16

Facts:
calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government,
particularly the JPEPA... but Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied that the Congressman
shall be provided with a copy thereof "once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal
review of the proposed agreement has... been conducted."... he Committee's request to be furnished all
documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has
been a work... in progress for about three years.
the House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the same
was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then House Speaker
Jose de Venecia had requested... him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President
gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.[3]
The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President endorsed it
to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution... first,... contravenes
other constitutional provisions on... transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
Second... ctive and reasonable participation in... all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
Lastly... hey proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded
will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive,... in violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
he first two grounds relied upon by petitioners which bear on the merits of respondents' claim of privilege
shall be discussed.
the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically... invoked and clearly
explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan... must be
allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations
and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality
Issues:
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that
it be a matter of public concern.
Ruling:
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern... it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic
matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information."
, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there should
be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged... by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is publishe
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage
future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
the Court recognizes that the information sought by petitioners includes documents produced and
communicated by a party external to the Philippine government, namely, the Japanese representatives in
the JPEPA negotiations,... his Court echoes the principle articulated in Fulbright that the public policy
underlying the deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic negotiations should also be accorded
privileged status,... it would be incorrect to claim that the doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a
controversy such as the present, where the demand for information has come from members of
Congress, not only from private citizens.
he privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens' demands for information,
but also in the context of legislative investigations.
the Court notes that the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is grounded more on the nature of treaty negotiations
as such than on a particular socio-political school of thought.
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need" referred to in the immediately
cited cases
The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely weakened by the disclosure of the full text of the
JPEPA to the public since September 11, 2006, even as it is still being deliberated upon by the Senate and,
therefore, not yet binding on the Philippines.
The Court observes, however, that the claim of privilege appearing in respondents' Comment to this petition
fails to satisfy in full the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the claim should be invoked by the
President or through the Executive Secretary "by... order of the President."
The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful
not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate
exercise thereof.
Principles:
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive.
the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being
that "the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general
confidentiality privilege to... shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper
governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing."... the treaty-making power is exclusive to the
President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive
Secretary[56]where the Court held
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in
the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate...
his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself
Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations... the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and... otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states.
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by... him.
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by
the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the
right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in
favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use
the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his
experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render
a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio
coverage.1wphi1.nt

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation,
finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or
television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members, 1 the Court denies
the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has resolved
to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.

What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary
purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law.4

For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom
and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain
certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and
control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.

There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he
is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the
Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how
their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The
recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot
quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is
sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial
can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in
the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of
their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility
that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent,
the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the
popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.

At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the
concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the
tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By
delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.

Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions
Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."6

No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made
of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such
documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.

Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
clbres was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he
explained:

In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving.
An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the
case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
 No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which
the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities
through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury
carried out their responsibilities.

I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons.
And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news,
and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would
be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an
actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public
understanding.

Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need.7

Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for
its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts,
especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases,
for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan
is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a)
the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may
determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made
for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to
ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who
had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing
of the contents of a tape.

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their
stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated
that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV stations is
a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses
or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that
the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the
NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form
of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar
as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno,
joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]

1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds
of media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants
to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of
the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying
the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the
identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect.
The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of
this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of
conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor,
a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of
the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be
calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the
Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law
should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the
need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.

2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted
a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.

[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made
his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of
media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit
itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in
Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:
 Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish
Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001,
the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the
Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of
PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez
filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed
to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside
the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash
which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower
court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the
court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of
probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter
for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in
nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape
which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice
or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand,
if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to
bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not
an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the
court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out
and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that
may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.

iii. NO.
 Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine
of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness
that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with
or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies
with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and
that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has
broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

CASE DIGEST

BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006

Facts

Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26
petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to
implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted
at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005,
a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in
front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one
of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to
stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on
Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation ofthe Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of
the message for which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment
of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for
the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and
penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set
limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on
clear and convincingevidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise
interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P.
No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the
right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave
public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to
Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the
permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue

Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held

No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right
of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
There is, likewise, no priorrestraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, this was declared null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permitshall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered
performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence
he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.