State instances when a suit against the State is proper.

Held: Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

1) When the Republic is sued by name;

2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.])

15. Has the government waived its immunity from suit in the Mendiola massacre,
and, therefore, should indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident?
Consequently, is the suit filed against the Republic by petitioners in said case
really a suit against the State?

Held: Petitioners x x x advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived
its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the
recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and
victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President
Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.

X x x

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the

heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in
any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important
to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission
was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and
casualties that took place. In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides
guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:

1. Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission
of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient
compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising
therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court.

In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only
serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate
his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The
Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in
any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and
executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or
said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from
suit. The Presidents act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does
not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to
borrow the words of petitioner x x x, it was an act of solidarity by the
government with the people. Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquinos
speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists.
By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability,
much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained

that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.

X x x

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then
party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident
occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their
authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by
the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police
and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880
as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself
by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his
acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991 (Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]), this doctrine still found application, this
Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and
non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official
of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the
rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very
people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the
trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a
sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except
when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers
to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand
indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit
does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no
affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge
of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though
the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue
of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it
quite clear that even a high position in the government does not confer a license
to persecute or recklessly injure another.

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the
deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named
defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this Court in Shauf v.
Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 713 [1990]), herein public officials, having been found
to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.
(Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.])

16. May the Government validly invoke the doctrine of State immunity from suit if
its invocation will serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen?

Held: To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable
for us to defeat petitioners-contractors right to be duly compensated for actual
work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public
have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and
reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor.

Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in
the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
 Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of State
immunity finds no application in the case before us.

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain
settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it
does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. (Citations
omitted)

Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective

shroud which shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark
case of Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It
is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the
part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. (Citations omitted)

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of
the States immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for
expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the
aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the
ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular
instance, the States immunity from suit.

To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and
welfare cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to
be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand
that the States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular
instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated on the basis of
quantum meruit for construction done on the public works housing project. (EPG
Construction Co. v. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, Mar.16, 2001, 2nd Div. [Buena])