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Michael Jonathan

Dr. Benjamin Nathans

HIST 135-401

1 November 2017

The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Linguistic Assimilation

On October 22, 1962, Americans tuning in to the evening news were informed of a

chilling circumstance by then President John F. Kennedy: The United States government had

discovered a build-up of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, just seventy miles south of the tip

of the Florida Keys. This radio-television announcement initiated one of the most pivotal events

of the Cold War, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. As much as it inched the two global powers

closer to nuclear conflict, it also revealed a surprising, new, mutual enemynuclear

armageddon. Throughout the negotiations that occurred between October 22, 1962 and October

28, 1962, both the US and Soviet governments became increasingly aware of the destructive

properties of nuclear weaponry and, as such, developed a shared language and vocabulary as

they attempted to work their ways out of the crisis impasse to a very large extent.

One of the first ways both the US and Soviet governments developed a shared language

was in the affirmation of peace. It is imperative to understand that neither country wished for

war. In the aforementioned presidential statement, Kennedy declared that [the US had] no wish

to war with the Soviet Unionfor [the US] are a peaceful people who [desired] to live in peace

with all other peoples (Medina 25). Kennedys early appeal to peace clearly showed the

reluctance with which he desired to wage war with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, his

statement proves that the US wanted to avoid war, urging the Soviet Union to do its part in

avoiding said catastrophe by removing its missiles from Cuba. The US adoption of the language
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of peace is best demonstrated in its lack of response to the crossing of a Soviet ship across the

imaginary line which, if crossed, would imply a violation of the quarantine against Cuba on

October 24, 1962 (Dobrynin 83). The lack of US response, despite public knowledge that

American warships could have shelled the ship for its breach of quarantine, signaled the US

dedication to peace over legality and threats.

This peaceful stance was one adopted later on by Soviet officials. Initially, Khruschev

presented a stance that could be perceived as threatening by US officials. In a reply to Kennedy

on October 23, 1962, Khruschev expressed the hope that the measures announced by Kennedy

would be called off to prevent catastrophic consequences for the world (Dobrynin 80). Owing

to his spontaneous nature and the looming 1964 party elections, Khruschev might have initially

donned a strongman attitude against the US to boost his image. Just three days later, however,

Khruschevs empty threats simmered down into a letter to Kennedy stating that Ideological

differences should be settled by peaceful means, so let us normalize our relations (Dobrynin

85). Here, Khruschev shows a change of heart, reaffirming his doctrine of peaceful coexistence

and a hope for peaceful negotiations to end the crisis. Thus, both US and Soviet heads of state

grew to use more peaceful language as the crisis unfolded, which may have aided in the

negotiations that took place to bring about the end of the impasse.

Another way both governments adopted shared vocabulary was in their agreement that

the Cuban missiles were destructive and dangerous, regardless of whether they were offensive

or defensive. The crisis was, in part, sparked by Kennedys labeling of the Cuban missiles as

offensive in his October 22 address, rendering them unnecessary and a threat to international

peace (Medina 19). This conflicted with the official Soviet line that the Cuban missiles were

defensive in nature, as they protected Cuba from potential invasions by capitalist columns that
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might try to overthrow the Socialist government. The US stance on the offensive nature of the

Cuban missiles was held until the very end of the crisis, but fortunately their diplomatic actions

were informed much more heavily by the potential fatality of nuclear war. In the morning of

October 22, President Kennedy asks Assistance Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze to make sure

no American officer can fire nuclear weapons without the Presidents say-so (Medina 30).

When Nitze contended that NATO strategic contact requires the immediate execution of

E.D.P, President Kennedy explained that thats why we ordered [no firing without presidential

consent] (Medina 30). Kennedys actions even at the beginning of the crisis show just how

much he understood the destructivity of nuclear weapons. This informed his later decisions and

his repeated exhortations to Khruschev throughout the crisis to remove nuclear weapons from

Cuba, as President Kennedy realized that a lengthening of the crisis would lead to more vocal US

army generals in support of a nuclear war against Cuba, and thereafter, against the Soviet Union.

President Kennedy knew that mass destruction would be the only fruit of such a scenario.

Similarly, while Khruschev maintained that the missiles in Cuba were defensive in

nature until the end of the crisis, he wrote in his October 26 letter to Kennedy that The Soviet

Union had no intention of attacking the United States because a war between the two countries

would be suicidal (Medina 85). Khruschev thus knew that the use of nuclear weapons would

lead to mass destruction. To him, such a prospect was direr than the petty debates on the

defensive or offensive nature of the Cuban missiles. In a communique to Kennedy accepting

the terms to end the crisis, Khruschev acknowledged again that that the anxiety of the United

States people in connection with the fact that the weapons which [Kennedy] describe as

offensive are, in fact, grim weapons. Both [Kennedy] and [Khruschev] understand what kind

of weapons they are. (Medina 33). Here, Khruschev shows that he was aware that both he and
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Khruschev understood that nuclear missiles were weapons of mass destruction, regardless of

their offensive or defensive capacities. This mutual understanding that the Cuban missiles

were destructive first, and defensive or offensive second, served to bring the two leaders

together in their endeavor to end the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Finally, both sides agreed on a more covert form of languageone that utilized less

public speeches and more private conversations. In the words of Robert F. Kennedy, The time

that was available to the President and his advisers to[develop] a course of action and

recommendationswas essential. If [their] deliberations had been publicized, if [they] had to

make a decision in twenty-four hoursthe coursewould have been quite different and filled

with far greater risks (Medina 81). While public press conferences were made to bring the crisis

to light and highlight several parts of the crisis, neither of the two global leaders ever publicly

declared war. The US media might have stirred the pot by releasing statements insisting that an

invasion of Cuba was possible, but President Kennedy never allowed the tensions reported by

the media to prod him to present a new course of action publicly (Dobrynin 85). President

Kennedy also did not let army generals inform his policy too widely. On the contrary, he was

disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field (Medina 83). These two

instances show just how much President Kennedy was unwavering in his pursuit of a slow,

methodical, and peaceful end to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The continuation of covert lines of negotiation serve to show that Moscow also wanted to

pursue a peaceful exit of the Crisis. In fact, on October 27, Without waiting for an answer to

Fridays letter, Khruschev sent Kennedy a further urgent message proposing a more concrete

compromise to end the crisis (Dobrynin 86). Khruschevs urgency serves to prove that, much

like President Kennedy, Khruschev also wanted a peaceful end to the Cuban Missile Crisis and
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preferred negotiations over the possibility of nuclear war, which the Soviets were not prepared to

engage in. Both leaders thus chose to avoid war if they could by resorting to clandestine

communications, which helped bring about an end to the crisis.

Thus, to a very large extent, it is clear that both governments grew to adopt shared

language and vocabulary in their pursuit of a resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both the US

and Soviet governments used much more conciliatory language by the end of the crisis. The two

governments also came to agree that the main qualifier for nuclear missiles was destructive,

and not offensive or defensive. Both sides of the crisis, moreover, preferred covert

communications over public speeches in order to buy more time for negotiations to end the

crisis. Hence, both parties assumed very similar language and vocabulary by the end of the crisis.