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Journal of Intercultural Studies

ISSN: 0725-6868 (Print) 1469-9540 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjis20

Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe

Ulrike M. Vieten & Scott Poynting

To cite this article: Ulrike M. Vieten & Scott Poynting (2016) Contemporary Far-
Right Racist Populism in Europe, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37:6, 533-540, DOI:
10.1080/07256868.2016.1235099

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Published online: 28 Oct 2016.

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JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 37, NO. 6, 533540
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2016.1235099

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe


Ulrike M. Vietena and Scott Poyntingb
a
Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queens University Belfast, Belfast,
UK; bSchool of Social Sciences and Psychology, University of Western Sydney, Penrith, NSW, Australia

KEYWORDS Racism; Islamophobia; far right; populism; anti-Immigration; Europe

A spectre is haunting Europe. Not for the first time, right-wing racist movements are on
the march across that continent, with parliamentary beachheads in a number of nations, as
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well, of course, as the possibly disintegrating European parliament. These troubling pro-
cesses were under way when this special issue was planned in 2014, arising from a session,
on right-wing racist populism, of the Research Committee on Racism, Nationalism and
Ethnic Relations (RC05) of the International Sociological Association at its congress in
Yokohama. The session had been proposed in 2012, and already the signs were there
that nationalist, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic movements and political parties
were on the rise, from the upsurge of Golden Dawn in economic crisis-ridden Greece,
to the arrival of English Defence League (EDL) thugs on British streets. As yet then,
Brexit was inconceivable, however, and indeed it failed to be conceived by the British
elite until they were surprised by the 2016 referendum and the effectiveness of its anti-
immigration campaign. The crisis of refugees fleeing from war in Syria and other devas-
tation from the Arab Winter had not been imagined at least not in the scale that even-
tuated, with its impact and reaction in Europe. We are currently confronted by all of these
realities; can we make sociological sense of the bigger picture? The EDL, the mainstream-
ing of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) that claimed victory in the Brexit
vote, the rehabilitation and popularity of the National Front in France, the advent of
Alternative fr Deutschland (AfD which has, as we write, just won the second-largest
party share of the vote in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state election), the protest
phenomenon of Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA)
in Germany (and somewhat beyond), the continued interventions of the Party for
Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands and their gains in the national and European parlia-
ments, the very close-run Austrian presidential election in 2016 (to be re-run in October)
with far-right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party candidate, Norbert Hofer, gaining
almost 50 per cent of the vote, in Sweden the rise in support for the far-right populist
anti-immigration party the Swedish Democrats, and in Greece the popular and electoral
surge of the aforementioned Golden Dawn: this is by no means a comprehensive listing,
even for Europe. Nor is the growth of right-wing populist, nationalist, anti-immigration,
anti-asylum seeker, anti-Muslim politics confined to Europe. Donald Trumps phenomenal

CONTACT Ulrike M. Vieten u.vieten@qub.ac.uk Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and
Justice, Queens University Belfast, Belfast, UK
2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
534 U. M. VIETEN AND S. POYNTING

successes in the US presidential primaries have been demonstrative and unexpected, and far
from Europe and North America, the dramatic return to parliament of Pauline Hansons
anti-immigration and xenophobic One Nation party in Australias federal election of
2016 has referenced European anti-immigrant and Islamophobic ideology in equal measures
with Trumps. This special issue confines itself to Europe, but the commonalities are not so
confined. To what extent is there a shared history in all of this, with common underlying
causes?
History tells us that economic crisis, with the casualties of attendant restructurings,
provides conditions favourable to the rise of right-wing populism, with the scapegoating
of Others being a key populist strategy. Indeed these circumstances are among the necess-
ary conditions of fascism. The nationalism inherent in fascism serves to engender a sense
that we are all in the crisis together. While these appearances are superficially real, their
presentation to us in this way obscures the underlying reality that not all sectors of society
(classes, class fractions, ethnicities, genders) are affected to the same extent by the crisis
as in the case of contemporary austerity measures. One form of Marxist theory of ideology
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dubbed this manoeuvre masking perhaps a more contemporary metaphor would be


veiling! in which deep structural causes are covered by the presentation of the
immediate.
The othering and blaming of out-groups is another ideological manoeuvre that obfus-
cates the real causes of economic crisis that lie within the tendencies towards periodical
crisis within the social relations of capital itself. In a sense, those responsible are capitalists
(though not all capitalists equally) and the beneficiaries are capitalists (though not all capi-
talists). Right-wing nationalist populism scapegoats the Other instead as the putative cause
of the crisis. Die Juden sind unser Unglck (The Jews are our misfortune), for example, in
the case of German Nazism in the 1930s. Communists, socialists and traitors were objects
of blame in the case of the proto-fascism of 1920s Germany. Radical intellectuals and what
would these days be derided as cosmopolitan elites were represented as enemies (in place
of class enemies) and blamed for the decline of the nation and (the welfare of) its people in
both cases. This is an ideological function that has been described as akin to fetishism,
whereby the perception of real social relations is distorted by a form of displacement or
projection, such that causality (blame) is attributed so something or someone else such
as a scapegoat. These forms of structuralist explanation of right-wing nationalism and
racism became deeply unfashionable among western intellectuals, and derided as false con-
sciousness theories, during the brief florescence of poststructuralism in the late 1970s and
the 1980s, coinciding with the political exposure of Soviet socialism and its gradual econ-
omic decline that led to its eventual sudden collapse. The global financial crisis has changed
all that. Social scientists can indeed must once again attempt the task of explaining
ideology and its functioning, rather than mistaking the commonality of common sense
for some sort of authenticity to be valorised in the culture of ordinary people.
Radical analyses of fascism that emerged among the new generation of post-war scho-
lars in the late 1960s found that another common precondition for the rise of fascism was
the defeat of the organised labour movement. With the transatlantic rise in the late 1970s
and early 1980s of what was then called the New Right, spearheaded by Thatcher and
Reagan, the labour movement suffered crushing defeats, and the post-war welfare state,
the basis for epochal social-democratic settlements, was progressively dismantled
through the instituting of what was then termed economic rationalism. The result was
JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES 535

neoliberalism. The global rise of populist, right wing, nationalist, xenophobic movements
is in large part a reaction to the insecurities and displacement of neoliberalism in the
context of global financial crisis. These movements are not the same as fascism, yet
they share many features in common. We must see the success of the Thatcherite
project in rendering unions insignificant as part of the context of contemporary right-
wing racist populism. In their absence, who is going to stand up for the little person?
Why Farage, Le Pen, Wilders, Hofer, Trump, et al.? All of these populists project them-
selves by definition as anti-elite. They portray liberal intellectuals as out of touch with
ordinary people, and they invoke the racialised Other as a threat to our way of life,
while blaming urban elites for ignoring or even indulging this threat, and banishing
popular fears about it to the realm of the unsayable. This ideological rhetoric has unmis-
takable resonances of historical populisms such as fascism.
Speaking from Europe, with its history of fascist populism and indeed the Holocaust,
the return of whitewashed contemporary far-right populism poses a particular challenge.
The global financial crisis, and the unequal burden caused by neo-liberal austerity
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measures in response to it, undoubtedly underlie the wide spread of nationalist and popu-
list reactions. For many, unified policy developments seen as imposed from beyond the
nation, are viewed as problem rather than solution; the EU28s lack of social integration
feeds the rising tide of populisms. The project of supranational governance of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has reflected the role of national and transnational elites. This must
be recognised in comprehending the nationalist and xenophobic reaction of Brexit and
the possibly multifold exits to come. The need for deep-rooted democratic and egalitarian
reform in matters of social and economic policy must be considered urgently, if alterna-
tive, global, visions of social solidarity are to be convincingly offered.
Thinking through historical experience is crucial as we face the puzzlement of the speed
of what is unfolding in the UK, across the Continent, and elsewhere. Thirty years ago, popu-
lism appeared as a scary narrative of the post-1930s economic, and political crisis in Europe.
Far-right populism was identified with Fascism (Italy, Spain) and National Socialism
(Germany); racist and anti-Semitic ideological populism came to power in Germany with
the (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei) being voted into parliament in 1932.
Likewise in Italy, Mussolinis dictatorship was attained initially by constitutional means,
with the elected (1922) government under the National Fascist Party being similarly
backed by organised extra-parliamentary militias. In that period, and with the background
of parliamentary, economic and social crisis, power was formally handed over by state
representatives, the king (Italy) and the Reichsprsident (Germany), but this formalised a
reality achieved on the streets.
Since the end of World War II, and the death of the fascist leader, Franco in Spain in 1975,
the period of fascism in Europe seemed to be ended. In the 1980s, however, far-right parties
returned to the political party system in different nation states across Europe. Slavoj iek
([2001] 2002) commented aptly ([2001] 2002: 2367) on the rise of extreme right-wing
parties, and their leaders and the democratic outcry against it, at that time.
The first thing to do here is to recall the well-concealed but nonetheless sigh of relief in pre-
dominant democratic political fields, when, a decade ago, the Rightist populist parties became
a serious presence (Haider in Austria, Le Pen in France, Republicans in Germany, Buchanan
in the US). The message of this relief was: at last an enemy whom we can properly hate all
together, whom we can sacrifice excommunicate in order to demonstrate our democratic
536 U. M. VIETEN AND S. POYNTING

consensus! This relief is to be read against the background of what is usually referred to as the
emerging post-political consensus: the only political force with the serious weight which
does still evoke properly political antagonistic response of US against Them is the new popu-
list Right.

Moving on, and more than 15 years later, Jrg Haider or Jean-Marie Le Pen, who rep-
resented the far and extremist right previously, are succeeded by other names. In the case
of France, we are confronted with a kind of Front National family tradition revealing
some of the troubling aspects of the transmission of generational norms and cultural
prejudices: Marine Le Pen, and even more recently, her niece, Marion Marchal-Le
Pen, carry on with far-right party leadership in France, notwithstanding conservative
gender paradigms of far-right parties.
As we have seen, populist far-right parties have gained considerable percentages of demo-
cratic votes and in some cases entry to parliamentary representation in national and regional
elections across Europe. With billionaire showman Donald Trump running as the Republican
Party candidate for the US presidency, the international wave of mainstreaming far-right
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politics, policy and white supremacy as an everyday-vernacular monoculturalism has


reached a new stage of normalisation across different parts of the (western) world.
This introduction sketches a discursive frame for the papers presented together here.
First, we review positions and perspectives on the phenomena of new populism
(Taggart 2000) or what some call neo-populism (Jansen 2015). We reflect on the charac-
teristics of twentieth-century far-right populisms, and ask: what are the dynamics of con-
temporary, twenty-first century, far-right racist populism? Though the focus of the papers
is on Europe, particularly West European countries of the EU, we discuss briefly in the
end, and before introducing each paper, a more global perspective on the rise of far-
right populism sketching some gaps in current research and the need to link distinctive
regional outlooks to a comparative analysis.
As we argue, right-wing racism has plunged into a more common populist project as an
everyday phenomenon in numerous countries. The previously banned or blamed extre-
mist views of far-right parties and their racist programmes have entered the core of
societies: this populism as the right of the native and self-proclaimed indigenous Chris-
tian Europe, for example, takes discourse and action onto the streets fighting extremist
fundamentalist Islam and claiming to save our women, particularly, if sexual violence
against women is seen to be exercised by non-white and non-Christian men. There are
new puzzling paradoxes to be noticed as the conservative gender regime of far-right
parties is not the rule any longer, and some parties (such as the Dutch Party for
Freedom PVV) play the gay-friendly and feminist progressive card. Increasingly, it
has become difficult to draw the line exactly between centre-right and far-right political
parties as anti-immigration, anti-Muslim and anti-EU rhetoric are intertwined in populist
views, and seem to signify common ground of mainstream national(istic) politics. Is popu-
lism the voice and face of media democracy in the twenty-first century? Does the concept
of populism help to make sense of the rise of far-right racism?
The term populism, in principal, captures radical left wing as well as far-right politics
of parties or movements. Taggart (2000) and other authors (see, e.g. Jansen 2015; Mudde
2015; Zquete 2015) agree that foremost, populist mood is driven by strong anti-elite
anger; and further, there is a claim to be nativist, and nativism here means, to have an
inherited entitlement to the common good of a society.
JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES 537

Until very recently, left-wing radical populism was identified with political movements in
South and Central America (De La Torre 2015; Lpez Maya 2015). Only with the
(SYRIZA) electoral victory in Greece; and the rise of PODEMOS in Spain, do we have two
South West European EU Member states where populist anger against national and EU
transnational elites rather steered a radical left vision of a democratic polity.
The majority of new populist movements, however, adhere to the far right. Jansen
(2015: 201, referring to Lipset 1960) stresses that status loss is one of the most important
drivers for the emergence of the radical positions within the electorate. Triggered by pro-
cesses of globalisation and Europeanisation, status loss and the fear of it, is what draws
increasingly larger scales of populations, in particular, of male and working-class back-
ground, to far-right populism.
All populist rhetoric shares the fundamental distinction between we the pure people,
and them, the corrupt elite. Having said that; far-right populism, further picks an enemy
figure on whom real insecurities may be projected: the Other, the Muslim: the Jew.
A faltering element in the anti-elite discourse is the different layers of elite interest and
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positions. Future research could usefully investigate how and to what degree established
national elites influence far-right populist views of their national people with respect
to new transnational entity-elites such as those of the EU. As Jansen (2015: 197) notes
(t)he rise of populist far right parties in Europe is linked to the expansion of the European
Union.
Another element of the populism question is the notion of representation: does repre-
sentative democracy and the political party spectrum, with all its middle-class standpoint,
still speak to the needs and interest of the ordinary people? Finally, of course, who are the
people? In far -right imagination, people is without race, class and gender distinction. It
is, however, ethnicity, race and religion as social divisions and identity containers that
matter most in populist debate religion when ascribed as culturally different (Ghorashi
2006). In consequence, societies that are more heterogeneous culturally diverse and
poly-national seem to be less prone to the uniting far-right rhetoric. Kaltwasser
(2015: 208) argues that the UK, for example, but also Spain, do offer negative cases, as
in those countries, different nations compete (Scotland/Wales/Ireland; Catalonia/
Basque-Euskadi) for the we/people, thus hindering the appearance of populism. Accord-
ing to Kaltwasser even the English UKIP and British National Party do not offer this com-
pelling populist narrative to engage a larger scale of society. Another relevant negative
case is Germany, according to Kaltwasser, who argues (2015: 212) The shadow of the
Nazi past is so pervasive that populist discourse faces a very hostile environment, particu-
larly when it appears to be combined with the topic of anti-immigration. Just how hostile
to populism this environment will remain has yet to be seen.
Be it the neo-fascist Golden Dawn in Greece, the anti-EU and anti-Islam new party AfD
in Germany, the EU-sceptical UKIP in the UK, headed by Nigel Farage, or Geert Wilders
and the PVV in the Netherlands, it seems that the core nationalistic and xenophobic
elements are strikingly similar. At one level, that is borne out by the papers collected in
this issue. Yet together they also demonstrate the importance of the specific national,
regional and even local histories and cultures in which these common ideological elements
are brought into play. These are here shown to be crucial not only for understanding the
contemporary phenomena of right-wing populist and racist movements, but for developing
politics that can effectively contest them: the necessary counter-hegemonic movements can
538 U. M. VIETEN AND S. POYNTING

only be built from the ground up, and that means on the existing ground of the local,
regional and national, where interests to sustain genuinely global solidarities can be found.
Fabian Virchows article, which follows, traces the advent in Dresden in autumn 2014
of PEGIDA, its limited spread to other German cities, and the context for this. The
peculiarities of Saxony and Dresden are here seen to be crucial. Might it be that, in the
Eurosceptic moment, the electoral politics of AfD prove to be more capable of mobilising
across Germany than the street-protest politics of PEGIDA? Certainly the making respect-
able and normal of nativism and Islamophobia is of central interest in this special issue,
and reasons for disruption and breakdown in such projects are vital.
In order to illustrate the characteristic social complexity of national or movement case
studies on contemporary populisms in Europe, we present here in some cases two perspec-
tives dealing with the same country or movement (for example the Netherlands, or the
PEGIDA movement). The chequered success of PEGIDAs transfer beyond Germany
in this case to Austria, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland is the subject of Lars Erik Bernt-
zen and Mans Weisskirchers instructive contribution, whose use of comparative method
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points up both the ingredients of successful mobilisations where they have occurred, and
effective barriers to them. They show where state sanctions against far-right racist street
protest and thus the social and political ostracism which this reinforces, have halted its
spread beyond pockets of success stemming from Dresden. They also show how and
where the movement was allowed a foothold. There is an important lesson here.
sten Wahlbecks piece studies populist far-right politics in the case of Finland, with an
analysis of the rhetoric of the Finns Party, from the partys public documents and pro-
nouncements of its leading spokespeople. Here we see the workings of the ideological
repudiation of purported special privileges for minorities, with a nativist narrative that
portrays the (ethnicised) true Finns as victims, discriminated against in their own land
by accommodation of cultural diversity. If the formally equal benefits of citizenship are
distributed by the state, what are the consequences for ethnic minorities when the state
becomes captive to populist politics that devalue the citizenship of racialised others?
Giorgos Kandylis and Michalis Petrou present a close-up ethnographic investigation of
the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn in a Greek rural community, especially in relation to myth-
making about foreign criminality and the symbolic effects of violence against immigrants.
This research is exemplary in showing the value of fine-grained examination of populist and
racist ideological processes as they are lived as experience. These authors argue that, rather
than being a barrier to popular acceptance of their politics, the deployment of an appeal to
violence by neo-fascists is what worked to the advantage of recruitment to their cause, and
they show how this plays out in a particular local culture and environment.
The first of our two articles on populism and ethno-nationalism in the Netherlands, by
Guno Jones, argues against the grain of the conventionally accepted commonsense that the
politics of racism are a surprising innovation in this hitherto successfully multiculturalist,
socially just and tolerant nation. Jones takes us through an instructive history of Dutch
colonialism and its racialised conferral of different degrees of citizenship. The taken-
for-grantedness of the privileging of white Dutchness in state immigration and citizenship
policies needs to be challenged, argues Jones, if we are to understand the appeal of con-
temporary racist populism, such as that of Geert Wilders and the PVV.
The second case study of the Netherlands, by Ulrike Vieten, offers a much-needed fem-
inist standpoint in analysing European far-right populist discourses through a focus on
JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES 539

Dutch society. So much of Islamophobic ideology recruits politics of gender and sexuality
to its populism, attempting to present itself as progressive. This is a key part of the invi-
dious normalisation of nativist nationalism by the far right, and the operation of forms of
racism that other certain cultures as irreconcilably alien, with their purportedly endemic
misogyny and homophobia being prime examples of this. As well as unpacking this ideol-
ogy and demonstrating its contradictions, Vieten presents some insightful interview
research that heeds the voices of Moroccan-Dutch women citizens, showing the superfi-
ciality of the far-right claims to progressive gender politics, and how these women are
Othered, as Muslim women, by the gendered politics of populist ethno-nationalism.
Finally, Kevin Braouzecs systematic comparison of the two street-based far-right
protest movements, the EDL and the French Bloc Identitaire, points up the commonalities
of ideological and political approach in quite different national cultures, especially with
respect to British multiculturalism and French assimilationism, and the safeguards of
freedom of religious practice vis--vis the secularity of the state. It is as well to be reminded
of these common ideological elements, and how, despite local and national peculiarities, the
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same species of populist far-right nationalism can take root in different soils.
While historical and institutional anti-Semitism as well as political party and populist
National Socialism are central to the horrors and experiences of the twentieth century, the
contemporary world faces Islamophobia, institutional anti-Muslim racism and the emer-
gence of trans-nationalistic populist far-right parties and their simplistic messages of
racialising and othering a religious minority once again. Though the reach and make-
up of populisms, racisms and anti-elite anger in a digital age is of course profoundly differ-
ent from the twentieth century, there are some striking common threats which seem
almost surreal in their rotten redolence. Though more than seventy years ago though
the world stood up and stopped the bastard, as Brecht starkly puts it in The Resistible
Rise of Arturo Ui, it may be that the same belly is preparing to whelp once again: die
Hndin, die ihn gebar, ist wieder lufig.
The rise of far-right racist populism is indeed resistible, but we need to understand in
their complexity and their depth the awful alignment of forces that we are resisting. To
that end, the excellent contributions to this special issue are intended collectively to
advance international debate on the depth and spread of far-right racist populism. That
depth and spread is, of course, larger than our focus in this special issue. We need
further investigation beyond Europe, also looking more closely at legacies of colonial
crime, whiteness and its exercise of entitlement in the many parts of the world where it
is equally populist far right and racist harms are currently perpetrated.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Dr Ulrike M. Vieten is Queens University Research Fellow at the Senator George J. Mitchell Insti-
tute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queens University Belfast. Her research interest include
critical cosmopolitanism studies, intersectionality and Feminist Theory, migration and the con-
struction and shift of racialised group boundaries.
540 U. M. VIETEN AND S. POYNTING

Scott Poynting is Adjunct Professor, School of Social Sciences and Psychology at the University of
Western Sydney and is recently retired Professor of Criminology at the University of Auckland. His
areas of interest include the criminalisation of ethnic minorities and the racialisation of crime, state
terrorism, hate crime and racialised moral panic.

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