CIA Maritima v.

Cabagnot 107 Phil 873

Issue: 1) Whether or not the deceased was an employee of the CIA Maritima, entitled to
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act?

2) whether or not the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as watchman at the
time of his death which releases the company from paying any obligation?

Ruling: 1) Yes. While it is true that no written employment contract between the petitioner and
the deceased was presented in evidence, it is not disputed that the petitioner company owns
the vessel where the deceased was assigned as gangway man, and it was found by the
Commission that the salary of the deceased was paid directly from the funds of petitioner.
From these circumstances, it would appear that at the time of the accident the deceased was
under petitioner's employ. There is nothing to the contention that the deceased was but a
casual employee whose services were engaged only for the duration of the strike and, not
entitled to compensation. It is clear from the above that for an employee to be excluded from
the term "laborer" or "employee" under the Act, his employment must be "purely casual and is
not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer".

2) No. In disclaiming liability, the petitioner further insists that the deceased was intoxicated
while performing his duty as gangwayman in the early morning of September 5, 1954. The
Workmen's Compensation Commission, however, upon examination of the evidence on this
point, noted serious contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses.

The defense of drunkenness in workmen's compensation cases must be supported by clear and
convincing proof to the effect that such intoxication or drunkenness rendered the employee
incapable of doing his work so that he could not be said to be engaged in his employment. The
accident or injury must be shown to have arisen out of his drunken condition and not out of the
work. No such evidence was adduced in the present case.

Pampanga Bus Company vs. Pambusco Employees Union G.R. No. 46739
Issue: Whether or not the right of the employer to select its employees was violated?

Ruling: Yes. We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The
general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of
the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to
sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an
employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee
have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the
employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the
employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression."

Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective
bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair
wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social
and moral well-being of their members." The term "collective bargaining" denotes, in common
usage as well as in legal terminology, negotiations looking toward a collective agreement. This
provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly
recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed,
we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental
curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be
effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the
Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside.

. . . Whatever may be the advantages of "collective bargaining," it is not bargaining at all, in any
just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides. The same liberty which enables men to form
unions, and through the union to enter into agreements with employers willing to agree,
entitles other men to remain independent of the union, and other employers to agree with
them to employ no man who owes any allegiance or obligation to the union. In the latter case,
as in the former, the parties are entitled to be protected by the law in the enjoyment of the
benefits of any unlawful agreements they make. This court repeatedly has held that the
employer is as free to make non-membership in a union a condition or employment, as the
working man is free to join the union, and that this is a part of the constitutional rights of
personal liberty and private property, not to be taken away by legislation, unless through some
proper exercise of the paramount police power.
Viaa v. Al-Lagadan and Piga G.R. No. L-8967

Issue: whether or not Alejandro Al-Lagadan was his industrial partner, not his employee?

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner maintains, contrary to the finding of the Referee and said Commissioner,
that the deceased was his industrial partner, not employee. In the opinion of the Referee, as
well as of said Commissioner, the mere fact that Alejandros share in the understanding could
be reckoned in terms of money, sufficed to characterize him as an employee of Viaa. The
Supreme Court does not share this view. Neither can they accept, however, Petitioners theory
to the effect that the deceased was his partner, not an employee, simply because he (the
deceased) shared in the profits, not in the losses. In determining the existence of employer-
employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered, namely: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct, although the latter is the most
important element. Assuming that the share received by the deceased could partake of the
nature of wages, on which the Court need not, and do not, express their view, and that the
second element, therefore, exists in the case at bar, the record does not contain any specific
data regarding the third and fourth elements. With respect to the first element, the facts before
the Court are insufficient to warrant a reasonable conclusion, one way or the other. On the one
hand, Atty. Morente said, in his aforementioned report, that the contract commonly followed
is on a share basis. The hiring of a crew is done by the patron himself. Usually, when a patron
enters into a contract with the owner of the batel, he has a crew ready with him. This
statement suggests that the members of the crew are chosen by the patron, seemingly, upon
his sole responsibility and authority. It is noteworthy, however, that said report referred to a
practice commonly and usually observed in a given place. The record is silent on whether
such practice had been followed in the case under consideration. More important still, the
language used in said report may be construed as intimating, not only that the patron selects
and engages the crew, but, also, that the members thereof are subject to his control and may
be dismissed by him. To put it differently, the literal import of said report is open to the
conclusion that the crew has a contractual relation, not with the owner of the vessel, but with
the patron, and that the latter, not the former, is either their employer or their partner. In the
interest of justice and equity, and considering that a decision on the merits of the issue before
us may establish an important precedent, it would be better to remand the case to the
Workmens Compensation Commission for further evidence and findings on the following
questions: (1) who selected the crew of the Magkapatid and engaged their services; (2) if
selected and engaged by the patron, did the latter act in his own name and for his own
account, or on behalf and for the account of Viaa; (3) could Viaa have refused to accept any
of the crew members chosen and engaged by the patron; (4) did Petitioner have authority to
determine the time when, the place where and/or the manner or conditions in or under which
the crew would work; and (5) who could dismiss its members. The case was remanded to the
Workmens Compensation Commission, for further proceedings in conformity with the
decision.
De Los Reyes v. Espineli G.R. Nos. L-28280-81

Issue: Whether or not there existed no contractual relationship between the petitioner and the
respondents?

Ruling: Yes. At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a contract, the
petitioner alleging, as he does, that his consent, express or implied, had never been given. His
position, simply stated, is that at the time the respondents were taken into his land by
Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer and therefore without the requisite authority to
contract in his behalf, and it was only later that he was promoted to the position of overseer.
However, in his "Amended Complaint" of April 22, 1968, the petitioner prayed that "judgment
be rendered ... finding the defendants guilty of a breach of their contractual obligation with the
plaintiff," and in the body thereof he incorporated statements from which it can plainly be seen
that a contractual relationship existed between the parties.

Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the
respondents. In our view the pith of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that of
agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the respondents) or that of farm employer and
agricultural laborer (as asserted by the petitioner). On a determination of this question depends
the respective rights of the parties, more particularly the proper assessment of the share of the
respondents under the law.