SY ET.AL. v. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC.

G.R. No. 182915 December 12, 2011 Del Castillo, J.:

DOCTRINE:a) The Labor Arbiter can acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent,
even without the latter being served with summons, through the latters voluntary
appearance;b) Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or
awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final
decisions, orders or awards.

FACTS:

Workers Marialy O. Sy et.al. filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for
underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th
month pay and other monetary benefits against Weesan and its owner Susan. Weesan filed
before the DOLE-NCR a report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six
months. As the workers were not anymore allowed to work on that same day, they filed
Amended Complaint and another pleading entitled Amended Complaints and Position Paper
for Complainants, to include the charge of illegal dismissal and impleaded Fairland and its
manager, Debbie, as additional respondents. A Notice of Hearing was thereafter sent to
Weesan requesting it to appear before Labor Arbiter Reyes. On said date and time, Atty.
Antonio A Geronimo appeared as counsel for Weesan and requested for an extension of time
to file his clients position paper. He did this again on the next hearing and thereafter filed
two separate position papers one for Fairland and another for Susan/Weesan. The Position
Paper for Fairland was verified by Debbie while the one for Susan/Weesan was verified by
Susan. To these pleadings, the workers filed a Reply. Atty. Geronimo then filed a
Consolidated Reply verified both by Susan and Debbie.

LA RULING: Dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.

NLRC RULING: There was Illegal dismissal. Susan/Weesan were solidarily liable to the workers.

Atty. Geronimo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, Fairland filed another Motion for
Reconsideration through Atty. Tecson assailing the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC over it, claiming that it was never summoned to appear, attend or participate in all the
proceedings conducted therein. It also considered Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to
the workers denied that it engaged the services of Atty. Geronimo. The NLRC however, denied
both motions for lack of merit. The NLRC resolution denying the said motions, however, were
not served upon Fairland.

CA RULING: It held that the labor tribunals did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Fairland. Furthermore, the CA concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately
furnished with a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its
Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that
because of this, said Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the
workers, has not attained finality.

ISSUES:
 1. Did the Labor tribunals acquire jurisdiction over the [person of the] respondent?
2. Has the NLRC Decision holding Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the
workers attained finality?

SC RULING:

1. Yes.It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent without the latter being served with summons. It must be noted that for the
initial complaints, the Labor Arbiter issued summons to Susan/Weesan which was
received by the latter. The workers thereafter amended their then already consolidated
complaints to include illegal dismissal as an additional cause of action as well as Fairland
and Debbie as additional respondents. We have, however, scanned the records but
found nothing to indicate that summons with respect to the said amended complaints
was ever served upon Weesan, Susan, or Fairland. True to their claim, Fairland and
Debbie were indeed never summoned by the Labor Arbiter. Although not served with
summons, jurisdiction over Fairland and Debbie was acquired through their voluntary
appearance. The fact that Atty. Geronimo entered his appearance for Fairland and
Debbie and that he actively defended them before the Labor Arbiter raised the
presumption that he is authorized to appear for them. It is unlikely that Atty. Geronimo
would have been so irresponsible as to represent Fairland and Debbie if he were not in
fact authorized. As an officer of the Court, Atty. Geronimo is presumed to have acted
with due propriety. Moreover, "[i]t strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal
interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he
has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned."

2. Yes. Citing PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the CA likewise emphasized that in labor cases, both the party and his
counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution
unlike in ordinary proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party. It
then quoted Article 224 of the Labor Code. The CA then concluded that since Fairland
and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the NLRC Resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration of its 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be
enforced against Fairland. We cannot agree. To stress, Article 224 contemplates the
furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their
counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards.
However, for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to
the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by the
counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to
party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt
of the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their
finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by
counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that decisions, resolutions or orders
of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same,
refersto the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CAs conclusion, the said
NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt.
YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS v. CA
G.R. No. 126322 January 16, 2002 Pardo, J.:

DOCTRINE: A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision
against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests.
The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude
the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in
the remedy first availed of.

FACTS: From the records before us and by petitioners own allegations and admission, it has
taken the following actions in connection with its claim that a sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission erroneously and unlawfully levied upon certain properties which it
claims as its own.

1. It filed a notice of third-party claim with the Labor Arbiter on May 4, 1995.
2. It filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on July 4, 1995,which was dismissed on August 30, 1995, by the Labor Arbiter.
3. It filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75628 on October 6, 1995. The Regional Trial
Court dismissed the case on October 11, 1995 for lack of merit.
4. It appealed to the NLRC the order of the Labor Arbiter dated August 13, 1995 which
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit on December 8, 1995.
5. It filed an original petition for mandatory injunction with the NLRC on November 16,
1995. This was docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-IC. 0000602-95. This case is still pending
with that Commission.
6. It filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Manila which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-76395. The dismissal of this case by public respondent triggered the filing of the
instant petition.

In all of the foregoing actions, petitioner raised a common issue, which is that it is the owner of
the properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex Development Corporation, which
were erroneously levied upon by the sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the decision
rendered by the said Commission in a labor case docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-02960-
90.

CA RULING: Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition on the ground of
forum shopping and that petitioners remedy was to seek relief from this Court.Petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Petitioner argued that
the filing of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the Regional Trial Court was proper
because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose properties were subjected to a
writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party)
by Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court and by several doctrines.Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration

ISSUES:

a) Was there forum shopping in this case?

b) May a third party be precluded the from availing himself of the other alternative
 remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of?

SC RULING:

1) FORUM SHOPPING. There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were questioned,
two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought. In the case
at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought.

The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of execution on the property
of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to
the case. The only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of
execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner, not a
party to the labor case.

On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial court was to
recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction. Hence, the causes of action in
these cases were different.

2) THIRD PARTY CLAIM. A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to
enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to
protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and
one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in
the event he failed in the remedy first availed of. Thus, a third party may avail himself of the
following alternative remedies:

. a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and

. b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.

The remedies above mentioned are cumulative and may be resorted to by a third-party claimant
independent of or separately from and without need of availing of the others. If a third-party
claimant opted to file a proper action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must institute an
action, distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced, with the court
of competent jurisdiction even before or without need of filing a claim in the court which issued
the writ, the latter not being a condition sine qua non for the former. In such proper action, the
validity and sufficiency of the title of the third-party claimant will be resolved and a writ of
preliminary injunction against the sheriff may be issued.
ANDO VS CAMPO
G.R. No. 184007 February 16, 2011 NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE: Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from
and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by
appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, it is, first
and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the
execution of a judgment of that body. However, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to
execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except
that of the judgment debtor.

FACTS: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an
independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers tasked to
manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them
on trucks. On June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for
illegal dismissal and with money claims. On June 14, 2001, Labor Arbiter Pura promulgated a
decision, ruling in respondents favor. PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay a total of P422,
702.28, representing respondents separation pay and the award of attorneys fees. Petitioner
and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal
because he did not pay the supersedeas bond. It also affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision with
modification of the award for separation pay to four other employees who were similarly
situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution.

To answer for the monetary award, the NLRC Acting Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution
of Personal Property over the property in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda
S. Ando." This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the
property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject
of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should
be made on the latters properties.

RTC RULING: The RTC issued an Order denying the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual
on the Execution of Judgment, petitioners remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC
Sheriff. Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case.
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order. Instead, he filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.

Petitioner argued that the writ of execution was issued improvidently or without authority since
the property to be levied belonged to him in his personal capacity and his wife. The RTC,
respondent contended, could stay the execution of a judgment if the same was unjust. He also
contended that, pursuant to a ruling of this Court, a third party who is not a judgment creditor
may choose between filing a third-party claim with the NLRC sheriff or filing a separate action
with the courts. He maintains that this special civil action is purely civil in nature since it involves
the manner in which the writ of execution in a labor case will be implemented against the
property of petitioner which is not a corporate property of PACSI. What he is seeking to be
restrained, petitioner maintains, is not the Decision itself but the manner of its execution.
Further, he claims that the property levied has been constituted as a family home within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
CA RULING: The CA affirmed the RTC Order in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction over the case, and nullified all other pronouncements in the same
Order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Do regular courts have jurisdiction over the enforcement of decisions, orders or awards
rendered in labor cases?

SC RULING:NO. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear
and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions,
orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the
Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction
which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, it is, first and foremost, the
NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a
judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only
by analogy or in a suppletory character.

The NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with third-party claims in
cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party
to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out
the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim. There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners
complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be
considered a "third party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor
Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and
not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not
to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At
the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation
of the law.

The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission
by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them
jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the
controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. There is no denying that
the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of
petitioners complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the
proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally
terminated, and there can be no end to the controversy without the full and proper
implementation of the commissions directives. Petitioner claims that the property sought to be
levied does not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was
sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be
made to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation.Moreover, the power of the
NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any
person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever
tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. In sum, while petitioner availed himself of
the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look
beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA
G.R. No. 213729, September 02, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On October 28, 1968, PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant. Sometime in 1971, PAL
implemented a retrenchment program. By April of that year, Bichara voluntarily resigned. On
May 15, 1975, he was rehired. In August 1993, Bichara was included in PAL's Purser Upgrading
Program in which he graduated on December 13, 1993. As flight purser, he was required to take
five (5) check rides for his performance evaluation and earn at least an 85% rating for each ride.
However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check rides with ratings of 83.46% and 80.63%. He was
then demoted to the position of flight steward.

On March 22, 1994, Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL, but no action was taken; hence, he
filed a complaint for illegal demotion before the NLRC-Regional Arbitration Branch. On June 16
1997, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora (LA Nora) issued a Decision declaring Bichara's demotion as
illegal, and ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position as flight purser.

PAL filed an appeal before the NLRC and later before the CA, both of which, however, upheld LA
Nora's finding. PAL no longer appealed to the Court, thus, it rendered the June 16, 1997 Decision
final and executory on February 5, 2004.

However, during the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA, or on July 15, 1998,
PAL implemented another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's
employment. This prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other flight attendants,
represented by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), to file
a separate complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment with claims for
reinstatement and payment of salaries, allowances, backwages, and damages against PAL. This
case was appealed all the way to the SC and still remains pending as of this time.

On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age under the PAL-
FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). On January 31, 2008, Bichara filed a motion for
execution of LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision which PAL opposed arguing that it has already
been overtaken by supervening events.

The LA Ruling

In an Order dated February 4, 2009, Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam granted Bichara's motion
for execution and ordered PAL and/or a certain Jose Garcia to jointly and severally pay Bichara:
(a) separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of
service counting from October 28, 1968 up to the present, excluding the period from April 1,
1971 until May 15, 1975, or a period of 35 years; and (b) attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.

LA Macam declared that, notwithstanding the pendency before this Court of the illegal
retrenchment case, i.e., FASAP case, Bichara's termination was invalid, given that: (a) PAL did
not use a fair and reasonable criteria in effecting the retrenchment; (b) PAL disregarded the
labor arbiters' rulings in the illegal demotion and illegal retrenchment cases which were both
immediately executory; and (c) retrenchment was made during the pendency of the illegal
demotion case without the permission of the court where the case was pending. However, since
Bichara may no longer be reinstated in view of his compulsory retirement, LA Macam, instead,
ordered PAL to pay Bichara separation pay with the salary base of a flight purser.

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision dated November 23, 2010, the NLRC reversed and set aside LA Macam's February
4, 2009 Order and denied the motion for execution for being moot and academic, considering
Bichara's compulsory retirement in 2005 without prejudice to the latter's entitlement to
backwages and retirement benefits of a flight steward pursuant to this Court's final decision in
the FASAP case.

At the outset, the NLRC ruled that Bichara's reinstatement could have taken effect, if at all, only
on January 31, 2008 when he sought the execution of the said relief. In this light, his
reinstatement and corresponding backwages prior to said date must therefore be based on the
salary rate and other benefits attached to the position of flight steward to which he was
demoted/reverted. However, it declared that reinstatement is no longer possible as the same
was rendered moot and academic when he compulsorily retired in 2005. NLRC remarked that LA
Macam exceeded his authority in awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, since such
relief is not contemplated in the decision sought to be executed the June 16, 1997.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated January 24, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC's ruling. It did not
find LA Macam to have exceeded his authority in ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement since this Court has consistently held that when reinstatement is not possible
due to over age, payment of separation pay is in place. The CA, however, observed that since
Bichara was one of the retrenched employees involved in the FASAP case, this Court's Decision
dated October 2, 2009, wherein it ruled that the retrenchment was illegal and thereby stated
that "[f]light attendants who have reached their compulsory retirement age of retirement shall
receive backwages up to the date of their retirement only, "should be made to apply. Thus,
instead of separation pay, Bichara is entitled to backwages from the time of his retrenchment up
to the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 60. In addition, since the June 16,
1997 Decision, rendered in the illegal demotion case, had already become final and executory,
he is entitled to salary differentials of a flight purser from the date of his demotion, up to the
time of his retrenchment in July 1998. He is also entitled to retirement benefits.

Issue:

Did the CA err in reversing the NLRC's Decision and thereby awarding Bichara the
aforementioned monetary awards?

SC Ruling:

Partly yes. Judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is
a long and well-established rule. A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final
judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. In this case, the
final judgment sought to be executed is LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, which was confined to
the directive that PAL reinstate Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal demotion to the
position of flight attendant.

Evidently, LA Macam went beyond the terms of the June 16, 1997 Decision when he, in his
February 4, 2009 Order, directed the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement Hence, LA Macam exceeded his authority when he ruled
on this issue and directed PAL to pay Bichara separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

PAL's supervening retrenchment of its employees, which included Bichara, in July 1998, and his
compulsory retirement in July 2005, however, prevent the enforcement of the reinstatement of
Bichara to the position of flight purser under the June 16, 1997 Decision. Nonetheless, since this
Decision had already settled the illegality of Bichara's demotion with finality, this Court finds
that Bichara should, instead, be awarded the salary differentialof a flight purser from a flight
steward from the time of his illegal demotion on March 21, 1994 up until the time he was
retrenched in July 1998. Notably, the award of salary differential is not dependent on the
validity of his termination, as it is, in fact, intrinsically linked to the illegality of Bichara's
demotion.

Also, since Bichara's illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be entitled to (a)
backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of retrenchment in July 1998 up
until his compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in
accordance with the existing CBA at the time of Bichara's retirement; and (c) attorney's fees,
moral, and exemplary damages, if any, but only if this Court, in the FASAP case, finally rules that
the subject retrenchment is invalid. Otherwise, he should only be entitled to the above-stated
salary differential, as well as the corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA,
or Article 297 of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The awards of backwages, and
retirement benefits, including attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, cannot,
however, be executed in these proceedings since they are incidents which pertain to the illegal
retrenchment case, hence, executable only when the FASAP case is finally concluded.
JOSE EMMANUEL P. GUILLERMO, v. CRISANTO P. USON
G.R. No. 198967, March 07, 2016

PERALTA, J.:

Facts: On March 11, 1996, Crisanto P. Uson began his employment with Royal Class Venture
Phils., Inc. as an accounting clerk. Eventually, he was promoted to the position of accounting
supervisor, with a salary of Php13,000.00 a month, until he was allegedly dismissed from
employment on December 20, 2000. On March 2, 2001, Uson filed with the Sub-Regional
Arbitration . Branch No. 1, Dagupan City, of the NLRC a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, with
prayers for backwages, reinstatement, salaries and 13th month pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against Royal Class Venture. Royal Class Venture did not make an
appearance in the case despite its receipt of summons.

Labor Arbiter's Ruling

October 22, 2001, Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera ruled in favor of Uson and ordered Royal Class
Venture to reinstate him to his former position and pay his backwages, 13thmonth pay as well
as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Royal Class Venture, as the losing party,
did not file an appeal of the decision. Consequently, upon Uson's motion, a Writ of Execution.

***
On May 17, 2002, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued. But with the judgment still unsatisfied,
a Second Alias Writ of Execution. Still, to no avail. Uson filed a Motion for Alias Writ of Execution
and to Hold Directors and Officers of Respondent Liable for Satisfaction of the Decision.

On December 26, 2002, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued an Order granting the motion
filed by Uson and pierced the veil of corporate fiction of Royal Class Venture and held herein
petitioner Jose Emmanuel Guillermo in his personal capacity, jointly and severally liable with the
corporation for the enforcement of the claims of Uson.

Guillermo filed, by way of special appearance, a Motion for Reconsideration but such was
denied by Labor Arbiter Nia Fe S. Lazaga-Rafols who sustained the findings of the labor arbiters
before her and even castigated Guillermo for his unexplained absence. Labor Arbiter Lazaga-
Rafols granted Uson's Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution.

NLRC Ruling

In a Decision dated May 11, 2010, the NLRC dismissed Guillermo's appeal and denied his prayers
for injunction.

CA Ruling

On August 20, 2010, Guillermo filed which denied Guillermo's petition and upheld all the
findings of the NLRC.

Issue/s:
 1. Can an officer of a corporation be included as judgment obligor in a labor case for the
first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory?
2. Can the twin doctrines of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" and personal liability of
company officers in labor cases apply?

SC Ruling:

1. Yes. Guillermo asserts that he was impleaded in the case only more than a year after
its Decision had become final and executory. It is true that the decision had become final,
immutable and unalterable and that any amendment thereto is null and void. But it is because
of his unjustified refusal of participating.

2. Yes. The veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors
and officers or even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable
solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on execution, so long as it is established
that such persons have deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment
obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so. When the shield of a
separate corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude
responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor case have not hesitated to step in
and shatter the said shield and deny the usual protections to the offending party, even after
final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in this
instance, does not connote bad judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.

Such evidence exists in the record. Guillermo didn't show up during the proceedings even
thought he was the one who personally received the summons. Due to this, the allegation that
he illegally dismissed Uson when the latter exposed his unlawful activities ie undervaluing
shares of stock remained undisputed and stood as fact; Guillermo also, upon creating Joel and
Sons Company after dissolving Royal Class Venture indicated bad faith his intention to avoid
liability.

The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid the obligations to Uson and frustrate
the execution of the judgment award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will not
countenance.

As for Guillermo's assertion that the case is an intra-corporate controversy, the Court sustains
the finding of the appellate court that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal
are determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. Although Uson is also a stockholder and director of Royal Class Venture, it is settled in
jurisprudence that not all conflicts between a stockholder and the corporation are intra-
corporate; an examination of the complaint must be made on whether the complainant is
involved in his capacity as a stockholder or director, or as an employee.