Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FOREWORD
Words from ACI..
INTRODUCTION
This handbook has been produced to provide airside managers with a comprehensive
set of guidelines to enhance safety and prevent incidents. Material has been provided
from major airports participating in ACI World Operational Safety Subcommittee and
has been summarised to produce a concise document. The aim has been to produce a
current best practice guidance document without being overly detailed further
details are available from the useful documents and websites listed in Sections 5 and
6.
GENERAL
This handbook is a guide to airside safety. It is written for airside managers and builds
on previous work by ACI namely the Apron Safety Handbook. The remit of this
handbook has been widened to include all topics relating to the safe operation of
airside areas.
Aviation throughout the world continues to grow, both in terms of the number of
flights and also in terms of aircraft size. Airfields become busier. The requirement is
to facilitate this growth in a safe environment for passengers, staff and aircraft.
Various bodies have produced both regulations and guidance covering a number of
aspects of airside safety, both nationally and internationally, including from within the
industry. This handbook is intended to complement such material by offering
guidance in areas perhaps not covered in sufficient detail. It updates and brings
together the best elements of managing airside safety from current experience of those
involved in this important task from airports around the world. The aim has been to
keep the contents brief and relevant.
CONTENTS
1. Safety Management
2. Apron Safety
4. Annexes
5. Useful Documents
6. Useful Websites
1. SAFETY MANAGEMENT
1.1.1 Policy
An airport should have a safety policy or safety objective formally adopted.
A safety policy should outline who does what, when and how they do it. It
should set out how the company deals with health and safety at work and the
organisation and arrangements you have for putting that policy into practice.
The policy should show that arrangements are in place to assess and suitably
control the hazards associated with your business. A general policy should
include arrangements to;
Protect employees
Assess all risks to health and safety caused by the business
Provide adequate controls for anyone affected (including customers,
thirds parties etc) whether safety or health related.
Consultation processes with employees
The provision and maintenance of equipment
The provision of suitable instruction, training and other information
Minimise accidents and incidents
Arrangement to review this policy at suitable intervals
The policy should be signed by the Chief Executive or Chairman.
Responsibilities for line managers and employees should be agreed.
1.1.2 Personnel
Personnel should be adequately trained in all tasks they can reasonably be
expected to carry out and should remain proficient at these tasks. Staff should
demonstrate their continuing ability to carry out the tasks required of them and
this should be recorded (see section 1.4 Competencies and Training).
1.1.3 Processes
Processes should be in place to support the organisations policy or objective.
Processes need to be consistently followed and the creation of standards and
procedures help to achieve this. Processes, standards and procedures need to
be clearly owned by a responsible person empowered to ensure they are
followed. These will be many and varied in nature covering for example
detailed activities of the airport duty teams through to the reviewing of overall
apron safety trends. Processes should be documented and form the basis of
staff training for new recruits. These by their very nature will need reviewing
and updating as things change on the airfield. The Aerodrome Manual is a key
part of the documentation and communication of certain processes to other
airfield users.
1.1.4 Reporting
Safety reporting has 2 purposes one is to check progress against achieving
targets, monitoring incident rates or measuring if a change has resulted in
improved safety and the second is to monitor that the required processes or
activities have been completed in other words to demonstrate safety
assurance. Reporting of both these aspects are useful in an SMS one
measures the input and one measures the output or results. Ongoing
records should be kept.
1.1.5 Records
Records should be kept of all aspects of safety processes to follow, processes
completed along with dates, personnel and their training records.
Throughout all the above boxes run the themes of leadership, communication,
consultation and delivery.
The steps to achieving a safe airfield will need to include a clear
organisational structure, setting out clear roles and responsibilities for the
individuals involved. Risk assessments form a vital part of the management of
safety Section 1.2 has more details.
Monitoring and auditing of safety including performance measurement should
be undertaken regularly in a way visible to all involved.
Risk assessments should be carried out for every task likely to be carried out
by staff. Risk assessments can also be carried out on a higher level of business
risk, for example concerning birdstrikes or runway incursions.
There are 5 simple steps as outlined by the UK Health and Safety Executive;
(www.hse.gov.uk)
1. Identify the hazards
2. Decide who may be harmed and how
3. Evaluate the risks and decide whether the existing precautions are adequate
or whether more should be done.
4. Record your findings
5. Review your assessment and revise it if necessary.
In practice most aviation situations have already had some sort of risk
assessment applied to them and already have some sort of control measures in
place. In this situation the following steps may be useful;
The process of carrying out a risk assessment involves a trained risk assessor
and a group of experienced individuals familiar with the task. The hazards
need to be identified and the probability of them occurring should be tabulated
in a grid an example of one is shown below.
5
1 2 3 4 5
Probability Consequence
1. Extremely improbable 1. Low effect
2. Extremely remote 2. Minor occurrence
3. Remote 3. Major occurrence
4. Reasonably probable 4. Hazardous occurrence
5. Frequent 5. Catastrophic/serious occurrence
Once the grid is completed the hazards with high probability and severe
consequences can be prioritised in an action plan for remedial action to reduce
the risk either the probability or consequences can be reduced by putting in
place additional control measures.
At present there are a number of matrices in use with varying definitions for
what the values 1-5 mean for both probability and consequence. Similarly the
definitions against the red/amber/green status can vary. It may be that in the
near future a standard layout is agreed. The actual detail of this is not so
important the value from this assessment is that it prioritises certain risks for
remedial action or review.
Risk assessments should be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure they remain
valid. They should also be reviewed after any incident or accident. This is
particularly important to ensure any lessons learnt from an accident or serious
incident are incorporated into the risk assessment which may not have been
thought of when it was originally written. Here are some suggested areas for
assessment;
Staff Tasks;
Aircraft marshalling
Bird control and use of firearms
Runway inspections
Exposure to MMMF
Runway change procedures
Use of airfield cleaning vehicles
Use of snow removal vehicles
Spillage clean up process
Use of airbridges
Activating low-vis procedures
Aircraft recovery actions
Business Risks
Runway incursions
Snow & ice procedures
Aircraft-aircraft collision on the ground
FOD damage to aircraft
Aircraft fire
Major birdstrike causing accident
Loss of supply of utilities
ATC evacuation/loss of ATC service
The health and safety of those working airside needs to be given careful
consideration. Risk assessments should be carried out covering each task that
staff are required to complete. (See previous section). An airport should also
ensure that third party companies operating airside also have completed risk
assessments for the activities of their staff. Once the hazards and residual risks
have been identified the hazard should be reduced. One method to do this is to
consider the following options item 1 being the best and item 6 being the
minimum;
1. Eliminate cease doing the task, remove the hazard altogether
2. Reduce reduce the time exposed to the hazard, substitute
something less hazardous (eg a 12v system to replace a 240v system).
3. Isolate physically isolate people from the hazard fit guards,
enclose the hazard.
4. Control put in place a safe system of work, require permits to work
to be issued, put supervision in place, require staff to use training and
follow procedures.
5. PPE issue personal protective equipment appropriate to the hazard
6. Discipline put procedures in place requiring staff to behave in a
particular way.
Staff should then be encouraged to wear the required PPE and follow the
procedures when carrying out a task.
Items of PPE may include ear defenders, hi-visibility tabards/jackets, safety
shoes, gloves etc
Ideally all airside users should work in a safety culture where it is expected
that if PPE is not worn anyone from any other organisation can challenge an
individual.
Ideally this subject should be reviewed jointly by a number of companies that
operate in the same area and joint work undertaken to reduce exposure. This
approach can be applied to noise, fumes, slips/trips/falls, musculo-skeletal
disorders arising from manual handling or ergonomic issues. Reviewing
causes of staff absence can reveal trends that can usefully focus preventative
steps.
Removal of the source of the problem is the best method to bring about
improvements wearing PPE is really the last step when nothing else can be
achieved to reduce the exposure.
Staff should be trained for each task they are required to carry out. The details
of such training will vary depending on the persons experience and
background and the complexity of the task. Key elements of training to be
addressed include
Theoretical training
Practical training including demonstration.
Testing understanding and demonstrating ability are key parts to the successful
completion of training.
In order to be competent at a task the individual should then demonstrate that
the theory, practical training and local knowledge can be applied together in a
satisfactory way this is the demonstration of being competent.
A key aspect of ensuring airside is a safe place for the activities to take place
involves inspections and audits. All the facilities on the airfield need to be
periodically checked to ensure they are serviceable and available for use.
Particular attention needs to be paid to the aircraft movement area, including
the runway, taxiway, apron including airside roads and grass areas.
The purpose of such inspections is to ensure that;
No FOD is present,
The surface condition is suitable (no loose material),
No birds or other wildlife are present,
The paint markings are visible and correct,
The lighting is serviceable,
The signs are visible and correct,
Equipment provided is safe for use and serviceable etc.
It is often beneficial to repeat these inspections after dark to check the lighting,
signs and markings.
The importance of diligence and accurate recording of these inspections
cannot be overstated. To reinforce this it is good practice to check that the
checks have been carried out and also to check the quality of the checks by the
supervisor on duty. Furthermore if senior management also carry out a
periodic check to ensure that the records have been completed, all faults
notified and passed for rectification and also visits the airfield to check that
everything has been reported, this adds a further reinforcement of the
importance of these tasks.
1.6 Asset management Un-serviceability reporting and rectification
All the above processes and activities should be recorded and documented.
These are key elements but are no means exhaustive.
1.7 Airside Driving, training, use of RTF, apron and manoeuvring area
Aircraft tugs require special procedures due to their size, manoeuvrability and
nature of operation moving aircraft on the manoeuvring area.
Typically an aircraft pushback involves at least 2 ground staff.
Requirements may include;
communication between the tug crew and the flight deck, and between
the tug crew and ATC must be maintained
coordination of actions must be achieved covering the following points
- application/ release of the aircraft brakes
- ATC permission to pushback
- aircraft engine start
- application/release of aircraft brakes
- tow bar disconnection / raising or lowering of the aircraft if
towbarless tug used, removal of steering pins and gear locks,
tug crew at a safe distance for aircraft to taxi
Tug drivers should maintain a listening watch on the appropriate ATC
frequency and be capable of clear use of the RT.
Other measures can help reduce the risks from FOD; these include;
Ensuring all airlines/handling agents check an aircraft stand prior to the
arrival of the flight
Installing catch fencing in open areas of the airfield to trap wind-blown
debris such as newspapers and plastic sheeting
Organising joint airport airline handler apron FOD walks to check
for FOD and to identify the source of it.
Organising campaigns and publicity to remind staff of the dangers
presented by creating FOD
Ensuring contractors involved in construction projects are aware of the
need to contain all their materials on-site and not allow spillages to
enter the aircraft areas
Organising a runway/taxiway/stand inspection or sweeping schedule of
suitable frequency
Analysing items of FOD to identify the likely contributors
Reviewing items of FOD at Airside Safety Group meetings involving
airlines, handling agents, support companies and aircraft maintenance
organisations.
Further details are to be found in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual
Part 2 Pavement Surface Conditions.
Specific activities will vary from airport to airport and are too detailed to
itemise here. General principles include;
Preparation and planning equipment availability, staff rosters etc
Communication of the snow plan to airlines, handlers, ATC etc
setting out what preparation and clearance activities will take place
when different types of weather forecast are received.
Communication of snow warnings when snow is forecast
Identification of snow removal areas / dumping locations
Communication of runway opening estimates to ATC, airlines etc
Local rendezvous points should be agreed with safe procedures for access to
all parts of the airfield with the minimum of delay. These should be clearly
signed and marked and kept clear at all times.
A reliable activation and communication process is needed to rapidly ensure
all relevant parties are informed as soon as possible, including basic
information about the incident.
Contingency planning for major incidents should include consideration of how
the airport will continue to operate whilst the incident is dealt with.
It is good practise to carry out regular exercises to test all these procedures
with all the organisations involved.
Most airports have existing security staff to meet the requirements of national
Governments. Airside Operations teams can work together with security staff
in a number of ways
Perimeter fence inspections can be carried out by Airside Operations
staff whilst carrying out airfield patrols.
Detection of any intruders can be reported to security
The presence of any birds close to the airfield can be reported to
Airside Operations by Security.
2. Apron Safety
The safety of the operation on an apron area can be enhanced if the area is planned
from the start with adequate space. However many airports develop over time and
do not have the luxury of adequate planning from day 1. Some guidance is given
in ICAO Annex 14. Factors in apron layout design include the clearances around
the aircraft, airside roads, clearways and vehicle parking space.
Apron markings should differentiate between those meant for vehicles and those
for aircraft aircraft guidance markings are a solid yellow line. Vehicle markings
can be in white or red. The use of colour can help differentiate the purpose of
markings for example passenger walkways or evacuation routes may be in
green, vehicle parking areas in red, no parking areas hatched and aircraft guidance
lines in yellow. Particular markings to indicate no parking in areas such as the
airbridge movement area, or around fuel hydrants may be useful.
Other services such as the movement of baggage, water supplies etc are possible
but remain relatively uncommon.
Fuel hydrants offer improvements to the aircraft turnaround process and can
deliver greater volumes of fuel than vehicle tankers. The cost and benefits of such
a system will however have to be evaluated specifically at each airport given the
traffic levels etc. Awareness of the hoses and electrical connectors should form a
part of apron safety training and efforts should be made to highlight them visually
to reduce the chances of accidental contact. Emergency fuel cut-off switches
should be provided and clearly signed at the head of stand.
Fixed electrical ground power (400Hz) is often provided at airports and is a cost-
effective alternative to stand alone generators, in addition to the environmental
benefits. Supplying the cable to the aircraft can be done in 2 ways either via
underground pits, offering the cable close to the aircraft, or running the cable on
lengths of transporter on wheels from a storage area at the head of stand.
Whichever method is used it is good practice to store the cable away after each
use to reduce the risk of damage to it.
Pre Conditioned Air is an alternative to APU running to cool or heat the cabin of
parked aircraft, saving on fuel burn and reducing noise and emissions. It is
installed at some airports particularly where the climate is hot. Hoses used for the
air supply to the aircraft should be highly visible when extended out to the aircraft
to avoid accidental damage by vehicles or being a tripping hazard to staff.
If the airport provides these facilities then it will be necessary to produce training
material for users to be trained in the safe, correct and proper use of this
equipment.
Stopping an aircraft in the correct location to enable the airbridge and various
services to successfully connect to it requires some guidance. ICAO Annex 14
refers. The basic elements involved are to provide left/right guidance and stopping
position guidance. The calculation of the aircraft stopping position needs to take
into account
the movement envelope of the airbridge (if provided)
the location of the fuel hydrants and length of hose available
the location of any other fixed services (eg FEGP)
the space required around the aircraft for apron servicing
clearance from the taxiway
Clearly the aircraft type itself is a key factor and details will need to be established
of the pilots eye position in order for this to be the basis of the overall aircraft
stopping position.
Many different systems are in use around the world and it is recommended that
details of the systems in use at your airport are published to users.
Systems include simple marshalling to a nosewheel stopping position, AGNIS and
PAPA, and radar based electronic parking aids that detect the aircraft and offer
stopping guidance to the pilot on a display ahead.
Whichever system is used there remains a need to keep it up to date with airline
fleet changes.
Road markings and signs should as far as possible replicate those used on the
public roads. This will ensure driver familiarity and reduce the chances of
misunderstandings.
Markings should remain in good condition to ensure they are visible to all road
users in all conditions especially at night. Signage should similarly be provided
to agreed standards. Checks should be undertaken from time to time to ensure
adequacy, check that no confusing signs have appeared or sightlines blocked and
that paint markings remain in good condition. Signs should be provided of an
adequate size and placed in good locations with clear lines of visibility to those
expected to see them.
Particular care should be taken when establishing temporary road diversions or
alternative road layouts. Clear new signage should be used and any redundant
paint markings should be blacked out or removed. The changes should be widely
promulgated to all road users in advance especially if any lower vehicle height
restrictions are introduced.
2.6 Apron control and stand allocation
Keeping the apron clean from FOD is an important aspect of housekeeping and
preventing FOD damage to tyres and engines. All apron staff of all companies
should be expected to remove and dispose of small items of FOD found on the
apron. FOD bins can be an effective part of this process but they then need
emptying periodically. Aircraft stands should be inspected before the arrival of
aircraft. In addition to these procedures it may be necessary to sweep the stands,
airside roads and equipment areas to remove all debris. This can be done by
dedicated staff, contractors using specialist vehicles or by brushes operated by
hand. Equipment manufacturers create specialist vehicles that offer a variety of
sizes and methods to remove FOD from the apron. Particular care and attention
should be given to works sites and contractors compounds. Joint airline airport
handling agent FOD audits should be undertaken to jointly check the amount of
FOD on the apron areas and also to jointly try to identify the sources of it.
At some airports a published process of implementing penalties is used if
companies or staff do not maintain a FOD free area after first having the FOD
pointed out to them. Various levels of financial penalties or other action are in use.
FOD should also be a standing agenda item on the Airside Safety Committee to
ensure its importance is not forgotten.
2.8 Aircraft fuelling, including spillage procedures, defuelling
Fuelling procedures for aircraft are technical and detailed. Fuelling can occur from
bowsers or from a hydrant system. At modern airports with a hydrant system it is
prudent to ensure that some bowser capacity is retained as this will be required if
it becomes necessary to defuel an aircraft for any reason.
The key points include;
Someone should be nominated as in overall charge of the refuelling
process
Fuelling zones of 6m should be established around all filling and
venting points in use on the aircraft and vehicle
The aircraft should be chocked
All hoses etc used in fuelling should be electrically bonded
Personnel should not be able to generate sources of ignition
accidentally
Equipment used should be intrinsically safe
Escape routes for staff, passengers and vehicles should be free of
obstruction.
Aircraft APUs should not be started during refuelling
Fuelling activities should be included in apron safety awareness training for all
staff and especially in driver training to make staff aware of the risks associated
with the high pressure hoses delivering fuel into aircraft from the hydrants and the
presence of the electrical bonding wire.
Fuelling with passengers on board the aircraft may require additional fire service
cover.
Spillages from fuelling can occur and a procedure to absorb the spilt fuel followed
by proper disposal should be devised. At some airports it is possible to wash the
fuel into the drainage system but at others an absorbent material needs to be used
to soak up the fuel and ensure correct disposal. A requirement should exist for
those involved to report all spillages to the relevant authorities and the airport.
2.9 Aircraft marshalling
When incidents occur in Airside areas there needs to be procedures and processes
in place to ;
deal with aftermath of the incident.
report and record all the pertinent details of the incident to enable
subsequent investigation (See para 2.11)
These steps include procedures to ensure
Emergency services attendance,
establishing safe temporary closures of the area affected,
cleaning up and returning to service,
communication with other airfield users
Once the immediate needs of the people involved have been dealt with the more
detailed report should be completed. This should include all relevant details in
order to enable a full investigation which can identify the root cause of the
incident. To assist this process the full details of all incidents should be recorded
on a database which enables queries and detailed analysis.
Misunderstood communication
Poor signs or markings
Poor training of those involved
Trained staff not acting in a way they were trained to
Too infrequent refresher training
Poor equipment / mechanical condition / mechanical failure
Tasks with inadequate resources being carried out too quickly
Failure to use PPE
Inadequate risk assessment
Laziness
Inadequate response to changing circumstances
On a periodic basis an analysis of all incidents that have taken place should be
undertaken. A database should contain all details of accidents, incidents and near-
misses. A classification system of incident types may be used but there are many
different systems in use. A common one is to describe the collision such as
vehicle- vehicle or vehicle aircraft. To gain the fullest picture all incidents
should be included including personal injuries, damage to vehicles, equipment and
aircraft. Classifications can also be used to denote the seriousness of incidents.
Airline
Handling agent
Stand number / Location
Time of day / night
Staff trained in the task they were doing?
Staff within date of refresher training requirements?
Aircraft type / vehicle type / equipment type
Years of airside experience
Type of incident eg slips or trips, falls from height, jet-blast, baggage
loader contacting aircraft fuselage etc
The use of this data is for prevention. Understanding what has gone wrong in the
past enables steps to be taken to prevent their recurrence in the future.
The data will reveal the magnitude of the problem, determine overall costs of
incidents, analyse trends to direct future preventative actions, and pinpoint
particular areas of tasks that are high risk. Trends in any of the above factors
will point to aspects that are in need of review and providing trend data to all
airside companies collectively will give incident prevention a high profile. This
will be enhanced even further if companies can provide indicative costs of
incidents including not only repair costs but also aircraft downtime or delay costs
and staff sickness / costs of overtime providing staff cover.
The aircraft turnround process is the key activity on the apron. It is where the
aircraft, many vehicles and staff from different organisations come together in a
time pressured and constrained space.
In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive have produced a document HSG 209
Aircraft Turnround which focuses on the requirement for the turnround to be a
coordinated activity involving all companies.
There are a number of software systems that assist in planning and real-time
allocation of staff to tasks involved in the turnround process which can highlight
potential conflicts.
Passengers may need to be evacuated from aircraft at any time and also
passengers or staff from buildings, terminals etc. To reduce the hazards in these
time-constrained activities involving a large number of people an evacuation plan
should exist.
This should include designated evacuation routes from buildings into safe areas on
the apron. Both routes and safe areas must be kept clear of equipment and other
obstructions at all times to enable their safe use by passengers who will not be in
familiar surroundings. Ideally they should be well signposted or painted on the
ground.
Procedures for dealing with the evacuation of aircraft should be covered in the
Airport Emergency Procedures. Should an evacuation occur staff should muster
passengers in a safe area away from and upwind of the aircraft until the
Emergency Services arrive.
The exact protection required will vary on the precise location of the equipment.
The general principles involve;
keeping vehicles, contractors and other airport staff away from the facility
providing warning signs, markings or lights at the edge of the sensitive
area to prevent accidental intrusion in to the sensitive areas
providing clear surface markings or fences (that do not interfere with the
facility itself)
physically placing temporary barriers across certain routes
roads and access routes should be planned to stay clear of such facilities
procedures exist to ensure snow clearing vehicles, sweeping vehicles or
grass cutting vehicles do not infringe the areas without permission and
coordination with Air Traffic Control.
Runway incursions present one of the greatest aviation hazards with potentially
very serious consequences. A number of serious fatal accidents have occurred
around the world resulting from runway incursions.
In recognition of the seriousness and growing frequency of runway incursions a
number of years ago the FAA and Eurocontrol began a concerted industry wide
review to seek to reduce the numbers of runway incursions. This work in Europe
gave rise to the Eurocontrol European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway
Incursions which involved many industry sectors. This is available on the
Eurocontrol website:
www.eurocontrol.int/runwaysafety/public/standard_page/EuropeanAction.html
The conclusion was that a local Runway Safety Team should be established at
each airport. Further details can be found in the Eurocontrol Action Plan.
Recommendations were made relating to;
Aerodrome operators
Aircraft operators
Air Navigation Service Providers
Communications
Regulators
Data collection and lesson sharing
3.3 Runway Friction Measurement (maintenance and testing)
Further details are to be found in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual Part 2
Pavement Surface Conditions.
ICAO has defined surfaces around a runway which should be kept free of
obstructions. Details can be found in Annex 14.
These surfaces should be protected from developments that may infringe them.
To achieve this a safeguarding or checking process is needed that captures
applications for new developments in the relevant areas with the relevant height
details. Checks can then be made to ensure proposed new buildings do not
infringe the protected surfaces. Clearly it is far easier to resolve these issues at the
planning stage than after construction has started.
During construction of new buildings it is possible that cranes will be used and
these may be erected to a height greater than the finished building, even if only
temporarily. To ensure this is not the case a process should be established to check
crane operating heights during on-airport construction and under the protected
surfaces. Crane heights should also be checked at the planning stage of new
buildings as outlined in the process above. In addition crane operating heights
should be checked during construction to ensure things have not changed resulting
in the crane operating at a height greater than planned. Cranes if erect in the hours
of darkness should also be lit with red obstruction lights.
To assist in this process it is often worthwhile if airports contact and educate crane
operating companies about the requirements for operating cranes in the vicinity of
airports.
Some airports use a Crane Permit system that gives authorisation for cranes to
operate up to a specific height in a specific location. An example of a crane permit
form is attached at Annex G.
Wildlife around airports can present serious hazards to aircraft operations. The
most obvious of these is the presence of birds but other animals such as deer,
foxes and other mammals can present a hazard.
Adequate fencing around the airside areas is fundamental to keeping mammals off
the airfield.
Birds present a hazard to aircraft in flight. Birdstrikes with civil aircraft have
resulted in the death of over 250 people to date. Clearly it is impossible to
guarantee no birdstrikes will occur but there are a number of activities an airport
can undertake to reduce the probability of this happening.
These include;
Collecting accurate information on all birdstrikes that occur, including
details of the species involved
Observations of bird species and bird behaviour both on the airport and in
the surrounding areas
Identifying the hazard presented by each species by carrying out a species
based risk assessment
Prioritising efforts towards the most hazardous species
The largest hazard is clearly presented by large birds that fly in flocks.
Practical steps that can be taken to reduce the attractiveness of an area to birds
include;
Cutting the grass so it does not provide invertebrates but not too short that
it provides a resting area
Ensuring no new water features or refuse tips are placed around the airport
that might generate hazardous flightlines across aircraft arrival or
departure routes
Not providing perches, ledges or other structures favourable to roosting
flocks of birds
Placing nets or other systems over water features to prevent access
If raptors or hawks are present ensure there are not rabbits or mice
attracting them to feed
Ensuring no bushes or shrubs are planted as part of airport landscaping that
produce berries which might attract birds.
The atmosphere of the group should be an open one to maximise the learning
about improving safety. It is suggested meetings are held either monthly or
quarterly.
An ideal opportunity to promote a safety culture is in training when staff are new
to the airport. Clear safety messages concerning their responsibilities to
themselves and to others will set the scene well. Following procedures and
carrying out tasks in the ways they have been trained is an important message to
push at the start.
Ideally on the apron everyone who works there should feel able to point out short-
cuts or examples of bad practise to anyone else working improperly.
The annual ACI Safety Survey of members airports provides statistics that can be
used in safety promotions.
3.8 Stakeholders - Interface with ATC, with operators, with project teams,
Engine testing is handled in many different ways at different airports. Key factors
include if there is a maintenance organisation based at the airport and also the
proximity of nearby residential areas.
Engine testing may be limited for environmental reasons to;
Only low power tests at night with a maximum duration per run and a
maximum total duration for each night
Only to occur in specific acoustic enclosures at night
Only to occur in remote parts of the airfield at night
Only to aircraft needed for an early morning departure the next day
Procedures should be in place to deal with flights of an unusual nature. These may
include;
Outsize cargo flights
Royal flights, VIP flights, Government Ministers, State Visits etc
Ammunition or firearms flights
Military flights
Flights shipping specialist livestock such as racehorses
Helicopter flights
These should ideally be planned some time in advance involving all the handling
companies, ATC, control authorities etc to understand the specific requirements of
the flight and to ensure all unusual matters are identified and planned.
Factors to consider include;
Any special approach procedures
Aircraft routeing from the runway
Aircraft parking place
Access airside for any third parties not normally airside
Vehicular routes
Marshalling requirements
Specialist cargo handling facilities
Spacing from other activities
Other aircraft arrival or departure routes affected
Involvement of Public Affairs teams to handle media interest
Depending on the size of the aircraft anticipated to be moved and the recovery
equipment available it can be useful to carry out aircraft recovery exercises.
The benefits of this include;
Staff familiarity with specialist equipment that is rarely used
Increased experience in team-work with the airlines and their insurers
Testing of communications protocols with other organisations involved
Practical understanding of how to move the aircraft and where to park it
Availability of cranes and other heavy equipment and locating them airside
Experience with chains, pulling gear and aircraft tugs in moving the
aircraft
The recovery process will involve liaison with the airline and its insurers and will
also require permission from Accident Investigators. Close liaison with the Police
will also be necessary.
AIRCRAFT MARSHALLING
MARSHALLING OF AIRCRAFT
11 Aircraft recognition s n/s 12 Manoeuvre planned? yes no
13 Awareness of blast/downwash yes no 14 Adequate wingtip clearance s n/s
15 Aircraft parked into wind yes no 16 Assistance from 2nd marshaller yes no n/a
17 Marshaller visible to pilot at all times yes no
Setting Up Site:
1. Ensure Works Permit clearance with ATC Watch Manager & Apron advised of stands affected
2. Close area with ATC on RTF - either Ground or Tower
3. Inform Ops Control Desk of area closed, who will advise Fire Service by land line
4. Isolate area with Barriers
5. Ensure green centreline routes are suppressed through works area
6. Ensure taxiway centrelines are blacked out
7. Ensure taxiway sign boards are amended
8. Check clearances from taxiway centreline to work site fencing & height
9. Check work site lighting
10. Safe Contractors route to site
Annex F
AIRCRAFT TURNAROUND SAFETY AUDIT - CHECK FORM
Date: Time: Print names:
Airline/Handling Agent Aircraft Type/reg:
Stand:
PART ONE - AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL
CHECKS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF AIRCRAFT
1 Is the turnaround Co-ordinator clearly identifiable? YES NO
2 Has Stand been checked for obstructions / FOD ? YES NO
3 Have adjacent aircraft parked on the correct centreline ? S N/S
4 Parking of vehicles / equipment S N/S
5 Position of airbridge S N/S
6 Correct SEG selection S N/S
7 Position of personnel S N/S
8 Is high vis clothing worn? YES NO
9 Adequate PPE ears / feet / hands? YES NO
Comments / Actions taken
SHUTDOWN OF AIRCRAFT
10 Is dispatcher still in attendance? YES NO
11 Has the aircraft parked on the correct centreline? YES NO
12 Were the Anti-collision lights off, Engines/propellers stopped before being chocked? YES NO
13 Were crew / dispatcher / 3rd parties advised that the aircraft was chocked? YES NO
14 Did staff / vehicles / airbridge approach aircraft before it was chocked? (BA Protocol) YES NO
15 Overall approach of turnaround service teams S N/S
Comments / Actions taken
SERVICING OF AIRCRAFT
23 Freight / Baggage removal e.g. positioning, manual handling, S N/S
adjusting of equipment
24 Blocked fuel /SEG switches? YES NO
25 Is Fuelling route clear? YES NO
26 Is the fuel overseer identifiable ? YES NO
27 Are banksmen being used? YES NO
28 Are steps, catering and cleaning vehicles positioned before aircraft YES NO
doors are opened?
29 Are safety guards being used when working from heights YES NO
Engineers, caterers, ramp
30 Vehicles running/unattended YES NO
31 Are personnel stepping between trailers YES NO
32 Overall supervision/co-operation YES NO
Comments / Actions taken
GENERAL
Check various operators understanding of risk from those working around S N/S
them?
Are they aware of the turnaround plan? Y N
Can they identify the turnaround co-ordinator? Y N
Are all staff aware of actions to be taken in an emergency? Y N
Comments:
ON-LOAD
33 Are Pax being escorted N/A S N/S
34 Is Pax route clear N/A S N/S
35 Pax guidance equipment used N/A S N/S
36 Freight / Hold Baggage loading N/A S N/S
37 Are adequate staff positioned to ensure pax safety (either airline and handling agent) N/A S N/S
38 Is High-Vis clothing worn YES NO
39 Adequate PPE - ears/feet/hands YES NO
Comments / Actions taken
12 NOTAM action re quire d by Airside Safe ty & Ope rations YES NO NOTAM No:
13 Details of Crane/Equipment Position:- Issued By:
metres from ARP (Aerodrome Reference Point) nautical miles Initials:
Bearing degrees True/Magnetic (delete as appropriate) Date:
feet AMSL Local Time:
Additional Comments:
ICAO: Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual Part 2 Pavement Surface Conditions.
ICAO: Manual On Safety Management For Aerodrome Operators (in draft at time of going to press)
ACI Europe
www.aci-europe.org
Birdstrike Canada
www.birdstrikecanada.com
Eurocontrol
www.eurocontrol.int
Transport Canada
www.tc.gc.ca