Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights: Correcting the Record

Author(s): David Boggett

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 14, No. 18 (May 5, 1979), pp. 813-821
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4367570
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 SPECIAL ARTICLES

Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights

Correcting the Record
David Boggett

This article seeks to demontstrate that

(a) the allegations against the government and Communist Party of Kampuchea of gross violationz of hu-
man rights have been grossly distorted;
(b) the sources of the allegations are, in almost all cases, extremely suspect, having vested interests in
discrediting the Pol Pot regime;

(c) the almost general appearance of such reports in the general Western press has been no more accid-
ent, but rather a concerted effort to conceal the trute causes of the Khmer people's misery; and
(d) the restructuring of Khmer society by the Pol Pot government was not a fanatical attempt to put back
the clock, but the only possible way for a responsible administration to alleviate the extreme miseries
which faced the Khmer nation in 1975.

THE dearth of information in the re-
gular press about government policies
for the social and economic reconstruc-
tionj of Democratic Kampuchea has
only been matched by the barrage of
almost daily allegations that the gov-
ernment and Communist Party of Kam-
puchea have been the worst violators
of human rights in history, restructur-
ing Cambodian society at the barrel of
a gun and practising calculated and
cold-blooded genocide against those
allegedly considerable elements of the
population which opposed them. Few
people outside Kampuchea knew that
the country was exporting a consider-
able rice surplus in 1977, but almost
all had heard that a huge number of
Cambodians had been liquidated, the
precise number of victims varying from
500,000 to as many as 3 millions in the
most extreme estimates. Faced with
such a negative propaganda attack, no
account of Kampuchea under Pol Pot
can avoid addressing the problem of
alleged mass violations of human rights. been killed in Kampuchea since the
The nature of the dharges themselves
makes them extremely difficult to coun-a claim would be meaningless and Ieng
ter; the sources are usually not credited Sary himself has said that "some killings chaud gave it as his view in February
and, where they are, it is usually
rendered by such vague terms as "ac-
cording to refugees" and more often
than not from infoTmation reported at
third, fourth and even fifth hand. For
exam,ple, a virulently anti-Kampuchean
editorial appeared in the "Christian
Science Morntor" (normally a liberal
patper) on April 26, 1977, which tured
out to be a fifth-hand rendering of
events in Kampuchea; the only document
the editor had read was a review by
Lacouture which appeared in the "New
York Review of Books"; the latter was distorted; (2) the sources of the allega-
based, in tum, on selections from mate-tions are, in almost all cases, extremely
rials published in the book "Cambodia suspect having vested initerests in dis-
in the Year Zero" by the French Fathercrediting the Pol Pot govemment; (3)
Ponchaud, and Ponchaud's material was the almost daily appearance of such re-
based, in turn, on the reports of re- reports in the general Western press
fugevs who had fled Kampucheal The has been no mere accident, but
further along the line the information rather a concerted effort to conceal
passed, the less balanced it became the true causes of the khmer
ending up in the "Christian Science people's misery by incorrectly blaming
Monitor" as an extremely virulent anti-the GoVernment of Democratic Kasn-
communist propaganda barrage aimed puchea for terrible conditions in Phnom
at the government of Democratic Kam.Penh caused by US policy toward the
pudhea. The distortions that accom- prior Lon Nol government and the
panied the information at each stage of Cambodian war; and (4) the restructur-
transmission must have rendered it ing of Khmer society was not a fanatical
well nigh impossible for the Pol Pot attempt to put back the clock, but the
government to reply sensibly or seri- only possible way for a responsible ad-
ously, even when they were the official ministration to alleviate the extreme
government in Phnomn Penh, let alone miseries which faced the Khmer nation
for concerned researchers or scholars in 1975.
outside Kampuchew.1
The purpose of this brief article has, EVIDENCE OF POPULATION STA-nSTICS
perforce, to be strictly limited; it does
not set out to claim that nobody has In September 1978, the UK Foreign
Office presented a report to the United
Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975. (Such Nations in which it claimed (according
to Reuter's synopsis) "that Father Pon-
could not be avoided". The author has 1978 that more than 100,000 Cambo-
never heard of a mass restructuring of dians had been executed must be taken
any society along revolutionary lines as the absolute minimum. It was
that was not accompanied by blood- possible that two or three times as
shed, whether it be the French or many people had. been executed. The
Russian revolutions or more recent number who had died because of the
attempts such as that of the Ayotallah lack of food and of medical and sani-
Khomeini in contemporary Irani). But tary facilities, and from the frantic pace
there is sufficient detail available to of work, might well have been more
cause thoughtful persons at least to than two million". The British gov-
query the human rights allegations. ernment report can be taken as fairly
This article seeks to demonstrate thattypical in arguing that between 100,000
(1) the allegations have been grossly and 300,000 had been killed and that

813

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 May 5, 1979 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
about 2 millions might have died ot
other (remediable) causes such as mal-
nutrition and lack of medical care. The
figure of 2 million deaths (and note
that "deaths" does not mean "execu-
tions") has been quite common. It
apparently derives from a claim made
in Paris and first widely reported in
December 1977 by Reuters. The report
reads, "An exiled Cambodian students
group said Wednesday that more than
two million people, one-third of Cam-
bodia's population, had died since the
Khmer Rouge took power in April
1975. Quoting refugee reports, the
Union of Young Khmer Students
(UNIJEK) said there were now
cally no births in Cambodia because of
famine, epidemics and Khmer Rouge
massacres." More extreme reports of
refugees in Paris even tried to suggest
that all 2 million deaths were the
result of direct massacres; an allegedly
fonner Khmer Rouge political commis-
sioner, Ear Soth, quoted in Paris "an
official declaration made at an Assembly
ot victorious armies held at Battambang
in February 1977. According to this
statement 2,500,000 class enemies had
already been killed since the takeover
of power in April 1975. The statement
added that the Communist party orga-
nisation (Angka) needed two million
survivors to reconstruct democratic
Kampuchea". Ear Soth was one of
four recent refugees to be presented to
the press by the indefatigable Father
Ponchaud, all of whom had allegedly
had high posts in the Kampuchean
government and party organisations.
In reporting the conference, Agence
France Presse expressed some surprise
that "the refugees were unable to give
details of resistance to the ruling
regime. They rqpeated rumours that
guerillas were operating in the provin-
ces of Kompong Thom and Kompong
Cham". The US Embassy in Bangkok
had also reported that they believed
1.2 million Cambodians had died
(again note, not "executed") since the
end of the war. The more extreme
allegation of up to two millions dead
or executed thus seems to originate
among Cambodian exiles in Paris and
the US Embassy in Bangkok. More-
over these same exiles were a major
information source on whom Father
Ponchaud has relied to cite evidence
for his book "Cambodia in the Year
Zero".
A mere glance at Khmer population
statistics, however, shows that the
2 million deaths figure is impossible.
In 1967, the population for Sihanouk's
Cambodia was verified at 6,400,000.
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At the end of the war, AFP statesthe the subjects of liquidation campaigns.
Khmer population was "estimated at It is certainly true that the Pol Pot
seven millions". Ieng Sary stated in government had little reason to feel
an interview with the Der Spiegel sympathetically disposed towards the
magazine in May 1977 that Kamjpu- Vietnamese minority, most of whose
chea's population was 7,760,000. There roots in Cambodia go back to the time
is little reason to disbelieve the claim, when they (rather than the Khmers)
for the not notably' Eprogressive Far were imported under the aegis of the
East Economic Review of Hong Kong French colonial government to staff the
states authoritatively in its "1978 Year- nascent colonial bureaucracy. (Mutual
book" that the population of Kampu- Khmer-Vietnamese mistrust, of course,
chea is 7,887,000. (The "1979 year- dates back even further.) But the dis-
book" sates 8.2 millions.) appearance of the Vietnamese minority
It might be pertinent to wonder why is by no means the responsibility of
the death of 2 million people (more the Khmer Rouge. Many of the
than one quarter of the country's popu-150,000 Vietnamese who lived in
practi-
lation) does not show in the population Phnom Penh in 1969 fled or were
figures, particularly when the same deported after the Lon Nol government
dubious and already quoted sources staged a series of massacres of the Viet-
state "there were now (practically no namese minority in April 1970. In
births in Cambodia"I It should also 1971 William Sullivan testified to the
be noted that the constantly rising US Senate that only 3,000 to 10,000
population figures quoted above conti- Vietnamese remained in Phnom Penh.
nue throughout the period of the Cam- It is possible that the residual Viet-
bodian xvar. The Pol Pot government namese minority under the new Kampu.
claimed that about 800,000 Khmers hadchean administration might have been
died in the war period (this figure wasdeported to Viet Nam, for the United
never contradicted by any US authori- Nations High Comnmssioner for Re-
ties and can probably be taken as a fugees reported on November 3, 1978,
relatively accurate estimate). More- "The country with the largest number
over, in the same Der Spiegel inter- [of refugees] is Viet Nam where 350,000
view, leng Sary stated that "about people have fled from Cambodia". A
2,000 or 3,000 people died during the later report dated December 10, 1978
evacuation of the city (Phnom Penh) stated, "More than 300,000 Cambodians
and another few thousand died in the have taken refuge in Viet Nam". It is
rice fields". Other remarks made in more reasonable to suppose after the
the Ieng Sary interview were later Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, that
found to be true. (Countering the among these refugees were former
then current allegation that SihanoukKhmers of Vietnamese origin, and one
had been executed, leng Sary stated can only presume *that they are now
"He is alive and living with his wife again back in Cambodia. (This assump-
in the former Royal Palace". Interest- tion seems plausible following the pub-
ingly, this remark was also not believedlication on January 13 this year of "a
at the time, until Sihanouk - embarras-manifesto issued in Phnomn Penh by
singly for the rumour-mongers - ac- the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary
tually emerged publicly in Phnom PenhCouncil headed by Heng Samrin to
from the Royal Palace!) Whichever mark the establishment of the new
way one regards the population statis-'People's Republic of Kampuchea'
which promised, according to a Bang-
tics, Ieng Sary's remarks seem' proba-
ble; two million deaths are downright kok Kyodo News Service re0port,
"freedom and equality between the
impossible.
sexes and among different ethnic
groups". As 99 per cent of Cambodia
The population statistics also reveal
some interesting changes in racial com- under Pol Pot had been racially pure
position. The 1967 census reveals that Khmer, one can only suppose that the
of the total population of 6,400,000 "different ethnic groups" referred to
,there were 330,000 Chinese (or 5.1 perin the Vietnamese-backed government's
cent); 300,000 Vietnamese (4.6 per cent)manifesto were brought back into Cam-
and 10,000 Indians. In other words, bodia from Viet Natn by Heng Samrin
around 10 per cent of the total popula-and his cronies.) WVib regard to the
tion where not Khmer. The 1978 other large minority noted in the 1967
statistics indicate that 99 per cent of census there is little evidence of parti-
the population are Khmer, and "signi- cular distress. Ito Tadashi of Kyodo
ficant ethnic minorities: none'. ThisNews Service who visited Democratic
evident change has led some observers Kampuchea in September/October 1978
to suggest that the missing 9 per cent reported that, "Ny Kan (the Foreign
of non-Khmer pecXles may have been Affairs Minlistry official who accompa-
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 ECONOMIC AND
nied us on our tour) said the problems
Viet Nam has had with its Chinese popu-
lation have not touched Cambodia be-
cause all people in Cambodia, includ-
ing the Chinese are, being treated
equally. He admitted that those few
who held special privileges in the pre-
liberation days have had some problems
adjusting". The Pol Pot government
thus clearly claimed that there were
Overseas Chinese still living in Demo-
cratic Kamnpuchea.
In short, the exaggerated claims that
as many as 2 million Cambodians have
been killed or had died since the libe-
ration of Phnom Penh in 1975 are ab-
surd and, when viewed against the po-
pulation statistics and the then known
numbers of Cambodian refugees (ap-
proximately 350,000 in Viet Nam, and
more than 100,000 in France, Thailand
and the USA), the lesser claims of be-
tween 100,000 and 300,000 massacred
seem to stretch the population data.
These figures appear to have originated
from the roughly 12,000 Khmers living
in exile in Paris. Of all the Caipbo-
dians abroad, those in Paris tend to
come from the higher classes of Cam-
bodian society since the French gov-
ernment gives priority to refugees who
can already speak the French languiage
or who have family members already
resident in France. Most, thus, come
from the French-educated Cambodian
olite of pre-liberation. days and, need-
less to say, have everything to gain
from blackening as much as possible
the reputation of the Pol Pot adminis-
tration.
CAMBODIAN RE:FuG E:Es IN THAILAND
But the Cambodian exiles in Paris
are by no means the only source of
human rights allegations against the
Pol Pot government. Another source
is the Cambodian refugees in Thailand
who exist in special refugee camps
close to the Thai-Cambodia border.2
The most famous revelation of these
refugees' stories was in Time magazine
of April 26, 1976, in which it was
stated, "Since the communist victory,
500,000 to 600,000 people -roughlv
one twelfth of Cambodia's population
-have died from political reprisals,
disease or starvation, and there is little
evidence that the wave of death has
crested. The country has become a
kind of Indochinese Gulag Archipelago
-except that the whole land is one
island of oppression." Its sources were,
"News does leak out from refugees
who have managed to flee to Thai-
land". The article was accompanied by
lurid line drawin,gs (prepared by Time's
artist) bearing such titles as "Artist's
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POLITICAL WEEKLY
rendering of Khmer clubbing execu-
tions", "Plastic bag method for slow
asphyxiation" and "Khmer Rouge sol-
diers bayonetting official". There was,
of course, no photographic evidence of
the alleged executions. Perhaps the
most curious feature of this source of
information on Democratic Kampuchea
is the astonishing fact that there were
no atrocity reports from the Cambo-
dian refugees' camps in Thailand until
almost a year after the liberation of
Phnom Penh. Moreover, the timing of
this information flow suggests that it
may have been related more to the in-
ternal politics of Thailand than to
Kampuchea. News of the existence of
refugee canips for Cambodians in Thai-
land first started to appear under the
liberation) Premier In Tam; "M R Kuk-
rit Pramoj. During this Thai adminis-
tration, leng Sary visited Bangkok on
several occasions which resulted in the
formation of a Thai-Khmer L,iaison
Office at the border town of Aranya-
prathet, the start of trade between the
two countries and a joint communique
in November 1975 about the future
establishment of diplomatic relations
signed by Ieng Sary and Tlai Foreign
Minister Chiatichai Choonhavan.
relations were still far from smooth
between the two countries as evidenced
in the series of border clashes that
broke out towards the end of 1975. It
was in this conmection that the Kukrit
gcovernment started to release informa-
tion about the Cambodian refugee
camps. On November 27, 1975, Premier
Kukrit ordered the expulsion from
Thailand of former Phnom Penh (pre-
liberation) Premier In Tam; "M R Kuk-
t-it refused to discuss the reason for
the expulsion of Mr In Tam who is
now living near the Thai-Cambodia
border, but said, 'He can't live here"'
(Nation newspaper). On December 15,
1975 (more than two weeks later) the
Nation reported under banner head-
lines "In Tam Still Here":
"Former Cambodian Prime Minister
In Tam has slipped into the border
area where Thai and Khmer Rouge
soldiers are engaged in clashes, Foreign
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan said
yesterday. General Chatichai's state-
ment thus confinned that In Tam who
had been ordered to leave the country
within one week early this month by
Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj is still
in tihe country. The minister also said
that In Tam was taken to Bangkok,
but somehow managed to slip back to
the border again. He was supposed to
leave for France. In Tam has announced
setting up a liberation movement
against the present administration in
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May 5, 1979
Cambodia which is now recognised by
Thailand. General Chatichai noted that
the current border incident could have
been' incited by In Tam's people or else
it was caused by misunderstandings
among low-ranking Khmer Rouge sol-
diers," (Emphasis added.)
Two days later on the 17th, the
Nation reported "In Tam Meddled in
Current Border Dispute", stating,
"Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj yester-
day openly charged that former Cam-
bodian prime minister In Tam has
meddled in the current border dispute
between Thailand and Cambodia in
Klong Huay Hia of Ta Phraya District,
Prachinburi. He said In Tam who is
staying in a refugee camp in Aranya-
prathet will be asked to leave the bor-
der area very soon. Foreign Minister
Chatichai Choonhavan said he has
asked In Tam to come to see him in
Bangkok today or tomorrow."
But still In Tam managed to avoid
leaving Thailand. A later Nation carried
an interview with him at the Wat Cha-
nachaisri refugee camp, where some
light was thrown upon the "In Tam's
people" mentioned by the Thai Foreign
Minister in the previously-quoted 're-
But
port: "In Tam has altogether 119 rela-
tives living in the refugee camp, and
also some 60 of his followers... There
are 2,551 Cambodian refugees in this
camp and many young men said they
are still loyal to In Tam. 'I'm ready to
defend 'him with my life', said one
tough-looking Cambodian ex-soldier."
That In Tam had been able to ignore
the Thai government's instructions to
leave the country is a clear indication
of high support for his Cambodian
activities within influential circles in
Thailand (presumably that section of
the military dissatisfied with the "soft"
policy on communism taken by the
civilian Kukrit government). The Kuk-
rit government was overthrown by
elections on April 4, 1976, and re-
placed by the fuddling government of
Kukrit's brother, Seni Pramoj, under
which the right wing Thai military
started to move more -openly, leading
to the notorious "Bloody Wednesday"
military coup dNetat of October 6,
1976. Lest there be any doubt of' the
military intentions of In Tam and his
"refugees" a Bangkok Post report of
November 29, clearly stated, "Former
Cambodian Prime Minister In Tam,
given a one-week deadline to leave,
Thailand, was yesterday named as one
of the strong leaders of a Cambodian
government-in-exile in Paris. The an-
nouncement, made by Col Sowattana,
aide of former Cambodian Premier
San Ngoc Tan in Paris, claimed
815
 May 5, 1979 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
that 135,000 armed troops are on its
side. Col Sowattana named In Tam
and San Ngoc Tan as two former aides
of former Cambodian President Lon
Nol who have joined the government-
in-exile... The 135,000 troops support-
ing the rebels. he said, are armed with
sophisticated American arms delivered
immediately after Phnom Penh fell
to the Khmer Rouge on April 17 this
year". And, presumably, many of those
135,000 troops were operating from In
Tam's refugee camps in Thailand.
It was after the defeat of the Kuk-
rit government in the April 4, 1976
Thai elections that the Thai military,
In Tam and his "refugees" were able
to operate more openly. It was not
until that time that Western Journa-
lists were invited to the Cambodian
refugee camps in Thailand, almost a
year after the fall of Phnom 1ienh.
From these visits, articles such as the
one quoted above in Time magazine
started to appear. But some journalists
who accompanied the group expressed
their reservations about the accuracy
of information gathered from the re-
fugee camp inmates (particularly out-
spoken were Norman Peagam, Bang-
kok correspondent of Far East Econo-
mic Review, and John Everinghaim,
whether in Thailand or Europe. This,
in itself, is perhaps not surprising, given
the confusion that must have prevailed
when many refugees left Kampuchea.
The first photographic evidence of bru-
talities in Kampuchea did not appear
until April 8, 1977 in the Washington
Post which carried "photographs depic-
ting forced labour conditions in the
countryside, with Cambodians working
under the guns of guards". It was only
later learned that the same photographs
had been offered to the anti-communist
Bangkok Post newspaper a year before,
in April 1976, but the newspaper had
refused to print them; "the offer was
turned down because the origin and
authenticity of the photographs was in
doubt", particularly because of "the
way the alleged Khmer Rouge soldiers
and those depicted to be villagers
dressed.. other observers pointed to
the possibility that the series of pic-
tures could have been taken in Thai-
land" (emphasis added).
When the Time magazine report of
Khmer "atrocities" was published, In
His views had been widely publicised a
Tam had at last detparted to Paris to as-
sume his more glorious post in the gov-
ernment-in-exile, but Time stated that
the movement was still being directed
gin, trained to infiltrate across the Kam-
puchean border and decoy Khmer
Rouge troops back into Thailand in
"hot pursuit" in order to cause Khmer
Thai border incidents. The Thai army
had sanctioned the activity but the
"stupid" police, unaware of such plan
had routinely arrested the 37 armed
"'Thais". Nothing was ever done about
the 37 for the army, in an unprecedent-
ed (and illegal) action removed the
case from police to army jurisdiction.3
It has also been discovered that a re-
ligious leader, a certain Thai Buddhist
monk, Kittivutho Bhikun (Kittisak Jara-
ensathabawm), was supporting such
mili.tary training programmes within the
refugee' camps. Kittivutho is a notorious
figure in Bangkok social and political
life; on the night of the Thai "Bloody
Wednesday" military coup of October
6, 1976, Kittivutho broadcast over the
military's "Annored Radio" urging those
in Bangkok to kill "the communists"
(students demonstrating in Thammasat
University) to protect the Thai nation,
the Buddhist religion and the King.
little before in an interview in the
Chatturat magazine in Bangkok:
"I think that even Thais who believe

former Vientiane correspondent of the - presumably still from within the re- in Buddhism should do it [kill commu-
same magazine). Evidently, upon ente- fugee camps - bv an (unnamed) "for- nists]. Whoever destroys the nation,
ring the refugee camps, the journalists mer Cambodian cabinet minister in the religion and king is not a complete man,
had been presented with pieces of pa- Lon Nol regime". The accuracy of the so to kill them is not like killing a man.
per on which each refugee produced atrocity reports from Khmer refugees inWe should be convinced that not a man
for interviews had written of their ex- Thailand is thus as questionable as the but a devil is killed. This is the duty
periences or the tortures/killings thatreports emanating from Paris (despite of every Thai person.
the fact that many of the Khmer exiles
they had witnessed. Interviews were Question: But isn't killing a trans-
held through interpreters from the in Thailand are of a considerably less gression?
camp staff. Naturally, many journalistselevated social class than their Paris "Yes, but only a small one when
paid for the information they received,counterparts); it not only seems highly
compared to the good of defending
likely that the atrocity reports may havenation, religion and king. To act in this
giving out 20 dollar bills to informnants.
But when others looked ov&r the pieces been fabricated to find a quick way of way is to gain merit in spite of the little
of paper (all written in Khmer script) cash to fund the refugees, the camps sin. It is like killing a fish to cook
they were surprised to find how many and any related resistance activities, for a monk. To kill the fish is a little
papers said exactly the same thing. but it is also demonstrably provable sin but to give to the monk is a
Moreover, those journalists who spoke from the Thai newspaper reports that greater good.
Khmer language began to find that In Tam and other former Lon Nol gov- Question: So the ones who kill left-
there were many refugees who could ernment leaders have been using the ists escape arrest on account of the merit
not speak the Khmer language at all, refugee camps as a center of military they gain?
and that, moreover, hardly any of the resistance activities against the govern- "Probably."
refugees were actually able to either ment of Democratic Kamtpuchea. "Ru- Such savoury "religious" leaders as
read or write! Some journalists began mours" (a good Thai source of factual Kittivutho appear to be lending their
to suspect that they were witnessing a information) continue to abound in support to the dubious activities of the
sort of stage-show arranged by the Bangkok about the refugee camps. Khmer refugees in Thailand.4 It was
camp leaders for publicity purposes andEyebrows were raised in early 1978 also notable that the atrocity stories from
which would, of course, bring in badly when Thai police arrested 37 so-called the refugees started to fall off as soon
needed extra income. (These details "Thais" laden with guns and grenades as Thai government policy dictated
were verbally related to the author by in Pachinburi on the Thai-Khmer border other priorities. As mentioned above,
a former editdr of the Thai Phuen ma- area. None of the so-called "Thais" the atrocity stoires themselves did not
gazine some time later in Bangkok.) No were apparently able to speak the Thai start until after the defeat of the civilian
photographic evidence has ever been language. Police investigations revealed Kukrit government in the election of
produced by any of the refugee groups, that they were refugees of Khmjer ori- April 4, 1976; they reached their height

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 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY May 5, 1979

during the ideologically extreme right- who accompanied Malcolm Caldwell on why should we have killed all these?
ist administration of Premier Tanin his fateful Kampuchean visit, reported We need a tremendous amount of
Kraivixien set up by the 1976 military in a January 1979 article, a meeting labourers to rebuild the country."
coup; the stories then remarkably drop- with the allegedly dead Ok Sakun: Later, in Bangkok (July 19, 1978) at
ped after a less publicly ideologically "Ok Sakun, 45 years old, one of the a press conference, Ieng Sary repeated,
rightist-committed military administra- intellectuals, engineers and economists "If the government of Cambodia com-
tion was set up in Bangkok by yet who are often said to have been Idlled mitted atrocities against its own people
another military coup led by the present in internal purges. He said he worked then it could not rally the people against
Thai premier, General Kriangsak Cho- in the Foreign Ministry. He mentioned the [Vietnamese] aggressors. Despite
manan, in October 1977;5 following the Hu Nim, Minister of Information and what refugees say, the government of
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and Propoganda, and Hou Yuon, Minister of Cambodia is one that serves the people;
the installing of the present Heng Sam- the Interior, Communal Reforms and it has no reason to massacre its own
rin government, the atrocity stories have Troops, as additional persons still active people." Moreover, of all the Indo-
miraculously ceased altogether. in the government who are regarded in chinese states, only Democratic Kam-
the West as missing." puchea has actually urged refugees
V1ZrAMESE PROPAGANDA abroad to return and help build the
Vietnamese propaganda against Kam-
country (in marked contrast to Viet
The third (and final) source of the puchea, its admitted enemy, is best dis-
Nam's policy of actively encouraging the
atrocity stories and allegations against carded for what it is; a series of fabri-
"boat people" to leave and face an urn-
the Pol Pot government emanates from cations and half-truths put out to dis-
certain future at sea in flimsy boats) and
Hanoi and the Vietnamese government credit Democratic Kampudhea in the
surely no government appeals to exiles
itself.6 Over the Kampuchean invasion, rest of the world in order to prepare
to return, merely in order to execute
the Vietnamese have been able to mobi- psychologically for the planned Viet-
them? Premier Pol Pot broadcast the
lise successfully all their many "pro- namese invasion.
appeal over Radio Phnom Penh on Sep-
gressive" foreign journalist friends, con- tember 26, 1978: "All Cambodians
All three sources of "atrocity reports"
tacts built up by the remarkable and abroad, in general, do not wish
- Khmer exiles in Paris, Khmer exiles
efficient Vietnamese publicity machine to live in those foreign lands,
in Thailand and the Vietnamese govern-
during the Indochina war. (The Cam- bu they stay there because they
ment - can be shown to be downright
bodians never developed a similarly have been fooled by our enemnies.
fabrications in their more extreme state-
effective organisation in Paris or else- If they want to return, no matter who
ments; they are at best a highly dubious
where during their war against the they are, we will give them a cordial
source of infonnation on events inside
USA.) The effect of the Vietnamese- reception." Further, Ieng Sary on a
Democratic Kampuchea. Moreover,
directed propaganda barrage against visit to the United Nations, extended an
none of the opponents of Democratic
Phnom Penh has been devastating, as it invitation to UN Secretary-General Kurt
Kampuchea have ever addressed the
has been penned on Viet Nam's behalf Waldheim - which was subsequently
question of why a government commit-
by journalists and intellectuals of "pro- accepted - to visit Kampuchea "to see
ted to an agrarian revolution that needs
giessive" reputation throughout the with his own eyes the truth of human
actual people to work in rice fields
world. Normally sensible commentators rights charges" (Associated Press,
should so thoughtlessly kill off so many
such as Australian writer Wilfred Burt- October 15, 1978).
persons, whose labour was so essential
chett and Japanese journalist Honda
to the success of its agrarian policy. An As stressed earlier this does not neces-
Katsuichi -with a high reputation for official of the Kampuchean Foreign sarily mean that nobody died in the
integrity -have parrotted the Viet- Ministry, Thiounn Prasith, reported to radical restructuring of Kampuchean
namese allegations, word for word. US journalist, Richard Dudman, "We society - far from it. But the allega-
Honda Katsuichi's book against Demo-
have only about 8 million people. In tions of genocide, mass murder or
cratic Kampuchea was entirely research-
Kampuchea there is no family planning. millions of deaths cannot be substan-
ed from Hanoi, where he interviewed
e' need more and more people. We tiated; evidence cited all points in the
selected "Cambodian refugees" in Viet
would like to have 20 million people in opposite direction. Pol Pot himself
Nam, specially chosen and presented to
10 years." (Quoted in the St Louis answered Richard Dudman, Flizabeth
him by the Vietnamese Foreign Minis-
Post-Dispatch, January 1979.) One of Becker and Malcolm Caldwell in Phnom
try; alleged photographic evidence of the first Western visitors to Democratic Penh, "We consider that 95 per cent of
the massacres - also thoughtfully pro- Kampuchea, Swedish Ambassador to the people, both those before liberation
vided by the Vietnamese government
Peking, Kaj Bjoerk stated, "there is one and those after liberation on April 17,
- are totally unidentifiable, and could
factor that may speak against the pro- 1975, are good. Among the other 5
have been taken anywhere during any
bability of mass executions at this stage. per cent who were hesitating, we were
war (and there is no shortage of photo-
That is their complaint about shortages
able to successfully re-educate and re-
graphs of massacres and war brutalities
of manpower and talk about the need cover more than 4 per cent, for the
in contemporary Indqchina!). Wilfred
of putting more people to work. In mylatter could re-educate themselves
Burtchett's information has been even
view this indicates that they would through the actual revolutionary move-
more concretely exposed. Writing in rather put people to work than execute ment. As for the remaining less than
the October 1978 issue of Afrique-Asie them" (Far East Economic Review, 1 per cent, we do our utmost to re-
Burtchett claimed (as has the Vietnamese March 26, 1976.) In the Der Spiegel educate them." leng Sary himself, as
government) that a dozen leaders of interview of May 10, 1977 Ieng Sarv quoted earlier, has stated that about
Kampuchea, including Ok Sakun, had replied to the allegations of mass exe- two or three thousand persons died
been internally purged. Richard Dud- cutions: "These people are mad. We in the evacuation of Phnom Penh and
man, one of the two western joumnalists only condemnned the worst criminals... some later working in thbe countryside.

817

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 May 5, 1979 ECONOMIC
The government has also stated that
several high-ranking officials of the old
Lon Nol regime have been executed
(former Premier Long Boret, for ex-
ample). But none of these admissions
-indicate any wN7idespread or general
abuise of human rights, in the generally-
accepted sense of the terms.
TRUE CAUSES OF KHMER PEOPLE'S
MISERIES
It is not, however, sufficient simply
to show that the allegations of atrocities,
massacres and deaths have been exag-
gerated and distorted, without offering
some explanation as to why such alle-
gations were made in the first place,
particularly if the allegations themselves
were false. In most accouints, the deatlhs
were said to arise from a rumber of
causes, the most commonly adduced
being starvation, lack of proper medical
care, the forced and su(dden evac-uation
of Phnom Penh and other cities (suclh
as Battambang), and hard working
conditions in the fields after the citv
populace had been relocated to the
countryside. By thus suggesting that
these phenomena were the responsibility
of the Khmer Rouge, the propagandists
careftully concealed the real reasons for
starvation, lack of medical care and the
e.vacuation of Phnom Penh. The fact
that people had been dying of starva-
tion in alarming numbers and that
Cambodian hospitals had been grossly
overcrowded and unsanitary long before
the liberation of Phnorn Peinh were
carefully omitted.7
Long before the liberation of Phnom
Penh, the economy of Lon Nol's Cam-
bodia was a total shambles. By the end
of 1973, the rice surplus areas of
Kompong Thom and Takeo had virtually
all fallen into the hands of the National
United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK).
The total cultivated paddy land dropped
from 2.46 million hectares in 1969 to
500,000 hectares in 1974. Destruction
of farm machinerv and impressment of
young males into the armv caused a
drop in yield on the paddv land re-
maining under Lon Nol's control. Rice
production fell from a total of 3.8
million tons in 1969-70 to a mere
493,000 tons in 197475 -an 87 per
cent decline in production. Whereas
Cambodia had exported some 230,000
tons of rice in 1968, it was forced to
import some 282,000 tons in 1974.
Phnom Penh became slowly flooded
with refugees escaping the US bomb-
ing. The population of the city in-
creased from a pre-war figure of 600,000
to a probab)le total of nearly 3 millions
818
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AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
(official census figures were never taken An eyewitness in Phnom Penh in the
during the war but the estimates of same month was quoted in Newsweek
various official organisations placed the as saying "thousands of small children,
population at anywhere between 1.2 their bellies swollen from hunger,
millions and over 2 million. When waited for slow death from kwahiorkor
evacuating the city the govemment of and marasmus". It has been estimated
Democratic Kampuchea took a census from such accounts that there must have
been an average of 250 deaths per
in which thev found the total close to
3 millions, according to a later inter- clay from starvation during the closing
day of the war; a figure which wN-ould
view with leng Sary). The consequent
give 8,000- deaths for the month of
increasingly acute rice shortage sent
rice prices up to a staggering height, March alone and an estimated
from 10 riels per kilogramme in Decem- minimum of 15,000 for the last 5
ber 1971 to 125 riels per kilogramme months of the war.
in December 1973, later to 300 riels and Accordina to a study by the Indochina
over by early 1975 (mid-February hit Resource Center, by 1974 an analysis
a price of 340 riels per kilogramme). of the total resources used by the Lon
Lack of food can lead to only one Nol regime to remain in control of
result - starvation. An investigation by Phnom Penh and a few outlying enclave
the Inspector General of the Office of showed that only 2.2 per cent
the US Department of State Inspector- of these came from domestic re-
venues, while 95.1 per cent came
General of Foreign Assistance in Febru-
from US assistance. During fiscal
arv 1975 "confirmed the universal medi-
years 1971, 1972 and 1973. the
cal impression given us by those involv-
United States provided $ 748 millions
ed in Cambodia health and nuitrition
in assistance to Lon Nol of which only
that children are starving to death".
$ 1.1 millions wen-t to assistance to
Medical evidence was confirned by
Phnom Penh's refugees (the rest sup-
journalists' observations; at a small
ported either military equipmient or mili-
Catholic Relief Services Hospital in
tarv salaries). US Senator Harrison
Neak Luong, Sy-dney Schanberg of the
Williams of New Jersey protested in
New York Times described the scene on
February 24, 1975: April 1975 that "although warnings were
given that large numbers of Cambodian
"The children gathered by the dozen children were beginning to experience
around a Western newsman... Some have
malnutrition and that a crisis was
swollen bellies. Some are shrunken. A emerging, little was done to meet the
10-year-old girl has dehydrated to the
crisis by either the US government or
size of a 4-year-old. Harsh bronchial
the Cambodian government" and that
cotughs come from their throats, m2ark-
in spite of the extraordinary airlift
ing the beginnings of pneunonia and
mouinted by the US to the beleaguiered
ttuberculosis. All have dysentery. Their
city of Phnom Penh, the administration
noses run continuously. Their skins
had "disregarded the need to move
have turned scaly. Every scratch on
food into the city until forced to [by
their legs and arms becomes an ulcer."
Congress]". At the same time an Asso-
The death rate among those few
ciated Press dispatch of March 5, 1975,
children lucky enough to be admitted to
stated that the US was airlifting 565
the few functioning clinics was extreme-
tons of ammunition into Phnom Penh
Iv high. At the Red Cross clinic the each dav!
death rate reached 46 per cent of those
Mledical services in pre-liberation
admitted in February 1975 alone.- Most
Phnom Penh were also hopelessly in-
could never hope to enter a clinic. The
adequate. Of the four major hospitals,
WVorld Vision Child Nutrition Center,
Preah Ket Melea hospital was reported
for example, had to turn away 1,758
to have more than three times the
severely malnourished children over a
number of patients that it could ade-
two-month period from December 1974
quately handle and to be short of anti-
due to lack of beds. The Officle of the
biotics, sterile dressings, syringes and
Inspector-General in the report quote(d
stethoscopes. Such modern equipment
above noted, "It requires little imagina-
it did have - operating room lights and
tion to picture these wretchedly frail and sterilisation equipment - was rendered
sickly little bodies, borne away in their unusable by continual power shortages
weak mothers' arms, carried to an ally (US Senate Committee on the Judiciarv
somewhere, to die: certain to suffer un- report). The same committee reported
treated,,unhospitalised, unfed." Dr Gay as early as 1971 that another major
Alexander, head of Catholic Relief Ser- hospital, the Khmer-Sovietique Hospi-
vices, stated in March 1975, "hundreds tal, had only 512 beds and 27 doctors
are dying of malnutrition every day". for 1,009 patients. Newsweek reported
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 ECONOMIC AND
an eyewitness to the same hospital in
March 1975:
"In the Khmer-Sovietique hospital,
more than 1,300 patients struggled for
survival last week. Doctors, nurses,me-
dical corpsmen, drugs and plasma were
scarce; malaria, tuberculosis and dysen-
tery were rampant. Out of desperation,
overworked staffers in some wards tied
wounded men to their beds to pervent
them from breaking open their wounds
and sutures. Flies covered the face of
one such patient, who could only shake
his bead feebly in a vain attempt to
keep them from crawling into his
mouth."
In his testimonv to the US Senate
Subcommittee on the Judiciary in Ja-
nuary 1975, Dr David French ("Hu-
manitarian Problems in Indochina")
describes a visit to one of the hospitals:
"We walked down corridors with
stretchers of mien with open wouhds
unattended; filth and detritus, flies and
insects and everything there, and there
was obviously no medical personnel to
meet their needs."
A report of Inspector-general of
Foreign Assistance over the samle pe-
riod reads:
"The facilities were not only over-
crowded; for the most part they were
crude and unsanitary. There was an
acute shortage of medicines and drugs.
Death frequently resulted from infec-
tion and lack of proper care; medica-
tion was not being administered to
patients suffering severed limbs or
gross traumatic abdominal wounds.
Little or inadequate antibiotic therapy
was being given to patients in need of
such tlMerapy... Patients overflowed
the wards and were lying on mats or
stretchers in the halls and corridors,
their unattended wounds exposed to
the dirt and filth of aseptic conditions;
the stink of pus and infection mingled
with the foul odour from clogged,
flooded toilets."
Such were the conditions v-hich the
Khmer guerillas inherited when they
marchied into Phnom Penh in April
1975. It was to meet these conditions
- to move the city people out to the
source of food supplies and in reach of
proper medical care offered by clinics
already set up in the liberated bases
- that the evacuation of Phnom Penh
was carried out. It was later alleged
that the Khmer Rouge had closed all
the hospitals, leaving their patients to
die in cold-blooded hatred. This was
not true. The only hospital considered
fit to take patients, the fornerly French-
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POLITICAL WEEKLY
run Calmette hospital was never
closed. According to Lawrence Masu-
rel in his report, "Phnom Penh, L'am-
bassade en perdition" printed in Paris-
Match of May 10 1975, ten French
doctors who appeared from the hospi-
tal to join the other foreigners assem-
bled at the French Embassy compound
stated, "WV'e have the impression that
they are replacing us with their ownI
doctors and in any case, the hospital
is functioning normally". Far from
causing deaths from starvation and un-
sanitary conditions, the Khmer revolu-
tionary soldiers must have saved an
inestimable number of lives by hastily
moving about three million persons to
the countryside where both food and
adequate medical care were available,
away from the deathhole of Phnom
Penh.
RESTRUCTURING OF KHMER SoCIETY
Democratic Kampuchea thus inherit-
ed starvation and unsanitary health
conditions from the previous Lon Nol
administration and its US backers; the
governmlent of Democratic Kampuchea
did not create these conditions, but it
had to find solutions to them. More-
over, Agence France Presse had re-
ported Lon Nol's Premier, Long Bo.-et
as stating on the eve of the surrender
of Phnom Penh, that the city had suffli-
cient rice for only eight days. Trans-
porting food to the city of Phnom Penh
was impossible. Firstly, as Ieng Sary
later pointed out (in an interview in
Chicago Tribunie, September 10, 1975):
"We did not have sufficilent transporta-
tion to move food into the capital."
Moreover, there was a shortage of fuel
since the new government received
virtually no foreign aid and had been
reliant on supplies captured from the
enemy during the war; afi_r the US
supplies of fuel to the Lon Nol regime
dried up, the new administration had
to trade for fuel across the border in
Thailand (according to a r-port by Sri
Lankan journalist, Errol de Silva, wlho
visited Kampuchea in August 1975).
Lack of pure water was also a health
hazard in the city; the US Inspector-
General of Foreign Assistance reported
in March 1975 that contaminated water
supplies presented "the potential for
the spread of epidemics of cholera and
typhoid fever" and concluded that
"Unsanitarv living conditions in Phnom
Penh caused by crowding and the in-
flux of refugees into the city create a
health hazard and present a danger of
epidemics". Although several w-itosses
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May 5, 1979
later reported that the new administra-
tion's soldiers had administered cholera
voccine to the population, there was
simply not enough to go round.
But the plan to evacuate the cities
was certainly not a new one. Thai
military intelligence r-eports had stressed
that the Khmer Rouge were militarily
capable of taking Phnom Penh when-
ever they wished for a couple of years
prior to the actual liberation of the
city; the fact that the Khmer Rouge
did not choose to take the city and
thus end the war earlier must have
been related to the logistics of supply-
ing the city of Phnom Penh. The
Khmer Rouge leaders moveover con-
side-red the cities (Phnom Penh and to
a lesser extent, Battambang) as a
false, oultside creations within Cam-
bodia. Life in the cities was a
life-sty,le imported from the West;
the cities were sort of internal
enclaves of WVestern culture, foreign
businesses and diplomats, totally unre-
lated to the rest of the Cambodian pea-
sant economy; the money-market eco-
nomy only operated in the cities (the
rest of the nation operated on a barter/
natural economy). The clear intention
to restructure the Cambodian economy
- minus its city enclaves of Western
culture and domination - had already
been expressed in Khieu Samphan's
early thesis on "Underdevelopment in
Cambodia". But the appalling condi-
tions inherited by the new administra-
tion in Phnom Penh added new ur-
gency to implementing the plan. There
wiere doubtless deaths during the eva-
cuation (admitted by leng Sary) and
disease might well have broken out
during the evacuation before people
could be got to the clinics in the for-
mer liberated country areas; but to
blame this on the Khmer Rouge is ab-
surd. Having inherited these foul con-
ditions from Lon Nol and the USA,
the Khmer Rouge rallher did all thev
could to alleviate the number of deaths
and the toll was much less than might
have been expected. Father Englemann
has summarised reports received from
Catholic priests who were involved in
the evacuation as, "Durina the first
days there were deaths: some very
ill, some old people, some newly born
- but very few. In any event, not
thousands, as certain newspapers have
written." Since 1972 there had been a
comprehensive medical care system set
up in the liberated areas consisting of
at least one hospital in each provinc-,
a fully-trained doctor for each district,
819
 May 5, 1979 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

a medical committee for each village
and two male nurses with three year3
medical training for each hamlet.
The entire system was under the direc-
tion of Dr Thiounn Thioeun, the for-
mer Dean of the Medician Faculty at
the University of Phnom Penh and ex-
director of the Khmer-Sovietique Hos-
pital. It was to get the sick under the
care of this superior and alreadv exis-
ting medical structure that they, too,
were evacuated from the insanitarv
hospitals of Phnom Penh.
There have also been allegations that
the populace of Democratic Kampuchea
w-as forced to labour under severely
hard conditions at gun point. As men-
tioned above, the only photographic
evidence adduced to prove this (print-
ed in the Washington Post) was so
suspect that a generally anti-communist
Thai newspaper refused to publish it.
Neither do these allegations accord
with observations of any of the foreign
visitors to Kampuchea. Ito Tadashi,
the Kyodo News Service correspondent
who visited Cambodia in September
last year, quotes working hour figures
that tally with the observations of othercomplained that the normal factory
foreigners; namely an 8-hour work-
ing day in both countryside and
few factories in the cities, divided into they had escaped from in Kam-
periods of 6 to 11 in the morning and puclhea" (unpublished letter to the
2 to 5 in the afternoon. He confirms
that meals are usually eaten communally ed in Journal of Contemporary Asia).
in the communes or factories. He also
added:
"In our journey of more than 1,000
kilometres across rural Cambodia. the
expressions of most of the farmers we press about all three Indochinese coun-
saw along the road were bright. One had tries since their liberation is pnesently
the impression both that these people
had adjusted well to their new environ-
ment and that in many ways the leisu-
rely relaxed atmosphere peculiar to ru-
ral areas in the tropics had suvived po-
litical changes." (japan T-imes, October
20, 1978.)
Elizabeth Becker also noted in her
report in Newsweek (January 8, 1979), reed with Caldwell's conclusions,
"We saw no such abuses ourselves...
Where are those armed guards oppres-
sing the peasantry?' Caldwell, would
cry mockingly as we drove past rice
fields with no guards in sight."
With regard to the observed working
houirs and conditions, one might pro-
fitably compare them with the situation
of day-labourers in Japan in such areas
as Kamgasaki. Even when jobs are avai-
lable, most day labourers leave home
at 6 am and do net usually return until
after 7 pm (the time taken including
work bours, finding a job and transpor-
tation tim^5 Frotm their meagre earn-
ings they often have to pay their night-
ly rent at a "doya" or hotel, as well
as tuberculosis (which is not supposed
provided for them). There are no ade-
quate health schemes, and diseases such
as tuberculosis (which is not supposed
to exist in "modem" Japan) are quite
high. By such comparisons, it is diffi-
cult to view the Kampuchean peasant,
working 8 hours per day in the fields,
wvith a 3-hour mid-day break and meals
provided on -the spot, as a brutally-
oppressed labourer. (Health care is, of
course, free of charge.) It is perhaps
not surprising that those few lower
class Cambodian refugees who have
come to the West - such as Khuon
Sakhon, a former peasant, and Peang
Sophi, a worker, in Melbourne, Austra-
lia, give a very different picture of
working conditions in Democratic Kam-
puchea. Peang Sophi has stated that
working conditions in revolutionarv
Kampuchea in 1975-76 were less severe
than in the Melbourne factory where he
now works and Cambodian nesident in
Australia, Chantou Boua, has stated,
"many refugees arriving in Melbourne
work theyv began doing was 'harder'
than the so-called forced labour
Times dated August 10, 1977 reproduc-
Notes
rA much more detailed book, outlining
the falsehoods spread bv the Wiestern
being prepared by Noam Chomsky for
publication in the USA.]
1 The twisting and turning distortions
wbich the information underwent
prior to appearing in the Christian
Science Monitor editorial were in-
vestigated through correspondence
with the authors involved by Mal-
colm Caldwell. Despite the fact
that informants at each stage ag-
the Christian Science Monitor ne-
ver published any retraction of the
extreme conclusions of the edito-
rial. Caldwell's correspondence on
the subject was subsequently pub-
lished in the Journal of Contempo-
rany Asia.
2 The precise number of Khmer re-
fugees in Thailand is difficult to
ascertain. The UN Commissioner
on Refugees has stated on several
occasions that thiere were 170,000
refugees in Thailand from Cambo-
dia and Laos. For the number of
Cambodian refugees the Agence
France Presse has estimated them
to be between 30 and 50,000.
However, Thai Communist party
publications early this year claim-
ed that the number of Khmer re-
fugees may be as low as only
10,000. Whichever figure is accep-
ted for the number of Khmer re-
fugees, it is in any case extremely
small, a fact which in itself
should be a cause for serious iie-
flection.
Both the Thai government and
the UN Cornmissioner for Refugees
have frequently stated that the
number of Laotian refugees in
Thailand is "over 120,000". For
both Laos and Cambodia, Thai-
land represents the only land exit
route for refugees and it may be
pertinent to wonder why there
should be more than 120,000 re-
fugees from Laos with a popula-
tion of around a mere 3 millions,
whereas for Kampucbea - with a
much greater population of nearly
8 millions - there ane, taking a
larger estimate, only about 40,000!
These figures alone would sug-
gest that conditions in Laos should
le carefully scrutinised - rather
than those in Kampuchea! It is
rather difficult to establish the ac-
curacy of information pertaining to
Laotain conditions. Suffice it -to say
that Thai Communist party source6
have claimed early this year that
since Laos and Viet Nam signed a
25-year "Treaty of Friendship and
Co-operation" in July 1977, as
many as one million Vietnamese
have immigrated to Laos as settlers.
It is also claimed that Viet Nam has
as many as 40 or 50,000 troops
permanently stationed in Laos. If
true, the unavoidable implication
is that almost a quarter of Laos'
population is now Vietnamese and,
whatever justifiable reasons there
may have been for this migration,
it does appear reminiscent of an
extreme form of "assimilation" po-
licy and casts considerable doubt
on Viet Nam's motives in establish-
ing an "Indochina Federation".
The present Laotian premier, Khay-
sone Phomvihane, is half-Vietna-
mese. That all is not well in Laos
was indicated by the flight in late
March this year of Laotian Deputy
Premier, Phoumi Vongvichit, across
the Mekong to Thailand. He ap-
peared to be making his wav to
China, but apparently agreed to
return to Laos after meeting with
representatives of Khaysone in
Hong Kong. The full details behind
the incident are not vet known.
Nevertheless, it must be a cause
for reflection that Phoumi, a sta-
unch Laotian liberation fighter
during the war, should have come
to contemplate such a course of
action.
3 The incident was fully reported in
a February 1978 issue of the Thai
language Athit (Sun) magazine.
The same magazine in March also
suggested that the former Thai
ambassador to (Lon Nol's) Phnom
Penh, Chanat Samutwanlich, had

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY May 5, 1979

been involved in these activities.
In the interview, carried in Athit,
Chanat stated that as ex-Ambassa-
dor, many refugees who had been
his former friends in Phnom Penh
came to seiek humanitarian aid
from him. He added that he had
been pressured by several high
fiZures in the Thai military to as- improving relations with Indochina.
sist the refugees, clearly indicating The magazine concluded that, as
that the refugees were receivinr
political assistance from high Thai
quarters. Nevertheliess in a subse-
quent interview in the Matichon
magazine (March 12, 1979), Cha-
nat stated that in order to get rice
and fish (from Tonglesap) the
Vietnamese "are forcing the Khmer KamDpudhea under Pol Pot. Shortly
peasants to work much, much har-
der than under the former Pol Pot
government".
4 According to the February 1978
Athit article quoted above,
Kittivutho is running military trai-
ning programmes for the Khmer
refugees from Wat Jittapawan
Ternple in Chonburi Province.,
East of Bangkok.
5 AthWt demonstrated in its early
1978 issues that the refugee re-
ports of atrocities reached their
height under the Thanin govern-
ment. It noted that both atrocity
reports and border incidents dra-
matically declined after Kriangsak
took power in October 1977 as
the mew government was intent on
the reports and their tone varied in
quality and quantity according to
the attitudes of the governments
in power in Bangkok, they reflected
only the current attitudes of the
Bangkok administration, and not
the objective situation pertaining in
after these statements, Athit re-
ported that it had been instructed
by General Prem, Deputy Assistaint
Commander-in-Chief of the Thai
army, to cease from publishing
any further information on the
Khmer refugees in Thailand.
6 Vietnamese government sources
have been the most common source
of atrocity stories. It is interesting
to note that the Soviet Union ini-
tially attacked the atrocity reports
and human rights allegations about
Kampuchea. As Soviet relations
with Viet Nam deepened, the tenor
of Soviet reports was toned down,
until, ater the signing of the Soviet
Viet Nam Treaty last December,
the Soviet Union accomplished a
propaganda about-face and added
its voice to those condemning Pol
Pot for atrocities and violations of
human rights.
7 The details which follow on the
growth of starvation in Phnom
Penh, the breakdwn of medical ser-
vices and the evacuation of the
cities are largely taken from t'he
firt two chapters of "Cambodia:
Starvation and Revolution" by
George C Hildebrand and Gareth
Porte.r (Monthly Review Press,
1976). Limitations of space have
not permitted the translation in
full of these two excellently docu-
rnented chapters. To save space,
also, a number of the original re-
ferences have had to be omitted.
Readers wishing to dheck source
references will easily find them in
the long section of footnotes at the
end of the original book.

Demand for Total Ban on Cow Slaughter

in IKerala and West Bengal
Some Observations
K N Raj

Vinoba Bhave's demand for banning cow slaughter in Kerala and West Bengal anid his fa
ing its acceptance raise three sets of issues; (a).the constitutional and legal basis of the d
economic rationale, and (c) the political implications and possible conisequences. This note exam
issutes.

VINOBA BHAVE'S demand for total
banning of cow slaughter in Kerala
and West Bengal, and his fast-unto-
death for gaining its acceptance, raise
three sets of issues which we need to
understand verv clearly. rhey are (a)
the constitutional and legal basis of
the demand, (b) its economic rationale,
and (c) the political implications and
the possible consequences.
The constitutional basis of the
demand is Article 48 of the Indian
Constitution, and the legal sanction
claimed is from a Supreme Court
judgment on cow slaughter delivered
in April 1958. Let us therefore consi-
der first what each of these says and
what follows from it.
Article 48 of the Constitution is
quite explicit on the question. "The
State", it says, "Shall endeavour to
organise agriculture ard animal bus-
bandry on modern and scientific lines
and shall, in particular, take steps for
preserving and improving the breeds,
and prohibiting the slaughter of cows
and calves and other milch and
draught cattle". This is in fact one of
the Directive Principles of State
Policy, which have been laid down as
"fundamental in the governance of
the country".
The Directive Principles are however
not enforceable by any court, and are
only a broad guide to policy. They are
to be applied in making laws, and it is
these laws alone that can be appealed
to or challenged in couris of law.
Moreover, if the laws so framed are
challenged, the courts are free to
interpret the relevant Directive Princi-
ple and decide wheher or not the
laws are in conformity with it and the
other provisions of the Constitution.
In fact this is what makes the
Supreme Court judgment of 1958 so
im.port4nt in this context. The Gov-
ernment of Uttar Pradesh had enacted
legislation in 1955 imposing a total ban
on cow slaughter, but only on the
slaughter of "the cow and its progeny";
while a lhw passecd by the Bihar
Legislature a year later imposed a total
ban on the slaughter cf all categories
of bovine cattle including buffaloes. On
the face of it one would think that
the Bihar legislation carried out the
intention of the Directive Principle
more fully, as Article 48 covered not
only cows and calves but other milch
and draught cattle as well. And yet
the Supreme Court thought otherwise,
and struck down the portions of the
Bihar law which prohibited the
slaughter of she-buffaloes, breeding
bulls and working bullocks (both
cattle and buffalo); it upheld in full
the constitutional validity of only the
Uttar Pradesh legislation. We need to
understand the grounds on which the
Supreme Court arrived at these deci-
sions, particuiarly because they pro-

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