Marbury v.

Madison
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson
took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adamss term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to
compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the
United States.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances
of the case

COURT RULING:

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury's petition
for mandamus on the argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the
law on which Marbury based the said petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have
appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. In the case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury
had already attained the five year legal right ti the commission because of the fact that the
commission document has been completed the moment it was officially sealed, obliterating any
doubt as to the authenticity of the signature affixed by the US President himself. However,
Marbury failed to show that the mandamus he prays for is an exercise of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction, which led to the denial of his petition.

"It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings
in a case already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus
may be directed ot courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the
same as to sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable
the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction"

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as
other departments, are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice
Marshall. He further reiterated that the written Constitution should be upheld and protected at
all times, and that the Court has a duty to ensure that such reverence is given to the written
Constitution. It must remain above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written
Constitution which itself is the source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to
assign original jurisdiction to that Court in other cases; provided those cases belong to the
jurisdictional power of the US. As to the power of the President over the officer whom he
appoints, it is limited by the written Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he
affixed his signature unto the commission document and "to withhold the commission x x x is an
act deemed by the Court not warranted by law but violative of a vested right."

The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court's
jurisdiction, and any law enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court's
jurisdiction without the Court's prior consent is unconstitutional and must be discharged.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for
filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not

through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral and constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but
as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a
grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought
to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a
permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that
the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the
Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted
to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

RATIO DECIDENTI:The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief
inthe form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before
the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger
of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to
determined the validity of executive and legislativeaction he must show that he has sustained
common interest to all members of thepublic. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a
law unconstitutional arises onlywhen the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority
for their protectionagainst actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision
of actualcases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidentalto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and
under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in thelast
resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy betweenlitigants.
Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actualpositive relief and the
court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question tosatisfy scholarly interest therein.
The court however, finds the defendant position to besufficiently sustained and state that the
petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulationnot to invalidate the law because it needs no
argument to show that abuse by officialsentrusted with the execution of the statute does not
per se demonstrate theunconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the
court conclude thatthere has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the
petitionersappended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of
Educationthey fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally
objectionablefor being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for
prohibition.

Whether the Court should take cognizance of the petition? - YESSolicitor General argues
that:oThere is no justiciable controversy because the petitioners have suffered no wrong under
the terms of law and thus, not entitled to any relief.oAll of them have permits to operate and are
actually operating by virtue of their permits. They do not assert thatthe Secretary of Education
has threatened to revoke their permits

Joya vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance

Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon
Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christies of 82
Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique
silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the
consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit
submitted audit findings to the President the assets subject of auction were historical relics
and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain
respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV
of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing
means a personal and substantial interest ion the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings
legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the
Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects were
confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without complying
with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners.
Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become
publicly owned.The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Mariano vs COMELEC

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya
Bautista,Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero,Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba and Perfecto Alba filed
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief,
assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Petitioners contend that (1)
Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds
with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X
and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will
restart the term of the present municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor
Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is
unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.
ection 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
RA no. 7854 provisions
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of theMunicipality of
Makati
shall continue as theofficials of the City of Makati and shall exercisetheir powers and functions
until such time that anew election is held
and the duly elected officialsshall have already qualified and assume their offices:Provided, The
new city will acquire a new corporate

petitioners pointed out that sec 51 were crafted to suit political ambitions incumbent Mayor
Jejomar Binay as he could possibly run for the same position and seek another 3 year
consecutive term. The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section
51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Oposa vs. Factoran

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruledthat the children had the legal standing to
file the casebased on the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility. Their right to a healthy
environmentcarried with it an obligation to preserve that environmentfor the succeeding
generations. In this, the Courtrecognized legal standing to sue on behalf of futuregenerations.
Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of
the police power of the state in the interest of publicwelfare

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in
his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil
case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm
and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law
The Court does not agree with the trial courts conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that
the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind.

KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO
was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational
company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long
engaged in lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with
some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the
technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to
PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated
by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. On 21 October 1993, the
Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the country's on-
line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for
final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Petitioners also submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed
Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold
and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
foreign or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the
"Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery
system, also known as "lotto."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing)

HELD:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by
respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The
preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the respondents
should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category
even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise.
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to
take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by
B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot
exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the
challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.

Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was
made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was
the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An
agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-
Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the
agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train
cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay
rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall
have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to
the government for $1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign
corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility
such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The
petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato

GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the
provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries
through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly.
Term is 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
It is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSOs charter.
It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and
it is not most advantageous to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

Rulings:

Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
cases are not.
RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioners standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real parties of interest.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.

petitioners are not the real parties to the contract. Petitioners allege that their standing in the
previous suit was sustained, however, the court held that the previous suit is different from the
present case. ELA is different from the 1993 Contract of Lease. The Law of the case does not
apply, so the ruling in the first case does not apply to the case now. Moreover, petitioners did
not
show what particular interest they have for bringing this suit. There was no allegation of misuse
of public funds to make this action a public one.
Since the petitioners have no substantial interest in the ELA that would entitle them to bring this
suit, they are not the real parties to the agreement. The real parties are the ones who can claim
a
right or are prejudiced in their rights.
ELA is a lease contract and contains none of the features of the former contract which were
considered badges of a joint venture agreement. The petitioners invoked EO No. 301 but this
doesnt apply to Contracts of Lease of equipment. EO No. 301 only applies to contracts for
purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. Heavy equipment is not a supply.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air
time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view
of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the
creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner
disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which
only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only
Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or
even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,
nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities.
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial
redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No.
70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being that case,
petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his
pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in
the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of
the Constitution.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the
EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other
commisioners in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001
addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment in
a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically,
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of
the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited
during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her
request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws,
rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in
essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated
for the implementation of said law.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seek... declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of

2003)... suffer from constitutional infirmity.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,"
appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental... budget on
the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right
to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an... unconstitutional
statute.

The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds[3]
because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional... act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens.
The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has
seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino
people.

he need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is... buttressed by the fact
that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring
Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos... abroad.

Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition... and
determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely
abused the discretion entrusted to it.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six... months immediately
preceding an election.

He claims that the right of suffrage... should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in
the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in
keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage
of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.

The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by the vice of
prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila

FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes
in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa
Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC.
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.

On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing
the Ordinance.

On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.

The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is
a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila
charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional since
it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners have standing

RULING:

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering wash-up rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are
also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments
have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection
to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.
More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,[26]
sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions
rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which
concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of a direct
and personal interest presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's
standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the
meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability
in Allen v. Wright.
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote
that: We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving
him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant
must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."Herein, it is clear that the business interests of
the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the
Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our
nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a
hindrance for customers to bring suit.

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing
to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or
classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,[35] the United States
Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that
would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to
their patients. The Court held that:

The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to
them."

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren, wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection
claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained
that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek
access to their market or function.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to
assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis,
challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties.
Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine
applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case,
the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a wash-rate time frame.

IN RE CUNANAN

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to
1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A.
972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed
if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although
for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the
correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953
75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the
S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and
secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise
adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large,
the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
- An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
- The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
- The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
- Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set
in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is
not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
- Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or
alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to
the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules
promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of
art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-
1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar
from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a
GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having
passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

People of the Philippines V. Efren Mateo y Garcia

On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against
appellantEfren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of
the trial court andrecommends an acquittal of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the
expressprovision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, lifeimprisonment or death

Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must
be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition

The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the
direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offensescommitted on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more seriousoffense for which the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice findsjustification in
the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rulesof Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:(d) All criminal cases
in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has
evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised PenalCode, as amended by Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained inSection 3 of Rule 122, Section 10
of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be
stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusivein character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.In passing, during the deliberations among
the members of the Court, there has been amarked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of
guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Someare convinced that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept therecommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor
General on the ground of inadequate proof of guiltbeyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion
best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,the determination and appreciation of primarily factual
matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.Categories

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service
Commission to release information on the civil service eligibilities of persons employed as
sanitarians (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) in the Health Department of Cebu City.
OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual interest. The
Court ruled however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the right of the people for
information on matters of public concern which is a public right.
1. The petitioner being a citizen (hence, part of the public) warrants standing in his part;
and
2. The State and its agents are mandated by the Constitution by virtue of Sec. 7 Article III
and Sec. 28, Article II.

Issue: WON respondent should release the information.

Held: Yes.
The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded on Sec.
7, Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-executory.
In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have
the discretion to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority
to regulate the manner of examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not
damaged or destroyed).
These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are subject to the
limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III Sec. 7 2nd sentence). The information
sought must be not be exempted by law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law.
Why/ How?
1. the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a
legitimate concern of citizens (public office as public trust);
2. Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit
the petitioners right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
3. Civil service exams results are released in the public.
Ratio:
Government agencies such as the Civil Service Commission do not have the discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.
What is within the bounds of the agencies then? They still have the authority to regulate
the manner of examining public records.
v The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit.
v The Court provided a distinction between discretion/ prohibition and authority to
regulate.
o Refusal to disclose only the Legislature may impose (Sec. 6, Article III)
o Authority to regulate the manner of examination done by government
agency which has the custody of public records.
v In case of denial by the agency, it must prove that the information is not of public
concern or if it is of public concern, it is within the exemptions (e.g. national
security). Further, every denial is subject to review by courts.
Is the information sought by the petitioner considered public concern/ interest within
those mentioned in the articles? YES!
v The constitutional guarantees are not absolute as the law may exempt certain types
of information from public scrutiny such as those affecting national security.
v There is no rigid test as the term public concern/ interest is broad. It is for the
courts to determine if the information falls within public concern or public
interest.
Legal historical background of the right to public information
Right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the
1973 Constitution (Section 6 of Article IV-Bill of Rights).
This was retained by Article III Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Further, such
guarantee was enhanced with the adoption of Section 18, Article II (Policy of Full
Public Disclosure).

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF

APPEALS

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision,

promulgated by the Court of Appeals, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and
Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health," which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Facts:
The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the Department of Health (DOH) in
1999, which provided five areas of general reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal
autonomy to government hospitals that implements the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners alleged that the implementation
of the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantage Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for
violating the following constitutional provisions: Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II,
Section 1 of Article III, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII, and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV.
On May 24, 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled Redirecting the functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided
for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. The petitioners
contented that a law, such as E.O. No. 120, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should
be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that E.O. No. 102
is void, as this was enacted ultra vires on the part of the President. The Court of Appeals (CA)
denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal. The CA also ruled
that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the various sections of Article II, III, XIII
and XV of the 1987 Constitution. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the
petitioners but the same was denied in a resolution dated March 7, 2005. Hence this petition.
Ruling
In a number of cases,[41] the Court upheld the standing of citizens whofiled suits, wherein the
transcendental importance of the constitutionalquestion justified the granting of relief. In
spite of these rulings, the Court,in Domingo v. Carague,[42] dismissed the petition when
petitioners thereinfailed to show any present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even inthe
cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantialinterest. Present
substantial interest, which will enable a party to questionthe validity of the law, requires that a
party sustained or will sustain directinjury as a result of its enforcement.[43] It is distinguished
from a mereexpectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[44] In the
same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & BroadcastAttorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
v. Comelec,[45] ruled that a citizen isallowed to raise a constitutional question only when he
can show that he haspersonally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
theallegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable tothe challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorableaction. This case likewise stressed
that the rule on constitutional questionswhich are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked
where a partyssubstantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys standing is determined bythe
substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After acareful scrutiny of the
petitioners substantive claims, this Court finds that thepetitioners miserably failed to show any
merit to their claims

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary

Facts of the Case
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.
364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with prayer for injunctive relief.
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of
separation of powers. It contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by
statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere
executive orders. While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the
President who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits that this broad power of control including the
power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner
contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President to ensure that the laws,
including those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an
extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an independent agency under
the Office of the President. It thus argues that since the legislature had seen fit to create
these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates, the President should respect
that legislative disposition. In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these
administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.
AMIN argues that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can be no policy
and program coordination between conceptually different areas of reform (NCIP and
DAR). It claims that the new framework subsuming agrarian reform, urban land reform
and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally incoherent in view of the widely different
contexts. And it posits that it is a substantive transformation or reorientation that runs
contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies.
AMIN argues that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of
agrarian reform to encompass NCIP and PCUP, and that how the law is ordered in a
certain way should not be undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of
administrative efficiency.

Whether or not the AMIN has locus standi-yes

Whether or not MDOI has locus standi-no
Ruling
Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization, petitioners locus standi or legal
standing, inter alia,[4] becomes a preliminary question.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes that
AMIN[5] has the requisite legal standing to file this suit as member[6] of Congress.
Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of the
Legislature. They posit that an act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned
by a member of Congress.[7] They add that to the extent that the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.[8]
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[9]
The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered peoples
organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi
in the province of Maguindanao.
As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIPs
becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain claims.
It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the processing of ancestral
domain claims filed by its members.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[10]
It has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act
is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[11]
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[12]
An examination of MDOIs nebulous claims of negative impact and probable
setbacks[13] shows that they are too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable.
And the line of causation it proffers between the challenged action and alleged
injury is too attenuated.
Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work
injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the
requisite standing. Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest it with
the legal standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes

FACTS
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon
Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Taon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Taon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the areas underwater composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well.
Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Taon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other
Purposes.
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Taon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latters
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the Resident Marine Mammals which inhibit
the waters in and around the Taon Strait, joined by Stewards Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection.
Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their
contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the payao or the artificial
reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-
kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Taon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations
are:
- The Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file
the petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.

W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have standing as the real party-in-
interests in this suit

Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit. A citizens
suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of
environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a
representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on
behalf of the real party in interest.

WON Petitioners have a legal standing

Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
Section 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action
to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the
filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a
brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.