9/17/2015 G.R. No.

105371

TodayisThursday,September17,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.105371November11,1993

THEPHILIPPINEJUDGESASSOCIATION,dulyrep.byitsPresident,BERNARDOP.ABESAMIS,Vice
PresidentforLegalAffairs,MARIANOM.UMALI,DirectorforPasig,Makati,andPasay,MetroManila,
ALFREDOC.FLORES,andChairmanoftheCommitteeonLegalAid,JESUSG.BERSAMIRA,Presiding
JudgesoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch85,QuezonCityandBranches160,167and166,Pasig,Metro
Manila,respectively:theNATIONALCONFEDERATIONOFTHEJUDGESASSOCIATIONOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,composedoftheMETROPOLITANTRIALCOURTJUDGESASSOCIATIONrep.byits
President.REINATOQUILALAoftheMUNICIPALTRIALCIRCUITCOURT,ManilaTHEMUNICIPALJUDGES
LEAGUEOFTHEPHILIPPINESrep.byitsPresident,TOMASG.TALAVERAbythemselvesandinbehalfof
alltheJudgesoftheRegionalTrialandShari'aCourts,MetropolitanTrialCourtsandMunicipalCourts
throughouttheCountry,petitioners,
vs.
HON.PETEPRADO,inhiscapacityasSecretaryoftheDepartmentofTransportationandCommunications,
JORGEV.SARMIENTO,inhiscapacityasPostmasterGeneral,andthePHILIPPINEPOSTALCORP.,
respondents.

CRUZ,J.:

ThebasicissueraisedinthispetitionistheindependenceoftheJudiciary.Itisassertedbythepetitionersthatthis
hallmarkofrepublicanismisimpairedbythestatuteandcirculartheyareherechallenging.TheSupremeCourtis
itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the
same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge,
becausenootherofficehastheauthoritytodoso.Weshallthereforeactuponthismatternotwithofficiousnessbut
inthedischargeofanunavoidabledutyand,asalways,withdetachmentandfairness.

ThemaintargetofthispetitionisSection35ofR.A.No.7354asimplementedbythePhilippinePostalCorporation
throughitsCircularNo.
9228.ThesemeasureswithdrawthefrankingprivilegefromtheSupremeCourt,theCourtofAppeals,theRegional
TrialCourts,theMetropolitanTrialCourts,theMunicipalTrialCourts,andtheLandRegistrationCommissionandits
RegistersofDeeds,alongwithcertainothergovernmentoffices.

Thepetitionersaremembersofthelowercourtswhofeelthattheirofficialfunctionsasjudgeswillbeprejudicedby
theabovenamedmeasures.TheNationalLandRegistrationAuthorityhastakencommoncausewiththeminsofar
as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion,ithasbeenallowedtointervene.

ThepetitionassailstheconstitutionalityofR.A.No.7354onthegroundsthat:(1)itstitleembracesmorethanone
subjectanddoesnotexpressitspurposes(2)itdidnotpasstherequiredreadingsinbothHousesofCongressand
printedcopiesofthebillinitsfinalformwerenotdistributedamongthemembersbeforeitspassageand(3)itis
discriminatoryandencroachesontheindependenceoftheJudiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
statutes.ThetheoryisthatasthejointactoftheLegislatureandtheExecutive,everystatuteissupposedtohave
first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is
clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself
upheld.Todoubtistosustain.

I
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WeconsiderfirsttheobjectionbasedonArticleVI,Sec.26(l),oftheConstitutionprovidingthat"Everybillpassedby
theCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof."

Thepurposesofthisruleare:(1)topreventhodgepodgeor"logrolling"legislation(2)topreventsurpriseorfraud
uponthelegislaturebymeansofprovisionsinbillsofwhichthetitlegivesnointimation,andwhichmighttherefore
be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in
orderthattheymayhaveopportunityofbeingheardthereon,bypetitionorotherwise,iftheyshallsodesire.1

ItisthesubmissionofthepetitionersthatSection35ofR.A.No.7354whichwithdrewthefrankingprivilegefromthe
Judiciaryisnotexpressedinthetitleofthelaw,nordoesitreflectitspurposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities,ProvidingforRegulationoftheIndustryandforOtherPurposesConnectedTherewith."

TheobjectivesofthelawareenumeratedinSection3,whichprovides:

TheStateshallpursuethefollowingobjectivesofanationwidepostalsystem:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee,withfullrecognitionoftheirprivacyorconfidentiality

b)topromoteinternationalinterchange,cooperationandunderstandingthroughtheunhamperedflow
orexchangeofpostalmattersbetweennations

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
includingbutnotlimitedto,philately,transferofmoniesandvaluables,andthelike

d)toensurethatsufficientrevenuesaregeneratedbyandwithintheindustrytofinancetheoverallcost
ofprovidingthevariedrangeofpostaldeliveryandmessengerialservicesaswellastheexpansionand
continuousupgradingofservicestandardsbythesame.

Sec.35ofR.A.No.7354,whichistheprincipaltargetofthepetition,readsasfollows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
CommonwealthActNo.265,RepublicActsNumbered69,180,1414,2087and5059.TheCorporation
maycontinuethefrankingprivilegeunderCircularNo.35datedOctober24,1977andthatoftheVice
President,undersucharrangementsandconditionsasmayobviateabuseorunauthorizedusethereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.

Thetitleofthebillisnotrequiredtobeanindextothebodyoftheact,ortobeascomprehensiveastocoverevery
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
coversalltheprovisionsoftheact,andisnotcalculatedtomisleadthelegislatureorthepeople,thereissufficient
compliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirement.2

Torequireeveryendandmeansnecessaryfortheaccomplishmentofthegeneralobjectivesofthestatutetobe
expressedinitstitlewouldnotonlybeunreasonablebutwouldactuallyrenderlegislationimpossible. 3Ashasbeen
correctlyexplained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may
properlybeincludedintheact.Thus,itispropertocreateinthesameactthemachinerybywhichthe
actistobeenforced,toprescribethepenaltiesforitsinfraction,andtoremoveobstaclesinthewayof
its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessarythattheyshouldalsohavespecialmentioninthetitle(SouthernPac.Co.v.Bartine,170
Fed.725).

Thisisparticularlytrueoftherepealingclause,onwhichCooleywrites:"Therepealofastatuteonagivensubjectis
properlyconnectedwiththesubjectmatterofanewstatuteonthesamesubjectandthereforearepealingsection
inthenewstatuteisvalid,notwithstandingthatthetitleissilentonthesubject.Itwouldbedifficulttoconceiveofa
mattermoregermanetoanactandtotheobjecttobeaccomplishedtherebythantherepealofpreviouslegislations

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connectedtherewith."4

Thereasonisthatwhereastatuterepealsaformerlaw,suchrepealistheeffectandnotthesubjectofthestatute
anditisthesubject,nottheeffectofalaw,whichisrequiredtobebrieflyexpressedinitstitle.5Asobservedinone
case,6ifthetitleofanactembracesonlyonesubject,weapprehenditwasneverclaimedthateveryotheractwhichrepeals
itoraltersbyimplicationmustbementionedinthetitleofthenewact.Anysuchrulewouldbeneitherwithinthereasonof
theConstitution,norpracticable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishmentoftheprincipalobjectiveofR.A.No.7354,whichisthecreationofamoreefficientandeffective
postalservicesystem.Ourrulingisthat,byvirtueofitsnatureasarepealingclause,Section35didnothavetobe
expresslyincludedinthetitleofthesaidlaw.

II

ThepetitionersmaintainthatthesecondparagraphofSec.35coveringtherepealofthefrankingprivilegefromthe
petitionersandthisCourtunderE.O.207,PD1882andPD26wasnotincludedintheoriginalversionofSenateBill
No.720orHouseBillNo.4200.AsthisparagraphappearedonlyintheConferenceCommitteeReport,itsaddition,
violatesArticleVI,Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution,readingasfollows:

(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparate
days,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbefore
itspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeeta
publiccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

ThepetitionersalsoinvokeSec.74oftheRulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives,requiringthatamendmenttoany
billwhentheHouseandtheSenateshallhavedifferencesthereonmaybesettledbyaconferencecommitteeof
bothchambers.TheystressthatSec.35wasneverasubjectofanydisagreementbetweenbothHousesandsothe
secondparagraphcouldnothavebeenvalidlyaddedasanamendment.

Theseargumentareunacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate
andtheHouse,itisnotlimitedinitsjurisdictiontothisquestion.Itsbroaderfunctionisdescribedthus:

Aconferencecommitteemay,dealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimitedtoresolving
theprecisedifferencesbetweenthetwohouses.Evenwheretheconferencecommitteeisnotbyrule
limitedinitsjurisdiction,legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmatter
canbeinsertedintotheconferencebill.Butoccasionallyaconferencecommitteeproducesunexpected
results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conferencecommittee(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:InaNutshell,1986Ed.,p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approvedbyboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Thereafter,thebillwasenrolledwithitscertification
bySenatePresidentNeptaliA.GonzalesandSpeakerRamonV.MitraoftheHouseofRepresentativesashaving
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
AquinoonApril3,1992.

Underthedoctrineofseparationpowers,theCourtmaynotinquirebeyondthecertificationoftheapprovalofabill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the
enrolledbill,isconclusiveupontheJudiciary(exceptinmattersthathavetobeenteredinthejournalsliketheyeasandnays
onthefinalreadingofthe
bill).8ThejournalsarethemselvesalsobindingontheSupremeCourt,asweheldintheold(butstillvalid)caseofU.S.vs.
Pons,9whereweexplainedthereasonthus:

ToinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippinelegislaturewhentheyare,aswehavesaid,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
PhilippineGovernmentwasbroughtintoexistence,toinvadeacoordinateandindependentdepartment
oftheGovernment,andtointerferewiththelegitimatepowersandfunctions,oftheLegislature.

Applyingtheseprinciples,weshalldeclinetolookintothepetitioners'chargesthatanamendmentwasmadeupon
thelastreadingofthebillthateventuallybecameR.A.No.7354andthatcopiesthereofinitsfinalformwerenot
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the

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measurewasdulyenactedi.e.,inaccordancewithArticleVI,Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution.Weareboundbysuch
officialassurancesfromacoordinatedepartmentofthegovernment,towhichweowe,attheveryleast,abecoming
courtesy.

III

Thethirdandmostseriouschallengeofthepetitionersisbasedontheequalprotectionclause.

ItisallegedthatR.A.No.7354isdiscriminatorybecausewhilewithdrawingthefrankingprivilegefromtheJudiciary,
itretainsthesameforthePresidentofthePhilippines,theVicePresidentofthePhilippinesSenatorsandMembers
oftheHouseofRepresentatives,theCommissiononElectionsformerPresidentsofthePhilippinestheNational
CensusandStatisticsOfficeandthegeneralpublicinthefilingofcomplaintsagainstpublicofficesandofficers.10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the
JudiciarybutalsotheOfficeofAdultEducation,theInstituteofNationalLanguagetheTelecommunicationsOffice
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation the National Historical Commission the Armed Forces of the
Philippines the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee the City and Provincial Prosecutors
theTanodbayan(OfficeofSpecialProsecutor)theKabataangBarangaytheCommissionontheFilipinoLanguage
theProvincialandCityAssessorsandtheNationalCouncilfortheWelfareofDisabledPersons.11

Theequalprotectionofthelawsisembracedintheconceptofdueprocess,aseveryunfairdiscriminationoffends
therequirementsofjusticeandfairplay.IthasnonethelessbeenembodiedinaseparateclauseinArticleIIISec.1.,
oftheConstitutiontoprovideforamore,specificguarantyagainstanyformofunduefavoritismorhostilityfromthe
government.Arbitrarinessingeneralmaybechallengedonthebasisofthedueprocessclause.Butiftheparticular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protectionclause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
shouldbetreatedalike,bothastorightsconferredandresponsibilitiesimposed, 12Similarsubjects,inotherwords,
shouldnotbetreateddifferently,soastogiveunduefavortosomeandunjustlydiscriminateagainstothers.

Theequalprotectionclausedoesnotrequiretheuniversalapplicationofthelawsonallpersonsorthingswithout
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting
maturebookstoallpersons,regardlessofage,wouldbenefitthemoralsoftheyouthbutviolatethelibertyofadults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classificationismeantthegroupingofpersonsorthingssimilartoeachotherincertainparticularsanddifferentfrom
allothersinthesesameparticulars.13

Whatisthereasonforthegrantofthefrankingprivilegeinthefirstplace?Isthefrankingprivilegeextendedtothe
PresidentofthePhilippinesortheCommissiononElectionsortoformerPresidentsofthePhilippinespurelyasa
courtesyfromthelawmakingbody?Isitofferedbecauseoftheimportanceorstatusofthegranteeorbecauseofits
need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pellmell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?

Werejectoutrightthelastconjectureasthereisnodoubtthatthestatuteasawholewascarefullydeliberatedupon,
bythepoliticaldepartmentsbeforeitwasfinallyenacted.Thereisreasontosuspect,however,thatnotenoughcare
orattentionwasgiventoitsrepealingclause,resultingintheunwittingwithdrawalofthefrankingprivilegefromthe
Judiciary.

Wealsodonotbelievethatthebasisoftheclassificationwasmerecourtesy,foritisunimaginablethatthepolitical
departmentswouldhaveintendedthisseriousslighttotheJudiciaryasthethirdofthemajorandequaldepartments
thegovernment.Thesameobservationsaremadeiftheimportanceorstatusofthegranteewasthecriterionused
fortheextensionofthefrankingprivilege,whichisenjoyedbytheNationalCensusandStatisticsOfficeandeven
someprivateindividualsbutnotthecourtsofjustice.

Inourview,theonlyacceptablereasonforthegrantofthefrankingprivilegewastheperceivedneedofthegrantee
for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providingforasmootherflowofcommunicationbetweenthegovernmentandthepeople.

Assumingthatbasis,wecannotunderstandwhy,ofallthedepartmentsofthegovernment,itistheJudiciary,that
hasbeendeniedthefrankingprivilege.Thereisnoquestionthatifthereisanymajorbranchofthegovernmentthat
needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondentswouldjustifythedistinctiononthebasispreciselyofthisneedand,onthisbasis,denytheJudiciarythe
frankingprivilegewhileextendingittootherslessdeserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from
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January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank
mailsfromtheJudiciaryandotheragencieswhosefunctionsincludetheserviceofjudicialprocesses,suchasthe
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails
coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total
amountofP60,991,431.00.Therespondents'conclusionisthatbecauseofthisconsiderablevolumeofmailfrom
theJudiciary,thefrankingprivilegemustbewithdrawnfromit.

Theargumentisselfdefeating.Therespondentsareineffectsayingthatthefrankingprivilegeshouldbeextended
only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who
need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery
althoughitisnotreallynecessarybutnotanoperationthatcansavehislife.

Iftheproblemoftherespondentsisthelossofrevenuesfromthefrankingprivilege,theremedy,itseemstous,isto
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problemisnotsolvedbyviolatingtheConstitution.

InlumpingtheJudiciarywiththeotherofficesfromwhichthefrankingprivilegehasbeenwithdrawn,Section35has
placedthecourtsofjusticeinacategorytowhichitdoesnotbelong.IfitrecognizestheneedofthePresidentofthe
PhilippinesandthemembersofCongressforthefrankingprivilege,thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotrecognizea
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the
withdrawalofthefrankingprivilegefromtheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesLadiesSteeringCommittee,wefailto
understandwhytheSupremeCourtshouldbesimilarlytreatedasthatCommittee.Andwhilewemayconcedethe
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greaterneedisnotrecognizedinthecourtsofjustice.

(Onsecondthought,theredoesnotseemtobeanyjustifiableneedforwithdrawingtheprivilegefromtheArmed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
widows,doesnotsendasmuchfrankmailastheJudiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a governmentcontrolled corporation, was created
and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in
exchangeforthefranchiseextendedtoitbythegovernmentandthemanyadvantagesitenjoysunderitscharter.14
Amongtheservicesitshouldbepreparedtoextendisfreecarriageofmailforcertainofficesofthegovernmentthatneedthe
frankingprivilegeinthedischargeoftheirownpublicfunctions.

WealsonotethatunderSection9ofthelaw,theCorporationiscapitalizedatP10billionpesos,55%ofwhichis
suppliedbytheGovernment,andthatitderivessubstantialrevenuesfromthesourcesenumeratedinSection10,
on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will
crippletheCorporation.

AtthistimewhentheJudiciaryisbeingfaultedforthedelayintheadministrationofjustice,thewithdrawalfromitof
thefrankingprivilegecanonlyfurtherdeepenthisseriousproblem.Thevolumeofjudicialmail,asemphasizedby
the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for
communicatingwithlawyersandlitigantsaspartofthejudicialprocess.TheJudiciaryhasthelowestappropriation
in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments of the P309 billion budgeted for
1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased
difficultiesofourcourtsiftheyhavetoaffixapurchasedstamptoeveryprocesstheysendinthedischargeoftheir
judicialfunctions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or
thingssimilarlysituated.Thedistinctionmadebythelawissuperficial.Itisnotbasedonsubstantialdistinctionsthat
makerealdifferencesbetweentheJudiciaryandthegranteesofthefrankingprivilege.

ThisisnotaquestionofwisdomorpowerintowhichtheJudiciarymaynotintrude.Itisamatterofarbitrarinessthat
thisCourthasthedutyandpowertocorrect.

IV

Insum,wesustainR.A.No.7354againsttheattackthatitssubjectisnotexpressedinitstitleandthatitwasnot
passedinaccordancewiththeprescribedprocedure.However,weannulSection35ofthelawasviolativeofArticle
3,Sec.1,oftheConstitutionprovidingthatnopersonshall"bedeprivedoftheequalprotectionoflaws."

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Wearriveattheseconclusionswithafullawarenessofthecriticismitiscertaintoprovoke.Whilerulingagainstthe
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our
ultimatepowerinourownfavor.Thisisinevitable.Criticismofjudicialconduct,howeverundeserved,isafactoflife
in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can
onlydecidethecasesbeforeusaslawimposesonusthedutytobefairandourownconsciencegivesusthelight
toberight.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 9228 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
RegistrationAuthorityanditsRegisterofDeedstoallofwhichofficesthesaidprivilegeshallbeRESTORED.The
temporaryrestrainingorderdatedJune2,1992,ismadepermanent.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,C.J.,Feliciano,Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,Davide,Jr.,Romero,Nocon,Melo,Quiason,PunoandVitug,JJ.,
concur.

Bellosillo,J.,isonleave.

#Footnotes

1Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations,8thEd.,pp.295296Statevs.Dolan,14L.R.A.1259Statev.
Doherty,29Pac.855.

2PublicServiceCo.v.Recktenwald,8A.L.R.466.

3Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations,8thEd.,pp.297.

4Ibid.,p.302.

5SouthernPac.Co.v.Bartine,170Fed.737.

6CityofWinonav.SchoolDistrict,41N.W.539.

77SCRA347.

8Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1.

934Phil.729

10Rollo,pp.89.

11Ibid.,pp.209210.

12Ichongv.Hernandez,101Phil.1155Sisonv.Ancheta,130SCRA654AssociationofSmall
LandownersinthePhilippinesv.SecretaryofAgrarianReform,175SCRA375.

13InternationalHarvesterCo.v.Missouri,234US199.

14Sec.14ofR.A.No.7354

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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