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Pensee Journal Vol 76, No. 6;Jun 2014

Secularisation in Western Society: An Overview of the Main

Determinants
Ziad Esa YAZID (Corresponding author)
Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen
Department of Economic Geography 0019 Landleven 1, 9747AD, Groningen
and
School of Management, University Science Malaysia
Tel: +31652342054 E-mail: e.b.y.ziad@rug.nl

Ahmad Fauzi ABDUL HAMID

School of Distance Education, University Science Malaysia
Tel: +60164757392 E-mail: afauzi@usm.my

Henk FOLMER
Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen
Department of Economic Geography
Tel: +31 50 363 3875 E-mail: h.folmer@rug.nl
and
College of Economics and Management
Northwest Agricultural and Forestry University
Yangling
China

Justin R. BEAUMONT
Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen
Department of Planning
Tel: +31 624 880 084 E-mail: j.r.beaumont@rug.nl

Abstract
Modern western welfare states are among the most secularised societies in history. Using literature research,
this article reviews the attributes of welfare states that contribute to secularisation, i.e., economic development,
industrialisation, democracy, science and technology and education. Economic development has reduced the

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need for religion to compensate for the frustration of economic deprivation while industrialisation has
changed societys economic activities from primitive agrarian to modern industrialisation, which has reduced
uncertainties and has ultimately led to secularisation. Democracy has made it possible for people to choose
their beliefs. The advancement of science, technology and education has replaced religion to explain events in
a more rational way than offered by religion. So far, it is concluded that these attributes do contribute to
secularisation.
Keywords: Secularisation, Christianity, Welfare
1. Introduction
The famous quote God is Dead is controversial and has provoked much philosophising. It is a widely
quoted statement made by Friedrich Nietzche (1882). He does not mean God in a literal sense. Nietzsche
refers to God according to the Christian faith while dead is interpreted as disbelief. Nietzche refers to
religion in this way arguably because of recent developments and increasing secularisation in the 19th century
in Europe which had marginalised religion that guided every aspect of life in Europe. The French
Revolution is an example of the death of God when French society underwent transformation from a
predominantly Catholic society to a secular one.
One recent case of secularisation circulating in the media today is France. The French government banned
ostentatious religious symbols, observing religious holidays and wearing attire which symbolise religion
(Melanie 2009); for example, religious symbols such as the Cross, Star of David and the Crescent. Children of
religiously observant Jews are not exempt from attending school even on the Sabbath, which is on Saturdays,
traditionally a day off for Jewish people.
Secularisation is a process of replacing religious influence with worldly influence in society (Jacobson 1992).
It has manifested itself throughout history. For instance, in Christianity, one of the earliest examples of
secularisation was during the Age of Enlightenment throughout 16th to 18th century Europe. Sparked by
philosophers such as Isaac Newton (1642-1727), John Locke (1632-1704) and Voltaire (1694-1778), the
Enlightenment is an age of reform from irrational superstitious beliefs to science and intellectual interchange.
In 1648, the first ever documented occurrence of institutional secularisation took place during the Treaty of
Westphalia (Shiner 1967). One of the provisions of the treaty had a profound effect on the power of the
church when the authority for lands was transferred from the church to the state.
The objective of this paper is to describe the determinants of secularisation among predominantly Christian
Western societies. So far, most studies regarding secularisation discuss the fundamental validity of the term.
For instance McBride (2005) discussed the persistence of religion despite economic growth, or Phillips (2004)
who discussed against the normative effect of secularisation against Church attendance and Stark (1999) who
attempted to debunk the secularisation thesis. There are also specific case studies in countries such as the
Netherlands (Lechner 1996; Knippenberg 1998; Houtman and Mascini 2002) and Sweden (Tomasson 2002)
where authors described the extent to which secularisation relevant to their respective countries. To our best
knowledge, we have yet to find a literature that attempts to give a global overview of the extent and
determinants of secularization in Christian societies. To achieve the objective, this paper is divided into four
sections. The next section focuses on the current debates and controversies regarding the secularisation. The
third section discusses the determinants of secularisation while the fourth section describes the interaction of
the determinants. The final section concludes and summarises the argument as a whole.
2. Current debates and controversies in Christian societies
The term secularisation is full of ambiguities. To begin with there are many meanings for the term
secularisation which makes it difficult to identifying a conclusive definition. The earliest definition of
secularisation was offered by Max Weber (1905b). He defined secularisation as a process of disenchantment 1
of religion in the course of history. Parsons (1973) defines secularisation as a process where religion becomes
a private matter. Besides these authors, there are many other authors such as Shiner (1967), Tschannen (1991),
Luckmann (1967), Fenn (1969) and Casanova (1994) who discuss different definitions of secularisation.
Some definitions proposed by these authors are conformity with this world (Shiner, 1967; Fenn, 1969),
renunciation of ecclesiastical powers (Fenn 1969), declericalisation of structures (Fenn 1969),

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deconfessionalising of social services (Fenn 1969); the list of definitions goes on. As pointed out by Bailey
(1998), a common explanation from all of these seemingly different definitions is that secularisation basically
means decline of religion.
Although secularisation essentially means religious decline, there are different versions of this basic meaning.
For instance, Shiner (1967) identified six themes running through the variety of meanings of secularisation,
which are depicted in table 1.
However, the themes that Shiner (1967) introduced are ambiguous and tend to overlap. To reduce the
ambiguities and overlaps of the term secularisation, Dobbelaere (1981) and Norris and Inglehart (2004)
divides the term and the analysis of secularisation into the following levels as depicted in table 1. Both
Dobbelaere (1981) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) concepts of secularisation based on three levels of
analysis.
Further on the different levels of analysis, another concept that is worth mentioning is the continuum if
privatization and generalization of religion, which could be seen at the end of the double ended arrows
illustrated in table 1. Downwards arrow means that in the course of modernity, religion shifts from societal
level towards individual, which means privatization of religion. Upwards arrow on the other hand means that
religion shifts from individual level to societal. Privatization and Generalization of religion have been
discussed by Luckmann (1967) by using, Casanova (1994), Bellah (1964) and Berger (1967) (1980).
Luckmann (1967) for instance explained privatization in terms of the shift of transcendence of religion in its
conventional sense from a larger societal level to private individual level, which is similar to Casanova (1994)
that postulates that modernity leads to privatization when religion gradually shift into private sphere.
Generalization however is the shift of religion in its mundane sense from individual or micro level to societal
level, also known as civil religion that is practiced in the United States.
For analysts of secularisation, the term secularisation keeps developing from simple definitions such as
Webers definition of the term to Dobbelaeres multidimensional explanation. However, there are also those
who deny secularisation. In fact Berger (1999), once a strong supporter of secularisation, changed his position
by starting to question the secularisation thesis along with authors such as Martin (1991), Rodney and Stark
(1999) and Luckmann (1967), after he found a resurgence of religion in the U.S, post-Soviet countries and the
Middle East.
One of the first authors to question secularisation was David Martin (1991) who addressed the incompatibility
between religion and modernity. His notion of incompatibility between religion and modernity is based on the
reasons of the resurgence of religion after the fall of the Soviet Union and what he considers a vague
definition of secularisation. For example, nowadays some post-Soviet countries have embedded religion in
their national movements after years of suppression (Martin 1991). The second reason is that the notion of
secularisation is unclear which makes it difficult to identify which definition a particular discussion of
secularisation is referring to. This lack of clarity could be a consequence of religion really being a cover for
something else, for instance, political frustration or nationalism. Other authors who advocate
anti-secularisation is Rodney and Stark (1999) who criticized early commentators such as Woolston2 and
Voltaire3. Luckmann (1967) is sceptical about the notion of secularisation because he postulates that religion
still exists but is invisible. By invisible, he means that religion is de-institutionalised insofar as only church
religion is in decline while new forms of religion such as New Age Cults and Zen Meditation among others
are flourishing, which brings us in part to the post secular position.
The latest controversy in the literature on secularisation refers to post secular society. This position
acknowledges that secularisation does happen, thus acknowledging that there is a decline of religion in some
areas in society such as the economy and in the educational system. However, at the same time, there are also
anti-secularisation influences in matters such as charity, belief, and politics, among others. One of the most
prominent authors, who is a proponent of postsecular society is Jrgen Habermas (2006) who postulates that
religion maintains its public relevance. This view is based on Habermas (2008) observation of the vibrancy
of the orthodox and conservative religious movements such as the Pentecostals, Evangelicals and
Multicultural Catholic movements. These movements4 are deemed as spiritualistic and with strict morality

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and adherence to the literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures (Habermas 2008).
Pro-secularisation theorists such as Bruce (2002) and Lechner (1996) often use empirical evidence,
particularly the decline in church belonging, church attendance and the decline in the belief in church religion,
as support for their stances. Based on statistical evidence of the decline in church attendance, it is believed
that individual level faith will decline as well (Stark 1999). However, authors such as Casanova (1994) and
Dobbelaere (1981) further explain that there are different levels of secularisation and that each level of
secularisation is distinct from each other, which means that institutional differentiation does not necessarily
entail a demise in individual religiosity. Casanova (1994), for example, presented the case of Poland where
despite being overwhelmingly secular communist, there was an increase in the number of bishops, priests,
nuns and other religious leaders in comparison with pre-communist Poland (Casanova, 1994). However,
Casanova (1994) also pointed out that the increase in religion could be a manifestation of political frustration
mainly from the communist regime. Another reason for the increase of religion despite institutional
differentiation is solidarity5 (Phillips 2004; Finke et al 1992). One case examined by Phillips (2004) on
Mormon communities in Utah in the US provided evidence that before the demise of the Mormon theocracy,
Mormons did not consider church attendance as important. However, as the social and political institutions
became increasingly disengaged from the Mormon religion, church attendance has become increasingly
necessary as a way to preserve Mormon identity and solidarity.
According to Bruce (2006) there has been an increase of religiosity despite institutional differentiation. He
makes a clear distinction between the term religiosity whether it is an organised or individualised form and
whether it is a traditional or untraditional form. For instance, the increase of religiosity can be an increase in
church attendance for modern churches instead of traditional churches. Obvious differences between these
two churches are Modern Churches have significantly less liturgical elements as well as more accommodative
to the secularising world as compared to traditional churches (Bruce 1998). For instance, modern Churches
have more engagement in contemporary worship, which involve charismatic speeches, modern music and
even dances rather than sermons, rites and anaphora. In the US, the attendance of predominantly
megachurches supersedes the traditional churches (Chaves, 2006). Furthermore, even for traditional churches,
the spirit of Church attendance nowadays is distinctly different from previous generations (Bruce, 2006).
In light of the previous paragraph, among the important questions that are worth consideration for this essay
are - what are the measurements of secularisation? and what are the motives of being and doing things that are
considered religious? . These questions are important so that there is no confusion on the different
descriptions of religiosity in different context.
Different measurements of religiosity may show different results. Commonly secularisation is measured by
the decline of religiosity. It is therefore important to note that the terms secularisation and religiosity are
sometimes used interchangeably as binary opposites of each other. The measurement of secularisation ranges
from a single item and multiple items to multi-dimensional approaches. For a single indicator type
measurement, secularisation is usually measured as , belonging, practice (church attendance) or believing.
Multi-indicator measurement on the other hand uses a group of items, for instance church attendance and
church contributions. Multi-dimensional measurement is a classification based on different groups of
indicators. As the measurement of secularisation has progressed, social scientists have started to develop
more comprehensive measurements which consist of different classifications and dimensions. One good
example is Fetters measurement of multi-dimensional religiosity (Fetzer Institute 2009) based on the
dimensions of spirituality, forgiveness, positive religious coping, public religiosity and self-rated religiosity.
Each of these dimensions has its own set of questions which serve as indicators of these dimensions.
To answer the question regarding the motives of being and doing things that are considered religious, the most
visible and traditional acts that could be considered religious, are church attendance, monetary contribution
and belonging. Usually, the ideal motive for church attendance is salvation (see. Azzi and Enrenberg 1975).
However, there are many non-salvation motives for church attendance such as social, financial, tradition and
status. The social motive for example, is the friendly communal interaction and exchange of ideas with fellow
congregants (Monaghan 1967). The same applies for church belonging, where the ideal motive is that of
salvation; however this is not always the case. Other non-salvation motives include tradition, social belonging

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and status. In Scandinavian countries religion is considered a mere tradition where the church is needed more
for burials rather than life, which partly explains the high rates of religious belonging (Demerath 2000)
although these countries are among the most secular in the world with low rates of attendance and belief (see.
Storm 2009).
The types of religiosity are also important because they suggest big differences in explaining secularisation in
different regions and countries in the West. Among the frequently used classifications of types of religiosity
is extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness (Allport and Rosss 1967). Briefly, extrinsic religiousness is referred to
as religion that is used to achieve something else (e.g. higher status, social conformity, financial benefits)
while intrinsic religiousness is referred to as religion that is lived, which means that one who has intrinsic
religiousness, beliefs, follows and does not expect any non-religious or more specifically, non-transcendent
benefits from their religiousness.
In addition to the duality between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, there is also a frequently used term in the
study of religion - modern religiosity - which is distinguished from traditional religiosity. There are many
ways to describe modern religiosity. Kliever (1979) describe modern religiosity as a religious belief that takes
into account individual autonomy, rational criticism and political freedom, which means that one is no longer
constrained by any authority on how and what to believe in. Taking into account these attributes of modern
religiosity, according to Luckmann (1990), modern religiosities are mostly prevalent in New Churches that
are commonly less transcendent and more private than a traditional one.
This section has addressed important issues regarding secularisation such as different definitions, different
stances of authors and the importance of the measurement of secularisation. The next section will address the
determinants of secularization in light of the aforementioned different secularisation definitions, stances and
measurements.

3. Determinants of secularisation in Christianity

During the modern age the so-called masses became more secular. Evidence for this secularisation comes
particularly from advanced societies such as West European countries. According to the European Values
Survey, West-European Churches attract fewer believers every year. In Finland, for instance, the percentage of
people who never attended church increased from 15% in 1981 to 28% in 2000 (World Values Survey 2006).
In Sweden 80% of Swedes believed in God in 1947, 64% in 1981 and 58% in 2001 (Norris and Inglehart
2006). In the UK, it has been predicted that church attendance would reduce by 55% from 1980 to 2020
(Brierley 1997). In Eastern Europe such as Hungary, church attendance decreased from 14% in 1990, 10.5%
in 1999 to 9% in 2008 (European Value Survey 1990-2008). Most informed observers such as Bruce (2002),
Barro and McCleary (2002) and Ingelhart (2004), would agree that these changes happened largely as a result
of industrialisation, urbanisation, democratization and technological advancement, which are some of the
central characteristics of welfare states.
The existence of modern welfare states warrants special attention to present the global view of secularisation.
Modern welfare states are usually referred to as post-industrial states are states that no longer put
manufacturing as important means of livelihood instead, putting services, research and information as the
main source. These states that are highly developed in terms of its economy, which is advanced industrial
research, service based, high technology, excellent education democracy and science. In terms of religion,
these states are popularly deemed as secular (Paul, 2005, 2009), which means that these states are highly
independent from the authority of the Church insofar relating themselves from any form of religion or church
entities. The central proposition of this paper is that the characteristics of modern welfare states have
contributed to the secularisation in the predominantly Christian West. Below we present a brief review of the
impacts of the aforementioned characteristics of the welfare state based on the literature review.

3.1 Economic development and industrialisation

Economic development and industrialisation are important determinants of secularisation. One of the most

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important points made by Marx (1844) from the introduction of his unfinished book A contribution to the
critique of Hegel's Philosophy of right was that the improvement of material conditions may reduce the need
for religious solace. This point was based on one of his literatures (see Marx, 1844) that referred religion as
opium of the people. The development of the economy involves social and economic change from a
predominantly agricultural based economy to advanced research and service based. This change means further
socio- economic development which, based on Marxs (1844) thesis, would further reduce the need for
religious solace.
Further along the lines of Marx (1844), one popular view by Norris and Ingelheart (2004) argues that humans
are essentially wary of insecurities. Among the insecurities that humans are wary of are food and shelter.
These insecurities are argued to be the main driving forces for human beings to seek supernatural or
transcendental help (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). For instance, in non-welfare states such as Sudan, Lesotho
and Gabon there are high levels of religiosity. Whereas looking at the advanced welfare states of the Nordic
European countries, economic development has led to extensive healthcare, education and social safety nets
available to citizen. The rise of economic development in terms of material wealth therefore reduces these
insecurities. Hence, this development also reduces the tendency of human beings to seek supernatural help.
Societies that are predominantly agrarian are poor societies with a high susceptibility to premature deaths,
hunger and disease (Inglehart 2004). These societies also have very poor access to basic conditions of survival,
which include among others, provision for clean water, sufficient food, basic healthcare and education.
Furthermore, these societies are also under threat and might still be in the middle of war. Based on Marxs
argument on religion, these agrarian societies therefore need religion to act as an opiate to bear the
deficiencies of life.
Industrial societies on the other hand fare much better than agrarian societies. Their sources of economy
progressed from mostly primitive self-sustaining agricultural activities to commercialised and mechanised
agricultural processing. In later stages, the economic activity progressed into the manufacturing industry.
From these progressions, industrialisation significantly reduces the problems of hunger, large scale premature
deaths and diseases. Furthermore, access to clean water, food, healthcare and education is less of a problem
for industrialised societies although it also depends on the stage of industrialisation. Note that , to some extent,
the uncertainties and the conditions of early stages of industrialisation were even worse than in agrarian
societies (Berg et al, 2006). Early industrialised societies were exposed to the hazards of their working
environment, particularly the ones who were involved in hard labour such as miners, builders and machine
operators. Furthermore, the safety procedures as well as healthcare for these workers were not well developed.
In the early stages of industrialisation, religion was still important. However, in the later stages, religion
becomes progressively less important because the deficiencies that existed in agrarian and early industrialised
societies declined significantly (Crockett and O'Leary 2004).
Post-industrial societies fare better than industrial societies, especially in terms of the economy and peoples
wellbeing. Their main sources of income are mostly from service sectors and innovation, which focus more
towards development of new technologies that are developed by white collar professionals and intellectuals
rather than industrial assembly line blue collar workers (Langlois 2001). There are also relatively less issues
of deficiencies in clean water, healthcare, education and even absolute poverty compared with industrial
societies. The reason is that most post-industrial societies are among the richest and a large proportion of them
consist of welfare states.
The trend of religiosity for post-industrial societies has sparked intense debate among sociologists and until
now the debate is inconclusive. Some claim that religions are rapidly declining and will eventually cease to
exist (Bruce 2002; Woolston 1733) while others (Habermas 2006, Taylor 2009) claim that religion is
re-emerging in different forms. There are some truths to both claims. The explanation of both claims can be
linked to the aforementioned post secular argument. Religious studies do not deny the decline and
disappearance of religion. However, they do make a distinction about the different levels of decline. For
instance, if it is referring to the decline of religion at an institutional level, then it is true for most modern
welfare nations. If it is referring to individual levels, then there are some doubts because individuals can still
be religious. It should be noted, though, that their kind of religiosity can be a modern type of religiosity

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instead of the traditional type.

In the eyes of economists, people make almost every decision based on utility. Religion, in the eyes of
economists, is viewed in terms of costs, benefits, demand and supply (Brown 2009, Iannaccone 1992).
Demand is usually annotated to the people and the supply to the churches. Both the people and the church
have their costs and benefits. People who are rational are assumed to maximise utility under constraints. Of
course, there are different aims of the utility. Typically, the aim of the utility is to achieve worldly gains i.e
financial gains, affluence in lifestyle etc. To do that, people invest time and effort. Traditional religions,
particularly church based religions, are time consuming in that church members need to attend church quite
frequently, which is considered as counterproductive (Iannaccone 1992). Even on Sundays, the time used to
attend church service could be better used to exercise, catch up with the chores and relax before Mondays
work. Thus, there is a positive relationship between economic development and secularisation. However, this
is not always the case. Instead of switching from religious to secular activities, it is also possible that people
switch from more strict religions to less strict religions that can accommodate more secular lifestyles
(McBride 2005; Iannaccone 1992). Nevertheless, this essay is not denying the fact that there are people whose
aim of their life goes beyond worldly gains, in search for more meaning of life and afterlife (Loveland 2003).
Nonetheless, based on the current trend in Western, predominantly secular society, the tendency is that people
are switching to less strict religions rather than strict religion. The reason for this is that less strict churches
are flourishing much better than traditional churches due to reasons such as gender equality and gay friendly.
Economic development can make societies more trusting and tolerant, which opens up for more emphasis on
self-expression, tolerance and more democratic decision making (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). A reason is that
economic development creates opportunities for more people to gain access to education and reflects a form
of liberation from state regulation of churches. Consequently, new churches emerge to accommodate different
religious needs and preferences. New religions, also the result of schisms, have emerged that offer more
attractive and less stringent products to society (Lambert 1999), which means that adherents are able to
spend more time to be productive thus improving economic development. It is possible that the change is
contingent on the existing church to accommodate their increasingly secular adherents. For instance some of
the Latter Day Saints movements have begun to soften their stance towards homosexuality (Charles and
Duffy 2010). Furthermore, the advancement of technology decreases the cost of religious production such as
cheaper cost of religious advertising, more effective ability to ask for religious donations (i.e. internet
transfers) and so on (McBride 2005).
In summary, sociologists such as Weber (1905), Durkheim (1912), Bruce (2002), Norris and Ingelhart (2004)
among others unanimously postulated the demise of religion in the wake of economic development because of
the shift of economic activities from agricultural to advanced post-industrial. This shift is argued to have
significantly improved the livelihood and reduced uncertainty. However, McBride (2010), Charles and Duffy
(2010) and others have suggested that in many cases, religion persisted but in different forms6, based on
supply and demand. It may be a new religion based on the increasing demand for a new and more secular
form of religion or a modified version of existing religion based on the adaptations on the supply side.

3.2 Urbanisation
Urbanisation usually goes hand-in-hand with industrialisation and economic development (McBride 2005;
Moomaw and Shatter 1996). It is defined as a physical growth in the urban areas because of, among other
things, rural urban migration and international immigration. Urbanization warrants attention as a determinant
for secularization because of the different cultures in rural and urban areas. The different levels and types of
social ties and social constraints in urban areas are, according to the theologian Harvey Cox in his 1965
classic The Secular City, considered the leading factors resulting in the decline in religion.
While not advocating simple binaries of rural-urban/ religious-secular, a typical argument is that people living
in the rural areas have high levels of social ties, which means that they are closer knit and caring (Anthony et
al, 2003). As a result of these characteristics, people in rural areas are forced to conform with their collective
norms which is reflected in terms of religiosity particularly in relation to church activities (Siegman, 1962).

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Consequently rural inhabitants tend to be less liberal in their ideas and thinking, which means they are more
intrusive and constraining (Anthony et al, 2003). In rural areas, therefore, one tends to experience less room
for irreligiosity especially when not going to church may seem asocial therefore less room for evasion.
Conversely, people living in urban areas tend to exhibit lower (or at least different) levels of social ties, which
mean that they are more individualised. At the same time, however, urban dwellers are less intrusive and more
tolerant7 (Wilson 1985). This observation fits with the characteristics of popular and less orthodox modern
forms of religion. As a consequence of the tendency towards more individualised and liberal societies in the
urban areas, people are more able to freely decide not to go to church or even not to be religious, putting aside
cultural pressures that elsewhere might be the case.
Rural-urban migration is relevant in the discussion of urbanization because it is one of the most important
building blocks of urbanization processes. Migration from rural to urban settings itself has links with the
decline of religiosity (Welsch, 1984) because the ones who migrate have to leave their places of origin and
sever ties with their family and friends often linked to the church (Van Dijk et al, 2010) in pursuit of better
economic gain (Brown and Moore, 1970). Once migrants reach a city they are among the many fragmented
segments of urban society whose chances of finding dense networks of trust within religious networks are, at
least at first, limited by the aforementioned individualism witnessed in urban societies.
More recent discussions on post secular cities (Molendijk et al 2010; Beaumont and Baker 2011), Faith Based
Organizations FBOs and cities (Beaumont and Cloke 2012; Cloke et al 2013) and migrant churches in urban
areas (Ley 2008) problematizes simple rural-urban binaries with respect to religion. The tendency however is
towards secularisation in the urban areas rather than the rural areas for the reasons explained previously by
Wilson (1985). Its relationship to urbanization is the continuous persistence relevance of religion under the
guise of FBOs as a supplement to urban welfare gaps (Beaumont 2008). At the same time critical observers
such as Beckford (2012) thoroughly doubt the purchase of the concept of the post-secular. We are fully aware
of these important contributions to the literature and the need to deconstruct simple binaries in the patchwork
of religious and non-religious affiliation in the contemporary city (Cloke and Beaumont 2013) in addition to
economic development, industrialisation, democracy and so on. For the purposes of our argument, we support
the generic relationship between urbanization and secularization, in keeping with Cox (1965). A closely knit
and constraining rural culture has made rural areas more religious because of the need to conform to the
largely dominant religious culture. Conversely the more individual and liberal culture of urban areas has made
it less constraining for urbanites to conform with traditional religions. Further, migration serves as the main
drive of secularization in urban areas because of widespread but not total abandonment of religious
institutions in urban and particularly inner city locations.
3.3 State Formation
The inception of a state is another important factor that is worth considering. Some states were built on the
basis of religion and some states were not. Furthermore, states that are founded on the basis of religion are not
necessarily religious in modern times, let alone, states that are founded based on secular foundation.
Most European states - whether they have retained the monarchy or not have a religious foundation. France
and Ireland are two European states that have Catholic, secular and Protestant foundations.
France had a difficult time prior to the formation of the modern French republic. Most of the difficulties
stemmed from wars of religion as a consequence of the oppression from the elites among the Catholics and
the rise of the Protestants. Because of these developments, the establishment of the French Republic became a
secular one. In a way, the aim of the secular republic is to assimilate the denatured 8 Protestants and Catholics
in to a neutral (secular) environment (Bien 1961). Consequently nowadays, France has 50% level of
non-dominations, which is among the highest in the world and 6.2% of church attendance per-week (Henkel
2001). However, wars of religion do not necessarily result in a secular base state formation.
For many years, Ireland has been involved in sectarian and political conflicts. Most of these conflicts were
between the predominantly Catholic Irish Nationalists and mainly Protestant loyalists - loyal to the United
Kingdom. The loyalists main aim is to maintain Ireland under British rule while the Irish Nationalist would
like to form an independent Irish republic as a reaction to British Imperialism. Furthermore, it was argued by

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Compton (1991) that there were economic disparities and marginalisation between these two main
denominations, mostly stemmed from political factions that exploit the notion of denomination and loyalty to
the British throne. Finally, in 1949, an independent Irish Republic was formed with Catholicism as a religion
with special position. Thus Catholicism became a powerful political actor for the politicians and
revolutionaries to inspire the Irish people (Larkin 1975). The history of the Irish state formation is reflected
in Irish Church attendance which was 40% in 2008; among the highest in Western Europe albeit declining
(European Values Survey 2008). Furthermore Church belonging was also the highest amongst other European
countries with 87% in 2008 (Henkel 2001).
From what has been discussed in this sub-section, it seems that the journey towards the formation of a state
stands as an important element in describing the different rates of religiosity/secularity. Each nation has its
own distinctive history which explains the status and the level of religion and religiosity. Both Frances and
Irelands state formation were based on religio-political conflicts. For France, the rebellion started from
denominational conflicts that had turned to a rebellion against any form Church and monarchical influence in
the Frenchs political and economic sphere. Irelands situation was a rebellion against the British Imperialists
towards a majority denomination.
3.4 Democracy
Democracy is an important determinant of secularization for two main reasons. The first reason is that
democracy has emancipated people from the constraints of traditional religion and even religion as a whole.
The second reason is that, as a consequence of the first reason, based on the classical theory of secularisation,
religion progressively disappears in every aspects of life. However based on the Market Theory of religion 9
(see. Loveland 2003; Iannaccone 1991) democracy has opened doors for non-traditional religions as well as
atheism as alternatives for traditional religious belief. Furthermore, Democracy has also opened doors for
technology, economy and industry to develop with the existence of academic and economic freedom.
Over the course of history, democracy has liberated the masses from the constraints of traditional hierarchical
religion through, among others, reformations and revolutions. Among the first regions in the world to embrace
democracy were the regions of Western and Northern Europe, to be followed by the United States and
Australasia.
The classical theory of secularisation posits that as society becomes more modern in terms of high economic
development, democracy, education and science, religion becomes less important to a society. Since
democracy is one of the most basic components of a modern society, evidence has shown that democracy
leads to secularisation. For instance, based on the evidence from the Democracy Index published by the
Economist Intelligence Unit (2011) and a Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism by WIN-Gallup
International (2012), it seems that the most democratic countries are also among the least religious countries
in the world. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2011), Sweden, the Netherlands and Australia are
listed as some of the most democratic countries in the world, while according to the Global Index of
Religiosity and Atheism (WIN-Gallup International 2012) these same countries are simultaneously among the
top atheistic countries
According to religious market theory (see. Iannaccone 1991), democracy has created opportunities for
different religions to compete in the religious market-place . As mentioned previously, historically before the
revolutions, religions were state and church (Pope) controlled . Furthermore, people who practiced other
beliefs not approved by the state or even criticised religion were considered as heretics and prosecuted. As a
consequence of that there were very few systems of belief and these systems of belief catered for only a
fraction of a society such as the aristocrats, the royals and the people who preferred strict religiosity. It is
therefore argued that there is a higher probability that not everybody was able to find a religion (including no
religion) that fitted their belief (Iannaccone 1991). Democracy has given the opportunity for other systems of
belief to participate in the religious market and people are able to choose and have more choices over a
range of beliefs. Looking at certain indicators of religiosity, sometimes it seems that the population is getting
more religious based on certain religious indicators. For instance, Opfinger (2011) has suggested that the
increase of religious diversity will also seem to increase the overall level of religiosity particularly for

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religiosity indicators such as belief and church denomination. This increase is one of the reasons why some
scholars such as Berger (1999), Finke and Stark (1998) and Chaves (1994) have suggested that America is an
overwhelmingly religious country. This increase also explains why, according to PEW Research Centre
(2007), 83.1% of Americans have some form of religious affiliation or belief. Scholars such as Taylor (2009),
however, argue that American, predominantly Judeo Christian, religiosity, is no longer in its traditional sense.
Dobbelaere (1981) has described the situation as one of organisational secularisation, which means that some
churches adapt to the predominantly secular demand of their followers or consumers and new churches even
emerge to meet the secular demand in the religious market-place.
We can conclude that democracy, in predominantly Judeo Christian countries, has resulted in a decrease in
religion. First of all, based on the history and the aforementioned statistical evidence, it is evident in Europe
that the most democratic countries in Europe are also places for the most atheistic or at least secular
populations. In America, on the other hand, although some indicators might lead us to believe that America is
still religious, historically, America has provided a fertile ground for many types of religion and that American
religiosity is no longer transcendent as compared to traditional religions.

3.4 Science and technology

The development of science and technology is an important determinant of secularization because it has
changed peoples worldview. Furthermore, the development of science and technology further strengthens a
nations economy that was possible with democracy. One of the main reasons for this change is that science
and technology are seen, at least according to not only scientists but also rationalists and empiricist since The
Enlightenment, as cognitively superior to religious belief (Oviedo 2005).
Before the rise of science religion was the most viable option of explanation for hitherto unexplained
phenomena (Evans and Evans 2008). However, since the rise of science in the 17th century, science has been
able to explain most of these phenomena using scientific reasoning, experiments and evidence. The rise of this
science was said to undermine the reliability of religious doctrines and truths. Nowadays, scientific reasoning
and knowledge have become increasingly common sense. For instance, schizophrenia was often attributed to
demonic possession where priests were called to perform an exorcism (Otsuka and Sakai, 2004). In this day
and age, schizophrenia is commonly considered a form of mental illness that can be treated with
psychological, social and medical treatment (Otsuka and Sakai, 2004).
Empirical findings have suggested that science and religiosity tend to have a negative relationship with each
other. Evidence provided by Larson and Witha (1998) suggests that among the top natural scientists, the
proportion of disbelievers in God is greater than ever with 65.3% of Biologists and 79% of Physicists in the
National Academy of Sciences (Larson and With 1998). As a consequence, we can observe a positive
relationship between technology and secularisation. The reason is that previously people relied on religion to
cope with uncertainties of life (Miller and Hoffmann 1995). However, when uncertainties are minimised,
religion is not needed as much anymore. This observation makes sense when, according to Bruce (2006),
technology provides people with the sense that they are their masters of their own destiny, especially when it
involves the reduction of risk.
Technology can also reduce secularisation because there are many instances in which technology is used in a
religious context (McBride 2005). For instance, just recently in America, social networking websites are used
by religious missions to spread the word of God to reach a wider congregation (see. Rosen-Molina 2009).
At an individual level, individuals nowadays can get easy access to the bible through applications via smart
phones.
To summarise, prior to the advancement of science and technology religion used to be the main reference
point for ancient societies to explain certain outcomes or phenomena such as plagues or whether the universe
was geocentric or heliocentric and so on. Furthermore the notions of uncertainty and safety were also a
concern before the advancement of science and technology. In modern times, however, the development of
science and technology has revolutionised the worldview of society and at the same time has pushed religion
into its own and distinct sphere. Since technology and science have reduced uncertainty and increased safety

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and in a larger picture, science and technology are argued to improve the economy, religion is no longer
needed to cope with these concerns, at least not in the same way. Nevertheless, churches adapt to the progress
of science and technology by using their products to their advantage.
3.5 Education
The level of education is an important determinant for secularization because education is the foundation for
human emancipation. With education, people have a sense of empowerment, which means that they do not
have to rely on anything but themselves (Gulecsi and Meyersson 2013). Furthermore, education also
inculcates at least a sense or awareness of scientific objectivity, which means that they are able to discern
between scientific facts and folklore. Over time, an increasingly educated population should in theory be less
dependent on supernatural and superstitious beliefs and ultimately less religious (Sacerdote and Glaeser,
2001). In addition increase in education level is argued to have an effect on the development in science and
technology and earning potential (Gintis 1971) that has links to the development of economy.
Traditionally, sociologists claim that education is detrimental to religion (Weber 1905a, Beckwith 1985)
because of reasons explained in the previous paragraph. Based on the education index provided by UNDP
(2011) and the Global Religiosity index provided by Win Gallup (2012), it is clear that countries that have a
high religiosity index are among the most secular countries in the world (see Stark 1963; Albrecht and Heaton
1984). A reason provided by Mishra (1977) as cited by Albrecht and Heaton (1984) is that people who have
higher education are trained to question everything, which includes questioning the fundamentals of
religious belief.
Apart from traditional wisdom, there are scholars who argue that educational level does not necessarily entail
a decline in religiosity (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Norris and Inglehart (2004), in particular, claim that in
post-industrial societies, the level of education is positively related to secularisation. The reason is that
educational levels have increased the level of pluralism by encouraging people to express their ideas.
Consequently, there may be an increasing number of religions. Since more people are able to get access to the
religion of their choosing, certain indicators of religiosity, particularly church attendance and church
denomination may be pushed upwards. This applies especially to modern religions such as the New Age
religion (Bruce 2006).
To summarise, much of the literatures suggests that education level has a positive as well as negative
correlation with religiosity. First of all, following the classical school of secularisation (see. Bruce 2006, 2002;
Norris and Inglehart, 2004) it is obvious that education is detrimental to religiosity. Secondly, the market
theory of religion is also a good explanation for the secularising effect of education when people can
rationally choose the religion that suits their intellect, which explains the increase of schisms particularly in
the US.
4. Secularization as the outcome of the interaction
Secularisation does not happen overnight although some may argue that there was a point of time in Europe
when there was a sudden surge in secularisation in the 1960s and the seventies. It happens gradually through a
development and interaction of factors. This section explains and illustrates the sudden increase of
secularisation due to the interaction of several factors that constitutes a welfare state using mainly the
Netherlands as a unique example.
The interplay between democracy, science, education and welfare, constitutes the environment (Weber 1905)
for the development secularisation10. In order for secularisation to go full throttle, several critical thresholds
need to be passed. While being fully aware of the different definitions, levels and types of secularisation,
special focus is given here on the societal level of secularisation, for instance when a big part of the society no
longer goes to traditional churches and even do not believe in any form of deity.
In the Netherlands by late 1800, there were already high quality scientific researches with the establishment of
Elsevier in 1880 (Groen 2007). In 1901, there was compulsory education (Frijhoff and Spies 2004) while in
1917 the Constitution provided general suffrage for men as well as women in 1922 (Frijhoff and Spies 2004).
However ironically, there were still low levels of secularisation. This is evident when in 1899, 1930 and 1947,

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the percentage of the population who do not belong to any church were 2.3%, 14% and 17% respectively
(Need and Graaf 1996). Meanwhile, output per-person for the manufacturing sector in 1909, 1920 and 1938
are 24.8, 24.2 and 24.8 respectively (Van Ark and De Jong 1996). Secularisation only took off in the early
sixties when the percentages of those who do not belong to church were 21% in 1960 and 42% in 1979
(Need and Graaf 1996) the output for manufacturing rose to 27.9 and 29.2 in 1950 and 1960 respectively,
which was obviously higher before the 60s (Van Ark and De Jong 1996). There are at least two prevalent
explanations for increase of manufacturing outpu and the decrease of religious belonging. First, as mentioned
previously in section 3, the theory of existential security proposed by Norris and Inglehart (2004). This theory
posits that the feeling of vulnerability to among others, physical, societal and personal risks are important
factors that drive the levels of religiosity/secularity. For the Netherlands, although there were full democracy,
compulsory school and high quality scientific research, there were some concerns about the First World War
in 1914-1918 despite its position being neutral (Abbenhuis 2006). This is because the countries surrounding
the Netherlands were involved in the First World War. Besides, the Netherlands also experienced devastating
economic effects because of the war. Due to these uncertainties, the theory argues that the Netherlands was
still religious. The uncertainties further escalated when The Netherlands was involved in the Second World
War. The German occupation of the Netherlands had adverse effects towards the Netherlands infrastructure,
economy and social wellbeing. Countless infrastructures were destroyed especially in the developed areas of
Rotterdam during the Rotterdam Blitz (Brunning 2011). The Dutch economy was basically war economy that
was directed to supply the German army rather than improving on the Dutch own economy (Willing 1986).
Some of the Dutch citizens were victims of forced labour by the Nazis (Willing 1986). They were forced to do
hard labour in German factories and repair the damaged infrastructure with very limited food rations.
The theory of existential security is accentuated when the situation very different after the Second World War,
especially in the 1960s. In terms of the economy, The Netherlands transformed from a situation of economic
turmoil to one of rapid economic development and from extensive industrial damage to massive
industrialisation (Abramovits 1986). This significantly reduced economic uncertainty. Furthermore, the
welfare policy that was devised after the World War Two was inspired by the inadequacies of the pre-war
policy. This was a huge improvement as compared to the pre-war welfare policy (Van Oorschot 2006)
whereby people would have to seek assistance from churches and charities. Therefore, the aforementioned
welfare policy reduced economic uncertainty, specifically in terms of the most basic needs such as food and
clothing.
Furthermore in the 1960s, the links between the previously mentioned democracy, economic development,
education, technological development and demography are argued to be a boom that ignited the decline of
religion. Firstly, there is a positive relationship between democracy in the sense that democracy has given the
opportunity for the economy and industry to prosper. With that, new improved and affordable technologies
have been developed making lives more comfortable, convenient and people are able to get access to mass
media such as radio and television. One obvious manifestation of these developments is the 60s student
revolts against the apparent authoritarian nature of the older generations that consists of parents, teachers,
clerics to political figures (Berghahn 1999). The generation of students in the 60s were the first privileged
generation that were able to enjoy peace, democracy, economic stability and were collectively influenced by
the technology of mass media especially the television (Kroes 2008). From the media, this generation was
introduced to among others freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, consumerism, sexual revolution and
rock n roll, most of which are argued to be of distraction and some of them to be against traditional religion.
Another reason for the Sixties Cultural Revolution in the Netherlands is the Verzuiling and the Ontzuiling.
Verzuiling in English basically means Pillarisation and Ontzuiling means de-pillarisation . Vezuiling,
according to Knippenberg (1998) means the segmentation of the Dutch society on the basis of major beliefs
such as Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals. Each member of society belongs to one of these pillars
and subscribes exclusively to institutions and organisations that are affiliated with its respective pillar. For
instance a typical Protestant household would go to a Protestant Church, listen to Protestant affiliated radio,
vote for Protestant political candidates and the children will go to Protestant schools. However, the post-war
period of prosperity, geographical mobility, media participation and advancement in education has promoted

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individualisation and people have become more critical of traditional values and notions (Knippenberg 1998).
Consequently the pillars collapsed, and this collapse, also known as Onzuiling has been argued to be one of
the major causes11 of the sudden surge in secularisation (Knippenberg 1998). Furthermore, there is also a
strong evidence that the verzuiling is actually the main trigger 12 of the massive decline in religion. Evidence
provided by CBS (1971) showed that the percentage of decline in denominations is only by the difference of
1.2% between 1947 and 1960 which shows that post-war fear13 had little to do with the decline in religiosity.
Instead, between 1920 to 1930 there was a higher decline of denomination by the difference of 6.5% which
substantiated the thesis that the verzuiling, which started in 1917 was one of the the main cause of
secularisation. Furthermore evidence of the ontzuiling as one of the reason for further secularisation also
emanates when there is difference of 5.3% between 1960 and 1971
To recap, developed European states were once religious mainly before the Second World War despite the
considerable amount of development in the economy education and scientific research. Therefore, the
interplay between the variables that constitute a welfare state is argued to be the determinant of secularisation.
However, there needs to be a certain amount of interlinked development between these variables and it seems
that for the European case, the chain reactions from fear of war and the wars itself might also be among the
main links between these variables (i.e economic development, industrialisation, technological development
etc.).
5. Conclusion
A basic idea among scholars such as Norris and Inglehart (2004) and Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) is that the
stronger the characteristics of a welfare state, the more secular the society becomes. For instance, Nordic
countries such as Sweden and Finland have very low levels of religiosity while the US, where the state of
welfare characteristics is substantially lower, has high levels of religiosity. The development of the economy,
especially in terms of development from agriculture to an industrial based economy, has reduced the
deficiencies of crucial necessities such as food and healthcare which eventually led to secularization. With
democracy, people are able to have the freedom of belief as well as disbelief or to have their own concoction
of belief system by which, in due course, will lead to secularisation. The advancement of science and
technology as well as education has changed the worldview of the society from a belief in superstition and a
divine entity to knowledge and reasoning, which leads to the final consequence, which is secularization.
Finally, the formation of state or more specifically, the events that has led to the formation of a state is one of
the most important if not the most important determinant of secularisation. This can be seen in countries such
as Poland and Scandinavian countries where some of the indicators of secularity seemed to show unique rates
of secularity as compared with other western countries. Based on the above discussion it is reasonable to
conclude most characteristics of welfare states collectively, will largely lead to a negative correlation with
religiosity.
Of course, there are many arguments that suggest and justify that the progression of economic activities from
agriculture to matured industrialisation or advancement of science and technology do not necessarily lead to
secularisation. Various debates and discussions on the post secular and public religions in secular society pay
attention to these caveats. These arguments, we argue in this paper, are mostly highly specific and contextual
which, while being important in their own right, do not undermine the overall global picture. The main
evidence examined for a global picture shows that the developments outlined in our discussion are strong
determinants of secularisation.

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Table 1: Different Concepts Proposed by Selected Authors

Shiner (1967) Fenn (1969) Dobblaere Norris and Casanova Luckmann Bellah Berger

(1981) Inglehart (1994) (1967) (1964) (1967)

(2004) (1980)

- Decline in -Renunciation of -Differentiation Generalization National

religion ecclesiastical power of the secular Integration

spheres

- Conformity in -Desacrilization of -Decline of -Sectors of

this world cultures religious Society are

beliefs removed

-Disengagement -Declericalisa-tion of -Societal level -Macro level from the

14
in society with structures secularisation Secularisation Different domination

religion levels of of religion

-Desacralization transcendence

of the world

-movement

from sacred to

secular society

-Transposition -Deconfession-alising -Organizational -Meso level -Differentiation -Churches

of religious of social services level Secularisation of religious rationalise

15
belief and secularisation institutions

institutions

-Individual -Micro level Privatization Decline in -Religion

level Secularisation personal becomes

16
secularisation belief individual

private

affair

The table describes briefly the different positions of selected authors on the different concepts of
secularization, which includes their similarities and differences

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Notes

1
Disenchantment of religion is a process of intellectualization and rationalization of mans view of nature and
social relations in almost every field, which includes administration, law and science.
2
Woolston (1733) predicted that Christianity would have disappeared by 1900
3
Voltaire predicted that religion would be finished fifty years after his (Voltaires) prediction (Redman 1949)
4
Luckmann (1963) and Habermas also observe the emergence of de-institutionalised religious movements such as
New Age Movements which combine different philosophies inspired by monotheistic religions such as
Christianity and Islam, polytheistic religions such as Hinduism and Jainism, science such as physics and astronomy
as well as pseudoscience such as Reiki and Ayurveda
5
Solidarity function of religion has been discussed extensively by Durkheim (1915) insofar solidarity is the very
definition of religion.
6
For instace, less stringent forms of religion that is more appealing towards a more secular society.
7
The reason for this provided by Wirth (1938) is that urbanism brings a multitude of backgrounds from different
cultures, personalities and attitudes together with secondary relationship that are argued to foster tolerance and less
intrusive.
8
Denatured in this context means a deviant form of Christianity, since at that time, Catholicism was the
mainstream religion.
9
Market theory of religion is the application of the Market principles of economy in studies of religion. This
theory treats religion as commodity, which means that consumers or in this context adherents. This means that
provided that religions are free to spread their doctrines to consumers, consumers are free to choose whatever
religion that suits them. Equally, religion can also alter themselves or branch out into a consumer driven religion to
meet the demands of the consumers. Iannaconne (1991), a major proponent of this theory argues that these
alterations to meet the demand of the consumers have the tendency to contribute to secularization. Among the
reasons for this is that competing religions will criticize each other of the weakness of each thus losing the faith of
the consumers.
10
Webers Environment is termed inclusion by Vanderstraten (2012). Vanderstraten (2012) uses Parsons AGIL
paradigm (see. Parson 1970) to explain the effects of inclusion policy, which is basically a welfare policy towards
secularity. I, defined by Vanderstraten, is inclusion policy implemented by a government which includes, among
others, compulsory education, social housing and unemployment benefits, all of which are characteristics of
welfare states, or as Weber deemed them, -environment- and can be used to control or define the level of
secularisation.
11
Among the causes of secularization as explained previously in this essay are among others, the development of
economy, democracy, science, technology, urbanization and education.
12
The trigger in this context is a set of causes that happens almost simultaneously insofar that it dramatically
changes the level of religiosity
13
Fear of war and the concerns that comes with the war such as safety, economic deprivation, freedom and
livelihood
14
Societal secularisation, which refers to the differentiation of religion from all subsystems of society. For
instance, the separation of religion from education, economy and law that started in Europe and spread to the rest
of the world through colonisation.

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15
Organisational secularisation, which involves institutional disenchantment. This means that at a religious
institution level, religion gradually loses its transcendent value through adjustment of belief and practice to
changes of the world. For example, the changing of moral attitudes on the use of contraception in Protestant,
Anglican and Catholic churches.
16
Individual secularisation, which is a personal religious decline. It means that the extent to which individuals are
subject to religious control decreases as a result of modernization. For instance in the Netherlands, the percentage
of people who are not affiliated with Christian Churches increased from 24% in the 1950s to 60% in
2002(Houtman and Mascini 2002).

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