Abstract

The peace negotiations between the National Democratic Front and the

Government of the Philippines would not be possible without the peace negotiating panel

and consultants that embodies the interest and voice of the party they represent. However,

NDF Consultants are constantly being pursued and arrested as the peace negotiations is

claimed to be in a deadlock. The study aims to determine the substantial effect of the

arrest of NDF Consultants Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria to the peace negotiations

between the GRP and the NDF. The study will be essential in exploring and identifying

the factors that lead to the advancement of stall of the GRP-NDF peace talks by

analyzing the cases of the Tiamzons. Descriptive Method and Qualitative Approach are

used as the primary research technique in the case study. The Vulnerability Theory of

DorinaBekoe is also used to support the research. The researchers used interviews and

archival research in gathering information essential to this research. At the end of the

study, recommendations are provided that could help further the progress of the peace

talks.

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 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background of the Study

The arrest of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria, both National Democratic Front

peace consultants has tested the effectiveness of the Joint Agreement on Safety and

Immunity Guarantees and the faithful compliance of the two parties involved in the peace

negotiations, the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic

Front of the Philippines (NDFP) who are both signatories of this comprehensive

agreement. The couple was arrested along with Rex Villaflor, Lorraine Castillo, Joel

Enano, JeosiNepa and Arlene Panea in Aloguinsan, Cebu on March 22, 2014(CPP,

2014). Wilma Austria is a holder of the NDFP Document of Identification ND 978226

under her real name while his spouse Benito Tiamzon holds the NDFP Document of

Identification ND 978227 under the assumed named CrisingBanaag (Dizon, 2014).

According to KARAPATAN (2014), a non-government organization and a cause

oriented group working for the promotion and protection of human rights in the

Philippines, there are already 504 Political Prisoners that are detained in different jails in

the Philippines, 208 out of this 504 are arrested and detained under the Aquino

Administration and 14 of them are National Democratic Front peace consultants

including the couple Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria who are both covered by the

Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees.

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 The Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), signed on

June 14, 1994 by the Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front

of the Philippines is made to facilitate the peace negotiations, create favourable

atmosphere conducive to free discussion and free movement during the peace

negotiations and to prevent any incident that may jeopardize the peace talks (NDFP,

2006). The protection of the negotiating panel is important so that both parties would feel

secure to discuss matters regarding the peace process and that no force or threat would

affect the way the negotiation happens. JASIG provides immunity and security to the

members of the peace negotiating panel who are prone to surveillance, arrest, detention

and interrogation so that no appalling incidents initiated by the opposing party shall

happen to them (NDFP, 2006).

As stated in the Immunity Guarantees provision of JASIG, that all duly accredited

persons shall be spared from surveillance, harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution and

interrogation or any other similar punitive actions that are due to the involvement and participation

in the peace negotiations (NDFP, 2006; p.12). This case study aims to determine the

substantial effect of the arrest of the two National Democratic Front peace consultants

namely, Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria, to the peace negotiations between the

Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. This case study aims

to gather data through qualitative method of research including interviews with different

resource persons like the members of the negotiating panels of GRP and NDF and other

individual and institutions that will contribute significant data to this study. Secondary

data shall also be accumulated from books, primers, journal articles, pamphlets and the

like. This study will also use key indicators to determine and measure the effect of the

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arrest and detention of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria to the progress of the peace

talks. Lastly, the researchers will formulate its conclusion and will try to provide possible

recommendations for the both parties that could help in advancement of the peace

negotiations.

B. Theoretical Framework

Party A Party B

Agreement

Vulnerability

Mutual Not Mutual

Advancement of the Peace Process

Peace Process Stalls

Figure 1: Mutual Vulnerability theory by Dorina Bekoe

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 The compliance on a peace agreement that is entered by parties involved in a

conflict is significant to the attainment of the goal of the deal. In the Mutual Vulnerability

theory, Bekoe (2005) suggests that the signatories to a peace agreement are compelled to

follow the contract not only because of the positive gains that a party will acquire by

following the agreement but also because of the negative consequences or sanctions from

the opposing party. The theory also explains the need of the parties to have the ability

sanction the other parties, creating a relationship that can lead to the advancement of the

implementation of agreement when sustained.

In figure 1, the framework illustrates the process of two conflicting parties

entering an agreement by which the vulnerability of both parties, in terms of the ability of

a party to give sanction to the other, is important for determining the success or failure of

the implementation of the agreement that can impact on the peace process per se. if each

of the two parties is vulnerable to the sanctions by the other party, the vulnerability of the

two parties are mutual and will lead to the advancement of the agreement.

In relation to this study, Party A and Party B represents the conflicting parties of

the GRP and the NDF that enters the agreement which signifies the Joint Agreement on

Safety and Immunity Guarantees that is created to provide security and immunity

guarantees to the persons involved in the peace process.

The vulnerability that could either be mutual or not mutual refers to the

willingness of both parties to acknowledge negative consequences such as sanctions. The

vulnerability also refers to the ability of both parties to maintain their openness to each

other and minimizing the use of threats and display of power. In the context of this study,

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the vulnerability manifests in the arrest of the two NDF consultants and the claim that

NDF did not comply to the terms of verification of the Joint Agreement on Safety and

Immunity Guarantees (OPAPP, 2012). The theory suggests that if the GRP and NDF

maintained their vulnerability and does not make efforts to diminish that vulnerability,

then there must be an advancement of the implementation of JASIG and the peace talks.

This concept from the theory allows the researchers to answer the main question of the

study on how did the arrest of the two NDF consultants (Wilma and Benito Tiamzon)

substantially affect the progress of the peace talks between the GRP and NDF.

The theoretical framework shows us the initial process of two conflicting parties

entering an agreement by which the vulnerability of both parties, in terms of the ability of

a party to give sanction to the other, which is important for determining the success or

failure of the implementation of the agreement and the success in advancement of the

peace talks. According to the Mutual Vulnerability Theory of DorinaBekoe (2005), if

each of the two parties is vulnerable to the sanctions by the other party, the vulnerability

of the two parties are mutual and will lead to the advancement of the agreement. The

vulnerability could either be mutual or not mutual depending on the willingness of both

parties to acknowledge negative consequences such as sanctions and also depends to the

ability of both parties to maintain their openness to each other and minimizing the use of

threats and display of power (Bekoe, 2005). Factors such as willingness of each of the

two parties to acknowledge sanctions by the third negotiating party or the other party (on

case of the GRP, NDF is the other party and on the case of the NDF, the GRP is the other

party) is necessary for the advancement of the peace talks.

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 The arrest of these three consultants of the National Democratic Front namely

ReynanteGamara, Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria which is considered as a violation

of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees mutually signed by the

Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front shows the

invulnerability of one party, the Government of the Philippines (GRP) on the grounds

that the GRP shows no willingness in acknowledging the sanction that will be imposed to

them by the other party or the third party on their violation of JASIG and refuse to

maintain their openness to each other and minimizing the use of threats and display of

power makes the presumption that the vulnerability of the two parties are not mutual. The

Mutual Vulnerability theory suggests that if the vulnerability is mutual among the parties

involved, then there will be advancement in the progress of the peace process but if one

of the parties involved declined to be vulnerable to the other party, then the peace process

will be stalled (Bekoe, 2005).

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 C. Conceptual Framework

Vulnerability of the
Parties

Not Mutual

Arrest of Gamara
and the Tiamzons

Progress of the Peace Process

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework applying Mutual Vulnerability Theory to the

effect of the Arrest of Gamara and the Tiamzons in the progress of Peace

Negotiations.

This framework, illustrates how the Mutual Vulnerability Theory of DorinaBekoe

(2005) can be applied in analyzing the substantial effect of the JASIG violations

specifically the arrest and detention of National Democratic Front Consultants

ReynanteGamara, Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria on the progress of the peace talks.

As patterned in the theoretical framework of Mutual Vulnerability Theory of

DorinaBekoe in Figure 1, the conceptual framework (Figure 2) illustrates the focus of the

study on the non-mutuality of the vulnerability of the two parties namely the Government

of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front as manifested by the arrest and

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detention of National Democratic front Consultants ReynanteGamara, Benito Tiamzon

and Wilma Austria, and its substantial effect on the advancement of peace talks.

In the context of this study, as shown in the conceptual framework above, the

researchers considered the vulnerability of the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the National Democratic Front as not mutual because of the violations

made by GPH in the implementation of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity

Guarantees as manifested in the arrest of NDF consultants Benito and Wilma Tiamzon

and ReynanteGamara which are covered by the said Agreement. The study aims to

determine the effects of the JASIG violations, which is correlated to the not mutual

vulnerability variable in the theory, in the progress of the peace process by using the

Mutual Vulnerability theory as theoretical foundation. The data gathered thru interviews

on the negotiating panel of both parties, its consultants and arrested members can be

utilized, analyzed and tested thru the Vulnerability Theory of DorinaBekoe which is

illustrated above (Figure 1). The process of testing the data will follow the flowchart in

Figure 2 from the Vulnerability of each of the two parties to its effect on the progress of

the peace talks.

All in all, this research would like to determine the possible implications of the

violations of the terms and conditions of Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity

Guarantees to the progress of the peace process between the National Democratic Front

and the Government of the Philippines.

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 D. Statement of the Problem

The Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees provides security and

immunity to individuals that participate in the peace process including peace consultants

that plays major role in the progress of the peace talks. However, there are alleged

violations of the agreement such as the recent arrest of the NDF consultants Benito and

Wilma Tiamzon. The study will determine the substantial effects of the arrest of the two

NDF consultants as a violation of JASIG to the progress of the peace process between the

National Democratic Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Focusing question: How does the arrest of NDF consultants Benito Tiamzon, Wilma

Tiamzon and ReynanteGamara, as JASIG violations, substantially affect the progress of

the peace process?

Subordinate questions

1. What specific provisions in JASIG were violated when the NDF consultants were

arrested? How did both parties view the arrest?

2. What changes took place in the peace negotiations between NDF and GRP after the

arrests?

3. What may be the other factors that could affect the progress of the peace negotiations

between NDF and GRP?

4. What has been the outcome of previous violations of JASIG? How did these violations

by GRP affect the progress of the peace negotiations?

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E. Significance of the Study

The case study on the effect of the arrest of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria

on the progress of peace negotiation between the Government of the Philippines and the

National Democratic Front involves a wide array of socio political implications to the

Philippine Society that is significant to the study of local conflicts in the Philippines. As

such, the study has academic and practical significance.

a. Academic Significance

The study will be of great importance in proving the Mutual Vulnerability Theory

by which when proved to be accurate by this study by way of applying this on the case of

the peace negotiation between GRP and NDF, this theory could be used by any two

conflicting parties entering into a peace agreement like JASIG. In assessing the

effectiveness of the theory as applied in this study, it can be used as a framework in

interpreting and evaluating other cases of armed conflict with regards to their approach in

the peace negotiations. This study is of immense help to researchers, students of politics,

and individuals who are part of the peace negotiations alike, since the study would be

proposing recommendations and approaches to develop the presently implemented Joint

Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees.

b. Practical Significance

The Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees is one of the major

breakthroughs of the two parties in the peace negotiation panel in their road to the

success of the peace talks and lasting peace in the countryside, and the arrest of NDF

Consultants Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria has tested the effectiveness of this

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agreement. This program has been in effect since June 14, 1994 and one of famous

example of an agreement that initially failed because of the improper handling of each of

the party involved (Mallari, 2014). Having focused on the effect of the arrest of Benito

Tiamzon and Wilma Austria and other victims of JASIG violations on the progress of the

peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and the National

Democratic Front, this study explores in identifying the factors that lead to the

advancement or stall of the peace talks by analyzing the cases of Benito Tiamzon and

Wilma Austria who are supposedly protected by the terms and conditions of Joint

Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees. The violations committed against JASIG

can explain which in which aspect of this agreement that the two parties need further

understanding and if deemed necessary, what part of this agreement needs revision. It can

also analyze as to why it is said to be repeatedly being violated even if both parties had

agreed to it. The outcome of the study can help the government as well as the NDF to

create a better approach with regards to the implementation of safety and immunity

guarantees.

The government institutions specifically the Office of the Presidential Adviser on

the Peace Process as well as non-government organizations can use the study for future

reference as a possible guide on handling similar cases with regards to the peace

negotiation process. In analyzing the effect of the arrest of the Tiamzons in the progress

of the peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and the National

Democratic Front, the results of this study could be used as a contribution to create a

more effective approach and agreement that will suffice the demands of both parties.

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F. Scope and Limitations

Conducting a case study on the effect of the arrest of Benito TiamzonandWilma

Austria on the progress of peace process involves a wide array of subject matter that may

include discreet and confidential information that could be a threat to national security

and the safety of the researchers. In order to avoid circumstances that may lead to

unfortunate events, the researchers will only gather limited information and data that are

open to the public. The researchers are given a timeframe of one year in completing this

study. The research subject is narrow and recent which makes data gathering limited

because there are only few literatures and articles that are significantly related to the

topic. The data will be accumulated primarily from actual interviews of different resource

persons that can provide significant data to the study and will be backed up by data

gathered from available books, pamphlets, academic journals, pamphlets, primers,

brochures, and leaflets. The focus of this study is limited only on the caseof the arrest of

Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria.

The study shall cover phenomena and events related to the arrest of the Tiamzon

couple and its effect to the progress of the peace negotiation process between the

Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. In conducting this

study, the researchers will try to provide a conclusion on whether the arrest of Benito

Tiamzon and Wilma Austria, has significant effect on the progress of the peace

negotiations. Due to time constraints, the assessment is limited only to phenomena and

events related to arrest of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria excluding those other

occurrences that has no direct relationship with the arrest of the Tiamzon couple, and its

effect on the progress of the peace negotiation process.Different institution like OPPAP,

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GRP JMC and AFP on the side of the GRP were also contacted but the information that

can be gathered depends on the availability of these institutions. On the side of the NDF,

possible persons that can be interviewed also depends on the availability and their

response to accept an interview or not.

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 CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES

A. Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees

The Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees also known as JASIG

is the main agreement of the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and National

Democratic Front (NDF) regarding the protection of their negotiating panel. The

chairman of the negotiating panel for GRP is Howard Q. Dee while from the NDF is Luis

G. Jalandoni. It was signed on June 14, 1994 in Breukelen, the Netherlands wherein its

main purpose is to facilitate the peace negotiations, create favourable atmosphere

conducive to free discussion and free movement during the peace negotiations and to

prevent any incident that may jeopardize the peace talks (NDFP, 2005).

It is stated in the Security Guarantees provision of the agreement that all duly

accredited persons in possession of documents of identification or safe conduct passes are

guaranteed free and unhindered passes in all are guaranteed free and unhindered passage

in all areas in the Philippines and in travelling to and from the Philippines in connection

with the performance of their duties in the peace negotiations (NDFP, 2006). This

agreement also guarantees the immunity of all accredited persons from surveillance,

harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution and interrogation or any other similar

punitive actions due to any involvement or participation in the peace negotiation as stated

in its Immunity Guarantees provision (NDFP, 2004).

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B. Local Conflicts

a. Peace Agreement in Mindanao

President Ramos outlined a peace and unification process that aims to unify the

state with the CPP/NPA and MNLF (Rasul III, 1993). The administration of President

Ramos tried to end the separatist movements in the Philippines by initiating the

government to come up with peace negotiations. Mindanao has the biggest number of

armed rebels with 50% of the NPA and over 20,000 Moro fighters from MNLF and

MILF (Linao, 2001). It grew from the assertiveness of poor and ethnic powerless groups

caused by the misdistribution resources and oppression that lead to armed conflicts

(Rasul III, 1993). Political issues with militarization, genocidal and ethnocidal threatens

the people of Mindanao (Linao, 2001). Since the Mindanao has very different culture,

some extremist try to eliminate them in order to take control of their lands. The

Philippine Government and Moro Liberation Front engaged formal peace talks since

2000 (Linao, 2001).

The Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and Moro

National Liberation Front in the year 1996 did not end the Muslim secessionist

movement in Mindanao (Buendia, 2004). The government already had a final peace

agreement but the end of the armed conflict still continued. It meant the failure of both

parties to comply with the said agreement. During the MILF peace process in 2008,

President Arroyo pledged to defeat the communist rebels by 2010 (Hicken, 2009). This

means that the Arroyo Administration sees the Mindanao conflict could be resolved but

not the communist insurgency that is why they continued the peace talks in Mindanao but

not with the CPP/NPA-NDF.

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 b. Mindanao Secessionist Movements

The Filipino Muslims main reason of resistance is the colonial integration policy

of the Philippine Government (Rasul III, 1993). This is because most of the laws and

development of the country is based on its colonial masters. The roots of the ethnic

conflict in Mindanao can be traced since the Spanish and American colonial periods since

the strong resistance of the Muslim communities (Quimpo, 2001). The people of

Mindanao stood independent since 1450 and were not part of the Spanish colonization

that questions them to be part of the modern Philippines or create a separate government

(Rasul III, 1993).

The three century Spanish rule of the Philippines often result in conflict with the

Muslims eventhough the Spanish treated the sultans sovereign (Majul, 1988). The

people of Mindanao have always separated themselves during the colonization years of

the Philippines. They were the only ones who were able to protect and preserve their

culture despite the efforts of the colonizers to impose its culture to them. The

independence from the United States pave way for the administration of the Moro areas

to the Christian Filipino Elite and the interests of the Moro people were not considered

(Haque, 1996).

It was more of a north-south division as a result from colonialism during the

nation building brought by the independence (Magdalena, 1997). Since the North of the

Philippines specifically Luzon became the center of the government during its

colonization era, it became the priority of the government and has become the center of

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development. Luzon as well as Visayas was part of the nation building whereas

Mindanao was somehow left behind and it let them progress their own nation building.

c. Moro National Liberation Front

This literature is important because it another armed conflict in the Philippines.

Compared to the CPP/NPA negotiations, the Mindanao secessionist has more progress in

their peace talks. NurMisuari is the founder and chairman of MNLF acting as the

chairman of Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development did not brought

peace and development in Mindanao (Buendia, 2004). During 1997, the Government of

the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front mediated by the Organization of the

Islamic Conference signed what was known as the final peace agreement which provided

the establishment of regional autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao (Quimpo,

2001). The Peace Agreement is a major factor for the Bangsamoro Revolution but its

implementation is rather problematic that hindered the expected peace and development

(Santos Jr, 2001). This means that even if there is already a final agreement, it does not

end there. There should be proper implementation and strict compliance and adherence to

what was the agreement in order to officially end the conflict and start the planned

development. There were claims that ARMM was not adequately funded by the

government which created tensions between the Government of the Philippines and

MNLF leaders even after the Peace Agreement (May, 2001). The Bangsamoro Juridical

Entity (BJE) includes the autonomy of Bangsamoro with power over basic law, security

forces, education, to have their own system of finance and political institutions as well as

full authority in the use of natural resources found in the territory (Hicken, 2009).

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 d. Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The MILF is a breakaway faction of MNLF in 1977 headed by SalamatHashim

was sidelined by the government since the 1996 peace talks (Buendia, 2004). This means

that the government now has to deal with two separatist groups in Mindanao in order to

resolve armed conflicts. It is possible that the CPP/NPA might have a breakaway group

and if they can handle this situation in the Mindanao, they may get a framework in case

such scenarios may happen in the future. The GRP-MILF official peace process started in

1997 through the signing of GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation of

Hostilities through the initiative of President Ramos but due to his end of term, it failed to

provide substantial results (Buendia, 2004). It was also problematic in terms of

implementing the agreements due to the change in administration. President Estrada

ordered an all-out war against the MILF in March 2000 (Quimpo, 2001). It was because

of little success from the government and frustration that led the Estrada Administration

to conduct an all-out war against the MILF (May, 2001). Due to the capture of MILF

chairman SalamatHashim, the GRP-MILF peace talks which began in January 1997 but

started tackling the substantial issues only in October 1999 collapsed (Quimpo, 2001).

This is important as the recent capture of NDF Consultants means that the peace talks

with the two parties may also go back to scratch. Upon the ouster of Estrada as the

President, the successor President Arroyo announced that the government would seek to

continue the peace talks with the Moro rebels officially ending the all-out war policy

against the MILF (Quimpo, 2001). The change of administrations also hinders the

progress of the peace talks as they have different views and approach on how to deal with

the separatist groups. During 2003, GRP-MILF negotiations tried to revive the stalled

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peace talks of May 2002 known as the fourth round of peace talks which produced two

agreement, one is an adhoc joint action group by the GRP and MILF for the security of

Mindanao against kidnap for ransom groups known as Lost Commands and second is the

Implementing Guidelines on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of

the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (Buendia, 2004). The first round

was sealed under the 2001 Tripoli Agreement of Peace that provided security,

rehabilitation and ancestral domain whereas the second and third round only centered on

implementing guidelines and ceasefire agreements (Buendia, 2004). During December

2007, Moro Islamic Liberation Front negotiators left the negotiating table and placed in

on hold and remained the same until the first quarter of 2008 (Hicken, 2009). Knowing

the progress of other peace talks by the government and other separatist groups shows the

willingness of the administration in its goal in unifying the state.

e. The Cordillera Conflict And The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army

The experiences of the Cordilleras self-determination and the establishment of

the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army can also be considered an offspring of the

National Democratic Revolution waged by the CPP-NPA-NDF. Aside from the fact that

the founding members of this revolutionary group based on the mountains of Cordillera

are high profile regional cadres of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the issues of

exploitation, neglect, social injustice and discrimination are also the main reasons in

waging this secessionist peoples war and the establishment of this revolutionary armed

group. The peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the Cordillera

Peoples Liberation Army can also provide some strategies for the success of the peace

talks.

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 The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA), a regional offshoot of the

nationwide revolutionary movement championing indigenous rights, agreed to a ceasefire

in 1986 (International Crisis Group, 2013). The Cordillera conflict can be traced to

centuries of neglect, discrimination and exploitation of the Indigenous People since the

colonial times (Rasul, 1993). The uncolonized people of Cordilleras has preserved their

indigenous way of life and consolidated their own national community separate from

their lowland brothers (Hernandez, 1989). The Philippine governments that succeeded the

series of colonial administrations threatened the distinctiveness of the Cordillera people

by imposing uniformity on policies without regarding the interest of the Cordillera people

(Sereno & Libarios, 1983).

f. Cordilleras Issues and Dilemmas

The most visible manifestation of these unjust social relations is the exploitation of

Cordilleras vast natural resources, oppression and discrimination on the Cordillera

people, impingement of big business and the integration of the Cordillera villages into the

market economy (Maranan, 1987). The main issues that causes the eruption of Cordillera

revolution are minoritization, exploitation of natural resources of the Cordillera People

without the benefit of economic development, the issue on the ancestral domain and the

dichotomy of values, institutions, systems and even goals between the Cordillera people

and their lowland brother which led to their aspiration of their autonomy from the

Philippine Government (Rasul, 1993). The plunder of environment and of the Cordilleras

and the violence on the lives of the people of Cordillera nation have been carried on by

the majority people and the Philippine Government not only on the Filipinos behalf but

also on behalf of foreign interest (Hernandez, 1989).

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 g. The Cordillera Peace talks

The Cordillera Peace Talks between the Philippine Government and the Cordillera

panel led to the creation of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), granting them

autonomy in Cordillera (Rasul, 1993). The talks led to the granting of autonomy in the

Cordillera with the establishment of the Cordillera Administrative Region (Rasul, 1993).

The CAR was established under EO 220 by returning Abra, Baguio City, Benguet,

Mountain Province, as well as KalingaApayao and Ifugao to the Cordilleras from

Regions I and II (Hernandez C. , 1989). The creation of this Cordillera self-government

marked the end of the threat posed by the Cordillera rebellion (Rasul, 1993). The issue of

the Cordilleras, as an autonomous region within the Philippine body politic is the high

point and references of struggle for a just and lasting peace (Hernandez C. , 1989).

B. The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines

a. Protracted Peoples War of the New Peoples Army

Time is a key factor for the armed revolutionaries in their strengthening their

armed forces and for the party to establish, expand and consolidate base areas in as many

parts of the country as possible and also politicizing and mobilizing the people for mass

support for what we call peoples war (Corpus, 1989).

All of these vital and necessary ingredients for a successful insurgency require

time to develop and therefore is the strategy of protracted peoples war in the Philippine

National Democratic Revolution waged by the CPP-NPA-NDF and the Filipino people

(Corpus, 1989). The CPP was formed in 1968 with only 9 original squads and with only

35 assorted rifles and handguns but now, its membership has already reached an

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estimated 24,000 full time guerilla fighters, opened more than 60 guerilla fronts and base

areas in the countryside, the NDF as a united front of different sectoral revolutionary

organization of the CPP which is just a skeletal organization at first, but now has gained

its flesh attracting influential members of the clergy, the business community, the media,

government and other strategic sectors of our society (Weekley, 2001). The strategy of

the protracted peoples war entails the total mobilization of the entire people for armed

struggle, open mass struggles, rural and urban uprisings and other forms of unarmed and

armed combat to destroy by stages the military and political capability of the reactionary

government (Hernandez, 1989). All of these factors are concretization of the strategy of

Protracted Peoples War wherein given more time; revolutionary fighters will continue to

build up strength until the balance of forces finally tilts in their favor (Corpus, 1989).

b. Encirclement of the Cities from the Countryside

The CPP-NPAs general strategy is to set up as many rural base areas all over the

country as possible, and to gradually expand and consolidate these base areas until they

link with one another, thus controlling a vast portion of the countryside before finally

taking the cities (Corpus, 1989). This strategy is based on the analysis that the Philippines

is a semi-feudal society wherein the countrys economy is predominantly agricultural

where the great number of population is composed of poor landless peasants living in the

countryside, meaning the agrarian revolution of the National Democratic Struggle will

attract the greatest number of people from the countryside (Guerrero, 2006). It is also in

the remote and depressed areas in the countryside that the government presence,

influence and control is minimal thus, the revolutionaries have their relative freedom of

action (Weekley, 2001). The extensive mountainous areas and forested regions in the

23 | P a g e
mountains of the countryside offer the guerilla revolutionaries an ideal room for strategic

military maneuver (Corpus, 1989).

c. Counter-Insurgency Campaigns of the Government of the Philippines

Counterinsurgency campaigns of the Government of the Philippines are used to

counteract the guerilla tactic of the protracted peoples war of the CPP-NPA. These

counterinsurgency campaigns have tried to pacify the armed revolution by force and

outside the negotiating table of the peace process. Events and phenomena in this

counterinsurgency campaign can also create a great impact on the peace negotiations

because the ground soldiers of each party are also subject most of the comprehensive

agreement mutually agreed in the peace talks.

1. OplanKatatagan

The Armed Forces of the Philippines has implemented OplanKatatagan from

1981 up to the end of Marcos dictatorship. OplanKatatagan was the militarys basic

strategy against the communist insurgency, which by then was considered the major

internal security threat wherein heavy redeployment of troops from Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) areas to the stronghold of the Communist Party of the

Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA) was affected

(Santos, 2005). OplanKatatagan was implemented in four stages namely the clear, hold,

consolidate, and develop counterinsurgency strategy which required military forces,

with the help of other government agencies, to systemically clear areas of insurgents,

hold these against returning guerillas, consolidate support for the government and

develop the areas economy (Hernandez, 2006). It also involved the police, paramilitary

forces through the strengthened Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF), civilian voluntary

24 | P a g e
organizations, and local development agencies in achieving the security-development

design of the plan (Hernandez, 2006).

Clearing was the duty of mobile armed forces (army battalions and constabulary

special action forces), while holding and consolidating were the tasks of the territorial

forces (the constabulary, police and militia). The methods used by armed forces included

food blockades, cordon and search operations, and hamletting of forced relocation of

communities (Malonzo, 2010). Military units were also positioned in town halls, business

and major roads (Dolan, 1993). Though correctly premised on the fact that the insurgency

is caused by social inequalities and other ills in the society, OplanKatatagans goal,

however, was still to defend the state instead of securing and caring for the people

(Hernandez, 2006).

2. OplanMamamayan

After Aqunos rise to power in 1986, the Philippine Military resumed

counterinsurgency operations against the NPA with a new strategy called

OplanMamamayan. This strategy was similar to Marcos OplanKatatagan but with

Aquinos additional theme of reconciliation, interestingly, then US President Ronald

Reagan approved heightened involvement of the CIA in Philippine counterinsurgency

operations in March 1986 (EILER, 2005). OplanMamamayan came from a sophisticated

counterinsurgency doctrine known as low intensity conflict (LIC) or a political-

military confrontation waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic,

informational and military instruments developed from Philippine experience and US

influence (Santos, 2005). The victory position was reflected in the establishment of

Special Operations Team (SOTs) that had three teams undertaking psychological,

25 | P a g e
security and "stay-behind" operations wherein the psy-ops team sought to discover

guerilla political organizations and structure, the security team handled the safety of

captured rebels while the third team took care of the barangay defense(Hernandez, 2006).

The Government of the Philippines held peace talks with the National Democratic

Front of the Philippines from August 1986 to February 1987, but the negotiations

collapsed after the MendiolaMassacre (Malonzo, 2010).

3. OplanLambatBitag

The AFP hatched the vicious strategy OplanLambatBitag, considered the best

counterinsurgency program thus far, by September 1988 (Santos, 2005). A further

refinement of its predecessors, LambatBitag's long term goal was to end the insurgency

by addressing its political, economic and social causes but its immediate aim was to

"slash its growth through military means" which demonstrates the "unsheathing of the

sword of war", a sign of the influence of the military in Aquino's policy regarding

insurgency (Hernandez, 2006). Military leaders considered the deployment of special

operations teams in 1987 and the creation of new militia units in 1988 as vital moves for

the efficacy of the counterinsurgency measure (Malonzo, 2010). The special operation

teams were squad sized military teams, which worked with the newly face-lifted militia

called the Citizens Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGUs), sent to communities to

discredit the CPP-NPA through civic actions and propaganda programs. The CAFGUs

were formerly the Civilian home Defense Force well known for killings and human rights

abuses (Dolan, 1993). OplanLambatBitag was notorious for the deployment of

anticommunist vigilante groups and other death squads, which the US was reportedly

involved in aside from psychological warfare (psywar) operations, US psywar included

26 | P a g e
distribution of anti-communist film and publications from the US Information Agency

(Malonzo, 2010). The AFP claimed to have substantially weakened the NPA and ended

the OplanLambatBitag in 1995, but this would later be called a strategic blunder of the

Philippine Military because the communist forces eventually recovered and began

gaining strength as the root causes of the rebellion-structural inequities, foreign

exploitation and pervasive poverty-remain unaddressed.

4. OplanMakabayan

Under the Estrada administration, which declared an all-out war in Mindanao, the

Armed Forces of the Philippines hatched another counterinsurgency campaign called

OplanMakabayan as a comprehensive approach to end the communist and Muslim

rebellions but is short-lived because of Estradas ouster in 2001 (Malonzo, 2010).

5. OplanBantayLaya

OplanBantayLaya (Freedom Watch) is the counterinsurgency campaign of the AFP

under the Arroyo administration. Formally known as Security Operations Plan

BantayLaya, OBL as it is now commonly referred to- is already the seventeenth in a

succession of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the Philippine Military since

the restoration of the elite democracy in 1986, spanning two decades and four

presidencies, the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched OBL in January 2002, a year

after Arroyo came into power, and is intended to run for five years (Malonzo, 2010). A

second OBL (OBL2) was put in motion in January 2007, with 2010-Arroyos final year

in office as its deadline.

27 | P a g e
 OplanBantayLayas strategic goal is to decisively defeat armed insurgent groups in

order to attain and maintain peace and security for national development (Malonzo,

2010). Among these groups, the CPP-NPA is singled out by the Armed Forces of the

Philippines as OplanBantayLayas principal target (Corpus, 2010).

OBL is patterned after the OplanLambatBitag, widely considered within the military

and defense establishment as the most successful counterinsurgency drive in the Post-

Marcos era (Corpus, 2010). Like the OplanLambatBitag, internal operations by the AFP

fall under the Clear stage of the overarching Clear-Hold-Consolidate-develop

operational framework (Corpus, 2010). Clearing villages of NPA influence or presence is

done through the Special Operations team (SOT) operations which are carved out from

regular infantry battalions of the Philippine Army and is composed of at least nine

members, which includes two psyops specialists, two intelligence specialists, and two

security elements (Espuelas, 2008).

SOT operations are designed to dismantle the politico-military structure or the

political machinery of the CPP-NPA in target communities (Corpus, 2010). SOT forces

focus on destroying the CPP-NPAs non-military organs and basses of mass support,

aware that they are manned by civilians and non-combatants, and deprive the insurgent

forces of support structures that enable them to operate, a measure that is likened to

taking the fish out of the water (Espuelas, 2008).

D. Peace Negotiation Efforts

Counterinsurgency campaigns are also complimented by peace negotiation efforts by

each administration on the part of the Government of the Philippines. Each

28 | P a g e
administration has its own strategy and tactics in handling the armed conflict through

military and political efforts.

a. Ramos Administration

The Government of the Philippines under former president Fidel V. Ramos saw

the on-and-off progress of peace talks between the GRP and the National Democratic

front because of the several stoppages of peace talks that were resumed eventually after

several negotiations. During this administration, the illegality of the Communist party of

the Philippines (CPP) was revoked because of the repealing of the Anti-Subversion Law

(University of Southern California, n.d.). also in this administration that the Joint

Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was formulated and

implemented in 1994 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights

and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998 (Human Development

Network, 2005).

b. Estrada Administration

It is on the term of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the Comprehensive

Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

(CARHRIHL) has been signed and been implemented in accordance with the Philippine

Constitution and other legal terms but it is also during his term that peace negotiations

has been suspended several times because of the side issues like the ratification of the

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) by the Senate of the Philippines, granting US military

forces unlimited access to and use of Philippine ports and airports which is claimed by

the NDF as a violation of the principle of national sovereignty and the GRPs own

Constitution (NDFP, 2006).

29 | P a g e
 It is also during his term that the Government of the Philippines has opted to local

peace talks after the suspension of the formal peace negotiations between the NDFP and

the GRP (Corpus, 2010). Estrada was not interested in an implementing mechanism for

CARHRIHL; he wanted an immediate comprehensive peace agreement with the NDF

and quickly becoming infuriated with the NDFs negative responseto move toward a

comprehensive agreement, Estrada declared an all-out war against the CPP-NPA-NDF,

but Estradas war failed miserably (Quimpo, 2006). His administrations failure to

address the root causes of the armed conflict and focus on the victory position helped

keep the armed conflict alive (Hernandez, 2006).

c. Arroyo Administration

On the early part of Arroyos term, the negotiations has been resumed and the

effectivity of JASIG has been reinstated. Formal Peace Talks in Oslo, Norway has been

resumed on April, 2001 with official hosting and facilitation by the Royal Norweigian

Government (RNG) (NDFP, 2006). But after the 9/11 attacks, the CPP-NPA-NDF has

been included by the US Government and its allies in their list of foreign terrorist

organizations (Corpus, 2010). The Government of the Philippines has recognized this list

of terrorist organizations released by the United States and include CPP-NPA-NDF

leaders and consultatants on their terrorist watch list (NDFP, 2006). The Government of

the Philippines under the Arroyo Administration calls on the NPA to lay down their arms

and join the mainstream of the society (Quimpo, 2006). After the visit of US Secretary of

State Colin Powell to the Philippines, the Arroyo Administration virtually declared all-

out-war on the revolutionary movement (NDFP, 2006).

30 | P a g e
 Extrajudicial killings is rampant during the anti-revolution campaign of Arroyo

Administration (EILER, 2005). Peasant leaders, worker organizers, student leaders and

other individuals that are part of the legal leftist organizations and Party-List groups are

suspiciosly murdered and under surveillance (Philippine UPR Watch, 2012). Human

rights violations like the abduction of the two UP Student-Activists, Sherlyn Cadapan and

Karen Empeno has been extensive during Arroyos Administration (Philippine UPR

Watch, 2012). This events empede the resumption of the talks between the GRP and the

NDFP on the latter part of her Administration (Quimpo, 2006).

E. Major Written Agreements before and after JASIG

a. The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992

The Hague Joint Declaration is the framework agreement for the GRP-NDFP peace

negotiations. It puts forward the attainment of a just and lasting peace as the common

goal of the formal peace negotiations (NDFP, 2006). It requires that the negotiations must

be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty,

democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent

character and purpose of the peace negotiations (NDFP, 2004). The substantive agenda

agreed upon in the declaration includes human rights and international humanitarian law,

socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and

disposition of forces (NDFP, 2005). The method is laid down for arriving at tentative

agreements on substantive issues in the agreed agenda; specific measures of goodwill and

confidence building are called for to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations

(NDFP, 2006).

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 b. The Breukelen Joint Statement of 1994

The Breukelen Joint Statement is a reaffirmation of adherence to the Hague Joint

Declaration of the Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic front of

the Philippines wherein the two parties has voluntarily undertaken measures to improve

the climate on negotiation (NDFP, 2006). In this Joint statement, the Government of the

Philippines Panel and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Delegation has

agreed to adopt safety and immunity guarantees for personnel who will participate in the

peace negotiations as negotiators, staffers, consultants and security personnel and the

ground rules for the future talks (NDFP, 2006). This Joint Statement is the foundation of

establishing the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG).

c. Comprehensive Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and

International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) of 1998

CAHRIHL is the first comprehensive agreement of four substantive agenda on the

peace talks between the GRP and the NDFP signed on March 16, 1998. The gist of this

agreement lays on the respect of the two parties, specially their armed forces to the

human rights and international Law and recognizing that respect for human rights and

international Humanitarian Law is of crucial importance and urgent necessity in laying

the ground for a just and lasting peace between the two parties (NDFP, 2005). CAHRIHL

is the fruit of the long history of struggle of the Filipino people to uphold and protect

their human rights (Philippine UPR Watch, 2012). It is a comprehensive agreement

rooted on a existing reality that systematic and widespread violations of human rights is

still existing in our country up to this time (Quimpo, 2006). This comprehensive

agreement so far is the biggest success of this peace negotiations and a contribution to the

32 | P a g e
currently existing local and international documents on human rights particularly on the

situations of armed conflict (Philippine UPR Watch, 2012).

The NDFP and the GRP signed the CAHRIHL in the context of negotiations for a just

and lasting peace (Human Development Network, 2005). This comprehensive agreement

is based on interests, aspirations and concrete conditions of the Filipino People,

especially those of the workers, peasants, urban poor, women, youth, fisher folks,

national minorities and other oppressed sectors in the Philippine Society (NDFP, 2006).

The CAHRIHL is a response to the peoples demand for justice against the continuing

violation of their human rights.

F. Major Written Agreements complimentary to JASIG

a. Additional Implementing Rules Pertaining to the Document of

Identification.

The Additional Implementing Rules Pertaining to the Document of Identification is

an additional agreement complimentary to the JASIG which is written and drafted in

order to declare additional rules of the JASIG exclusively pertaining to the Documents of

Identification (NDFP, 2004). In this agreement, it is stated that each party shall be

entitled to issue not more than eighty-five (85) documents of identification that shall be

duly recognized as safe conduct passes given to the duly accredited persons who are

practicing their duties as negotiators, consultants, staffers, security and other personnel in

their respective parties (NDFP, 2006). The provisions and implementing rules stated in

this agreement should become complimentary and shall not impair or diminish the safety

and immunity guarantees provided for under the JASIG (NDFP, 2006).

33 | P a g e
 b. Additional Implementing Rules of JASIG pertaining to the Security of

Personnel and Consultations in Furtherance of the Peace Negotiations.

The Additional Implementing Rules of JASIG pertaining to the Security of Personnel

and Consultations in Furtherance of Peace negotiations which is primarily written and

drafted in order to secure and protect the respective personnel of the two parties involved

in the peace negotiations through their respective security forces (NDFP, 2006). This

kind of security for their respective personnel is likewise required for the consultations,

public meetings, and free and unhindered passage in all areas in the Philippines in

connection with and in furtherance of the peace negotiations that those duly accredited

persons conduct (NDFP, 2004). Some provisions included are the right of the security

personnel to carry a sidearm each including its ammunitions, accessories and spare parts

for their security and self-protection while in the performance of their functions in the

peace negotiations, the creation of Security Committee for the respective Party and other

provisions complimentary and shall not impair or diminish the safety and immunity

guarantees provided for under the JASIG (NDFP, 2006).

c. Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and the

Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs) of

the GRP and the NDFP.

The Joint Agreement on the Formation Sequence and the Operationalization of the

Reciprocal Working Committees of the Government of the Philippines and the National

Democratic Front of the Philippines is an agreement creating different major Reciprocal

Working Committees of the two respective parties in which it should be composed of a

chairperson and two members to be appointed by their respective Negotiating Panels and

34 | P a g e
shall be assisted by consultants, advisers and staff (NDFP, 2006). The said committees

shall be named after the four major headings of the substantive agenda namely Human

Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Socio-Economic Reforms, Political and

Constitutional Reforms, and End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces (NDFP, 2004).

G. Political Prisoners

a. Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria

A military report presented that the couple are the real in command of the CPP-

NPA and not the founder Jose Ma. Sison(Matus, Fernandez &Dizon, 2014). Benito

Tiamzon was a student activist from UP Diliman in the 1970s who organize labor unions

(Maru, 2014). Benito was already arrested in Fort Bonifacio during the Marcos regime

under the Martial Law (Gloria, 2014). The Tiamzon couple was arrested by a joint police

and military team through a checkpoint in Cebu (Matus, Fernandez &Dizon, 2014).

Benito and Wilma Tiamzon were already arrested from an alleged involvement in the

1985 massacre in Leyte where Wilma escaped the detention center in Camp Crame

(Maru, 2014). They were both named as NDFP Consultants have identifications with

them. This arrest means that the couple was under surveillance even if they are both

protected by JASIG.

b. Reynante Gamara

ReynanteGamara is identified as the secretary of the Metro Manila Regional Party

Committee of the CPP who replace FilimonLagman who was killed in UP Diliman in

2001 (Nepomuceno, 2012). NDFP failed to comply with the mechanisms for the

verification of NDFP Consultants that rendered JASIG inoperative (OPAPP, 2012). This

can explain as to why the NDFP failed to provide the necessary information for their

35 | P a g e
consultants. It shows that the implementation of JASIG is not fully clarified as both

parties have different sides regarding the matter.

c. Roy Erecre

Roy Erecre is identified as a senior leader of the Communist Party of the

Philippines and was arrested last May 7, 2014 (Manlupig, 2014). He was able to post bail

of almost half a million for his temporary release (Ligalig, 2014). He was arrested for

robbery in Bohol and frustrated murder in Negros Occidental and was given P5.4 million

bounty (Maru, 2014). His case can be related to study because he was able to bail himself

out of jail while the Tiamzon couple cannot. He is also identified as an NDFP Consultant

but was still arrested.

d. Eugenia Magpantay and AgatonTopacio

The AFP-PNP counterinsurgency forces arrested two elderly persons whom they

thought are CCP Leaders (Sapnu, 2014). They are identified as Lourdes Quioc and

Reynaldo Ingal suspected to be Eugenia Magpantay and AgatonTopacio respectively

(Ocampo, 2014). The two elderly are victims or mistaken identity. Ms. Magpantay and

Mr. Topacio are NDFPConsulatants who holds Documents of Identification. This means

that even if they are identified as NDFP Consultants, there are still efforts from the

government to arrest them even if they are protected under JASIG.

e. Timeline of CPP-NPA Leaders under Aquino

A timeline was provided by Rappler regarding the arrest of CPP-NPA Leaders

under the Aquino Administration. On 2011, TirsoAlcantara was caught on January 5 and

Allan Jazmines was caught on February 14; On 2012, FilimonMendrez was caught on

36 | P a g e
December 25; On 2013, Kennedy Bangibang was arrested on February 24,

ReynanteGamara on April 2 and Maria LoydaTuzoMagpatoc on July 28; On 2014,

George VIllacortGeluz was caught on February 8, SylvestreLayones on February 9,

Sonny Gonzales on February 10 and Romulo Bitoon on February 17 (Santos Jr, 2014).

In the given timeline, the government have arrested multiple leaders of the

CPP/NPA. The NDFP is providing the information who is their consultants but the GRP

however do not identify which is an NDFP Consultant and which is not.

37 | P a g e
 CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Methods

This study will utilize descriptive method in a case study design using qualitative

approach as the primary research technique. The descriptive method will be used to

describe the cases of the detention of National Democratic Front consultants Wilma

Austria and Benito Tiamzonand explore its effect to the progress of the peace process.

Using qualitative approach, the study will utilize interviews and archival research in

gathering the necessary information that are essential to this research.

a. Case Study

The research design that was utilized in this research is Case study which aims to

create an in depth study on a specific instance of a phenomenon (Yin, 2003). Case study

examines a certain phenomenon intensively in relation to its context by focusing on the

details of the case.According to Baxter (2008), when the study aims to answer how and

why questions and the behaviour of the individuals involved in the study cannot be

manipulated and the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context is not clear,

then the case study design should be considered.

b. Descriptive method

Descriptive research is a type of research that aims to describe a single variable or

to acquire separate descriptions and explanations for each variable when the study utilizes

38 | P a g e
several cases (Gravetter and Forzano, 2009). This type of research method basically

describes the characteristics of a community or a phenomenon and may be used if there is

complexity in the object of the research. According to Monsen (2008), the concerns of a

descriptive research are the structures, practices, conditions, relationships that exist,

differences, opinions and processes that are existing and evident.

c. Qualitative Approach

Qualitative approach on research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions,

characteristics, symbols and description of things and tends to assess the quality things

using words, images and descriptions (Berge & Lange, 2012). Qualitative method is

basically the subjective method of analyzing and gathering data which deals not on

numbers and statistics. In relation to this study, the researchers will make use of

qualitative method in gathering data by interviews and analysis of archival resources such

as books, articles and journals.

B. Data

Resource Persons

There are resource persons that will be the primary sources of data in this

interview which includes but not limited to; the peace negotiating panel of the

Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines that

include the names of Luis Jalandoni (Chief Negotiator of the NDF Peace Panel),

Consultants and Staffs of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines such as

Randall Echanis and those political detainees that are claimed to be victims of JASIG

39 | P a g e
violations like Benito Tiamzon, Wilma Austria, who are peace consultants of the

National Democratic Front.

The researchers will also try to conduct an interview with former members of the

peace negotiating who are witnesses and part of the effort on signing the Joint Agreement

on Safety and Immunity Guarantees like Silvestre Bello III, representative of 1 BAP

Party List (former Chief Negotiator of GRP).

C. Procedure

Using case study in this research, the researchers will use published and

unpublished written and documented data which includes but not limited to books,

brochure and leaflets, academic journals, dissertations, and thesis. Aside from these

sources, the researcher also utilized interviews in gathering substantial data. Gathering

procedures was conducted at the negotiating panel between the Government of the

Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and other individuals

and institutions related to the research topic and that are covered by this study within the

timeframe of Aquino Administration. Articles, Journals and Reports from libraries and

research institutions including documents from Office of the Presidential Adviser on the

Peace Process (OPPAP) and Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) shall also be utilized.

D. Research Instrument

a. Interview

The primary data gathering instrument that the researchers will use is interviews

as part of its qualitative approach. This is for the researcher to gather data from particular

40 | P a g e
people that has the sufficient knowledge and direct involvement about the research topic

and the program itself. The target respondents of these formal and informal interviews are

government officials from Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

(OPPAP), peace negotiating panel, consultants and staffs of National Democratic Front

of the Philippines and the Government of the Philippines, and the political detainees that

are directly affected by the arrest of the Tiamzons. The researchers will utilize set of

questions for the resource persons to answer that are structured to provide the desired

data in the form of personal interview and interviews through e-mails, phone and video

calls if necessary.

b. Archival Resources

Documents, literatures, academic researches, studies and reports related to the

effects of the arrest of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria on the Peace Negotiations

between the NDF and GRP that are available on the archives and libraries will be

utilized. The files from these archives and libraries are beneficial to achieve the goal of

this academic study.

c. Brochures, Primers and Leaflets

The researchers are able to collect brochures, primers and leaflets from the

National Democratic Front of the Philippines and shall try to acquire similar and other

forms of materials from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

(OPPAP) and the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). The brochures, primers and

leaflets contain significant information and data about the arrest of the Tiamzons and its

effect on the peace negotiations between the NDF and GRP.

41 | P a g e
D. Definition of Terms

a. Conceptual Terms

Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) an agreement

between the Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front that

provides safety and immunity guarantees that protect the rights of negotiators,

consultants, staffers, security and other personnel who participate in the GRP NDFP

peace negotiations, in order to facilitate the peace negotiations, create a favorable

atmosphere conducive to free discussion and free movement during the negotiations, and

avert any incident that may jeopardize the peace negotiations (NDFP, 2006).

New Peoples Army (NPA) the armed wing of the Communist Party of the

Philippines; they lead the armed struggle against the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines (Segovia, 2008).

National Democratic Front (NDF) an umbrella organizing under whose wings were

progressive groups, including CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) and its armed

elements, the New Peoples Army (Segovia, 2008, p.263).

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) leads the Peoples Democratic

Government that offers an alternative of a national-democratic society with a socialist

perspective (Human Development Network, 2005).

Counterinsurgency is a government program meant to neutralize insurgency (Ordua,

2005)

42 | P a g e
Imperialism extending the rule of a city or state under foreign control (Barash&Webel,

2014)

Bureaucrat Capitalism politicians earning private profits through governmental

functions (Ordua, 2005)

Peace Talks dialogue and discussions looking for an agreement of peace and end of

fighting (Adriatico, 2000)

Feudalism socio-economic system through landlord oppression of the peasantry

(Ordua, 2005)

b. Operational Terms

Armed conflict/struggle radical approach in promoting social and political change;

mostly practiced by militant groups such as the New Peoples Army (NPA).

Conflict Resolution end of conflict through peaceful negotiations

Deadlock end of negotiation for failure of parties to continue or compromise

Vulnerability refers to the ability of both parties to sanction and be sanctioned by the

orhter parties.

43 | P a g e
 Chapter IV

Data Presentation Analysis and Interpretation

A. Data Presentation

This chapter will provide the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the

gathered data regarding the effects of the arrest of the Tiamzons to the peace process. The

group, having done rigorous research and qualitative interview with top officials from the

National Democratic Front and the Government of the Philippines, have gathered enough

information to forward the cause of the paper. The resource persons coming from both

sides of the peace negotiating panel, their official statements and some secondary data

available have provided adequate aid in the proceeding of this academic study. This

research paper will provide a vast analysis on the substantive effects of the arrest of

Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria, both NDF Peace Consultants, on the progress of the

peace talks. The Chairperson of the NDF negotiating panel Luis Jalandoni and NDF

consultant Randall Echanis has given the researchers the support and trust to explain the

status of the peace talks and its view on the arrest of the Tiamzon couple.

Moreover, it is the KARAPATAN Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples

Rights that fully assisted the researchers on their whole course of research. The Joint

Monitoring Committee of both parties also assisted the researchers on process of their

data gathering; by providing sets of academic documents and references, and recognized

the possible benefits of this study for the research aspects of conflict resolution and the

GRP-NDF peace negotiations per se.

44 | P a g e
 The researchers conducted interviews with the chairperson of the NDF

negotiating panel, Luis Jalandoni, NDF consultant Randall Echanis and former GPH

chief negotiator, Congressman Silvestre Bello III. Official statements and published

interviews of other NDF peace panel members such as Jose Maria Sison and the Office of

the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process was also utilized.

Specific JASIG violations

On the question What specific porvisions in JASIG were violated when the NDF

consultants were arrested, Luis Jalandoni of the National Democratic Front stated in our

interview that the arrest of Benito and Wilma Tiamzon is a violation of Article 1 Sec 1 of

JASIG which provides immunity to all the participants of the peace negotiation between

the GRP and NDF. Prior to the arrest, the Tiamzons were also subjected to surveillance

for two months by the Intelligence Security group, Intelligence Service of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, The Philippine Army, Criminal Investigation and Detection

group and Carcar Police (Matus et al, 2014) which also violated the provision mentioned

by Jalandoni. In addition to that, Randall Echanis of NDF specified a provision in JASIG

in our interview stating that all duly credited persons are guaranteed immunity from

surveillance, harassment, arrest, detention, prosecution and probation and other similar punitive

actions due to any involvement and participation in the peace process. He stressed the fact that

the Tiamzons are consultants of NDF especially Wilma Austria who, according to him, is

publicly involved in peace negotiations and uses her real name in her document of

Identification that is provided by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity

Guarantees.

45 | P a g e
 However, in an interview with Silvestre Bello III, he said that he cannot prove

whether or not the arrest is a violation of JASIG because the verification tool in the form

of diskettes and encryptions allegedly malfunctioned, making the verification of the NDF

consultants with documents of identification impossible. However, he also stated that

GPH must comply with the agreements stated in the JASIG in order for the peace process

to advance and cited the strong political will and eagerness to comply with the signed

agreements by President Ramos manifested on the immediate release of the victims of the

violations of JASIG. The claim of Bello is contrary to the statement of the GPH panel

regarding the arrest, stating that the arrest made no violation of the JASIG, which is

inoperative, and blamed the NDF as the cause of the inoperativeness of the agreement.

According to the statement of OPPAP (2014), the failure to open the verification tools,

which is the fault of NDF, makes JASIG inoperative to those consultants that are using

assumed names or not directly participating in the peace talks. In the case of Benito

Tiamzon and Wilma Austria, the former is listed under an alias. While the latter is not

eligible for JASIG protection even if she was identified in the JASIG list by her real

name because she escaped from detention in 1989, six years before JASIG came into

effect.

Perspective of Both parties

On the question on how the both parties view the arrest of the Tiamzons, Luis

Jalandoni, National Democratic Front Chief Negotiator, on our interview with him,

argued that the arrest and detention of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria is a violation

of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity guarantees signed by the both parties.

46 | P a g e
According to him, the arrest and detention of the Tiamzons shows the insincerity of GRP,

its refusal to comply with its standing obligation and a clear violation of the Hernandez

Political Offense Doctrine, which provides immunity for political prisoners and activists

convicted for common crimes because of their social consciousness and objective.

Moreover, a fellow peace consultant of the Tiamzons, Randall Echanis seconded

this argument of Jalandoni and stated that the Tiamzons, especially Wilma Austria, is

publicly involved in the peace process and is a holder of a Document of Identification

under her real name. He also seconded the statement of Jalandoni that the arrest is a clear

violation of Hernandez Political Doctrine and claimed that the opposing party has filed

trump-up cases against the Tiamzons. Both Jalandoni and Echanis are strongly

condemning the arrest and demand for the immediate release of the two. However, still

quite unsure on the legitimacy of the arrest and whether there is a violation of JASIG or

not, Silvestre Bello, former Chief Peace Negotiator of the GRP has firmly argued that

JASIG should be respected and operative and whenever the two has been verified as NDF

Consultants, the GRP should immediately release these two political prisoners.

Changes after the arrest

On the question, what changes took place in the peace negotiations between

NDF and GRP after the arrest? Randall Echanis reiterates that the arrest of the Tiamzons

legitimized the reservations of NDF in the talks that the Philippine Government, which he

claimed as reactionary, is not worthy of their trust and thus, they need to become more

vigilant in their every actions. However, Luis Jalandoni of NDF stated in his interview

last January 2015 that the resumption of peace talks, after years in stall, is going to

47 | P a g e
transpire the following month that will start with pre-panel meetings that will create the

concrete steps of the talks. The chief political consultant of the NDF, Jose Maria Sison,

stated in an interview that the peace negotiations between the NDF and the Aquino

government is in deadlock even before the arrest of the Tiamzon couple because of the

non-compliance with and violations of existing agreements and thus, the arrest will create

adverse costs to the peace talks (Valerio, 2014). However, the GRP has made itself more

supercilious and invulnerable after the arrest of the Tiamzons. The Armed Forces

declared that the CPP-NPA-NDF is near to its downfall after the arrest of Benito

Tiamzon and Wilma Austria whom they consider as the leaders and the central

commander of the whole revolutionary movement (Dizon, 'With Tiamzons arrest, its

time for NPA to surrender' AFP, 2014).

Other Factors

Other factors that could affect the progress of the peace negotiations between the

NDF and GRP were also mentioned by the interviewees. Silvestre Bello III stressed the

importance of trust and sincerity of the two parties in advancing the peace talks. He

commends the sincerity of the GRP peace panel during the Ramos Administration

wherein the peace panelist from both the GRP and NDF has considered tactical and

strategic value of the talks that led them to consider back channelling and informal talks

to advance the peace talks. He explained that the lesser peace talks mean more shooting

and vice versa. According to him, while the peace negotiation continues, the frequency of

the battle should go down.

48 | P a g e
 This was indirectly supported by Echanis stating that the sincerity of the can be

considered another factor that could affect the progress of the peace talks. He mentioned

that in 13 years and 7 months, the GRP declared indefinite recess three times (totaling 8

months and 41 days) suspended the talks 6 times (totalling 44 months and 74 days),

collapsed the peace talks once (lasting for 1 month) and terminated the peace talks once

(amounting to 21 months and 4 days). Altogether, these unilateral moves by the GRP to

initiate recess, suspension, collapse and terminate the peace talks amounted to 6 years, 6

months and 5 days and that on the same period in 13 years and 7 months; while in the

same period of time, the NDF has declared the postponement of the formal talks only

once. It lasted for 4 months and 5 days in order for the other party to comply with the

agreement. According to Jalandoni, the release of some detained NDF consultants will

prove the "seriousness" of GRP in pursuing the peace negotiations with the NDF,

Pointing that the resume of the peace talks relies on President Aquino.

Another factor that was stressed by Jalandoni for the GRP to consider is the

support of National and International Independent peace advocate groups such as

Philippine Ecumenical council, Pilgrims for peace, KAPAYAPAAN, Campaign for a

Just and Lasting Peace, Citizens Action for Justice. One concrete example given by

Jalandoni is the effort of an ecumenical peace advocate group in the United States to

create a law in the congress requiring the Philippine Army to have improvements in their

Human Rights record in order for them to receive the 50 million USD worth of military

credits from the US.

49 | P a g e
Previous violations

On the question what has been the outcome of previous violations of JASIG?

How did these violations by GRP affect the progress of the peace negotiations?

Jalandoni mentioned the arrest of Sutero Llamas in 1995, an NDF Consultant, the same

year JASIG was signed. The NDF stated that the peace process will not resume unless

SuteroLlmas was released. The GPH treated the demand as a pre-condition to start the

peace talks which lead to the compromise of the NDF. Echanis added that the arrest was

condemned by the NDF and appealed the immediate release arguing that the GRP should

comply with JASIG for the advancement of the peace talks. The GRP later released the

NDF consultant in respect to JASIG. In line with said agreement, according to Bello, the

Chief Negotiator of GPH during the Ramos Administration, When he advised the

president to release the detained NDF consultants as a sign of compliance to the

agreements, they were immediately released which lead to the creation of 10 documents

that are significant to flow of the peace talks. The OPPAP (2012) however argued that in

the case of the arrest of ReynanteGamara, NDFP failed to comply with the mechanisms

for the verification of NDFP Consultants that rendered JASIG inoperative.

50 | P a g e
 B. Interpretation of Data

Immunity Guarantees Provision

The two parties presented opposing view with regards to the arrest of the

Tiamzons whether it is a violation of JASIG or not. The NDF is united in their claim that

the arrest of the Tiamzons is a clear violation of JASIG because it violates the immunity

guarantees provision which provides immunity to the peace talks participants from

surveillance, arrest, detention and harassment. However, the data shows that there are two

different perspectives that arose in the claims of GRP whether the arrest is a JASIG

violation or not. Former GRP Chief Negotiator Silvestre Bello III contradicts the

reiteration of OPPAP that there is no violation of JASIG because they already declared

that the Joint Agreements inoperative.

Dual Perspective of GRP

The opposing view from the two GRP respondents shows that the strategy in pursuing the

peace negotiations and the interpretation on implementation of JASIG is dependent on

the judgement of the current administration. According to Bello, the strong political will

of the President during the Ramos Administration has resulted to the creation and signing

of 10 documents that are vital to the adherence of the two parties in the general

framework of the peace talks which is the Hague Joint Declaration. Contrary to the

Ramos Administration, the Aquino government failed to produce any agreements with

the NDF and the progress of the peace process was limited to special tracks that are just a

supplementary to the regular track of the talks to revive the latter.

51 | P a g e
 The answer of Silvestre Bello, which is coincidentally, the chief negotiator of

GRP during the Ramos Administration, was based on his experiences in the peace panel

during the time of President Ramos. The contradicting statements of the current GRP

panel under the Aquino administration and the chief negotiator of the GPH panel in the

Ramos administration proves that the progress of the peace process clearly depends on

the political will and eagerness of GRP to comply on signed agreements that changes

every GRP administration. The consistency of the NDF in their will in pursuing the peace

process is evident from the time of the Ramos Administration up to the present

administration as noted by one of the respondents. The data analysis revealed that it is on

the prerogative of GRP to meet the resiliency and strong political will to pursue the

negotiations that is being displayed by the NDF.

Aftermath

The data presented shows that unifying statements of the respondents on the side

of the NDF indirectly indicates that the arrest of the Tiamzon couple has a trivial cost on

the conviction of the NDF side to trust the other party in their track in pursuing peace

talks. Trust, according to the former GRP Chief Peace Negotiator, Silvestre Bello III, is a

vital element of peace negotiations especially on the case of the GRP-NDF peace talks. It

is according to Bello that when a certain party has lost its trust on the other party, the

peace negotiations has a high possibility to stall. The data utilized from the interview

from Bello legitimized the conceptual framework of this study which is anchored on the

Mutual Vulnerability Theory of Dorina Beckoe.

52 | P a g e
 Factors such as trust and political will of any of the two parties to acknowledge

sanctions by the third negotiating party or the other party (on case of the GRP, NDF is the

other party and on the case of the NDF, the GRP is the other party) has clear effects on

the progress of the peace talks. The arrest of the Tiamzons is the product of the

invulnerability of the GRP under the Aquino Administration. The data shows that the

arrest of the Tiamzons signifies the weak political will of the Aquino Administration in

addressing the root causes of the armed conflict and pursue the peace talks with the NDF.

Arrest and detention of NDF Consultants Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria is a display

of force and invincibility by the GRP thus making them invulnerable to sanction from the

opposing party and the third party involved. But the willingness of the NDF to carry on

the track of the peace talks amidst the arrest of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria shows

their strong political will in pursuing just and lasting peace through peace negotiations

and socio-economic reforms. The events transpired after the arrest of the Tiamzons also

showed that the NDF have very minimal changes on its conflict resolution strategy, they

remained resilient on their strong political will in pursuing the peace talks and remain

allegiant to the agreements and frameworks mutually signed by the two parties. However,

the invincibility of the GRP subsequent to the arrest of the Tiamzons made itself outlying

from the track of just and lasting peace through peace negotiations with the NDF.

Sincerity, Willlingness and External Support

The arrest of NDF Consultants Benito and Wilma Tiamzon and other NDF

consultants which claims to be protected by JASIG is a considerable factor on how the

peace negotiation progresses. However, there are several factors that could also be

53 | P a g e
considered. Bello mentioned that formal talks, informal talks and back channelling

transpired during his term as GPH Chief Negotiator under President Ramos. These

avenues showed the sincerity of the Ramos Administration in pursuing peace talks as

they resorted to back channelling method in trying other possible ways to advance the

peace talks with the NDF. The willingness and political will of GRP and NDF can be

measured based on the numbers of recess, suspension, collapse and termination of the

peace talks.

Another factor that could affect the peace process is the influence of peace

advocate groups and peoples organizations in promoting the advancement of the peace

talks. The effort of peace advocate groups to pressure the congress of the United States to

pass a law regulating the military assistance depending on the improvements on the

Human rights record of the Philippine Army clearly shows that civil society groups could

influence the peace process through direct or indirect ways.

Experiences

The alleged violations of JASIG that transpired prior to the arrest of NDF

consultants Benito and Wilma Tiamzon generated significant effects on the flow of the

peace negotiations. The data showed that the initial reaction of National Democratic

Front whenever there is an alleged violation of JASIG is in form of protest that leads to

the slow progress of the peace talks because of the diversion of the focus of the peace

process, from the roots of the armed conflict to the issue of preconditions and compliance

to agreements signed by both parties. In the case of Sutero Llamas in 1995 and other

54 | P a g e
similar cases, the arrests lead to the demand of the NDF to release the said consultant

before they agree to resume the peace talks.

The issue on whether or not the arrest is noncompliance to JASIG should be

disregarded since the claim of both parties are contradictory. The main point is that,

whether the demand for the release of NDF consultants is a precondition or not, the

alleged violations of JASIG hinders the progress of the peace talks. The immediate

response of the Ramos administration to previous JASIG violations that lead to the

advancement of the peace process during that time proves that the strict compliance of

the GRP in the signed agreements is vital to the peace talks. The respondents from the

NDF and GRP side both emphasized on the loss of the verification tool that could open

the encrypted file that contained the names and identities of the NDF consultants which

was passed by the NDF. Respondents from the NDF clearly stated their willingness to

constitute another verification file. However, the refusal of the GRP to prioritize the

peace process with the NDF maintains the stagnancy of the negotiations.

55 | P a g e
 Chapter V

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

A. Summary

The focus of this study is to determine the effects of the arrest of Wilma and

Benito Tiamzon to the progress of the peace talks between the National Democratic Front

and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The background of the study in

chapter one was done by studying literatures and articles that covers the arrest of the

Tiamzons and the NDF-GRP peace negotiations. The arrest of the Tiamzons is contested

as to whether it was a violation of JASIG or not according to the background of this

study. Chapter two includes the study of literature that are related to the topic that

includes researches, books and articles that discussed about peace negotiations,

communist insurgency and other subjects related to conflict resolution. In order for the

proponents to answer the main and sub problems, interviews were conducted to the main

personalities involved in the GRP-NDF peace negotiations such as Luis Jalandoni, the

chief negotiator of the NDF, NDF consultant Randall Echanis and former GRP chief

negotiatior Silvestre Bello III. The answers of the respondents are validated and

supported by secondary sources coming from issued statements, published interviews and

news articles. The proponents utilized descriptive method in a case study design using

qualitative approach as the primary research technique.

The main question was answered by figuring out the sub problems of this study

such as: the specific provision of JASIG that was violated in the arrest and how both

parties viewed the alleged violation; The changes that occurred in the peace negotiations

56 | P a g e
between GRP and NDF after the arrest; Other factors that could affect the progress of the

peace process; and the effects of the previous violations of JASIG to the peace talks. The

data showed that the arrest is clearly a violation of the Immunity Guarantees provided in

the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG). However, the GRP

claims that the agreement is inoperative. Moreover, the GRP also have two views

regarding the arrest which proves that the peace process is directly influenced by the

changes in GRP administration.

The aftermath of the arrest of Wilma and Benito Tiamzon showed the consistency

of the NDF in reviving the peace talks because of their willingness to reconstitute a new

verification tool in JASIG which protects the participants in the peace negotiations. Aside

from the violations of agreements such as JASIG, there are also other factors that could

affect the progress of the peace process such as the sincerity of both parties, willingness

of the GRP and NDF as reflected in the numbers of recess, suspension and termination of

the peace talks and the support of peace advocate groups. The previous violations of

JASIG generated different effects on the progress of the peace talks. There were cases

wherein the peace talks were suspended by the NDF to protest the release of an NDF

consultant that is covered by JASIG. However, other cases showed very minimal effects

on the negotiations.

B. Conclusion

The research shows the consistency of the NDF in the peace ngotiations with the

GRP by following the National Democratic line constituted in their 12 point program.

There are very minimal changes in their principles and political strategy in peace

57 | P a g e
negotiation with the Government of the Philippines since it formally started entering into

the talks with the government in 1992. However, the Government of the Philippines have

a dunamic political strategy in dealing with the peace talks. The study shows that each

administration has its own approach in dealing with the peae negotiatons with the NDF.

The frequent alteration of GRP peace panel also contributes to the inconsistency on the

strategy for peace by the Government of the Philippines. In the case of the current

administrations scheme in dealing with the peace talks, the Aquino Administration

demonstrates invicibility, invulnerability from sanctions and weak political will in

addressing the root causes of the armed conflict and the advancement of just and lasting

peace through peace talks with the National Democratic Front.

The arrest of the Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria has NO substantial effect on

the progress of the Peace Talks but has marginal upshot on the trust of the National

Democratic Front towards the Government of the Philippines considerint the previous

violations of Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees and other mutually

signed agreements that remain unsolved.

It is apparent that the events transpired prior and after the arrest and detention of

Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria shows the strong political will of the National

Democratic Front of the Philippines to go back to the negotiating table and talk about

how to address the root cause of the armed conflict between the GRP and CPP-NPA. The

diminution of trust of the National Democratic Front toward the Government of the

Philippines could result to the stall of the peace talks, however this diminution of trust is

trounced by the strong political will of the NDF to attain a just and lasting peace thru

socio-economic reforms and peace negotiations with the GRP.

58 | P a g e
C. Recommendation

The researchers, after an obscure assessment on the substantial effect of the arrest

of Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria to the progress of the peace talks, now lead to

possible recommendations towards the peace negotiations between the National

Democratic Front (NDF) and the Government of the Philippines (GRP). The assessment

and all the processes of the study involved have drawn the researcher to make general

and specific recommendations which will be as follows.

A. For the use of the both parties involved in the negotiations (NDF and GRP)

and this study.

This recommendation will be pertaining to the two parties involved with

the peace negotiations namely the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the

Government of the Philippines (GRP). The researchers believe that arrest of

Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria as NDF Consultants is a big letdown on the

part of the Government of the Philippines and the minute effect of this event on

the trust of the NDF towards the GRP should become a lesson learned on the part

of the GRP. In line with this, the following are the recommendations of the

researchers:

1. For the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)

The researchers highly recommend to the peace negotiators,

regional committee leaders and consultants of the National Democratic

Front (NDF) to declare unitary ceasefires and unconditionally release

59 | P a g e
some of its prisoners of war (POW) as a sign of goodwill and willingness

to pursue the peace negotiation with the Government of the Philippines

(GRP). It is also highly recommended by the researchers that the National

Democratic Front use backdoor channelling and side tracks in advancing

the peace talks with the GRP. Moreover, it is also hightime for the NDF to

finally submit to the Joint Monitoring Committee and the third party

involved the clear list of the individuals involved in the peace talks with

their assumed names and real identity to clear the doubts and reservations

of the GRP in pursuing peace talks.

2. For the Government of the Philippines (GRP)

The researchers highly recommend to the Government of the

Philippines that they conform and respect the Hague Joint Declaration and

all mutually signed Joint Agreements between the GRP and the NDF. It is

the responsibility of the Government of the Philippines as a ruling

government body of the land to lead and take the initiative in resolving the

armed conflict and show strong political will in advancing the peace

negotiation with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines. It is

also highly recommended by the researchers that the Government of the

Philippines release all Political Prisoners detained in any of the jails under

the Government of the Philippines specially those JASIG protected

National Democratic Front consultants not as a form of giving in to the

pre-condition of the NDF but as a sign of adherence to the mutually signed

60 | P a g e
 Joint Agreements and the Hague Joint Declaration. The researchers also

deject the Government of the Philippines in its efforts of surveillance,

harassment, arrest, detention, prosecution and interrogation or any other

similar punitive actions to NDF peace panels, consultants, personnel and

anyone who has direct involvement or participation in the peace

negotiations for it may jeopardize the peace negotiation that may result to

the diminution of the trust of the NDF. It is also hightime for the GRP to

lift its declaration that JASIG is inoperative. The researchers sturdily

recommend that the Government of the Philippines be consistent in

showing strong political spirit towards the peace negotiations. The GRP

should also need to review on how to sustain allegiance to previously

signed agreements with the NDF and become resilient in their approach

despite the changes in the Administration. Lastly and more importantly,

the Government of the Philippines should address and provide solution to

the root causes of the armed revolution which includes but not limited to

poverty, social justice, social equality and better justice system thru socio-

economic reforms in order to attain just and lasting peace in our land.

B. For the utilization of this study

Scholars undertaking academic researches in Conflict Resolution and

Management should attempt in studying peace negotiations especially in local

conflicts like the one we have between the GRP and the NDF. This study can

61 | P a g e
be utilized as a helpful literature and source of data in assessing deeper

phenomena that occurs during the track of the peace negotiations.

Recommendation for future researches

Future researchers should attempt to comparatively study the

dynamics of strategies on each administrations of Government of

the Philippines in dealing with the peace talks with NDF, identify

and assess their strengths and weaknesses and offer a

comprehensive proposal on how to effectively maneuver in dealing

with the negotiations for the advancement of peace talks.

62 | P a g e
Appendix A

LUIS JALANDONI INTERVIEW.

JANUARY 2, 2015

MAKATI CITY

0:00 37:20 Part 1

Luis Jalandoni: itong bahay na ito, bahay ng kapatid ko si Lourdes, yung

husband niya Dela Paz, marami sila rito. May sakit siya yung
parkinsons kaya palaging nakawheeled chair. So
nagcelebrate sia ng 85th birthday niya nitong December 17.

Researcher: nandito na po kayo non?

Luis Jalandoni: oo dumating na kami the ano. For that birthday celebration.
So yung wife ko, si connie, member din siya ng negotiating
panel (NDFP) *laughs* at siya yung kuwan, spokesperson
ng MAKIBAKA, yung revolutionary womens organization na
member ng NDF. Yung gabriela, yung open. Ang
makibaka *laughs* pero aktibista rin yung puso ng kapatid
ko. Palagi yoon nag aapply ng mga demonstration kaya
welcome na welcome ditto ang mga activists. Youth,
students, known activist, sina Ka Raullo, Vic Ladlad.. Okay
pwede umpisahan niyo ng first question niyo.. ano..

Researcher: hmm. Ano po ba yung initial response ng NDF po nung

nagkaroon po ng JASIG violation doon sa pagkaaresto kay
Reynante Gamara po at sa Tiamzons?

Luis Jalandoni: Ah oo, nagprotest kami at nagdemand na irelease siya at

iba pang mga NDF consultants na nakakulong ngayon. Who
have been arrested and detained in violation of the Joint
Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) at
ahh yung agreement na yun was signed in 1995. Kwan yun
eh, reciprocal agreement stating that all the participants of
the peace negotiations of both sides; panel members,
consultants, staff, whether above ground or in the
revolutionary underground, they are covered by safety and
immunity guarantees.ganun din yung mga participants sa
government ni Aquino at sa NDF din. So nag agree noon,
noong 1995, na on the NDF side, pwedeng 85 na

63 | P a g e
 participants sa peace negotiations, part ng peace
constituency, are covered by safety and immunity. Yung iba
sa knila, yung iba sa 85, kagaya ko, JOMA, Agcaoili, Connie
Ledesma, we use our real names. Pero karamihan, they
have or use assumed names for their safety at safety ng
families nila. So assumed names. Agreed yun ng both sides
eh. Nagkaagree kami ni ambassador Howard Dee. Who
was, at that time, the chairman of the GRP panel. So nung
nahuli si Reynante Gamara, nagprotest kami and dinemand
naming na irelease siya. Actually trumped up charge yung
sa kanya eh. Yung sa warrant of arrest, *ADJONTO*,
idinagdag yung pangalan niya doon sa warrant of arrest.
Pero madalas nilang gawin yan, trumped up charges ang
ginagawa. Ako nilagyan din ng trumped up charge. Accused
of multiple murder ako. *laughs* kasama nila Joma sison, si
vic ladlad, Raphael baylosis, si Satur Ocampo, ngayon si
Benny Tiamzon, si Wilma Austria, eto marami kami na
inaccuse.

Researcher: recent lang po ito?

Luis Jalandoni: this was already an accusation on 2007, meron kaming

inorder daw na killings of 15 persons doon sa Ilonggos,
Leyte. Yung false witness nila nagsabi na NPA daw siya dati
at doon sa NPa camp sa ilonggos, leyte, nakita niya sa table
na merong papel ordering the killing of so many people.
Signed by JOMA sison alias ka amado guerrero, ordered by
Ka Satur Ocampo alias Ka Satur, Luis Jalandoni alias Ka
Louie. Yun ang kanyang at sinabi niya na yun ay nakita dahil
dinala ni Ka Satur doon sa Ilonggos, Leyte noong May
1984.ngayon, sabi ng abogado ni ka satur, si ka satur was
still in prison under marcos, was inside prison, how can he
go to Ilonggos, Leyte and how could he sign. Si Joma sison
was in isolation in prison under marcos, how could he give
this order? Ako naman andoon sa Europe *laughs* andun sa
Holland, Netherlands so tatlo lang kaming pumirma niyan,
yun ang sabi nitong false witness at noong sinabi ng
abogado ni Ka Saturn a imposible yan dahil May 1984, si Ka
Satur was in prison, and Joma in isolation, binago ng false
witness sabi ay nagkamali nga ako na May 1984, May 1985
nung pumunta si Ka Satur doon dahil naka-escape si Ka

64 | P a g e
 Satur after 9 years in prison, nakaescape from prison under
marcos nung April 1985. So sinabi yun nga, nakapunta siya
dun at nakapirma. Eh pano si JOMA Sison? in isolation
*laughs* pero the prosecutor, public prosecutor doon sa
Leyte sabi niya, pinasa niya ito sa judge, judge abando,
judge doon sa leyte ang sabi oh, there is probable cause,
so lahat ito sila, akusado, warrant of arrest kaya hinuli si Ka
Satur. I dont know if you remember that time, it was 2007
nung hinuli si Ka Satur, hinuli siya, nilagay sa bilangguan
doon sa United Nations Avenue. Sa Pulis. Pagkatapos,
hinila siya forcibly at dadalhin sa helicopter para dalhin sa
ilonggos leyte.. doon sa court. Kung saan yung mga
militarmeron nang mga placards SATUR OCAMPO
MURDERER mga ganun. Dahil doon sa danger na yan si
Romy Capulong, yung lawyer ng Public interest law center
nagfile ng motion sa Supreme Court, madalian, at ang sabi
dapat di dalhin si satud doon, sa ilonggos leyte. Mabuti
nagdecide yung supreme court immediately that the
evidence is weak and so Satur was given bail tapos naibalik
siya. Di pa siya nakabalik sa Ilonggos, naglanding in another
place eh. Pabalik. So ngayon si Satur, out on bail,
nakakaikot ikot.

Researcher: ahh so out on bail po siya?

Luis Jalandoni: out on bail siya. Pero there is a strange twist to this. Siguro
mabuti na makita yung one specific case no? after almost 7
years, 2007 noon no? nung February 2014, yung supreme
court nagdecide 15-0, unanimous, na there is a probable
cause in this case and then instructs the RTC here in Manila,
to proceed with this case. So problema na naman. Si Satur,
Si Raffy Baylosis, si Randall Echanis,si Vic Ladlad yung
tatlo: Vic Ladlad, Raffy Baylosis at Randall Echanis NDF
consultants kasi nagparticipate sila sa talks. They are.. raffy
baylosis and others are members ng NDFP reciprocal
working committee on social and economic reforms.
Nakapunta na yan sa Norway, nakapunta nay an sa Holland.
Si Vic Ladlad, political consultant ng NDF, nakapunta na din
yan so they have bail also. Tas ngayon, ang decision ng
supreme court, after almost 7years, nagchange. Sabi kwan,
may probable cause, at ang sabi, these four are at

65 | P a g e
 temporary liberty because they are on bail. So di ma-carry
out yung warrant of arrest. Tapos si vic ladlad, si Raphael
baylosis, randall echanis, are participating in the peace talks
as consultants. So while the peace talks are going on, di rin
sila mahuli. Pero either matapos na yung case or if the three
no longer participates In the peace talks, pag nagdeclare
yung Aquino government na wala nang peace talks, pwede
na din silang hulihin. Kasi whichever comes sooner, pwede
silang hulihin. Ngayon, ako, nakalgay din diyan sa case na
yan. Kasama na din diyan ngayon sa case nay an si Benny..
Benito Tiamzon, Wilma Austria. Si Joma palaging sinasali
nila pero walang warrant of arrest sa akin but pwede rin na
the authorities ask the court for the warrant of arrest. Kaya
nung pumasok ako ng July, hininto ako diyan sa
immigrations.. sa airport.. kasi merong ganitong case. So
ang sabi ng lawyer mag-appear si Alex Padilla, chair ng
GPH negotiating panel at kontakin si Laila De Lima, yung
secretary of Justice at sabihin na payagan ako na pumasok
at umalis kasi nakalagay ako sa watch list. Tawag nila dun
watchlist? At resolution ng immigration doon sa NAIA, si Mr.
Misol, sabi niya ay pag nasa watchlist, deny departure pero
apparently because of the possibility of peace talks atsaka
yung ganun, tinanggal ako sa watchlist kaya nakakapasok
ako.

Researcher: kayo po ni Ka Fidel?

Luis Jalandoni: Ka Fidel? Wala eh. Hindi nakalagay sa watchlist. Wala

siyang hindi siya pinasok dito sa multiple murder case
although meron another case ata na pinasok. Anyway,
marami itong trump up charges na ginagawa. Kagaya kay
Reynante Gamara. Trade union leader din siya. Diba yung
anak niya nagpprotesta.

Researcher: taga UP Manila po?

Researcher: kolektib ko po siya dati.

Luis Jalandoni: ahh kolektib mo?

Researcher: opo, si Nikki

66 | P a g e
Luis Jalandoni: ayan, pinoprotest naming yan at dinedemand na kung
magkakaroon ng resumption ng peace talks, dapat igalang..
di lang yung JASIG pati yung CAHRIHL, yung agreement on
Human rights. Parang ganon. Ang problema dito sa kanila
ay marami silang trump up charges na fina-file. Pero
mukahng yung kay Reynante Gamara may possibility yata
na, meron yata yung iba nab aka nadismiss na eh. May
possibility na amgkaroon ng resolution. Either through the
peace negotiations or through.. yung pagpush ng lawyer na
madismiss yung case against him. Pero yung iba, like si
Tirso Alcantara, 35 ata o kwan.. madaming criminal charges
ang fina-file. Kaya Alan jasminez madami din. Pero ang
kwan namin.. lahat ito ay violations ng JASIG. Which has to
be respected if the peace negotiations is.. will push forward.
Kahit na siguro hindi lahat.. labinglimang (15) NDF
consultants ngayon ang nasa prison eh. Reynante Gamara,
Benny Tiamzon, Wilma Austria, Alan Jasminez, Tirso
Alcantara, andyan pa si Jayme Soledad na na-release na
pero na-rearrest. Merong may sakit.. taga midnanao.. si
Kodaste. Meron si Alfredo Mapalo na nag agree na si
Senator Guingona na ipa-release na at siya yung mag-
gaguarantee at yun marami pang iba. Yung isa ay si
Kennedy Bangibang.. ewan ko kung narinig niyo yung Lacub
martyrs? Yung sa abra? Yung pinatay yung pitong NPA
atsaka dalawang sibilyan. Ang isa dun ay si Recca Monte na
32 years old na very popular na student.. pinatay.. walang
bullet wound pero wasak yung mukha. So anyway, sa
JASIG, necessary na kwan yan. Parang standing obligation
yan ng Aquino government na respetuhin at iimplement yung
jasig. Ngayon, sinasabi nila secretary Delez atsaka nila alex
padilla at iba sa military na precondition daw ng NDF yan. Di
daw dapat may precondition ang pag resume ng peace
talks. Ang sinasabi namin.. di yan precondition. Yan ay
standing obligation based on an agreement that was signed
by both sides. Sabi nga ni Secretary Bello.. Silvestre H. Bello
III, yung dating chair ng GRP panel, sabi niya.. the
agreements have to be respected and complied with sabi
pa niya.. who will trust a government that does not respect
and comply with agreements and contracts it has entered
into diba? Sino ba naming rerespeto kung pirma ng pirma,

67 | P a g e
di naman tinutupad. Kaya hindi yan propaganda on the other
side na ayaw nila ng peace talks dahil sinasabi nila na NDF
ay may precondition. Hindi, hindi yan precondition.
Obligasyon yan arising from an agreement signed and
approved by both sides.

Mahalagang mahalaga yung JASIG lalo na ngayong

magkakaroon ng peace negotiations kung huhulihin yung
mga panel members, consultants. Hindi naman namin
hinuhuli o hinuhuli ng NPA yung mga.. sina Alex Padilla, sino
pang nandyan.. yung ibang panel nila. Oo kase, ofcourse
kelangang irespect yung agreement so reciprocal yan. Ang
gusting ipalabas ng GPH(Aquino government), parang
malaking pabor daw sa NDF yung kwan, yung JASIG. Hindi!
Reciprocal agrrement yun in both sides protecting all
participants in the peace negotiation para maisulong yung
peace negotiations. That Address the roots of the armed
conflict like land reform, problems ng hacienda luisita,
hacienda look, hacienda roxas.. andami nyan land reform at
national industrialization so dapat kung iaddress itong roots
of the armed conflict, dapat merong agreement.. parang ang
sinasabi nila eh dapat lahat ng covered by the JASIG should
be above ground.. Hindi! Ang agreement noong 1995 eh
doon sa 85 na pinag agreehan na pwede from the ndf
mabigyan ng jasig o documents of identification, eh yung ilan
kagaya namin eh hindi na kami gumagamit ng UG
(Underground) names no. si joam si Julie, si connie, ako, si
fidel siguro mga labinglima yan. pati nga si Wilma Austria
real name na yan dahil pinarelease siya ni Ramos noong
president siya 1994 na nahuli si Wilma Austria kaya real
name na ginagamit niya. Meron pang iba na nahuli
pagkatapos na-release eh real names na. pero karamihan
agreed assumed names at ngayon isa pang reklamo nila
Alex Padilla ay nung gusting buksan yung, supposed to be
may safety deposit box kung saan ilalagay yung mga photos
nitong gumagamit ng assumed names. Merong 3 rd party
depositary , agreed upon by both sides, magbubukas ng
safety deposit box na ilalagay doon. Ngayon, according to
the agreement, yung document of identification issued by the
NDF to each panellist, staff member, lahat yan, together..
may picture din yan tsaka kung ano ang function, pero

68 | P a g e
karamihan dun assumed names, tapos merong letter of
acknowledgement na binibigay ang chair ng GRP panel
noon na si Howard Dee, later si Silvestre Bello tapos ang
sabi ito at ito magkasabay, pagka may nahuli ay ipapakita
lang.. dapat irespect yon at hindi hulihin. Ngayon sinsabi, so
ngayon valid na yan, for further verification, kung may
question ang isang party, pwedeng sabihin o buksan natin
ang safety deposit box para matignan kung yun nga talaga
ang true document of identification corresponding, further
verification lang yan. So ginawa na y an.. Ang ginawa ng
ndf, to protect the security, encrypted yung gma photos kasi
mahirap naman pagtransfer from the province to the center
to the abroad, sa Holland. Eh mahirap kung it falls in to
enemy hands or baka mabuksan ng CIA o ano yan, kaya
encrypted. Ngayon, nangyari ganito, it becomes a long story,
noong 2007, nagpush ang Philippines, especially under
GMA yan at si Norberto Gonzalez, na Rabid Anti-
Communist, nakasuhan si JOMA nang murder, murder to
yung naging ahente ng military. Ngayon, ang ginawa, with
the cooperation of US and the dutch government, hinuli si
JOMA tas ni-raid yung offices namin at residences. So yung
limang diskettes, kasi in-encrypt yung mga photos no,
limang diskettes needed to decrypt the encrypted photos,
kinonfiscate yan ng dutch police at pagkatapos yung apat
corrupted na nang sinoli nila at yung isa ay di na sinoli.
Ngayon, nung 2011 nung mag attempt na buksan, di na
mabuksan. Corrupted na yung apat at di na sinoli yung isa.
Ngayon, sinasabi ni Alex Padilla, hindi na daw operative
yung JASIG at yung gamit ng mga underground names o
assumed names. Oo sabi nila di na daw ma-verify, ang sabi
naming, di na ma-verify dahil sa actions ng dutch police,
instigated din by Norberto Gonzalez. So ang kwan namin,
re-constitute, bago, madali lang, sabi naming in two months
pwede. Ngayon ready na. ire-constitute at ipagpatuloy. Kasi
yung gma encrypted photos are legitimate photos. Sabi nga
ni Rommel Capulong pati yung sa diplomacy, sa business,
ginagamit yung encrypted photos atsaka agreed upon in all
courts na legitimate photos. So another issue yan ni nirere-
raise. So ang sabi namin ngayon, kung gusto magkaroon ng
peace talks ulit, kelangan igalang yung jasig, dapat

69 | P a g e
marelease itong mga ndf consultants, hindi to precondition
kundi obligasyon based on the agreement signed. Tapos
yung JASIG list, yung listahan, madali, ireconstitute,
encrypted photos tapos ilagay sa safety deposit box by a
third party depository accepted. It is not an obstacle that
cannot be solved or overcome, this can be solved easily
within a few weeks tapos nay an, ready na nga yung samin
eh. Reconstituted na eh. So yun sa JASIG, isa yon, of
course meron din silang obligasyon according to the
CAHRIHL, diba yung agreement on human rights,
international humanitarian law, which was signed in 1998,
during the time of Ramos pa yan, but the approval from the
NDF, kase ang kwan dyan, pag nagne-negotiatie yung two
panels, pag angsing sila ng agreement gaya ng CAHRIHL,
kailangan yung principals of both sides, yung presidente ng
GRP atsaka yung chairperson ng NDF ay dapat mag
approve, written approval. Kapag nag approve na yan,
binding and effective na yung agreement. So, ang
procedure, nagnenegotiate yung panel o yung committee,
panel, pag nagkapirmahan na yung panel, iaakyat sa
principals. The principals have to approve. Pagka-
naapprove, magiging binding na yung agreement, so yung
CAHRIHL, napirmahan yan ng March 16, 1998. Yung NDF
chair, si kasamang Mariano Orosa, pumirma na yan ng
April.. April 10 ata. Pero si Ramos, did not approve it. Under
ERAP parang surprisingly under ERAP pa, noong August 7,
1998, elected president na siya, siya ang nag-approve.
Parang nakakatawa pa to kasi ininterview si ERAP noong
August 10 kung kayo daw ay pumirma at nagapprove nitong
kwan.. di ko na maalala ala eh *laughs* actually meron
siyang signed approval kaya starting August 10, 1998,
binding and effective na yung CAHRIHL.

According sa CAHRIHL, nakalagay diyan na. the political

offense doctrine, kwan ito eh.. doctrine ito of decision ng
supreme court ng GRP ng 1956.. pwedeng tingnan niyo.
Diyan sinasabi, yung political offense doctrine sinasabi na di
dapat i-arrest, charge, detain or convict for common crimes
yung political prisoners o activists. Dapat.. yung political
offense doctrine kasi sinasabi na itong mga aktibista at
kwan, di naman sila mga criminal lang eh, for money or for..

70 | P a g e
sila ay may social consciousness at objectives. So dapat di
sila papatungan ng common crimes like murder, multiple
murder, robbery mga ganun. So yun ang nakalagay sa
political offense doctrine, Hernandez political offense
doctrine. Na desisyon ng GRP Supreme Court ng 1956.
Ngayon, sinabi sa CAHRIHL na lahat ng mga political
prisoners that have been charged, detained and convicted
for common crimes in violation of the political offense
doctrine should be released kasi mali yung pagcharge sa
kanila.

So ngayon, meron anng about 500 political prisoners. Under

the Aquino administration practically dumoble nay an. Imbes
na iapply yung hernandez politialdoctrine at iimplement yung
cahrilhl, patuloy yung kanilang panghuhuli sa mga aktibista,
sa mga anti-mining activists, indigenous workers, women,
youth, yan ang pinapatungan ng common crimes. Andun din
yan sa charihl. So isa rin yon na, syempre kelangan
idemand din ng NDF, (showbiz sensation), di naman ibig
sabihin na kelangan lahat ng 500 na-release na bago
magkwan. Pero kelangan magkakaron ng releases at
kelangan mapag usapan yung pagre-release nyan.
Mahalaga naman na parang merong sign of seriousness na
magrelease na din sila ng mga ndf consultants at political
prisoners para ipakita na meron silang seriousness kahit
sabihin nilang di pa nila kayang gawin lahat. Kasi alam mo
naman sa GPH merong ilan na maaring gusto na rin
magkaroon ng peace negotiations pero meron ding ilan o
mas marami pa siguro na ayaw especially sa militar o sila
Secretary Velez. Malakas yan against. Sila.. sila kwan..
dinky soliman.. si trillanes.. ayaw nyan kasi may ginawang
gesture si Ka Joma Sison at sabi niya na hes willing to meet
with noynoy. Diba lumabas sa news. Pagka meron daw na
substantive agreement like social and economic reforms na
mapirmahan, pwedeng magmeet siya kay noynoy as
founding chair of the communist party o pwede din na to
boost the peace talks tulad ng pagmeet ni noynoy with
muhrad noon sa Japan. Parang ganung idea. So thats a
gesture na ginawa ni JOMA at ang unang nagsuggest nyan
kay JOMA at sa amin ay si Ronald llamas na pol adviser ni
noynoy. Pinropose niya noong novemner 2013 na pwede

71 | P a g e
 daw historic event pag si joma at noynoy ay magmeet sa
Vietnam. Pwede daw sa Vietnam, pwedeng sometime in
February or January 2014. Eh di natuloy yon. Ngayon
cinriticize ni trillanes si joma. Ang sabi self-invite daw yon. Di
daw mahusay na ideya yan at dapat sa protocol eh si
noynoy ang magiinvite kay joma. Sabi ko.. mali si trillanes,
first of all, dahil negative siya sa pagresume ng peace talks.
kagustuhan na din ng taumbayan at mga peace advocates.
Second, mali din siya na self invite dahil ang unang
nagpropose nung idea niya ay si Ronald llamas na emissary
at political adviser ni noynoy noong kwan.. nandoon ako
nung sinabi yan ni Ronald Llamas sa meeting.. andun si
joma, Ronald llamas, ako at si fidel. Pwede daw, historic
event daw yan.. it will push..h istoric event daw yan. Kagaya
ng pagmeet ni noynoy kay muhrad ng MILF. Tapos sabi pa
niya, by that time, kung magmeet si joma with noynoy, eh
andyan na din si Alan Jasminez.. yung political prisoner na
economist yun na member na at naappoint na naming sa
ndfp reciprocal working committee on social and economic
reforms dahil magaling siya na economist eh pero nasa
bilangguan siya.. nasa bicutan.. so yun.. dapat may positive
movement na magkaroon ng peace negotiations on the
principle na to address the roots of the armed conflict for the
benefit of the people like land reform for the peasants.

37:20 End Part 1

00:00-53:05 Part 2

00:00-00:34 Personal things

00:35-9:54

Luis Jalandoni: Yun siguro ung details sa JASIG and CARIHL

Researcher: Sir yung next question po, yung earlier impelentations ng

JASIG meron na po bang violations na nagawa yung GPH?

Luis Jalandoni: ah oo, meron na, kalian pa

Noong edi 1995 yan na sign no, nung 1995 pahinuli na si

Sutero Llamas na siyang NDF consultant sa Bicol area
ngayon ang claim nila, ang claim sa kabila ay di pa daw valid

72 | P a g e
and effective yung JASIG dahil na postpone ung peace talks
ng mga 4 weeks pero ang sabi namin according to the
agreement valid na so after mga more than 1 year bago na
arrange na they would comply so from June 27, 1995 up to
June of 1996 narelease si Sutero Llamas

We had to have an agreement, sabi naming di pwede

maresume ung talks kung hindi nirerelease si Sutero Llamas
sabi naman nila e kung gagawin naming yan para kaming
nag gigive-in sa inyong demand so nagkaroon kami ng
compromise

June 19, 1996 mag uumpisa yung peace negotiations di pa

narerelease si Sutero Llamas

June 21 magkakaroon ng 1 day recess sa talks

June 21 irerelease nila si Sutero Llamas, yun ang nangyari

nagcompromise na lang na okay word of honor sila
irerelease nila June 21 mag uumpisa kami ng peace
negotiations June 19 nagumpisa ang negotiations sa
Holland so narelease nga sya nung it took 1 year bago
maimplement nila yung kanilang obligation to respect and
comply with the JASIG that was very early on 1995
napirmahan 1995 ng February yung JASIG by June
nagkaroon na ng violation tapos it took 1 year

The next violation sabihin ko na rin, si Dan Borjal was

consultant and was arrested in November 1996 if I am not
mistaken parang November 21 or 23, 1996. Sabi naming di
pwedeng magpatuloy ang talks kung di niyo nirerespect ang
JASIG, dapat nyo irelease si Dan Borjal tagal Bicol din ito na
consultant. After 3 months nagkaroon kami ng meeting kasi
gusto rin nila ituloy ang talks.nagkaroon kami ng 8 day
meeting sa Holland nung panel both sides and then we
came up after 8 days of meeting with 1 short paragraph na
agreeing that Danilo Borjal NDF Consultant would be
release within 10 days ayun nangyari so nung February
actually 18 February 1-8 kami ng meeting 8 days within 10
days February 18 narelease na rin sya so yun violation yun
later dumami na yung violations kasi umabot na yung
hanggang 15 yung nahuli yung iba may narelease pero

73 | P a g e
 hinuli rin naman so continuing yan kasi ang claim ng military
pinaghirapan naming itong hulihan tapos irerelease lang sabi
namin part yan ng peace constituency tapos papatungan nila
like Tirso Alcanatra. NPA commander si Tirso Alcantara edi
hinuli pinatungan ng 35 common crimes sabi naming
kailangan irelease so ngayon sinasabi naming gusto nyo
ituloy ang talks dapat irelease nyo yan si Benny Tiamzon, si
Allan Jasmines, si Wilma Austria, si Reynante Gamara yan.
Kahit hindi marelease all in one day pwedeng within short
periods. So right now kasama sa 15 NDF consultants na in
prison yan si Reynante Gamara, Benito Tiamzon, Wilma
Austria, Allan Jasmines, Tirso Alcantara yung pati husband
ni ka Recca si Kennedy Bangibang NDFP Consultant nasa
korte sya NDFP Consultant for Cordillera and Indigenous
Affairs so may sa Mindanao meron sa karamihan nandyan
sa Bicutan at Camp Crame. Binisita namin sila nitong
December itong less than 2 weeks ago. So nameet namin
yon si Benito Tiamzon, Wilma Austria si Reynante Gamara
at si Eduardo Soriano nandyan sila sa Camp Crame.

Researcher: Iilan lang po sila?

Luis Jalandoni: 4 silang consultants pero meron pang ibang hindi

consultants so political prisoners. Sila Almonte andoon tapos
sa Bicutan sa Womens Section meron doong 8 babae ang
isa consultant si Loyda Magpatoc from Mindanao at saka
nandoon din si Andrea Rosal diba balitang balita tapos
meron isa na Miradel Torres ng GABRIELA na nanganak
nasa PGH ngayon pinayagan for 2 months na magtake care
pero dinedemand namin na irelease na yan, siya at si
Andrea Rosal. Tapos sa Bicutan sa Mens Section merong 4
na cosultants si Allan Jasmines, Tirso Alcantara, Leopoldo
Calosa at si Emeterio Antalan and 22 other political
prisoners nandoon nadalaw din naming nitong last week or
so before Christmas nakadalaw kami doon.

9:54-28:22

Luis Jalandoni: Ayan sa maraming issue kailangang matake up kung

magresume ang peace talks ngayon di pa masigurado since
meroong nagpupush na magkaroon ng peace talks ulit pero
merong mga nagsasabing ayaw. I think the decision rely

74 | P a g e
 principally kay Noynoy kung matutuloy man baka sakali in
February magkaroon ng panel to panel talks pero ang
Norwegian Government na siyang 3rd party facilitator very
eager, very enthusiastic na ipagpatuloy ang peace talks so
inooffer na nila na kung magkaroon ng resumption doon sa
Norway sa Oslo. Karamihan ng past talk doon sa Oslo kasi
yung Norway ang nagbabayad ng plane tickets, saka hotel
accommodation tapos tumutulong na sila sa pagkuha ng
visa. 3rd party facilitator sila. Hindi sila mediator or arbitrator
na makapagdecide above the two hindi, sila tutulong sila sa
good offices pero hindi sila nagdedecide ang nagdedecide
yung dalawang magkatunggali na nag-away GPH Aquino
saka NDFP representing CPP/NPA at iba pang
organizations. So yun maraming violations lahat. Ang isa
pang violation ay pinatay si Sotero Llamas. Pinatay siya ng
military ng May 2006 tapos mayroon pang mga NDF
Consultants na dinisappear. Leo Velasco

Researcher: Yung taga UP Manila po?

Luis Jalandoni: Tatay yan ni Aya Santos also a desaparecidos. Si Prudencio

Calubid at ang asawa niya si Selina Palma plus ang mga
kamag-anak pinatay din yan. Mayroon pang ibang mga NDF
si Rogelio Calumbad saka yung anak niya sa Southern
Luzon na pinatay sa Southern Tagalog. Mayroon pa sa
Mindanao, Entise, we met the daughter yung parents niya
dinisapper mga NDF Consultants ito. May mga kinulong
merong pinatay merong dinisappear. Ganun yung iba may
kinasuhan sa may iba pa.

Researcher: Wala pong pwedeng punishment sa violation ng JASIG?

Luis Jalandoni: Yung punishment for violation of JASIG syempre according

to the agreement ay yung magpupunish nyan yung sa kung
violation ng JASIG by the GPH or Government sa kanilang
side sila ang magpupunish. Sila dapat ang magbigay ng
disciplinary action or kung ano pero ang ginawa ng GMA
nagtayo ng isang Inter Agency Legal Action Team (IALAT).
Inter Agency Legal Action Team na ang fuction was to file
trump up charges against yung mga aktibista or sa NDF
side. They file trump up charges ang dami niyong trump up
charges ano tapos their function was also was to legally

75 | P a g e
defend those who are accused of extra judicial killings and
disappearances and other violations. Yun ang function
nitong IALAT na ang policy that time ang tawag nila legal
offensive. Legal offensive meant maraming cases na file
against us. So si Philip Alston naging special rapporteur ng
United Nations for extra judicial killings nung pumunta rito
ang isang recommendation was to abolish the IALAT. Finally
inabolish din yun kasi ung team na yun was under Norberto
Gonzales na cabinet minister under GMA later became
secretary of defense pero ito ay rabid anti-communist ito.
Sinasabi niya na si Satur Ocampo ay nagbibigay ng pera
from the nakukuha sa congress binigay daw sa NPA na
accused tapos sinasabi niya ni Norberto Gonzales itong mga
aktibista ng BAYAN, BAYAN-MUNA, KMU ito sila ay to be
considered semi-combatants ibig sabihin legitimate targets
ng military so pero itong IALAT because of the
recommendation of UN was abolished pero may itinayo na
kagaya rin nyan pero ibang pangalan so under Noynoy
meron ding the same with a different name so marami ring
maraming ginagawa ung different name pwede kong hingin
kay Edry Oralla ang alam niya nakalimutan ko.

So sa peace talks kung gusto nilang matuloy kasi depende

rin kung anong tingin ng the other side. Merong balita
lumabas na si General Emmanuel Bautista former Chief of
Staff ang siyang gagawin na bagong chair na panel ng GPH
kasi si Alex Padilla naging President and CEO ng Philhealth
tapos several times na ata humihingi na magresign so may
balita na medyo malakas na si Gen. Bautista ay magiging
bagong chair kaya hiningan ng comment si Ka Joma ng
Inquirer ang sabi niya walang objection ang NDF side kung
si Gen Bautista ay maging chair kasi siya ay retired na so
civilian na rin siya. May mga gestures galling from the NDF
side from Joma na parang positive. Ayaw pa nilang
magrelease pero ang NPA nagrelease na ng prisoners of
war. Pati nga yung mga sundalong nirelease nagsabi dapat
maresume yung peace talks at mabait daw naman yung
NPA. They were given, they were accorded humane
treatment tapos may dalawang nirelease meron pa yatang 6
or 7 prisoners of war na merong mga attempts na marelease
ang sabi naman namin dapat naman irelease si Andrea

76 | P a g e
 Rosal, si Miradel Torre. Itong may sakit na NDF Consultant
sa Mindanao si Codaste.

I think within the next few weeks merong lalabas more

definite kung mas probably nagkaroon ng 3 meetings sa
Netherlands and probably 1 more meeting para kung
matutuloy para pinuhin na kung pano kung magkakaroon na
ng talks kung ano ung mga concrete steps. Sinasabi namin
si Allan Jasmines kung kailangan niyong Social Economic
Reformed Agreement dapat irelease siya dahil siya ay
Economist na makakatulong doon sa committee. Tapos sabi
naming gusto niyo si Benito Tiamzon, Wilma Austria irelease
din para mapabilis ung talks. I think we can expect na siguro
after the Popes visit meron ng pupunta sa Netherlands para
magkaroon ng paguusap bago makaresume whether
makaresume or meron pang pre-panel tapos panel meeting.
So kung matuloy man more probably it might be sometime
next month. I think may possibility. Mga peace advocates
ung Philippine Ecumenical Peace, ung Pilgrims for Peace,
ung Kapayapaan, Campaign for a Just and Lastin Peace
andyan sina Editha Burgos yung sa Mindanao very active
din yung Sewing Seige for Peace yung Exodus ata for
Peace tapos meron din dito ung Citizens Action for Justice,
sa Abroad marami rami din sa US at sa ibang lugar na gusto
magkaroon ng peace talks ung isang grupo sa US na
Ecumenical napush nila sa congress nila na yung $50million
of military credits for weapons for the Philippine Army ay
hindi ibibigay kung walang concrete evidence na yung
Human Rights record ng Philippine Army ay na improve so
maganda ung kanilang move parang nakawork sila sa
congress. So nakikipagrelate din sila dito sa NUPL, National
Union of Peoples Lawyer sila Edry Oralla at sa
KARAPATAN dito sa I think United UCCP, IFP very active
din, Philippine Independent Church yung Aglipayans very
active sila.

Researcher: Nasagot na po niyo yung ibang questions

Researcher: May tanong lang po ako ung nametion niyo po kanina ung
niraid ung mga bahay niyo. Bakit po nandun ang Dutch
Police akala ko parang independent sila pagdating sa mga
ganun?
77 | P a g e
Luis Jalandoni: Dapat independent sila pero malaki ung influence ng US sa
Dutch Government kaya nung nilagay si Ka Joma at
CPP/NPA sa US list of Terrorist nung August 2002. Si Colin
Powell siya ung Secretary of State bumisita dito ng August 2
and 3 ata tapos ang dinig naming na sinasabi na noon ni
GMA na ilagay sa listahan ung CPP/NPA at saka si Joma
nung bumalik si Colin Powell, August 9 dineclare nya ang
CPP/NPA as foreign terrorist organization. August 12 nilista
ng US Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Asset
Control CPP/NPA at si Joma na sa listahan at i-freeze ung
mga bank accounts. August 13 one day later nilagay ng
Dutch Government CPP/NPA at si Joma sa terrorist list at
nag-announce pa na they will push na ilagay din sa
European Union list. Nauna pa ung Dutch Government 2
days pa ung UK si Tony Blair was very close also tapos
sumunod na rin ung Canada 2 weeks later tapos sumunod
ung European Union nung October 28 ata at saka Australia
kasi ang lakas ng influence ng US so nung nagpush ngayon
ung GMA Norberto Gonzales na akusahan si Joma para
hulihin for murder daw ng dalawang naging taksil sa kilusan
si Romulo Kintanar at si Arturo Tabara. So ang claim ng
Dutch na on Dutch soil si Ka Joma ay nagbigay ng order na
patayin itong dalawa so may criminal case sila kay Ka Joma
so inaresto si Ka Joma exactly on the same hour same day
niraid ung NDF Office at 6 pa na lugar. Bahay din naming
ung apartment naming niraid yan lahat tapos kinuha mga
gamit, materials so yun ang case na yun so nakita na di
naman ganun ka independent ang Dutch Government.
Malakas ung influence ng US.

Panel member din saka sa joint monitoring committee ng

Joint Secretariat may office dito sa Cubao sponsored by the
Norwegian Government na 11 staff members ng joint
secretariat that helps to implement the joint monitoring
committee ng CARIHL na agreement nandyan supported by
the Norwegian Government isang building isang floor ung
kalahati sa GPH side joint secretariat ang kalahati may
corridor lang in between NDFP joint secretariat maganda sa
Cubao sa Nagtana Street.

78 | P a g e
Connie Ledesma: Malapit sa Immaculate Concepcion Church building ng
Diocese 6th floor

Luis Jalandoni: Building ng Archdiocese of Cubao na si Bishop Ongtioco

28:22-28:38 Marian Dingdong

28:38-30:52

Luis Jalandoni: Anyway doon nadoon yun, pwede kayong dumalaw mga
peace agreements lahat mga documentation nandoon. So
yung Dutch Government under heavy influence ng US kasi
nung nagkaroon na nag case sa European Court chinallege
ni Joma ung paglagay sa kanya sa terrorist list ng European
Union, Council of the European Union na nagkaroon ng
hearings doon sa European Court of Justice sa Luxembourg
ung anak naming abogado nakita niya sa website ng Foreign
Ministry ng Dutch Government na nakalagay doon sa
website the relations between the Philippines and the
Netherlands are very good there are more than 30
companies doing good business in the Philippines and
relations are very good except that the resistance against
the Philippine Government is based in Utrecht kung saan
kami nakatira and the Chief Person in that resistance Jose
Maria Sison resides in Utrecht so nilagay doon at the
instance of the US among others ung nilagay sa terrorist list
at frineeze ung accounts ni Joma Sison so nakalagay un sa
website so nacite ung ng lawyer ni Joma sa court ang
ginawa ng Foreign Ministry after that winithdraw nila ung
winithdraw nila pero meron na kasing written

Part 2 30:52-53:05

30:52-32:03 Personal things

32:03-53:05

Luis Jalandoni: So yung Dutch Government is very closely connected sa

US. Yung isang political party doon na progressive nung
after one day lang, nilagay na CPP-NPA at si Joma sa
listahan, nag-raise sya ng, itong isang parliament member
ng Socialist Party raised 9 questions to the government.

79 | P a g e
 Why? What are your reasons <wherein> just one day after
the US has, why do you put the Communist Party, New
Peoples Army and Joma Sison on the terrorist list when they
are peace negotiators.

Researcher: Napatanggal po ba natin sa list?

Luis Jalandoni: Napatanggal sya sa European Union list dahil after 6years of
hearings, he and his lawyers, they have been able to prove
that there were no basis for putting him on the terrorist list.

Researcher: Sa US po?

Luis Jalandoni: Sa European Union, but he is still in the US <list of

terrorists/terrorist groups>.

Researcher: Sino po yung target? Yung Communist Party po?

Luis Jalandoni: CPP-NPA nandyan pa rin sa EU list, ang natanggal lang, si

Joma lang. Ang natanggal lang dyan, yung CPP-NPA sa US
list, nandyan pa rin sya sa Australian list, I think nasa
Canadian list pa rin sya. Uhm. Wala sya sa UN list, pero just
sa US list. CPP-NPA, for a long long long time, wala sa New
Zealand list pero nung one week before Conie and I would
visit New Zealand, for a picket, nilagay din yung CPP-NPA
sa New Zealand list, oo. So may mga nagku-question dyan
sa ano, so nandyan parin kasi, atsaka yung Dutch
Government na refuses to grant Joma Sison any residence
although he has been recognized as a political refugee
according to the Geneva Convention on refugees, uhm uh,
the Dutch Government refuses to grant him residence in
Holland, although the highest administrative court the
Netherlands , the Council of State o, twice declared that he
is a political refugee. So doon sa Holland, usually, pagka na-
declare ka na political refugee according to the refugee
convention, bibigyan ka na rin ng status and residence, eh
ditto, hinati nila yan in just recognizing , pero ayaw syang
bigyan ng status and residence. So up to now, yung wife
nya, si Julie De Lima, biniggyan ng residence on

80 | P a g e
 humanitarian grond. Pero si Joma, wala. Sabi naman na
thats kind of compromise, sabi ng Dutch official, si Julie, has
residence permit, so she has the right to invite anybody she
wants kaya pwede si Ka Joma *laughs*. Pero yung
allowance ni Julie, dahil residence sya, meron syang
allowance na 500 euro which is much lower than the
minimum eh sabi ng Dutch Official, pwede na rin si Joma
mabuhay dyan *laughs*. Tapos yung insurance nya, wala,
ayaw syang bigyan eh. Pati yung pension, actually,
yungpension office siguro without the knowledge of other ***,
was giving him pension. Konti lang naman siguro, mga
250euros a month for several years. But later, siguro
nalaman ng other offices specially yung Ministry of Justice,
inistop yung pension, at inorder pa sya na bayaran nya yung
several years na nakuha nya. Pero of course, meron ding
mga solidarity with the other countries na nagraise ng
donations para matulungan si Joma maging I think yung
medical insurance, hindi na yung galling from the
government. Private na lang. Kumuha si Julie ng insurance
kasi for several times, na-hospitalized na si Joma.
Nagkasakit ng pneumonia, yun. So ganun. Talagang ginigipit
sya. , si Joma dun.

Researcher: Kayo po, din na kayo nadadamay sa ganong mga bagay?

Luis Jalandoni: Di, ni-raid din yung apartment namin. Lahat ng files ko sa
peace talks, daming nawala, kinuha lahat. Atsaka
computers, laptops, USB sticks, lahat ata kinuha nila.
Kinonfiscate. Pero parang may pagka-joke lang *laughs*
yung pagkaplanning, yung door, pagpasok nila doon sa
amin, they use a cutting kwan, winasak. Si Julie lang yung
nandon eh, tapos nung sumigaw sya, ginanon pa sya ditto,
nagkaroon pa sya ng bruises. Tapos ilang hours ba sila?
Mga six hours sila. Lahat kononfiscate nila. Tapos yung
door, yung kay Ruth, na staff, nung nag-raid sila, pababa pa
lang sya, winasak na yung door. Two more apartments na
tingin nila ay sa staff namin, winasak. Yung sa amin, wala
ako roon kasi kasama ko si Joma noong inaresto. Si Conie
lang ang nandoon. Nagbuzzer tapos, tapos ng umakyat,
pagbukas, pasok na sila. Tatlo sila. Pero ang kwan doon,
yung mga winasak nila na mga doors, meron silang

81 | P a g e
 company for repair. Private company for repair. Tapos
pagrepair, sabi nuung company, kami kailangang bumayad
pa. Sabi, If you want, you can ask the insurance. Sabi
namin, sobra naman itong Dutch State, winasak na yung
ano ng mga pulis, ikaw parin ang pababayarin no? *laughs*.
Ang tagal, siguro mahigit isang taon bago sinoli yung mga
kinuha nila. Pero yung iba din a nagsoli eh. Merong camera
na hindi na naisoli, yung isang file ko, din a ako sure eh. Like
yung kay velasco, parang may kwan doon, police blotter,
hindi ko na makita. *laughs*. Yung pagsoli, di naman ano eh,
by boxes lang eh.

Researcher: Pero considered din po kayong, parang yung kay Ka Joma,

considered din kayong political refugee?

Luis Jalandoni: Oo. Pero kami, matagal na kaming nagfile, tapos, naging
resident at naging Dutch citizen, nanga kami eh. Kasi noon,
yung rule nila, nung pumunta kami noon, after five years na
residence ka doon, pwede ka nang mag-apply ng, after you
get political asylum, pwede ka nang mag Dutch Citizenship.
Mas medaling bumyahe to go to other countries for political
activities. So si Joma, hindi sya makaalis sa Holland,
makapunta lang sya sa Norway pag may Peace talks kasi
Political Consultant sya. So kapag may talks, susulatan ko
sya, imbitado kayo, tapos it applies sa Foreign Ministry ng
parang lisee pass Yung pwedeng magamit yan for travel
for one purpose like for the peace talks. Tapos from from
there, you used to go also to the Department of Immigration
to get what you call return liseaux. Kasi, kung one week
yung talks, bibigyan sya ng permit. Doon, noong may
hearing sa court hearing sa Luxemburg, which is about four
hours ride, binibigyan din sya ng ganon. Pero kung
imbitahin sya sa England, sa Greece, sa Hong Kong, sa
India for conferences, hindi sya pinapayagan. Itong peace
talks lang. Atsaka kung may court hearings. Pero ngayon
wala nang mga court hearings eh. Oo, meron pa rin syang
mga court hearings pero ginagawa sa Holland kasi, merong
European Law dated 2004, na nagsasabi na someone who
is a political refugees in a hould be given a refugee passport
and residence, e sabi ng lawyer nya, there is still, according
to that European Law, he should be, in effect sa Dutch

82 | P a g e
 territory, eh ayaw pa rin ng Judge na ibigay. May claim kasi
kasi yung Dutch Government na they have the freedom of
policy. Diba nga sa ating kung meron kang, declared kang
political refugee, dapat may status ka at residence, sabi nya,
they have the freedom of policy because of their credibility
with other foreign states ang nasa isip talaga bila US eh na
hindi talaga dapat ibigay itong status atsaka residence kay
Joma. So talagang clear yung pressure ng US nandyan.

Researcher: Nasagot na po niyo yung ibang questions

Reasercher : So hanggang now po, si ka Joma ay Filipino Citizen?

Luis Jalandoni: Actally, parang in limbo sya eh. Kasi, he applied for political
asylum dahil he was persecuted by the Philippine
Authorities. Tapos nirecognize sya ng highest administrative
court na political refugee sya. His has reason to feel
persecution. So, dapat bigyan na sya ng status sa Holland
kaso ayaw talagang ibigay. Pero nung nagkaroon ng peace
talks noong 1998, si Jose De Venecia who is a candidate
for president, gusto nyang pumunta ditto sa Philippines si
Joma at magkaroon ng malaking gathering to approve the
CAHRHIHL. Iniisip nila noon 1million people sa Luneta eh.
Tapos, nakakuha din si Joma noon ng Philippine Passport in
accord with the peace negotiations parang without declaring
its adherence to the Philippine Government. But because of
the peace negotiations, nabigyan sya ng passport. Tapos
parang they initiated, uhm political yung kwan eh. Akala ni
Jose De Venecia, that time, sabi nya, I can win 25% of the
votes , with your support, kala nya susupport ang NDF, you
can get 8%, with that 33% daw, presidente na sya. So that
has been arranged. Pero, that did not push through. Dahil
hindi alam ni Joe De Venecia na yung Executive Secretary
at Foreign Secretary under Ramos, na tutulong sa pagpunta
ditto ni Joma ay bumaligtad nap ala at pumunta na doon sa
side ni erap *laughs*. So dinelay nila yung arrangements for
Jomas return. Pero yung pagpunta ni Joma ditto, is also
controversial kasi merong mga nagsasabi na its too risky for
him. Although he was thinking, na kung maraming political
prisoners na irerelease on that occasion, he will risk his short
stay dito. May dalawang NPA Commander na nagvolunteer
na sila yung magpoprovide ng security. Tapos ang plano ni
83 | P a g e
 Joma noon, eh sa UP Guest House sya titira. But anyway, it
did not push through naman e *laughs*. Although for a while,
Joma had a Philippine Passport which he could never use.
Ganonm pa rin. But of course, Joma is very active in
statements, interviews, yung portfolio ng kanyang latest
series lumabas na. Merong earlier series, ngayon, series of
yung nagkaroon ng book launch sa UP.

Researcher: Meron po bang pressure pa rin from the Dutch Government

na parang yung tipong may sumusunod sa inyo, na biglang
huhulihin kayo bigla. Mga ganon po.

Luis Jalandoni: Uh, right now, parang wala nang ganoong pressure lalo nat
nanalo si Joma ng kanyang case sa European Court.
Actually the Dutch Government ay napahiya doon. They
were thinking of appealing within the period of two months
and ten days, pero napakapowerful nung decision ng Court.
Second, lumabas na walang ibang European country na
willing to join the DutchGovernment in making an appeal.
Tapos nung huli, sabi ng Dutch Government, parang useless
naman tong appeal. Pero meron kaming nakuhang balita
which is unconfirmed no> Balita na the Dutch Government
asked the US to pressure the German Government and to
make the appeal para may sumama sa kanila no?*laughs*
pero walang sumama. So after 2months and 10days, naging
final and executor yung decision na to take off Joma from
the European list. So within a few weeks, tinanggal na si
Joma dun sa dun sa European Union list. Pero nandon pa
rin yung CPP tsaka NPA. Yung pressure, I think yung
surveillance nila, hindi yung sinusundan ka. Pero,
mamomonitor nila yung telephone calls, plane trips, pero
mahihirapan sila sa mga train trips. Tsaka siguro kung
merong mga important government official from the other
country, we are sure that the NDF international office is,
yung residence ni Joma, yung amin, are all under
surveillance. Surveillance in the sense that namomonitor nila
yung mga telephone calls at email. Kasi yung inexpose ni
Snowden? Lmabas sa news na in one month, the NSA, got
1.8million in Holland lang, telephone calls, emails, and the
likes sa Holland. At sigurado kasama dun yung kay Joma, sa
akin, sa office. Usually sa office, pagka lets say nagmemeet,

84 | P a g e
 okay lang, sinasabi. Pero pag mayroong sensitive na
information, sulat na lang yan.

53: 05 End

Appendix B

RANDALL ECHANIS INTERVIEW

MARCH 9, 2015

KARAPATAN OFFICE

0:00 54:35

Researcher: Ano po yung specific provision doon sa JASIG ang na-

violate doon po sa pagkakahuli kina Ka Benny at Ka Wilma?

Actually, ang pinakabuong essence, esensya ng JASIG ang

na-violate. Kasi ang JASIG ano yan eh Joint Agreement on
Safety and Immunity Guarantees.

So ang ibig sabihin, sino mang member ng panel, consultant

o staff at sinomang involved sa peace negotiations between
ndf and grp ay covered nung JASIG.

ibig sabihin immune siya sa kahit anong arrest, pagsasampa

ng kaso, at maga-guarantee ang kanyang safe na pagpunta.
Parang safe conduct pass.

Hindi siya pwedeng arestuhin o anuman. Kahit nga actually

hindi nagkakaroon ng actual na peace talks pa eh kasi yung
peace negotations, tuloy tuloy yan.

So yun mismo ang na-violate dun sa kanilang pagkaka-

arrest noong March 2014 sa Cebu.

Researcher: Mag wa-one year na po ano?

Oo. so hindi dapat sila inaresto. Lalot lalo na at si Wilma

Austria Tiamzon ay, yung kanyang document of identification
as a holder siya ng pass ng NDF ay mismong pangalan niya
ang nakalagay. Hindi lang yon. Publicly known na involved
siya sa peace negotations eh kaya di na niya kelangang

85 | P a g e
 patunayan na involved siya kasi narelease na nga siya
noong time pa ni ramos dahil nasa peace negotiations siya.
Si Benito Tiamzon naman, si Ka Benny, ay holder din ng
document of identification. Kung di ako nagkakamali parang
Crising Banaag

Researcher: Crising Banaag po?

Oo ganon. At pinatunayan naman niya at pinakita niya na

siya yon. So kumbaga lahat ng requirements para
patunayan nila at para sila ay dapat na hindi arestuhin, may
immunity na nga eh, na dapat nagawa(?). so direct violation
yong nangyaring yon. Specified yan sa buong JASIG. Yon
yung mismong anong yun.

Idagdag ko lang ano, eto icicite ko yung sa ano, all duly

credited persons are guaranteed immunity from surveillance,
harassment, arrest, detention, prosecution and probation(?)
and other similar punitive actions due to any involvement
and participation in the peace process.

Unang una, accredited persons sila, may document of

identification sila eh at bago hinuli ang mga yan sinubject
sila sa surveillance etc. sinubject din sila sa harassment
tulad ng pagfa-file ng trump up cases, pagsasabi na may
armas na nakuha kahit wala naman.

So marami talagang naviolate. Actually hindi lang sa kaso

nila. Pati din sa cases nung ibang NDF. 70 na nga ngayon
eh, NDF consultants na under detention. Kahit yun ay na-
violate ang rights na gina-guarantee ng JASIG.

Researcher: Next question po. Ano po ba yung current state ng peace

negotiations sa ngayon ? ano po yung estado niya sa
ngayon po?

Ah ano eh, nagkaroon ng resumption after ng mga, historical

ano lang ano, baybayin lang natin para mas malinaw. Nung
time kasi ni GMA, halos 5 years na na-istall yan bago
nagresume ulit ang formal talks noong february 2011 dito na
kay Aquino. 5 o 6 years na stalled talaga. Wala, wala
talagang galaw. Kasi nga yung Oplan Bantay Laya eh
inaano niya.

86 | P a g e
 Nagkaroon naman ng resumption noong February 2011.
Yung sa resumption ng 2011, nagkaroon ng tinatawag ng
Oslo statement of declaration na nailabas after nung mga
ano, may mga ilan kasing mga usapin don na dapat
magreresume talaga yung peace negotiations like tatapusin
yung negotiations sa Comprehensive Agreement on Social
and Economic Reforms (CASER) within 6months tapos
mabubuo na din yung Working group para sa political and
constitutional reforms para magtuloy tuloy na. actually,
nakaplano na yan na magtuloy tuloy yung resumption.

Ahh ang naging problema pagkatapos nung February 2011

ay yung compliance ng gobyerno. Kasama din kasi diyan
yung releases ng most or majority o halos lahat ng detained
consultants na noon ay mga 13 o 14 lang, nadagdagan na
nga ngayon eh. Tapos yung release ng mga political
prisoners, actually yan ay resulta pa ng agreement noong
2004, napakatagal na nga nyan eh. Sa isang oslo
agreement din yan. So wala ding na-release, nadagdagan
pa ng nadagdagan.

So dapat nung 2011, may mga ganyang releases. Ang

problema, ang gobyerno ayaw niyang icomply ang ganung
agreement like yung pagrelease ng mga ndf consultants.
Ang masama pa roon, by the end of February, dineclare pa
niyang inoperative na ang JASIG.

Ibig sabihin, kumbaga wala nang bisa lalo na sa mga

nakadetain at sa mga bago nilang mahuhuli eh malaking ano
yan, malaking bagay yan sa hindi maayos na pagtutuloy.

Researcher: Mga bandang February 2011 po?

Oo bandang April o May nagkaroon ng mga exhanges kasi

dyan. Dineclare ng GPH chair na si Alex Padilla na
sinasangayunan naman ni Deles ng OPPAP na inoperative
na yung JASIG. Ang ginagamit nilang katwiran, eh mahirap
daw na mapatunayan na yung list ng JASIG holders dahil di
na nga daw maretreive dun sa files dahil nacorrupt na nga,
yun ang mga dinadahilan nila. Pero syempre sa panig ng
NDF unang una, yung pagkakacorrupt ng mga files at
encryption ay kagagawan din nila.

87 | P a g e
Kasi nung ni-raid yung NDF office, hindi din nila ibinalik.
Actually yung mga files kasi na yan ay nakadeposit sa
Utrecht, sa isang third party na pwede lang magbukas nyan
ay GPH at NDF representative na may nakaharap na bishop
na third party. Eh ang problema nang binuksan yun, di na
talaga maretrieve kasi naman yung mga password na mga
susi ay nacorrupt nung ni-raid ng Netherlands police yung
office ng NDF.

Willing naman ang NDF na ire-constitute ang list kaso ayaw

nang pumayag ng GRP kasi sinasabi nila inoperative na
pero kung titingnan natin doon, dahilan lang nila yon kasi
kung gusto talaga nila magtuloy tuloy ang talks, madali
naman nilang i-comply yun pangalawa, eh di sumunod na rin
ang mga nahuling consultants, ang pinakahuli na nga eh ang
mag asawang tiamzon. Bukod pa sa dineclare nilang
inoperative na ang JASIG, tinawag din nila yung the hague
joint declaration na document of perpetual disunity, parang
sinasabi nila na ang agreement ay hindi nakakapag unite sa
atin (GRP at NDF) yan kundi nakakapaghati lang. so parang
hindi na naman nila kinikilala.

Eh yung hague joint declaration, napakahalaga niyan sa

peace engotiations mula sa simula hanggang sa pagtuloy
tuloy ng pag uusap eh. Kumbaga eto yung framework ng
magiging pag uusap. Kung ihahambing mo yan sa gph at
milf, kung meron silang framework agreement na pinirmihan
nila noon.

Eto ay parang framework agreement din yan dahil nilalatag

nito kung papano ang magiging takbo ng peace negotiations
para maging maayos. Actually yan ang pinakaunang
document na pinirmahan ng pareho (GRP at NDF).

Anong halaga non? Doon nililinaw na una, walang

preconditions yung bawat parties na isiniset sa pag uusap.
Dapat ang parang framework sa ganyang pag uusap ay ang
principle ng social justice at mutual respect sa bawat isa.
Sineset din niya dyan yung agenda ng pag uusap. Ibig
sabihin yung sequence ng pag uusap. Ang una, pag
usapang ang CAHRIHL na naaprubahan noong 1995 o

88 | P a g e
1998. Yan ang kauna-unahang agenda na nabuo yung
agreement.

Ang susunod dyan at ang pangalawang agenda na tinatakda

ng the hague joint declaration ay ang CASER. Ang halaga
namn nito, eto yung pinaka-essence na ng pag uusap kasi
dito sisikapin na magkaroon ng agreement on both parties
para gumawa ng substantial reforms sa kalagayan ng mga
manggagawa, magsasaka at ordinaryong mamamayan. Eto
ang pinaka-root. Eh ang problema naman ay ang kalagayan
ng basic masses eh. Kaya merong labanan. Kung iaaddress
ito sa pamamagitan ng CASER, isang malaking hakbang
yan upang matigil ang mga labanan.

So yung next agenda ay end of hostilities and disposition of

troops. Eto na yung kasi natapos mo na yung mga
substantive agenda eh so pupunta na dun sa last agenda.
Tigil na yung labanan, end of hostilities, yun na yung
mahabang truce o ceasefire na.

after maaddress mo yung mga problema ng mamamayan sa

social, economic and political and constitutional. Yun yung
pinag usapan sa the hague joint declaration at ganun siya
kahalaga tsaka syempre nililinaw din doon na ang pag
uusap ay dapat sa labas ng bansa.

Kasi sa experience din namin pag dito ginanap, di mo rin

masecure yung security ng mga participants kahit pa may
JASIG, eh may JASIG na nga may nahuhuli pa.

so napakaimportante ng the hague joint decalaration, pero

after February 2011, dineclare na nilang document of
perpetual disunity. Eh di parang binabalewala ulit. So yung
mga ganun ba. Tapos sinunod na nila yung jasig, inoperative
na. tapos hindi na talaga nagkaroon ng pag uusap since
February 2011. Yung formal ah.

Ngayon, dahil ang NDF naman ay gusto niyang mag move o

matuloy yung pag uusap. So sometime in 2013 hanggang
2014, nagpropose siya ng tinatawag na special track na pag
uusap. Kasi yung peace negotiatins, regular track yan, may
mga agenda. Ngayon dahil na-stall yan at di na nagmove
dahil ayaw na nga ng gobyerno, ayaw na magrelease,

89 | P a g e
 inoperative na, ayaw nang ituloy yung CASER, actually hindi
sila nakahanda sa CASER, wala silang matibay na plano at
draft dyan eh. Ang NDF merong ginawang draft dyan.
Pinresent na natin sa kanila. Ngayon, nagpropose ang NDF
ng special track, parang special na pag uusap para lang
umusad (ang peace talks). Ang special track na yan ay
pwedeng makapunta sa pagkakaroon ng truce and
cooperation bastat mami-meet yung ilang mga reforms and
conditions din. Di naman pu-pwedeng magkakaroon ng truce
at cooperation ng walang basis. Tulad ng land reform,
kelangan pag usapan, national industrialization, human
rights hanggang sa national sovereignity. Mga madali
namang pagusapan para umusad. Pagkatapos
magkakaroon nga ng truce. Siguro nagkaroon ng mga
dalawa o tatlong pag uusap dyan. Nagkaroon ng special
team ang gobyerno para dyan pero kadulu-duluhan, wala
ding nangyari. Wala, di rin nagmove yung ano. Di rin
umaaksyon ang gobyerno, lalo na si Aquino, para
aprubahan yung ganung pag uusap sana saka conditions sa
special track. Ngayon, ngayong 2015, bumubukas na naman
yung ano, pero mas special track ulit. Nagkakaroon ulit ng
opening. Kasi nung unang special track, si Ronald Llamas
yung parang head ng special team nila. Dito ngayon, late
2013, almost 2014, si Nanny Braganza. Si Nanny Braganza
dating member yan ng gph panel ng peace negotiations. Si
bebot bello ang head noon. Siya ngayon ang naglelead ng
special team na nakikipag usap. Nagkakaroon naman ng
pag uusap para maresume ulit yung special track batay din
dun sa parang December 2013 na conditions.

18:15

Randall Echanis: na napagusapan ng napolcom, national sovereignty maikli

lang yan mga 5 or 6 pupunta na sa truce and cooperation
kung gusto naman nila ng truce edi truce tigil ang laban.Yun
ung ongoing ngayon ng pinag uusapan na as of now
mukhang nasasapawan nitong mamasapano pero optimistic
naman tayo na kung talagang interested ang goberyno na
iresolve ang problema sa pamamagitan ng pag uusap at
magkaron talaga ng truce at cooperation base sap ag uusap.
Dapat mag tuloy tuloy so wala pang malinaw pero hopeful

90 | P a g e
 naman tayo na baka umusad din ngayong 2015. Pero di
tayo tumitigal dyan para tuloy tuloy kasi kung tutuusin
kailangan na kailangan din siguro kahit san ano dapat
magbukas na para mapagusapan lalo na nasasalang
ngayon ung peace negotiation sa MILF. Kung talagang
interested and sincere sila walang dahilan para hindi ituloy
ang special track. Special track dahil hindi nga maituloy ung
regular track pero hindi ibigsabihin ito na ung papalit. Pag
nagtuloy tuloy ung special track para ung regular track
maibalik para dun sa regular agenda. Para ano lang to
umusad kesa wala edi kung uusad ng konti ito pag uusapan
na natin ung regular track. Meron pa naman syang natitirang
isang taon pero syempre umiikli na rin ang panahon nya.
Ang ndfp naman pwede pagkatapos ni Aquino kung sino
papalit at magiging bukas naman edi ituloy tuloy ang pag
uusap nun di naman nagsasarado actually ilang president na
nga mula kay ramos, Estrada napirmahan ung carihl, gma
nagkaron pero nagstall pero nagkaron din ng simula kay
abnoy nagpulido naman nung 2011 e kung sakaling hindi na
pero ang prospect naman ay nandyan lagi na magresume
lalo nag uusap naman kaugnay nung special track. At least
kung magtutuloy tuloy baka by 2015 pagdating ng 2016
mahirap ng pag usapan yan, kung talagang decided sila
ngayong 2015 meron pang time para atleast kahit ung
comprehensive agreement sa social and economic reforms
na napaka importante. So may prospect malinaw linaw pero
wala pang definite saka plano pero hindi ibig sabihin na
wala.

22:35 25:55

Randall Echanis: medyo mahaba haba lang talaga ung kailangan natin itong
peace negotiation ilang years na rin to wag lang tayong sige
tuloy lang total kahit di nag uusap tuloy tuloy naman ung
kilusan di naman pagwala ng peace talk e wala na tayo.

Researcher: malinaw po dun sa hauge joint declaration na hindi

necessary ung truce o tigil putukan habang on-going ang
peace talks.

Randall Echanis: actually ung sa hague joint declaration ung end of hostilities
nasa panghuli yan nasa pang apat na agenda yan meaning

91 | P a g e
 ireresolve muna sa isang comprehensive agreement un
ikalawa social economic reform tapos ung ikatlo. Syempre
ung implementation pag uusapan pa yan bago mapunta dito.
Ung pagkakaron ng ceasefire sa ibat ibang panahon
halimbawa kung meron malalaking calamities like Yolanda,
Pablo at ung mga affected areas nagdedeclare naman ng
ceasefire ang npa at ndfp pagnagrerelease ng prisoner of
war okaya pag panahon ng pasko hanggang bagong taon
ung pagbisita nga ng papa nag declare din nyan. May mga
declaration ng ceasefire kaugnay ng mga okasyon hindi
ceasefire para talaga makapag usap hindi tulad ng milf at
gph parang truce 4 years na ung kanila ceasefire tuloy tuloy.
Ito kakaiba naman kasi ung talagang mahabang ceasefire o
end of hostilities na nga un e nasa dulo kasi pag pina una
mo na yan na hindi naman nareresolve ung basic problems
e ano lang yan wala ring magiging effective na ano yan kasi
di mo nareresolve ung ugat ng armed struggle so iresolve
mo ung basis para mas lasting at just ung ceasefire pero
hindi tayo nasasara sa short ceasefire na nadedeclare wag
lang ung uunahin mo ng hindi nareresolve e may problema
dun kasi parang in effect nag surrender ka na nyan pero
hindi pa nga nareresolve. Actually un ang gusto ng gobyerno
un ang lagi nila pipilit habang nag uusap mag ceasefire tayo
ang problema pag ginagawa nga un hindi na makikipag usap
yan mag ceceasefire na lang yan.

25:55 30:35

Researcher: ano po ung immediate actions na ginawa ng ndf pano sya

nagrespond sa pagkakahuli ni Benito and Wilma Tiamzon?

Randall Echanis: kaagad naglabas ng statement ang NDF na kinocondemn

ung arrest at illegal detention nung dalawa kasi violation yan
sa JASIG. Syempre nagkaron din kaagad ng mga campaign
para sa release ng mag asawa at from time to time sa mga
hearings nila nagkakaron naman ng pagsuporta at pag
attend sa hearings. Kaagad naman dinalaw ng lawyers ng
NDF para magbigay ng legal assistance dun sa mag asawa
so un ang kaagad na ginawa tapos dinedemand din natin
ung immediate release nila dahil part sila o involve sila sa
peace talks at bilang peace consultants allowed sila kung
magreresume ang peace talks kailangan ung presence nila
92 | P a g e
 so kailangan ung immediate release nila mahalagang bahagi
sila sa peace neogtiations. Ang pinakahuli kung
sakasakaling magtutuloy tuloy ung special track, idedemand
natin na part sila sa 17 ndf consultants na nakakulong, 17 na
sila ngayon dumami na nga kasi after 2011 nadagdag bago
February 2011 nahuli si ka tirso tapos February 14 mismo
eve ng resumption ng peace talks hinuli si Allan Jasminez
pagkatapos nun sina Loida Magpano tapos si Roy Erecre
tapos sumunod na sila Wilma kaya mga 17 na sila ngayon.
Meron pa ngang convicted na isang NDF consultant si
Eduardo Serrano nasa muntinlupa actually sa ang pinaka
una na covered ng JASIG na naconvict. Trump-up ung kaso
nya ung iba mga 16 sila nasa under trial pa ung mga cases
pero ung iba marmaing kaso dalawa tatlo. Talagang grabe
ung violations ung pagconvict violation.

30:35 36:04

Researcher: Yun pong sinasabi niyong mga unang nahuli violation po

talaga un?

Randall Echanis: Sa kaso ko nga lang violation na un kasi arrested ako nung
2007 samantalang alam na alam nila na nasa peace
negotiations ako naka ilang attend na ako ng peace
negotations alam ng military yan alam ng peace panel pero
inaresto pa rin nila ako nung 2007 kasi bago ako inaresto
kasama ako sa kaso sa leyte ung mass grave biro mo yan
ay mga pinatay daw ng NPA sa isang conflict o purge nung
1985 pinatay daw sa leyte mahigit 30 na suspected NPA
deep penetration agents pero nahukay lang daw nila ung
mga bangkay nung 2007 pinakita sa media ung mass grave
dun na ako sinama sa kaso kasama sila Benito and Wilma.
Samantalang nung 1985 nakakulong ako sa Camp Agoro sa
Region 2 from 1983 to 1986 nakadetain ako paano ako
masasam dun anyway di nag issue ng warrant ung judge ng
leyte sa sinamang palad nahuli nila ako nung 2007. Dapat
hindi nila ako kinasuhan kasi protected ako ng JASIG
nakalagay dun e detention at NDF consultant ako dahil alam
naman nila ang nangyari for 1 year and 7 months pa ako
dinetain. Narelease lang ako nung 2009 sa isang kaso na
talagang politically debated. Isa dun sa tatlong kaso ni
Benito at Tiamzon na hearing sa Manila RTC isa sa kaso
93 | P a g e
 nila ung sa leyte. Ung sa Quezon city kidnapping sa cebu
ung illegal possession. Yung manila RTC yan ung leyte
obligado kami umattend kasi naka bail lang ako ngayon si
Satur nakabail pero ung kaso naming tuloy tuloy di pa tapos
so violation din un so anumang hulihin nila kasi pwede pang
manghuli sila ngayon pag tuloy tuloy yan bastat NDF
consultant violation pa rin un sa JASIG at marami silang
violation.

Researcher: ung mga panahon po ba na nasa regular track pa ung

negotiations at nagkaron ng JASIG violations meron po ba
un naging epekto sa takbo ng negotiation?

Randall Echanis: Meron halimbawa sa kaso ni Sutero Llamas noon. NDF

Consultant din yon. Involved sya sa peace talks. Ngayon, sa
isang armed encounter, nahuli sya. Sa Bicol, sugatan sya. At
hiningi talaga ng NDF yung release nya. At dahil violation
sya sa JASIG yung paghuli sa kanya, kung di sya
marelease, e pwedeng hindi magresume yung talks. Pero
ano yan, after ng ilang ano, narelease din. Yung kaso ni ano,
ni Edhan Borjal na NDF Consultant din, ang immediate
position ng NDF ay irelease yung mga consultants. At kung
meron mang ongoing na talks e talagang.. o resumption
pero hindi naman talagang pag hiningi eh hindi din naman
irerelease eh. Pero kinakailangan hilingin. Pero wala pa
naman talagang Sa pagkakatanda ko ha? Ginawang
pagsuspend ng NDF sa regular talks dahil hindi sila ano.
Kasi Dala ko nga itong ano eh, itong libro para sa pag
uusap natin. Yung timeline, mahalaga itong timeline ditto eh.
Eto oh. Eto kasi ginawa noong ano eh, kaya ang nirerefer
nya ditto,.. 200 no? So mula nung 2006, kay GMA yun, 2006
nung sinuspend ni GMA kasi 5 years na noong 2011. In
thirteen years and seven months, the GRP declared
indefinite recess three times (totaling 8months and 41days)
suspended the talks six times (totaling 44months and
74days); ollapsed the peae talks once (lasting for one month
and terminated the peace talks once (amounted to 21months
and 4days). Altogether, these unilateral moves by GRP to
recess, suspend, collapse, and terminated thepeae talks
amounted to six years, six months and five days. Ganun
kahaba yung kung wala naming anong dahilan, sinususpend

94 | P a g e
nila. Samantalang sa same period in 13years and 7months,
the NDF has delared a postponement of the formal talks only
once. This lasted for four months and five days para
magcomply sila sa condition. So kung makikita mo kung sino
talaga yung dahilan ng hindi pagtutuloy, sinong dahilan ng
pagsususpend, sinong dahilan ng ayaw mag usad usad, eto
klarong estado ito sa timeline eh. Biruin mo sa 13 years eh
halos kalahati nun e hindi nila inano pero sa loob ng 13
years once lang nagsuspend (ang NDF). Hindi pa yan
kasama dun sa ang ano eh, hindi magrelease kundi sa
ompliance sa kung ano ba talaga yung dapat nilang gawin.
Like dun sa terrorist listings noon, yung list ng mga political
prisoners noon na almost 300 na. Mga ganon na ompliane
nila. Kaya napakahalaga kung inaano dun sa pagtatanong
ng pagrerelease. Kagaya ngayon yung sa regular track, isa
lang naman yung releases ng NDF consultants dun sa
mismong ano eh, yung compliance nila sa JASIG. Na yung
pag arrest sa kanila, yung pagrerelease, dapat talaga
magrelease sila. Mga ganyan. So malinaw eh. Na kahit dun
sa study na for 13years and six months, walang usad yung
peace talks. Hanggang 2006 yun nga yung kay GMA
nagkaroon lang nung 2011pero the same period once lang
nagdeclare ng postponedment yung NDF. So actually nasa
benefit ng mamamayan na magtuloy yung peace talks peace
negotiations at umabot sa umabot talaga sa mga sa mga
comprehensive agreement na macaroon ng sabihin na
nating makabuluhang reform/reporma na magbebenipisyo
ng mamamayan kasi nasa interes naman yan ng
mamamayan eh kaya yan naman yung tuntunin ng ano dun
at tsaka syempre ang mga ano nyan ay bahagi ng buong
national democratic line ng NDF na isulong ito para sa
complete national liberation at tsaka yung democratic
interest nung mamamayan so ganun kahalaga yung
pagtutuloy ng peace talks na sa part ng NDF ano yan eh ano
mang day na makukuha natin yan eh makakatulong sa
advancement ng ibat ibang masses ng mamamayan at
advancement ng buong struggle syempre sa ano naman ng
gobyernoang tingin nila sa peace negotiation kasi
magcapitulate kayo, ibaba nyo armas nyo. Magcease fire
muna tayo bago tayo mag usap. Ang daming mga ano na

95 | P a g e
 hindi talaga yung resolbahin yung problema ng mamamayan
so talagang eh asahan naman natin yan.
Magkaiba/magconflict talaga yung interes na diladala pero
kung pwede naman talaga sanang magkaroon ng pag uusap
kung talagang sincerity ng gobyerno no eh kadalasan
syempre mix service talaga pero anumang peace
negotiation ano mang pag uusap tulad halimbawa nabuo
yung baril possible naman magfit ng mamamayan yun yung
labanan eh mahuhumanize kung baga hindi pwedeng
violations ng international human cahril laws o kaya sa mga
local military law na malaking bagay sa mamayanan yun na
sinusubjet nila sa force evauation o mass arrest etc kasi
binabawal lahat sa cahril yun eh so malaking bagay yan
kung maimplement ganon din sana yung ibang agreements
ang buong peace negotiation na makatulong sa
mamamayan. Yun nga lang yung effort mo na so wala nang
ibang nagnanais na umusad yan at tuloy tuloy kundi yung
interes ng mamayanan at sa kanilay maraming suspension
bad relation

Researcher: So sa tingin nyo po anong demand po nung pagkakahuli

nung kana Ka Beny at Ka Welma sa pag usad ng peace
negotiations?

Randall Echanis: Syempre may epekto rin yun kasi part naman sila dun sa
mga naviolate dun sa ginaguaranty nung Jasig kaya
kailangan talagang irelease sila pero syempre hindi naman
yung isang condition na pagka pre condition na pag di sila
nirelease eh hindi magkakaroon ng peace talks. Yung
release nila ay pagcomply, pagsunod . Compliance,
pagpapatupad ng gds dun sa jasig na agreement na
pinirmahan nila. Ngayon syempre dahil mga peace
consultant naman sila eh ang hirap naman na part sila ng
peace negotiations na nakakulong. Paano sila
makakapagparticipate? So kinakailangang marelease din
sila so in a way may epekto rin kasi nalilimit din yung
kanilang participation habang nakakulong. Kaya dapat
talaga na marelease sila kasi important matter rin naman sila
eh. Kung baga eh mahalaga din naman yung kanilang papel
sa peace negotiations. Yun lang masasabi ko.

96 | P a g e
Researcher: So hindi ba nabawasan yung trust nung NDF dun sa GRP
dahil sa pagkakahuli ng mga to?

Randall Echanis: Ah kasi usapin ng trust talagang mahirap magtrust sa

ganyang klase pa eh pero syempre kung nakikipagnegotiate
tayo meron din. Kinikilala mo din pero syempre ano naman
yan. Ano bang tawag dun? Ah yung negosasyon syempre
habang nakikipagnegotiate ka wari ka din sa mga
movements nila at the same time syempre kinakailangan din
na hanapan mo rin na pano rin kayo magtatagpo kasi ganun
nga yan eh so yung trust naman sa gobyerno ano naman
yan eh. Kung sa trust ano lang wala tayong trust talaga pero
dahil kausap mo sya eh tingnan mo kung nasaan sya. Pero
alam natin na never na mapagkakatiwalaan mo sila kung sa
talagang sa interes ng mamayanan. Talagang hindi mo
pagkakatiwalaan. Nasa sa iyo nay an eh yung pagtutuak ng
kalesa dun sa negotiation. Eh yung ahril nga eh kahit
pirmahan nila eh hindi naman nila maimplement so talagang
yung trust talaga yung wala ka talagang trust sa kanila
bilang kaaway sa uri kaaway talaga yan pero dahil nakikipag
usap ka eh di harapin mo sila sa negosasyon ng tapatan.
Pero hindi dapat na ano. Dapat very vigilant ka sa mga
ganyang bagay.

Researcher: Nag iba po ba ng strategy nung NDF after nung

arrest? I mean yung strategy sa peace talks nung NDF after
nung arrest ni Ka Benny tsaka ni Ka Welma?

Randall Echanis: Palagay ko hindi naman. Hindi naman palagay ko kasi ang
ano naman natin sa peace negotiations sa pagharap sa
negosasyon sa gobyerno. Nakaano pa rin naman yan sa
buong NB line natin. Dun pa rin nakapaloob yan. So kung
ano man yung pagpasok ng special tract kung ang ibig
sabihin. Actually yung speial track hindi naman nya iniiba
ung buong framework parang special ano lang sya para
umusad. Magbibigay ito ng magandang daan para umusad
naman itong regular track kasi kinakailangan na bumalik ka
pa rin dito para sa basic agreements ng agenda. Syempre
yung arrest ng dalawa dahil crucial din naman ung part nila
kailangan din na idemand ung compliance ng gobyereno
para irelease sila pero definitely di malaki ang nabago sa
framework.
97 | P a g e
Researcher: yung special track po ba bunga ito ng pagkakahuli kila
Benito and Wilma Tiamzon?

Randall Echanis: Hindi kasi ung special track bago pa maarrest meron na
nyan. Ang special track ano pa yan mga 2013 o late 2012
hindi na nga umuusad ang regular track since 2011 tapos
ang demand ng gobyerno ceasefire muna. Ito na nga kung
itong special track e maayos ang usapin pwedeng magkaron
kaagad ng truce at para umusad na agad ang regular track
so hindi pa connected ito sa arrest nung dalawa kasi earlier
pa sya. Ito nga ung ilan sa special track accord national
independence, democracy and human rights, agrarian
reform and national industrialization. Magkaisa lang tayo
dyan tapos pwedeng mabuo ung committee of national unity,
peace and development at saka tayo magkakaroon ng truce
and cooperation. Before arrest pa nila yan ibigsabihin late
2012 pa nga yan hanggang 2013 yan nag uusap sa special
track. Hindi special track para sa arrest nila. Para tumuloy
ang talks kahit ayaw nila sa regular track kasi kumbaga
napave nya ung way pero kahit nga dito nagkakahirapan pa
rin so yan pa rin ung nakasalang ngayon. So yan pa rin ung
nakasalang ngayon ung special track. Kung magkakaron by
2015 malamang ung special track ang paguusap kung hindi
man edi sa susunod na presidente.

Researcher: may posibilidad pa po kaya na bumalik ung parehong party

bago matapos ang term ni Aquino.

Randall Echanis: meron possibility dahil nag eeffort tayo saka optimistic tayo
pero kung umabot nga ng 2016 wala na yan next president
na yan pero kung uusad pa yan this early 2015 para may
time ka pa kasi kung negotiation naman yan mahina ang 5-6
months dyan pagdulo ng 2015 pagdating ng 2016 wala ano
na yan election na kung hindi man sya napatalsik o
napagresign so kung magresume yan early part ng 2015.
Kaya wala talagang ano na wala na kung sakasakali nga
itong early part na to pag lumagpas na yan wala ka na ring
time saka di nagseseryoso.

54:35 End

98 | P a g e
Appendix C

SILVESTRE BELLO INTERVIEW

MARCH 11, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

0:00 21:32

Researcher: yung interview po ay tungkol dun sa effect po ng

pagkakahuli doon kina ka Benny tsaka kina ka Wilma
Tiamzon doon po sa..

Slivestre Bello: sino?

Researcher: Ka Benny Tiamzon po at Ka Wilma Tiamzon po doon po sa

peace process.

Yung unang question po ay bilang isa po kayo sa mga

signatories po ng jasig, tingin niyo po ba ay violation ng
JASIG yung pagkakahuli doon sa mag asawang Tiamzon?

Silvestre Bello: ah well, unang una, id natin masabi kung may violation or
not, kasi under the JASIG, merong kasunduan na uanng
una, yung mga member ng panel nila, mga consultants nila,
yung mga security officers nila, yung mga messengers nila,
who were given yung tinatawag natin na document of
identification, which is in the common parlans call, safe
conduct pass, di dapat hulihin, they should be given
unhindered passes to other country. Ngayon, nahuli si Wilma
Tiamzon at Benito Tiamzon, they were claiming that these
two are consultants of NDF panel. Ang problema kasi dyan
is there is no way of verifying if they are consultants because
under the JASIG, they were supposed to submit to us names
of the consultants nila, yung mga security officers, lahat ng
ano nila who are involved in the peace process, bigay niyo
sa amin ang pangalan nila para mabigyan sila ng document
of identification o safe conduct pass. However, it was very
clear that among those that they submitted, may mga real
names. Just like for example yung pangalan nung chairman,
si Luis Jalandoni, si Connie Ledesma, si Joma Sison, Fidel
Agcaoili, si Ruth De Leon tsaka si Osterlio Palima, eto mga
real names. Kilala sila eh. Pero meron silang mga tinatawag

99 | P a g e
 na assumed names o aliases. Now, when they gave us this
list of assumed names, our agreement was that they should
also provide with the real identification nitong mga aliases.
For that purpose of they were supposed to submit to us yung
mga real identity nila na inilagay sa loob ng envelope with
their pictures and everything para kung mahuli halimbawa,
kunwari nahuli ka at nilagay mo juan dela cruz, pero ang
inilagay mo iakw pala si Kumander pusa, so pagka-nahuli
ka, sasabihin mo uy covered ako eh. andun yung pangalan
ko. Tingnan niyo Juan Dela Cruz so you were supposed to
look for that ano. Yung notebook nila, dineposit naming sa
isang bangko sa Amsterdam, ang may hawak ng susi ay
yung kanilang representative, si Luis Jalandoni. Yung isa,
yung ating consul sa Netherlands at yung isa ay yung
Obispo ng Nehterlands. So sila lang ang may hawak ng susi
para kung bubuksan yon, yung safety deposit, sila lang ang
makakapagbukas. And that is the way of verifying. Ang
problema, hindi nasunod yung usapan na dapat sa envelope
eh, ang nilagay pala nila, diskette. And then mukhang yung
diskette because sa tagal ng panahon ay nasira. So yung
validation process ay nawala. Anyway, the NDF is claiming
na these two are consultants so they should be covered by
JASIG. Yan ang problema, sabi ng gobyerno eh wala
naman process of verifying kung sila talaga ay consultant
niyo kasi di niyo naman sinunod yung usapan. So yun ang
nagiging problema. Pero on my part, kung tatanungin ako ni
Pnoy which he will not (laughs), I would recommend that one
of them should be released. Especially the wif, Wilma,
because under the International Humanitarian Law, di mo
pwede ikulong yung mag asawa. That happened during
Corys time when I was the secretary of justice, nahuli si
Satur Ocampo, nahuli yung asawa niyang si Boby Malay. So
they came to me and asked kung pwede mapalaya si Boby
Malay and I recommended the President Aquino, Cory, na i-
release in compliance sa International humanitarian Law na
pag mag asawa ang nakulong, ang isa, palabasin. Sinunod
naman ni cory. Ewan ko lang kung kaya din yan ni president
noynoy and besides he will not ask for my recommendation.

Researcher: pero si Wilma Austria po ay real name niya yung nakalagay

doon sa document of identification?

100 | P a g e
Silvestre Bello: yung ang di natin malaman na eh kasi di natin inano yung
ano. Pero alam ko na nakasulat sila noon.

Researcher: Si Benito alng po ang may assumed name, Crising Banaag.

Silvestre Bello: kaya dapat di lang on that basis but also in the basis of
Humanitarian consideration. Eh mag asawa eh, pano yung
mga anak although siguro matatanda na din ang mga anak
nila.

Researcher: Pero sabi po kasi ng NDF po na nagdeclare daw po ang

GRP na inoperative daw po yung JASIG? Parang yun daw
po yung dahilan.

Silvestre Bello: yun nga, para sa akin ay di pwede. I do not agree with the
government position that the JASIG is inoperative because
as long as the peace talks is ongoing, the JASIG is in effect.
Kasi we have to honor our signature kundi sino ba naman
ang makikipagkasundo sa atin? Anything that we sign in, we
must honor. Alam mo naman na pag nahuli ka na eh wala na
rin eh. (laughs)

Researcher: nung time niyo po ban a chief negotiatior ng GRP, meron din
po bang ganitong cases na hinuli.

Silvestre Bello: oo marami. Infairness the former president arroyo marami

siyang pina-release. And the same during the time of
President Ramos,

Researcher: pero may mga nahuli din po during your time?

Silvestre Bello: Meron din, si kuwan, sa panahon ni ramos. Borjal, Danny

Borgal.

7:00 11:10

Silvestre Bello: nahuli sya sa may Jollibee sa papuntang UP ang problema

nung nahuli sya di nya dala ung safe conduct pass nyo di ka
covered wala ka but eventually he was able to produce.
Sumulat sa amin ung dean ng college Jesuit na
ginaguarantee nila si Danny Borjal na un talaga ang identity
nya. During the time of FVR ang dami nyang pinalaya pagka
ung president may political will at hawak nya ang military

101 | P a g e
 andali nyang gawin yan minsan kasi pag ang president hindi
nya hawak ang military alanganin.

Researcher: sa tingin nyo po ba ung mga previous violations during your

time naka apekto po ito substantially dun sa peace
negotiations.

Silvestre Bello: ung tungkol sa JASIG wala masyadong violations nun kasi
pagsinabi nila covered yan e si FVR sige what I remember
during my time ang chairman nun si Howard Dee. Pagsinabi
naming na palayain sinusunod ni president Ramos kasi sa
kanya kailangan hindi mahinto ang talks. That is why it was
during Ramos time we were able to sign 10 documents. 1 is
the document on substantive issue which is the
comprehensive agreement on human rights and international
humanitarian law. Yan ang number 1 substantive issue.
Kaya apat lang yan nakakuha na kami ng tatlo wala kasi
short live ung term ni FVR 6 years lang pero tapos na sana
yan. Biro 10 agreements including JASIG, it was JASIG that
pave the way for the return of the talks.

Researcher: Sa tingin nyo po ba ung pagkakahuli sa mag asawang

Tiamzon may substantial effect ito sa peace negotiations

Silvestre Bello: Alam mo minsan nakakabuti kasi itong dalawa ito ung anti-
talks. Ito ung mga hardcore ayaw nila ng peace talks gusto
nila tuloy ang guerilla warfare. Alam mo kasi dyan sa loob ng
CPP yan ang mga ayaw ng peace talks ung grupo nila JoMa
sila ung sa peace talks so nung nahuli sila may upperhand
na sila JoMa

Researcher: so usapin po ito ng internal nila

Silvestre Bello: Oo kaya nakakabuti sa kanila although gusto pa rin nila

palayain

Researcher: tingin nyo po ba itong pagkakahuli nila may epekto sa trust

ng ndf sa grp

Silvestre Bello: oo naman kasi naiintindihan naman nila na wala na ung

process of verification kasalanan din nila kasi nasunog daw
ung office nila tapos nacorrupt. Hindi nila sinunod ung
envelope ang nilagay diskette kaya kasalanan nila ngayon.

102 | P a g e
11:10 14:00

Researcher: sa tingin nyo po ba may possibility pa na bumalik ung

regular track sa negotiation

Silvestre Bello: pwede still possible *requested to be off recorded*

Researcher: Sir bukod po sa compliance ng mga agreement nila ano po

kaya ang iba pang factors para maging successful ang
peace negotiations.

Silvestre Bello: alam mo napakahalaga in peace negotiations ung trust. I

remember nung panahon ni Ramos kinausap ako
magmember ka dyan kasi kaibigan mo sila. Ito kasi si
Ramos suspetsado nya ko na kaliwa ako in fact kinulong ako
nyan si Ramos ang nagkulong sa akin nyan pero nung
maging presidente sya ginawa akong secretary of justice.
Yung sinseridad yan kung hindi mo pagkatiwalaan ung
kausap mo walang mangyayari that is why sincerity is very
important dun so meron tinatawag ng formal talks, informal
talks may tinatawag na back channeling. Yung back
channeling is sometimes more effective that formal talks.
Baka nga makulong ako pag kwinento ko sa inyo. Pero
nagkaron ng mga agreements pagnahuli kayo wala akong
alam okay pero we succeeded in pushing the peace process
forward until we were able to achieve 10 documents. 1 of
them is the first agreement of substantive issue 2 nd would be
socio-economics 3rd would be political and social reform and
finally the end of hostilities and disposition of forces.

14:00

Silvestre Bello: Yung CASER, yung Comprehensive Agreement on Soio-

economi Reforms. Kaso nagpa-ano sya eh, nagpadala sya
sa tsismis na kaliwa daw ako (laughs). Ayun.

Researcher: Sa ngayon po kaya possible pa pong ma draft yung

CASER?

Silvestre Bello: Actually, hindi na dapat e. Kasi unang una napag-usapan na

naming yan e. Napag usapan na naming yan nung panahon
ni GMA. Maganda yung daloy nun.

Researcher: Ano pong nangyari?

103 | P a g e
Silvestre Bello: Eh wala. E diba kasi tinanggal ako? (laughs)

Natsismis na kaliwa daw ako. Naniwala sa tsismis.

Wala akong nagawa.

Researcher: Sa ngayon po, kung ire-rate nyo po yung sincerity nung

Aquino Government sa peace talks, yung political will po nila
from 1-10, tingin nyo saan po kaya sila magfafall don?

Silvestre Bello: Actually wala akong valid basis e. Unang una di pa naman
sila nag uusap pa. Di pa sila umuusad. Pero, I want to give
the President the benefit of the doubt kung gusto nyang
magkaroon talaga ng kapayapaan. Pero the way he handles
it, ibang klase eh. Kailangan nandyan yung will mo eh.
Naalala ko si Ramos nun, kontra ng kontra si Secretary De
Villa ng Defense, sabi nya You already told so much, let us
now listen to the panel. Ewan ko lang kung magawa ni Pnoy
yan (laughs).

Researcher: Yung pagkakasabi nyo po na ibang klase yung

pagkakahandle ni Pnoy, positive po ba ito o negative?
Halimbawa compared po dun sa paghandle ni Pres. Ramos?

Silvestre Bello: Ah malayo sya. Malayo sya kay Ramos. Pero hindi naman
hopeless si Pnoy. Only if he gets the right decision from the
right advices from the right people. Kasi wala naming
mawawala e. Kasi we need to consider I dont know if I
already told you the tactical and the stratregic value of the
talks?

Researcher: Hindi pa po

Silvestre Bello: Kasi yung tactical value of the talks, sa isip ni Ramos nun,
while you are talking, yung putukan nababawasan. Less
talks, more shooting. More talks, less shooting. Tactical
value yan. Habang nag uusap tayo, aba! Yung level of
battle, should go down. Yan yung tactical value. And the
more important value is the strategic value. Yun ang while
you are talking, you are actually addressing the root causes
of the armed conflict. Yun yung pinag uusapan nyo, bakit ba
tayo nag-aaway? Oo. Di ko alam kung naabutan nyo si the
late Heidi Yorac. She used to be the chair of the Comelec.

104 | P a g e
Comelec Chairman yun si Heidi Yorac eh. Ngayon ,
kinomisyon ni GMA, no no no, si Corry pala. Kinumisyon ni
Cory si Heidi Yorac to come up with an in depth study kung
bakit tayo may armed conflict. Yun. So inidentify ni Heidi
Yorac. Number one is the extreme poverty of the people.
Number two is the conception of the people that government
is not capable of giving justice and number three is poor
governance. Yun yung inidentify ni Heidi Yorac noong
panahong iyon. So inaadress naming. Habang nag-uusap
kami, yung sa socio-economic reforms, inaaddress namin.
Bakit mahirap yung taong bahay? Bakit sila walang pambili
ng lupa? Pambayad ng tuition? Pambili ng gamut? Pambili
ng gatas sa bata? Yan yung pinag uusapan sa talks eh.
Pinag uusapan doon kung bakit yung isang tao sa
probinsya, pag ninakawan ng kalabaw, hindi pupunta yan sa
pulis. Kasi pag nagsumbong yan sa pulis, madadagdagan
pa yung nanakaw sa kanyang kalabaw. Diba? (laughs).
Yung mga kwan doon, pupunta sila sa NPA, overnight
ibabalik yung kalabaw. Yan ang perception ng mahihirap.
Which is true. That justice system is just for the rich and the
powerful. That is the sad reality of our justice system. Yan
ang madalas ko sinasabi sa mga committee hearing. Kayo,
mga nasa Sumpreme Court, you are the number one
recruiter of the NPA. Ah, nagalit sila sa akin eh. E totoo e.
Kung walang katarungan, sasama ka pa ba sa gobyerno
mo? Kung alang katarungan? E wala eh. May mga kaso
dyan nakapending ng 15years, 20 years. E yung mahirap,
tingnan mo ha? May limang ektaryang lupa. Inagaw ng isang
mayaman. Syempre magrereklamo ka. Pupunta ka ng
husgado,malayong manalo ka dun. Tingnan natin
halimbawa, tsumamba ka. Nanalo ka sa RTC, puupunta yan
sa Court of Appeals, ilang taon yun, tapos minsan, sa
Supreme court pa. By the time nananalo ka na, wala na.
Yung lupa mo wala na. Ganon yung ano e. The people is
dissatisfied with the government. Kaya lumalaban.
Lumalaban sila. Sabi nga ni Gov. Adaza non, pag nagutom
yang pagkain, magnanakaw yan ng pagkain o pera pambili
ng pagkain. Pero pag nagutom ng katarungan yan,
mamumundok yan. Di na magnanakaw yan. Mamumundok
na yan. That is why very important yung strategic value of

105 | P a g e
 the talks. Kasi hindi mo naman maaachieve yung peace
talks kahit ilang agreements pa yang pirmahan mo eh. Kahit
ilang agreements pa yan, kung nandyan pa rin yung root
causes, mananatili yangkaguluhan. So you remove the root
causes. Kung wala nang gutom sa pagkain, kung wala nang
gutom sa katarungan, magkakaroon tayo ng kapayapaan.
Kapag wala nang nangungurakot na congressman. (laughs)

Researcher: Ah sir last question nap o, ano po ba yung maipapayo nyo

po dun sa dalawang panig para matuloy nap o itong peace
talks?

Silvestre Bello: Simple lang. Go back to the peace table. No conditions.

Ganun din sa NDF. Balik na din kayo. If you have to talk
about peace, then talk about peace. Trust one another again
although it is difficult.

Researcher: Thats all sir. Maraming salamat po sa oras nyo.

21:32 End

106 | P a g e
107 | P a g e
108 | P a g e
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