Torts: Notes

Concept/ Definition

The term Tort is of Anglo-American law-common law which is broader in scope than the
Spanish-Phil concept which is limited to negligence while the former includes international or
criminal acts. Torts in Philippine law is the blending of common-law and civil law system.

Quasi Delict refers to acts or omissions which cause damage to another, there being fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant, who is obliged by law to pay for the damages done.

Elements of Quasi Delict:

1. Damages suffered by the plaintiff

2. Fault or negligence of the defendant

3. Causal connection between the fault or negligence of the defendants act and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 426, 96)

ELEMENTS OF QUASI DELICT/TORTS

1. act or omission
2. damage or injury is caused to another

3. fault or negligence is present

4. there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

5. causal connection between damage done and act/omission

DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION

CONTRACT QUASI DELICT DELICT

(1170-1174 NCC) (2176 NCC) (365 RPC)

Vinculum Juris Contract Negligent act/ omission Act/omission committed

(culpa, imprudence) by means of dolo
(deliberate, malicious,
in bad faith)

Proof Needed Preponderance of Preponderance of Proof beyond

evidence evidence reasonable doubt

Defense Exercise of extraordinary Exercise of diligence of

available diligence (in contract of good father of a family in
carriage), Force Majeure the selection and
supervision of employees
Pre-existing There is pre-existing No pre-existing contract No pre-existing contract
contract contract
Contractual party. Prove Victim. Prove the ff.:
Burden of proof the ff.: Prosecution. Accused is
presumed innocent until
1. existence of a 1. damage the contrary is proved.
contract 2. negligence

2. breach 3. causal connection

between
negligence and
damage done

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CRIME & CUPLA AQUILIANA

Crimes: Culpa Aquiliana: Culpa Contractual:

(i) Pre-existing obligation
1. Crimes affected the public 1. Only private concern. between the parties
interest.

2. Penal law punishes/ corrects 2. Repairs the damage by

the criminal act. indemnification. (ii) Fault or negligence is
incidental to the performance
3. Only acts covered by Penal 3. Covers all acts that are of the obligation
Law are punished (Barredo vs faulty or negligent.
Garcia, 73 Phil 607; J. Bocobo,
1940 : Taxi c lied with
Carretela)
(iii) Defense of having
4. Guilt proven beyond 4. Preponderance of evidence. exercised diligence of a good
reasonable doubt. father of a family is not
available, just like in criminal
action. Applied doctrine of
5. Reservation to file separate 5. No reservation its Respondent Superior, or Master
civil action. No reservation, independent from crime. and Servant Rule.
civil action is impliedly
instituted in the criminal
action.

6. Employers liability is 6. Employers liability is

subsidiary. solidary (Fabre Jr. vs CA, 259
SCRA 426)
CIVIL LIABILITY IN QUASI-DELICT vs. DELICT

DIFFERENCE QUASI-DELICT DELICT

Liability of Employer Solidary Subsidiary

Reservation Requirement Civil aspect of the quasi-delict is Civil aspect is Impliedly

impliedly instituted with criminal action, instituted with criminal
but under 2000 Crimpro Rules it is action
independent and separate

Effect of judgement of Not a bar to recover civil damages Not a bar to recover civil
acquittal in a criminal EXCEPT when judgement pronounces damages
case involving same that the negligence from which damage
act/omission arise is non-existent

DISTINCTIONS

FAULT signifies voluntary act or omission causing damages to the right of another giving rise to
an obligation of the actor to repair such damage.

Fault is of two (2) kinds:

1. Substantive and independent fault in that there is no pre-existing relation. This is the
one referred to Art. 2176 NCC and source of an obligation. It is also known as culpa
extra contractual or culpa aquiliana covered by Art. 2176 NCC.
2. Fault as an incident in the performance of an obligation existing is known as
contractual fault or culpa contractual governed by Art. 1170-73 of NCC.

NEGLIGENCE consist in the omission to do certain acts which result to the damage to another.

As to Intent to cause damage to another through an act or omission:

1. It is culpa absence such intent, the actors liability is civil governed by the Civil Code.
2. It is dolo presence of such intent and the act or omission becomes crime and the
actors civil liability is governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Distinctions Importance of knowing these distinctions lies in filing the proper cause of action
against the tortfeasors. The same act or omission which is faulty or negligent causing damage
produces civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action
for quasi delict or culpa contractual under the Civil Code.

NEGLIGENCE
The omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the persons, time and place. (Art. 1173, NCC)

KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE

1. Quasi delict (Art. 2176 NCC)

2. Criminal negligence (Art. 356 RPC)

3. Contractual negligence (NCC provisions on contracts particularly Arts. 1170 to 1174)

TESTS OF NEGLIGENCE

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he isguilty of negligence

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course pursued? If so, it as the needed to see
of picture. actor to take duty this the areprecautions to guard against harm

CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSIDER

Time
Place

Personal circumstances of the Actors

WHAT MUST BE PROVED

1. Negligence - In action for Quasi Delict, plaintiff must prove negligence of defendant

Exception:

1. In cases where negligence is presumed or imputed by law - this is only

rebuttable/presumptionjuris tantum

2. Principle of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) - grounded on the difficulty in
proving thru competent evidence, public policy considerations

2. Damage/injury

3. Causal connection between negligence and damage (to be actionable) -Defendants

negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff to
enable plaintiff to recover. Thus, if plaintiffs own conduct is the cause of the injury
there can be no recovery.

If plaintiff's negligence is only contributory he is considered partly responsible only, may still
recover from defendant but must be reduced by the courts in proportion to his own negligence
Concept of proximate cause the adequate and efficient cause which in the natural order of
events and under the particular circumstances surrounding the case, would naturally produce
the event

DEFENSES:

1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - the theory here is that the plaintiff was also negligent
together with the defendant; to constitute a defense, proximate cause of
injury/damage must be the negligence of defendant
2. CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE - the theory here is that both parties are equally negligent;
the courts will leave them as they are; there can be no recovery

3. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE - even though a persons own acts may have
placed him in a position of peril and an injury results, the injured is entitled to recover
if the defendant through the exercise of reasonable care and prudence might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff.

This defense is available only in an action by the driver or owner of one vehicle against the
driver or owner of the other vehicle involved.

Elements:

1. plaintiff was in a position of danger by his own negligence

2. defendant knew of such position of the plaintiff

3. defendant had the least clear chance to avoid the accident by exercise of ordinary
care but failed to exercise such last clear chance and

4. accident occurred as proximate cause of such failure

Who may invoke: plaintiff

Inapplicable to:

1. joint tortfeasors
2. defendants concurrently negligent

3. as against 3rd persons

4. EMERGENCY RULE a person is not expected to exercise the same degree of care
when he is compelled to act instinctively under a sudden peril because a person
confronted with a sudden emergency may be left with no time for thought and must
make a speedy decision upon impulse or instinct

Applicable only to situations that are sudden and unexpected such as to deprive actor
of all opportunity for deliberation

But action must still be judged by the standard of the ordinary prudent man

Absence of forseeability
 5. DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK Volenti non fit injuria

Intentional exposure to a known danger

One who voluntarily assumed the risk of an injury from a known danger cannot recover
in an action for negligence or an injury is incurred

Plaintiffs acceptance of risk (by law/contract/nature of obligation) has erased

defendants duty so that his negligence is not a legal wrong

Applies to all known danger

6. DUE DILIGENCE diligence required by law/contract/depends on circumstances of

persons, places, things

7. FORTUITOUS EVENT - no person shall be responsible for those events which cannot be
forseen, or which through forseen were inevitable

Exception: assumption of risk

8. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA a principle that involves damage without injury, therefore
no liability is incurred; there is no legal injury
9. LAW specific provision of law

10. EXERCISE OF DILIGENCE OF GOOD FATHER OF FAMILY IN SELECTION AND SUPERVISION

OF EMPLOYEES

11. PRESCRIPTION

Injury to right of plaintiff/quasi delict - 4 years

Defamation - 1 year

When no specific provision, must be counted from the day they may be brought

12. PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE RECOVERY - Responsibility for fault or negligence

under quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from civil action arising from the
RPC but plaintiff cannot recover damages 2x for same act or omission of the defendant
13. ACT OR OMISSION IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE

14. OTHER GROUNDS MOTION TO DISMISS

1. lack of jurisdiction over person of defendant

2. lack of jurisdiction over subject matter

3. venue improperly laid

4. plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue

5. there is another action pending between same parties for same cause
 6. cause of action is barred by prior judgement /statute of limitations

7. pleading asserting claim states no cause of action

8. claim set forth in pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished

9. claim is unenforceable under the provision of statute of fraud

10. condition precedent for filing claim has not been complied with

PERSONS LIABLE FOR QUASI DELICT

1. TORTFEASOR - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being no

fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done (art 2176).
2. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE the obligation imposed in 2176 is demandable not
only

3. VICARIOUS LIABILITY law on imputed negligence; a person who himself is not guilty
of negligence is made liable for conduct of another

Reason:

1. public policy deeper pocket/capacity to pay

2. violation of duty on account of relationship he is negligent

PARENTS - The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are
responsible for damage caused by:

1. minor children

2. who live in their company

Note: Father and Mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over common children. In
case of disagreement, father's decision shall prevail (art 211).

GUARDIANS - Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minor or incapacitated
persons who are

1. under their authority &

2. live in their company

OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT/ENTERPRISE - Owners & managers of

establishment or enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their employees

1. in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed OR

2. in occasion of their function

EMPLOYERS - Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees &
household helpers
 1. acting w/in the scope of their assigned task

2. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry (unlike in
RPC subsidiary liability of employer attaches in case of insolvency of
employer for as long as the employer is engaged in business/industry)

Defenses available to employers:

1. exercise of due diligence ins election and supervision of employees

2. act/omission was made outside working hours and in violation of company's
rules and regulations

STATE - The state is responsible when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
same is caused by an official to whom task done properly pertains in which case art
2176 is applicable

SCHOOLS, ADMINISTRATOR, TEACHER - Teachers or heads of establishments of arts &

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their

1. pupils, students & apprentices

2. as long as they remain in their custody

Note:

Family Code, art 218 - The school, its administration & teachers or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority & responsibility over the
minor child under their supervision, instruction or custody (authority & responsibility shall
apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises or the school, entity or
institution).

Family Code, art 219 - those given the authority & responsibility shall be solidarily & principally
liable for damages caused by act/omission of the unemancipated minor; parents, judicial
guardian or person exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARTICLES 218 & 2180

Art 218 Art 2180

School, admin, teachers engaged in child care Teachers, head of establishment in Arts and
are made expressly liable trades are made expressly liable

Liability of school, admin, teachers is solidary No such express solidary nor subsidiary
and parents are made subsidiary liable liability is stated
Students involved must be minor Students involved not necessarily minor

Issues:

Whether or not schools are liable?

GR: schools are not liable as party defendants

exception:

1. FC 218 schools are expressly made liable

2. St. Francis case ruling schools liability as employer

3. PSBA case ruling school has liability based on contract

So that

1. if culprit is a teacher, follow St. Francis ruling (sue school as employer)

2. if culprit is a stranger, follow PSBA ruling (sue school based on contract)

3. if culprit is a student - apply 2180

Does 2180 apply to school of arts & trades only?

No. applies to all including academic institution per weight of jurisprudence based on obiter of
Justice JBL Reyes in the Exconde case

Basis of liability of teacher principle of loco parentis (stand in place of parents)

so long as they remain in their custody

not literal anymore; before: boarding & living with teacher due to peculiar
characteristic of trade & arts school
as long as they are in the protective, supervisory capacity of teacher special parental
authority

PERSONS EXPRESSLY MADE LIABLE BY LAW (even without fault)

1. POSSESSOR OF AN ANIMAL OR WHOEVER MAKES USE OF THEM EVEN IF THE ANIMAL IS

LOST OR ESCAPED

Except:
 1. Force majeure
2. Fault of the injured/damaged person

2. OWNER OF MOTOR VEHICLE - In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily

liable with the driver if:

1. he was in the vehicle, and

2. could have through due diligence prevented the misfortune

3. MANUFACTURERS & PROCESSORS OF FOODSTUFFS, DRINKS, TOILET ARTICLES &

SIMILAR GOODS

they are liable for death and injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers

4. DEFENDANT IN POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS OR SUBSTANCES, SUCH ASFIR

EARMS AND POISON

there is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of defendant if death or

injury results from such possession

Exception: The possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business

5. PROVINCES, CITIES & MUNICIPALITIES

shall be liable for damages for the death or injuries suffered by any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision

6. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING OR STRUCTURE

responsible for the damages resulting from any of the ff.:

1. total or partial collapse of building or structure if due to lack of necessary repairs

2. explosion of machinery which has not been taken cared of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and
adequate place

3. by excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property

4. by falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure

5. by emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed

without precautions suitable to the place

7. ENGINEER, ARCHITECT OR CONTRACTOR

if damage of building or structure is caused by defect in construction which happens

within 15 years from construction; action must be brought within 10 years from
collapse
 8. HEAD OF FAMILY THAT LIVES IN A BUILDING OR PART THEREOF

liable for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here in
the Philippines and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be
opened through the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other
remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. McLoughlin allegedly placed the
following in his safety deposit box 2 envelopes containing US Dollars, one envelope
containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit cards, bankbooks and a check book. On 12
December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some items from the safety
box which includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the
other envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and
his credit cards. The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out that a
few dollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing. Eventually, he
confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the
key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted
her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit
box with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole
the key assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep. McLoughlin insisted that it must be
the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez refused to accept
responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled Undertaking
For the Use of Safety Deposit Box

ISSUE: WON the Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box admittedly executed by
private respondent is null and void.

HELD: YES Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public
policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business
like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their
persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn
does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in
so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on
guests for their signature. In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to hold
hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be
actually delivered to the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such effects are
within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced
when the missing items are taken without the guests knowledge and consent from a safety
deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case. Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the
undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003, CC for the yallow Tropicana to be released
from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any
cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana
for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred
by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-
keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused
by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it
may proceed from any force majeure.

=========================================================
=======================================Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat
in the plane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way
of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in
fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier a case ofquasi-delict. Damages are proper.

=========================================================
=============================Dulay vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that
petitioners filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary liability. Respondent
Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that
their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory
of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.
(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.
It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted,
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.
=========================================================
======================================

Barredo v Garcia (Torts)

BARREDO V GARCIA G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO
GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CRIMINAL CASE):

1. CFI- Rizal Fontanilla was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
2. CA: affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CIVIL CASE):

1. CFI Manila: Fausto Barredo is liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Barredo in the amount of 2,000.
2. CA: reduced the damages to 1,000.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making
him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla

RULING:
Yes.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi- delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It
is this fault that is condemned by the law.
One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this
being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons
with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.

Crimes under penal code

1. affect public interest
2. Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act
3. not as broad as quasi-delicts because crimes are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them
4. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required

Culpa aquiliana / Cuasi-delito

1. Only of private concern

2. Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage (includes both reckless
and simple negligence)
3. include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
when there is exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.

4. only preponderance of evidence is required

Note: not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility.

The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not
be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law) The basis of civil law liability is not respondent
superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. A quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability
of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties. xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
=========================================================
=======================================

Taylor v Manila Railroad (Torts)

TAYLOR v MANILA RAILROAD (1910)

FACTS: The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained
of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an
electric light system in the city of Manila.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12
years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one
Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made
on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving
the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
 These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and
each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use
of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power.
After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
them home.
After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old,
and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with
a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal
by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more
mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
Defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of
such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff
failed in his proof.

ISSUE:
Whether defendant company is liable

RULING:
No, the company is not liable.
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff,
which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating
cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in
keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's
premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match
to its contents.

Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite
are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in
the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of
these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in
question or had the caps under its possession and control.
plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion.
the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and

their consequences; he was sui juris (legally competent; capacity to manage ones own affairs)
in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act.
Counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the
United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
there the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the
doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a
very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus:
(1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by
them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of
children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
premises;
(3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the
mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice;
(4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will
warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Principle of proportional damages is not applicable. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with
the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
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=======================================

Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court Et Al. (1990)

FACTS:
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within
its land
inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction
July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until
after judgment in the related Criminal Case
 spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety
HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431
of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the
rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
=========================================================
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Cangco v MRR (Torts)

FACTS:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with
a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
On January 20, 1915, the plaintiff Jose Cangco upon stepping off the train, one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and
was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six
meters before it came to a full stop. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark
night. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation. Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the
negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company's trains.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI MRR not liable. Although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the
cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due as to obstruct passengers passing
to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering.

ISSUE:
Is MRR liable?

RULING: Yes.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
Under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent
in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof
of due care and diligence in this respect.
From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that
in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

Culpa contractual
1. Due diligence in the selection & supervision of the employee is not a defense
2. vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation
3. proof of the contract and its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery

Culpa aquiliana
1. It is a defense (under Article 2180 of the present code)
2. Wrongful or negligent act or omission itself creates the vinculum juris
3. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the negligence

Plaintiff, also, is not guilty of contributory negligence. Thousands of person alight from trains
under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has
kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff
would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's
negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
=========================================================
=======================================

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was
killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman)
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court
found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally
liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal
damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and
LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere
fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated
by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that
the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where
they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through theexercise of
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or
injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due
to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art.
2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the
employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach How then must the liability of
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be
described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other
in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a
quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages

is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was deleted.

=========================================================
=======================================

Singson v BPI (Torts)

SINGSON v BPI G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968 JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL
CASTILLO,plaintiffs, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his
capacity as President of the said Bank, defendants.

FACTS:
Singson, was one of the defendants in another civil case of the Court of First Instance, Manila,
in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely,
Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein,
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but
not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and
executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the
Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's
credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of
execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ
of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said
garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits
of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona,
prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C.
Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the
balance of his deposits in the said bank, plaintiffs checks were dishonored and were refused
payment by the said bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took
steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff
Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard their
letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from his account had already been
removed.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its
president, Santiago Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs'
account.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI- Manila: dismissed their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and Santiago Freixas. upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the
defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is
contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 (Moral damages) of
our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not established the
amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.

ISSUE:
Whether damages may be awarded

RULING:
Yes.
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor. In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as
the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had
committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need
not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would
suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.

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=======================================

PAL v CA (Torts)
PAL V. CA (1981)

[G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.] PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and JESUS V. SAMSON, Respondents.

FACTS:
The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, private respondent herein,
averred that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi
with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and Pili, Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante
as commanding pilot of a C-47 plane belonging to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the
herein petitioner; that on attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Captain Delfin
Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a
result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the
airplane crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit
and break through the thick front windshield of the airplane causing him severe brain
concussion, wounds and abrasions on the forehead with intense pain and suffering cranad(par.
6, complaint).:onad
The complaint further alleged that instead of giving plaintiff expert and proper medical
treatment called for by the nature and severity of his injuries, defendant simply referred him to
a company physician, a general medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior
injuries without examining the severe brain concussion of plaintiff
defendant airline company instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert medical treatment,
discharged the latter from its employ on December 21, 1953 on grounds of physical disability,
thereby causing plaintiff not only to lose his job but to become physically unfit to continue as
aviator due to defendants negligence in not giving him the proper medical attention
cranad(pars. 10-11, complaint). Plaintiff prayed for damages
defendant PAL denied the substantial averments in the complaint, alleging among others, that
the accident was due solely and exclusively to inevitable unforeseen circumstances whereby
plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and minor injuries which were promptly treated by
defendants medical personnel cranad(par. 5, answer); that plaintiff did not sustain brain injury
or cerebral concussion from the accident since he passed the annual physical and medical
examination given thereafter on April 24, 1951; that the headaches and dizziness experienced
by plaintiff were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required up-grading
or promotional course given by defendant company
The pilot, Captain Delfin Bustamante, was a competent and proficient pilot, and although he
was already afflicted with a tumor of the nasopharynx even before the accident of January 8,
1951, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in passing upon the fitness of pilots, gave Capt.
Bustamante a waiver of physical standards to enable him to retain his first class airman
certificate

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC: ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff,
2. CA: Plaintiff-Appellee, who has been deprived of his job since 1954, is entitled to the legal
rate of interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint

ISSUE:
Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the
accident on 8 January 1951 and the subsequent periodic dizzy spells, headache and general
debility of which private respondent complained every now and then, on the one hand, and
such periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility allegedly caused by the accident
and private respondents eventual discharge from employment, on the other?

RULING:
Yes. The dizzy spells, headache and general debility of private respondent Samson was an
after-effect of the crash-landing
We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent court to PAL for having allowed
Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on January 8, 1951
The pilot was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx cranad(nose). He is now in the
Great Beyond. The spot is very near the brain and the eyes. Tumor on the spot will affect the
sinus, the breathing, the eyes which are very near it. No one will certify the fitness to fly a
plane of one suffering from the disease.
the evidence shows that the overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove
was caused by the pilot for which acts the

defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for this negligence of defendants
employee, it is liable
The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash-
landed due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the latter is
clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Article 2219, cranad(2) New Civil Code is applicable,
justifying the recovery of moral damages.
The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human
Relations which requires that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

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=======================================

Syquia v CA (Torts)

Syquia v CA G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993 JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA
C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia.
On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance against herein
private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract and/or quasi-delict.
2. According to the complaint, the petitioners and respondent to inter the remains of deceased
in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978. They also alleged that
the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased had a hole approximately three (3)
inches in diameter. Upon opening the vault, it became apparent that there was evidence of
total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged and the exposed parts of the deceaseds
remains were damaged.
3. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay
plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, etc.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. Trial Court: dismissed the complaint. the contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the
defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre- existing
contractual relation.
Contention of the defense: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it
has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging
would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."
2. Court of Appeals: affirmed dismissal.

ISSUE: whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with
petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.

RULING:
NO, there was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery.

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the
existence of aculpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding
that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict

Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of
Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the
relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there
been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be
held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules
and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be
waterproof.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to
be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a
family.

Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the
accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth
around the grave filling the same with earth.

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Lopez v. Pan American World Airways

Facts:
Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco
was made by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and company. First class tickets
were issued and paid for. The party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez
requested Minister Busuego to contact the airlines regarding their accommodation. However,
they were informed that there was no accommodation for them. Because of some urgent
matters to attend to in San Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight under
protest.
Issues:
(1) Whether the defendant acted in bad faith for deliberate refusal to comply with its contract
to provide first-class accommodation to the plaintiff
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) From the evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant - through its agents -
first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafterdeliberately and
intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting
them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so
misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly
placed itself into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should
there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in
this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than
the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its
flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have
been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such
conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill-will.
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty,
made plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willful-non-
disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not
simply the erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the
resulting contracts. And, as above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.

(2) First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of
its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious
anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by
defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to
be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found
among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from
the contractual undertaking.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith,
the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In
view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively
deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we
find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages.

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Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their daughter boarded a PANAM plane
from Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While on stopover, Mr. Zulueta
found the need to relieve himself and after finding the terminals comfort rooms full, he walked
down the beach to do his business. Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr. Zuluetas absence
was noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, You people almost made me miss
your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged.

Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the airport manager stopped plaintiff
and asked him to surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing to comply with the order,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane. His wife and daughter were able to proceed but
were instructed to leave their baggages behind.
Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of damages against respondents for breach of
contract. The defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs reason for going to the beach was
not to relieve himself but because he had a quarrel with his wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of contract.

HELD:
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs testimony about what he did upon
reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct evidence
about said alleged quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would not have walked back from
the beach to the terminal before the plane had resumed its flight to Manila, thereby exposing
his presence to the full view of those who were looking for him.

Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of plaintiff, it appears that
Captain Zentner received information that one of the passengers expressed a fear of a bomb
on board the plane. As a result, he asked for the plaintiffs bags to verify the bomb.
Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The Captain failed to explain why he seemingly
assumed that the alleged apprehension of his information was justified. Plaintiff himself
intimated to them that he was well known to the US State Department and that the Captain
was not even aware of the informants name or any circumstances which may substantiate the
latters fear of a certain bomb.

Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence for failure to
reboard the plane within the 30 minutes announced before the passengers debarked
therefrom. This may have justified a reduction of the damages had plaintiff been unwittingly
left by the plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or even, wittingly, if he could
not be found before the planes departure. It does not, and cannot have such justification in
the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up before the plane had taken off and he having been
off-loaded intentionally and with malice. With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is
entitled to damages from respondent company.

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People vs Ligon
People vs Ligon

Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with
homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old
working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of
his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell
down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced
with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was
acquitted.

Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability

Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault
and negligence.

Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
While the guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witness at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
=========================================================
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Chua v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII issued a
search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and the
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Canoy seized the vehicle and took custody.

Chua filed a civil action for replevin for the recovery of possession of the vehicle against Canoy
and in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Caares.
He alleged that he had a lawful ownership and possession of the vehicle; that he had not sold
the vehicle to anyone; that he had not stolen nor carnapped it, and that he had never been
charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that matter. The writ of replevin was
issued and the vehicle was seized.

Meanwhile, a case for carnapping against Chua pending preliminary investigation before the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was provisionally dismissed with the following reservation:
"without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved".

The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII and ordered the
dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be
restored to Canoy.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred when it ordered the transfer of possession
seized to Chua when the latter filed an action for replevin.

Held:

Yes. Where a personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe
that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there are
conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for
replevin; however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing
of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was "dismissed
provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor
of complainant", or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and
actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper
remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and
not in any other branch of the said court.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of
possession of the property seized to Chua when the latter filed the action for replevin. It
should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping
case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in
jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot
annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-
equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.