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CABANLIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FULFILLMENT OF DUTY

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special Prosecutor (G.R. No/ 148431, July 28, 2005)

Facts:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN were all charged for the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before
the Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino was a detained prisoner who was escorted to retrieve the effects of the crime to the place where
he hid the same. Aboard the police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 rifle and about to jump out of the jeep.
CABANLIG shouted hoy!and without issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting his head, left side of the
chest and left lower back.

CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an act of self-defense and
performance of duty. Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but acquitted his 4 companions.

Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG

RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty

A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as is reasonably (and absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and
detain the offender, (2) overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his escape, (4) recapture him if he escapes, and (4) protect himself from
bodily harm. (People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943]; People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).

Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is NOT
a requisite.

In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who lunged at a policeman with a bamboo-makeshift lance,
the SC ruled that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitives unlawful aggression, in that case, had already ceased
when the policeman killed him, however, the policeman's act of shooting at him is justified because he was running away from him
when he was shot. Ordinarily, it may appear that the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the aggressor, but his aggression
is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF the policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of
duty, and the same situation was given, there would be NO self-defense because there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part
of the deceased.

RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when he IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino without issuing a warning.

The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The
directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional
circumstances where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option but to use force to
subdue the offender, the law enforcers failure to issue a warning is EXCUSABLE.

RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?


There was none.
G.R. No. 205298 September 10, 2014

EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July 2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision 4 dated 20 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.

The Facts

Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was charged, in conspiracy with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all
surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Bni for frustrated homicide and homicide.

The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracywith each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and
contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performedall the acts of execution which would produce homicide as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that
prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations
on the different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a
consequence but which,nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented
his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information 7 was filed when the victim Freddie dela Cruz died:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his
body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remainat large.
Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo
Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could testify.
Petitioners sister was also scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only be corroborative, the prosecution admitted her
testimony.8

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando were walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town proper
when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up with them.

Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter parried the attack with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to
gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert dela Cruz lost his
hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.

Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking
Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left.
Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruzs chest with the same stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.

Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina dela Cruzs hair,
slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.

Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo
at him. The attackers left when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the victims and call for help.

Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained
from the attack.

After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries. Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his
attackers.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15 January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the Quintos house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the front portion ofthe
house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the
bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got slashed with the bolo. The
scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.

Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie
dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember how many times hehacked
Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of homicide for
the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of Robert dela Cruz
and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9

The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as
defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporalwhich is from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the
penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision Mayorin its full extent, the range of which is from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, the accused is
accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.

Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php
75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorneys fees.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayoras minimum to Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 1,650.00and moral damages in the
amount of Php 15,000.00.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayoras minimum to Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in
the amount of Php 15,000.00.

In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive imprisonment,they shall be credited in
the service of their sentences with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditionsprovided for in
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting
them despite the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the prosecutions failure to prove petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy should not be leftto
conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to present evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the
victims in furtherance ofa common design to kill.12

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Review of Questionsof Fact Improper

The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. This Court does not weigh all over again
the evidence already consideredin the proceedings below. 13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed under this rule allows us to
swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of course, admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual
milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which, if duly
considered, lead to a different conclusion.14

In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, alleging that had the said courts given
weight to the defense evidence, conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court to review the
probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below.

A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 15 For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. 16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 17

Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a
careful reading of the decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here. The discussion of the trial court
deals extensively with evidence from both sides, weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the evidenceof
the prosecution and the defense alike.

Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect, and in the absence of any compelling reason to
deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His argumentrevolves mainly on
self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy.

We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and
Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their testimonies are
corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took
the statement ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.

We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment ofthe trial court on this point is
generally binding on this Court, and noneof the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court found that the
prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely against the accused.

Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense.
Because of Pedros admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the burden to establish such defense by credible, clear and
convincing evidence;

otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their conviction. 18

We held in People v. Nugas:


x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence,
not on the weakness of the States evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence ofthe
crime, and establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.

To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful
aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-
defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression. 19

Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of their brother Lando. 20 The defense of relatives
argument likewise fails in light of the lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to be entitled to
exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel. 21

The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:

We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants allegations that they were acting in self-defense because the victims were
committing unlawful aggression. We foundthe following loopholes:

First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house. No actual
sudden or imminent attack, however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening words, even if said
aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the partof
the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely
imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means
enough. Unlawful aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d]
intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack
that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.

Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went
out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.

Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran
towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felominas possession and concealed under a towel. Ifthis is true,
Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedros narration,
itcannot be definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the determined intention to inflict
serious harm on Pedro.

Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos who was lying on the ground and being attacked by the
deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando. Pedro would like to impress
upon the court that Lando was also involved in the fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it
was he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers, including Lando, were "just there, sir, pacifying."

Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report the incident to the police. During
crossexamination, Pedro admitted that:

Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that happened on January 15 as what you are telling
now?

A: No sir.

Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even
to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.

It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident
tothe police. Pedros alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent them from doing so. Pedro had at least three
brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to report the
alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This omission, therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-
appellants.

Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims negate[s] the accused-appellants claim of self-
defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia and multiple
hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right
hand." Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim
suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar
lacerated wounds.

It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-
defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the wounds on
Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate accused-appellants claim of self-defense.

We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the prosecution and this Court believes that the version
of the latter is more credible and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they attacked Freddie dela
Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22

Existence of Conspiracy

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina
dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show concurrence of wills and unity of
purpose.

Petitioners presence during the commission of the crime was wellestablished as he himself testified to that fact.1wphi1Assuming
that he was merely present during the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof.23

Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred
from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.

In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.

x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their. common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or
mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with
the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate courts,.establish that
petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the
latter were retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a different task. After the attacks, all the
accused left the felled dela Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of one is the act
of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was in order.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated
11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS ALCONGA

On the night of May 27, 1943, in Mauricio Jepes' house in San


Dionisio, people were playing prohibited games. The deceased
Silverio Barion, the banker of black jack, was loosing to Maria de
Raposo because the accused Dioscoro Alconga was helping her by
communicating the cards of the deceased. Upon discovery of the
cheating, the deceased became angry and there was an exchange of
words between him and the accused. They almost hit each other if not
for the intervention of the maintainer. The deceased left,
threatening the accused, "tomorrow morning I will give you a
breakfast."

The deceased and the accused did not meet the next day. When the
accused was performing his duties as "home guard", the deceased came
along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your
breakfast," then he tried to hit him. The accused avoided the blow
by crawling under the bench with the intention to runaway. He was
also avoided the second blow. The accused then managed to go out of
the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While the deceased was in
the act delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a
crawling position, fired at him with his revolver, causing him to
stagger and to fall to the ground. The deceased drew his dagger and
directed a blow at the accused, however, was able to dodge it with
his bolo. Then, there was a hand-to-hand fight. Having sustained
several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the
accused. After running a distance of about 200 meters, the deceased
was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal
bolo blow caused the deceased to fall to the ground. The other
accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of
the "home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the
accused Alconga with the contention of surrendering him.

On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan
Collado, a guerrilla soldier. Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga
to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters. In the
afternoon of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio
Barredo, a municipal policeman of San Dionisio, together with the
weapons used in the fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused, Alconga, can invoke self-defense.

Ruling:

Alconga was found guilty of the crime of HOMICIDE.

Reason:

There were two stages in the fight:


First - commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without
sufficient provocation on the part of the latter There was
unlawful aggression because he was being attacked. There was
employed reasonable necessity of means used to prevent it because,
as a security guard, he has in hand a revolver. There was no
sufficient provocation on his part.

Second stage when the deceased ran and was pursued by the accused.
When the deceased ran, it meant that the unlawful aggression
subsisted. On the night of May 27, 1943, in Mauricio Jepes' house in San
Dionisio, people were playing prohibited games. The deceased
Silverio Barion, the banker of black jack, was loosing to Maria de
Raposo because the accused Dioscoro Alconga was helping her by
communicating the cards of the deceased. Upon discovery of the
cheating, the deceased became angry and there was an exchange of
words between him and the accused. They almost hit each other if not
for the intervention of the maintainer. The deceased left,
threatening the accused, "tomorrow morning I will give you a
breakfast."

The deceased and the accused did not meet the next day. When the
accused was performing his duties as "home guard", the deceased came
along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your
breakfast," then he tried to hit him. The accused avoided the blow
by crawling under the bench with the intention to runaway. He was
also avoided the second blow. The accused then managed to go out of
the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While the deceased was in
the act delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a
crawling position, fired at him with his revolver, causing him to
stagger and to fall to the ground. The deceased drew his dagger and
directed a blow at the accused, however, was able to dodge it with
his bolo. Then, there was a hand-to-hand fight. Having sustained
several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the
accused. After running a distance of about 200 meters, the deceased
was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal
bolo blow caused the deceased to fall to the ground. The other
accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of
the "home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the
accused Alconga with the contention of surrendering him.

On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan
Collado, a guerrilla soldier. Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga
to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters. In the
afternoon of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio
Barredo, a municipal policeman of San Dionisio, together with the
weapons used in the fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused, Alconga, can invoke self-defense.

Ruling:

Alconga was found guilty of the crime of HOMICIDE.

Reason:

There were two stages in the fight:


First - commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without
sufficient provocation on the part of the latter There was
unlawful aggression because he was being attacked. There was
employed reasonable necessity of means used to prevent it because,
as a security guard, he has in hand a revolver. There was no
sufficient provocation on his part.

Second stage when the deceased ran and was pursued by the accused.
When the deceased ran, it meant that the unlawful aggression
subsisted.
PEOPLE VS VINO

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

LITO VINO, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated January 18, 1989 denying
the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged
principal in a separate proceeding.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao,
Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was
resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto
ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius
were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor
responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and
Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was
carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his
companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortemstatement. In the
said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant.

The autopsy report of his body shows the following-

Gunshot wound

POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal

1 & 2 cm. diameter left

Slug found sub cutaneously,

2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Tension Hemathorax 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial
Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging
Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to
which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an
accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due
course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3

Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:

1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED
IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS
PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE
ACTUAL;

3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL
ORDERLINESS. 4

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the civil court as
he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that
Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.

The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to
which the respondents were again required to comment. The required comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for
resolution.

The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the crime of murder,
can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two
other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is
no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant.
That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering
that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left
shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5

In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging the proper
offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in
which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be
charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said crime was established by the
evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While
the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and there. The degree of responsibility
of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.

The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the
separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence
the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an
accessory be maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of
the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may
nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must
likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result
of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was established.
By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar
who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino
as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada
identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius
Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the ground
that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the
shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic
examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the
crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following
observation:

There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law enforcement agencies to
gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public prosecutor to direct the
production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of
evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping
aboard the bicycle of Vino.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine
fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the
participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory
can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.

We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and sentenced. Should the
accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly
proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a
rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial
court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial
of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established
beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant
is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for helping in the escape of the
principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply in
the case at bar, which is sui generis and not covered by the general principle.

As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the principal at Vino's trial. At his
own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the escape not of an
unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being
held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be reversed.

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.

There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where the principal was found to be
a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the effects or instruments may be
convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and convicted.

But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not be convicted
unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and convicted.

I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having
assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial separately
and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as
accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial
court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in
his tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of a killer.

The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not in point. In
the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young
housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was nevertheless convicted.

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to
the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.

The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal.
Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from the scene of the
crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be the
murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is
acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies.

I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for helping in the escape of the
principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply in
the case at bar, which is sui generis and not covered by the general principle.

As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the principal at Vino's trial. At his
own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the escape not of an
unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being
held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be reversed.

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.

There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where the principal was found to be
a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).

An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the effects or instruments may be
convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and convicted.

But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not be convicted
unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and convicted.

I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having
assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial separately
and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as
accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial
court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in
his tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of a killer.

The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not in point. In
the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young
housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was nevertheless convicted.

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to
the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.

The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal.
Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the Identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from the scene of the
crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be the
murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is
acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies.

I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.

PEOPLE VS COLLADO

NATURE APPEAL from the decision of the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Br. 26

BRIEF

4 Robbers killed an old woman

FACTS
The accused 4 are charged with crime of robbery with homicide before the RTC

(April 15, 1986) Fernando Collado and Crisanto Lara pleaded not guilty. Romeo Gloriani and Felix Collado remained at large

(Sept. 9, 1986) Fernando Collado withdrew his plea of guilty and pleaded guilty as an accomplice

So, Lara was tried based on the previous merits, and he was found as the principal in the crime of robbery with homicide and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua

Basically this present appeal was by Crisanto Lara.

(Jan. 18, 1985) Lara went to the house of Honorio de los Santos in Pila and proposed that they holdup Maria Regay but he was
twice denied by Delos Santos

(Jan. 20, 1985) @around 7 am, Josefina Buenaflor, daughter of the victim Maria Regay saw Lara on the road walking to and fro bet.
His house and her house

(Jan 20, 1985) @around 10 am, Mario Marasigan, son-in-law of the victim who was cutting trees saw Felix and Fernando standing
on either end of the pathway leading to brgy. Pansol and concepcion as if waiting for somebody. He also saw Lara and Gloriani at the
pathway. Lara was holding a piece of wood while Gloriani was hiding behind a coconut tree.

(^same d) after a few minutes, he saw the victim walking along the pathway at a distance of more or less 40 m from him. Felix who
was at the end of the pathway hid himself and Lara is now behind a coconut tree. Lara then struck her on the face with a piece of
wood, a guava branch with a diameter of 2.5 inches with such strong force that the old woman fell on the ground. Lara then hid
himself and Gloriani dragged the victim for about 5 meters to a coconut tree where he pulled out his knife and after stabbing her
once, she appeared to have gained consciousness. She struggled on her back, rolling on the ground as Gloriani continued stabbing
her. The weapon used by Gloriani for stabbing was a double bladed dagger around 6-7 inches long excluding the handle.

Marasigan was so surprised to see his uncle hit his mother-in law that he was not able to shout (C CRISANTO LARA ANG UNCLE
NYA)

When the old woman stopped struggling, Gloriani pulled up her skirt and cut a cord tied around her waist where she kept her
money. Lara reappeared and he left with Gloriani followed by the Collados who took the same route through the fence towards
Fernandos house.

Marasigan went down the tree but did not go near the victim and did not tell his relatives bec. Lara is his uncle. He left the place at
around 10:30 am and did his normal work.

(Jan 20, 1985) @around 10 am so same morning, Josefina Buenaflor was told by her sister that their mother who attended a
wedding feast at Mojon has not yet returned home. So they looked for her at the coconut plantation (her usual route to Mojon) but
they failed to find her. Neighbors also didnt know

(Jan 20, 1985) @around 3 pm a certain Ugid Balatibat told Josefina that he saw Maria Regay sprawled on a coconut plantation.
Josefina and her sister ran to reach the place but around 3 coconut plantations away where they eventually found their mother, Lara
told them not to touch the body of their mother as there were no policemen yet at that time.

(Jan 21, 1985) Josefina was finally able to see her moms body. She was with barrio mates and policemen.

Her mother had a kacha tied on her waistline where she kept her earnings from selling pigs and chickens that she raised. When
the mom was found dead, the kacha was no longer there. Her Seiko watch worth 500 pesos was also not in her pocket anymore.

The wake of Maria Regay lasted for 5 days and the fucker Lara even attended the wake and looked at the cadaver often. He even
solicited donations from tricycle drivers.
Dr. Rosauro Pramil conducted an autopsy, and he said that the victim had already shown a sign of putrefactive changes as shown
by the appearance of small worms on the eyes, nose and ear openings. The body was emitting an unfavorable odor which suggest
more than 4 hrs have passed since death. ETD is 10 AM of January 20.

External Findings: There was a depressed fracture on the head region and on the left temporal with contusions. There is also a
periorbital contusion on the side of the head. There were multiple stab wounds on the chest and the back (about 9:2 (wtf is this?)
stab wounds on the left and right area below the clavicle, one on the right breast, stab wound on the left breast, stab wound on mid
portion of the chest etc etc) in extremities, right forearm had a closed and complete fracture at the 3rd radioulna bones. Left upper
arm was almost macerated which could be the result of a stray dog bite.

Internal Findings: Extradural Hemorrhage on the left temporal area; intrapleural hemorrhage on the chest due to wound on both
lungs. Heart was not hit.

Affected body parts: brain, lungs, bones, abdominal region

Cause of death: PULMONARY FAILURE SECONDARY TO LUNG DAMAGE. Examiner cannot ascertain victims position but probably
the victim was not facing the evil when she was hit

After 15 days, Mario Marasigan finally reported the matter since he was bothered by his conscience.

CRISANTO LARA DEFENSE: He was @ Laguna Prov. Hospital since his nephews body was swollen and stayed there until around
2pm. Then he went to the house of his nephews father and cooked food. He went to sleep @a round 6: 30 pm. He denied Mario
Marasigans claim that he struck the victim with a guava tree branch because his left hand is amputated and his right hand is
pasmado. His right hands forefinger is severed and basically his fingers are deformed (bec. Of palay milling). He claimed tha this
right hand cannot hold a knife but he was able to grasp a stamp pad in the court.

Fernando Collado said that Lara was not with them during the commission of the crime but this looks like an afterthought bec. he
implicated the abused at the police station.

ISSUES x RULING

WON Crisanto Lara is Guilty beyond reasonable doubt

YES. Mario Marasigans positive identification testimony. Medicolegal stated that the victim was hit by a hard object. Lara is still
able to work as a banana buyer even when his hand is damaged, and he is right-handed (left hand ang amputated). Honorio
delos Santos subsequent statement that he knew of Laras plans (although 2 yrs late ang admission). Nephew never confirmed
that accused was at the hospital.

TRIAL COURT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: disregard of age and sex, uninhabited place, taking advantage of superior
strength and evident premeditation.

SC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: evident premeditation and disregard of respet due to offended party by reason of
rank/sex/age should not be taken into account because the crime is robbery. So bale ang natira ay uninhabited placeand taking
advantage of superior strength

DISPOSITIVE Decision appealed is affirmed. LARA IS GUILTY.


PEOPLE VS MAGLIAN

[G.R. No. 189834; March 30, 2011] Criminal Law| Mitigating Circumstance

Article 13: Mitigating Circumstance

Pp vs. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES

FACTS:

The accused and his wife Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmarias, Cavite when they got into an argument. The
accused refused to let Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy
had given him for Christmas and told her he would burn them all and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to
wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wifes plea, the accused
still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire.
The accused brought Mary Jay to one hospital to another to treat her but at the PGH where she was last transferred, she was no
longer able to recover. Before she expired, she told her mother what had happened to her, declaring, Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa
akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)

The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it was Mary Jay who was being difficult
while they were arguing.
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son. While climbing the stairs, he heard
Mary Jay shouting. He ran down the steps and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen.

Accused-appellant contends that,


(1) he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed or so grave an offense as the felony charged against
him; and
(2) that he voluntarily, and of his own free will, surrendered or yielded to the police or government authorities.

RULING:

No intent to commit so grave a wrong


The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.
As aptly explained by the trial court:
The accused had full control and possession of the kerosene. He is a bulky and very muscular person while the deceased was of light
built, shorter, smaller and weaker. the kerosene content of the gallon container must have been poured over the head of the
deceased. This explains why when she got ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from head to toe. There was no
disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.

Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender if the following requisites are present:
1) the offender has not been actually arrested;
2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and
3) the surrender was voluntary.
The Court explained, The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that
may be incurred for his search and capture.
The claim of the accused is backed by the records of the case and a certification made by the Dasmarias Police Station that he has
voluntarily surrendered. He contends that both the RTC and the CA inexplicably did not appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his
favor. That the Accused-appellant at the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police
authorities. His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to the claim of
accused-appellant that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

BALEROS JR VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas, stayed at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in front of her bedroom door.
December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and Alberto wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt
inside, with short pants with stripes lent by Perla Duran and leather shoes.
December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt with fraternity symbols and black shorts with
the brand name Adidas from a party. He requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at
that time only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito could not produce the required written authorization, he let him in
because he will be a tenant in the coming summer break. Joseph was awaken by Chitos knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let
him. He saw him wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt.
December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a
piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could not move because she was
tightly held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right hand free to squeeze his sex organ causing him to let her
go. She went for the bedroom door and woke up Marvilou. She also intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko
pinagtangkaan ako". Malou proceed to Room 310 where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and
Rommel Montes were staying and seeked help. She saw her bed in a mess and noticed that her nightdress was stained with
blue. Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads to
Room 306 was now open.
December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were asked by the CIS people to look for
anything not belonging to them in their Unit when Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt with fraternity symbol, a Black Adidas short pants,
a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an underwear and socks.
Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had happened and asked him to follow him to Room
310 carrying his gray bag and since no one was there they went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at
Room 306 the day before.
handkerchief and Malous night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like
what Malou sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
RTC: guilty of attempted rape
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape

HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion
and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to
pay the costs.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt
act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense
Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, they constitute unjust vexation
punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad
enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or
irritate an innocent person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and
the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA, APPELLANT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal[1] assailing the Decision[2] promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04461. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to
the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).[4]

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two
(2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y
BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on
26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.

The CA summarized the parties' evidence as follows:

The Prosecution['s] Evidence

Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in
her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to leave the house to go to
the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him.
She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted for
help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants,
including appellant, used a tres cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim
managed to take the knife away from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground.
Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda
rushed the victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her
father to death in front of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00
p.m., her father immediately went to the house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away from their
house, to ask for malunggay leaves. Upon coming home from her aunt's house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which
prompted the victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but
then the Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene. She further testified
that she had no knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her father's death brought her pain and sadness
and anger against the perpetrators of her father's killing.

The Defense['s] Evidence

The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna
Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip
and a certain Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and upon
arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry,
causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled
from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded. Appellant's sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang
Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers. [6]

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the
commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the defense failed to
adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy) [7] employed treachery and
took advantage of their superior strength when they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered
17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is
inconsistent with appellant's theory of defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive
proof of evident premeditation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y
ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts:

(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest
per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;

(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando
Cueno; and

(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.

The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal [9] on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant's notice
in an Order[10] dated 19 April 2010.

The CA's Ruling

The CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC's ruling that appellant's claim
of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. There was
also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack
of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds that Cueno sustained.

The CA disagreed with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was
not forewarned of any impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law's house to
gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken
piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers' attack made it impossible for Cueno to retaliate.

The CA also disagreed with appellant's contention that there was no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all
armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing Cueno until they
saw him unconscious.

The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court
convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The PAO filed a notice of appeal[12] on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records
to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution.[13]

Appellant's Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,[14] noted the records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections
(BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that there is no
record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2012, [15] this Court required the Quezon City Jail
Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The Quezon City Jail
Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,[16] informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former
Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant's demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October
2012 letter were photocopies of appellant's death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail Warden's
letter.[17] In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,[18] this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and
required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013, [19] which stated that it had already exhaustively
argued the relevant issues in its appellee's brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March 2013.[20]

In view of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of the CA's decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013
which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party; and (2) to
COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution." [21]

The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013.[22] According to
the Public Attorney's Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant have not communicated
with it since the case was assigned to its office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata,
who was appellant's next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of appellant still failed to communicate
with the PAO.

In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

xxxx

9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same
does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No.
175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the
death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
as party does not arise.[23]

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the estate
of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case." [24]

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, we declare that because of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of the CA's decision, there is no further need
to determine appellant's criminal liability. Appellant's death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant's death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v.
Bayotas,[25] reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."[26]

We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from
the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced."[27]

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from
quasi-delict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.[28] On the other hand, if the
act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.[29]

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Coirollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription. [30] (Emphases supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule
or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or
legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may
be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file
against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAO's Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant, [31] Cueno died because of
appellant's fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts. [32] Appellant's civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be
pursued because appellant's death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as
from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the
"legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this
case,"[33] the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas,[34] require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this
case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil
actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. [35] The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. [36] The civil action which may thereafter
be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule
3[37] in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87. [38]

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case.
Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present
Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno's death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and
recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar
cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by
the trial court but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,[39] this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court's
pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

We also turn to the Code Commission's justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw
a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby
be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence?
Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice - a cause for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or
wronged.[40]

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course
subject to the policy against double recovery.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The
criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final
judgment.

Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS LUCIANO DE GUZMAN

416 SCRA 341 Criminal Law Aggravating Circumstance Treachery Absorbs other Selected Circumstances

At around 8 pm on March 9, 1992, Luciano de Guzman and two others entered the house of the Calamnos. Luciano and the two
others let the victims face the wall then after fired upon them. They even surrounded the victims. The accused were later convicted
for murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and treachery be appreciated.

HELD: The aggravating circumstance of nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength (as the accused outnumbered and out armed
the victims for they used high powered guns) are absorbed by treachery. The means and ways employed by the accused ensured
them impunity as they fired upon the victims while the victims were facing the wall giving the victims no means to defend
themselves.
PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General
then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the
Supreme Courts decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Courts decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil
liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil
liability is extinguished because there will be no party defendant in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does
not exist. Further, the Court stated it is, thus, evident that the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death came
after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also
gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. Therefore, Bayotass death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.

DE GUZMAN VS PEOPLE

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious
physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during
and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006, [1] whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September
10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.[2]
Antecedents

The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o'clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below
his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"),
the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo
did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged
and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and
continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him
on his left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander
then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to
the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to
Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second
floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General
Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The
other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2)
cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the
thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga,
the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused
Alexander's death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he
passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander's back, causing the latter to
throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo
hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter's face. [3]

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR,"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised
Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR
as MAXIMUM.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical
element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the
heat of anger during the fistfight between them; that he did not inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could have
inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found
guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[5]

The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.[6]

Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in
his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.[7] Inasmuch as the trial and
appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to
ascertain the presence of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that the
heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor
abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious
physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently
established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.[8] Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People,[9] we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before,
during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at
the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.[10]

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner's
submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight
between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that
Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioner's attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly
proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander's chest being sufficient to result
into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony
of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention
accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of
Alexander's testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the
conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose
direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency
of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the
latter committed the crime.[11] Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner's mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was
contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander's statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm
the petitioner's conviction for frustrated homicide.

The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"[12] fixed by the RTC erroneous
despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate
sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. [13] The maximum term is the penalty
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term
is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower
to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayor in its medium period from eight years and one day to 10 years is proper.
As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not within
the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."[15] We need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to
the law, the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,[16] we emphatically declared to be "imperative that the
courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused,
unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We explained why in the
following manner:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed
by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused
in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the
civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels
us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing
tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in
equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be
true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law
require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. [17]

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender committed violence that nearly took
away the victim's life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." [18] Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of
the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries.[19] Towards that end, the Court,
upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. [20] In addition, AAA was
entitled to recover civil indemnity of P30,000.00.[21] Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman,
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCEShim to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner
to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of P14,170.35,
plus interest of 6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 525 SCRA 254, G.R. NO. 158053, June 21, 2007This is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the CAs Resolution dated January 31, 2001 and the CAResolution dated April 14, 2003 which
denied Razon s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:On August 1, 1993 around midnight, PO1 Francisco Chopchopen was walking towards Upper Pinget Baguio City whenhe was
met by taxi cab driver, Edwin Razon. Razon told Chopchopen that he was held up by three men at DreamlandSubdivision. When
Chopchopen asked Razon if he stabbed Benedict Gonzalo, 23 years old and a polio victim, he answered noand when questioned by
SPO2 Bumangil, he was held up by two men and he stabbed Gonzalo in self-defense. Razon broughtout a fan knife and told Bumangil
that it was the knife he used to stab Gonzalo. A search was conducted on the taxi cab acolonial knife with bloodstains was found
under a newspaper near the steering wheel.An autopsy conducted on the body of the victim showed that he sustained 3 stab
wounds, wound on the abdomenkilled Gonzalo, as it penetrated the small intestines, pancreas and the abdominal aorta, causing
massive hemorrhage and lossof blood. On trial, the RTC convicted him of homicide, it was found out that while there was unlawful
aggression by Gonzalo who poked a knife on Razons neck, such aggression ceased when Razon was able to grab the knife from Gonzalo and freed
hisright hand from the hold of Gonzalos two companions who stepped out of the taxicab followed by Gonzalo. Razon could had have started the engine
and just left the place. But he did not. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Gonzalo, Jr. theamount of P12,770.00 by way of
actual damages; P50,000.00 by way of moral damages; and P10,000.00 by way of attorney'sfees.On appeal, the CA required him,
through his counsel Atty. Rigoberto Gallardo to file an appellant's brief. Two motionsfor extension of time were filed by Atty.
Gallardo.

Instead of filing the brief, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to Withdraw asCounsel for Razon. CA then directed Razon to cause the entry
of appearance of a new counsel or manifest whetherhe wanted the court to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, since no
compliance has been filed by Razon his right to berepresented by counsel has been waived; but on July 25, 2001, Razon filed with
the CA a Motion for Reconsideration whichwas later on denied by the CA; hence, this appeal.ISSUES/RULING:1. Whether the CA was
correct in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief. NO, the CA gave Razonsufficient opportunity to file his
appellant's brief. Instead of complying, however, he chose to ignore the many directives ofthe CA and puts the blame on his former
counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was allegedly guilty of gross negligence. Even if theCourt were to admit that Atty. Gallardo
was negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client except when thenegligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.

No suchexcepting circumstance can be said to be present in this case because as properly observed by the appellate court,
Razonhimself was guilty of negligence. While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party must strictly comply
with therequisites laid down by the Rules of Court on appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely a statutory
right. Proceduralrules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Both courts and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide
strictly bythe rules.2. Whether petitioner acted in self-defense in killing Gonzalo. NO. It is settled that the moment the first aggressor
runs away,unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
nolonger has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.

Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. As to the damages
certain modifications were made. RTC failed to award the heirs of Gonzalo, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death. Civil
indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of commission of murder or
homicide. Actual damages is replaced by temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00. In this case, Gonzalo's heirs were only
able to present receipts amounting to P4,925.00. This is consistent with the ruling of the Court in People v. Werba, citing People v.
Villanueva which held that in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than P25,000.00 are proved during the trial, the
award of temperate damages ofP25,000.00 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount. As to moral damages, the
RTC correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00, as the prosecution was able to show that the father of the victim, Benedicto
Gonzalo, Sr., suffered mental and emotional anguish due to the untimely death of his son. Moral damages may be awarded in favor
of the heirs of a victim upon sufficient proof of mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injury. RTC was correct
in awarding P10,000.00 as attorney's fees to the heirs of the victim. As provided for in Art. 2208 (11) of the Civil Code, attorney's
fees may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
People vs. Gaffud
G.R. No. 168050. September 19, 2008

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. was found guilty of two (2) counts of murder for killing Manuel Salvador and Analyn
Salvador by means of fire. Evidence for the prosecution presented the following:

1) That on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador, while on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador, heard two gunshots
and thereafter saw the house of his uncle burning. He saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning house, one of whom he
identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr.

2) That Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at about 8:00 PM that evening, heard successive gunshots and saw the deceaseds
house burning.

3) That prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado Ballang saw the appellant a few meters away from the house of the deceased.

4) That earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, went to the house
of the appellant to inquire about her husbands share in the construction of the barangay hall. Dominga also related that had earlier
filed a complaint against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.

In his appeal, the appellant argued that the court failed to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, despite the fact that
there was no proof as to what overt acts he committed which would constitute the crime of murder.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.

2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double
murder.

HELD:

1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused
in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. In
the case at bar, however, direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims was established beyond doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no longer essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.

2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime
in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Hence,
there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.

People vs Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Facts:

In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were charged with murder for the killing Andre Man
Masangkay. As narrated by a witness, the victim answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house where they
were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and later they heard the victim shouting for help and when they ran
towards the scene he saw the accused on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with along bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega
and Garcia brought the victim to a well and dropped him and placed stones into the well. The trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed averring that the trial court erred in holding them criminally liable because at the
time the victim was dropped into the well, he was still alive.
Issue:

Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but
due to drowning?

Decision:

A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the
resulting crime is more serious than that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as follows:

1. the intended act is felonious.

2. the resulting act is likewise a felony

3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts.

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