~t.ttElUOK CO RT OF 'l'llf.. DI~TRIC'f OF Ot.

UMDIA

UOi\U:S"l'lC \10LF.~C'E: NIT

U~l'lli 0 ~I ATE
Case No.
-
,

.
\'

. . .BARAIIOi',\

tT ' ITE 0 STA'l 1- '

f'asl' Nn.

"
. . FSCOBAR

Th\:SC two unrl!lated ca.)C'l rres~:nt n questJou that arb ., with sume freque11 y in \he

~uperior Court':. ()omc~tic Viol~:; c;: Unit~ d1 c:; :1 n,n..:tU7cn's ..:onvktion for 11 mi..d~n ~anor

domc!>Li \ iolen..:e ttfcns~ ~o impa..:l hi;; or h~::l imml;,!r<lti~.;ll st!llus "'-'create a (Qt stitutional

entitlement to :t jury tr'AI bas~d (lnttl~ :-.cnou.:.' ;lturc of the aggre-dale ~lilllllOr) pen '1 hies'. lo

tht: .: cases. the Cour1 h:b li uud thatlhc off~J\'iC" chJrg~-.1 - c;impl~ ~sault and misdemeanor

:=~lt:tl abu~~- simr I>' Jo uot ctm~lit te th~ cype of dumc'\lic ' iulencc otlen~t:') thnt cttn _... cas a

ptcdic te to dep(lrt:l"l<'n under ft:d~ral immigmtion I"'' :'nd hus thus denied the Ddenrlnnt-.' jury

wa1demanc!s. nlc ,..curt is tiCS thi~ Mcmu~t,d . m Opinion tQ ~ct torth in ftilthcr lk il me =:.p;y..

~for 1ts d~:cic;:iom in lhesc eases.

I. Background

Defend:mts. .H:uah{ln3 and - 1!scob~r e:tdt t:,cc mi 1cmemor ~on C'\tic

"iolcnce c.:harses. ~1r. H:nahona v. ch:lrged on 'ep~~mbcr 4. :;0!3 '' ith one count N ;implc
assault in violation of D.C. Cod~ 22-404 t2001 ).'On Augu t 23. 20 1-t, Mr. Escobar was

charged with one count of attempt~d misd~mcanor ~exual ahust: in \:iolation of D.C. Code 22-

3006-:3018 ~2001) and one count of simple us~ault i11 violation of 22-404. Because the charge"S

they face carry ma~imum pcnallic <'f no more than l80 days in joil and'or a 1,000 fine, s~e

D.C Code 22-3571 .0 l: D.C. Cock 22-40-t they do not gcm;rally confer upon th~ Ddndants

a constitutional or statutory right to a jury lriat St!e Blmnor~ v La~ Vegas, 489 .s. 538, 5-H -42
(' 9&9) trresumptively characterizing otTc:n~es carrying a maximum prison term of sixth n1orlths

or kss as ""pclly oflen c:~- that d() not trigger Shlh Amendment j ury trial right) ~ D.C. C..ode 16-

705(b (I (A) (rcquir:ingju~ trial if defendant is chargl.!d ..,.ith an offense \\hich is punishable b}

a 1ine or penalty of more th~n 1,000 or by imprisonme11t tor more lhan 180 da) s __ .l'). Neither

Defendant is a Citizen of the t:nited States.:

In these cases, however. the DeiC!ndants have argued that the) will he deponed upon

convictinn. and that th~ fact that they face this additioual penalty ch,mg~~ the ix:th Am~ndment'

calcuJus in a matmcr that confers upon them a <.:or~'drutjonal right to a trial by jury. On

September 24. 2014.lvlr. Barahona ti led a MoLion Demanding a Jury Trial. :mtJ Mr. Escobar

filed an essentially identical mmion the following day Al1cr extensive f11rther bnefing b} the

panies. the Public Ddt!ndcr cni<.:e Dfthe District ofC'olumbia (hercint1ftt"r po~") filed a

' Alth~ugh ~ir. Barah<n:t was arrasgned on August 20, 20 l 3. h.: 1:'\i l~d to appeJr f<H ~ s!atu.s ht:3ring em October I 0.
2013, and did not mum to court until .\Ia.> S, :!01-l. The .lppomsmcnt of a new auonacy anJ i'\sues n:l,;ued to
Defendants health further delayed lhc tmal date :n th1!\ crJ.Se.
1 Both Mr. Barahona ond Mr .. Escobar made thts ~presentat;uu co the ( oun m their respc~ti\e motionr;. Defendant' s

"I
lotion Demanding a Juf) Trial, United SlcJt&:.n Nujud IJar.-JI(Jna. 1'\n 20 1].l)\'\113 ~8. I (Scp 24, 20 11):
Ocfendants Motion DemiiJlding o Jury 'Jri;tl. I.JnitcdS:aJes ~ \lanm b "ubar. '\u :l0l4-0\ M-194f.. et llStpt.-:N,
20 14) .
.. The Sixth Am~ndn\ent to the United SUtl~!i Consttrution guanuUC'CS that rs)n .ucriminal p,rosccution.~. the: a cused
0

.$hall enjoy &he right to a speedy and puhli.: tri3..1. b) lfl impJrt1al jury of the! Stal~e" 3nd distri1.1 .~herein tl.e crime sh::dl
ha..e bem tommttted . ." L I) C{)~.ST,..\.!.1,
fhe ~me anomey represents Mr. Bar.thona ;utd Mr. E~.:obar.

2
 1cmorandum as Am feu Curiae on 'ovcmber 4. 2014. The Court heard the argument of the

partie and f>D .. at a NO\ ember I0. 20 14 motions hearing.

Th Defendants and PDS l:Oncede that bccau~c defendants con\'icted under the District's

simple assault nnd mi.;dcme.mor sexu<a1 abuse statutes face le:,s than i.x months in prison. thc:sc

offen es ordin:trily constitute .. petty oftcn~c!!>" rather than serious crimes" for Sixth memJrnenl

purposes. and defendant charged with dlcse crimc.s thu~ prcsumpti\ d) do not have a right to

tnal by jul'). St!(! Blamon. 489 U.. at 541-43. They note. hO\\ever. that the t\erity of certain

other consequences of a conviction ~an entitle a defendant to a jul) trial for"' hat otherwise

would be deemed a ..petty otlensc" if a defendant can demonstrate that an} addition,d stmutory

penaltie . 'ie,,ed in conjunction with tJ1e max;rtlurn authori7.ed period of incarceration. are so

e\ere that tht) d.:arly reflect a kg1slative det ~rm i naLion lhat the of1cn e in que tion is a

~erious' one.'' /d. at 5 3. The OefendaHb point uut th<il ft.:dcrnl immigration law subject.;;

non itu.cn to automatic removal from the Unitt:!d Sl~ales upon con\'iction for a ..crime of

domestic 'iolcncc.'" 8 U..C. s I:!~7(a)(~)(E)fi). ami argue that the)' thu lace the t) pe of

addilional statutory penalties" that create a const1tutional right to a jt~ry trial for the e ollC:nsc:s.

lbe Defendants and PDS acknowledge that the District nf Columbia Coun of Appeals

has hdd in at least t\\ o cases- Olt{fi:w_n~ '' United Stateoo, 857 A.2d I 078 (D.C. 200-l) and Foote

\'. Uniletl State.'l, 670 A.2d 366 (D.C. J996) - that administrative deportation proceeding do not

raise an othcrv. ise pelt) offense to the lc-.cl requiring a jury trial: 0/t!f"i.\oy~. 857 A.2d :tt I084.:.

' The PO amicus brief takes no position on "htlhrr the Defendants" ould be bj~-t to depQrtarion :ss a result of
convictions for Simple assault and'or misdtm~nor sexual abuse. instead f, ing solely on cbe constiMiomtl
question whdhcr dqx>tution as an addiliorn~J potential penalty entide~ a l.h:fntdant to ajuf) tnal under 1he Sixth
Amendmaat.'" Memorandum ofthe Public Dc:fendcr Smkc- Amuus Crma in upportofthe Defendants'
Motion Demanding a 1nal B~ Jwy. 'nit~J Stales,. Rilj~c/ llw<~ho1ra. No.101 'D\'M-1158 and (Jnm:d Stm ~
\faninscobar. No. 2014-DV 119-JS.at I (NO\', 4, 20 1 ~)_

3
ttrgurnents as lo lhe current ((,h:e or lhcs~ msc:. w; binding prcccdenG 1 o hcJin with. dlcy

criti izc the sumnlM)' n:nure o flhe analysis in Foote 3nd OJa_fi~vJ " and maintain that their

commentary on the impa l of po~;:,ible deportntion on the jury tri::tl ritdll represents dicta.

Jlcrhap' more imponrulll). the arg umcut.; ad.,:mccd by Dcfcndmt:> 11ld PDS c.JSL substantial

doubl on ''hellu:r Lh~ concllbion reached in fn111t 30d 0/ajho.h ' !i f"'IVC!'\ in light of P<uhllil \,

Km.tuch S59l .S. :\56 (2U I0). Tltc1'1!1 the Supreme Co Jrt obs\!neO th3t-dtport~uion is .

intimately rdatcd to the crimin:tl pro~,.;~:.: id aL 365. ;:,Uch that it se~ms difficult to d ivorce Lilc

pt=n31ty from the <:on,iction in the JcpotU\I io n contc.xl." ltJ. :u 366: that deportation is a

-pwkularl) SC\'erc pmralty. iJ u~ 365 tcitation omittc"; emphas is all :led)~ and Ll1al deportation

or rertlO\ al fo llowing com ictiun h no h:n r er n.n "unC\!rta.in and pun' I}' collaternl ~onscquenccn ...

Foor~. 670 A.:!d at 372. but a'\ inuall~ me\ itabk [ ~'u ltj forD \ USt numher o f noncitizens

con' i ted of ~rime:>." P.wlifla, 559 L, .. ,,t 361) PDS furthl'r contc~l <:: P'! i.:tlly in lil!ht of

lite fanguagc used in Pnclilln, it st!<m" difficult lo argu~ that deportation amount to a less.

~ignificant penah. thsn th o~ th"t other courts ihH' hc l:l tnn~form peuy oflcnc;es.. into ..~riot.L!I

crime.:. for the purtxsc of e ..aluatinr the right to:\ j ury trial. Sr:('. ~-~ Richr r '' fairbanks. 903

F.:!d 1202. I :!OS (8th (ir. 19901 ( 1--year f\!\Ocmi<m of dri\~rs li ~ II'!' ): Unikd .\!ate 'I l'. Smrth

151 F._Supp _2d U 16 (N. D. Okla. 2001 tb:m on por;<>.c-.sion o f u ftn:<1Im).

In oppo ing the Defendants' j ury demand", the go\'emm~nl has maint:tined. mrt~r aha

dust Padilla has no impac' on the: 'iH lhy of Fr>ult, ond that hinding pn:,~dcntthu!> ~quires the

rcj~ction ofthc DcfC"ndant requests. The United . tales has also argued that, a arc ult oft1

number ofinmtigradon cases in ''hich iu ~po5ition did 1 ot pre\ ail in th~ Supreme Court and

in \'ariow federa l appellate courtst the offcn~s " ith which it htl' chaq;ed the Defendant'\ do not

qual if) as crimes of domestic violem:c .. under 8 U. ~ I:!27(at<_2 {H) i . and DcfClld3nL-.

4
com ietil'ms in these c~c-s simpl) could not lead to their deportation under federal immigration

law.

On Decemher 3. 2014. the Court is \Jed an Order in each ca~e d~ny ing the Motion

Demanding a Jury 1 rial, .;tdling that:

.. because: the Court concludes that rncither simple assault n()r misdemeanor
!>cxual assault] c~n~Litutc a crime of domestic' iolence.. as defined by 8 U .. C.A.
s
1227(a)(2)(F) and lR U.S.C. 16. it tind!; tl1at Defendant's com iction in this
case would not subject lwn to de.,onation. Defendant thus does nor face the t) r<"
of additional statutory penalties that \\'ould rcquin: the cia .;;itication of the offense
charged as ..serious'' lor Six.th Amendment purf>oses. \ee Blanton v. Crty ofSorth
La.'i regas, 489 U.S. 538. 541--B ( 1989). and he is not entitled t~ a jury trial in
this c~-.e.

See Uniu:dStates v. Rafael Barahona, 1\o. 20l3-DV~f- 1 358 (-Oec, 3, 2014) (ordcrden)ing

motion ltlr jury tri~-tl}~ United. tat~s v AfmTir~ Es{'[!lxmr, No. 20 J4-DV\1-1945 (Uec., 3, 20 l..t)

(order denying mot ion ft)r juf) trial).

II. Analysis

Changes in the fcdc.:ral immigration law over the past t\\enty }~:.trs .. hu' c drnmaticall)

rai ~d dte stakes of a nom;iti:~.en 's criminal comictions." Padilla, 559 l ..S. at 36-l. As the

Defendants and PDS emphasize. the Supreme Court's decisiOn in Padilla descrtbcd the harsh,

punitive nature of deportation a~ well as the interdependent relationship between criminal and

immigration procc:c:dings in a murmer tha seems entirely incompatible "ith the: Court of

Indeed. had federal La\\ changed such that Mr. Barahona and Mr. E.-;cob;tr would becume

deportable as a result of their convictions in lhe~c misdemeanor cases. this Court \\ould be

inclined to charactc:rizc the chargel) they lact: as scr1ous c:rime~" li.1r which the ixth

5
 mendment guarantees a jury trial. However, because federal law has not been so altered as to

permit deportation for these particular domestic violence misdemeanors, the Court does nothad

no need to rule on the continued vitality of Foote and Olafisoye, and nlt:tst deAyhas denied the

Defendants' requests for a jury trial. 6

A. Deportation for "crimes of domestic violence"

Despite what appear to be popular misconceptions to the contrary, conviction for a

domestic violence misdemeanor can only lead to deportation under a very narrow set of

circumstances. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., allows for

automatic deportation from the United States of any noncitizen convicted of a statutorily-defined

"crime of domestic violence." Jd. at- 1227. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) provides

that, upon the order of the Attorney General, an alien shall be removed for commission of a

"crimeO of moral turpitude" if convicted "of a crime of domestic violence .... " !d. The statute

defines the term "crime of domestic violence" as:

... any crime ofviolence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code) against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by
an individual with whom the person shares a child in common, by an individual
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an
individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person under the domestic or
family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any other

'While the language in its briefs was at least somewhat equivocal, at the November 10, 2014 motions hearing the
United States urged the Court to find that the Defendants could not be deported as a result of convictions in these
cases. The doctrine of judicial estoppel should preclude the government from taking a contrary position in
hypothetical future immigr~~ion.heari~gs involvin.g the Defend~ts. Ju~icial e.stoppel prevents a party that
successfully ~serted a pos1t1on m a pnor proceedmg from asse~mg an mcon~1stent position in a later proceedin .
Zedner v. Umted States, 547 U.S. 489, 491, (2006). See also Atkzns v. 49-10 W1sconsi~, LLC, 93 A.3d 1286, g
1289
(D.C. 20~4); Ward v. Well~ ~argo Bank, !v .~, 89 A.3d 115, 127 ~D.C. 2014) (~easonmg that the purpose of'udic
estoppel1s to '"preclude a ht1gant from playmg fast and loose" w1th a court ofJUStice by changing a po 't J tal
" accord'mg tothe v1crss1tu
. . . des o f se If.-mterest
. . aIone, the Defendants ~shouldSl aon
") . Th us, on th'IS bas1s t f;
"additional statutory penalty" of deportation as a result of their convictions. no ace the

6
 individual against a person who is protected from that individual's acts under the
domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal
government or unit of local government.

Id. (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. 16 supplies the referenced definition of"crime of violence,"

defining that term to mean either "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, 18 U .S.C. 16(a), or

'any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical

force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the

offense::.: 18 U.S.C. 16(b).

The applicable statute thus does not broadly permit the deportation of all defendants

convicted of any domestic violence crime; instead, it subjects defendants convicted of such

offenses to deportation only when those offenses qualify as "crimes of violence." In cases such

as this- in which the Defendants face only misdemeanors, making the language of 18 U.S.C.

16(b) inapplicable - the question whether the offenses charged constitutes a '"crime of violence"

turns on whether tile offense!! "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. 16(a). Courts that have

interpreted this portion of the statute have found that its use of the term "physical force" requires

a showing of violence that goes beyond the type of offensive contact or touching that defines

common law battery. The Supreme Court has interpreted read the statute's "physical force"

language to ';suggest[] a category of violent, active crimes," Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11

(2004), and has interpreted similar language in 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i) to describe critnes

that go beyond mere offensive touching in that they involve 'force capable of causing physical

pain or injury to another person" and Hconnote[] a substantial degree of physical force:.-:" Johnson

v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

7
Circuit further clarified the distinction bemeen offcnsi\'c contact a ault nnd the catt!gory of

rime: ot \iolencc: created hy JK lJ . .C. 16 a):

c tion lli{a) refers to the .. use l)f 1hy:sical force: J~\ ery bauery em!lib u touch.
and it imp '-.;ible to touch someone \\i ithout applying om~ force. if only a
midgcon. Uocs it folll'l~ that e\ cry battery comes within 16(a}? No, it does
not. h\el") ballet) imohe "force" in &he sense of physics or engineering. \vhcre
.. force"' means the ac,eleration ofnHt"iS . .. To avoid ~.:nllapo;ing the distincti<~n
bet\\et!n violcm and non-\ iolcnt offenses. \\t! rnu~t treat the\\ ord "force.. as
having a meaning in the leg.tl ctmununity that differs fr~Jm its me:1ning. in the
ph~ sic community. The way to do this it to in~i'>t t 1at the force be \'iolcnt in
nature - the sort that is intended tL' .,;3use hodily injuf). or at u minimum l i kel~ Lu
do . Othen' isc physical force ac.ainst" and .. P~ y~ic:1f contact with" would end
up meaning the same thing. t!\ en lhl'ugh these senses arc distinct in law.
Flore. ,. A h rnfl. 350 F.3d 666. 672 {7th Ci1. 2003) lCmphasis in original. <:1tations

omitted); 1!1! also Karim v. 1/oltl~r. 71: r:'d -61, 566 (4th Cir. 20 13) (cxplamint! that the

8. Cia sification of {/aft /(m cnm'\' wuJ.~, the j ideral dt!j imttull of "crm:.~s (~(vmlcncc

11~e panies in this case disagree u~ h.l whether the oiTcn. e~ of simple assault and

misdemeanor sexual abu c. a defined by Oistrict of Columbia law, qualify as "crimes of

\'iolence.. under 18 ."'.C. l6fa and thU!'>..!!... ..crimc~l)fdurncstic \'iolcncc"undcr8 L.S.C.

1227(a)(2} ' Indeed. ctassitication of a state crime under u federal definition can be tricky:

Flores~ 350 F.3d at 668. In order to dctcm1inc whether an (lO~nse created hy swtc. f _ law

falls within the ambit of IS U.S. . 16(a). ClltU1s employ the o-called t:ategl)ri al approach.

looking "'only to the statutory definition of the ~tate crime= and the fit t of conviction to dt:tcrminc

' In arJU&nJ lhat the c:hatg~s dtt)' face do con tihue ..crimes of dome~ tic' ioleth.e/ the l>efC"ndllnts rei~ hc3\ ily ( .ln
the Supmne Court's dccuiOflm l mua' S1a1:,J ,., c;:w! num _ U S._. 11 ~ . C:t._-J.;os l~O I It at.: ..e.
ho"ner.tums on the mterptetation of the phrast mtsdcmeanor .:rime of domesti~ \itlllen.;e" in 18 ( 1 s.c
922(&)(9) -a federal firearm 'C.tule C4.&stt!malt, 114 . 1 :st 141 u.u. Cwthnrun thus luis n bcann ,, 0 the
conJU\ICttoa o( a ~t~t chat d~fines 1 category of offenses unmodific:J by the term .. nttsdcme:mor."'

8
whether the onduct rirninalizcd by the . mcutc, indudmg the mn.ff wnOL't!nl caliducl qu:.lific a..

a crime of,iolcn 1.! ."' Karimi, 715 1:.3d ot 567 ~quoting Umti:d. wtes v. 1urresJ\{rguef, 701

F. d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2012 (emphasis added)).~ 'Jhe Jan unge of the federal statute dcm3Ilds

an analysis of th~ clement of the chnrg~d crime ruther than the actual conduct imolved. as it

'"'require u:-. tu IIJok to the clement and the nature of the orTens~ of conviction. rather than to the

paniculat fact.; rdating. "' [a def~ndant":s) crime." Ltmcal, 543 l .. S. at 7;_s e ulw f1cJre'fi 1 0

F.3d at 670 (dcscribing 18 H.. .C. ~ 16{n) :l.:t adopring a charge-oftC:ns r.tth~r t.h:111 ren)-QfTen e

approach'').

The app1ication of the c.au:gorical approach has Jed a numb<:r t)f feder-.11 couns to

on Jude that pccific dnm stic ,joJcncc misdemeanors under state law don t con~tiluk crim

of' iolen e.. undcr 18 \J .. .C. I~n). In Kartmi. for example. the United . tate~ Court of

Appeals forth~ rourth Circuit cmph>)' ~tlthc catcgoricllf approach to anal}~.I.e '' heth r a 1arylnnd

sccond.<Jcgree a!!osauh coil\ iction con~titutt::\ a ..crinu: of \'iulencc:" un ier 18 U.....C. 16fa . &e

715 !F.3d 561 at 563. focusing solely on the clements of tht: Mar) lund sccond-dcgn:c assault

statute.' rather than on the specific indhidual conduct that ga.'e ri:-.c: to the conviction. th court

explained that the tatute re-aches violent and non-\iolcnt tou hing :1li c._ Jd. Ill 568._-

9
Accordingly. the Fourth Cir-cuit ru led that the! <ippdlanrs conviction under the Maryland sLatut~

doc~ not catcguri :dly qual if) a a "crime ot violence" under 18 L.s.c. 16(n).

go\ emment'-. contention in the l:U'}es before them that \'arious misdemeanor dome.:.tic "inlencc

con\'i tion 1m1euRt should be considered" rimes of violence -.and thu crime~ of don1estil:

\'iolence: In One~aMLm.J. : \'. Gor..:ale.,-. 450 F.3d. JOl 0 (9th Cir. 2006), the 'inth Circuit

reje tc:d the: go\cmm\:nl's argumc~nLth!lL an appdlunf~ conviction for battery under California

. llaliticd a" u l:rimc: of dornestic viol nee.. wi~itH~ ~eaAirl"

un r 8 U.S.C. 1~~7ta)(2)(E){i). _ ec -l50 F.Jd. at 11 13. _Applying the catc~orical approach.

the Onega,Mende: l:Oun looked to whctl er batt('f}' was "an oflcnsc that has as an elem m the

use. auc:mptcd usc. or threatened use or phy~iL:al fun.:c against the person or property of another.''

~ithin the mc!aning ,.,f 16(a). /d. at lfll6 (explaining that cortsi-.tent \\ith Leo<AJI, the f\unh

Circuit has square I) held that the l\u"\:e ntt:essary to constitute a crime of' iolc:nc (under l8

U.S.C. 16{a)) must actually be vio le-nt in natur~). Tht: Orte~a-.\f~:ntlt:: ~ourt first considc!rc:J

the language of the sutute, finding thJt the usc of the di$junctivc force or violence." Cal. Pt!n.

Code 242 (emphasi add.:d}, indicates that "rll)n\ i llent for c suflil:es[.] othcm i~ the or' has

no fw.ction." /d. The coun also lughlighted tht! interpretation of the tatute's language in prior

judicial opinion noting that it had be~n held to criminalize non-violent but <.lOC:nsi"c touchings_

Jd at 1016. The inth Circuit lhu concluded that Ortega-Mendel's bauery conviction wa:; not a

crime of\ iolence under 18 U.S. . 16(a} and ~not a depurtablc ..crime of domestic

violence.. under 8 U.S.C. ~ 12.27ta)(2){E ~i). Stc. also Singh 1. A.'<hcro{l. 386 f.3d 1228, 1232

(9th Cir. 2004) (holding lhat harassment und!!r an Oregon statute was not a "crime of \'iolcnce..

In Califomaa.. a ..batkl)' ts any "'lllful and unw" fut use ol fl'I'Ct <'r \ i lencc UJ)(IO the rerson of Qnothcr." .'k~.:
CAL PENAL CODE 242 c2000

10
within the mc.aning of~ 16(a) be ause the statute encompassed non\iofcnt acu such as ..spitting

""another" and fi]ndirect physical contacts such as ... hitting another" ith a thr0\\11 mi ile?

poking :mother With 3 Stick \)f ';";";""!..:.:-Slriking the clothing mlher than the flc'ih of the \.'lCtim");

Flon, 350 F.3d at671-72 (concluding that because! Indiana bath:ry sLUrute permitted a

on\ iction based on any often. ive t:ontact or touching. com iction under this "tututc:: did not

penn it removal ror cNnmiss.ion of a crirnt! of domestic violence''),

C. implc msault cmd misdemeanor ''l',wal llhU.\1! t.H crimes that c/o nol m ~t the
,tejltrition of 'crimeJ ofdonu.>.ltic viohmcc"

like the state statul~s at is uc in Kanmi, Ortega- fendc=. Singh. and Florl!.l , the rwo

District ofColumbta lows at i~suc. here crimin;1lizc acts th~tt do not necessarily involve the type

ofphysical force" contt!mpl:u~d in I R {' ...... C. 16(a). Application ofth~ C!ltegori al approacllco

the clements of t11e~ crimes thus dc:mnnstrati: th3t these otl'en~es cannot be considered

deportable "crime~ of dome~tic violt:n~e under the lmmigrution and ~atJonality Act.

The go-.crnm~!nl has chargc:d both ~tr.l3arahuna tnd ~1r. r.. cobar with simple nssault.
D.C. Code _224~a) I) states that'"whoev~r unlawfully ass Lulls. or threatens anotl1er in a

iHstA~GliaR tiefiAe lhrer for-ms of ~.iA1p)e essault fiFcJ'"'Ft~!lhis statute include~ three

A.2d 1196(D.C'. 1990); intent-to-frighkn" assault, .tee A\fc:Gt?~ l'. Unitt!dS'tatt:s, 53J A.2d 1268.

1270 (D.C. 1988}; and ..sexual touching" assault. ~t:e Tn re A.B.. 556 A.2d 65. 646-47 (D.C.

1989);~ee also Criminal Jury Instructions for tht: Di trict of Columhia, No. 4 . 100 (4th ~d. TC\' .

2008); As with the Maryland assault statute at issue: in Karinrt and the Indiana battt::ry statut~ in
II
Flore . our ourt of ppcals has repeatedly reiterated that proof of an offensive louching or

contact establishes the commission of a imple a sault in the District of Columbia, and lhat the

go\ emmcnt ne d not prove: an) amount of force. violence. c:r physical pain or injur) to prevail

under any of the e three theories:

0 it is firmly e tablishcd in our case law that the in_iul) resulting from or

threatened by an assault may be extremely slight There need be no ph)sical pain.

no hruisc:s, no breaking of the skin, no loss of blood. no medical tr atmcnt. TI1at i
hecause :simple assault. a presenh:d here . is designed to protect not only
0 _

against physical injury. but against all forms of offensive touching. and e\ en the
mere threat of such touching.
Dunn ,.. 'mletl tat~s. 976 .2<.1 217. 220 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Comhc.r , .. Uniled Stat~s. 584

A.-d 26. 50 (O.C. 199) (en hanc));_wl! also Ray, 515 A.2d aL 119K ("Violence in i~ ordinary

meaning is not a necessary clement of assault. for an attempt to do unlawfully to anoth~:r any

bodil} injury however small cunslitutcs an assault."): Afahmw 1. United State., 721 A.ld 290 30

(D.C. 1998) (holding that reo:moval of a phone from complainant"s left hand and rcmo\'al of a

cigarette from complainant's right hand \\as suOicient to set om prima facie e\'idence of two

separate assaultive acts): Harris v. United Staftt'i, 201 A.2d 5 '2, -34 (D.C. 1964) (affirming an

assault c<>nviction when the evidence sho\\c:d only that the 'il:tim of an nuemptcd pickpocket

some acts that fall outside of the: category of violent, acth c crime ." LeU:a/,543 l .S.at 11, and

that do not cause physical pain or injury to another person,. or inHllvc "a substantial degree of

n The jury instruction for imp)c assault further emphasizes that the swtutc reaches 'iolc:nl and
non-\iolent touching alike; the instruction clarific: that c\idcnce of'any phy:sical injury.
ho'Kever .small. including a touching ofTen i'e to a person of reawnablc sen ihility" adequately
pro\eS attempted-battery assault or intent-to-frighten assault. Criminal Jury Instructions, No.
4.100 (emphasis added). With respect to sexual touching assault. the jury instru tion provides
that an assaulti~c sexual touching does not e\c:n require proof that ~a complainant was B\\ re of
being touched. /d.
12
ph) ical Coree ... Jolm on. 559 .S. at 140. it does not qualify a.s a crime of violence'' under 18
-
U. . . . 16(n or, ac oniingly. a a deportable crim~ of a dom~stic violence under 8 U.S.C.

1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

imi1ar anal} sis of the District' misdemeanor sexual abuse statute. und~r \\tlich the

go,emment has hrought an additional t:hargc against Mr. Escobar. lend to the same conclusion

~garding dtat offense. Under D.< . Code .22-3006. "whoever engages in 3 . e'ual act or sexual

contact '' ith am.'ther person and who hould have knowledge or n:n~nn to know that Ole ace ''as

committed without that other person's permission" is guil~y of misdemeanor sexual abuse. DC

Code . -2-3001 further defines exual contact" as:; :.:.touching with any clothed or unclothed

body part or any object. either dircctty or throuch the: dorhing. of the genitalia, anus. groin.

breast. inner thigh. or buttocks of any person with an intent to abu e humiliate. harass. dcgr-.1de,

or arouse or gratify the sc:xuat de"ire of an) person ... /d._As with !'iimple uss:lull. many rypes of

offcnsi\c but non-,iolent touching establish the clements of this offense. ee also Criminal Jury

Instructions for the Oi!o.tril:t ufColumbia. No. 4.400 (4th cd. rev. 2008):. fungo\'. United Stat.?s.

172 A.2d 240. 245 (D.C. ::!00 1). Under lhc c:Jtegorical npproach-KW.iefe-mliniAg v. heth~r a 5loat~

c:rime lib v. i~in a fideral ftnitiffll. thb offense docs not constitute a ..crime of vioh!nce" and

thus cannot be considered a deportable ..crime uf u domestic violence:

Ill. Coaclu ion

Ana1ysis of the elements of simph: a~~ault and misdemeanor sexual abuse demonstrates

that those crimes cannot be cia sificd a crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(a). nnd Utus

do not qualify as ~crimes of domestic violence' under 8 U.,.. .C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). As a result.

13
neither Mr. Escobar nor Mr. Barahona can be deported as a result of a conviction in these cases

and neither actually faces the Hadditional statutory penalties" that they arguecould require the

Court to characterize the offenses charged as "serious crimes'' giving rise to a constitutional right

to a jury trial. ACCOrGI Motions Demanding a Jury Trial have been denied

Associate Judge
(Signed in Chambers)