SUBSTITUTION BY THE HEIRS

EDWINO A. TORRES (deceased), represented and substituted by ALFONSO P. TORRES III

and FATIMA P. TORRES, son and daughter, respectively, of deceased petitioner versus
BALLIGI V. RODELLAS, G. R. No. 177836, September 4, 2009

We agree with petitioners that the Office of the President misapplied the rule on substitution
upon the death of a party litigant.

Note that the rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of
the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, entitled Prescribing
Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Though
nothing therein provides for substitution of a party in case of death, the same states in its Section 9
that:

SECTION 9. The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character

whenever practicable.

Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus, finds application herein, in that it covers
the situation in case of the death of a party. The rule provides:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending

action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the

deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or

representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if

the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. (Emphases ours.)

Clear from the aforequoted provision that a deceased party may be substituted by his heirs,
but it must be emphasized that substitution may only be allowed in actions that survive the death of
a party thereto. In Gonzales v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[26] citing Bonilla v.
Barcena,[27] we declared that the determination of whether an action survives the death of a party
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. We explicated:
 2

In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained of affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental x x x.

In the case at bar, both parties accuse the other of unlawfully depriving them of their
respective rights to acquire the subject property, together with the house built thereon, by means of
an MSA grant from the State. Evidently, what are primarily and principally affected herein are the
property and property rights of the parties, and any injuries to their persons (i.e., damages) are only
incidental. Such property and property rights survived Edwinos death and may pass on by
succession to his heirs. Therefore, the heirs must be allowed to continue any litigation to protect
said property or property rights and to substitute themselves for the deceased party in accordance
with appropriate rules.

According to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, a counsel, within 30 days
from his clients death, is duty-bound to inform the court of such fact, and to submit the name/s and
address/es of the deceased clients legal representative/s. Thereafter, the court shall order, forthwith,
the appearance of and substitution by the deceased partys legal representative/s within another
period of 30 days from notice.

Nowhere is it mentioned in the instant case when exactly Edwino died. Atty. Restor just
informed the Office of the President of the fact of Edwinos death in the Motion for Reconsideration
of the 5 August 2003 Decision, which he filed on 15 September 2003 on behalf of his deceased
client. With no exact date of Edwinos death, we have no basis for determining whether Atty. Restor
was able to inform the Office of the President of such fact within the requisite period of 30
days. Nevertheless, even assuming that Atty. Restor belatedly notified the Office of the President of
Edwinos death, Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court only provided that, in case of
failure of the counsel to comply with his duty as stated in the first paragraph thereof, it would be a
ground for disciplinary action against said counsel, not that he/she would already be without
personality to appear as counsel in the proceedings for the benefit of his/her client or the latters
heirs.

Instructive herein is our ruling in Heirs of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals.
[28]
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (Florentina) was the appellant in the case still pending before
the Court of Appeals when she died. Florentinas counsel, Attorneys Bausa, Ampil and Suarez, gave
the Court of Appeals notice of their clients death and requested the suspension of the running of the
period within which to file the appellant's brief, pending the appointment by the probate court of an
executor of the latters estate.The Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension/suspension of
time to file appellants brief and dismissed the appeal. Florentinas counsels filed their urgent motion
for reconsideration, explaining that their predicament over the requests for extension/suspension of
period to file a brief was due to the uncertainty of whether their services would still be retained by
the heirs or legal representatives of their deceased client. Florentinas counsels still felt obligated,
however, to preserve the right of Florentinas heirs/successors to continue the appeal, pursuant to
what is now Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, pending the settlement of the
question of who among such heirs/successors should be the executor of the deceased's estate.
Hence, Florentinas counsel presented, for admission, the printed "brief for the appellant," the
printing of which they had deferred "for professional ethical considerations," pending action by the
appellate court on their request for suspension of the period. Despite the foregoing explanation by
Florentinas counsel, the Court of Appeals still refused to reconsider its earlier dismissal of the
appeal and to admit the submitted appellants brief. In addition to invoking the general principle that
litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course; the
appellate court also cited the equally established principle that the relation of attorney and client is
terminated by the death of the client. In the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized
representatives of his deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or
authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's
 3

death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case. Upon appeal to us,
we found that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the
appearance of the legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the latter
who had yet to be substituted in the pending appeal. We held that:

Respondent court therefore erred in ruling that since upon the demise of the
party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship between her and her counsels "was
automatically severed and terminated," whatever pleadings filed by said counsel with
it after the death of said appellant "are mere scraps of paper." If at all, due to said
death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the attorney-client relationship, further
proceedings and specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing the
appellant's brief should be legally deemed as having been automatically suspended,
until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant by her executor or
administrator or her heirs shall have been effected within the time set by respondent
court pursuant to the cited Rule.
xxxx
Prescinding from the foregoing, justice and equity dictate under the
circumstances of the case at bar that the rules, while necessary for the speedy and
orderly administration of justice, should not be applied with the rigidity and
inflexibility of respondent court's resolutions. What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities. x x x.[29] (Emphases supplied.)

In this case, Atty. Restor is in much the same situation as Florentinas counsels. Though
incomplete, the mention by Atty. Restor of Edwinos death in the Motion for
Reconsideration effectively informed the Office of the President of the same. Having been apprised
of the fact of Edwinos death, it was incumbent upon the Office of the President, even without Atty.
Restors motion to such effect, to order the legal representative/s of the deceased party to appear and
be substituted; or, at the very least, to direct the counsel to furnish the court with the names and
addresses of such representative/s.

Since Atty. Restor filed the Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period and
no longer requested for suspension/extension of time to do so, the Office of the President need not
suspend the running of said reglementary period as in Heirs of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer, but it
could have deferred any action on said Motion until a substitution had been effected and it had
ascertained that the substituted heirs chose to retain Atty. Restors services as legal
counsel. Conspicuously, the Office of the President completely failed to act on the information that
Edwino had died so as to effect proper substitution by the latters heirs, as set forth in Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The only action the Office of the President took as regards
said information was to deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Restor for his lack of
personality, given his clients death. This we find totally contrary to equity and fair play since
Edwinos heirs were, in effect, deprived of their right to seek reconsideration or appeal of the
adverse decision of the Office of the President which was itself partly responsible for their non-
substitution.

We emphasize that the purpose behind Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Procedure
is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by
the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself or herself protected, as he/she continues to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. [30] The
spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal substitution of heirs is not really because
substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance therewith results in
the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.[31]
It must also be remembered that, unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case;[32] he is obligated by his client and the court to do what the interest of his client
 4

requires until the end of litigation or his representation is terminated formally and there is a
termination of record.[33] And the only way the Office of the President could have ascertained
whether Atty. Restor still had the authority to file the Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of
Edwinos heirs, or otherwise had been relieved or his representation terminated, was by having
Edwinos heirs come forth as the rules required. In fact, in the Letter of Appointment dated 16
November 2003, which was presented before the Court of Appeals, Alfonso and Fatima, as Edwinos
legal representatives and heirs, explicitly retained the services of Atty. Restor by [appointing] and
[engaging] [his] legal services x x x in O.P. Case No. 98-8537 before the Office of the President and
to further represent [them] in the event that the afore-mentioned case is appealed to the Court of
Appeals/Supreme Court.[34] Even though belatedly executed, such Letter of Appointment
demonstrates that if they were just given the opportunity by the Office of the President, Alfonso and
Fatima could have easily confirmed the authority of Atty. Restor to continue acting as their counsel
in the proceedings and to submit the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5 August 2003 Decision of
the Office of the President.

Interestingly, if, as argued by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, Atty.
Restor no longer had the personality to represent Edwino upon the latters death, assuming he died
prior to the rendition of the decision of the Office of the President, should it not also follow that the
sending of a copy of the 5 August 2003 Decision of the Office of the President to Atty. Restor, as
counsel of record, could no longer be deemed a notice to the party, and his receipt of the same could
not have caused the commencement of the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration? As a consequence, the reglementary period within which to move for
reconsideration of the assailed decision in O.P. Case No. 98-8537 had really not yet begun to toll.

Given the foregoing, the 5 August 2003 Decision of the Office of the President could not
have attained finality. It being partly responsible for the non-substitution of the heirs for the
deceased Edwino, the Office of the President could not dismiss the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Atty. Restor, to the prejudice of said heirs. Justice and equity demand that Edwinos heirs be
given the opportunity to contest the adverse judgment that affects the property and property rights to
which they succeeded. A rule intended to protect due process cannot be invoked to defeat the same.
This having been said, we address the recent theory [35] of Atty. Fabros, Balligis new counsel,
that Atty. Restors lack of personality to file the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5 August 2003
Decision of the Office of the President was due to the failure of Atty. Castillo, Edwinos previous
counsel, to formally withdraw as such, and of Atty. Restor to formally substitute for Atty. Castillo. A
thorough review of the Order dated 27 October 2003 of the Office of the President (dismissing the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 5 August 2003 filed by Atty. Restor, due to the
latters lack of personality), and the Resolutions dated 29 November 2006 and 2 May 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (affirming the dismissal by the Office of the President of said Motion for
Reconsideration) reveal no such pronouncement. The plain reason for the dismissal of the Motion
for Reconsideration was that Atty. Restor had no more personality to file the same, given that
Edwinos death extinguished the attorney-client relationship between them.

But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Office of the President and the Court
of Appeals did find that Atty. Restor had no personality to file the Motion for Reconsideration in
question because Atty. Castillo had not withdrawn as Edwinos counsel and Atty. Restor had not
substituted for Atty. Castillo; such finding would have likewise been erroneous. A party may have
two or more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation, [36] but the fact that a second
attorney enters his appearance for the same party does not necessarily raise the presumption that the
authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn.[37] The second counsel should only be treated as a
collaborating counsel despite his appearance as "the new counsel of record." A lawyer is presumed
to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears; [38] the second counsel, in this
case Atty. Restor, is presumed to have acted within his authority as collaborating counsel when he
filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5 August 2003Decision of the Office of the President.

Finally, we stop short of resolving the issue of whose MSA should be given due course,
because in order to do so, we must first make findings of fact concerning the authenticity and
validity of the Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale of Right dated 9 October 1989, allegedly executed
 5

by Balligi in favor of Edwino. It must be noted that the DENR and the Office of the President made
divergent findings thereon. We cannot, as of yet, make such findings given the derth of evidence on
record. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the remand of the case to the Court of Appeals is in
order, so that it can give due course to the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305. Time and
again, we have stated that this Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to
receive and evaluate evidence de novo, unlike the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals generally
has the authority to review findings of fact, and even hold hearings for further reception of
evidence. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It
is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters,
including documentary evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

assailed twin Resolutions dated 29 November 2006 and 2 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81305 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as they affirmed the declarations of
the Office of the President in the latters Order dated 27 October 2003 in O.P. Case No. 98-8537 that,
given the death of his client, Edwino A. Torres, Atty. Alexander Restor lacked the personality to file
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 5 August 2003; and that, since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal had been timely filed, the said Decision dated 5 August 2003 of the Office
of the President had become final and executory.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is ORDERED to give due
course to the Petition for Review filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305 and to hold further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.

HEIRS OF MAXIMO REGOSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 91879, July 6, 1992

Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his
client's death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator,
or legal representative of the deceased. Sections 16 and 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party.

Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.

Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litemfor the minor heirs.
 6

The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better
position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform
the court of the names and addresses of his legal representative or representatives.

In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for substitution of the deceased
defendant, was ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial
notice of the death of defendant, Maximo Regoso, without the proper manifestation from his
counsel. It must be remembered that the fault or negligence was Attorney Javier's alone (Llantero
vs. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 609; Chittick vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 219; Pulido vs. CA,
122 SCRA 63).

The supervening death of the defendant, Maximo Regoso, did not extinguish his wife's action for
partition of their conjugal assets, for it is an action that survives. The trial of the case on the merits
was already finished before the defendant died. Since it was not informed about that event, the trial
court may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering the substitution of the
deceased defendant. Its judgment is valid and binding upon the defendant's legal representatives
or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned
(Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al., 129 SCRA 304).

Attorney Javier's appeal from the decision of the trial court was correctly dismissed by the
appellate court for upon the death of Maximo Regoso, Attorney Javier's authority to represent him
also expired. Then notice of appeal, which Attorney Javier filed on behalf of the decedent was an
unauthorized pleading, hence, invalid (Barrameda, et al. vs. Barbara, et al., 90 Phil. 718; Caseas
vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462).

However, the validity of the judgment of the trial court was not affected by the defendant's demise
for the action survived. The decision is binding and enforceable against the successors-in-interest
of the deceased litigant by title subsequent to the commencement of the action [Section 49(b) Rule
39, Rules of Court; Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al., 129 SCRA 304].

This is in line with the following provisions of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 49. EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS.The effect of a judgment or final order

rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or order, maybe as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. (Section 49(b), Rule 39,
New Rules of Court.)

Thus, a judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but
also against the members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derived their right of
possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). The same rule applies
to the successors-in-interest of a deceased party in an action that survives, if the decision should
go against the latter (Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304, 305.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 7

GLICERIO R. BRIOSO, substituted by FELICIDAD Z. BRIOSO, BENER Z. BRIOSO, JULITO Z.

BRIOSO, GLICERIO Z. BRIOSO, JR., and ERNESTO Z. BRIOSO, CONCEPCION B. NOLASCO,
MARCOS NOLASCO and SALVADOR Z. BRIOSO vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO and
LEONARDO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. 132765, January 31, 2003

The Issues

Petitioners posed these "two-fold issues"15 for resolution:

1. Whether there was a valid substitution of deceased Glicerio; and

2. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Petitioners assert that the trial court failed to comply with the clear language of Section 17, Rule 3
of the old Rules of Court which provides as follows:

"Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs."16

Petitioners allege that, as there was no appointed administrator for the estate of the deceased
defendant, the trial court should have ordered the heirs to appear personally before it and manifest
whether they were willing to substitute Glicerio. Petitioners further aver that if none of the heirs
appeared or manifested to act as substitutes, the trial court should have ordered the adverse party
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased who should appear for and on
behalf of the deceased's interest.

Petitioners also harp on their failure to receive a copy of the Spouses Mariano's motion for
substitution of Glicerio as well as the Order of the trial court admitting the motion. Petitioners argue
that, even if they received a copy of the Order, the same did not grant the Spouses Mariano's
motion for substitution. Since they were not aware of the purported substitution because of the lack
of service on them of the motion and the Order, petitioners insist that the entire proceedings in the
trial court were void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons.

It must be pointed out that, contrary to the Spouses Mariano's view, their complaint for recovery of
possession of real property is an action which survives the death of a party.17 Such being the case,
the rule on substitution of a deceased party is clearly applicable.

Under the express terms of Section 17 of the old Rules, in case of the death of a party and due
notice is given to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to order the deceased's legal
representative or heir to appear for the deceased.18 Otherwise, "the trial held by the court without
appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment
rendered after trial, are null and void."19
 8

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the proceedings and
judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the
legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other
words, a party's right to due process is at stake, as we enunciated in Vda. de Salazar v. Court of
Appeals,20 thus

"We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of
heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the
general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a
legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith
results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified
of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein." (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving a notice of Glicerio's death, failed to
order the appearance of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Order
merely admitting respondents' motion for substitution. There was no court order for Glicerio's legal
representative to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be
substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the respondents ever procure the appointment of such legal
representative, nor did Glicerio's heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court
failed to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, contrary to the Court of
Appeals' decision, no valid substitution transpired in the present case.21

Thus, we rule that the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are void as to Felicidad, Glicerio,
Jr., Bener and Julito. There is no iota of proof that they were apprised of the litigation against
Glicerio. There is no indication that they authorized Atty. Pardalis to represent them or any showing
that they appeared in the proceedings. Given these facts, the trial court clearly did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. Such being the case, these heirs cannot be bound by the judgment
of the trial court, as we have pronounced in Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,22thus

"Inasmuch as Manolita Gonzales was never validly served a copy of the order granting the
substitution and that furthermore, a valid substitution was never effected, consequently, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over Manolita Gonzales for the purpose of making her a party to the
case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as legal representative of the
estate of her mother Manuela."

However, despite the trial court's failure to adhere to the rule on substitution of a deceased party,
its judgment remains valid and binding on the following heirs, namely, Salvador, Concepcion and
Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily
appeared, shared in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant.23 This is
precisely because, despite the court's non-compliance with the rule on substitution, the heirs' right
to due process was obviously not impaired.24 In other words, the purpose of the rule on substitution
of a deceased party was already achieved. The following facts indicate plainly that there was active
participation of these heirs in the defense of Glicerio after his death.

First, Salvador and Concepcion were among the original defendants in the case. Needless to state,
the trial court, even before Glicerio's death, already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of these
heirs. Hence, the rule on substitution of a deceased party is no longer required as to Salvador and
Concepcion because they were already impleaded as defendants. In fact, Salvador, a lawyer son
of Glicerio, was also one of the counsels for defendants.

Second, the lengthy testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto show that they defended
their deceased father. Both Concepcion and Salvador testified in defense not only of themselves
but also of their deceased father. As to Ernesto, while he was dropped as a defendant, he testified
and admitted that he was one of the substitutes of Glicerio, thus

"INTERPRETER: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

WITNESS: ERNESTO BRIOSO, 45 years old, widower, farmer and residing at Puro-Batia,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.

INTERPRETER: Your witness is now ready.

 9

ATTY. PARDALIS: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

COURT: Proceed.

Q: Are you one of the defendants in this case who was substituted for the late Glicerio
R. Brioso?

A: Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx"25

This shows that Ernesto understood that he was a substitute defendant in the case.

Third, Atty. Pardalis continued to represent Glicerio even after the latter's demise. Acting on
Glicerio's behalf, Atty. Pardalis presented the testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, to
prove, among others, that Glicerio no longer had any interest in the Properties. These pieces of
evidence clearly negate petitioners' contention that Atty. Pardalis ceased to be Glicerio's counsel
upon the latter's death.

Assuming that Atty. Pardalis no longer represented Glicerio after his death, he remained as
counsel for Salvador, Concepcion and Marcos. He should have questioned immediately the validity
of the proceedings absent any formal substitution of Glicerio. Yet, despite the court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of his clients, Atty. Pardalis never bothered to challenge the same, not
until after the trial court rendered its adverse decision.

Lastly, Atty. Pardalis received a copy of respondents' motion for substitution and the trial court's
Order admitting the motion. Upon receipt of the motion and the Order, Atty. Pardalis should have
immediately opposed the same for failure to comply with the rule on substitution. However, Atty.
Pardalis did not question the motion and the Order, not until after the trial court rendered its
decision. His long silence, which certainly binds his clients, can be construed as defendants'
submission to the court's jurisdiction. The acquiescence of defendants and their counsel on the trial
court's jurisdiction effectively precluded them from questioning the proceedings in the trial court.

In Ferreria et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,26 Manolita Gonzales (one of the heirs of deceased
defendant) was not served notice and, more importantly, never appeared in court, unlike Salvador,
Concepcion and Ernesto who appeared and even testified regarding their father's interest in the
Properties. In sum, with the active participation of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Accordingly, the proceedings and the decision of the trial
court are valid with respect to these heirs.

As regards Marcos Nolasco, he was impleaded as a defendant primarily because he and

Concepcion were among the actual possessors of the Properties. It was even defendants'
contention that the complaint was defective for failure to implead Marcos as he was an
indispensable party.27 Accordingly, the Spouses Mariano impleaded Marcos as a defendant, without
whom no final determination can be had of the action.28 With Marcos' inclusion as a party, it is
beyond dispute that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, the proceedings
and judgment of the trial court are valid and binding upon Marcos.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 2, 1997 is MODIFIED. As to Bener Brioso, Julito Brioso and Glicerio Brioso, Jr., the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, is void for lack of
jurisdiction. As to Felicidad Brioso, Concepcion B. Nolasco, Marcos Nolasco, Salvador Brioso and
Ernesto Brioso, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, is
valid.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
 10

15
Memorandum for Petitioners, Ibid., p. 164.

This particular provision has already been amended by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
16

Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:

"Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel
to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs."

17
Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 (1962).

18
Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 88 SCRA 695 (1979) citing Caseas v. Rosales,
19 SCRA 462 (1967), Caisip, et al. v. Hon. Cabangon & Pineda, 109 Phil. 150 (1960)
and Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976).

19
Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305 (1995).

20
Ibid.

21
Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al., 104 Phil. 143 (1958).

22
Ibid.

23
Supra, see note 19.

24
Riviera Filipina, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117355, April 5, 2002.

25
TSN, February 3, 1989, pp. 1-2.

26
Supra, see note 21.

27
Records of Civil Case No. L-006, p. 162.

28
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.