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2016
[LAND TITLES AND DEEDS]
Agcaoili Book; Atty. Panes Lectures; LA Notes
Sec. 1 Title of Decree This decree shall be known as the Property
Registration Decree.
Regalian Doctrine (Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 PC)
- all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to
the State
Jura Regalia
private title to a land must be traced to some grant, express or implied,
or from its successors
- The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the
Philippines. This refers to Royal Rights that all lands were formerly held
by the King.
- (Maam Panes): refers to private ownership and how private ownership
of lands were given by virtue of the royal rights possessed by the King
Exceptions to Regalian Doctrine
1) Native Title (Carino v. Insular) refers to pre-conquest rights to
lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been
held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/Indigenous Peoples,
have never been public lands, and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held the same way since before Spanish Conquest
Time Immemorial - A period of time when as far back as
memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of an owner, and
utilized a defined territory developed to them, by operation
of customary law or inherited from their ancestors with their
customs and traditions
2) Ancestral Domain (Cruz v. Secretary)
During the pendency of the 1st case, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into
1. (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
2. (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (A/D).
3. (15m) buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved
for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants , owners of beach resorts in Boracay
filed with this Court an action to nullify PGMAs proclamation claiming that it
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay; there is no need for
a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land; and Being classified as
neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first PLA. Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
OSG argued that petitioners-claimants Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into A&D. There is a
need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions
in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
HELD:
REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RECLASSIFY
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
1) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;
2) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos; and
3) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

1935 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987

SECRETARY OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTION
October 8, 2008 1. agricult 1. agricultural 1. agricultur
ural 2. industrial/comme al (maybe
This case involves 2 petitions regarding the right of the present occupants of 2. forest or rcial A/D)
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. timber 3. residential 2. forest/tim
4. resettlement ber
FIRST CASE: G.R. No. 167707 Certiorari on CA decision affirming RTC granting 5. mineral 3. national
declaratory relief field by Mayor Jose Yap et al and ordered the survey of Boracay 6. timber/forest parks
for titling purposes 7. grazing lands 4. mineral
1976, (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which 8. others by law
identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. President
Marcos declared the area as tourist zones and marine reserves under the Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Hence, subsequent expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
- Petitioners claim that Proclamation and PTA Circular precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
survey of land for titling purposes; Marcos declaration raised doubts the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands and Since the and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
ownership; Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
titles. from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to
OSG invoked Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code that determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership.
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as
the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was NOT available for the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands,
disposition and since Boracay Island had not been classified as A & D whatever as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.
ISSUE: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment
to the titling of the lands in Boracay. RTC neither Proclamation nor the Circular SPANISH RULE
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
- Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. The Laws Of The First introduced Regalian doctrine and laid the
- The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Indies And The foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Island were covered by OCT in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Royal Cedulas Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
Tirol. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933. the public domain
- CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a Ley Hipotecaria provided for the systematic registration of titles and
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were Or The Mortgage deeds as well as possessory claims.
part of a forest reserve. Law Of 1893.
The Royal partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the
Decree Of 1894 Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information
SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 173775 a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and Or The Maura as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PGMA classifying Boracay into Law
reserved forest and agricultural land.
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land, under certain conditions which were set forth in public domain since time immemorial or
said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an since July 26, 1894.
1) informacion posesoria or possessory information
title, Amendments of this Requirement
2) when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
is converted into a title of ownership OCENPO 30 Years
3) only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of PD No. 1073,
4) uninterrupted possession which must be actual, OCENPO since June 12, 1945, or
public, and adverse, earlier.
5) from the date of its inscription.
6) However, possessory information title had to be There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
perfected one year after the promulgation of the imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
lands would revert to the State. possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
a) titulo real or royal grant; (2) The classification of the land as alienable and
b) concesion especial or special grant; disposable land of the public domain.
c) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence
d) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and in land registration proceedings. Under the decree,
e) informacion posesoria or possessory information title. all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply
PD No. 892
for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
February 16,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
1976
decree on February 16, 1976.
Spanish Titles
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands
may no longer be
AMERICAN RULE shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
used as evidence
Philippine Bill of 1) AGRICULTURAL ( those public lands acquired Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
of ownership due
1902 from Spain which are not timber or mineral 3344.
to the rise of
US assumed lands) Evidences of Ownership during Spanish Regime
several conflicting
administration of 2) MINERAL 1) Royal Grant
claims of
the Phil. Is. After a. absolute grant (freehold system) 2) Special Grant
ownership
the 1898 Treaty b. lease (leasehold system) 3) Adjustment Title
of Paris 3) TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS. 4) Title by Purchase
established a system of registration by which 5) Possessory Information Title
Act No. 496 recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and 6) Gratuitous Title
Land imprescriptible. This is known as the TORRENS Amended and updated the Act. No. 496
Registration Act SYSTEM. enacted to codify the various laws relative to
On February 1, Made the Court of Land Registration registration of property
PD No. 1529,
1903 Does not create title nor vest one, simply confirms governs registration of lands under the Torrens
Property
and register system as well as unregistered lands, including
Registration
introduced the HOMESTEAD SYSTEM , chattel mortgages.
Decree
provisions for judicial and administrative Broadened the jurisdiction of RTCs with regard to
Act No. 926 June 11, 1978
confirmation of imperfect titles original registration of title to lands
First Public Created the former LRC which is now Land
i. OCENPO of agricultural lands for the next ten
Land Act Registration Authority
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904
October 7, 1903
SALE OR LEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS.
title to public
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality
lands in the A POSITIVE ACT DECLARING LAND AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
Philippines REQUIRED. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
purchase lands of the public domain
remained in the time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
judges of courts have the authority to determine
govt and its title such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
classification of lands
sprung from disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141
CFIs had power to adjudicate cases relating to
Treaty of Paris limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
land titles and disputes
delimited and classified.
Cadastral system of registration when in the
opinion of the President, the public interest requires THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE
that the title to any lands be settled and adjudicated, OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS ON THE PERSON
he shall order the DoL to make survey thereof, w/ APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
Act. No. 2259 notice to all persons claiming an interest therein. the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
Cadastral Act Thereafter, DoL shall be represented by SG, shall presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
Feb. 11, 1913 institute the registration proceedings by filing a of the application (or claim) is A/D.
petition in the proper court against the possessors
stating that public interest requires the titles to such 1) presidential proclamation or P
lands be settled and adjudicated. 2) an executive order; E
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of 3) an administrative action; A
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and 4) investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a R
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the 5) legislative act or a statute. L
same privileges.
Act No. 2874 For judicial confirmation of title, possession and The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
Second Public occupation en concepto dueo since time claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
Land Act immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required. disposable.
November 29, ***POSITIVE ACT REQUIRED In this case records bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
1919 Courts are no longer authorized to determine Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
Under Jones Law classification of lands that the land is A/D. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
Gave the executive through the President the assumed. They call for proof.
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands into A
& D, mineral or forest. After declaration of A&D, Who may classify lands?
this law requires publication and notice JUDICIARY (ANKRON AND DE ALDECOA )These cases were decided
CA No. 141 under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 (October
remains as the existing general law governing the 7, 1926). During that time, the President had no power to classify lands of
PUBLIC LAND
classification and disposition of lands of the public the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. Hence, the courts
ACT
domain other than timber and mineral lands, and were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
1935
privately owned lands which reverted to the State. vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of
Constitution;
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the the evidence. To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under
December 1,
requirement under Act No. 2874 of Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
1936
possession and occupation of lands of the classification that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, lands are
considered agricultural. However, this presumption did not automatically
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converted all lands of the public domain as A&D agricultural lands for it
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa
attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act
No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to
an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves
of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified
and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Since 1919, courts were no longer free to
determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except
those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated
in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied,
to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the HEIRS OF CIRIACO TIROL who were
issued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for determination
by the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put,
there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No.
926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to
determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants
cannot bank on Act No. 926.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS CONTINUED POSSESSION UNDER ACT NO. 926
DOES NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS ALIENABLE.
Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title
in their name.A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-
a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States.
The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of
the government and the friar lands. Thus, it is plain error for petitioners
to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. (Emphasis
Ours)
EXCEPT FOR LANDS ALREADY COVERED BY EXISTING TITLES,
BORACAY WAS AN UNCLASSIFIED LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1064. SUCH
UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC FOREST
UNDER PD NO. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by President
Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a PUBLIC FOREST as a
mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705,
all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto
considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under
PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in
the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest
cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier
tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more
of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. Nevertheless,
that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island; that the island has already been stripped of its
forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution
classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushesA forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied)
PROCLAMATION NO. 1801 IS NOT A POSIITIVE ACT. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert
that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land but merely recognizes that
the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
its powers under CA No. 141. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801
cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801shows that the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
IT WAS PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 OF 2006 WHICH POSITIVELY DECLARED
PART OF BORACAY AS ALIENABLE AND OPENED THE SAME TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No.
1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public
lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent
such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.
PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705
did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land.
Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705., the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
reclassification of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion
of the Department of Justice on this point: Thus, obviously, the
prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of
forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits
of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE UNDER CA NO. 141. NEITHER DO
THEY HAVE VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE OCCUPIED LANDS UNDER THE
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SAID LAW. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1) OCENPO of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Why pb of 1902 and act. No. 926 and pn 1801 reliance must fail?
because of the absence of the 2nd of a/d their entitlement to a
government grant under our present public land act presupposes that
the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable.
this is clear from the wording of the law itself. where the land is not
alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of OCENPO of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
All is not lost, however. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress
to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary
to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are
needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in
Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
FACTS: Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for registration of 4
parcels of land located in Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the
subject lands having acquired them from LID Corporation. LID Corp. acquired the
land from Calderon, Moraga, Monje and their predecessors in interest who have
been in OCENPO for more than 30 years. She believes that the lots are not
mortgaged nor encumbered.
RP opposed the application alleging
1) No OCENPO since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
2) muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of his OCENPO ;
3) applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that
4) parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to RP not
subject to private appropriation.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat which was subsequently affirmed
by the CA. Hence, the appeal before the SC. The Republic faults the CA on its
finding which respects the length of Naguiats occupation of the subject property
and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in
question have been declassified from forest land to A&D property.
ISSUE: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of
forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
RULING: SC had an opportunity to discuss the concept of Regalian Doctrine in this
case. It states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State that is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof to overturn the presumption that the land subject of an
application is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The SC said that the
CA, in this case, assumed that the lands in question are already A&D. CA
ratiocinated that the possession of Naguiat of the lands created a legal fiction
where without judicial declaration, the same ceases to be a public land and
becomes private property ipso jure.
Respondent Naguiat did not present any incontrovertible proof that there has
been a positive act from the government which reclassified the land applied for as
A&D. The tax receipts cannot be a sufficient proof for there is no information about
the classification of the property on it. Instead, the applicant could have obtained
a Certificate of Land Classification from the DENR as a valid proof. Since the land
is unclassified, according to SC, the same cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation. Occupation on such land in the concept of an owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered title. To this, the application
of Naguiat to have the lands registered is denied.
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
347 SCRA 128
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its
implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For
this reason, it prays that the petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa
countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also, that the
law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found
within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same.
According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The
constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains.
That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only
agricultural lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable and
disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources
and 1/3 of the countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while
60 million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These figures violates the
constitutional principle of a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot
be Alienated or Ceded
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Sec. 2 Nature of Registration Proceedings, Jurisdiction of Courts 1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
Judicial Proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be have been in OCENPO of AD lands of the public domain under a
in rem bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Based on generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system 2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over under the provisions of existing laws
all applications for original registration of title to lands, 3) Those how have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
including all improvements and interests therein, and river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, 4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.provided by law
The court through its clerk of court shall
furnish the Land Registration Commission with Where and how to file the application for Registration?
o 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filedor issued
With the inRTC of the province or city where the land is situated. The TC
applications or petitions for land registration, shall issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing, and the
o with the exception of stenographic notes, public shall be given notice thereof by means of publication, mailing
within 5 days from the filing or issuance thereof and posting. Any person claiming an interest in the land may appear
and file an opposition, stating all his objections to the application. The
case shall be heard and all conflicting claims of ownership shall be
determined by the court.
Once the judgment becomes final, the court shall issue an order for the
History issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title in favour
- conceptualized by Sir Robert Torrens from South Australia of the person adjudged as entitled to registration.
- the purpose is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of Thereupon. The LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY shall prepare
the system the corresponding decree of registration as well as the original and
duplicate certificate of title which shall be sent to the Register of Deeds
What is Torrens System? of the city or province where the land lies for registration.
- Those systems of registration of transaction with interest in land whose
declared object is, under governmental authority; Jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to property
- To establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and Sec. 19(2), BP 129
indefeasible title to realty, With the RTC where assessed value of the property exceeds 20k
- To simplify its transfer If Manila, if the assessed value of the property exceeds 50k
Exceptions
What are the Purposes of Torrens System? (Legarda v. Saleeby) o Forcible entry
1) To quiet title to land; o Unlawful detainer of lands or buildings
2) To put a stop forever to any question of the legality of title
Exception
Claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate or DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
which may arise subsequent thereto TITLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure without Source of right Merely confirms a title already existing
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador Foundation of ownership Mere evidence of ownership
de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Best evidence of ownership Best evidence of title
Advantages of the Torrens System
1) Substitutes security for insecurity
2) Reduced the cost of conveyances and time occupied LEGARDA V. SALEEBY
3) Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
4) Simplified ordinary dealings
5) Affords protection against fraud
CASE: Land is registered under the name of two persons
6) Restored to their just value many estates, held under good holding FACTS:
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect,
and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults o That the plaintiffs LEGARDA and the defendant SALEEBY occupy, as
owners, adjoining lots which existed a number of years a stone wall
THREE PRINCIPLES in the TS
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs
1) Mirror Principle
LEGARDA. Upon petition to the Court, Legarda was able to obtain a decree
o if there are several transfers, the TCT will be a mirror in of registration which included the stonewall.
that it should be identical to the current facts. If the seller
o Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
sells the land, the old title must be identical to the new one LEGARDA discovered that the wall which had been included in the
in terms of technical description, so as to reinforce the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted
concept that the buyers should be able to rely on the face to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of
of the title.
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed
o Exception
o The lower court however, without notice to the defendant SALEEBY denied
a) when a person deals with a registered land with
said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the
someone that is not the registered owner
registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
b) when the party has actual knowledge of facts registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant
which should impel a reasonably cautious mind SALEEBY.
to make such inquiry to the lack of title;
c) in cases of banking and financing institutions ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in granting to SALEEBY the stonewall as
2) Curtain Principle
his registered property? NO
o The concept that the buyer should be able to rely on the
face of the title, and should not go beyond the certificate. In RULING:
a way, the buyer does not have to go behind the curtain to
The REAL PURPOSE OF THAT SYSTEM is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
ascertain the truth of the title, because the Torrens
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
Certificate guarantees him that.
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
3) Insurance Principle
That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered
o Equates registration to a guarantee by the State the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
LAWS PRIOR TO 1529, See Table under Sec. v. Yap registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of
PD 1529 Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result
How is jurisdiction over the RES acquired? is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
A: Sec. 23
1) Publication
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
2) Mailing
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
3) Notice
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
Who may apply for registration? by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
A: Sec. 14, p. 1-4 OPAL
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to

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again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very
purpose and intent of the law.
THE REGISTRATION, UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM, DOES NOT GIVE THE
OWNER ANY BETTER TITLE THAN HE HAD. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered.
The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would
be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished
in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse
of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between
the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow
that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who
are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, EXCEPT as to rights which
are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain
other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. REGISTERED TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM CAN NOT
BE DEFEATED BY PRESCRIPTION (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been
settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts.
Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823,
says: "THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT IN THE CASE OF TWO CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE, PURPORTING TO INCLUDE THE SAME LAND, THE EARLIER IN
DATE PREVAILS, WHETHER THE LAND COMPRISED IN THE LATTER
CERTIFICATE BE WHOLLY, OR ONLY IN PART, COMPRISED IN THE
EARLIER CERTIFICATE. Hogg adds however that, "IF IT CAN BE VERY
CLEARLY ASCERTAINED BY THE ORDINARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
RELATING TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE LAND
IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIOR DATE IS A MISTAKE, THE
MISTAKE MAY BE RECTIFIED BY HOLDING THE LATTER OF THE TWO
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE TO BE CONCLUSIVE." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in
his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier
in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under
the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed
to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the
case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that WHERE TWO
CERTIFICATES PURPORT TO INCLUDE THE SAME REGISTERED LAND, THE
HOLDER OF THE EARLIER ONE CONTINUES TO HOLD THE TITLE" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser
for value has acquired an interest.
GENERAL RULE: "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in
any court,
EXCEPTION: fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year.
Q: If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for
fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent
certificate or decree of registration?
We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision
which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in
the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code
provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold
to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes
it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or
purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case
depends upon priority of registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes
and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that
in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of
two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In the present case, the appellee SALEEBY was the first negligent (granting that
he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he cannot complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. Granting that he was the
owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the
registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud,
forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is
no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
IN CASE OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION
ACT, THAT THE OWNER OF THE EARLIEST CERTIFICATE IS THE OWNER
OF THE LAND. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied
to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the
other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate
to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right
which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38,
55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be
protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of
available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or
interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections.
UNDER THE RULE OF NOTICE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE PURCHASER
HAS EXAMINED EVERY INSTRUMENT OF RECORD AFFECTING THE TITLE.
Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring
a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of
want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that
all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule
of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion
and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages
to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage
is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice
of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule
that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The
fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men,
at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or
all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the
vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be
applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He,
in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name
other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties
we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
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unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the
original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that
part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose,
for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system.
Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer
the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser"
of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants
precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice
resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in
harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the
appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and
his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of
a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate
who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and
his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who
had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge
of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by
reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he
is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting
from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system.
We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens
system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient,
in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS Corp. vs.CA
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title on
a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite which was allegedly registered by Virata in
his name by fraudulently obtaining a title through an administrative reconstitution
of a non-existent original title of the land, and that by reason of said reconstitution,
there now exists a cloud on the title of Solid State. Solid State alleges that it bought
the land from Julian Pearanda who obtained the same through the grant of
application for the sale of a friar land from the government. The land was registered
in the name of Pearanda in 1969 under CA 32. Pearanda's occupation of the
land is derived through a voluntary assignment of right of the former occupant,
Mabini Legaspi, and that the same is free from claims and conflicts and that the
said applicant has established his rights over the subject land, in view of which,
said investigator recommended that said lot be awarded to applicant Julian
Pearanda according to law.
Virata countered saying that he bought the land from Mabini Legaspi who
obtainedownership in 1957 on the subject land after the Director of Lands sold the
same at public auction. Official Receipts of payment for the instalments were
shown as a proof. The title was reconstituted since the Provincial Capitol of Cavite
was burned including the ROD office which holds the title to the subject property.
Legaspi also denied that she sold the land to Julan Pearanda. RTC ruled in favor
of Virata which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal
before the SC.
..
Issue:
WON CA correctly held that Virata is the true and lawful owner of the subject
property? NO.
Ruling:
Solid State contends that Act No. 1120 or Friar Lands Act provides the procedure
for the sale and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons. The acquisition by Pearanda was in compliance
with all legal requisites laid down by the law for the validity of the sale. He further
contended that the issuance to Mabini Legaspi of a COT in her favor was a violation
of the Friar Lands Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and
occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a
certificate stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then
shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the
instalments and at the interest specified in the certificate. Subject to a resolutory
condition that non-payment of price in full may cancel the sale. The court said that
the title Pearanda has the valid acquisition from the government of the subject
friar land since it was in compliance with law and hence, the sale in favor of Solid
State is valid and binding. Contrary to that, the
SC said while the sale of the lot to Legaspi occurred much earlier in time, the same
cannot be considered as a ground to for him to be considered the true owner of
the land. Legaspi did not present an evidence showing that a certificate of sale was
ever issued by the BoL in his favor. The existence of the official receipts showing
payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was legally
conveyed to her without any contract of sale. Legaspi also alleged that he
purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is nowhere
provided in the pertinent laws conveying friar lands. The law expressly state that
an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a private
sale not in a public auction. There was also absence of a deed of conveyance to
Legaspi by the government after the full payment of the instalments on the disputed
lot.
Time and again, registration does not vest title to the land, but merely a
procedure to establish
evidence over realty. Even if the 1 year period has already lapsed, the title did
not become incontrovertible but it is a null and void for not complying with the
requirements of the law. Therefore, Virata could not have validly obtained title to
the land
FULLTEXT RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this Court to
discuss them jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the respondent appellate
court and supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however accept the
legal conclusion made by the appellate court and trial court that the registered title
of private respondent to the land should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act
provides the procedure for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private
persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest Julian Pearanda of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of the
friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act No.
1120, for the validity of the sale by the government in favor of Pearanda of such
friar lands.
It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Mabini
Legaspi, and the issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in violation of the
Friar Lands Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
There is no dispute here that the land involved in this case is a friar land and that
the laws which are applicable are Act No. 1120, known as the Friar Lands Act,
providing for the administration and temporary leasing and sale of certain
haciendas and parcels of land, commonly known as friar lands, and
Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15, 1936 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 316 dated June 9, 1938, which provided for the
subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar lands estated remaining
undisposed of.
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant
a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell
to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so fixed
payable as provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands . . . and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued
and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty
two of the Land Registration Act.
Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. (Emphasis ours)
Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in part:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona
fide occupants of any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten
hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private
sale and at a price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, after taking into
consideration its location, quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its
value, the provisions of section 12, of Act 1120, as amended, to the contrary, . . .
(Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the government.
1) The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that
the government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant.
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2) The occupant then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the
purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest
specified in the certificate.
3) The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so
called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the
property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser
becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his
favour subject only to the cancellation thereof in case the price agreed
upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4
SCRA 849.)
4) Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interests, the government shall then issue a final deed of
conveyance in favor of the purchaser.
5) However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved by
the Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws,
however, required that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.
It is undisputed that SOLID STATEs predecessor, Julian Pearanda was the
actual occupant of Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase the said lot
on November 22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources approved the sale of the lot without auction to Pearanda;
that a sales contract was executed between the Director of Lands and Pearanda
on February 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00 payable in 10 monthly
installments; that upon the full payment of the price, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final deed of conveyance of Lot No.
7449 in favor of Pearanda. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued
TCT No. 39631 in the name of Pearanda, and when the latter sold the land to
petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-80889 was issued in favor
of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Pearanda was in compliance with
law. The execution of the sales contract vested the right of ownership in Pearanda
over the land. There is no doubt whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it was
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale
made by Pearanda in favor of the petitioner transferred the ownership of the land
in favor of the latter resulting in the proper issuance of TCT No. T-80889 in its
name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title by respondent
VIRATA are clearly shown in the records. The latter's predecessor, Mabini
Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public auction held on May 5, 1943
conducted by the Bureau of Lands and friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid
the purchase price thereof in installments in 1943; that on December 12, 1944, the
Bureau of Lands sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting the
issuance of certificates of title to several persons including Mabini Legaspi, in
whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that subsequently on December 6, 1957,
she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata, which was evidenced by a deed
of sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 10, 1957; that
on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was issued in the name of Virata. Due to the
fire which gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on June 7, 1959, the
latter administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. 11520 on September
1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate and renumbered the same as
TCT No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier than the
date of acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the evidence
presented by respondent Virata indicates that the latter's predecessor paid the
purchase price of Lot No. 7449 on installments. Nowhere in the evidence for the
respondent or in the records of this case however, would show that a
certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of Lands, which would vest
ownership and title over the land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The existence of
the official receipts showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does not
prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale having
been executed by the government in her favor. Viewed from all angles, the
acquisition of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in
compliance with the procedure mandated by law for the sale of friar lands.
For one thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly purchased the land in a sale at public
auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as
amended by C.A. 316. The laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the land
shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at public
auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there any deed of
conveyance issued to Legaspi by the government after the full payment of the
installments on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there was neither allegation nor proof
that the sale was with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
The absence of such approval made the supposed sale null and void ab
initio. Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the ownership of the
land from the government Mabini Legaspi and without the required approval of the
sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We find that Mabini Legaspi
did not in any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The ownership
or title over the friar land, specifically Lot No. 7449 remained in the government
until Pearanda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired ownership over
the same lot on February 28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed in
his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest
ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the
lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been held that registration does
not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.
Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than that
what he actually has (De man et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935
December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June 22, 1984,
129 SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the
certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale
from the government, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null
and void since the acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its
action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In one case, this Court ruled that an adverse
claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long period of time
is not barred from bringing an action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title
which was illegally or wrongfully acquired. In actions for reconveyance of property
predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a
claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing. Being null and void, the sale
made to Mabini Legaspi and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto
produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum producit affectum.
There being no title to the land that Mabini Legaspi acquired from the government,
it follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the former to
respondent Virata. Even assuming that respondent Virata was a purchaser in good
faith and for value, the law is, as between two persons both of whom are in good
faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the
lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights . Further if a person happened to obtain property by mistake
or to the prejudice of another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title which
may have been issued to him under the circumstances may and should be
cancelled or corrected. Our unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the title of
petitioner under the Torrens land system should be upheld considering that
no previous valid title to the same land existed.
Petition granted.
GREY ALBA VS. DE LA CRUZ
17 SCRA 49
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of Segunda Alba Clemente. They, as co-owners sought for
the registration of a parcel of
land located in Baliuag, Bulacan. The land is said to be an agricultural one used
for the raising of rice and sugar cane. This petition for registration was granted by
the court. Subsequently, Anacleto Dela Cruz objected before the court asking for
the revision of the case. Dela Cruz alleged that the decree of registration was
fraudulently obtained by the petitioners and that included in the parcels of land
Albas sought to register is the two parcels of land he inherited from his father which
was a state grant. To this the court revised its decision which excludes the two
parcels of land claimed by Dela Cruz.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Anacleto De La
Cruz? YES.
Ruling:
It is admitted that Dela cruz was occupying the two parcels of land at the time the
appellants presented their petition for registration. That Dela Cruz did not appear
in the petition as an occupant and also that he is alleged to be a tenant for the
Albas the reason why the latter did not include his name in the petition as occupant.
It is proved that the Uncle of the petitioners, who took care of them after their
parents died, have leased the property to Anacletos Father. Anacleto agreed that
there was a lease but the two parcels of land he is claiming were not
included in the lease contract. The fact that the petitioners were able to have the
subject land registered will tell us that such registration is conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the government, whether their names are mentioned
in the application or included in the general description to all who it may
concern. By express provision of the law, such as the Land Registration Act, the
world are made parties-defendant by the description in the notice to all whom it
may concern.Though, Anacleto De la Cruz was not served with notice, he
was already made a party defendant by publication and the entering of the
decree in 1908 must be held conclusive against all persons including him.
The SC said it was error for the lower court to have opened the decree and
modified the judgment on account of absence, infancy, or other disability. It
could have been opened only on the ground that the decree was obtained
through fraud.
While it was alleged that there was fraud, the SC did not consider such allegation.
It ruled that the petitioners
honestly believed that Anacleto was occupying the lands as their tenant. Specific,
intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual
or positive fraud.To this, the SC said that the Lower Courts decision be reinstated
and the decision of the Appellate Court be reversed.
JURISDICTION OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES
VENUE
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RTCs Exclusive Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 (2) of PD 1529) consent or waiver upon a court objection on improper venue may be
1) All applications for original registration of title to lands, including which otherwise would have no waived by the failure of the defendant
improvements and interests therein jurisdiction over the subject matter of to raise it at the proper time.
2) All petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear an action
and determine all question arising upon such applications or Rules as to jurisdiction can never be In such an event, the court may still
petition left to the consent or agreement of render a valid judgment
MTCs delegated jurisdiction the parties.
MTCs may hear and determine land registration cases in the following jurisdictional Procedural (may be waived); to
instances: provide convenience to the parties
1) Lot sought to be registered is not subject to controversy or rather than restrict their access to the
opposition courts as it relates to the place of trial.
2) Lot is contested, but the value thereof does not exceed 100, 000
a. Such value is ascertained by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
by the affidavit of the claimant a. laying of venue is procedural
by the agreement of the respective claimants (if there be more than one), rather than substantive.
or b. It relates to the jurisdiction of
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property the court over the person
rather than the subject matter.
SC Administrative Circular 6-93-A c. Provisions relating to venue
Nov. 15, 1995 establish a relation between
1) Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this A.C. the plaintiff and the
shall be transferred by the Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction defendant and not between
over the cases to E.J. of the appropriate Courts of limited jurisdiction for the the court and the subject
required raffle among the branches of the court under his administrative matter.
supervision d. Venue relates to trial not to
2) But those already commenced as of the date of effectivity shall remain w/ jurisdiction, touches more of
said courts, except when the parties agree otherwise the convenience of the parties
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., rather than the substance of the
vs. RoD Paranaque. case.
[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:
FACTS: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial court
PETITIONER CORPORATION was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its
Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to change inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc and was approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 20, 1997. As a consequence of its change of VENUE, IN INFERIOR COURTS AS WELL AS IN THE CFI (NOW RTC), MAY BE
name, petitioner sought the amendment of the TCTs over real properties owned WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY Dismissing the complaint on the ground
by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of
Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of
petition for amendment of titles with the RTC of Paraaque City impleading as first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where the
respondent the ROD of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by
amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition THOUGH TECHNICALLY WRONG, MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES
now impleading ROD of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in FOR WHOSE CONVENIENCE THE RULES ON VENUE HAD BEEN
Paraaque City. Court dismissed due to improper venue since properties are DEVISED. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
in Pasay In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all
dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
properties are located in Pasay City.[7]MR denied devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to
the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
PETITIONER BEFORE SC
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the INDEED, IT WAS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE
following reasons: TAKEN A PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT BY DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO the
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
venue; outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary
still a matter of right on petitioners part to amend its petition in order to importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere
correct the wrong entries therein; and to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well,
3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in the right to be heard on his cause.[18]
Paraaque City, so venue was properly laid despite that erroneous allegation
in the original petition.[11]
PETITIONER CORRECTLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL
OSG TRIAL COURT IN SEEKING THE AMENDMENT OF ITS CERTIFICATES OF
The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment said that trial court TITLE. The jurisdiction of the RTC over matters involving the registration of lands
did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of
petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:
the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings
acted on the motion to admit amended petition. for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
PETITIONERS REPLY JURISDICTION V. VENUE On February 15, 1999,
petitioner filed its Reply. TC had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
appeared to be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
location of the properties. improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of such applications or petitions.
improper venue? NO.
The COURT through its CLERK OF COURT shall
RULING: While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition 1. furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies
below was clearly that of improper venue, the Solicitor General confuses venue of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
with jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn. applications or petitions for land registration,
2. WITH THE EXCEPTION of stenographic notes,
JURISDICTION OVER THE VENUE OF AN ACTION 3. within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
SUBJECT MATTER
nature of an action is conferred only as fixed by statute may be changed by
by law. It may not be conferred by the consent of the parties, and an
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In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces
of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the
lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.[19]
VDA. DE ARCEO VS. CA
185 SCRA 489
Facts:
Spouses Arceo are owners of four parcels of unregistered lands located in
Bulacan. They had one Son named Esteban who had 5 children. Estebans
children and their children are the parties involved in this case. In 1941, Spouses
Arceo executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Jose, one of Estebans children.
Since 1942, Jose paid the taxes, took personal possession of the land and claimed
it as his own. In 1941, also, Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa to give away the subject properties in favor
of all his grandchildren including Jose. However, the said document was notarized
in 1944 only after Mrs. Arceo died.
Subsequently, the wife of Jose, together with their children, filed with the cadastral
court an application for
registration in their names the subject lands. This was contested by Pedro and
Lorenzo, Joses siblings contending that they are entitled to a part of the subject
parcels of land. The cadastral court rejected the registration and distributed the
properties according to law on intestate succession instead. The CA affirmed its
decision.
Issue: WON the cadastral court has jurisdiction in determining the ownership of
lands?
Ruling:
As to the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of PD 1529 provides that RTC, sitting as
a land registration court, is no
longer circumscribed as it is in the previous law. PD 1529 eliminated the general
jurisdiction of RTC and the limited jurisdiction of RTC acting merely as a cadastral
court; the purpose of this is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
In this case, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction in the
determination of issues on
ownership, which at the same time involves the issue on the right of registration.
There would be a multiplicity of suits or the registration will be prolonged if not
impossible should the cadastral court decide not to pass upon the issue of
ownership.
As to the issue of co-ownership:
Joses wife contends that they acquired the lot through acquisitive prescription.
This was rejected by the SC. The Civil Code provides that prescription does not lie
against co-owners, unless the following requisites concur.
a. There is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated
the co-ownership.
b. He has made known to the co-owners that he is assuming
exclusive ownership over the property.
c. Clear and convincing evidence thereof.
d. His possession is OCEN.
This circumstances were not present in the case at bar. The fact of paying taxes
cannot defeat the right of coowners to their right to enjoy the use of their property,
the same does not confer title upon a claimant.
Nonetheless, the SC granted the petition and have the lands registered under the
name of Jose and his heirs by
virtue of the valid deed of donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court further ruled
that the donation mortis causa did not revoke the first donation. The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable subject to
few exceptions. Finally, the court said that the disposition in favor of Jose of the
subject properties should be respected.
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought
under the operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for
unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided,
that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered
under Section 113 of this Decree.
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No
deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land
not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the
parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner
herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary Entry
Book and a Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall contain,
among other particulars,
1. the entry number,
2. the names of the parties,
3. the nature of the document,
4. the date, hour and minute it was presented and received.
5. The recording of the deed and other instruments relating to
unregistered lands shall be effected by any of annotation on the
space provided therefor in the Registration Book, after the same
shall have been entered in the Primary Entry Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the
Register of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner
provided herein. In case the Register of Deeds refuses its administration to
record, said official shall advise the party in interest in writing of the ground
or grounds for his refusal, and the latter may appeal the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration in accordance with the provisions of
Section 117 of this Decree. It shall be understood that any recording made
under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better
right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse
among other things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file
number and the date as well as the hour and minute when the document
was received for recording as shown in the Primary Entry Book, returning
to the registrant or person in interest the duplicate of the instrument, with
appropriate annotation, certifying that he has recorded the instrument after
reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or city assessor as
required by existing law.
(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and
other instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to
unregistered lands, if made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be
admissible to record under this section.
(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this section,
he shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar services for
the registration of deeds or instruments concerning registered lands.
REGISTRATION UNDER THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW
TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD NO. 4136 The case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz
would soon be the core of subsequent decisions declaring the infamous Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as a forgery foisted upon the courts and bereft of any validity
and efficacy as evidence of ownership. In this case, petitioners-heirs did not
adduce
evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation
of P.D. No. 892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Proof of compliance with P.D. No.
892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
REGISTRATION UNDER ACT NO. 3344; ineffective as against 3rd persons
The inscription under Act No. 3344 of a transaction relating to unregistered land
was held not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the law on
double sale of the same property. The registration should be made in the property
registry to be binding upon third persons; mere registration of a sale in ones favour
does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner
of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier
sale was unrecorded.
CHAPTER II
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient
execution of the laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive
and accelerated land reform and social justice program of the government,
there is created a commission to be known as the Land Registration
Commission under the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.
Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land
Registration Commission shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known,
respectively, as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall be appointed by the President.
The Commissioner shall be
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar
with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and
shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those
of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
The Deputy Commissioner, who shall
possess the same qualifications as those required of the
Commissioner,
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shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos
per annum less than that of the Commissioner.
He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration during the
absence or disability of the Commissioner and
when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall
have been designated or appointed in accordance with law.
The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other functions
as the Commissioner may assign to him.
They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary
in the interest of the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to
the Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each
receive compensation at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos per
annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner.
All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission
including those of the Registries of Deeds whose salaries are not herein
provided, shall receive salaries corresponding to the minimum of their
respective upgraded ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of Budget
Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum thereof across the board,
notwithstanding the maximum salary allowed for their respective civil service
eligibilities.
The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without
prejudice to such benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted
by the President or by the legislature to government employees.
All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
Section 6. General Functions.
(1) The Administrator of Land Registration shall have the following
functions:
a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the
courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance
by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of
title;
b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and
other personnel of the Commission;
c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from
decision of, Registers of Deeds;
d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and
personnel of the Courts of First Instance throughout the
Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and
functions in relation to the registration of lands;
e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated
relative to the registration of lands
and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules
and regulations therefor;
f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496
except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
(2) The Land Registration Authority shall have the following
functions:
a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the
implementation of the land reform program of the government;
b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings;
c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration
of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision
and consolidation plans of titled lands.
SEC. 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one
Register of Deeds for each province and one for each city.
Every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos
during the last three years shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds,
and every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than three hundred thousand
pesos
during the last three years, shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds and
o one second Deputy Register of Deeds.
The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial
jurisdiction of each Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, with the end in view of making every registry easily
accessible to the people of the neighboring municipalities. The province or city
shall furnish a suitable space or building for the office of the Register of Deeds
until such time as the same could be furnished out of national funds.
Registry of Property
in accordance with Sec. 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument except a will-
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is
not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but
it does not affect innocent 3rd persons.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned.
Between the two buyers of the same immovable property registered
under the Torrens System, the law gives ownership priority to
1) First registrant in good faith
2) First possessor in good faith
3) Buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
Effect of Registration
Constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing, or entering.
SEC. 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other
subordinate personnel; salaries. Registers of Deeds shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. Deputy Registers of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the
Registries of Deeds shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration. The salaries of
Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shall be at the following rates:
(1) First Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in
first class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos
per annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner.
(2) Second Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in
second class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred
pesos per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in first
class Registries.
(3) Third Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in
third class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos
per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in second class
Registries.
(4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and Second Deputy
Registers of Deeds shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per
annum less than those of their corresponding Registers of Deeds
and Deputy Registers of Deeds, respectively.
(5) The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, shall cause the reclassification
of Registries based either on work load or the class of province/
city, whichever will result in a higher classification, for purposes of
salary adjustments in accordance with the rates hereinabove
provided.
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of
Deeds. No person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been
admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been actually
engaged in such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a
like period in any branch of government the functions of which include the
registration of property.
The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Provided, however, That no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds
holding office as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof,
be removed from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary
except for cause and upon compliance with due process as provided for by
law.
SEC. 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments
affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the
province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper
documentary and science stamps and that
the same are properly cancelled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
o deny registration thereof and
o inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
o stating the ground or reason therefor, and
o advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
Office of the Register of Deeds
Public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city
wherein such office is situated
NATURE OF THE DUTIES OF LRA
General Rule:Its duty is ministerial those acts of functions that conform to an
instruction or a prescribed procedure. They act under the orders of the court and
the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record. If the LRA is in doubt as to the issuance and preparation
of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. In this sense, they
act as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the
act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
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The validity of the document is not for the register to determine for it is a function
of a court of competent jurisdiction. Validity is to be decided after the registration
in a litigation. In case of doubt, it shall be referred to the LRA
LRA shall after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken on the doubtful question which shall be conclusive and
binding upon all RoDs
Exception: LRA officials may exercise discretion in the following instances:
a) When obeying the courts order would result to double titling;
b) When there are several copies of title but only one is presented with
the instrument to be registered
c) Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of
conveyance bears the signature of only one spouse;
d) Where there is pending case in court where the character of the land
and the validity of conveyance is in issue;
o In this case, the matter of registration may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the
interested parties could be protected by the filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.
e) Where required certificates and documents are not submitted
May the RoD be compelled by mandamus?
No. Since the registration is a judicial function, it cannot be compelled by
mandamus. The interested party must resort to the available administrative
remedy before he can have recourse to the courts.
SEC. 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc.
1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a
province or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion
of the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds
to discharge his duties, said duties shall be performed by the following
officials, in the order in which they are mentioned below, unless the
Secretary of Justice designates another official to act temporarily in his
place:
a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of
Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second
Deputy Register of Deeds, should there be one;
b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second
Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or
any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City
Fiscal.
2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds
without pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice
may, in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional
compensation to the official acting as Register of Deeds, such additional
compensation together with his actual salary not to exceed the salary
authorized for the position thus filled by him.
3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of
a Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds
for the new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province
or city shall be the ex-officio Register of Deeds for said new province or
city.
SEC. 12. Owners Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every
Registry an index system which shall contain the names of all registered
owners alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall be
prepared in the name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all
lands registered in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within
ten days after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on collections
and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of
December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his
Registry.
SEC. 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic
Engineer in the Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical
adviser of the Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall be
responsible to him for all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a
geodetic engineer in said office. He shall perform such other functions as may,
from time to time, be assigned to him by the Commissioner.
PD 239
- Only the LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU has authority to approve
original survey plans for registration purposes.
- The grant of authority to the LRC to approve original survey plans has
resulted in wasteful overlapping or duplication of functions. There was
therefore a need to centralize in one agency, the LMB, the function of
verifying and approving original survey plans for all purposes in order
to assure compliance with established standards and minimize
irregularities in the execution of land surveys
Survey Plan
- serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land portion thereof already covered by previous
land registration, and to forestall the possibility of which by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
LABURADA V. LRA
FACTS: Spouses Laburada were the applicants for registration of a parcel of
land located in Mandaluyong City, RTC, acting as land registration court,
granted such application. After the finality of the decision, the Sps filed a motion
before the RTC requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration,
which was then granted by RTC. However, the LRA refused to do so. To this,
the Sps Laburada filed an action for mandamus.
LRA contends that such refusal is grounded on the fact that a portion of the
subject property was a subject of a land decree in court of land registration,
that if it will be pursued, it will result to double titling which destroys the policy
and purpose of the Torrens System. The SG sought to have the petition of the
Sps Laburada dismissed after it found out on its investigation that the title
issued for the subject lot cannot be located.
ISSUE: w/n the LRA can be compelled to issue the decree of registration
through an action for mandamus (for ministerial duties)? NO
HELD:
There are three reasons why Mandamus is not the right remedy
1) JUDGMENT IS NOT YET EXECUTORY
- The judgment Sps Laburada seek to enforce is not yet executory
and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. They do not
have any clear legal right to implement it. It was ruled previously
that a judgment of registration does not become incontrovertible
until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.
2) A VOID JUDGMENT IS POSSIBLE
- LRAs refusal to issue a decree is based on documents which, if
verified, may render the judgment of the TC void. To this, LRAs
hesitation to issue a decree is understandable, even imperative. If
it issues the decree, it will destroy the integrity of the Torrens
System. LRA is mandated to refer to the courts any doubt it may
have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of
registration. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance
to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
Since in this case, the subject property has already been decreed
by the court for registration. Hence, LRA is divested of jurisdiction.
3) ISSUANCE OF A DECREE IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
- It is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act, which may be compelled thorough mandamus. This
is because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.
Writ of mandamus can only be had when the plaintiffs legal right
to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,
mandamus cannot issue.
ABRIGO V. DE VERA
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to
the first registrant in good faith
then, the first possessor in good faith; and
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.
FACTS:
Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-
Go covered by a tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-
Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved. The said free
patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the
Spouses Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera
registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo
before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the
instant (RTC) case that neither of them can physically take possession of the
property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.
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RTC JUDGMENT
Compromise Agreement approved.
Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy
back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in
favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff
shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed
to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses
Abrigo as well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners
and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
CA JUDGMENT
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid
one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since
Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita
Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also
dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis
to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and
for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens
title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.
HELD: DE VERA
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria
Villafania first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from
whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was
executed by Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of
the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they
registered their respective sales under Act 3344 For her part, respondent
registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale,
Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper
registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present
case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court
upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final
conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was
not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at
the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason,
inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens
system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered
under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
NOTES:
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of
PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale
is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not
affect innocent third persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules of
registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is
without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has
been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore
the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else
even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein
that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered
under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of
the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and
was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a
complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying
[Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution
sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was
registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered
land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the
time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of
petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment
debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
3. Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire
the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title
is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.We explained the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second
buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article
1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith.
Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior
jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer
registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil
Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights
under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second
buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such
knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by
Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first
buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show
that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the
first buyers rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to
him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.34 (Italics
supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving
a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in
the certificate. Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to
go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such
condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.Following
this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a
purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof
whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.
CHAPTER III
(ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS)
SECTION 14
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Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro
may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the
applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of
any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument
creating the trust.
Registration the entry of instruments or deeds in book or public registry. To
register, means to enter in a register, to record formally or distinctly, to enroll; to
enter in a list.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) The first title issued in the name of a registered
owner by the ROD over a parcel of land registered under the Torrens System by
virtue of
a) Judicial or
b) Administrative proceedings.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Subsequent issuance of ROD pursuant to any
voluntary and involuntary instrument relating to the same land.
Note: Registration proceedings may be in rem or in personam. The following are
its distinctions.
In rem Binds the whole world
In personam To enforce a personal right against a person
Quasi in rem Deals with status, ownership or liability of a particular property.
It only operates on the question between the parties.This is not to ascertain or
cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
SECTION 14 (1) OCENPO
-Registration under the first paragraph of Section 14 requires the concurrence of
the following
REQUISITES:
(1) Land applied for is an agricultural public land classified as alienable and
disposable land at the time;
(2) Application for registration is filed with the proper court;
(3) Applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
OCENPO thereof, under bona fide claim of ownership;
(4) Such possession and occupation has been effected since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
SECTION 14 (2) PRESCRIPTION
PRESCRIPTION LACHES
an extraordinary mode of acquiring or the unreasonable delay in the
losing of ownership and other real bringing of a cause of action before
rights through the lapse of time in the the courts of justice. It is also referred
manner and under the conditions laid to as sleeping on your rights
down by law.
A matter of time A question of equity
It is statutory not statutory
It is based on law based on equity
based on a fixed time the period varies
on a case-to-case basis
The basis for Sec. 14 (2) is found in Article 1113 of the Civil Code
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
Maam: You have to be specific, because not all lands of public domain are
inalienable. Patrimonial properties of the State are still considered public domain.
Patrimonial property Property owned by the State but which is not devoted to
public use, public service, or the development of national wealth. It is wealth owned
by the State in its private capacity.
For private lands, which are patrimonial properties of the State, to be
acquired via prescription, the following must concur:
1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription, 10 years possession in good faith and
with just title; or
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription, uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith and just
title; and There must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
Facts:
In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed that he purchased the
land from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in OCENPO of the land for more than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanans witness, testified before the court that the
property originally belonged to a 22- hectare property owned by Lino Velazco, her
great-grandfather. Lino had 4 sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban.
Esteban is Aristedes grandfather. The property was divided among the 4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Estebans wife, became the administrator of all the properties
of the Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died, their son Virgilio
succeded them in administering the properties, including the subject land, which is
owned by his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was presented
verifying the said land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of Malabanan. Republic
appealed, now represented by the OSG, CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/Ruling:
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER TO BE
REGISTRABLE UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF JUNE 12, 1945.
The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12, 1945 cannot be
registered either under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government form giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D. Such unreasonableness
is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945, Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state. The SC cited the case of Naguit. Such decision
provides that the Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 only requires the property sought to
be registered as already A&D at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the application, it
is presumed that the State is still reserving its right to utilize the property. But in
this case, the property was already classified as A&D, this shows an intention of
the State to abdicate its authority over the land.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT A LAND CLASSIFIED AS A&D BE
DEEMED PRIVATE LAND AND THEREFORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
ACQUISITION BY PRESCRIPTION.
In this case, the petitioners primarily based their registration bid on Sec. 14 (2) of
PD 1529 or prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
SC said, unlike Sec 14(1), Sec 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. The SC also said that the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code is applicable in Sec 14 (2).Article 1113 of the Civil Code
says that only the patrimonial property of the state can be subject to prescription.
Also it is clear that land which is part of public dominion cannot be alienated even
if it is declared A&D. There must be a declaration of the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial for the period of
prescription to run. Without these, the property remains to be of public dominion.
Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession while
Sec. 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and
the Public Land Act, while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both
by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
Also, Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act is based on possession,
Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code. The rules on prescription under the Civil Code do not apply to Sec 14 (1)
since there is no such intent manifested by the legislature and that PD 1529 is
neither superior nor inferior than Civil Code, legislature is not bound to adhere on
Civil Code framework.
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AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT MALABANAN IS ENTITLED TO
REGISTER THE PROPERTY BASED ON SECTION 14 (1) OR SECTION 14(2)
OF PD 1529 OR BOTH.
The SC said that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
thas acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since June,
12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, as
evidenced a tax declaration, is to the year 1848. Therefore, they cannot register
the land under Sec. 14 (1). Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2)
as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared A&D in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use, public
service, or for the development of the national wealth. The classification of the
subject property as A&D land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription
RP V. CA AND NAGUIT
Section 14 (1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. A contrary interpretation renders par. (1) Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D.
SEC. 14 (3) ACCESSION AND ACCRETION
A. Accession Refers to the right of an owner of a thing to its products as
well as whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an accessory. The
accessory follows the principal.
Basis in the Civil Code
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.
Requisites of Accession (applies to lakes, creeks, and streams):
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the river.
B. Accretion and Alluvion
Accretion defined as the addition of portions of soil, by gradual
deposition through the operation of natural causes, to that already in the
possession of the owner. (Blacks Law)
Alluvion It refers to the accretion made by flow of rivers. A form of
accession natura , which is provided for in Articles 457 and 461.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed.
Requisites of Accretion or Alluvion:
1) The change must be sudden;
2) The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and not
temporary over flooding of anothers land;
3) The change of the river must be a natural one, not by artificial means;
4) There must be definite abandonment by the government;
5) The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up
or disappear.
Rationale of the law on accretion:
- It is primarily anchored on the principle or right of accession in Art.
457. Also, to compensate the owner for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his lands.
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP IN ANY MANNTER PROVIDED FOR BY
LAW
o RESERVATION FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC PURPOSE
GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners Grande are the owners of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of
Magsaysay, province of Isabela. They inherited the said land from their mother
who inherited the same from her parents. The land is registered in the name of the
parents of their mother. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration in 1930,
the northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, a gradual accretion
on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River.
That by 1958, an alluvial deposit of 19, 964 square meters, more or less, had been
added to the registered area.
In 1958, Grandes filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion.
They alleged that they and their predecessor-in-interest were formerly in peaceful
and continuous possession of the said land until the Calalungs entered upon the
said land under claim of ownership in 1948. The Calalungs, on the other hand,
asserts that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of
the land since prior to the year 1933 up to the present.
RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered Calalungs to vacate the premises.
The lower court said that the land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land, the same belongs to Grandes. That the same cannot be acquired
by prescription since it is considered a registered property under Section 46, Act
496, hence, it could not be acquired by prescription. CA overturned RTCs decision
saying that prescription has already set in favor of the Calalungs.
Issue: WON Calalungs acquired the alluvial property in question through
prescription?
Ruling:
It is undisputed that under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners Grande are the
lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. Any alluvial deposits adjoining ones land does not become
ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. To obtain the
protection of imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws where in certain judicial procedures have been provided.
In this case, Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property until the
present action. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled to the protection of imprescriptibility, which means it was
subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd persons. Furthermore, in this
case, the CA found that Calalungs were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933
or 1934 until 1958. The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided
in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code since the New Civil Code rules
on prescription were not yet in force. The SC finally said that Calalungs acquired
the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription.
Alluvial formation along the seashore forms part of the public domain
- It may only be disposed of if there is a formal declaration by the government that
the same is A and D. Its
disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Land
Management Bureau.
SEC. 14 (4) IN ANY OTHER MANNER PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
1) Presidential proclamation reserving lands for specific public purpose
The president has the authority to set aside lands from sale/public
acquisition and reserve them to public use, even though this might
defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are
not subject to entry and may not be the subject of lawful settlement.
Example:
1) Proclamation 791. It set aside a parcel of land for the University of the
Philippines College of Agriculture even though a logger-corporation had
been possessing the land by virtue of a timber license. (International
hardwood vs. University of the Phil.)
2) Proclamation 350 was a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center even
though the occupant possessed a sales patent. (Republic & Mindanao
Medical Center vs. CA)
3) Proclamation 180 set aside a parcel of land upon which a public school was
to be built. The occupant could not prove OCENPO and could not therefore
assert a superior right over the school. (Republic vs. Doldol)
RP BY MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER V. CA
FACTS:
In 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied
with Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a land situated in Davao City, the subject
property applied for was a portion of what was known as Davao Cadastre. Bureau
of Lands accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the land. The Director of Lands
annulled the auction sale by reason of non-participation of Eugenio due to non-
service of notice.
Bidding was held where Eugenio was the lone bidder, he equaled the bid
previously submitted by Dr. Ebro which is P100.50 per hectare. An order of award
was then given to Eugenio. Thereafter, A survey was conductedand the same was
approved. In 1936, the DL ordered the amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio saying that a portion of the property is needed by the Philippine Army for
military campsite. The area excluded was identified was Lot 1176 B 2, the land
in question which consists of 12.8 hectares. In the same year, President Manuel
Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing the subject lot from sale
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and settlement and reserving it for military purposes. Then, Eugenio paid for
the installment for the Sales Patent, this payment did not include the military
campsite after it was excluded from the application. Finally, in 1948, the Sales
Patent was awarded to him by DL and by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Subsequently, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked
Proclamation No. 85 which opened the subject property to disposition under
the provisions of the Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters. However,
the same revocation was superseded by another order reserving the lot for
medical center site. In 1969, Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
registration of the land under Torrens System claiming a fee simple title.
Respondents De Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father has
prior vested right on the property.
RTC Davao ruled in favor of MMC. CA overturned RTCs decision recognizing De
Jesus alleged vested right.
ISSUE: WON De Jesus has vested right and is consequently entitled to the
registration of the property in dispute?
RULING:
No. President Magsaysays proclamation (No. 350) legally effected a land grant to
MMC of the whole lot and not only a portion thereof. Such land grant amounts to
a fee simple title or absolute title in favor of MMC.
Section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president to
reserve from sale or other disposition to the private domain of the Government of
the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The land
reserved shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such Executive Order
until otherwise provided by law.
Section 83 of the Public Land Act authorizes the President to issue proclamation
to declare lands reserved for public use or when the public interest requires it.
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege
rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed
to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that
unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain
portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title,
or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents,
the property must be held to be part of the public domain
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenior de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would
anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site
when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936.
B. LAND ACQUISITION BY PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Ownership by Corporations
History
1935 It allowed private juridical entities to acquire alienable lands of
Constitution public domain, which shall only be less than 1, 024 hectares.
1973 Section 11, Article 14 of the said constitution stated that no
Constitution private corporation xxx may hold alienable lands except by
lease not to exceed 1000 hectares in area.
1987 Section 3, Article 12 retained the 1973 Constitutions
Constitution limitations, but added lease period not exceeding 25 years
and renewable for not more than 25 years.
General Rule: Corporations are disqualified from owning alienable lands of
public domain except through lease.
Exception: Where at the time the Corporation acquired the land, its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with OCENPO as to entitle him
registration in his name. The Constitutional prohibition will no longer apply as
the land, by virtue of prescription has become private. (Suzi vs. Razon)
DOL V. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER
146 SCRA 509
Facts:
In 1981, Acme Plywood and Veneers Co. Inc. applied for a land registration of 5
parcels (481, 390 sqm) of land it allegedly acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
both member of the Dumagat tribe. The Infiels substantiates their ownership
saying that their ancestors have possessed and occupied the land from generation
to generation until it came into their possession. Acme contended in its application
that their adverse and continuous possession since 1962 and by tacking their
possession to that of the possession of the Infiels, they have already acquired title
over it; that the ownership of lands by corporations is governed by the 1935
Constitution. Acme further proves that the subject land is a private land after it
ownership was given to the non-Christian tribes pursuant to RA 3872. That
also, they have introduced more than 45 million pesos worth of improvements on
the land. Also that their ownership is recognized by Municipality of Isabela through
the donation it made which was accepted by the former.
The Director of Lands opposed to nothing of the allegations except the applicability
of the 1935 Constitution. DL contends that the registration was commenced only
in 1981 which was long after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Article 14 Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares. This proscription is not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force the time Acme bought the land in question. Hence,
it cannot be registered under Sec. 48 of CA 141. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the
Director of Lands.
Issue: WON the title Infiels transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor
of Acme? And WON 1973 Constitution should apply?
Ruling:
The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
transferable title in 1962 when Acme purchased it. Acme also had a perfect right
to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 constitution prohibiting
Corporations from acquiring and owning private lannds. Even if the land remained
technically public land despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no question to Acmes right
to acquire the same since there is no prohibition for corporation to acquire
incomplete or imperfect title. The only limitation was that corporations could
not hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1, 024. 1973
Constitution also cannot defeat a right already vested before the law came
into effect, or invalidate transaction then perfectly valid and proper
What is a Corporation Sole?
It is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. It
consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at
a time), who are incorporated by law to give them some legal capacity to
administer church properties that come into their possession.
They are not treated as ordinary private corporation. As by the nature of its
incorporation, it is empowered by law to purchase and hold real estate and
personal property.
Vested rights
It is some right or interest in property, which has become fixed and
established and no longer open to doubt or controversy. It cannot be
impaired without violating ones right to due process.
Judicial confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
AYOG VS. CUSI
146 SCRA 15
FACTS:
In 1953, the Director of Lands granted Binan Development Co., Inc. its Sales
Application of the land located in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares. There
were protesters but then their protest was dismissed by the Director and ordered
them to vacate the subject lot. No appeal was made from the decision. Despite
that, the squatters defied the Director of Lands order to vacate. An ejectment suit
was brought which caused the delay of the issuance of the patent.
The Director of Lands recommended to the Secretary of Natural Resources the
approval of the Sales Patent saying that the Corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, that the land
in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent
was legal, and the said issuance is an exception to the prohibition of ownership by
private corporation.
The Secretary of Natural Resources noted that the applicant had acquired a vested
right to issuance. Subsequently, the ejectment suit was decided in favor of the
corporation. However, the squatters alleged that the adoption of the 1973
Constitution was a supervening fact that will make the issuance of patent
illegal since no private corporation is allowed to hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.
ISSUE: WON BInan Development Corporation may validly acquire the Sales
Patent despite the prohibition embodied in the 1973 Constitution? Yes.
RULING:
The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Corp. because it has already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time of the 1973 Constitution took effect. Such vested right
has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
A vested right is defined as when the right to enjoyment has become the property
of some person as a present interest, or, it is some right or interest in property
which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. In this case, it is undisputed that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the effect of
segregating the said land from public domain. The petitioners contention that their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property should fail, the SC said,
they should have applied for patent applications if it is true.
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Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
ZARA V. DOL Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
FACTS: oppositors-appellees.
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of 107 hectares JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES
parcel of land pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land (SECTION 48 (b) of CA 141)
had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn Period of possession for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect title:
acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Historical Background
Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land LAW DATE OF RULE
Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the EFFECTIVITY
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, PLA- 926 Oct. 17, 1903 OCENPO of agricultural lands for 10 years
on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous before the effectivity of this Act
and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years
2 PLA
nd Nov. 29, 1919 OCENPO of agricultural lands (excluding
immediately preceding the application.
2874 timber and mineral lands) of the public
domain, under bona fide claim of acquisition
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by
of ownership, since JULY 26, 1894
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
RPLA 141 Dec. 1, 1936 Possession and occupation of lands of the
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of
public domain since JULY 26, 1984 only
107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied
limited to Filipinos
for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent RA 1942 June 22, 1957 Possession and occupation for atleast 30
Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel years immediately preceding the filing of the
sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said application
decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, PD 1073 January 25, Land must be A&D (not anymore agricultural
Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty 1977 lands of the public domain, it must be
(60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, possessed and occupied since June 12,
according to them, was OCENCO that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of 1945
the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their
imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same The amendment from agricultural lands to A & D is not a substantial
issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. amendment because only agricultural lands are alienable. The prevailing
Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is rule for OCENPO is not anymore 30 years. It is now since June 12, 1945
concerned, there is already "res-judicata" in other words, the cause of action of or earlier. The amendment was made to jive with Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr requirement for
transferred to the Director of Lands. OCENPO) preclude application for registration of alienable lands of public
domain commenced only after June 12, 1945?
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as No, considering Section 14(2) still allows acquisition of alienable lands of
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its public domain through prescription. In civil law, prescription is one of the
opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been wars of acquiring public land. So even if the possession was commenced
declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case. later than June 12, 1945, you may still qualify under Section 14(2).

The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss Requirements for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is 1) The land must form part of the A&D agricultural lands of the public
declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be domain;
the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only 2) Applicant must have been in OCENPO
the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent 3) Under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or since
or by homestead." June 12, 1945

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor
the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
ISSUE:
whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente
S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land,
precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial
confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended.
HELD:
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by
Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative:
- for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or
- for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse
and continuous possession for at least thirty years.
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative,
since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had
constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land
in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated
in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the
land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein
is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public
domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he
is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the
necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that
they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for
its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
RA 8371
Oct. 29, 1997
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
CARINO V. INSULAR
Facts:
Carino applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Benguet province.
Carino alleges that:
a. His predecessors has been in the possession of the land for more than 50
years.
b. He was inherited the land under the Igorot customs.
However, it was not shown that Carino has a document of title to prove ownership
such as royal grant. The dispute arose when the government opposed the
registration contending that the land in question belonged to the State.
That the Spanish law provides that all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown (Jura
Regalia), and it could not have been acquired by Carino since prescription does
not lie against the crown.
Issue: WON Carinos application should be granted? YES.
Ruling:
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title. The Supreme
Court of the United States through Justice Holmes had this to say: It might
perhaps be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership. It
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
Conquest, and never to have been in Public Land. It was further ruled that Carinos
kind of title, a native title, is an exception to Jura Regalia.
CRUZ V. DENR
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its
implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For
this reason, it prays that the petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa
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countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also, that the
law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found
within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same.
According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The
constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains.
That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only
agricultural lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable and
disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources
and 1/3 of the countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while
60 million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These figures violates the
constitutional principle of a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot
be Alienated or Ceded
Ancestral Domain- refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
Ancestral Land refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or
traditional ownership
Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains, which, as far back
as memory reaches, have been held under claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs.
Time Immemorial period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner
IPRA connotes group or communal ownership. Ancestral domains are
private, but community property
Private- since it is not part of the public domain
Community ancestral domain is owned in common and not by 1
particular person
Ownership over the natural resources STILL belong to the State
- ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them
for future generation. The rights of IPs take the form of management
and stewardship
Modes of Acquisition of Ancestral domains and ancestral lands by the IP
a) Applicant must be a member of indigenous cultural group;
b) He must have been in possession of an individually-owned ancestral
land for not less than 30 years
c) By operation of law (IPRA), the land is already classified as A&D land,
even if it has a slop of 18% hence there is no need to submit a separate
certification that the land is A&D
Transfer of land or property rights
1) Only the members of the ICCs/IPs
2) In accord with customary laws and customs
3) Subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15
years if the land was transferred to a non-member of ICCs/IPs
Mining Operations on Ancestral Land
General Rule: Not allowed
Exception: If the ICCs concerned consent to it
In the event of an agreement of mining operations
1) Parties shall agree upon the Royalty payment
2) The Royalty payment shall form part of trust fund for the socio-
economic well-being of the ICC
Members of the cultural communities are given priority in awarding of SMALL-
SCALE MINING CONTRACTS- Sec. 7, 7076
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
1) Jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs
o Condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdictions:
Exhaustion of all remedies provided under their customary
laws and a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute and
that it was not resolved.
2) It has the authority to issue Certificates of Ancestral Lands Title
(CALT) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
3) It has OEJ over petition for cancellation of CADT and CALT
alleged to have been fraudulently acquired to any person
4) Issuance of certification as a precondition to grant of permit for
disposition
5) Power to cite for contempt and issue restraining orders
Ancestral Domains Office
- Responsible for identification, delineation, and recognition of ancestral
lands/domains
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT
OF NON-TENANCY
SEC. 104. Provisional Register of Documents. The Department of Agrarian
Reform shall prepare by automate data processing a special registry book to be
known as the Provisional Register of Documents issued under PD-27 which
shall be kept and maintained in every Registry of Deeds throughout the country.
Said Registry Book shall be a register of:
a) All Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued pursuant to P.D. No. 27; and
b) All subsequent transactions affecting Certificates of Land Transfer such as
adjustments, transfer, duplication and cancellations of erroneous Certificates
of Land Transfer
SEC. 105. Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents.
The Department of Agrarian reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27 issue in
duplicate, a Certificate of Land Transfer for every land brought under Operation
Land Transfer, the original of which shall be kept by the tenant-farmer and the
duplicate, in the Registry of Deeds.
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant
of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously
titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on the aforementioned
Emancipation Patent and shall assign an original certificate of title number in case
of unregistered land, and in case of registered property, shall issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title without requiring the surrender of the
owners duplicate of the title to be cancelled.
In case of death of the grantee, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall determine
his heirs or successors-in-interest and shall notify the Register of Deeds
accordingly. In case of subsequent transfer of property covered by an
Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from an Emancipation
Patent, the Register of Deeds shall effect the transfer only upon receipt of the
supporting papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform.
No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged or imposed in connection with
the issuance of an original Emancipation Patent and for the registration of related
documents.
TENANT EMANCIPATION DECREE
(PD 27)
(Oct. 21, 1972)
Applicability/Coverage
This applies to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease
tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not
Retention Limits/Award Ceiling
A farmer shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-
size farm of
o 6 hectares if not irrigated
o 3 hectares if irrigated
Landowner Retention Limit
o 7 hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or
will now cultivate it
Cost of Land/Compensation
The land shall be equivalent to 2 times the average harvest of 3
normal crop years
It shall be paid by the tenant in 15 equal annual amortizations
including interest at the rate of 6% per annum
Requisite before the title to the land owned be actually issued to the
tenant farmer
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Tenant farmer should become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized 2) Regular farmworkers;
farmers cooperative 3) Seasonal farmworkers;
4) Other farmworkers;
Transferability of title acquired to PD 27 5) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands
Only through hereditary succession or to the Govt in accordance w/ 6) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries
pertinent laws 7) Others directly working on the land

children of landowners who are qualified shall be given preference.

Actual land-tillers shall not, however, be ejected or removed therefrom
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude,
and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM Support services shall be extended equally to women and men agrarian
(RA 6657) reform beneficiaries
Aug. 7, 2009
Agrarian Reform - redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits
produced, to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective Retention Limits of Landowners
of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services o Maximum of 5 hectares
designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other o 3 hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner subject
arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as to the following qualifications
production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares 1. Atleast 15 years of age
of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of 2. He is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
the lands they work farm
Retention limits shall not apply to LGUs acquiring private agricultural land
Agricultural land land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act by expropriation or other modes of acquisition be used for public
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. purposes

Agricultural activity cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit Disposition or Sale of retained land by land owner
trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm Valid, as long as the total landholding that shall be owned by the
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed
conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or the landholding ceilings
juridical.
Award ceiling to beneficiaries
Coverage o 3 hectares
All public and private agricultural lands including lands of public domain o It may be a contiguous tract or several parcels of land cumulate up
suitable for agriculture to the prescribed award limits
All lands in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress
All other lands owned by the govt devoted to or suitable for agriculture Landless Beneficiary owns less than 3 ha. Of agricultural lands
All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the Determination of just compensation
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon 1. Cost of acquisition of the land
o Except landholdings of landowners with a total area of 5 2. Value of the standing crop
hectares below 3. Current value of like properties
4. Its nature, actual use, and income
Exemptions and Exclusions from CARP coverage 5. Sworn valuation by the owner
1) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, 6. Tax declarations
forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding 7. Assessment made by government assessors
grounds, watersheds and mangroves; 8. 70% zonal valuation by the BIR
2) Private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds, provided that the same have not been Manner of Payment
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award issued to It shall be paid by the beneficiaries to the LBP in 30 annual amortization
agrarian reform beneficiaries under the CARP; of 6% interest per annum
3) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be Payment for the first 3 years may be at reduced amounts
necessary for: LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded, it may be
a. National defense, school sites and campuses, foreclosed by the LBP for nonpaymnet of an aggregate of 3 annual
including experimental farm stations operated by public amortizations
or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and Beneficiary whose land was foreclosed shall be permanently disqualified
seeding research and pilot production center from becoming a beneficiary
b. Church sites and convents, mosque sites and Islamic
centers, common burial grounds Transferability of awarded lands (CLOA)
c. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by only through hereditary succession, to the government, or to the LBP, or
inmates to other qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a period of 10 years
d. Government and private research and quarantine
centers Voluntary Land Transfer
e. All lands with 18% slope and over, except those already landowners of agricultural lands may enter into a voluntary arrangement
developed to direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to
Agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into residential, guidelines set in the law
commercial or industrial uses excluded Payment shall be made by the farmer-beneficiary to the land owner under
This is based on DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides terms to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
that with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands It shall be binding upon them, upon registration with the approval by the
covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the DAR
authority of the DAR to approve such conversion may be Approval is deemed given, unless notice of disapproval is received by
exercised from the date of its effectivity or on June 15, 1988. the farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration
Thus, all lands already classified as commercial, industrial or In case they dont agree on the price, the procedure for compulsory
residential before that date no longer need any conversion acquisition shall apply
clearance from the DAR. LBP may extend financing to the beneficiaries

Homesteads
While PD No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of
the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, it cannot
defeat the very purpose of the Public Land Act which has
been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor.
When the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or that the land will have greater economic value
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes
The DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the land-owner, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition Provided that
the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation Irrigated and irrigable lands,
shall not be subject to conversion

Qualified Beneficiaries Jurisdiction of DAR

Landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless a) Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority reform
1) Agricultural lessees and share tenants; b) Resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems
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c) Approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although
d) readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses appropriated. The word initial simply means that additional amounts may
be appropriated later when necessary.
Appeals
DAR decision
4) Finally, on the contention that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it requires
15 days from the receipt CA by certiorari
the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation
Notwithstanding appeal to the CA, the decision of the DAR shall be
therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed,
immediately executory.
the Court held that the law is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
Jurisdiction of DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State
a) Determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose, but deals with a
implementation of CARP
revolutionary kind of expropriation (which) affects all private agricultural
b) Cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of EPs
lands. (S)uch a program will involve not mere millions of pesos (but)
and CLOAs which are registered with the ROD.
hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the
amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it
For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be a tenancy relationship
is by our present standards.
between the parties which has the following elements:
1. Parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee
Based on the slogan: Land for the Landless
2. Subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land
1935 constitution mandated the policy of social justice to ensure the well-being
3. Consent between the parties to the relationship
and economic security of all the people, especially the less privileged.
4. Purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
agricultural lessee
- founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
6. Harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
- who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
agricultural lessee
- in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
Note: If the action is brought before the trial court, it must determine first the
To this end, the State shall
existence of tenancy relationship. If there is, then it should dismiss the case.
- encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
It there is no such relationship, then it has jurisdiction over the case. Finding
- subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
by DAR of such relationship is merely preliminary and does not bind the
may prescribe,
courts.
o taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation.
An action to enforce rights as a tenant is barred by prescription
- In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
If not filed within 3 years
landowners.
Special Agrarian Court designated by the RTC shall have the following
o The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
original and exclusive jurisdiction
land-sharing.
1) All petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and
3844 - Agricultural land reform code (aug. 8, 1963)
2) Prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657
PD 27 - compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for land owners (Oct. 21, 1972)
Titles issued pursuant to PD 27 and RA 6657 shall become indefeasible and
imprescriptible after 1 year from their registration in the ROD
EO 228 - full ownership in favor of PD 27 beneficiaries and providing valuation of
still unvalued lands
Jurisdiction of DAR and DARAB
PP 131- CARP and EO 229 providing mechanisms for its implementation
DAR DARAB RA 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, by P. Aquino (June
Prior to registration with the ROD After registration with ROD 10, 1988)
Case involving issuance, recall or Issuance, correction or cancellation
cancellation of CLOAs and EPs of CLOAs or EPs

NATALIA REALTY V. DAR

MODES OF ACQUIRING PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND
1) Operation Land Transfer
2) Volutary Offer to Sell
3) Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme
4) Compulsory Acquisition
5) Voluntary Stock Distribution in the case of corporation
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural
lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Lands
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 are outside its
coverage Natalia vs. DAR
Lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. It declared as unconstitutional the provision in RA 6657 insofar
as it included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform Luz Farms vs.
Secretary of DAR
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SAR (1989)
1) the requirement of public use has been settled by the Constitution itself. It
noted that (n)o less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform which is
the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners,
subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The Court also declared
that the law is a valid exercise by the State of the police power and the power
of eminent domain.
Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of CARL are outside its coverage
HELD:
Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of CARL by government agencies other than DAR. Thus, for instance, the
conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision for residential use and
developed such prior to the passage of the law excluded the area for CARL
coverage because it ceased to be devoted to agricultural activity.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent
DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of
CARL.
LUZ FARMS V. SECRETARY
Farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine not covered
in determining the area of land to be excluded, AO No. 9 fixed the following
retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of
animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from
the operations of the CARL.

2) On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters
have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated.

3) And on the alleged payment of public money as just compensation without

the corresponding appropriation, the Court said that there is no rule that only
money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. The

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