ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURSE OUTLINE

SEPTEMBER 16

I. General Considerations

Sources:

Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies

- Article IX, Constitution
- Social Security Act- established the Social Security Commission
- Administrative Code of 1987 (http://www.gov.ph/1987/07/25/executive-
order-no-292/)

II. Doctrine of Separation of Powers

* Book II, Administrative Code of 1987
Cases
- Planas vs. Gil, 67 phil 62
Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President
The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases.
- Government of Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 276
The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the
government is interested essentially an executive act
The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,
through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The
Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such
exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is
allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
- Occena vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 759
Delegating to administrative agencies the power to make rules and
regulations.

III. Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

Cases
- Sec. of DOTC vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129
Power of the president to reorganize the government
YES. The President through his duly constituted political agent and
alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case may legally and
 validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region with the concomitant transfer and
performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.
- Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196
Power of congress to abolish
NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it
can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken
stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is
primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature
has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.

On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to

1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by
petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable
conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize is
limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity,

albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its

attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was
not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and
program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: Attachment. (a)
This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy
and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having
the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
 having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through
its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for
the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
- Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713
Power of the president to dismiss
Under the law, Career Executive Service Officers, namely
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by
the President.

Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining

authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle
that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts

no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service
officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-
distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus
with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a
period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer,
petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees
of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as
amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes
enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a
presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the
license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact
that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the
recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause
and in accordance with procedural due process.

IV. Powers of Administrative Agencies

Cases:
- Phil. Ass. of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, et al 212 SCRA 298
Rule-making power of administrative body
the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit
grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants
the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor
 shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is here by
authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
- Mateo v. Court of Appeals 247 SCRA 284
RTC without jurisdiction over civil action involving employee of quasi
public corporation
MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198,
known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In
Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions, the Court en
banc ruled that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of

GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
Rules and Regulations. PD No. 807, EO 292, and Rule II section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service
Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against
illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by
a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government
involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the
CSC.

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.

The CSC under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are
unappealable and subject only to this Court's Certiorari judgment.
Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
- Carino v. Capulong 222 SCRA 593
Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a
discretionary duty
The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a
petition for mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their
application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational
institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial
duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
 discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of
judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a

ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function
on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in
accordance with and not in violation of the law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government

grant of permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg.
232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the
rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools
(Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a
discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a

permit in blatant violation of law. Public respondent has no ministerial
duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City
before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application
has been first processed in accordance with the rules and regulations
on the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law
to grant such permit or to allow such operation without a permit,
without first processing an application. To do so is violation of the
Educational Act
- Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be

expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will
have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies.

- Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425

Presidential power of control over executive departments
YES. Implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive
Award System has been decentralized to the President or to the head of
each department of agency -

V. Delegation of Power
Cases
- Eastern Shipping Lines, inc vs. POEA, 160 SCRA 533
Undue delegation of legislative authority
GR: Non-delegation of powers.
E: It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power (MEMORIZE!)

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power,
1.) COMPLETENESS TEST - the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2.) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - there must be adequate guidelines
or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.

- Tatad vs. Secretary of Dept. of Energy (G.R. No. 124360, Nov. 5,

1997)

We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the
constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged
law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck down
laws abridging the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to
offend the other more powerful branches of government. There is no
reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the
economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big
business within reasonable bounds.
 - Pelaez vs. The Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24,
1965
Sufficiency of standards
No There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and
b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.

In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public

welfare may require which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will
not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the
first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is
the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is
the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

SEPTEMBER 21

VI. Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power

Cases
- Abella, Jr.. v. Civil Service Commission, 442 SCRA 507
The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function
as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process,
are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential
to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to

heads of departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it
had been issued as an incident of the administrative bodys power to issue guidelines
for government officials to follow in performing their duties.
 - Smart Communication v. NTC 408 SCRA 678
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to

hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it.

only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the

exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers distinguished
- Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 116356 June 29, 1998

Nature of quasi-legislative power

Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service

charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for
foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude that
E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may
not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid

only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion
whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it.
Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular
and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

- Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328

Administrative regulation must be reasonable

The Presidents exercise of such authority does not constitute undue

delegation of powers of Congress because
 The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and
the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law
consists in that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to what
the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; the latter can be done.

- Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. 146 SCRA 120

Administrative rule with penal sanction

NO. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of
law. There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of
administrative agencies.

No lesser administrative, executive office, or agency then can, contrary

to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the
constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the
legislative enactment. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose
a penalty not so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation of the
rules and regulations, much less one that is applied retroactively.

VII. Quasi-Judicial Power

Cases
- Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 509 SCRA 332, 369-370.

Nature of quasi-judicial power

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is

the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power
 to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it

- Cuenca vs. Atas, 535 SCRA 48

Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process

In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings where the magistrates

or tribunals hearing the case are not bound by the niceties and finer
points of judicial due process, the CARDINAL PRIMARY
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. x x x
2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence presented. x x x
3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. x x x
4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but the evidence must be
substantial. x x x
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. x x x
6) The [c]ourt x x x or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. x x x
7) [The court] should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if

based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority.

It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are

generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence in the records of the case. It is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or
 office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the
latters findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this
Court.
- Scenarios, Inc. vs. Vinluan, G.R. No. 173283 September 17, 2008
Technical rules not applicable

Service of notices and resolutions, including summons, in cases filed

before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of
the New NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven,

official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial
proceedings regularly conducted. This presumption of the regularity of
the quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC includes the
presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. It is
therefore incumbent upon herein petitioners to rebut that legal
presumption with competent and proper evidence, for the return of the
registered mail as unclaimed is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein.

- Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 344

Phil. 723, 736
Procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly
construed
procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly
construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor
cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be
relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the
complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the
parties. The Court said that it is ever mindful of the underlying spirit
and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case
speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process. So long as there is a
substantial compliance, a party can be placed under the jurisdiction of
the labor court.

In the case at bar, there is substantial compliance when summons was

served to Jose Edmundo Pison who was also the administrator of the
Hacienda. Petitioner is therefore adequately represented by Pison in
the proceedings in the labor tribunal. If at all, the non-inclusion of the
corporate name of PADC in the case before the executive labor arbiter
was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction
of the labor tribunals.
- Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners 28SCRA345
Right against self-incrimination
 The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of
Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance
with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take
the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against
himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation
of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee
protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his
guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

- United Pepsi-Cola supervisory Union vs. Laguesma 288 SCRA 15

- Delfin vs. Inciong 192 SCRA 151

Res Adjudicata
: While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the
union, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The real party
who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the name of the union is
the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become final and
executory, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic for the same
violations committed during its existence is barred by Res Judicata. The bringing of the
same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take out the
case from the ambit of the principle of Res Judicata.

VIII. Administrative Appeal and Review

Cases
- Suyat Jr. vs. Torres 441 SCRA 265
Appeal to the president
- Tan vs. Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302
Appeal to the president
ISSUE: WON the appeal to the court is the proper remedy.

HELD: No.
Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238
withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it
as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of
the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to
 take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
- Calo vs. Fuertes 5 SCRA 399
Withdrawal of appeal
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the
Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal,
because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative
case.

Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or
order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
Cases
- Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624
Failure to file motion for reconsideration
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no
one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis
of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
- Social Security System Employees Association vs. Bathan-Velasco
313 SCRA 250
Finality of factual determination by administrative body

When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature

resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.

Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for
certiorari involve a review of the factual findings of the Bureau of Labor
Relations.

Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for

certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to
questions of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial review does not extend to
an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper
labor officer or office based his or its determination.

OCTOBER 7
IX. Judicial Review

Cases
- Macailing, et al vs. Andrada, et al January 30, 1970, G.R. No. L-21607
Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not
necessarily imply that it is unavailable
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some
statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent.
Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review
is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes;
appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies
to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute,
the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of
Court are still available
- Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lopez (A.M. no. p-10-2788, 18
January 2011
Quantum required is substantial evidence
Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. (n)
X. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Cases
- Gonzales vs. CA, 357 SCRA 599

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is

that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to
pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent
the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action
of the petitioner.
- NFA vs. CA 311 SCRA 700 (1999)

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard

and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private
respondents contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their
replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In fact, respondent Masada,
a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public
bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed,
an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture
pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The urgency of the situation
compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these
negotiated security contracts
- Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro 77 SCRA 264, 267

Exceptions
- Vda. De Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission 105 Phil 377

he respondent Commission is n estoppel to invoke the rule on the

exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice were Advisory in nature, which may either be
accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the
court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial
ruling in her favor wold be accepted by the Commission.

- Bordallo vs. Professional Regulations Commission 421 Phil. 281

One of these exceptions is when the question is purely legal, such as
the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of petitioners to appeal to the PRC,
therefore, is not fatal to petitioners cause.
- Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa,Iinc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92,
113.
- As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled
that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President,
bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access
to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal
the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could
be had immediately.

XI. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Cases
- Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs.CA 184 SCRA 426
Primary jurisdiction involves matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since
the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter.
- Roxas and Company Inc. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 106
However, failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of
due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the
power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries.
Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's
application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter.

To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process,

which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be
given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177
farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these
farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic
precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people,
through no fault of their own, of the land they till.
Inapplicability of the doctrine:
- Aquilino Q. Pimentel, ., et al vs. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,
March 8, 2011
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The
issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal
questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

XII. Administrative Procedure

*Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987

*Executive Order No. 26 - Prescribing procedure and sanctions to ensure speedy
disposition of administrative cases