However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL
& FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
Lucio A. Dixon for respondent F. Calion.
FERIA, J.:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of
Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or
against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged
to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint,
where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;
but the court may make such orders as may be just to
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed
or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S.
Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief
that the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of
Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition
for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from
August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against
respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in
the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from
that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss,
counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner
opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes
of action between the same or different parties, embodied
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum
of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and
1
 costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims
are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion
of the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended which reads as follows:
... Where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims or causes of
action joined in a single complaint are separately owned
by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall
furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the
totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is
the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or
more separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the
regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of
action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount
of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present
rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule,
"where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall
furnish the jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of Vda. de
Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the former rule
applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it
was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as
may be deduced from the ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of
separate claims against several defendants of different
amounts each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls
under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court
under section 88 of Republic Act No, 296. The several
claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions and there seem to be no questions
of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6. Therefore, if
new complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party
in interest they should be filed in the justice of the peace
court. (87 Phil. 519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez,
88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join
in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate
causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single
complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common
question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of
permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which
were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace
(supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs.
Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a
complaint against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of
which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then
the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs'
demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their
joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate
claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of International Colleges,
Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers
jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the
2
municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was
within, although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not
fall under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court. Similarly, in the abovecited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and
Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against the several
defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and
there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as

plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the
claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if
instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are
filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint
shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2
and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for
the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

3
G.R. No. L-40010 May 26, 1975
RUSSEL R. ENERIO, DARROW O. ENERIO, and VIRGINIA
RODRIGUEZ, plaintiffs,
vs.
HON. NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, SONETRAN CO., INC., ERNESTO KHO,
and MAX VILLEGAS Y YANSON, respondents.
Jose O. Macaso, Sr., Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito C. Jalandoni, Sr. for
plaintiffs.
Yulo, Sedonio, Alejano and Associates for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:+.wph!1
The Court sets aside respondent court's dismissal order for alleged lack of
jurisdiction. The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of
money between the same parties furnishes the jurisdictional test and since
petitioners' total claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and came close to
P30,000.00, it properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first
instance.
On May 27, 1974, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of first
instance of Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge Nestor B.
Alampay a complaint for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and costs of litigation totalling close to
P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc., Ernesto Kho
and Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a result of the physical
injuries caused petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of age (herein
represented by his parents, the co-petitioners) when bumped on the road
on January 15, 1974 by a passenger bus of respondents driven allegedly
"in a very reckless, negligent and imprudent manner" by respondent Max
Villegas.
Respondents filed in due course their answer with counterclaim for
P20,000.-moral damages and P2,000.-attorney's fees.
Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said
date, without its jurisdiction having been questioned or placed in issue by
respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing the complaint on
the ground that "without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this
case will not fall within the jurisdiction, of the court of first instance," without
prejudice to re-filing in the court of proper jurisdiction and without costs, as
petitioners-plaintiffs had been allowed by it to file the case as paupers-
litigants. The pertinent portion of the dismissal order reads as
follows:t.hqw
At the pre-trial of this case the attention of the counsel for
the plaintiffs was drawn to the allegations of the complaint
which limit the claim for actual damages of the plaintiff
minor, Russel Enerio, to the amount of P478.00
corresponding to hospital and doctor's bills and medicines
and for the miscellaneous expenses attendant to his care
after he was bumped by a passenger bus of the defendant
company. In same complaint, plaintiff Darrow O. Enerio,
father of said minor, claims the amount of P500.00,
representing his alleged loss of income during the period
while attending to his injured son. All such claim for actual
damages would thus be in the total amount of only
P978.00. Along with these considerations, the court notes
that plaintiffs seek moral damages in the sum of
P10,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P15,000.00
and an award for attorney's fees of P3,000.00 and
expenses of litigation in the sum of P500.00. Without the
claims for moral and exemplary damages, this case will
not fill within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
It is therefore the considered view of the court, considering
the minimal amount of the claim of the plaintiffs for actual
damages, that the moral and exemplary damage recited
and claimed for in the complaint is but an obvious means
taken to circumvent the provisions of the Judiciary Act with
respect to the jurisdiction of inferior courts and the Courts
of First Instance, respectively. The disproportionate and
bloated claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in this instance reflect that such were
merely placed in the complaint in order to shift jurisdiction
to this court, but that under the recited facts this case
should not be taken cognizance of due to the limited
amount that is actually involved. To tolerate the imposition
of this case on this court can open the floodgates to
parties who may then institute slight physical injury in the
Courts of First Instance on mere assertions of clearly
4
 disproportionate and imprudent claims for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, with the resulting
effect of adding burden to the docket and load of the
superior courts. ... .
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order.
Upon consideration of respondents' comment and of petitioners' reply
thereto, the Court resolved to treat the case as a special civil action and
dispense with the filing of briefs for an expeditious determination of the
simple issue of jurisdiction involved.
It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a
case, is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and since
petitioners' complaint asserted a total demand, exclusive of interest of over
P10.000.00 (and sought recovery of damages of close to P30,000.00) the
case clearly falls within the original jurisdiction of respondent court of first
instance as provided by section 44 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296
as amended.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between
the same parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount demanded in the
complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and for determining the
jurisdictional amount in civil cases.1 Here petitioners' total claim of P978.00
for actual damages, P10,000.-moral damages, P15,000.-exemplary
damages and P3,000.-attorney's fees, etc., was clearly in excess of
P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent
court of first instance. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petition
lesser claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out
petitioners' other claims for moral and exemplary damages as "bloated"
and summarily dismiss motu proprio the case as not failing within its
jurisdiction contrary to the very allegations on the face of the complaint.
Petitioners contend with reason that their complaint asserted lawful
demands for the imposition of moral and exemplary or corrective damages
against respondents "to serve as deterrent against reckless driving" on the
basis of their specific allegations in their complaint that respondents' bus
"was running very fast and was being driven ... in a very reckless, negligent
and imprudent manner, in utter violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law
and the traffic rules and regulations and without due regard to life and
property," and "that as a result of the injuries received by minor plaintiff,
plaintiffs suffered physically and underwent mental torture and worried,
wounded feelings, serious anxiety. ..."2
Petitioners have disclaimed any "bloating" of their claim for moral and
exemplary damages as merely surmised by respondent court without
having given petitioners their day in court and without having received the
proofs of the parties. Petitioners rightfully contend that it is not the lesser
nature of the injuries suffered by the minor or the relatively modest amount
of actual damages incurred by them in the hospitalization of the injured son
and the father's loss of income but the gross and wanton negligence of
private respondents in the operation of their public vehicle which resulted in
the injuries inflicted upon the minor (as alleged and if proven by them at the
trial) that would be decisive and controlling on the matter of moral and
exemplary damages claimed by them. Petitioners have cause to complain,
therefore, that respondent court in refusing motu proprio to take
cognizance of the case on the ground that the claims for damages were
"bloated" in effect prejudged the case without hearing and without the
evidence, and wrongfully barred them from seeking moral and exemplary
damages in excess of P10,000.00 by dismissing their suit before it and
requiring them to file their action in the inferior courts, where their total
claim for damages would be limited to not more P10,000.00.
There appears no valid justification in the record for respondent court's
bare conclusion that petitioners' claim for damages were "bloated" in order
to shift jurisdiction to it rather than to the inferior courts and that the filing of
the case with it amounted to an "imposition of this case on this court."
Respondents' contention in their comment that "since the award of said
amount (of moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its
(respondent court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total
amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in
dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction" is manifestly
erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court should have narrowed
down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable
damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties' proofs thereon and
thereafter rendered judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any
award of moral or exemplary damages to petitioners if this were its
determination. This simply means that it should have properly assumed
and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather
than erroneously dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction
with all the attendant delay caused thereby and the remand of the case
back to it.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby annulled and
set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for trial and
adjudication on the merits. Without costs.
5
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second
Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to
be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the
motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to
set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be
assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi
vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the
filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages.2While the present case is an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for
temporary restraining order, etc.3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the
annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for
the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4However, in the
present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants
that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and
after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and
sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the
money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring
the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing
the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount
of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered
by plaintiff.5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of
opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint
was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as
merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00
and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As
maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount
only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the
body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which
should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought
to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an
investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff
through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint
was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and
other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court
6
directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer.
Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs
to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged
in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an
or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court
to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery
of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages
should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing
fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to
the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper
and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original
complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be
the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as
the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show
clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The
docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages
as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such
original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and
void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the
basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this
case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded
when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an
amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the
order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced
amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is
obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The
ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
merit.SO ORDERED.
7
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The
WARBY, petitioners, Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive
vs. that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO sala which was then vacant.
TIONG, respondents.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said
petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order
Offices for private respondent. its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise
required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in
GANCAYCO, J.: their complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court
Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk
acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee
of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket
has not been paid.
fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the
same in said certificate.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for
brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by
Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy
petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default
for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was
thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint
issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying
Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings
filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance"
complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of
Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the
litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent
the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection
was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof
should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
8
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total
claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some
seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling,
among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1,
09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as
amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving
due course to the portion thereof questioning the
reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the
Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee
to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the
amount of P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said
judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional
docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket
fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had
paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related,
and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee
that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be
dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In
support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court
in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at
the time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what
is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein
this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if
the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of
the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection
of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the
peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment
dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but
he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required,
within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving
notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the
amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of
these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire
9
jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not
thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention
to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the
Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid
only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for
citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in
accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed
at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship.
Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration
of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required
filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee
were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the
right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the
clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the
proclamation as provided therefor by law.10However, the required docket
fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this
Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real
date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the
docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint.
However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner
seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have
other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before
the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery
of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket
fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null
and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to
whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay
monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property
is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in
the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary
damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct
amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff
alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the
docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of
P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to
pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include
the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the
exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer
merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees
of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an
opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court
reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which
plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged
that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has
to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be
considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not
sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed
filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an
honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket
fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the
docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for
damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based
on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in
the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of
such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment
10
that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order
requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the
subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of
plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for
attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender
of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for
purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount
of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only
P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint
as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific
performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the
correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78
Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the
complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-
plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body
of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket
fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November
12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff
did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages
alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages
was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court,"
this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment
of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were
declared null and void.13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of
under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court
together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are
similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total
amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer,
the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the
refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the
docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended
complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the
complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private
respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based
on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total
claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987
wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears
to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering
the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private
respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case.
The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due
it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the
filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee
until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court
held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that
11
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had
that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional
docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of
stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk
or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of
Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the
additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering
the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if
any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims

and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless
the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

12
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, Branches 1
and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas,
respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO
PINEDA, respondents.
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three
(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 ) were
separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants,
docketed as follows:
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial
Court, presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was
assigned to Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda was the
owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership
being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed
the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having
himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the
defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made
more than a year prior to the commencement of suit. The complaints
prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by
the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered
to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped by
them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:
1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2 ) Actual damages, as proven;
3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court
may fix ;
4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees
of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;" 4
and
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and
remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently
made by plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately
above the typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention
apparently being to make the entire phrase read, " P5,000.00 as and for
actual damages as proven. 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by
common counsel .6 Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not
acquired jurisdiction of the case
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the
mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ...
Supreme Court dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify
13
 all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from
defendant;" and
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute.
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but
ordered the expunction of the "allegations in paragraph 11 of the ...
complaint regarding moral as well as nominal damages . 7 On motion of
defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered the striking out, too, of the
"handwritten amount of 'P5,000. 00 as and for.' including the typewritten
words 'actual damages as proven' ... in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in
the conclusion and prayer of the complaint ..." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209
were also denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial
Fernandez. 9 His Order in Case No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a)
declared that since the "action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and
Attorney's fees ... (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b)
that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages "are only one
aspect of the cause of action," and (c) because of absence of specification
of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they
should be "expunged from the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez
in the rendition of the Orders above described, the defendants in all three
(3) actions have filed with this Court a "Joint Petition" for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that
said orders be annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the
complaints "without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's re-filing a
similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7." The joint petition (a)
re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to state
the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the
Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted
the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to
expunge the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action
for "reivindicatoria" remain for trial" by itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 1-
88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto
attached 11 were not certified by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized representative. Certification was made by the petitioners'
counsel, which is not allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important
reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent Judges in rendering the Orders complained of or, for that
matter, the existence of any proper cause for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus. On the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied
the law to the admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the
actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are
principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an
accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of
actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and
regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for
recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de
possesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for partition or condemnation of, or the
foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property 13 - in other words, a real
action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying
claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action
would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." 14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property
involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule
also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an
award of damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to
the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases
e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or
actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the amount
claimed, 17 or the value of the personal property, is determinative of
14
jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed
should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked,
as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar.
That circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7,
1987), has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be
discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified
and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from
the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount of
damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes than
to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee." The following rules were
therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless
the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints,
petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court
now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not
specified in the pleading - i.e., damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading-as to which the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the
basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property
in litigation or the value of the estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other
words, as already above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real
property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's
jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal
fees; and there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or
the recovery of money and/or damages, in which the value of the property
or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence
(aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). 19
15
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar within the relevant prescriptive period.
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the costs.
assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise Regalado, JJ., concur.
statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may
be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may
be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim
has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance
thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may
properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription
has set in and consequently barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as
well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of
the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the
fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of
full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may
grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where-
as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the
action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over
the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is
not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because
of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge
those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is
what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for

16
 [G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003]
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO
GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student
Services, petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that
has been served on the adverse party. The docket fees must likewise be
paid within the reglementary period.Petitioners have failed to show why they
merit an exception to these stringent rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the November 16, 2000[2] and the June 22, 2001
Resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV UDK No.
0236C. The November 16, 2000 Resolution disposed as follows:
In view of the foregoing, Appellees Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Resolution, dated March 14, 2000, is hereby RECALLED
and SET ASIDE and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.[4]
The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court[5] as follows:
[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating back [to]
the school year 1988-1989 taking up the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second semester held on
October 22 to November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment,
despite repeated pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties and
his lawyer.
On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel [petitioner college
to] re-admit him. On December 28, 1993, an Order was issued directing
[petitioner college] to admit [respondent] for the second semester but still
[petitioner college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite
implementation of said order and the pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel
so that he could catch up with the bulk of the school days of the semester
and could graduate.
Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-admitting him
and his defiance to the order and because the period of the second
semester [was] already about to close, [respondent] amended his
complaint and concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this case.
On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its
enrollment period for the second semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11
October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993.However,
classes for the second semester of that school year commenced on 25
October, 1993. During these periods for enrolment, [respondent] never
enrolled with the x x x College and neither did he accomplish the basic
requirements for enrolment. However, on 05 November, 1993, the
x x x College was in receipt of a letter from Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on
that same date requesting for a reconsideration of an alleged decision
denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the said letter, it
was endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote
Atty. Pilotin explaining among others that was not denied enrolment but
rather [the] latter did not enroll with the said College. Considering,
however, that the x x x College started its regular classes on 25 October,
1993, in the event [respondent] was able to enroll on 6 November, 1993,
he would have then exceeded the required absences for his supposed
enrolled subjects.
Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for enrolment, there is no
reason why the x x x College should relax its rules to accommodate
[respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed its disciplining authority
when it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter of admission of
students is within the ambit of academic freedom and beyond the province
of the Courts to decide.[6]
On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.[7] Petitioners received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On
the same date, they filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved
on December 2, 1998.
17
 Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground of
petitioners failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. The
trial court, however, denied the Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order.[8]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of
petitioners for their failure to pay the required docketing fee within the period
for filing an appeal.[9] But, upon their motion, the CA granted, in a Resolution
dated March 14, 2000, reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated in
the interest of substantial justice and considering that [petitioners] already
paid the docket fees.[10] Respondent moved for a reconsideration on March
29, 2000.
After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the
challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution, dismissed the appeal filed by
petitioners, because the docket fees were only paid after one (1) year and
eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of appeal. [11] It deemed it
imperative to reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution to conform with the law
and long settled jurisprudence[12] on the matter. Thus, in the June 22,
2001 Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;
2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the
authority to dismiss the appeal.[14]
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the payment of
the docket fees.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Timeliness of Payment of
Appellate Court Docket Fees
The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. [15] For this
reason, and to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and
proceeding,[16] the Rules on Civil Procedure[17] mandates the payment of
docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the
jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected. [18]
The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the judgment
issued by the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, was elevated to
the CA for review. Rule 41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides the
essential requirements for making such an appeal, as follows:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. x x x.
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
or the record on appeal.
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of
appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time.
x x x x x x x x x.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of
the time to appeal of the other parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
18
 Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements
must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed
with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be
appealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party;
and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of appellate court
docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that
rendered the judgment or final order.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within
the prescribed period is mandatory,[19] even jurisdictional,[20] for the
perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to
act on the subject matter of the action,[21] and the decision or final order
sought to be appealed from would become final and executory.[22]
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the
docket fees. After resolving thrice the timeliness of the payment of the
docket fees, the CA finally found that these had been paid one (1) year and
11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received
the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision. Consequently, they had 15 days to
file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but failed to
pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that they paid these only
on July 8, 1999,[23] or after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last
day for payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November 17,
1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to appeal, had long become
final and executory.
Relaxation of the Rule on
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment
of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is
qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within
the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration
of all attendant circumstances.[24]
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[25]
the
payment of the docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment
was accepted, because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules
by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals[26] saw us
again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that the appellate court
may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able
to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the failure to pay the correct
amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without
fault on the part of the appellant.[27]
In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason
to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they
presented their case before us leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we
are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this
Court as well as the appellate court.
The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid
the docket fees on time. Hence, it is essential that they specify the exact
dates when they filed their notice of appeal and paid the corresponding
docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do so. All they said was
that the appeal had been seasonably filed.
In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as
enumerated earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with
the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15 days from the issuance of the trial
court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same
period; and (3) served the notice to the adverse party.
True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed
period, but they paid the docket fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They
adamantly insisted on page 6 of their Petition[28] that the appeal was
seasonably filed, but later said that the the appeal fee was paid immediately
after 23 April 1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the foregoing
therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment of
docket fees on time.[29]
They admitted, though, that because of the excusable negligence or
mistake of their counsel, the official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not
been attached. They reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof of
payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil
procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.[30] At any event, respondent
denies being served such notice.[31]
Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by
respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTCs approval of petitioners
notice of appeal, the required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on
time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal,
until April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they made
19
no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to
immediately pay the docket fees after being informed of the April 23, 1999
Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
approving petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected
sincere willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had
raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket fees as early as December
28, 1998.
On this point, petitioners counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers
play in the dispensation of justice. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan[32] held thus:
Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and
foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties -- assisting in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice -- is more significant than
that of [the cause of] their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that
candor in all dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good
faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[33]

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of

law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an
appeal.[34] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final
order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[35] As laid
down in Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v. Imperial:[36]
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is
purely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of the law. Well-rooted is the principle
that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court
of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

20
 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN G.R. No. 116121 passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven
REINOSO, SR., represented by Ruben by Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
Reinoso Jr., Present: Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
Petitioners,
CARPIO,* J. On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a
VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a
- versus - PERALTA, third party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation
ABAD, and (FGAC) under Policy Number OV-09527.
MENDOZA, JJ.
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO petitioners and against Guballa. The decision in part, reads:
TAPALES, JOSE GUBALLA, and
FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant
CORPORATION,* * Promulgated: Jose Guballa:
Respondent.
July 18, 2011 1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr. 30,000.00

2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the 120,000.00

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x time of death (2,000.00 Court used
1,000.00 only per month (or 12,000.00
DECISION only per year) & victim then being 55 at
death had ten (10) years life expectancy

MENDOZA, J.: 3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses 15,000.00

and all incidental expenses in the wake in
serving those who condoled..
4. Moral damages .. 50,000.00
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20, 1994
Decision[1] and June 30, 1994 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in 5. Exemplary damages 25,000.00
CA-G.R. CV No. 19395, which set aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket 6. Litigation expenses . 15,000.00
fees. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision 7. Attorneys fees 25,000.00
appealed from is SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the
Or a total of 250,000.00
complaint in this case is ordered DISMISSED.
For damages to property:
No costs pronouncement.
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against
defendant Jose Guballa:
SO ORDERED.

The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a

passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of June
14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger
of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The
21
1. Actual damages for repair is already
awarded to defendant-cross-claimant
Ponciano Tapales by Br. 9, RTC-Malolos,
Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G-Tapales); hence,
cannot recover twice.
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at 9,000.00
150.00 per day) and for two (2) months
jeepney stayed at the repair shop.
3. Moral damages ... 10,000.00
4. Exemplary damages . 10,000.00
5. Attorneys fees 15,000.00
or a total of 44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party plaintiff
by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the
amount of 50,000.00 undertaking plus 10,000.00 as and
for attorneys fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the
Court that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and
3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims as
specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence
preponderance in their favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr.250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to
damage of his passenger jeepney.44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No.
OV-09527....60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of
interest per annum from date of complaint until fully paid
(Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground of
non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid down
in Manchester v. CA.[4] In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had
set in, petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.[5]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was
denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994.[6] Hence, this appeal, anchored
on the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of
the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages
appearing in the prayer of the Complaint was NEVER
PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE
COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) NOR IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more
substantial issue as to the negligence of the private
respondents and their culpability to petitioners.[7]
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have
been applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the
promulgation of the Manchesterdecision in 1987. They plead that though this
Court stated that failure to state the correct amount of damages would lead
to the dismissal of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied
prospectively.
Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint
in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of damages they were entitled
to, because the amount of the lost income would still be finally determined
22
in the course of the trial of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the
trial court remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as
long as the correct amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue
either in the RTC or in the CA.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,[9] it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[10] wherein
the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within
a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise
that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees required.[11] Thus, in the more recent case
of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,[12] the Court explained that where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees
in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on
the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin,[13] the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement
of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that
its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure
to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its
exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of
circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.[14]
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one
hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes
fairly and equitably,[15] for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit
which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before
the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was
at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue.
It was only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict
application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally
prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to
secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder
but to promote the administration of justice.[16]
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed
before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals[17] and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga.[18] In
the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat
(Mactan),[19] it was stated that the intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants
full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of
sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new
rules. In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay
the correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of
procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They were conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that,
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus,
if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice, it is always within the
23
 power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a
particular case from its operation.[20]
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the
actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the
clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. Where the court in its final
judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional
fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess
and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if
petitioners claim would be dismissed on a strict application of
the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more
than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court,
a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its
resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the
parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney passenger,
died as a result of the collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at
around 7:00 oclock in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon
City. It was established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was
the negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace.
Based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities and the
narration of the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision was brought
about because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on,
the left side portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade,
hitting the passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC
appears in its decision as follows:
Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced
as well as proper consideration of all the circumstances and
factors bearing on the issue as to who is responsible for the
instant vehicular mishap convince and persuade this Court
that preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and
defendant Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of
evidence spread on the records and its influence support
plaintiffs plaint including that of defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No.
4136), reads as follows:
Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway.
Unless a different course of action is required in the
interest of the safety and the security of life, person
or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty
of operation in compliance therewith, every person
operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn
vehicle on highway shall pass to the right when
meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him,
and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles
going the same direction, and when turning to the
left in going from one highway to another, every
vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center
of the intersection of the highway.
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this
Court is convinced of the veracity of the version of the
passenger jeepney driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs and
Tapales witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward
bound towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per
hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984) the sand & gravel truck from
the opposite direction driven by Mariano Geronimo, the
headlights of which the former had seen while still at a
distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade
astride lanes 1 and 2, upon reaching said wooden block
suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3 and 4 at high
speed napakabilis po ng dating ng truck. (29 tsn, Sept. 26,
1985) in the process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at
the left side up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique
manner pahilis (57 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after
it was bumped by the truck due to the strong impact was
thrown resting on its right side while the left side was on top
of the Bangketa (side walk). The passengers of the jeepney
and its driver were injured including two passengers who
died. The left side of the jeepney suffered considerable
damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-Tapales, pages
331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos
to the effect that the gravel & sand truck was running in high
speed on the good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1
& 2) before the wooden barricade and (having in mind that
24
 it had just delivered its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so
that when suddenly confronted with the wooden
obstacle before it had to avoid the same in a manner of a
reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith swerving
to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the time of the
bumping, the jeepney was running on its right lane No. 4
and even during the moments before said bumping, moving
at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then
somewhat rough because being repaired also according to
Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself
one of those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and
Mondalia are convincing and consistent in depicting the true
facts of the case untainted by vacillation and therefore,
worthy to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and
confirmed by the sketch drawn by the investigating officer
Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division, NPD, Quezon City who
rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst
fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-
Tapales, pp. 166-168, records; the Certified Copy found on
pages 598-600, ibid, with the attached police sketch of Pfc.
Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169, ibid;
certified copy of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the
fact that the bumping indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and
showing how the gavel & sand truck is positioned in relation
to the jeepney. The said police sketch having been made
right after the accident is a piece of evidence worthy to be
relied upon showing the true facts of the bumping-
occurrence. The rule that official duty had been performed
(Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of
Court) there being no evidence adduced and made of
record to the contrary is that said circumstance involving the
two vehicles had been the result of an official investigation
and must be taken as true by this Court.[21]
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault
in automobile collisions,[22] the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in
the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit
the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the
passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck
reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion
of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing
damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at
that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck
owner, Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring
and supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee.[23] Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and
service record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.[24] Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that
the evidence presented by respondent Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
25
 x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa,
attempted to overthrow this presumption of negligence by
showing that he had exercised the due diligence required
of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the vital
parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the
compound like the oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn,
July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo had been driving for him
sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation came about
(5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of the
compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied
with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he
considered as selection and supervision in compliance with
the law to free himself from any responsibility. This Court
then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an
exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his driver Mariano
Geronimo.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994

Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

26
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, G.R. No. 176339 On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave
INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM and notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31,
LELY KUNG LIM, 1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with
Petitioners, Present: the Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million
- versus - NACHURA, instead. DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the
PERALTA, same.
BERSAMIN,* and
ABAD, JJ. While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they
SECURITY BANK CORP., continued to use the property in their business. But the Bank posted at the
TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency
EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY Promulgated: guards, on instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong
AGENCY CORP. and GIL SILOS, and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred the
Respondents. January 10, 2011 Lims as well as DMIs employees from entering the property. One of the
guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x of this, DMI was unable to close several projects and contracts with
prospective clients. Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to
DECISION retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the
property.
ABAD, J.:
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
claims embodied in the plaintiffs supplemental complaint filed without prior restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-
payment of the corresponding filing fees. defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos.[2] Answering the
complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the
The Facts and the Case property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first
refusal. DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option. On
From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the
petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans property to a third party. DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and
from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that the Bank granted it. But the parties could not agree on a purchase price. The
totaled P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do
some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a so. As a result, the Banks buyer backed-out of the sale.Despite what
building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon happened, the Bank and DMI continued negotiations for the purchase of the
St., Santolan, Pasig City.[1] leased premises but they came to no agreement.

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through
petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although
the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. DMI and the
Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to
September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the
lease. The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the
property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI
and the Lims. To protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the
building even before it leased the same to DMI. Indeed, this arrangement
benefited both parties. The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the
parties could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the
property, DMI vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession to
the Bank.

27
 The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it
claimed that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving
the building. For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and
the Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there. The latter
claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the
movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the
Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in
additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.
The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that
date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding. The
court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their
evidence ex parte. The court eventually reconsidered its order but only after
the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence and were about to rest
their case. The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs witnesses for cross-
examination but allowed the Bank to present its evidence.[3] This prompted
the Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from
this Court but to no avail.[4]
During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant
Payongayong, a bank officer. For repeatedly canceling the hearings and
incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to
present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
DMI and the Lims. It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffs P27,974,564.00
as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But the court
absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning
among other things the RTCs authority to grant damages considering
plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The
RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank,
reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaims.[5] DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied the same, hence this petition.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate
plaintiffs supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure
to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and
harassment committed against DMI and its representatives; and
3. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the
machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they
were barred from the property.
The Courts Rulings
One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that
plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal
to their action.
But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their
Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs action
from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the
payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs non-payment of
the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC
of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.[6]
Two. As to the claim that Banks representatives and retained
guards harassed and intimidated DMIs employees and the Lims, the RTC
found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages
to the plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police
officers regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers
were not present when they happened. The CA may be correct in a way but
the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal
knowledge. The police officers testified merely to point out that there had
been trouble at the place and their investigations yielded their findings.
The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners witnesses for
having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the ex
parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less
credible. It was the Banks fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It
cannot profit from its lack of diligence.
Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the
Bank guards unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower. Their
testimonies were never refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified
that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the
28
leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked
in the building. When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a Bank
representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone from
taking any property out of the premises. It was only after Dela Paz talked to
the Bank representative that they let Lim out.[7]
Payongayong, the Banks sole witness, denied charges of
harassment against the Banks representatives and the guards. But his
denial came merely from reports relayed to him. They were not based on
personal knowledge.
While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business
harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was
therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and
building guards.
Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their
supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in
admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it
since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this
after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful
execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were
incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the
amount of the award.[8]None of these circumstances obtain in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the
actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid
no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing
to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered
to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because
the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like
any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to
be paid upon its filing.[9] The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of
non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its
decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to
have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the
case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing
fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant
exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions
are embodied in its rules.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden
of proving that the movable properties in question had remained in the
premises and that the bank was responsible for their loss. The only evidence
offered to prove the loss was Domingo Lims testimony and some undated
and unsigned inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition
and REINSTATES with modification the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The
Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners
DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following
amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P100,000.00 for attorneys fees. The Court DELETES the
award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00.
SO ORDERED.

To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although the Bank brought up the

question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for
reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment
before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the
prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no
excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the
court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.
29
 the highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., G. R. No. 154061 was registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January 1986 and
Petitioner, annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering the
Present: mortgaged properties.

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on
PEREZ, the basis of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner
HEVA MANAGEMENT and SERENO, failed to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The corresponding
DEVELOPMENT REYES, and TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank.
CORPORATION, PAMPLONA PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.*
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession
CORPORATION, and against petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly
SPOUSES CANDELARIA Promulgated: authorized manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of
DAYOT and EDMUNDO counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension
DAYOT, January 25, 2012 of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.[2] The pertinent
Respondents. portions of the Manifestation and Motion state:
3. That after going over the records of this case and
the case of Traders Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc.,
Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is irrevocably withdrawing its
Motion for Suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x and its Motion for Reconsideration referred in paragraph 2
above and will accept and abide by the September 21, 1990
DECISION Order denying the Motion For Suspension;

SERENO, J.: 4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges

petitioner (TRB) to be the registered owner of Lot 1-A;
Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and Lot 5
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial
covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioners failure to pay
84236; T-84237, T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free
the corresponding docket fees.
of liens and encumbrances, except that portion sold to
Shell Co. found in Lot 5. That Petitioner (TRB) as
The facts are as follows:
registered owner is entitled to peaceful ownership and
immediate physical possession of said real properties.
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-
owned and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage
5. That PRI further acknowledges that the
Contract covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor
Provincial Sheriff validly foreclosed the Real Estate
of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure 20 million worth of loan and credit
Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to pay the loan
accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that
of 20,000,000.00. That TRB was the purchaser of these
already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road referred to as
lots mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriffs Auction
6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D.[1]
Sale as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated January
20, 1986 and the Certificates of Titles issued to Petitioner;
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to
extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153.
On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as
30
 6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past,
present or future opposition to the grant of the Writ of
Possession to TRB over the parcels of land mentioned
in paragraph 4 above and subject of this Petition and
even assuming arguendo that it has, PRI irrevocably
waives the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in
securing possession of said properties as witness
against squatters, illegal occupants, and all other
possible claimants;
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily
surrenders physical possession and control of the
premises of these lots to TRB, its successors or its
assigns, together with all the buildings, warehouses,
offices, and all other permanent improvements
constructed thereon and will attest to the title and
possession of petitioner over said real properties.
(Emphasis supplied)
TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No.
6153, which is under dispute.
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial
foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract.
Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of
Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of
Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages.[3]
It then filed an Amended Complaint[4] on 1 January 1995 and again
filed a Second Amended Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on
these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a
waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioners claim or
demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an
indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to
Dismiss of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by
petitioner was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputed
properties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed
by petitioners duly authorized representative with the assistance of counsel.
This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming
otherwise.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without
paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed
a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet
familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only
on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court
personnel that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of
Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of
docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal
interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order [8] dismissing the
appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the
Order[10] alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the
former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court
erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.
On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.[11]
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural
rules.
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision[12] on the
Petition. It held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus,
appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated 29
September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration.
31
 It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this
Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect
on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts
may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of
time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000[13] was issued on
29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.
By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the
questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended
Decision[14] in the present Petition granting respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given
retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider the case as
exceptionally meritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano,
explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of
Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice
of Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might
lead to the dismissal of the case.
On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution[15] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs dismissal
of the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive
jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively,
petitioner argues that while the appeal was dismissible for failure to pay
docket fees, substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed in
this case.
The Petition has no merit.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has
been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil
or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.[16] More so
when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket
fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the
RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss
the appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of
Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may
be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA
committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal,
taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its
Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for
the perfection of an appeal.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.[18]
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.[19]
We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a
magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required to be followed,
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed
to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[20]
We cannot consider counsels failure to familiarize himself with the
Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of
the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
This principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within
the scope of their general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against
it.[21]WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack
of merit.SO ORDERED.
32
 G.R. No. 158239 After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE,
Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of
Petitioner, Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not
Present:
comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels
BERSAMIN, of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.[4] Faced with Priscillas
- versus - *ABAD, and refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional
Promulgated: Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97
entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v.
January 25, 2012 Priscilla Alma Jose.
RAMON C. JAVELLANA,
ET AL., In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the
Respondents. execution of the deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x of P80,000.00 and had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had
paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon
DECISION Juvenals representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses
of registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had
BERSAMIN, J.: called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and
that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged
but had been sold to him.[5]
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
defending partys motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling
the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute
other than to execute the order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his
period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the favor.[6]
denial.[2]
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was
Antecedents already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause
of action.[7]
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita)
sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4,
deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 1998.[8] However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed
square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that
that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to
the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party
the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a thereto; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the balance;
reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, that he had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or
her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or
daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not credible.[9]
the balance and proceed with the application for registration.[3]

33
 Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the
presentation of evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of
the proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were
hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be
considered in resolving the motion.[10] Nonetheless, he attached to the
motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to
Juvenal.[11] Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed
to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile
acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as
sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them
under the Torrens System.[12]
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.[13]
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21,
2000 order,[14] which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were
elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the
following as errors of the RTC,[15] to wit:
I G.R. CV No. 68259,[18] reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT
HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL PAYMENT OF
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL
AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY
UPON THE SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF
SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING
TWO CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE], PARTICULARLY
ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING NOT A PARTY TO THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER
MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-
APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT
BE COMPELLED TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE
SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE
ON THE MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable;
that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of
forum shopping.[16]
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders
dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001,
however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding that the RTC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding
that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in
issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-
Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC for further
proceedings in accordance with law.[19] The CA explained that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to
the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land;
that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal
obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound
to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to
its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by
Javellana who had actual possession of the properties; and that based on
the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the
cloud on his title had come about only when Priscilla had started dumping
filling materials on the premises.[20]
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration, [21] stating that it decided to give due course to the appeal
even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the
proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his
appellants brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest
opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities,
34
such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was
given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
Issues
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred
in not outrightly dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21,
2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed
belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for
filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that
were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA. She posited that,
even if the CAs decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs
dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the
complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had already prescribed.
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by
Priscilla involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through
petition for review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a
final order, was appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that
he was not guilty of forum shopping because at the time he filed the
petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject
of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration.
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing
more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court
has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v.
Tortogo,[22] thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done
except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of
the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the
trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;[23] but the remedy
from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given
in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of
the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose
as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by
him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued
by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject
of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
35
 with the ground for appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from
the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified
that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of
an interlocutory order.[24]
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of
time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on
July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or
after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for
reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he
received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000,
or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed
his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been
dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the
reglementary period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall
be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from
July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due
to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running
of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July
19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,
however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period
rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous
of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules
in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or
even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling
reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions
may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
36
 reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.[26]
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there
are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[27] According to De los Santos v.
Vda. de Mangubat:[28]
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues
they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights
in rules of procedure.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it
prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal
may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the
rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period
rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the
present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of
the fresh period rule will amount to injustice, if not absurdity,
since the subject notice of judgment and final order were
issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to
the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were
issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued
in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period
rule while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in
the instant case, will not.[29]
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely
filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a
notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As
earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated the policy against forum
shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping
in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and
303169 and Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of
Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:[30]
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or
more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of
rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought.
Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action,
there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as
to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve
the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought.
37

Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing
of the petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet
pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a
notice of appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case
due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the
same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of
the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective
of nullifying the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that
warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal
and a petition for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior
to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the
instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis
pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA,
through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits
are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same
subject
matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-
5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking
the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for,
are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum
may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her
case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event
that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others,
she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been
speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse
to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the
filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as
the petitioner couches it, becomes a precautionary measure
for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable
decision. This is the very evil that the proscription
on forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels,
Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil sought to
be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several different forauntil a
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules
against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules
results in the dismissal of the case.[32]
The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise
involved the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition
for certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding the CAs
dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through separate
decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here
even if the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the
petition for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the
appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In
his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs
erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due
course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective
to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from
proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved, as the
CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.[34]
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against
forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first
danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action,
would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the
unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a
favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise
38
because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing
of the petition for certiorari.

Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent

remedial approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by
Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretakers
eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into
a residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition
for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was inadequate and
not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her
transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject
property to other parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of
possession and ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal
by the RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the
property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against
petitioners overseer xxx.[35] Thereby, it became far-fetched that Javellana
brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum
shopping.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

39