Criminal Law II
feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on
Crimes against Persons CASES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo,
Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for
the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the
penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or
not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance
therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue
with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses
Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said
KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his
instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused
gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on
the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds
which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which
prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began
while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban,
Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to
Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not
able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the
station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The
accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he
went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in
Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9,
tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to
the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around
6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh
there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the
"hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong.
He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.).
Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room
adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit
by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the
head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also
exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the
kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also
exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as
she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado
who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to
work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00
for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same
purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment,
the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not
consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he
is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley
Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and
Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh
and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in
Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced
and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning
faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused
Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full
pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation
of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President
of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the
court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED
INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247
reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married person who, having surprised
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age,
and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
 Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies
in the instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his
wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of
murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the
time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse
with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must
be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the
accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after
surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he
should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the
death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But
the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The
killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in
the Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely
provides or grants a privilege or benefit amounting practically to
an exemption from an adequate punishment to a legally married
person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious
physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his
righteous indignation, the accused who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical
injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted
from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional
circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting
circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no
punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and
penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional
circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the
prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd,
since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot
be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons .
. . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or
exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of
the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to
the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,
Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more
manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code
(Article 423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII)
of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think,
hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could
not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but
grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another
or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case. as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the as to costs.
physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who
were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The IT IS SO ORDERED.
Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder
against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the
Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable
for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony. 9

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was
not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased.
Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We
cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the
injuries suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free
from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be
entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased,
he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not
enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we
hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that
is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated
for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina
Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was
placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical
certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore

impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver
penalty (than destierro). 13

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The

accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN
MARK WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art.
248, Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to
pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing
actual expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days,
P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages, exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of
P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged
with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a
bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death
and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping
off her head and different parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and
was raffled to Branch 152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was
arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of
not guilty.[4]
The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa
Santos-Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex
Motor Corporation where accused-appellant was the Manager while Elsa
was the Assistant Personnel Manager. Both accused-appellant and Elsa
were married, but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In
April 1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty
rumors about her illicit affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears,
however, that she continued her affair with accused-appellant even after
she resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee
assigned to drive for accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at
the latters condominium unit at the Platinum Condominium, Annapolis
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[6] Accused-appellant ordered
him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30
a.m. He found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents house, wearing
a violet-colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags --- a
paper bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the
trademark of Mitsubishi. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants
condominium unit.[7]
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in
Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel
Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to
Platinum.Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive
Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he
had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that
he was going home.[8]
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants
unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which
was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant who told her
that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-
appellant go inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to
Lucy.[9]
 At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-
appellant. He went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At
5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home.[10]
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum
Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant
to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano
asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium
unit. Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy
gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-
appellant upon his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him
to drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they
were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told
Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the
Farmers Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview,
Quezon City, to pick up some clothes, then returned to the condominium
at around 10:00 a.m.[11]
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He
was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around
noon, he went back to the condominium. He had lunch outside
at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in the
servants quarters.[12]
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television,
accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to
work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever,
and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant
shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May
problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant
told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya
pinatay?[13] Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather
she died of bangungot.[14]
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-
appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if
he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of
them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought
a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray.[15] Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary
and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked
Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio
entered accused-appellants bathroom and found the dismembered
hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by
the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a
black trash bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts
in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the
bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in
Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk
of accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took
the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left
the condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around
Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the
South Luzon Expressway and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When
they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told
Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that road,
accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car.[17]
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the
trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and
dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the
empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and
said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.[18]
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon
Expressway, through EDSA and towards the North Luzon
Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They then took
the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the
Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop
the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and
to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and
accused-appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant
alighted and threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant took something from a bag, tore it to
pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan,
accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the
road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress
with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]
It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived
at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was
scared that he might be the next victim.[21]
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered
Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang
sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho.[22] At 1:00 p.m., accused-
appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a place
called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM
card. Accused-appellant burned the middle of the card, twisted it and
threw it out of the window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and
Quezon Avenue at 2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can
get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left,
accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on a
vacation. I will give you money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio
P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.[23]
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what
happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey
Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview
to talk to him.[24]
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio,
his wife and his brothers went to the Department of Justice. They were
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation, where Demetrio gave his
statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized
Crime Division.[25]
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought
Demetrio was exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed
by Marianito Panganiban, to verify Demetrios report.[26]Accompanied by
Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered around the
mutilated parts of a human body along the road.[27]The body parts had
been discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police, under Chief
Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an
investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that
Demetrios report was positive.[28]
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral
Parlor in Sta. Rosa. Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the
house of Elsas family to inform them of her death. The NBI agents
accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida Santos, to
the funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts as belonging to
Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was
arrested by operatives of the NBI as he drove up to his parking space at
Apex Motor Corporation.[29] When Atty. Sacaguing approached and
introduced himself, accused-appellant became nervous and started to
tremble.[30]
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he
arrived there, Atty. Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to
impound the car since, based on Demetrios statement, the same was
used in the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant asked
permission to retrieve personal belongings from the car. After getting his
things from the car, accused-appellant opened the trunk to place some
items inside. When he opened the compartment, the people around the
car moved away because of the foul stench that emanated from
inside. Atty. Sacaguing inspected the interior of the trunk and found stains
on the lawanit board lying flat inside the compartment, which he
suspected to be blood. Thus, he instructed his agents to fetch a
technician from the NBI Chemistry Division to examine the stain.[31]
During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed
contusions on accused-appellants lower lip and cheek. As standard
procedure, and in order to rule out any accusation of violence on
accused-appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered
a medical examination of accused-appellant.[32]
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants
left periumbilical region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right
leg.[33]
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-
appellant was brought to the Department of Justice for
inquest.[34] However, accused-appellant moved that a preliminary
investigation be conducted, and signed a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, he was detained at the
NBI.[35]
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant,[36] the NBI
agents conducted a search of the condominium unit of accused-
appellant. They recovered hair strands from underneath the rubber mat
and rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom.[37] In accused-appellants
bedroom, they found bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also
found a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a bottle of Vicks Formula
44 cough syrup, and some more hair strands on the lampshade.[38]
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to
retrace the route he took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the
objective of retrieving the items thrown away by accused-appellant. They
were able to recover a violet bag, one brown sandal and a shirt with violet
and green floral prints,[39] which were brought to the NBI office. Amelia
Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to identify the items.[40]
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic
Biologist of the NBI, who conducted comparative examinations between
the hair specimens found in accused-appellants bathroom and hair
samples taken from the victim while she lay in state, found that the
questioned hair specimen showed similarities to the hair taken from the
victim.[41]
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion
cover, bedspread and Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-
appellants bedroom, gave positive results for human blood, showing
reactions of Group B.[42] The bloodstains on the plywood board taken from
accused-appellants vehicle were also examined and found to give
positive results for human blood showing reactions of Group B.[43]On the
other hand, the examination of blood taken from the victim likewise
showed reactions of Group B.[44]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the
autopsy, concluded that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were
stab wounds.[45] Dr. Mendez found one stab wound on the right breast
which penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab wounds under the
left breast which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and
also penetrated the right portion of the liver.[46]More particularly, the
autopsy yielded the following postmortem findings:
Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.
Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed
cutting completely the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs,
disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off with both patellar bones, missing;
both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off; all soft tissues of
both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral
bones and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-
abdominal area, along median line, with the abdominal incision involving
the whole thickness and the thoracic incision involving the soft tissues
and cutting the sternum from the xiphoid process up to the level of the
third cartilage; from the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the
forehead, temporal, nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms.,
deltoid area, extending down to the upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp
infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues, cutting
completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity,
penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with
sharp inferior extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues only with
an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp
infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 2.2 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards, and from left to right, involving the soft tissues,
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into the abdominal
cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth
10.0 cms.
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on
September 23, 1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he
asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios testimony
that accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that accused-
appellant told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant
maintained that he did not see Demetrio at any time in the afternoon of
September 24, 1993.[48]
On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was
feeling better, hence, told Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac,
Bataan that afternoon. They left the condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30
p.m. and proceeded straight to Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac,
accused-appellant went straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father,
aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of the car and then
asked accused-appellants permission to take the car to go to the town.[49]
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that
accused-appellant arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on
September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning, she saw
accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and her
husband had lunch at the clubhouse, which was about three to four
minutes drive from their house. When they returned home at 2:00 p.m.,
accused-appellant and his driver, Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was
corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.[51]
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of
September 25, 1993. He alleged that the water was choppy and caused
his jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he suffered bruises on his chest and
legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed clothes and
rested. Later, as he was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended
his arm to stop his fall. He had lunch with this family. At 1:30 p.m., he and
Demetrio left Bagac for Manila.[52]
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when
he was arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993.[53] He denied having
anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason to kill her
since he was in love with her.[54] Sometime during his relationship with
Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters. The
first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang
pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman
mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang walang ganti.Matitiyempuhan din
kita. Putang ina mo.[55]
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang
tungo. Mahal mo ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan
mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]
At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa
about them, she got very upset and worried. She said the letters came
from Fred, her estranged husband.[57]
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and
her mother visited accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23,
1993. She went inside the bedroom and talked to accused-appellant for
about 30 minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified that she did
not see anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the
bathroom inside the room was open, and there was nobody inside. The
next day, at 4:00 p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant. Again,
they went inside accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one
hour. The door of the bathroom was open, and she saw that there was
nobody inside. The following morning, they passed by the condominium
before proceeding to Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-
appellants bedroom and talked to him. As in the last two occasions, Ms.
Sison saw through the open door of the bathroom that there was no one
inside.[58]
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that
between December 21, 1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from the
middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she slept in the bedroom
subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum
Condominium; that she regularly has her menstruation around the end of
every month; and that her blood type is B.[59]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed
judgment, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[60]
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of
the trial court, alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
OF THE CRIME CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING,
DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited
from Demetrio Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62] On the
premise that accused-appellants guilt or innocence depends largely on
the weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully scrutinized and
examined his version of the events, and has found that Demetrio Ravelos
narrative is both convincing and consistent in all material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had
happened to Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was
willing to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if
accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his
side after learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly,
Demetrios description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in
accused-appellants bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the
mutilated body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the
prosecution.[63]
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown
by accused-appellant along the road to Bataan, were found by the NBI
agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter
witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal
belongings one by one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and
sincerity. The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination. In fact, the trial court gave full faith and credit
to his testimony, stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo
when he took the witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively
cross-examined by one of the defense counsel and he withstood the
same creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible witness and his
testimony is likewise credible.[64]
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court
deserve the highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge
is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who
appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[65] Especially,
where issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts
findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or
circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected the
result of the case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and
respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they
testified in court.[67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence
against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of
the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas death inside accused-
appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report revealed that
Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together
with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife
inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable fact
that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[68] For this reason,
it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently
than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of
Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against
accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence
that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-
appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all
others. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity
of the accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons
would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper
protection. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the
conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the
following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt
of the guilt of the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully
proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa
Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit on
September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave
it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993,
accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that
accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere
in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas
personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the
mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as
Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where
Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants
bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas
head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread,
covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal
Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the deceased
notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to accused-
appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the
pancreas. Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause of
death was not adequately established. Then, he relied on the
controverting testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who
was himself a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the
effect that the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and
inconclusive. The trial court noted, however, that Dr. Brion was a biased
witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon because he entered his
appearance as one of the counsel for accused-appellant and, in such
capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr. Mendez. Accused-appellant
counters that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving
testimony. Moreover, the trial courts ruling would imply that lawyers who
testify on behalf of their clients are presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean
that he perjured himself on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was
presented as expert witness. His testimony and the questions
propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death
of the victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the
well-known exceptions to the rule against admissibility of opinions in
evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to
give his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of
Dr. Brion, which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was
to choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was
the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr.
Mendezs testimony, not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but
more importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who conducted the autopsy
and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact
that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants
bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant who cut up
Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only
suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as
if to conceal the real cause of her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was
convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to refute Demetrios statements
by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous
and reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender
his resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed
Elsas death on him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel
treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to
implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than
entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo,
this Court views his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family
and, later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice to the
cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant
and, therefore, illegal. In this regard, the rule is settled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[72] In other words, it is
too late in the day for accused-appellant to raise an issue about his
warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid information and after a
judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening
letters which, according to Elsa, were written by the latters
husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate accused-
appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-
appellant, not Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in
accused-appellants condominium unit, and subsequently discovered
dead in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead
body was found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who
was probably responsible for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse
of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. [73]The fact that
the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-
appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There
ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the
victim.[74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as
the crime itself.[75] In this case, nobody witnessed the actual
killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of
the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took
advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary,
this Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused-
appellant[76] that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not
adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the
corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere
decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. [77] In this case,
accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body
like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body
in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the
ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly
depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and
horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for
the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.
 In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled: The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved,[86] and
thus should be affirmed.
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her
murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the
death. In murder, the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at
qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the
P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in murder requires no proof other
Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of
than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-
the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was
appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and
limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant
hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer
facetiously described as pulutan.[78] the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil
the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
person or corpse.[79] This circumstance was both alleged in the P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and
information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-
penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No appellant.
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the
SO ORDERED.
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.[81] Therefore, the trial
courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
need not be modified. JJ., concur.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be
modified. Elida Santos, Elsas sister, testified that the funeral expenses
was only P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the trial court erred when it awarded the
amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions,
speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent
proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the
loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with
reasonable certainty.[83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of
the physical suffering and mental anguish brought about by the felonious
acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in death.[84] It is
true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to
penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the
heirs.[85] Considering, however, the extraordinary circumstances in the
case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage suffered by
her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and
disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should
be more than the normal amount dictated by jurisprudence. However, the
amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is
rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering
the immense sorrow and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all
the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has
remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peacerrada,
44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida,
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the
pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered
by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to
pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry,
now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the
appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that
the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Lloyd Peacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis
of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case
to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome
Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing
Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with
her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in
Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales
spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador
Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio
Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw
the lifeless body of Lloyd Peacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an
hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and
started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock
in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer,
went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations.
Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by
Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman
Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of
the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been
informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs
of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought
to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peacerrada's cadaver was performed at about
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made
with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body
moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located
at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed
upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd,
forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in
width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right
lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located
1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed
inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed
toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of
the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length,
directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the
upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length,
located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left,
directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm.
in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed
inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery
coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior
portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the
aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located
at the medial portion of the medial border of the right
scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length,
located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located
at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural
fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left
ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the
right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right
middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the
descending colon of the large intestine, thru
and thru.
 5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the
apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16)
wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal
organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared
before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where
his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by
the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy
police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder
dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as
follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities are
still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-
pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating
and helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose
to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd
D. Peacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon
said Lloyd D. Peacerrada multiple wounds on different
parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to
the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused
the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both
entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981,
and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the
case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the
basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming
as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant),
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed.
Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not
guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
(ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C.
Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peacerrada,
the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the
deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981
after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed
that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1)
lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the
possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
(except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined
that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the
probability that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police
authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident.
Nanie Peacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by
reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome
Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the
accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged
eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his
age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in
Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio,
and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the
vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach
the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20
meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging
upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated
some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what
he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what
he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months
after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim
which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of
helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peacerrada. Hence, out of his volition,
he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peacerrada lived, and
related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in defense of her
honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was
located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the
incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that
night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and
in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding
Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including
the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of
Peacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that
Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at
a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering
that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was
stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant
were moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities,
we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said
he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The
natural reticence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this
country to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into
criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially
declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted
that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he
and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984)
He said that he could not think of any reason why Huntoria
should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the
trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced
the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years
 and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should
have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to
the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00 should
be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings
of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126
SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31
(1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the
Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime
as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains
and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however
no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would
have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible.
If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the
bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it.
And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of
attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the
linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more
than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the
other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to
state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by
the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never
mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the
victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of
the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the
killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed
persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have
conspired in killing Lloyd Peacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the
sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or
more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that
one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales'
admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all
too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that
there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of
these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by
the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a
meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused,
including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981,
in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a
clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime
was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused
as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon.
He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But
on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who
among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what
particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-
examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is
it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that
you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at
that distance by the herein accused as
identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly
shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking,
will you please tell this Honorable Court who
was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding
Peacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did
the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the
"labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the
rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor,
and I cannot determine who was hacking
and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this
Court who really hacked Lloyd
Peacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the
hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this
Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid
movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you
could not even identify the weapons used
because according to you it was just
flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific
act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court
and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of
the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation
under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did
the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the
Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through
the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
 Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law
are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo)
but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by
means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this
instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim
that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that
he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant
"hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific
act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes
the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as
adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it
follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or
dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant,
granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing
alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest
(already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five
accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the
accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of
two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal
wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on
her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily
the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more
it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's
long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be
endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he
feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally
volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and
Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the
accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the
original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would
still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by
the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In
fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was
because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so
long from the time you saw the stabbing and
hacking of Lloyd Peacerrada when you
told Mrs. Peacerrada about what
happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody
else but because I was haunted by my
 conscience and secondly the victim was Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate
also my landlord I revealed what I saw to circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
the wife of the victim.46 appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in
xxx xxx xxx the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused. 52
(Emphasis ours.)
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our doubt.
socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if
not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported SO ORDERED.
eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the
conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, would, in a perverted
sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the
surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because
the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a
greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as
May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial
distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the
victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for
his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but
dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation
of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada doubtful it is
contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition
and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore
improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime
of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-
year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that
the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the
purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in
the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S.
ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No.
111232-H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted
hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery as charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or
any aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No.
7659 entitled An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous
Crimes and Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet
shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond
any reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet is likewise hereby ordered to
pay, unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by
reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the
three (3) children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and another
P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma. Odyssa Suzette Tecarro-
Tuadles, as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
f. Costs.
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet,
accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR.,
shall be liable to pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-
adjudicated sums or the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F
with Serial Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five
(5) live bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to
the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO
S. ANTONIO @ Ambet from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been
an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a
deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of
the other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional
basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a
.9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S.
Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board
(GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became
socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became
reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International
Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro
Manila, which houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and
gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to
play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their
preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian
poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1,
1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of
the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their
third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles
at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting
for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for
two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only
when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at
around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from
the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and
the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution
alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without
warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot
Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to
accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the
prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security
guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on
the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their
argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the
middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles
suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life,
Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for
possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell
face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had
actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was
accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted
the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis
could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused
SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the
scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute
in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security
guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to
his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they
proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a
member of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios
residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls
and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon,
Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the
custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police
authorities. Later, the two security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven
back to the club where they waited for the police investigators. Sometime
thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his statement at
the police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days
later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for
the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and
SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a
gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, by then and there suddenly,
unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo
Arnie Tuadles on his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause
of his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder,
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his
public functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or assisting
the accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving
false information which tended to deceive the investigating authorities;
and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of
murder either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with
abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by
concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the
crime, in order to prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the
laser sight of the gun used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to
take steps to preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime, and
purposely failing to call on the crime laboratory service of the proper
agencies for appropriate action.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of
Not Guilty. Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a
plea, and the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for both of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as
charged, imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them
to pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and
damages, set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three
accused filed separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and
disposition.
Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following
assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOSE JIMMY BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS
DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT
ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH
TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES,
INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO ARNIE
TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE
IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF
P7,200,000.00 AS COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF
ARNIE TUADLES DEATH, DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE
MORAL DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO
AMBET ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.[3]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision,
arguing that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN
ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS
MURDER[4]
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the
following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN
CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS
SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE
DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT
SHOWN FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH,
DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL
THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME,
QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE
SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH
DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.[5]
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall
deal first with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the
credibility of the prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy
Bobis. Appellant Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and credibility as an
eyewitness on two (2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan
authorities averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was
still ascending the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took
place when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement
taken at the Eastern Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the
trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement, this time averring that
he had indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with
neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and
shoot the latter pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis
testimony, according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said
witness unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out
the contradictions and inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and
second statements and court testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the
San Juan Police investigators false information in his first statement,
saying that nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant
Antonio. On the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was
Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change
his statement and testimony so that the murder charge against appellant
Antonio would be strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court
testimony, on the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in
his first statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is
more credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus,
by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever
there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.[6] Moreover,
inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn
statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said
witness.[7] Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more
credence to SG Bobis testimony given in open court despite his having
executed an earlier statement which was inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG
Bobis explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information
in his first statement. He had testified that moments after he saw
appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: Ikaw, wag
kang tumistigo, ha.[8] Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac,
were allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in Quezon City. He
also testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer
instructed him (Bobis), should the police investigator ask him who shot
Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident.[9]
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to
say that they were both outside the club when the trouble started,
saying: kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club.[10] Bobis
stated that he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police
investigator, appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not
see appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the
stairs when the gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at
that time, but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of
conduct of private security guards when he did not make a formal report
to his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the
Club but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him
to the latters house. This being so, neither was he able to put said
accused Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active
service who was with them at the time and who should have done so, had
also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who
are just ordinary security guards. (Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na
po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet
Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.)
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the
time. Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked: parang galit pa sila
sa amin he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the
house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.[11]
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and
seeing Tuadles widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve
and courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at the
EPD. When he testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his
declaration that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun
from behind and shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times
and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility
of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies
and he was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.[12]
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons
given by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he
made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court
testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This
Court also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this
fact has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of
witnesses.[13]
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier
contradictory statement, his direct testimony and answers under cross-
examination appear clear and convincing. We agree with the trial court
when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict
with each other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the
Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused
Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in
completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and
straightforward answers to the gruelling questions propounded on him
and had stuck to his truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses
demeanor on the stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words,
accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The
other prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like
SG Bobis, untainted in their testimonies.[14]
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we
respect the findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG
Bobis as an eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in
a better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself
and observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[15]
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule
that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and
to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.[16]
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of
the trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect.[17]
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is
best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of
his demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed
in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false.[18]
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis
was given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized
he was no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a
wealthy businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in
power. Appellant Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself
and his gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours
later, he went to see then Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City
so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice President, what happened in
his own words.[19]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan
Police Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis
lowly station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be
one of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can
fault him for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of
appellant Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him,
knowing they were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived
threat, whether real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out
and just repeat what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his
enemies, but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have
momentarily avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to
their dictates, but he could not escape the proddings of his
conscience. He realized he had to right a wrong, and this he did with
selflessness and at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of
SG Bobis except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of
the EPD who told him how to testify.Thus, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing
evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and credence.[20]
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid
culpability by claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere
accident without his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-
defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an
accused admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his
plea of self-defense by clear, credible and convincing evidence.[21] To
successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio must clearly and
convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not have provoked the
victim into committing the act of aggression.[22]
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the
events that took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant
Antonio only for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-
defense were attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio
alleged that Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles)
grabbed the gun which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then
concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against
him (Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from
shooting him. His bare testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not
convince us that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The
testimony of Bobis shows that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant
Antonios loud invectives, and it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the
aggressor under such a situation. And even if Tuadles had grabbed the
gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles intended to keep the gun
away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him
considering the state of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was
in. This would be a more believable scenario since even appellant
Antonio admitted that he was suffused with anger, his temper short due to
three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
 Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun
at him. There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonios
uncorroborated testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot
him. Hence, there is no convincing proof that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.[23] The burden of proving unlawful aggression lay on appellant
Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof that would stand
careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this requirement, appellant
Antonios claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot even
claim it as an extenuating circumstance.[24]
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke
Tuadles, if indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio
himself admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a
furious rage. Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a
provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that
appellant Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to use it against
Tuadles. If ever there was provocation, it was certainly coming from
appellant Antonio, not from Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of
Tuadles was an accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while
he, Antonio, was performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault
or intention of causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to
prove his claim of self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of Tuadles and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there
is no basis for us to argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing
a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.[25]
We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took
place leaves much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed
dictum on the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden
death he may have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of
them even irrational. However, we respect the trial courts findings. The
trial court upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that
if Antonio indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected
of him would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a
hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead,
appellant Antonio left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend,
lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both
had their hands on the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled
the trigger, we agree that appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no
one else would touch the gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on
it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for
preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio
also handed the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece
of evidence that could have proven his claim of self-defense or accident
was unfortunately lost due to his lack of presence and due care.
Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear
from the records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was
Tuadles who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall
who fired the gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles
who did it. Next, he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-
defense. Only, he could not indubitably prove that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. Failing there, he again admitted
shooting Tuadles, but that it was an accident. Again, he failed to prove
that he was in the process of performing a lawful act when he shot
Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an
accident to escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of
the victim. And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the
killing, conviction of the accused is inescapable.[26] Appellant Antonio had
to rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-
defense is already an open admission of responsibility for the killing.[27] As
it was, appellant Antonios testimony is not only uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself[28] for
being ambivalent and self-serving.[29]
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant
Antonio claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this
score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order
that voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his
case. First, he had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It
is of no moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to
the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the
case of People v. Bautista,[30] the voluntary surrender of the accused to a
police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was
considered attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio
voluntarily surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was
arrested, hence the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be considered in appellant Antonios favor.[31]
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating
circumstance, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the
offended party.[32] However, apart from his own testimony, appellant
Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked by
Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused
or could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating
provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot,
and never will, be a reason to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant
Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the argument arose from
Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-
serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.[33]
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case
which the trial court overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial
court when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have
carefully examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the
justifications of the trial court upon which it based its decision.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.[34] It ruled
that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain
the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a
sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision,
typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the
issue of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into
murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode
of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was
a spur of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where
accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form
of execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a
crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may
take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the
aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to
perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia
where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a
mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide
without risk to himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when
the latter refused appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic
drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of
alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision
to attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment.[39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the
means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger
to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made
by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be
appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender.[40] Such deliberate or conscious
choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an
impulse of the moment.[41]
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes
the killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the
decisions of this Court.[42] Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of
the mode of attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is
likewise an established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a
person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The
same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before
any conclusion may also be reached respecting the attendance of
treachery, whether as qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal
case.[43] There is no such proof in this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and
Tuadles spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The
situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant
Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio
and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a
fact attested to by the defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness
himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio
even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.The argument precluded the
presence of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and
methods to kill Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any
eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44] where we
held that there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a
verbal altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced
that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such
as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was
standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not
have been unforseen.[45] (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still
be no treachery. In People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our consistent view
that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was
preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on
guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was
forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the
accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a
heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as
admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded
that the shooting was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill
Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their
argument which neither of them had foreseen.Hence, there was no
treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must have
been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an
unforeseen occurrence.[47]
In People v. Nitcha,[48] we held that:
To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous. (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him
to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist
with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In
treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted
consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his
reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. [49] Thus, the killing
of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and
favorably considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was
not proven by convincing evidence[50] is advocated by the Solicitor
General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's
contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to
agree with this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles
engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they were heard laughing and
kidding each other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter
turned into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient
violence. Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression
of Antonio. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal
altercation or spat between the victim and the assailant such that the
victim must have been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case,
Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before
Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate
distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before
the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend
himself.[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that
should be imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one
(1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be
imposed shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal, that is, from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty to be imposed shall be the penalty next lower which is prision
mayor in any of its periods.[52] Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral
damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was
unsupported by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of
P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages, the trial court relied
completely on the testimony of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who
stated that at the time of his death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a
month from his construction business. Applying the formula laid down by
this Court in the cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,[53] and People v.
Quilaton,[54]the trial court arrived at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as
compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity. Appellant Antonio
argues that the trial court cannot just rely on the sole testimony of Suzette
Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its computation on mere
speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre[55] and People v. Verde,[56] we held that the
absence of documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude
recovery of said damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of
earning capacity computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim's
wives. This was reiterated in People v. Dizon,[57] where we held that:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R.
No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary
evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did
not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the
victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who
was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle
driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in
People vs. Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary
evidence. (Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages
should be calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income - living
expenses
(50% of
gross annual income)
x = 2(80-40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
3
= 26.67 x P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion.[58] We agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award
of moral damages was excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in
the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[59] And though
moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the
claimants for actual injury, they are not designed to enrich the
complainants at the expense of the accused.[60]
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support
of his family and they will also be deprived of his love and
companionship. No amount of money could ever compensate for their
loss. While the award of moral damages may help ease the emotional
and psychological trauma that they continue to suffer, this Court has not
granted so large an amount as moral damages. Accordingly, we find that
the amount of P3,000,000.00 granted by the trial court in this case is
excessive, and the same is therefore reduced to P500,000.00.Moreover,
there being no aggravating circumstances attendant in this case, the
award of exemplary damages should also be deleted.[61]
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M.
Nieto. He argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an
accessory. The trial court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed
to arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information tending to
deceive the investigating authorities.[62]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one
who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part
in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself
or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2)
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when
the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.[63]
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are
two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who
harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public
officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime
committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light
felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused
his public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of
accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime
committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's
culpability is concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument
between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by
shouting, Sarge! Sarge! Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the
latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot
Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from
the table, which Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went
downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them,
and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They
arrived at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around
11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made
some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked
to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis
that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and
Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident
took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac
returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the San Juan
police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar,
arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police investigated the
scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his
instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the
club. While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front
of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the questions of the
police investigator.[64]
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG
Bobis. Appellant Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of
the crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory.Being a police officer
in the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the
latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself
witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to
do. Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they
stayed for more than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et
al., it was held:[65]
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local
president of the town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has
incurred criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to
prosecute the crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made
it possible for them to escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in
fact. This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been
unable to explain his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this
serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him, and
consequently he should suffer a penalty two degrees inferior to that
designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the Code, by virtue of article
68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before
the shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went
upstairs. He saw that appellant shot Tuadles.Despite this knowledge, he
failed to arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with
the latter. To this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.[66]
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto
provided false information to deceive the investigating authorities. He
instructed Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating
officer, in order to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the
incident and thus make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an
accessory to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose
on appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prison correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s
appeal. After carefully reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we
find that the trial court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an
accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla,
Jr. was his failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during
the trial. However, such omission does not amount to concealing or
destroying the body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to
prevent its discovery. The laser sight had been surrendered to the police
authorities so there was no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter
does not make appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as
custodian thereof, he may be made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He
further stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you
as alleged in the information that you tried to conceal or destroy
the effects or body of the crime to prevent its discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the
body of the crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as
investigator and I worked for it up to the wee hours of the morning
up to the next morning, I still did it and I gathered evidence and I
submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and even when at the time, I
have been hearing that I will not be the one who will investigate,
they got it from me without proper notice, that they will take over
the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I was asked by
Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was even
the investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC
and I still worked hard, I even remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this
moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that
this policeman is very hardworking, even the investigation is not
with him anymore, but still, he's working and I answered him,
whatever, whatever they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job
and so, I will also do my job. Because as far as I know, I will not
be implicated because I have not done anything, I have not done
the charges that they filed against me, I was surprised when I was
given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is why my
youngest child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told
him that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory
because according to one of the witnesses, the gun together with
the laser sight was handled to you and when that gun reached
Crame, the laser sight was no longer there, answer me, what
happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by
Inspector Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately made
the transmittal for the laboratory and I described what is there,
together with the laser and after that, I placed it in a brown
envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the second day, I was really
busy on that day because I was the only one. I was asking for
assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I just
found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I
gave the envelope together with the transmittal and when it was
being received, he checked it and he said Sgt. Where is the laser
sight? and I said it's there, attached. And he said please look at it.
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I
was planning to go back right away but I just said, okay, I will just
cross it out and I did not erase because I want that I will not hide
anything. It has happened because maybe somebody is interested
or I might have left in my drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's
why I did not sno-pake it and I just crossed it out so it can be read
together with my initial and when I came back, I asked them who
touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was
talking.[67]
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did
not intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution
failed to prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the
principal accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an
accessory device attached to the gun, it was not essential to the
commission, investigation and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself,
which was the instrument of the crime, was surrendered to the authorities
and presented as evidence in court. The failure of appellant SPO1
Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in
any way affect the outcome of the trial, much less prevent the discovery
of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing that appellant SPO1
Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal
Code and jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make
him liable as an accessory to the crime committed by appellant
Antonio. Even the Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to
convict appellant Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or
its corpus delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight
could not have prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential
instrument of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with
serial number BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved
and presented as evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation
of the laser sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way,
concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have
so committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the
case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not
make him an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he
may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.[68]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in
Criminal Case No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the
crime of HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning
capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is
ACQUITTED and absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ Ambet,
appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the
above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said
heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), joins Justice Puno in his concurring &
dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTNG OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I agree with the majority decision except its finding that treachery
did not attend the killing of the victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, and the
conclusion that the accused-appellant, Alberto "Ambet" Antonio, should
not be held guilty of murder but only of homicide.
For proper perspective, I wish to relate the relevant facts on the issue
of treachery.
On November 2, 1996, at about 9:30 a.m., the victim, Arnulfo "Arnie"
Tuadles, 40 years old, a former professional basketball player and a
family man, was shot to death by accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet"
Antonio, 59 years old and former Chairman of the Games and
Amusement Board. The murder weapon was a 9mm Beretta Model 92F
pistol, with a laser sight.1 Tuadles sustained a single gunshot wound on
the forehead, between the eyes.2 The bullet hit the brain and exited at
the right portion of the back of the head.3 He died due to "intracranial
hemmorhage."4
Dr. Jaime Leal, Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted the autopsy examination on the Tuadles. His examination
showed that Tuadles was shot at close range, specifically at a distance
of less than 12 inches.5 The bullet's trajectory was directed backwards,
slightly upwards and to the right.6
 The autopsy also revealed that Tuadles suffered five (5) abrasions
("gasgas"), located on his forehead, nose, tip of nose, cheek, and right
lower lip. He sustained these abrasions as he collapsed on the floor after
he was shot. There were also contusions on Tuadles' forehead and lower
lip that could have been sustained when his face hit a hard blunt object,
and hematomas on both eyes caused by the "pulling of the blood in the
spaces between the eyes." He had a lacerated wound on the cheek which
could have been caused by a forcible contact of the skin with a hard blunt
object, such as chairs or tables, when he was falling to the floor.7 All the
injuries were located on the head of the victim.
Security guard Jose Jimmy Bobis gave the eyewitness account of
the shooting. He reported at the IBC Club in Greenhills, San Juan, on
November 2, 1996 at 7:00 a.m. He relieved co-security guard Ernesto
Olac. At that time, there were only five (5) people inside the club: Antonio,
Tuadles, SP04 Juanito Nieto, Olac and Bobis. Antonio and Tuadles were
at the second floor playing "pusoy dos", SP04 Nieto and Olac were
sleeping in the dining area at the ground floor, while Bobis was in the bar,
also at the ground floor, keeping watch of the premises.
In the course of his duty, Bobis heard Antonio and Tuadles laughing
and teasing each other ("nagkakantiyawan") while playing "pusoy
dos". He recognized the voice of Antonio because it was loud in contrast
to Tuadles' voice which was soft. At past 9:00 a.m., he heard Antonio say
in a loud voice: "Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag pa pass ay mag-ta-
tap ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?" Antonio then said "Sige
". Tuadles' response was almost inaudible because he spoke in a soft,
cool voice (mahina at malamig ang boses).8 Again, Antonio spoke: "Barya
lang itong pinagla-laruan natin" (We are only playing for loose
change). Tuadles kept silent. Antonio then called: "Sarge,
Sarge, Sarge!," referring to SPO4 Nieto. Bobis walked to the sleeping
Nieto and informed him that Antonio was calling him. They went to the
second floor and saw Antonio and Tuadles standing between the billiard
table and the "pusoy" table. They were facing each other but at a certain
angle, and about three feet of space separated them. Antonio appeared,
hiding his right hand behind his back. He (Antonio) cursed "putang ina ka
kasi". Tuadles uttered something which Bobis could not understand
because Tuadles' back was turned on him. Antonio then quickly raised his
right hand, pointed a gun at the face of Tuadles and fired the
gun ("Mabilis na inangat niya ang kanang kamay niya at itinapat sa
mukha ni Arnie Tuadles at ipinutok ang baril ").9 Tuadles twisted to the
right and fell on the floor face down. Antonio removed the gun's
magazine, cocked it and replaced its magazine. The gun had a laser
light attached to its end.10 Antonio ordered SPO4 Nieto to get the score
sheet and the cards laying on top of a table. SPO4 Nieto placed the cards
on a paper, folded it several times, and placed it inside the clutch bag of
Antonio. Bobis was taken aback by the incident. When he regained his
composure, he asked Antonio: "Boss, bakit nangyari ito." Antonio did not
immediately respond but later pointed his finger at Bobis and then
warned: "Ikaw, huwag kang tumistigo, ha!" Bobis kept quiet due to
fear. They all went downstairs. Olac who heard the gunfire inquired from
Bobis what happened. He told him that Antonio shot Tuadles. Antonio
then commanded Bobis to get the key of Tuadles' car. He did as he was
told. Only two vehicles were parked in the premises of the club: the
Mercedes Benz van of Antonio and the car of Tuadles. They boarded the
van, with Antonio driving. Following them was the car of Tuadles driven
by Antonio's driver. The driver left Tuadles' car near Shaw Blvd. and rode
in the van. They headed to the house of Antonio. They left the club at
10:00 a.m. and arrived at Antonio's house in Green Meadows at 11:30
a.m. On instruction of Antonio, his driver burned the score sheet and
the cards. They stayed at Antonio's house for several hours while
Antonio conferred with his lawyer. Antonio's lawyer told Bobis that he
should say that the shooting was an accident. SPO4 Nieto instructed
Bobis to claim that he was outside the entrance of the club when the
shooting took place. Bobis, Nieto, Olac and Antonio's driver returned to
the club at 5:00 p.m. Thirty minutes later, a team of policemen from San
Juan arrived. They found the lifeless body of Tuadles sprawled on the
second floor.
Police investigator SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. took the statement of Bobis
that same day. In his statement, Bobis denied seeing the shooting
incident. On November 4, 1996, Bobis happened to watch the television
and he saw the crying Mrs. Tuadles while being interviewed. Bothered
by his conscience, he requested the operations manager of their
security agency to bring him to the Eastern Police District. On November
5, 1996, he gave another statement to the EPD and revealed the
truth that fateful day of November 2, 1996.
Given these facts, the majority holds that treachery did not
attend the killing of Tuadles.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.11
The two elements that must be proved to establish treachery are: (1)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of
the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the
victim no opportunity to defend himself, and (2) the means, method and
manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender.12
 I respectfully submit that the killing of Tuadles was characterized by
treachery.
First. There is little doubt that the first element of treachery was
proved by the prosecution. The victim, Tuadles, had absolutely no
opportunity to defend himself from the aggression of
Antonio. The attack was sudden, coming as it did like a thunderbolt
from a blue sky. It was preceded by a not too serious argument about a
rule of the "pusoy dos" game which appeared to have been overlooked by
Tuadles. The little argument agitated Antonio but not
Tuadles. Hence, the attack was unexpected especially because
Tuadles and Antonio did not have any prior misunderstanding. Tuadles
even endearingly called Antonio "uncle". Likewise, Tuadles was a
basketball player when Antonio served as Chairman of the Games and
Amusement Board.
Second. The prosecution also proved the second element of
treachery that "the means, method and manner of execution
were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender." This
element deals with the subjective aspect of treachery, hence, the more
difficult element to determine. We are not, however, without any
established jurisprudence in determining whether the accused-
appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means, method and
manner of killing the victim. The authoritative La Fave and Scott, after a
survey of court rulings, tell us of the relevant evidence to consider, viz:13
"On the basis of events before and at the time of the killing, the trier of
fact will sometimes be entitled to infer that the defendant actually
premeditated and deliberated his intentional killing. Three categories of
evidence are important for this purpose: (1) facts about how and what the
defendant did prior to the actual killing which show he was engaged in
activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts
about the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with the victim from
which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the
killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so
particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a preconceived design. Illustrative of the first category are
such acts by the defendant as prior possession of the murder weapon,
surreptitious approach of the victim, or taking the prospective victim to a
place where others are unlikely to intrude. In the second category are
prior threats by the defendants to do violence to the victim, plans or
desires of the defendant which would be facilitated by the death of the
victim, and prior conduct of the victim known to have angered the
defendant. As to the third category, the manner of killing, what is
required is evidence (usually based upon examination of the victim's
body) showing that the wounds were deliberately placed at vital areas
of the body. The mere fact that the killing was attended by much
violence or that a great many wounds were inflicted is not relevant in this
regard, as such a killing is just as likely (or perhaps more likely) to have
been on impulse. Conduct by the defendant afterthe killing in an effort to
avoid detection and punishment is obviously not relevant for purposes of
showing premeditation and deliberation, as it only goes to show the
defendant's state of mind at the time and not before or during the killing."
(emphasis ours)
The evidence proves the deliberateness of the attack made by
Antonio. The attack was done with swiftness. It was motivated by the
failure of Tuadles to follow an agreement on the "pusoy" game. The
deliberateness of the attack is also shown by the fact that Tuadles was
shot at close range, with the muzzle of the gun less than 12 inches
from Tuadles' forehead.Antonio aimed at Tuadles' forehead, between
the eyes. The bullet penetrated Tuadles' brain, destroyed its right
hemisphere and caused Tuadles' instantaneous death. Clearly, Antonio
chose to shoot Tuadles at a vital part of his body. As a result, Tuadles
became an instant statistic of the graveyard.
With due respect, I do not agree with the majority that the case
at bar involves a spur of the moment killing, hence, there is no
treachery. The majority states that there was a prior heated
altercation between Tuadles and Antonio. The heated altercation
allegedly forewarned Tuadles of the attack. The so-called heated
altercation, however, is not well-established by the evidence. A
replay of the facts will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially heard the two
teasing each other ("nagkakantiyawan"). Later, an argument developed
between them which cannot be characterized as a "heated
altercation." Bobis testified as follows: 14
"Q: Now, this matter of 'kantiyawan' and 'nagtatawanan' iyong dalawa,
how long did this continue during the period of time you were
there?
A: A few seconds only.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Would you be in a position to recognize the voices of Ambet
Antonio and Arnie Tuadles?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Arnie Tuadles' voice is soft and Ambet Antonio's voice is loud.
 Q: Let's focus on Mr. Antonio, you said his voice was loud, did you A: 'Barya lang and pinagla-laruan natin.' It's only a (sic) loose change
hear him mentioned (sic) anything at that time? that we are playing with here.
Atty. Flaminiano: Q: Did you hear any word from Mr. Tuadles?
Leading, your Honor. A: No more, sir."
COURT: In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated during the
alleged altercation. Tuadles spoke in a soft and cool voice that Bobis
Answer. could hardly hear and understand him. The characterization of the
A: Yes, sir. argument that preceded the shooting of is decisive of the issue of
treachery. I submit that the argument between Antonio and Tuadles
Q: What did you hear? was trivial for it merely concerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap
xxxxxxxxx the table when making a pass. Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles
violated the rule intentionally. Nothing shows the degree of damage
A: Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap ng suffered by Antonio as a consequence of Tuadles' omission. It is thus my
dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa? submission that the argument appears to be slight and cannot justify the
xxxxxxxxx conclusion that Antonio acted in the heat of passion or on impulse in
killing the victim.
Q: Before you heard this statement, did you hear other things from Mr.
Ambet Antonio apart from what you have said, before that? The case of People vs. Cruz 16 is apropos. In said case, the accused
and the victim were "compadres" for having stood as sponsors in the
A: None, sir. baptism of a common friend. The accused used to drive one of the
tricycles of the victim until the latter sold the tricycle the accused was
xxxxxxxxx
driving. It was claimed that the accused bore a grudge against the victim
Q: Was there any comment that you heard from Mr. Tuadles? because of the said incident. At any rate, while the victim was talking with
a co-tricycle driver along the street while waiting for passengers, the
A: Yes, sir. accused appeared and approached the victim. Upon nearing the victim,
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Tuadles? accused angrily uttered, "Pare, walang presidente presidente sa akin" as
he simultaneously drew out a gun from the front portion of his waist and
A: I could not understand because his voice was soft and ... shot the victim with it point blank, hitting the upper left eyebrow of the
Prosecutor Llorente: latter which caused him to fall on the ground. Thereafter, accused
left. This Court rejected the claim of the accused that the shooting was
May we put on record the answer of the witness in Tagalog? accidental and noted with approval the observation of the Solicitor
General that "if the shooting of the victim were accidental, accused would
COURT:
have come to his aid and taken him to a hospital, instead of abandoning
Granted. him." The Court further held that the accused was liable for murder. The
victim was unarmed. He did not have the least suspicion of the accused's
A: "Mahina at malamig ang boses." design to shoot him. In contrast, accused had a gun. The victim,
Despite the soft response from Tuadles, Antonio continued with his therefore, had no chance to defend himself against the latter's frontal
outburst, thus:15 attack. Treachery qualified the killing to murder.

"Q: Going back now to Mr. Antonio, did you hear him again mentioned With due respect to the majority, I find the killing of the victim
(sic) or say other things? Tuadles qualified by treachery. I vote to convict accused-appellant
Antonio of murder as charged.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Ambet Antonio?

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi
Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for
the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER
for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course
of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was
amended to MURDER.1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with
the said handgun Roland John Chapman who war hit in
the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law.2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill and evident premeditation, and by means of
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the
head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly
caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-
4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the
death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of
his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law.4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against
accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No
bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John Chapman. A
petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9,
1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution
manifested that it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify
on the killing of Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the
wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that
day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the
murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's
testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding
of Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant.5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be
wasted if the testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of
Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were charged
involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be
allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the
inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder
charges.6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution
wanted to present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait
until after the arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense
pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution
would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it
could present Leino.7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail
until after arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial
on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The
defense counsel acceded.8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges.
The prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3)
cases. No objection was made by the defense.9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino
invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party
at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m.
and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they
transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until
past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up
a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they
entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street,
about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in
going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany
Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany
Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and
asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only
wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB)
I.D. 14 Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's
wallet and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind
Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk
and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman
felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you
shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked:
"Do you want a trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The
shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she
became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly
shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody
help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the
sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused
stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without
being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed
to the side of accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused's car, trying to put some distance between them.
The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside
Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away
and directly in front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused
turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino
was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside
him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused
return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least
three (3) people looking on and standing outside their houses along
Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private
security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT,
a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and AGRIPINO
CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey
Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street,
Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of
their employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to
return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first
gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see
what was happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the
fence of their employer's house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each
saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino)
sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a
woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and
flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from
the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the
gunman. He saw the control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He
described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat
white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the
getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver
metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face.
They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters
away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20)
meters away from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place
was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the
incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house
and went near the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece
along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat
requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of
Dasmarias Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and
narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas
repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his
logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down the license plate control
number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes.
They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for
treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES
BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO
FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial investigation
disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles registered
with the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down
two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was
registered in the name of JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street,
Dasmarias Village, with plate number PKX 566, and another was traced
to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the
NBI, was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team
to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the
house of Jose Montao35 where they found ahead of them the Makati
police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to
verify from Mrs. Montao whether the white Lancer car registered in the
name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's
car. Mrs. Montao denied and declared they had already sold the car to
Saldaa Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben
Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City.
Mrs. Montao called up her husband and informed him about the
investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to
the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car.
Ranin brought them to the NBI office for investigation, together with
Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao the whereabouts of
his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was
at the residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street,
Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13,
1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa Enterprises. Conti
confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from
two (2) NBI agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon
Ranin's request, Montao left his car at the NBI parking lot pending
identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot
investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They
interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their office the
next day for further investigation.38 They also interviewed Agripino
Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied
having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to
Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night and served him a
subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the
next day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian
national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the
scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car
was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and
refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every
effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection.
Ranin even asked a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax
Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as
summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn statement.41 Cadenas,
however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the
incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI
agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding
information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas
confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was
apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family.
After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He
described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW
566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where Montao's white Lancer
car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was
different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and
to point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car. He
pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he
pointed to was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas
replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him
ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from
the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture
(Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his
name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial
Court to apply for a search warrant. After a searching examination of the
witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit
"RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray,
1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number
PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of
accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that
they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for
investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the
house at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up
someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage
and secured accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them.
Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that the keys were with
accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with
accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to
the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to
the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the
NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the
NBI office and waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3)
Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he just came from
the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that
he was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the
whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused
claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back and
was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's
house at Dasmarias Village since then. Due to the lateness of the
evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the following
day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim
pressed accused on what really happened at Dasmarias Village.
Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that he
would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into
silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was
requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded.
Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to
identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two
(2) other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification
by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from
the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman
in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house
and escorted him and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along
Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the
house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was
parked about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with
Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino
was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the house
and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the
unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of
them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that
time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece
of paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his
sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The men in
the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes,
they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the
lineup, Leino identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred
the cases of murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis
Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat.
Baldado went to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the
residence of his employer in Dasmarias Village. Baldado interviewed
Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his
statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched
Mangubat from his house and brought him to the Makati police station. At
the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would be coming and
see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the
stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete.
He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major
Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was going up the stairs,
Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman.
Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to
see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he
was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police Major.
When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again
asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head
in response. 60 Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado,
boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his
post at Dasmarias Village by other Makati
policemen.61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's
house and asked him again if accused was really the gunman. Once
more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat
that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado)
earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the
NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the
gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12)
pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify
the gun gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of
accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was
taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal
identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the
presence of the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez
and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco
protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out
that since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and
they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati
municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the
courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was
part of their on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels
acquiesced but requested that identification be made without the
presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if
accused is not identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor
accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup
at Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the
SOG office the men composing the lineup and he asked them to go near
accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed
to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,
located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed
backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and
central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then
lacerating the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign
body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the
right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the
right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft
tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino.
After entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth.
Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain
scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on
the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence
of the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of
the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his
tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty
in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman.
He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must
have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He concluded that the
gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the
acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center,
operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw
Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was bloodied all over.
Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the
eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side
of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She
was also given a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered
injuries on the skull and brain. There were several splintered bullets in her
brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a
team who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head,
remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets
embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain
and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital
signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was
wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of
Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her
brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A second surgery
was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used
the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering
of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of
brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed
infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen
developed brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third
operation to remove brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr.
Solis explained that Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead.
The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the
forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the
right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet
eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital
parts of the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan,
they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it
caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second
covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling
underneath the forehead brought about by edema in the area. Scanning
also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the fragmented
bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the
internal bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments
and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right
jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it
was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if
Maureen survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she would
have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary
routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye and
there was possibility she would have also lost her vision on the right eye.
All her senses would have been modified and the same would have
affected her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for
Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of
confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October
17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near
the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his house at #53
San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July
13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning.
Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his
house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the
Dasmarias shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He
denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente
Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car
ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an
accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting,
his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in
Dasmarias Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused,
however, conceded that although the car was not in good running
condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station
at around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac
and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the ownership of the
Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to
the Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to
a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany
him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would
present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He
furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the Makati police.
Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the
Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked
to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside
Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him
in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to
identify him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the
lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes
Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi
Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated
at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his
protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and
ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he
was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was
not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991,
he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566
in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit
a bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The
accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and damage to his
father's car, 90especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a
little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at
Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he
brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at
Dasmarias Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and
drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car
to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and
they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III
claimed that from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using
the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and
since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been
made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders
Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He
capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an
overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness
allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile
witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and
Vivian Hultman were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two
(2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He
legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had
three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the
initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading
to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that
Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke
Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out
but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first
salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time
of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up
at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their
house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to
accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked
on accused in jail and discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail
guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention,
headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F.
BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the
shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned
from Mr. Jose Montao that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate
number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in February 1991. This
car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and
was in the residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other
witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montao's white Lancer car was
not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente
Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not
give the central letters of the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of
the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked
the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid
told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say:
"Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's name
but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor
asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged
statement of the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13")
prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he
and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of
the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the
lobby. After a few minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused
passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he
could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat
told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than
accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo
Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said
statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo puti"
(somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
testified on the paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both
hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test
yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In
said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more
than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained
that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may
not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a
person who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also
took the stand for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling
the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at
the Security agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed
him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and
was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to
testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the
attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the
torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the
irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their client. When
asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he
objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he
filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice
upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the
excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused
at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment
would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the
investigation and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed
accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the
progress in the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7)
newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila
Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's
Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense
evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news
reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified
two (2) news reports as having been partly written by him. One was a
news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE
METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of
the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually
the product of collaborative work among several reporters. They follow
the practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to
cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different
reports they file and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in
evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to
take over the investigation of the murders of Roland
Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a
family Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela,
19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been
angered when Hultman, a 10th grader at the International
School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman after
going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-
whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot
when they tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman
murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a
"highly sensitive" matter that might involve influential
people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of
the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them
from previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the
only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director
Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN
CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions
thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the
defense and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the
national capital region, claims, however, that another
security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the
police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at
Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder
burns on Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at
the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not have fired the
gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two
(2) newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA
SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3",
thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she
called "Daddy" shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
 But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that
Hultman was a dancer before she was adopted by her
foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along
Caballero street inside the village after the shooting and
was believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using
the Palm street gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a"
and "3-c". He just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They
were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE
SON HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991
issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the
case came when the witness showed up and said that the
gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet
away near the car and was talking to Hultman, who was
shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-
examination, Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as
Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information available at
that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report,
entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she
wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her
information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that
Teehankee was arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car
with plate control number 566 who had not been
questioned, voluntarily went to police headquarters upon
invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy
Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged
concerted effort of the investigators to implicate accused as the lone
gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and that
someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c)
that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a
white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the
investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray
Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the
portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU",
which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's Journal
(Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders
Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected
occasion," Hultman said the day after his 17-year old
daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted
the Hultman family's request for permission to visit
Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still
hiding behind the curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told
me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities will
pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item
marked as Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-
e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin
sila," Ong was quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the
Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases
because he belongs to a secret but very influential multi-
sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other
crimes in high levels of government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given
to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged
blind and consuming personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against
accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment
by some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due
process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified
the news account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7").
He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his
information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi
Lancer with plate number "566." The witnesses cannot tell
the plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July
1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED,
SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of
said news item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the
defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an
investigator who asked not to be identified insisted that the
NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case
from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom
he described as "resembling Teehankee but looks much
younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified
only as Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the
early morning of July 13. The witness, however, failed to
identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP
CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news
account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence,
thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called
"surprise witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an
NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able
to interview Mangubat himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada
sa kanya si Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi
raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo, said a
red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want
to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article,
entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the
July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2)
portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's
Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's plate number when a
white Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said
Chapman's father is a communications specialist. He said
the shooting could be the result of an altercation on the
street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the
news account he wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions
of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the
corner of Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias
Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of
Chapman who was killed in front of his friends on his way
home from a party. The armed men, on board a white
Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz
car inside the village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint
ordered Chapman to alight from the car. They shot
Chapman several times in the body, while his companions
identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were
seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car with
bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will
announce later the names of the detained suspects after
their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED"
(Exhibit "23"), which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who
blocked Chapman's car on Mahogany St. in the
subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and
his two companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi
Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray
Lancer with plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw
the same car in the garage of the Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a)
stories was the NBI and they were based on information available to the
NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT
as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify
accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police station. Her
reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his
place of work in Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about
the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado
then said him he would no longer require him to sign the statement he
prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI, was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified
that extensive washing of hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate
gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued
washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate
residue embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand
can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a
suspect within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during
which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of
the paraffin test. She related that she once attended a training in Baguio
City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said
training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his
hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using
diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined,
the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992
for the presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a
day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a
Constancia 135 manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-
rebuttal evidence, the same being unneccesary. The defense, however,
declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in
the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear.
The prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and the petition
for bail be submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense
counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their sur-
rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten
(10) days from receipt of the Order within which to submit their
simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense
objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a
motion asking for additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time,
both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio
J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said
accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and
to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in the
sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
Philippine Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio
J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him
to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of
Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said
deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio
J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said
offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine
Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84),
Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual
damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said
offended party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
 (4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all
the offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B.
Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for New Trial, 139alleging for the first time
that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for decision not only
the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that
accused's right to adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for
new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE ONE
WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN
NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE
APPELLANT WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND
PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE
ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
KILLING OF CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE
SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
EXORBITANT MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE MILLION PESOS
(P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AND ON THE PETITION
FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE
MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE
ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3)
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously
assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in
Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers
before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by
Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that
the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI
when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The
shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze
could not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His senses were
also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by
the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness
identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms
of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently
suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components.
First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a
bystander, involves perception of an event actually
occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of
the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and
communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in
eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages,
for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and
retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal
human fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis
Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined
up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged
irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor
was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The
records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be
fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy
security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the
identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI
office as it was cramped with people and with high security
risk. 145 Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his
companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin,
Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that
there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often
done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the
mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio
and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him.
Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in
the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the
investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures.
He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification,
he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to the
shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug
shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-
court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification
by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp
post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The
incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to
falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the
defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant.
When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the
crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been
somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to
reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his
hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive
injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak.
He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also
no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a
witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode
Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not
solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the
finding that the prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and
"suspiciosly short in important details," there being no investigation
whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch
prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There
is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the
CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is
not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible
for Leino to have remembered appellant's face when the incident
happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short
time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed
before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We
have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to
strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner
the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of
the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper
motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and
appellant were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If
Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real
culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that
Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses that when the
Dasmarias security force and the Makati police conducted an on-the-
spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across
Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent
interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied:
"Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as
to what he supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed
him for investigation. He went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the
next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas
allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to
the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the
trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was
not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence
perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential
family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection
from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The
Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and
limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the
initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities
as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this
ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne
out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a
certain Ponferrada, information about his torture. The allegation is an out
and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand.
Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of
torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed
to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended
protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT,
citing the testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati
Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as
the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station.
Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively
identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He
averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to
his place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant
was the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat.
Baldado said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit
"HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously
prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant,
whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give
more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records
to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as
generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved
that the Makati police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant
favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing
less than a congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial
court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement
in previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that
evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing
at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the
bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court
found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been
the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that
he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus:
"Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy."
Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the
crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say:
"Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from
Dasmarias Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not
in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted
on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN,
since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b)
JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge
violated the rule on res inter alios actawhen he considered his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a
mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a
trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have
caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new
trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence
"unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice)
has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach
especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a
federal appellate court to "give judgment after an examination of the
entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects,
or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our
jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we
examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of
the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error
as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence
against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is
not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge
in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted
mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high
credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal
gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission,
however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot
nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was
not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the
NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the
NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show
that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key
which was then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed
not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence
show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to
Dasmarias Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses'
description of the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as
light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white ("medyo
puti"); 163 Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified
it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no
more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they
do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering
the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the
break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do
not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration.
Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy."
The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman
could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen
could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did
not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy." 167Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still
in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into
this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the
gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products
of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also
recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant
washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the
time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora
Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of
hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove
gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of
the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of
the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the
nitrates could have already been removed by washing or
perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant
was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already
lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction
as he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an
impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for
high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the
case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then
Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the
hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the
trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there
were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators
inside the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings
into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger
sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his
way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For
one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-
trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state
of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news
form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is
out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark
Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he
observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and
probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh
with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he
is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of
brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of
the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted
the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of
the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they
do not disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a
carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or
improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel
called the attention of the court to the visible display of a
placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the manifestation,
the trial judge immediately directed that the placard be
hidden. Only then did he order the start of the arraignment
of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the
exclusion of the media after they had enough opportunity
to take pictures. The court granted defense's request,
noting that the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument
ensued between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When
part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense
counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court and moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the
public was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were
yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court regarding
media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the
outpouring of sympathy by spectators inside the courtroom
has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also
manifested that he personally saw that when accused was
being brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a group
of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in
full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared
that he could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He
noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a
reaction at the spur of the moment. He then admonished
the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued
on the coverage of the trial by the press. The defense
alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and
deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It
invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows
the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except
the organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued
that exclusion of the public can be ordered only in
prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to
murder cases. He added that the public is entitled to
observe and witness trial of public offenses. He quoted the
U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A
responsible press is always regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal
field. The press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What
transpires in the courtrooms public property." The trial
judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance
to cover the proceedings before the trial proper but,
thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during
the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom
but were ordered to desist from taking live coverage of the
proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing
began, the trial judge gave the media two (2) minutes to
take video coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again
gave the media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the
trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly
admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the
proceedings and just take down notes. 183
 6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon
session, the judge admonished the media people present
in the courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against
the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he
presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied
heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to
the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on
his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same
time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial
judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to
assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon
elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we
directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the
proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not
present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of
Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately
adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the
crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove
treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the
crimes at bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the
shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on
the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It,
however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of
Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events
leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant
suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman
who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who
they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D.,
Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant
what was wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a
gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected.
"Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him
with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on
record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design
without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of
the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each
other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short
and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash
and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate
act of will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack
on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent
any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for
Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we
hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant
ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her,
Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between
them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging
for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position
before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between
the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period
which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus
correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the
killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant
posits that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of
earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino
were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of
attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of
victims Hultman and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was
sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death
and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant
was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum
of: Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for
death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million
Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of
deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was
sentenced to pay: Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual
damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of
U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino;
and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay
each of the offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos
(or a total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in
detail the matter of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a
felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil
obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws,
". . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV)
regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil
liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.)
and said consequential damages in turn include ". . . those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the
crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject,
however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the
Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant
shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen
by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there
is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos
even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support
according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's
 inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has
already been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00
in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-
18793, promulgated October 11, 1968 190, and it must be
stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral
damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages
being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this
civil liability when the crime has been committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being
"separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot
however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection
with the indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art.
2206) and is cases wherein exemplary damages are
awarded precisely because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances,"
(Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss or injury must
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in
question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages,
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of
the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation, the same may be recovered only when
exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1)
or . . . when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the
following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense
P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any
evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances attending the
commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
an amount to be fixed by the court according to the
circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income
at the time of death and his probable life expectancy, the
said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as
a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not
caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give
support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not
an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more
than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to
be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by
one or more aggravating circumstances, an amount to be
fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be
considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the actual
amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to
recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary
damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased and for moral damages
are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed
sum of P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00) corresponding to the
indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages
may, however, be respectively increased or lessened
 according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND
JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of
Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped
together the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages
at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the
particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different
kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be
given as temperate or moderate damages for the records do not show
any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary
damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be
considered as one for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New
Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime . . . shall be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under
current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed
by appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be
awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He
contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman
as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the
parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in
effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father,
is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family
Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate descendants of the adopted concur with the
adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the
entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her
natural father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders
Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the
award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is
unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply
justified by the circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen
recovered between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days. Her family
experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that
time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was
never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death.
She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be
perpetually by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the
shooting, their siblings had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety.
Left unattended, her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her
family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23)
doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without abatement. They
were forced to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started
receiving contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses
and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her
demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the
foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by
the circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in
addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar
acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious
consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the
wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of
Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her
companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for no
apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his
victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the
imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from
taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover,
since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the new Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against appellant for the
death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
moral, moderate and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered
extensive injuries as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was
shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore it. His
tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste
buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he
had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down
his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and
the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical
injuries and suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that
distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time of
the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two
(2) days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had
trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the
middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family.
Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He
had to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would be
safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One
Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral
damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed
with treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil
Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino
of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that
the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for
loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss
of his earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the time
of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then
a fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record,
which was presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would
have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due time; and a
doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount
of income Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical
studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in
Philippine pesos, of Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with
appellant that this amount is highly speculative and should be denied
considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the
International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve
the military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his
ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991,
he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional
pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said school and
was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to
justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish
his studies at the Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a professional
pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN
HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial
court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working in
Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per
the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it
appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills
needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial
course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path,
thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been
(sic) shot and she continued her studies,
what professional career would she (sic) like
to pursue considering her interests and
inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just
turned 17 and our projection is that,
certainly she would have been an artist in
the creative side. She would have become
an actress or a movie producer or probably
she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the
salary of a secretary in Sweden, how much
would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a
month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million
(P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen far loss of earning
capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high
school, Maureen took up a short personality development course at the
John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts
Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just
received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to
celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor
her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute
the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to
use the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17,
1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for
reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her
net income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the
formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age of victim at
time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have
been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of
earning as capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred
Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos
(P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's
heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages
for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased,
and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is
exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the
ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed
to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as
attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings
having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost
one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses testified during the
hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight
(68) documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents
related to the trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least
twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and
the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial,
the trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on
the cases, where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by
the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning
the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on
the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination
of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper.
He claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all
the cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to
present its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first
hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was
appellant's petition for bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be
remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against
appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course
of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution
was appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the
surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate
delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one
continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony
of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to
the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that
since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the
killing of Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in
which bail were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would
present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after
accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed
on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same
time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented
Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No
objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the
hearings conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for
bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and
documentary evidence relative to the shooting incident,
including evidence in support of the claim for damages.
These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the
defense counsels. The defense never objected that
evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its intention
was really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant's
petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their
cases, the trial court issued an Order 211 directing the
parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main
case as well as the petition for bail are respectively
submitted for Decision and Resolution." After receipt of this
Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for
extension of time to file the defense Memorandum. In both
Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's
Order submitting for decision the main case and the
petition for bail. Neither did it move for a reconsideration of
this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses to
present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This is
inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing
conducted was only on the petition for bail. If the defense
insist that what was submitted for decision was only his
petition for bail, he would have only prayed that he be
granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment
from the trial court, the defense did not interpose any
objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the defense
attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested
that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail
were heard simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover,
appellant's right to present additional evidence was not abridged by the
trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court
afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the
defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense
presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary
evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against
appellant that he filed a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time,
he alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged said offended party the following amounts: (P30,000.00)
additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as
shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen
reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-
decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court. Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in Philippine
Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and,
Decision of the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus: Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio
J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the (4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of
crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John the three (3) offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00]
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion (5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said
deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand SO ORDERED.
(P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death;
and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
damages.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio
J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of
Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of
the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One
Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as
actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand
Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos
(P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio

J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer
 Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No.
86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan
y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y
Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia;
Republic of the Philippines and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y
SUPREME COURT Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008
Manila against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer
charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
SECOND DIVISION
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge
and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995 witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the
incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled
to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the
vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between.
TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused- Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western
appellants. Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit
could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten
minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this
was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin
PUNO, J.: ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige
gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd
newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.1
openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by
"Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
a known "Coryista." fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and
Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos,
the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few
minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then
shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and
Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He
then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of
persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-
shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They
caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to
extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and
pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his
body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush
to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could
extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo
unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers.
They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away
from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos
also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was
already fallen.3Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on
the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo
on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify
Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito
Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more
fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the
head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang
saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he
did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off
the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps8 and then tried to
flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in
the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa
akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang
flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo
to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took
him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained
various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as
revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm.,
frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left
side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left
side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0
x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right
elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right
knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials
and fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press
people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing
national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to
order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to
investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for
persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the
killers.11Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their
identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended
and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by
the prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in
Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at
the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at
his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at
that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility;
he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos
admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains
why his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other
accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member
of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that
fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like
Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the
pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers
because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie
Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito
Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery
and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court,
however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other
accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando
Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery,"
Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and
hereby acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no
other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby
imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum,
to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case
No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and, there being no other extenuating
circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No.
86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder"
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum,
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case
No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said
charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said
charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-
49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
 under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate
penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los
Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar,
Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and
Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the
pendency of these cases shall be credited to them
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to
release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and
Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are
being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez
has become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of
the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo
is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the
decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the
penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo,
to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of
homicide because the information against him did not allege the said
qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar
y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED
of being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has
been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme
Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED
TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR
AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO
HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN
SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE,
 DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF
THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT
INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE
HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT
UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-
SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE
VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL
CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48",
"W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER
THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED
WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE
PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING
THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are
unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According
to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect
because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by
General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn
statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved
version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly
identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused
unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several
times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the
reward announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them
ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and
submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling,
even before announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that
he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw
them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make
them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to
identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of
Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the
trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and
evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for
he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony.
On the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial
court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling
reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses
when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the
verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused
does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make
his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a
truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons
with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of
a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to
the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe
with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the
medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body
which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard
object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused
by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of
intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which
may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as
fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants
with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary
weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-
13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista,
the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent
dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his
sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other
prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a
surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should
have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he
was being mauled at the Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the
pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 as he
was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo
and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as
the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is
being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the
person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in
evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either
by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to
its accuracy. 52Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as
part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.
objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However,
when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V",
"V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and
therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The
photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused
Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty.
Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their
respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-
examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was
made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared
at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their
admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not
presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by
some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime
is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the
photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was
affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel
Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence
thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal
that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely
running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the
pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not
exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of
the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did
not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally
identified by Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When,
while several persons, not composing groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a
confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons
who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty ofprision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted
one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone
was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof
cannot be ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred
because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion
subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was
only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as
loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as
much as fifty in number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit
the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive
force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself.
They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument
several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already
fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up,
prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face.
But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not
defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried
to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his
pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged
use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to
murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the
instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was
deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from
any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was
sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he
was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban"
sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate
court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the
rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by
them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being
attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the
information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden
and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following
amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the (c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a the victim.
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to Costs against accused-appellants.
who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to
sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the
SO ORDERED.
others regardless of the intent and character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all. 68
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual
damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of Francisco, J., is on leave.
the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was
twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for
employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young
person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small
children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the
death of the victim.71
 2004,[5] respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8 January
2003 Resolution[6] of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon
City.

The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City

recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S.
THIRD DIVISION No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by Private
Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262 (Mutilation), both of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, G. R. No. 170723 known as Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, for
Petitioner, insufficiency of evidence.
Present:
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, Aguirre against respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina
Chairperson, S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for
SECRETARY OF THE CORONA,* falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CHICO-NAZARIO, and
MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE- REYES, JJ. The antecedents of the present petition are:
OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B.
AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP Laureano Larry Aguirre[7] used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary
and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, Promulgated: Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and
Respondents. licensed by the Department of Social Work and Development
March 3, 2008 (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latters
x--------------------------------------------------x spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their four daughters,
who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to
know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have
Larry spend a few days at their home and then return him to the
DECISION
orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine
months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre
and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Legal Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta
Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the
Aguirre spouses guardianship of Larry was legalized when the Regional
In this petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as
of Court, as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005 Decision[2] and 5 December As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children
2005 Resolution,[3] both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP noticed that his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His
No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department cognitive and physical growth did not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4
of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa years, Larry could only crawl on his tummy like a frog x x x;[8] he did not
B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does. utter his first word until he was three years of age; did not speak in
sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up and walk after
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled
part of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child
issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February 2004[4] and 12 November experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven,
Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and psychological
evaluations. The psychological evaluation[9] done on Larry revealed the
latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency.[10] Consequent
thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney,
an educational institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon,
was approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of
age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended
patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a
psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether or not the former
could validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of his
mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to
respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric
report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the
following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian.[11]
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school
graduate of St. John [Marie Vianney], was referred for
psychiatric evaluation to determine competency to give
consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and
prenatal history is not known to the adoptive family except
that abortion was attempted. Developmental milestones
were noted to be delayed.He started to walk and speak in
single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio
de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant
learning difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and
4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11
years old. Neurological findings and EEG results were not
normal and he was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his
neurologist.Psychological evaluation revealed mild to
moderate mental retardation, special education training
was advised and thus, he was transferred to St. John
Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and secondary
education in the said school. He was later enrolled in a
vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable to
continue. There has been no reported behavioral problems
in school and he gets along relatively well with his teachers
and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is
the youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his
adoptive parents are already old and have medical
problem and thus, they could no longer monitor and take
care of him like before. His adoptive mother has Bipolar
Mood Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A year
ago, he had an episode of dizziness, vomiting and
headaches after he was hit by his adoptive
mother. Consult was done in Makati Medical Center and
several tests were done, results of which were consistent
with his developmental problem. There was no evidence of
acute insults. The family subsequently decided that he
should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident
and the possibility that he would retaliate although he has
never hurt anybody. There has been no episode of violent
outburst or aggressive behavior. He would often keep to
himself when sad, angry or frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and
given assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the
mornings. He enjoys playing billiards and basketball with
his nephews and, he spends most of his leisure time
watching TV and listening to music. He could perform
activities of daily living without assistance except that he
still needs supervision in taking a bath. He cannot prepare
his own meal and never allowed to go out and run errands
alone. He does not have friends and it is only his adoptive
family whom he has significant relationships. He claims
that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high school
who was more like a best friend to him. He never had
sexual relations. He has learned to smoke and drink
alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the
drivers. There is no history of abuse of alcohol or any
prohibited substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was
cooperative and he had intermittent eye contact. Speech
was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He responded to
questions in single words or simple sentences. He was
anxious specially at the start of the interview, with full affect
appropriate to mood and thought content. There was no
apparent thought or perceptual disturbance. No
suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to
time, place and person. He has intact remote and recent
memory. He could do simple calculation. He could write his
name and read simple words. His human figure was
comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair
judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes
Ledesma) and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to moderate mental
deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right
deep parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion
in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x
x volume loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria
consistent with sequela of postnatal or neonatal
infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles
associated thinned posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larrys mental deficiency could be associated with
possible perinatal insults, which is consistent with the
neuroimaging findings. Mental retardation associated with
neurological problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry
is very much dependent on his family for his needs,
adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life
decisions. At his capacity, he may never understand the
nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) that his family
wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of decision
making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist[12]
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro
Aguirres written consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with
the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent
Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro
Aguirres eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,[13] docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466,
contained the following allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic)
medical practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry
respectively; while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my
father; Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the
victim Laureano Larry Aguirre xxx is my common law
brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who,
acting upon the apparent instructions of respondents
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre,
actually scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual
and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral
vasectomy of my common law brother Larry Aguirre
subject hereof.

xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary
Villa of the Good Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of
respondent Dra. Pascuals Psychiatry Report dated 21
January 2004 by the DSWD, in which my common law
brother Larry was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own
consent to the MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL
VASECTOMY intended to be performed on him by all the
respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses
invariably committed by all of the respondents in
conspiracy with each other, on 31 January 2002, my
common law brother Larry Aguirre, although of legal age
but conspiratorially caused to be declared by respondents
to be mentally deficient and incompetent to give consent to
his BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then intentionally,
unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed
thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL
VASECTOMY x x x, EVEN WITHOUT ANY
AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP
COURT, nor personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an
allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical
examination, professional interview
of nor verification and consultation
with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-
Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual
baselessly, fraudulently and with
obvious intent to defame and malign
her reputation and honor, and
worse, that of our Sabido family,
falsely concluded and diagnosed, via
her falsified Psychiatry Report, that
my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre
purportedly suffers from BIPOLAR
MOOD DISORDER x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirres accusations against them,
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,[14] respondent Olondriz denied that she
prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false
statement, mutilated or abused her common-law brother, Larry Aguirre.
Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went
through a vasectomy procedure, there is
nothing in the Complaint which explains
how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy,
I can state with complete confidence that I
did not participate in any way in the alleged
mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the
physician who performed the vasectomy,
Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father,
Pedro Aguirre, Larrys guardian, who
obtained his services. I merely acted upon
his instructions and accompanied my
brother to the physician, respondents Dra.
Marissa B. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what
manner the Complainant is authorized or
has any standing to declare that Larrys
consent was not obtained. Complainant is
not the guardian or relative of Larry. While
she argues that Larrys consent should have
been obtained the Complaint does not
dispute the psychiatrists findings about
Larrys inability to give consent.

xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what
alleged participation was falsified or the
portion of the psychiatric report that
allegedly states that someone participated
when in fact that person did not so
participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation
of the report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he
(Larry) is mentally deficient or incompetent
to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy
operation was explained to him (Larry) by
both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my
father on the belief that my father continues
to be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of
no one else who asserts to be his legal
guardian x x x.[15]
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as
charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can
state with complete confidence that I did not
participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.[16]
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does
not in any way amount to mutilation, as the latters reproductive organ is
still completely intact.[17] In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre explains
that the procedure performed is reversible through another procedure
called Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a
procedure called Vasovasostomy. I can also state
with confidence that the procedure enables men
who have undergone a vasectomy to sire a
child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused
by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in
the complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person
participated in any act or proceeding when that
person did not in fact participate x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the
report of Dra. Pascual. She arrived at her report
independently, using her own professional
judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petitas Complaint is
how Larry is argued to be legally a child under the
definition of one law but nonetheless and
simultaneously argued to be capacitated to give his
consent as fully as an adult.[18]
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship
over Larry had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre,
way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being one of
the legal guardians, consequently, parental authority over Larry is vested
in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that Larry does have the
capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only Larry would
have the right to do so.
 Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep
also disputed the allegations of facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting
the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the
charges against him, he vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the
intended procedure. In his counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x
wherein I painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and
the consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental
deficiency, x x x I advised his relatives and his nurse who
accompanied him to have Larry examined by a psychiatrist
who could properly determine whether or not Larry x x x
can really give his consent, thus I required them to secure
first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to the
contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a
psychiatric report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In
her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer from
mental retardation, mild to moderate type and further
stated that at his capacity, he may never understand the
nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian x x x.
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit
executed by Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal
guardian of Larry x x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to
vasectomize Larry x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy
was performed with utmost care and diligence.[19]
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation,
respondent Dr. Agatep argued that subject complaint should be
dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this
case. As mentioned above, she is only a common law
sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of
Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on
the condition of complainants mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her
reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the degree of
participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does
not apply to me since it clearly gives reference to co-
respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascuals Psychiatry Report,
dated January 21, 2002, in relation with her field of
profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any
participation in the preparation of said report, x x x neither
did I utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified
document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate
to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not
considered an organ in the context of law and medicine, it
is quite remote from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague
in specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers
that Laureano Larry Aguirre is a child, and alleges his
father, Pedro Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x
x.[20]
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of
falsification and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the contents of
the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirres mental status was based
on my own personal observations, his responses during
my interview of him, the results of the two (2) psychological
tests conducted by clinical psychologists, the results of
laboratory tests, including a CT Scan and MRI, and his
personal and family history which I obtained from his sister,
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes
Aguirre is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirres
mental status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patients
personal and family history as conveyed to me by Mrs.
Aguirre-Olondriz.
 6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an
expert opinion, cannot give rise to a charge for
falsification. A contrary opinion by another expert only
means that the experts differ, and does not necessarily
reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre,
because I never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry
Aguirre except to render an opinion on his capacity to give
informed consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit
that complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe
to the same as they are not the offended party, peace
officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement
of the law violated x x x.[21]
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances
attendant to the case did not amount to the crime of falsification. He held
that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report
was falsified, because consent was not given by Larry
Aguirre to the vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on
said operation does not constitute falsification. It would
have been different if it was stated in the report that
consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it was
written therein that he was consulted on the vasectomy,
because that would mean that it was made to appear in
the report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or
proceeding by giving his consent or was consulted on the
matter when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if
not, the entry would have been an untruthful statement.
But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report was
made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his
consent to his intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the
matter of Larrys consent having obtained or not may nor
be an issue after all, because complainants (sic) herself
alleged that Larrys mental condition is that of a child, who
can not give consent. Based on the foregoing
consideration, no falsification can be established under the
circumstances.[22]
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr.
Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be
considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact
personally interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that
the latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
Disorder. The report merely quoted other sources of
information with respect to the condition of Lourdes
Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes
Aguirre was physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not
of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that Dra.
Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal
knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and
may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she
has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true,
she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes
without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty,
then with more reason the other respondents are not
liable.[23]
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor
also held that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation
as defined and penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to
procreate, the operation is reversible and therefore, cannot
be the permanent damage contemplated under Article 262
of the Revised Penal Code.[24]
The Assistant City Prosecutor,[25] in a Resolution[26] dated 8
January 2003, found no probable cause to hold respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of
falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the violation of Articles 172
and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
petitioner Gloria Aguirres complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-
entitled case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[27]
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the
foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition
for Review.[28]
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In
resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the
Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright
the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in
the questioned resolution or finds the same to be patently
without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its
attachments and found no error that would justify a
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with
the law and evidenced (sic) on the matter.[29]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November
2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court
of Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirres recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and November 12,
2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are
hereby AFFIRMED.[30]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for reconsideration proved futile
as it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December
2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS,
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
CONCLUDED, BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE
INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM
OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS
PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A FUTURE
MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO
MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW
WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND
FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.[31]
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for
this Courts consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the
latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding of lack of probable cause for
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to
stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
 In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of
sterilization as a result of a vasectomy operation, and the
chances of restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral
vasectomy performed on Larry does not constitute
mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to
prevent him from siring a child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the
latter act the reproductive capacity is permanently removed
or damaged.[32]
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than criminal,
which private respondents may have incurred for the
alleged absence of a valid consent to the vasectomy
performed on Larry, is certainly beyond the province of this
certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the issue of
whether or not the Secretary of Justice and the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed grave abuse
of discretion in their determining the existence or absence
of probable cause for filing criminal cases
for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and
262 of the Revised Penal Code.[33]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of
Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate several important facts: 1) that
bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioners brother, Larry Aguirre, was
admitted[34]; 2) that the procedure caused the perpetual destruction of
Larrys reproductive organs of generation or conception;[35] 3) that the
bilateral vasectomy was intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever
of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that
respondents, in conspiracy with one another, made not only one but two
(2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made it
appear in the psychiatry report[36] that a) Larrys consent was obtained or
at the very least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy;
and b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated.
Paradoxically, however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way
state that she, instead of respondent Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship
over the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents should have
obtained Larrys consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public
respondent DOJ, argues that the conduct of preliminary investigation to
determine the existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing (an)
information is the function of the public prosecutor.[37] More importantly,
the element[s] of castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for
generation is completely absent as he was not deprived of any organ
necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ.[38]
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file the complaint, as she has
not shown any injury to her person or asserted any relationship with Larry
other than being his common law sister; further, that she cannot
prosecute the present case, as she has not been authorized by law to file
said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents
Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit that they, together with the other
respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged with,
prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1) mutilation x x x since the
bilateral vasectomy conducted on Larry does not involve castration or
amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements
of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent[39]; and 2) falsification x x x
since the acts allegedly constituting falsification involve matters of
medical opinion and not matters of fact,[40] and that petitioner Gloria
Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that
vasectomy is not mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the
excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which transport semen[41];
that it is the penis and the testis that make up the male reproductive
organ and not the vas deferens; and additionally argues that for the crime
of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code
necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some
essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or
prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes,
therefore, that vasectomy does not correspond to mutilation.
 Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent
Dr. Agatep asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any
information, data or facts as contained in the contentious Psychiatric
Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed
Psychiatry Report was the result of her independent exercise of
professional judgment. Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre
to be incapable of giving consent, based on interviews made by the
psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who interacted with him.[42] And
supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous medical
diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[43] The term does not
mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.[44] It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief;[45] that is, the belief that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is
not a pronouncement of guilt.[46]
The executive department of the government is accountable for
the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful
execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the power to
execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators,[47] the
responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination
of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range
of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by (public) prosecutors.[48] And this Court has consistently
adhered to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information
against the supposed offender.[49]
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged
in him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction.[50]
Prescinding from the above, the courts duty in an appropriate
case, therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the assailed
executive determination of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law
to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of
the finding of whether or not there exists probable cause to file an
information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse
of discretion is not enough.[51] Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without
authority.[52]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the
reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal
complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is
determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and
mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual
and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as
defined and punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document,
the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant
to the case did not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of
consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the
latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do
not in any way amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was
made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was
obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the
fact that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar
Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because said
report does not put forward that such finding arose after an examination
of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned
that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not
the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent provision of the
penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor
was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the crime of falsification
of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and
use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party,
or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a
private document for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in the
dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was concealed from
him by the respondents x x x,[53] as well as for falsely concluding and
diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
which defines the acts constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in
an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to
the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts
complained of do not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the
imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts constituting
the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime
of falsification of private document under the Revised Penal Code, a
crime which all the respondents have been accused of perpetrating. The
elements of said crime under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our penal code
are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any acts of falsification,
except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the falsification
was committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a
person may commit falsification of a private document by causing it to
appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or
proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so participate in
the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the
same article is perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in
an act or proceeding, made statements in that act or proceeding and the
offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or persons
statementsother than those in fact made by such person or persons. And
the crime defined under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when 1) the
offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; 2) he
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3)
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at
bar, in order that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in
conspiracy with her, to have committed the crime of falsification under
par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that
that there be prima facie evidence to show that she had caused it to
appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at the very
least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But in
the assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the
reason for having Larry psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to
ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with impunity to the
proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige
respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import of the medical
procedure was. Further, that Larrys consent to be vasectomized was not
obtained by the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it
stated in said report that such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner
Gloria Aguirre contradicts her very own allegations when she persists in
the contention that Larry has the mental age of a child; hence, he was
legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes
Aguirre, with regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, we quote with approval the succinct statements of the Assistant
City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of
her own personal knowledge in her report does not mean
that she committed falsification in the process. Her sources
may be wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but
for as long as she has not alleged therein that she
personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation
would not then be true, she cannot be charged of
falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the
author of the report is not guilty, then with more reason the
other respondents are not liable.[54]
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished
by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements[55] of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation
of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part
of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this
Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of
mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to
the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v.
Esparcia,[56] in which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the
implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is
whether or not the crime committed is that defined and
penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The English
translation of this article reads: "Any person who shall
intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The
Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word
"castrare," inadequately translated into English as
 "castrate." The word "capar," which is synonymous of
"castrar," is defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary as
the destruction of the organs of generation or conception.
Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person
who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ
necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is
that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their
order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the name of
'castration' which consists of the amputation of whatever
organ is necessary for generation. The law could not fail to
punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which,
although not destroying life, deprives a person of the
means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this
article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable
that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not
look only to the result but also to the intention of the
act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a
person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act,
although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it
would not come under the provisions of this article, but
under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p.
70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the
negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular
passage, called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are
transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the
seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely
tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a
passageway that is part of the duct system of the male reproductive
organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit of
structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and
consisting of a range of tissues.[58] Be that as it may, even
assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an
organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of
any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not
entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive
system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back
into the incision.[59]
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary
usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a limb or essential part
(of the body),[60] with the operative expression being deprivation. In the
same manner, the word castration is defined as the removal of the testies
or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of
mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to
respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much
less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain
why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is
unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Courts general
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As
it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case.[62] The courts try and absolve or
convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to
prosecute him.[63] The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of
the executive. But that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5
December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria
Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

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