TOPIC: Rule 120 - Judgment The antecedent facts and proceedings that led to the filing of

the instant petition are pertinently narrated as follows:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the
crime of "other forms of swindling" in the Information,
THIRD DIVISION 1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:

G.R. No. 149588 September 29, 2009
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C.
LLAMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MAKATI CITY
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition captioned as "Annulment of Judgment and
Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction," petitioners assail, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the trial courts decision
convicting them of "other form of swindling" penalized by
Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1978, in the
municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, well knowing that
their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of
Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No. 4869, situated
at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to
one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free
from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado
P. Avila bought the aforementioned property for the sum of
12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned
amount of 12,895.00.
Contrary to law.2
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision3 on
June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of
18,085.00 each.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999
Decision4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. In its December 22, 1999 Resolution,5 the
appellate court further denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court,
petitioners filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their
petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 141208.6 The Court,
however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners
failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000,7 the
judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19,
2001 Warrant of Arrest,8 the police arrested, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail
term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner
Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.9
On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or
recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
10
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said
motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the
instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the
appellate courts decisions.
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition
in the September 24, 2001 Resolution,11 but reinstated the
same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001
Resolution.12
After a thorough evaluation of petitioners arguments vis--vis
the applicable law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the
petition.
In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of
annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases,
thus
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the
remedy of annulment of judgment to the following:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment
by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.a1f
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment
being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit
such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of
the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section
18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to
criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to
56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the
scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. As we explained in
Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule
providing for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed x x
x.14
Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to
assail a decision in a criminal case. Following Bitanga, this
Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law
or in the rules.
In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court
which rendered the assailed decision had jurisdiction over the
criminal case.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established
rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.15 In this
case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable
law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,16 approved on August 14,
1981, which pertinently provides:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the
latter.
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
criminal cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Article 316(2) of the RPC, the provision which penalizes the
crime charged in the information, provides that
Article 316. Other forms of swindling.The penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered,
shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not
recorded.
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1
month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value. Here, as alleged in the information, the value of the
damage caused, or the imposable fine, is 12,895.00. Clearly,
from a reading of the information, the jurisdiction over the
criminal case was with the RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the
information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable
with a fine of not more than 4,000.00.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal
SUPREME COURT Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and
Manila Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30
p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of
FIRST DIVISION raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.

G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009 The Information5 in each case reads as follows:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6

vs.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic] in
MONTESCLAROS, Defendants. the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome
Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due
DECISION to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who
PUNO, C.J.:
was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in
conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas
permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the
CONTRARY TO LAW.
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the commission
of rape. That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 oclock [sic]
dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was
at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and
was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked as a
waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On
February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a
house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995,
about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with
Ida and Tampus9 who were both drinking beer at that time.
They forced her to drink beer10 and after consuming three and
one-half (3 ) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very
sleepy.11While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she
overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be
allowed to "remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.
13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon
as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then
went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep
and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties
was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in
her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that
her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was
coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from
work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant
Ida ignored her.15
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was
left alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer
house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill
her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone.
17 He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but
Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if
she shouted.18 He undressed himself, spread ABCs legs, put
saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he
then inserted his penis into ABCs vagina and made a push and
pull movement.19After consummating the sexual act, he left the
house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the
latter again ignored her.20
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC
sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She
told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC,
together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer,
reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995,
Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal
Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services,
Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and
issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the
result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed
laceration at the seven (7) oclock position and a shallow
healed laceration at the one (1) oclock position on ABCs
hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She
accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated
and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her
Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida
who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she
stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden
club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that
at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to the
public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00
p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer
house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied forcing ABC to
drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have
sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant Ida also testified that
she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1,
1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She
said that she always brought her daughter to the beer house
with her and there was never an instance when she left her
daughter alone in the house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink
beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving
permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified
that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters between
7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual
duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995.
Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on
April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at
8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in
the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination,
Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the
logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial
court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry
on April 2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on
April 3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is
just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the
barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty
could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.30
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the
Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed
that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally
diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as
principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case
No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice
in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in
Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of
the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code.33 The dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals
[sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No.
013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion
Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
accused Tampus died on November 16, 200035 and his appeal
was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.36 Thus, the
appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of
appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the
testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial courts decision with
modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she
was completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On
the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the
attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished
the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of
the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the amount
of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary
damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (Php
25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC
is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal accused.
Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the
ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of
ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude
that Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to
convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal
case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings
unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.38 The
rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of
complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to her
testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the
rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for
a young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own
mother in such a vile act, allow an examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a
victim of rape and was impelled to seek justice for the
defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who
had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1, 1995.
The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and
direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was
asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was
committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established
beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.41 In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes
into consideration the events that transpired before and after the
victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission
of the act of coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that
accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC] on
April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus defense
of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against the positive
evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two
occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did
not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the
aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the
Court has taken note of the following circumstances: (1) The
drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink
beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two
accused when accused Tampus requested accused Ida
Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have
sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus
and the complainant were the only persons left in the house
when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the
request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and
blood in complainants vagina and the pain in her head, groin
and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the
complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her
if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995;
and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately ensued.
These circumstances form a chain that points to accused
Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge of
[ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial
court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was
charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an
accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or
intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request
of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse
with ABC did not prove their conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that,
"[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the
commission of the crime by previous acts but her participation,
not being indispensable, was not that of a principal. She is
liable as an accomplice."45
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human
nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped. She
maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone
in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Idas
appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF
RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA
MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF
RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is
liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17
of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following
requisites must be proved in order that a person can be
considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter
in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.48
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the
execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape
by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to
Tampus request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.
Idas acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her
permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter.1avvphi1
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty.
Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink
beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on
April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1,
1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain
that you had not been used to drinking beer and then, why
suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so,
I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at
that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she
already threatening to maltreat you if you would not drink that
beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat
you if you would not drink that beer that she proposed for you
to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden
stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering
the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.50
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome
went out of the house and you overheard Bartolome asking or
proposing to your mother that he would have sexual intercourse
with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo",
Bartolome would want to have a "remedyo" with you. When
[sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this statement,
while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking
beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were
renting.51
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were
quite sure that it was you who was being referred by Bartolome
Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan dialect that
"gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual
intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I dont know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.52
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word
"remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00
oclock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not also
bother to tell her of what you suspected that something serious
or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual
intercourse with her, leave her immediately!"55
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the
word, "remedyo", when your mother arrived in the morning of
April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not
tell her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you
had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something
to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an
accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida
and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of
and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when
ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with
the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus
plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation
by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the
commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a
principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows
that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the
commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida
and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because
Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse
with ABC and he could have consummated the act even
without Idas consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission
of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink beer; when
ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have
sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and
lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with
his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an
Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as would
diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her
of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for
schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert
opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at the time
of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct
Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V.
Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said,
is provisional, would you say that the patient [sic] totally
deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals
in the commission of the crime of rape for having given her
daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly
convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995.
Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November
11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that
having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at
the time, after January 12, 1995, she must have acted with
discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even
with the treatment, and even without any medication, it may be
what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be
yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much
concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of
intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her
act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal liability,
please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of
this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with
certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own
daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she wants to
gain financial or material things from the daughter if no
material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This
is my opinion.57
 xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right
or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to
discern between right or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at
the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think,
although the mother alleged that the sickness could be more
than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was
allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the
mother, so she was in acute stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas
testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida
Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in
that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument,
the alleged accusation against her is true, being an expert on
scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother,
who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it
still in her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation
if she want [sic] to gain some material things, if not, it is
because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter
allegedly to be rubbished by another person, then there must be
something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from
scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered
mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the
willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr.
Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but
her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical
Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for
schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the
testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas schizophrenia could be
considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower
although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is
the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at the time of the
incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying
circumstance which would have increased the imposable
penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of
the offender to the victim, either as the victims parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information
and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as
qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged
and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's
daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even
though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the
offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
should be given retroactive effect following the rule that
statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and
the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.63Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC,
this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special
qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an
accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered
Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the
offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L."64 The Court of Appeals, however, did not
award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and
exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper to award
ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto
is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct
from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need
of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such
award.65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple
rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages. 66 However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has
been extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains for
accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for
which each accused is liable when they have different degrees
of responsibility in the commission of the crime and,
consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is
committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the
commission of the crime and though all the persons who took
part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is
not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be
liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for
depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the
commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the
principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is only
given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by
the law for the crime committed69 and an accessory is given the
penalty lower by two degrees.70However, a felon is not only
criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to
indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by
his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and
damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the
accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin which the
Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding
penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory
the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in
the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to
determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the
principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for,
without guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there
are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts
shall determine the amount for which each must respond."
Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of
the principals, accomplices and accessories within their
respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the
amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals,
accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class,
shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for
their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons
liable."72
As courts are given a free hand in determining the
apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with
this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v.
Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77People v.
Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. Villanueva,
80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del Rosario,82People v. Yrat,
83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and
accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire
amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People
v. Sotto,86 the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the
amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the
principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,87 the
principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice
were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This
makes the accomplice who had less participation in the
commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for
the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the
crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of the
amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle
behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for
felonies, i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the
degree of participation of the accused in the crime committed.
In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the
execution of the offense but whose participation is not
indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the
same amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct
participation who took a direct part in the execution of the
criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability
imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of
the offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and not
collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for
the acts actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this
individual liability must be graduated not only according to the
nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending
it, but also the degree and nature of participation of the
individual offender.
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,
91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v. Bato,93 and People v.
Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with
the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as
civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily
liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to
pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 separately from the
principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the
accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined
amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages.
In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable
with the principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde
the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal
for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and
moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally
liable with the principal for only half of the amount of the civil
indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the
enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended
party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when
payment has been made, the person by whom payment has been
made shall have a right of action against the other persons
liable for the amount of their respective shares.95 As against
each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-
debtors only the share that corresponds to each, with interest for
the payment already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment
is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who
made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the
part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example
the principal paid the victim the entire amount of the civil
indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth
(1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The
principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total
amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the
accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid for the
half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could
claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus,
the principal would have become ultimately liable for three-
fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
damages, while the accomplice would have become liable for
one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and
People v. Madali,100 the principal was ordered to pay twice the
share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the
Court determined the respective amounts for which the
principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The
principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was
ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory was ordered to
pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal
and accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount
of the civil indemnity or half of it, in Nulla, the court
particularly determined the amount for which each shall
respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should
determine the amount for which the principals, accomplices and
accessories must respond to and upon specifying this amount,
the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their
quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves
for their quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their
quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its
respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of
the other classes, which shall be enforced first against the
property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices;
and lastly, against that of the accessories.101
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay
more than double the amount that the accomplice is liable for.
In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was
apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable
for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in
solidum among themselves for the other half of the indemnity,
or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for one-
fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire
amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500.00.
In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be
jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly
and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their
insolvency the principal was secondarily liable for such
amount.
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-
fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while the
principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and
damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to
P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay
P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil
indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest
of the indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which
the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and damages among
the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though
the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons
liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that
this amount can be decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The
power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands
factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to
speculation and caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the
moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the
persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act.
Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion
that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases in
order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among
two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because
there are different degrees of culpability of offenders, or
because of the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On
this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code
of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the
amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.
107 The courts have the competence to determine the exact
participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the
commission of the crime relative to the other classes because
they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not
be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind
differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the
commission of the crime. The person with greater participation
in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in
the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the
crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely
profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a
greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages
than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be
liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care
should also be taken in considering the number of principals
versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there
are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the
civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot
assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the
principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though
the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as
against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is
P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00--
when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share
of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each
principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the
principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four
principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is
solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous
apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not
take into account the difference in the nature and degree of
participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the
accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation include her
acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to
have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without
these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus,
the principal by direct participation, who should have the
greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also
with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a
quota amount for every class for which members of such class
are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are
only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The
Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability
among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the
case at bar.
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of
the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be
liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil
indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be
ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity
for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral
damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be
divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where
Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of
P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-
third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil
indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67.
However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity
ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages
cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus
share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if
Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida
would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the
civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability
with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the
principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus
obligation to pay P66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity
is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily
liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation,
there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach
to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary
damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the
offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also
known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment
for those guilty of outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary damages
may be awarded only when one or more aggravating
circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during
the trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance
was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the
victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of
the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the
presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the
award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the
offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
Information.112 The minority of the rape victim and her
relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order to be
appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.
113 While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC
was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that
Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and
appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary
damages is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida
Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the
amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and
sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the
amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and
sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to
damages is DELETED. SO ORDERED. Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The facts of the case are as follows.
Manila
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape
THIRD DIVISION and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio,
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009 Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court,
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS,
presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as
BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE
Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No.
CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB
Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order
86, Respondent. the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper
Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-
DECISION
accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed
Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of
that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the
respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional
crimes charged.
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations
filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases
No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant
City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City
Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C.
de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as
an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the
Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack
of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in an Order of even date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed
Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus,
bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
C A N T H E H O N . S U P R E M E C O U RT C O M P E L
RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND
SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION?2
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel
the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City
Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against
petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays
exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of
mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in
those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge
refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on
the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on
it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available
anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying
the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari
against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been
argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this
Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such
cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners
cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v.
Demetriou7:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion
on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at
bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by
the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of
the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not
find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a
rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable
showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify a judicial
intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case
the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for
mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context.
In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez
brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging
the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to
quash the Information filed against him and six other persons
for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor
Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because
of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information.
We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if
there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez
should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing
of charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not
against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to
compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw
Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The prosecution
has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos
v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we established in the
leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal
complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or
dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused
rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the
trial court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to
withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or
after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that
the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant
to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of
the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with
the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said
motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the
directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its
judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion
for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred to the Resolution
of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the
case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision in
People v. Montesa, Jr.12:
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for
reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The
former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority
of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-
called new relevant and material evidence and determine
whether the information it had filed should stand.13
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took
specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting off the
portions which would expose the real import of our
pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was
directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to
arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to
dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case.
The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the
disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution
by the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same
Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the
latter ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We
held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the
Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on
whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of
probable cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment.
Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision
in Montesa, Jr. reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a
final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case
which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of
the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss
based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of
Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor
recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for
it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the
contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final
resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the
Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as
amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.14
As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from
Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine that the judge
should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of
whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary,
Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information
is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the
discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot
impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to
dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the
court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law.15
In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners
counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is allowed to deny
a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only
when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there
is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors,
the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void.
Petitioners counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the
Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages which was
attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota
of grave abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor
De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons of the
Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and
VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court
in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September
5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the
courts bare denial of a motion to withdraw information
pursuant to the Secretarys resolution is void." (Underscoring
ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon.
Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because of
its falsity.16
This statement of petitioners counsel is utterly misleading.
There is no such statement in our Decision in Ledesma.17 The
excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to
the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
 No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and
considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice
secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in
petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the
secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the
exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of
which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is
inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and
competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to
dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's
recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold
petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He
merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his
reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.
18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely
misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Counsels use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies
that he intends to make it appear that the passages are the exact
words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words
"Underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the
underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original.
Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to
show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed
to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did
we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a
trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a
Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and
complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion.
Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on
the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of
the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion.
Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however,
commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it
refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply
insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of
having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.
19 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive
portion of the assailed Order apparently states that there was no
probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein
accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of lasciviousness, the
motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24,
2006 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.20(Underscoring ours.)
Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge
himself found no probable cause against them, the Motion to
Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor
should be granted.21
Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly
shows that the insertion of the word "no" in the above
dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order
states in full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements of the
complainants and the resolution dated March 3, 2006 of 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds
that there was probable cause against the herein accused. The
actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts
of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal
of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance
did not make voluntary the complainants submission to the
criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA
214, 2002). The complainants affidavits indicate that the
accused helped one another in committing the acts complained
of. Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their
trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house where
they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to
react forcefully or violently in protecting themselves from the
unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both
complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered
children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in
People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004
becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected
to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a
situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who
have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior
expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of
emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by
calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from
rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March
11, 2004).
The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged
actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts
of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in
nature and should be evaluated after full blown trial on the
merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment
against the accused.22
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly
stated that the court found probable cause against the
petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the
reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where
there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo
and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where
the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so
clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail.23
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to
compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw
Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to
compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion
when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw
an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not
bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the
government, but is required to make an independent assessment
of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the
respondent judge in the case at bar.25
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court
seeking a review of the finding of probable cause by the trial
court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the
case. After going through the same, we find that we are in
agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable
cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We
decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case,
as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might
result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only
intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is
DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the
proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act
on the case with dispatch.
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE
why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for his
disquieting conduct as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184760 April 23, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184
which affirmed the 05 October 2005 Decision2 promulgated by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno
Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.3
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-
bust operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against
accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging
him with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, the accusatory portions thereof reading.
Criminal Case No. 6992
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession,
direct custody and control a total of 2.04 grams of white
crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
Criminal Case No. 6993
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away
to another 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance contained in
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave
positive result to the test for Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.5
The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo,
Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly
charged in a different Information, which case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused of possessing
illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Information containing the
following averments:
Criminal Case No. 6994
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession,
direct custody and control of 0.05 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet which gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel,
entered NOT GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the was already at the Daangbakal, Dulongbayan I area and was
merits ensued. selling prohibited drugs. Riding an unmarked vehicle, the team
proceeded to where Lorenzo was. On their arrival, Lorenzo was
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and
(PO1) Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team. Daangbakal. PO3 Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid
in a place where he was not visible to Lorenzo. PO3 Pineda
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9
stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then hiding inside a
September 2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a
tricycle near Lorenzo. While this was happening, the
confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo was
confidential informant approached Lorenzo for the transaction.
peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of
Lorenzo and the confidential informant were approximately
PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against said
four (4) meters away from PO3 Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda
drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3 Pineda prepared
knew who Lorenzo was and considering the place was
two (2) pieces of marked 100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust
illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The
money. At around 10:00 oclock in the evening of the same day,
confidential informant and Lorenzo were talking for about one
PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1 Arellano and PO3 Tougan,
minute, after which the informant gave the marked money to
proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly met with
Lorenzo. After taking the marked money, Lorenzo handed the
their confidential informant. According to the confidential
shabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano
informant, he had not seen Lorenzo and raised the possibility
alighted from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and
that he was not in the area at the time. Assessing the situation,
introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested
the police officers instructed the confidential informant to
Lorenzo.
continue with his surveillance of the area and to inform them
immediately if he comes across Lorenzo. Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1
Pineda was able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other
At around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003,
sachets of shabu from him. Seeing what had happened to
while PO1 Pineda and his companions were waiting at Gen.
Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a
Luna Street, the confidential informant reported that Lorenzo
certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and
ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of his
pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were
taken to the police station where the incident was recorded in
the police blotter. The plastic sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20
grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.
The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E
showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.6
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-
appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand
and presented their version of the facts.
Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to
Dulongbayan sometime between 12:00 oclock in the evening
and 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003.
Estanislao, who was also with him at the time, was riding in his
motor cross style bike and was supposed to buy food at said
place after playing tong-its.
While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos
Angeles Street, the chain on Estanislaos bike went loose.
During the time Estanislao was repairing his bike, PO3 Tougan,
PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were then on board an
owner type jeepney, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and
Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were to be
brought to the Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested,
claiming not having done anything wrong but the police
officers continued with the arrest. It was later that they were
informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting
Lorenzo for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but
acquitting Estanislao, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, first paragraph,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6993)
or illegal selling of 0.20 gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00).
(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, second paragraph,
No.3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No.
6992) or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as maximum and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (300,000.00).
(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation
of Section 11, second paragraph, sub paragraph 3, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GUILTY for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered
released from detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained
for some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases
are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the
Officer-In-Charge of the Court is hereby ordered to safely
deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.7
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense
witnesses, as well as the other evidence presented during trial,
the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecutions version
that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal
drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial
court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions accorded to police officers.
According to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust
operation and the seller, object and consideration, including the
delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of the
buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the
police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence
against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of conviction rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby
dismissed and the assailed October 5, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal, Branch 76, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15,
2004. This judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of
Appeal,8 adopting the same arguments raised before the Court
of Appeals:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165; AND
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DEFENSE OF DENIAL.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case
is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural
rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that
an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense.
In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of
evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence
on its behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall
prevail and, hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However,
once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense
bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.
Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the
trial courts to be determined. Consistent with the rulings of this
Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual
findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies
of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive
effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of
the case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of
accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and evaluated
the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the
appellate courts decision convicting accused-appellant.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of
reasonable doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure
of the prosecution to adopt the required procedure under
Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody
and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous
drugs. According to the defense, this alleged failure to follow
proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the
retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to whether the specimen
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court were
indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also
faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the
PDEA regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether
the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzos
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
We rule in the negative. The prosecutions case fails for failure
to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral
certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of
drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following
elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.9 Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had
actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.10 The term corpus delicti means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case,
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond
doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on
the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug
must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing
that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.
While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective
way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise
conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation is
susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to
be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific
procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have
been laid down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecutions
burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have been
complied with in proving the elements of the offense.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is
provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said
provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in
complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident
purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the
accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the
stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items,
for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
In People v. Sanchez,11 we clarified that this saving clause
applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.
Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no
photographing of the drugs took place. Non-compliance by the
police operatives with the foregoing requirements in the instant
case is fatal to the prosecutions case. Although the prosecution
recognized its failure to coordinate with the PDEA because of
the urgency of the situation, it ignored the issue of specifically
identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation.
There is absolutely nothing in the records to show that the
inventory and photography requirements, or their credible
substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary value, were ever
followed.
In People v. Lim,12 this Court held:
xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control
of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after
seizure and confiscation, have the same physically inventoried
and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be
any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure
of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt
whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants.
It negates the presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.
In Bondad, Jr. v. People,13 where the prosecution did not
inventory and photograph the confiscated evidence, this Court
acquitted therein accused reasoning that failure to comply with
the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity
of the items seized.
In People v. Ruiz,14 this Court acquitted accused due to the
failure of the prosecution to comply with the procedures under
Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR as no physical inventory
was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required.
In People v. Orteza,15 the Court explained the implications of
the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of
the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.1avvphi1
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the
Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe
the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the
material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of
the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to
the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.
To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the IRR of Republic Act
No. 9165 is coupled with the proviso that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.
Thus, in Malillin v. People,16 the Court explained that the
"chain of custody" requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is constructed by
proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and
must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it
is offered in evidence.17 Failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from accused is fatal to the prosecutions case.
There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the
item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug.18
PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who
purchased the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only
retrieved it from said informant. He further testified that he
marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two
other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from the
accused, but it was not certain when and where the said
marking was done nor who had specifically received and had
custody of the specimens thereafter.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the
poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction.
The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away
from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From
this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation
between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.
The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to
whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp
Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. We therefore
find that this failure to establish the evidences chain of custody
is damaging to the prosecutions case.19
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case Republic of the Philippines
failed to support accused-appellants conviction for violation of SUPREME COURT
Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the Manila
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense. FIRST DIVISION

Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail. G.R. No. 185209 June 28, 2010

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
14 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02184, is vs.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.
PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS is hereby ACQUITTED for REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG"
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable BARGO, Accused.
doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
DECISION
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be
furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and
the Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency,
for their information. SO ORDERED.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction
that the appellant conspired with his co-accused in committing
the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury could not be sustained because there was no genuine,
imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his escape that
compelled him to take part in the commission of the offense
charged.
 Factual Antecedents
On July 19, 1995, an Information1 was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch
60, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey
Villatima (Villatima), and alias "Dedong" Bargo (Bargo) with
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed
against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information contained
the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about 9 oclock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at
Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito
Berallo in order to rob, steal and take away the following:
1) sidecar of the tricycle which costs 16,000.00;
2) motorcycle described as Kawasaki HDX colored black with
Engine No. G7E-088086 and Chassis No. HDX-849776 which
is worth 103,536.00;
3) wallet with cash money of 1,250.00;
4) wrist watch and ring worth 3,800.00.
and inflicting upon the person of Juanito Berallo the following
injuries, to wit:
1. Gaping incised wound, shallow at the extremeties and deeper
at the middle portion, 7 cms. long, from right lateral aspect of
the neck going slightly downward and to the left of anterior
neck.
2. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 14 cm. deep, directed slightly
upward and to the right, located on the upper chest below
wound # 1.
3. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 12 cm. deep, directed to the
right, located at the left chest, level of 3rd rib.
4. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long 20 cm. deep, directed slightly
downward and to the left, located at the middle of the chest,
level of 5th rib.
5. Incised wound 1 cm long, right cheek.
6. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 6 cm. deep, directed
downward located at the medial aspect of the upper back, right.
7. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 10 cm. deep, located at the
upper outer quadrant of the back, right.
8. Incised wound, 2 cm. long, located at the middle of the upper
quadrant of back, right.
9. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 4 cm. deep, directed downward
located at the medial aspect of upper inner quadrant of back,
left.
10. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 5 cm deep, directed downward,
located at the middle of upper quadrant of back, left.
11. Incised wound, 2 cm long, located 2 cm to the left of wound
# 10.
12. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 7 cm. deep, directed
downward located at the middle of lower back, left.
13. Incised wound, 6 cm. long, distal third left forearm.
14. Incised wound, 3 cm. long palmar surface left hand.
15. Incised wound, 5 cm. long palmar surface left hand, 2 cm.
below wound # 13.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple
Stabbed wounds,
which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the
amount, to wit:
50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.
150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or
such amount to be fixed by the court.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-
large to date. Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" when
arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case
against the appellant is as follows:
On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto
Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a
conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of
Julies Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived
and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant
approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his
companions to Hacienda Caridad for 30.00. When Berallo
agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue
jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.
Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at
around the same time Joquino and Ballesteros were in front of
the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle
while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread,
she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-
asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo
replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to
cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep,
she saw two more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.
On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a
robbery with homicide incident. Together with other policemen,
he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw
Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters
away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of
footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle sidecar in a canal
beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue
jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem
examination on the cadaver of Berallo. She found that the
victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage
due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as
fatal and caused the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds
also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than
one person.
The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the
appellant as one of the suspects. After having been apprised of
his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took
Berallos tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the
sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house
of Villatimas aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).
Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that
her nephew Villatima, together with the appellant, and another
companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her
house in Kabankalan.
Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered
from the house of Natividad as the one stolen from her
deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and
the value of the personal property stolen from her husband. She
allegedly spent the sum of 2,400.00 for the purchase of the
burial lot.
The Version of the Defense
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed
that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 oclock in the evening, he
bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded
to the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle
with two passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he
wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and
told the driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver
requested him to accompany them up to Segundo Diez. He
agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon
reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the passengers announced a
hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the
driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed.
Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and
dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew
what happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle.
However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two
passengers.
Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and
detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They then took him to a
house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the
premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City.
The two passengers even accompanied him to his house and
threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the
incident to the police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening,
policemen came to his house and asked where the motorcycle
was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and
insisted that he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed
that the two passengers whose names he did not know, were
responsible for the crime committed.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a
Decision2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds
accused RENE BARON Y TANGAROCAN (detained)
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information and there
being the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of 50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of the
victim, Juanito Berallo and the amount of 5,050.00 for the
cash and the value of the wrist watch and ring of the victim plus
the amount of 2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot by
way of reparation and in addition the amount of 100,000.00 as
moral damages and 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
sidecar and the motorcycle are hereby ordered returned to the
heirs of the victim.
The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to
the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to
immediately forward the records of this case together with the
Decision of this Court to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
The case against Rey Villatima and alias "Dedong" Bargo [both
of whom are] at-large is hereby ordered archived and [to] be
immediately revived upon their arrest.
Cost against accused Rene Baron.
SO ORDERED.3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court
erred in finding him guilty as charged and in not appreciating in
his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/
or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However,
the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the
requisites for said circumstances were lacking. The appellate
court found that the alleged threat, if at all, was not real or
imminent. Appellant had every opportunity to escape but did
not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the
tricycle as if he was one of the malefactors. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision4 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated February 12, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Criminal Case
No. 1675-C finding accused-appellant Rene Baron y
Tangarocan guilty of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION reducing the death penalty to reclusion
perpetua without parole conformably with R.A. 9346 and
reducing the award of moral damages from 100,000.00 to
50,000.00 and exemplary damages from 50,000.00 to
25,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Still aggrieved, the appellant comes to us for a final review of
his case. In his brief, he assigns the following correlated errors:
 I to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
IRRESISTABLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE
FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
A C C U S E D - A P P E L L A N T G U I LT Y B E Y O N D
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.5
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a
conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide,
as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction
needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.6
In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his
companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his
companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be
passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused
declared a hold-up and at gun point, tied the hands of the victim
and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was
stabbed to death. The victim was divested of his wallet
containing 1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from
the sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the
victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal
beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the
accused. They proceeded to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan
and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatimas aunt,
Natividad.
Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the
appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime.
However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial
evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may
be inferred according to reason and common experience.
7 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8 A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.9
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to
them and no one else as the culprits. We thus agree with the
observation of the trial court that:
A careful examination of the records of this case reveals, [that]
no eye witness was presented by the prosecution pointing to the
three accused to be actually responsible in the perpetration of
the crime charged except the extra-judicial narration of the
accused Rene Baron but who also tried to exculpate himself
from the commission of the crime by denying his [complicity]
in the crime.
Despite this finding however, this Court found from the records
of this case, numerous and cumulative material circumstantial
evidence from which one can derive a logical and necessary
inference clearly showing the three accused to be responsible
for the crime charged and these are the following; to wit:
1. The fact that at about 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 1995
witness Ernesto Joquino, Jr. while in front of Julies Bakeshop
saw the victim Juanito Berallo [park] the latters tricycle in
front of the bakeshop when accused Rene Baron hired the
tricycle of the victim in going to Hda. Caridad and whose
companions were Rey Villatima and "Dedong" Bargo (TSN-
Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10). Thus, the excerpts of the
Transcript of the Stenographic Notes has this to reveal in vivid
fashion, to wit:
"Q. Mr. Joquino, on June 28, 1995 at about 8:30 in the evening
where were you?
A. I was in front of Julies Bakeshop.
Q. Where is this Julies Bakeshop located x x x?
A. At Magsaysay Street, Cadiz City.
Q. What were you doing at Julies Bakeshop at that particular
date and time?
A. I was x x x having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros.
Q. While you were x x x in front of Julies Bakeshop, was there
anything that transpired?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Can you tell us what was that?
A. I saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle in front of Julies
Bakeshop.
Q. When you saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle x x x in front
of Julies Bakeshop, what transpired after that?
A. Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked him if he
can conduct Rene Baron to Hda. Caridad.
Q. By the way, do you know Rene Baron before June 28, 1995?
A. Yes, maam, I know him because we are all drivers of the
tricycle.
Q. What about this Juanito Berallo, do you know him before
June 28, 1995?
A. Yes maam.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. Because he ran as councilor in Cadiz City.
Q. So going back to the incident where you said Rene Baron
approached Juanito Berallo and asked Berallo if the latter
would conduct him to Hda. Caridad, what was the answer of
Juanito Berallo to Rene Baron?
A. Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how much he will pay
[to] him and then Rene Baron said that he will pay Juanito
Berallo the amount of 30.00 and then again Juanito Berallo
asked Rene Baron how many x x x will ride on the tricycle and
Rene Baron said that there were three of them.
Q. By the way, how far were you from where Juanito Berallo
and Rene Baron were talking?
A. From here up there. (Witness pointed to a distance of about
four (4) meters.)
Q. After Juanito Berallo agreed with Rene Baron and his
companions to conduct them to Hda. Caridad, what did Rene
Baron do if there was any?
A. Rene Baron called his companions who were just across the
street.
Q. Were you able to recognize x x x the two companions whom
Rene Baron called from across the street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And who were they if you know?
A. Rey Villatima and Dedong Bargo."
(TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10)
2. The fact the Rey Villatima was wearing a fatigue jacket when
the latter boarded the tricycle of the victim and proceeded to
Hda. Caridad (ibid, p. 12) and it was the same fatigue jacket
recovered by the police from the sidecar of the tricycle at the
scene of the crime and this was the last time that the victim was
seen alive;
3. The fact that witness Pacita Caratao corroborated the
testimony of Ernesto Joquino, Jr. and Berallo sitting on the
latters tricycle parked near Julies Bakeshop and saw Rene
Baron sitting behind Juanito Berallo and the witness even asked
the former if he will be going to Lag-asan to which the victim
Juanito Berallo refused because he has some passengers to be
conducted (TSN-Tan, March 13, 1997, pp. 3-4) and has referred
to the accused Rene Baron and his two companions (TSN-Tan,
March 13, 1997, pp. 4-5) as his passengers;
4. The fact that the during the police investigation witness
SPO2 Jude de la Rama found the dead body of the victim inside
the sugarcane plantation in Hda. Sta. Ana and found many
traces of footsteps inside the sugarcane fields (TSN-Tan, July 8,
1997, p. 4) indicating that more than one person conspired and
co-operated with each other in killing the victim;
5. The fact that the witness De la Rama found the sidecar of the
tricycle beside the Martisan Bridge which is just beside the
scene of the incident and also beside the sidecar of the tricycle
they found a fatigue jacket and has recovered inside its pocket a
used soap (ibid, p. 5);
6. The fact that when the police officers invited Rene Baron for
interview, Rene Baron pointed to his co-accused, Rey Villatima
as the one who was wearing the fatigue jacket the police
officers recovered as well as had named his (Baron) other
companion as alias "Dedong" Bargo (ibid, p. 7);
7. The fact that after the three accused had detached the
motorcycle from its sidecar, Rey Villatima was pointed to by
the accused Rene Baron as the one who drove it while he (Rene
Baron) and "Dedong" Bargo rode behind and all of them
immediately proceeded to the house of the aunt of Rey
Villatima in Brgy. Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental
(ibid);
8. The fact that it was accused Rene Baron who had guided the
police investigators to Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, a
city in the southern portion of Negros Occidental which is
about 150 kilometers away from Cadiz City in the north, the
scene of the crime; and with the cooperation of the Chief of
Police of the former place proceeded to the house of a certain
Natividad Camparicio, the aunt of accused Rey Villatima (ibid,
pp. 7-8);
9. The fact that Natividad Camparicio affirmed that the stolen
motorcycle was brought to her house at around 1:15 in the
morning of July 1, 1995 by her nephew, Rey Villatima together
with the latters companions and pinpointed to accused Rene
Baron as one of them (ibid, p. 9);
10. The fact that prosecution witness, Police Insp. Eduardo
Berena also confirmed they were able to recover the stolen
motorcycle which was kept in the ground floor of the house of
Mrs. Camparicio (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 8-15);
11. The fact that the stolen motorcycle was positively identified
by witness Nemia Berallo as the same motorcycle driven,
owned and registered in the name of the victim, Juanito Berallo
(TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 9-10);
12. The fact that accused Rene Baron admitted during his
testimony that he rode in the tricycle driven by the victim
together with the two passengers in going to Segundo Diez but
reached only the area of Bangga "Doldol" where the actual
robbery and killing took place (TSN-Tan, May 11, 1999, pp.
9-12);
13. The fact that when the two hold-up men brought the driver
inside the sugarcane field, accused Rene Baron who was left on
the road outside the sugarcane field (ibid, p. 11) did nothing
and instead of escaping and seeking help, accused Rene Baron
leisurely stayed in the tricycle as if everything [was] normal
and nothing [happened], thus indicating that he (Baron) [was]
in conspiracy to rob and kill the victim since as the facts are
depicted x x x Rene Baron would clearly appear that he (Baron)
acted as a "look out" while the two companions were killing the
victim and to make matters worse, he (Baron) even went along
with the two other accused up to Oringao, Kabankalan City
where they hid the stolen motorcycle (ibid, pp. 12-13);
14. The fact that the accused Baron was left unharmed by the
killers of the victim in spite of the fact that he (Baron) is a
potential witness to the serious crime of Robbery with
Homicide; and when they were in Oringao, ate breakfast with
them then rode a passenger jeep with many passengers; alighted
in Kabankalan proper from Barangay Oringao; stood and
waited in a public place at the Ceres Bus Terminal; rode a
public transportation bus to Bacolod City for three (3) hours
then alighted in Libertad Street in Bacolod City; and again rode
a passenger jeepney going to a place known as "Shopping" to
take another passenger bus in going back to Cadiz City (ibid,
pp. 21-30).1avvph!1
From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the
inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused were in
conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the
motorcycle as the combination of these numerous
circumstantial evidence [is] enough to produce the strong moral
certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced] mind to safely
conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired
to perpetrate the crime as clearly the series of events
indubitably [shows] that there was unity of purpose,
concurrence of will, and that they all acted in concert towards
the same end, the accused being together with a group when
they rode the tricycle of the victim; all of them were together at
the scene of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen
motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan City; all of
them were together in hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house
of Natividad Camparicio; and they were together as a group
going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through]
and stopping [at] various cities and municipalities.10
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his
companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to
prevent the killing.11 There was no evidence adduced in this
case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus,
regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant
and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in
conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," the appellant is
guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of
the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.12
The appellants attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting
that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this
exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than
or at least equal to that committed.13 A threat of future injury is
insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.14
We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellants
insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused in
participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence is to the
contrary. Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim towards the
sugarcane field and left the appellant inside the tricycle that
was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had every
opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a
real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to wait
for his co-accused to return and even rode with them to
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the victims motorcycle
in the house of Villatimas aunt.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he
traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours and passed
several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to
escape or at least request for assistance from the people around
him.
Robbery with Homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable
with reclusion perpetua to death under paragraph 1, Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code. We find that the trial court correctly
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery, which
exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof that tend directly and specifically to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.15 The evidence points that one of
the co-conspirators tied the hands of the victim before dragging
him to the sugarcane field.16 Thus, he was unable to defend and
protect himself against his malefactors who were superior in
number and armed with knives and guns.
As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr.,17 treachery is
not a qualifying circumstance but "a generic aggravating
circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and
indivisible crime".18 Corollarily, "Article 62, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing
the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be
taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which
in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law
or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account
for the purpose of increasing the penalty".19 In the case at bar,
"treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide".
20Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide".
21 As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing
the penalty for crime.
In this case, the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance would have merited the imposition of the death
penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," we are
mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.22
In line with current jurisprudence, if the death penalty would
have been imposed if not for the proscription in RA 9346, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be 75,000.00.23 As
compensatory damages, the award of 2,400.00 for the burial
lot of the victim must be deleted since this expense was not
supported by receipts.24 However, the heirs are entitled to an
award of temperate damages in the sum of 25,000.00.25 The
existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the award of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is proper. However, it
must be increased from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.26 Moral
damages must also be increased from 25,000.00 to
75,000.00.27 Moreover, the appellant is ordered to return the
stolen items that were not recovered. Should this no longer be
possible, there must be restitution in the total amount of
5,050.00 representing the cash contained in the victims
wallet, as well as the value of the wrist watch, the ring, the
motorcycle and sidecar taken by the appellant and his co-
accused.
him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
S. The appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
75,000.00 as civil indemnity; 75,000.00 as moral damages,
and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Actual damages
is DELETED, and in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay
temperate damages in the amount of 25,000.00. The appellant
is also ordered to return the cash of 5,050.00 taken from the
victims wallet and the other pieces of personal property also
taken but not recovered, more particularly his wrist watch, ring,
his Kawasaki HDX motorcycle and its sidecar. Should
restitution be no longer possible, the appellant must pay the
equivalent value of the unreturned items.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CR HC No. 00638 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B.
ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner
Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside
the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and
acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual because the Information
charged him with a different offense which is estafa through
falsification of a public document.4 However, the CA still
adjudged him civilly liable.5
Factual Antecedents
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents
spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto),6secured by
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472
located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner
prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in
Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly
without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.
8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his
name and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging
petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with intent to
defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting
of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803
square meters executed before Notary Public Gines N. Abellana
per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of
1987 of the latters Notarial Register showing that spouses
Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land
located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of 130,000.00
in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or
[causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of
spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their
typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth
and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia
B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated
descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said
document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear
that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto participated in
the execution of said document when they did not so
participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did
then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his
name using the said falsified document, to the damage and
prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the
amount of 130,000.00, the value of the land .
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
12 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the
main issue for resolution was whether petitioner committed the
crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial
court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses
Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their obligation,
petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses
Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing
before the notary public. From these, the trial court concluded
that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a
Public Document by a private individual under Article
172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification of public
document as charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY of the crime of
falsification of public document by private individuals under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX
(6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore
ownership and possession of the real properties in question in
favor of private complainants. After private complainants shall
have acquired full ownership and possession of the
aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused
the sum of 130,000.00 [with] legal interest thereon reckoned
from the time this case was instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession
in favor of the private complainants [of] the real properties in
question within a period of six (6) months from the time this
decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to pay said
complainants the sum of 1,103,000.00 representing the total
value of the properties of the private complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the
following:
1. 15,000.00 for nominal damages;
2. 20,000.00 for attorneys fees;
3. 50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. 30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused
who was acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless be
convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged
and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime
or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22,
2006, ruled in the negative.17 It held that petitioner who was
charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of
public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be
convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private
Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2).
The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article
171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature
or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when
the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person
participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person
did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction
of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or
one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the
trial courts finding with respect to petitioners civil liability.
The dispositive portion of the CAs February 22, 2006 Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside
the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it
found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that
charged in the Information. The civil liability determinations
are affirmed. SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in the Resolution dated August 15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue of whether he
could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by
the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of
acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.21 When the
exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the
civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal
action.22 In other words, the "extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
exist."23
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it
convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not included
in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner
was charged with estafa through falsification of public
document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto
actually signed the document although they did not personally
appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the
RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public
document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioners conviction
cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
24 The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil
liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus
sustained the same.25
We do not agree.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of
the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a
crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x
x overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes
damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to
spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed
had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly
committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to
spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently
making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the
transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the
presentation of the parties respective evidence, the trial court
found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto
indeed signed the document and that their signatures were
genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not
personally appear before the notary public for the notarization
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily
nullify or render void ab initio the parties transaction.27 Such
non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. "To
convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as
to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the
deed must be upheld."28 And since the defective notarization
does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner
remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of
Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses
Alontos title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and
thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to
the spouses Alonto.
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed
upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery
of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and
other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view
of the trial courts finding that the signatures of the spouses
Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not
forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative.
There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose
sentences in the alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion
of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in
the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with certainty the
particular penalty."31
affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e.,
the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of
1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the
payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal
basis. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173089 August 25, 2010

In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no
basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly
liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject
properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them 1,103,000.00
representing the value of the properties and to pay them
nominal damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED
insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the
crime of falsification of public document. The portion which
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16,
and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.
From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30
oclock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was
riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private
complainants Kennard Majait (Majait),Joeniel
Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes). An altercation
ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes
escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder
in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the
Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The
trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus,
in its August 29, 2005 Decision,2 the RTC held Abordo liable
only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less
Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also
appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor
of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo
was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding
the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include
moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil
and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought
withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its
supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion
for reconsideration while Calvezs motion to withdraw was
granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez
appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos
Indorsement3 of the October 11, 2005 letter4 of Assistant City
Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
based on the following grounds:
GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
J U R I S D I C T I O N I N F I N D I N G T H AT P R I VAT E
RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING
HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF
FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN
C R I M I N A L C A S E N O S . N - 2 2 11 A N D N - 2 2 1 2 ,
RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE
CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
J U R I S D I C T I O N I N A P P R E C I AT I N G F O U R ( 4 )
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.5
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition
outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the
petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was
questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser
offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an
appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorariplaced the accused
in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:
x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as
it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally
beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment
appeal is the remedy. In view of the improper action taken by
the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment
or final order unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor General,
representing the People of the Philippines is assailing the
judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty
of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and
of acquitting him in another. It appears to us that the Solicitor
General is also representing the interest of the private
complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the
latters Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to
the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor General is
allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must
point out that in filing this petition for certiorari, the accused
is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is
tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution,
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy.
We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a
decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to
increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would
place him in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is
dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken
by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also
on the ground that such action places the accused in double
jeopardy.6 [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this
petition for review under Rule 45 presenting the following:
GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF
THE PETITION
I parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE
JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON.
ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM.
CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS
CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29,
2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN
CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.7
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the
parties complied with the order.
We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition
outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the
remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial
court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to
the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal
is final and unappealable.8 The rule, however, is not without
exception. In several cases,9 the Court has entertained petitions
for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the
dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,10 the
Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not
absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgmentbut
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr.,11 where the acquittal of the accused
was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out
the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer
to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not
result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled
or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in
Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper.1wphi1 Since appeal
could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct
in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to
have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.
As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the
merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all discussed.
Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.
A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not
be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs
petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would
not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due
course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We
deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the
disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many
occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on
the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings,
as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the
remand of the case."12
The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it
of its very power to dispense justice."13 The case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan,14 presents an instructive exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been
denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception
is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse
of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this
reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."15
A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA,
however, fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its
right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not
mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right.
Unlike in Galman, the prosecution in this case was never
denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the defense
were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and
documentary. Both parties had their opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the
evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there
was no mistrial.
The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of
the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the
outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and
credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:
In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private
complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and
credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses
Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings,
however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.16
It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion."17 Subsequently, in its memorandum, it
merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in
appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution
and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial
courts judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.
The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should
have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against
Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment.
This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordos
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An
appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial
courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors
of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of
certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those
involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the
case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,18 it was written:
Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the
nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public
respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the
former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of
the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The
petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of
the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of
public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced
by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent
may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is
certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the
evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a
case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence
of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings
and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be
attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the
evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground
that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for
the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari,
on its face, cannot be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition
for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The Facts
SUPREME COURT
Manila On June 19, 1987, a Decision[4] was promulgated against
petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the
SECOND DIVISION dispositive portion of which states:

G.R. No. 191370-71 August 10, 2015

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations,
this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario
RODOLFO BASILONIA, Petitioner,
Catalan, and John "Jojo" Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND
vs.
REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No.
DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Respondents.
1773 for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15,
DECISION 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, without any
PERALTA, J.: aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and sentences the said
[accused] to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, 1
The lone issue for resolution in this petition for certiorari under
month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules)
years, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and the
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
accessory penalties thereto; to pay and [indemnify], jointly and
temporary restraining order is the applicability of Section 6,
severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Roblete the
Rule 39 of the Rules in criminal cases. Specifically, does a trial
sum of 1!32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial,
court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which
and expenses for wake; the sum of 1!30,000.00 as indemnity
was filed almost twenty (20) years after the date of entry of
for the death of Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost
judgment? In his Orders dated December 3, 2009[1] and
income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased
January 4, 2010,[2] respondent Judge Delano F. Vi11aruz of the
cannot be ascertained; and to pay the costs of suit. [Accused]
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 16, held in the
Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of
affirmative.[3] We sustain in part.
evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court
finds the accused John "Jojo" Basilonia GUlLTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Frustrated Homicide,
as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on
September 15, 1983, defined under Article 249, in relation to
Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences the
said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6
years, and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the
costs. [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan,
Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence.
In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all
[accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the
trial court granted on August 3, 1987.[6]
On January 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
appeal for failure of petitioners to file their brief despite
extensions of time given.[7]
The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment
on September 18, 1989.[8] Thereafter, the entire case records
were remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989.[9]
Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on
May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming
to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a
Motion for Execution of Judgment.[10]
He alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City
Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not
been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his
request.
Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City
Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for
Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.[11]
On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for
Relief of Judgment praying to set aside the June 19, 1987 trial
court Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA Resolution.
[12] Further, on September 1, 2009, they filed before the trial
court a Manifestation and Supplemental Opposition to private
respondent Roblete's motion.[13]
The trial court granted the motion for execution on December
3, 2009 and ordered the bondsmen to surrender petitioners
within ten (10) days from notice of the Order. The motion for
reconsideration[14] filed by petitioners was denied on January
4, 2010.
Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration
of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their
provisional liberty was ordered forfeited on January 25, 2010.
[15] On even date, the sheriff issued the writ of execution.[16]
The Court's Ruling
The determination of whether respondent trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution which was filed
almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case
became final and executory necessarily calls for the resolution
of the twin issues of whether the penalty of imprisonment
already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime
already extinguished. In both issues, petitioners vehemently
assert that respondent trial court has no more jurisdiction to
order the execution of judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules.
We consider the issues separately.
Prescription of Penalty
With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, Act No. 3815, or
the Revised Penal Code (RPC)[17] governs. Articles 92 and 93
of which provide:
ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The
penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the
penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties.-
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country
with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should
commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.
As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros
Occidental,[18] the Court already opined that evasion of
service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of
penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al.[19]expounded on
the rule that the culprit should escape during the term of
imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, thus:
x x x The period of prescription of penalties- so the succeeding
Article 93 provides - "shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence."
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence?
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready
answer. Says Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of
his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender
is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during
the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That
escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized
by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which
provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall
have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation,
or through connivance with other convicts or employees of
the penal institution, * * *" Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking."
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The
Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 - from whence
Articles 92 and 93 of the present Revised Penal Code
originated- reads:
"Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben: Las de
muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte aos.
***
Las leves, al ao.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia
en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena, si hubiera esta
comenzado a cumplirse. * * *"
Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en
que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme",
written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is
significant. What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de Ia condena".
And, "quebrantamiento" or "evasion" means escape. Reason
dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of
sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty
consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run
when he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:
"El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia
en que ha tenido Iugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia
firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la
notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se
consigna que el termino de Ia prescripcion se cuenta desde
que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se
imponga le pena respectiva. Luego ausente el reo, ya no podra
prescribir hoy Ia pena, pues que Ia notificacion personal no
puede ser sup/ida por Ia notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada
la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion
personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en privacion
de libertad solo podra existir Ia prescripcion quebrantando el
reo Ia condena, pues que si no se hallare ya preso pre-
ventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerrarniento en
el acto de serle notificada personalmente la sentencia."
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
[20]
Following Tanega, Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo[21] held
that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said
to have escaped therefrom. We agree with the position of the
Solicitor General that "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Of more recent vintage is Our pronouncements in Pangan v.
Hon. Gatbalite,[22] which cited Tanega and Del Castillo, that
the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the RPC
applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and
are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty,
and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only
when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court,
therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they
were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite
being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment.
Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their
favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the
motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.
Extinction of Civil Liability
The treatment of petitioners' civil liability arising from the
offense committed is different.
Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.[23] We said in one case:
It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes two
(2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury produced by
the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is
sought to be compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in
nature." (Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559). As early as 1913,
this Court in US. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the
civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the
crime committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x.
Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability established in
Articles 100,[25] 101,[26] 102,[27] and 103[28] of the Code
shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations,
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the
Civil Code is the governing law, the provisions of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39
thereof, is applicable. It states:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in conjunction
with
Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(3) Upon a judgment

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the
fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences
from the time the judgment became final.
Based on the foregoing, there are two (2) modes of enforcing a
final and executory judgment or order: through motion or by
independent action.
These two modes of execution are available depending on the
timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce
the court's judgment. Execution by motion is only available if
the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution
by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive
period for execution by motion had already elapsed. However,
for execution by independent action to prosper - the Rules
impose another limitation - the action must be filed before it is
barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code,
is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.[29]
An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any
issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or
correctness of the first judgment.[30] The purpose is not to re-
examine and re-try issues already decided but to revive the
judgment; its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the
merits of the original action.[31] However, being a mere right
of action, the judgment sought to be revived is subject to
defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and
those arising after the finality of the first judgment or which
may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective such
as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of
transactions not connected with the former controversy.[32]
Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which
is the trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.
[33] Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the period is null
and void.[34] The limitation that a judgment be enforced by
execution within the stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy,
goes to the very jurisdiction of the court. Failure to object to a
writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason
that jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and not by
express or implied will of the parties.[35]
Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a number of
exceptions wherein the Court, on meritorious grounds, allowed
execution of judgment despite non-observance of the time bar.
In Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al.[36]it was held:
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution,
although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is
that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to
operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise.
Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend
the time within which the writ may be issued without scire
facias. x x x.[37]
Thus, the demands of justice and fairness were contemplated in
the following instances: dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings
of the judgment obligor which redounded to its benefit;
[38] agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the
enforcement of the judgment;[39] strict application of the rules
would result in injustice to the prevailing party to whom no
fault could be attributed but relaxation thereof would cause no
prejudice to the judgment obligor who did not question the
judgment sought to be executed;[40] and the satisfaction of the
judgment was already beyond the control of the prevailing
party as he did what he was supposed to do.[41]Essentially, We
allowed execution even after the prescribed period elapsed
when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
[42]
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete
did not file a motion for execution within the five-year period
or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period.
Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not
been enforced because the public prosecutor has not acted on
the request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and
compelling reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our
equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent
Roblete, the instant case does not fall within the exceptions
afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution
was entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any
hand in causing the same.[43] As regards the civil aspect of a
criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that
Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their
case. They should give the necessary assistance to their
counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers
are expected to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and
competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of
law practice as well as certain fortuitous events sometimes
make it almost physically impossible for lawyers to be
immediately updated on a particular client's case.[44]
Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs
and incidental expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and
it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they
are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of
court.[45] Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so.
Their indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of lack of
interest in executing the decision rendered in their favor. To
remind, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations
for executing judgments or orders is to prevent obligors from
sleeping on their rights.[46] Indeed, inaction may be construed
as a waiver.[47]
To close, the Court cannot help but impress that this case could
have been averted had the lower court been a competent
dispenser of justice. It is opportune to remind judges that once a
judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial
court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the
penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A
motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary.
With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court
should cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant of arrest, if the
accused is not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is
already under detention by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued, the trial court should immediately issue the
corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate
transfer of the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his
sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of
sentence in the National Penitentiary. The commitment order
should state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had
been withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.
If aside from the penalty of imprisonment the penalty of fine is
likewise imposed, the trial court should issue at once an order
requiring the payment of fine within a reasonable period of
time and, in case of nonpayment and subsidiary imprisonment
is imposed, he should likewise serve the subsidiary
imprisonment. If, however, the penalty is only fine and the
judgment has become final and executory, an order should be
issued by the trial court at once for the payment of the fine. And
in case of non-payment, the bail bond previously issued for his
provisional liberty should be cancelled and a warrant of arrest
should be issued to serve the subsidiary imprisonment, if there
is any.
In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those
convicted of capital offenses or convicted of non-capital
offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail,
a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately issued
after the promulgation of judgment by the trial court as long as
the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the
National Penitentiary. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice of appeal should
not stop the lower court from performing its ministerial duty in
issuing the commitment order, unless a special order has been
issued by the Court in specific cases - to the effect that the
convicted accused shall remain under detention in the
provincial jail or city jail while the motion is being heard or Republic of the Philippines
resolved. SUPREME COURT
Manila
In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is
concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in SECOND DIVISION
accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing
G.R. No. 198270 December 09, 2015
jurisprudence.

ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Orders dated
December 3, 2009 and January 25, 2010 of Presiding Judge
Delano F. Villaruz, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch
16, are AFFIRMED IN PART only insofar as to the execution
of the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Let the records of
this case be REMANDED to the trial court for the immediate
issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-2013, in
relation to OCA Circular No. 4-92-A.
The Office of the Court Administrator is
hereby DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the possible
culpability of those responsible for the unreasonable delay in
the execution of the judgment of conviction. SO ORDERED.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES , Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision[1] dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution[2] dated
August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated
February 23, 2009 and Order[4] dated July 13, 2009, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77,
which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision[5] dated September
3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal
Case Nos. 337902-03.

The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo
Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as
contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name
and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction
materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that
twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within
seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty
percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the
last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks.[6]
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction
materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the
construction site where respondent and his partners were
undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent
paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks,
drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of
P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner
attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at
Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were,
however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately
thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent
and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent
issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon
deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason
that the account from which they were drawn was already a
closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands
from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her
to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati
City.[7] Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were
filed against respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory
portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 337902
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto,
in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein
represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or
for value the check, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of such check upon its presentment which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the said accused failed lo pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 337903
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto,
in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein
represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or
for value the check, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of such check upon its presentment which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days alter receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution recommending that respondent and his partners be
charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for
Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision,
finding that the prosecution had proven all the elements of
violation of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine
equivalent to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00),
for Check No. 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two
Pesos for Check No. 2960203218 or a total penalty of Two
Hundred Thousand Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos
(Php213,032.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. However, accused MILO MALONG, is
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Both accused
Malong and Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the private
complainant the total sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos (Php447,462.00)
which are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of
these cases, with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum
and three percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in the
invoices, reckoned from the date of receipt of the demand on
February 28, 2004, until the amount is fully paid, plus the costs
of suit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC
arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over
the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued,
drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the
action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the
offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also
pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner's testimony on
March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the
public prosecutor manifested his presence in court and that he
delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor.
Thus, since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor,
nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the proceedings
should be declared null and void.[10]
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in
the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo]
the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present
witness Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during
the March 14, 2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining
an adverse judgment, it would be an injustice if all the
proceedings had in the case would be set aside.
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A
violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which
is oft-repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine,
jurisdiction may be had in several places where one of the acts
material to the crime occurred.
Accused Natividad postulates that since the checks were
presented and dishonored in Makati City, which is not the
place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo]
lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The
fact remains that the bank where it was presented for
payment is in Makati City. These checks passed through
this bank for clearance, confirmation, and or validation
processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took
place or was completed at the end of the collecting bank in
Makati City, where the private complainant maintains her
account over which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant
Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly,
the appealed decision of the court [a quo] is hereby
AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18,
2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed
the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the
pertinent portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the
offense happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established
that the subject checks were issued to private complainant at
petitioner's office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from
petitioner's account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of
dishonor of the checks by the maker also transpired in
Pampanga. After private complainant was informed of the
dishonor of the checks, she immediately proceeded to
petitioner's office in Pampanga, personally informed him and
his companions of the dishonor of the checks and tendered a
demand letter for the payment of the construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the
drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity
of the subject checks, private complainant deposited the
same in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
Branch. Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank
that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank, Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in
Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in said
place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in
Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since she
deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the
same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City. However,
as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of depositing the
check is not an essential clement of BP 22. Likewise, the fact
that private complainant was informed of the dishonor of
the checks at her bank in Makati City did not vest the
MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in
any of the places where its constitutive elements actually
transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of
the checks is not an element of BP 22. The law speaks only
of the subsequent dishonor of the checks by the drawee
bank and the knowledge of the fact of dishonor by the
maker. Consequently, none of the elements of the offense
can be considered to have transpired in Makati City. Thus,
the venue of the instant case was improperly laid.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the
following argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE
O F F E N S E WA S C O M M I T T E D W I T H I N T H E
JURISDICTION OF SAID COURT.[13]
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place
where the dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction
over the instant case. In support of her contention, petitioner
cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] wherein it
was held that since the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was
deposited and presented for encashment with the Angeles City
Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of
Pampanga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which
accused therein was charged.[15] Thus, petitioner asserts that
the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not
have jurisdiction to try the instant case. That none of the
essential elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 occurred
in the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the place where the
check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.
Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of
BP 22 were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, the
prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent issued
the subject checks as shown by the documentary evidence
submitted. They were issued for value, as payment for the
construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered
to the accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was
clearly shown that respondent had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank, which
subsequently dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22
provides that "the dishonor of a check when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee." In this case, petitioner states that the prosecution was
able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were presented
within the time period required by law. In fact, written demand
relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the subject
checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to
respondent as evidenced by the demand letter signed by
respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account with the
drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently
dishonored for the reason that the account from which they
were drawn was already a closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the State, is in line with the appellate court's and
respondent's stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
instant case. According to the OSG, the act of depositing the
check is not an essential element of the offense under the
Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,
[16] the OSG posited that the place of deposit and the place of
dishonor are distinct from each other and that the place where
the check was issued, delivered, and dishonored is the proper
venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x
x The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch,
Metro Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges
San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction
of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or information. Although the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ,
San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and
knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes
committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in
Pasig.[17]
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus
claimed that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction
over the instant case for none of the essential elements of
violation of BP 22 occurred therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized
as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while
some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of
the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed.[18]
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded
that "the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the
place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered
the place where the check was issued, delivered and
dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the
proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court,
however, cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he
issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac.
Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San
Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been
dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other
efforts to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural
Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22
at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in. San
Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC
of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been
offered to show that his check was issued, delivered,
dishonored or that knowledge of beneficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however,
disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the
drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly
showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at
Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been
offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was
deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places
where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is,
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x
x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the
place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, sit its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San
Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense, was
also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question
that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan arc
triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both
allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction
upon the RTC in Pasig City.[19]
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the
prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in
violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the
RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it
held, either expressly or impliedly, that the place where the
check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions
involving violations of BP 22, it is true that the Court, in Rigor,
acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered
at the Rural Bank of San Juan, while the same was deposited
wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation cannot
be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of
the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations
of BP 22. In the absence, therefore, of any ground,
jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments,
the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply
inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[20] cited
by petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant case.
In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated
check drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila as
payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in
the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands,
joven was advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of
Manila returned the check for the reason that the account
against which the check was drawn is a "closed account."
Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of BP 22
before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused
that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court
categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged
herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in
Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no
basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited
and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City
Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact
clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is
charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the
crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.[21]
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,[22] wherein the
modes of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand,
the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations,
Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground
that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation
of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try
the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense
was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal
case for violation of BP 22 may be tiled in any of the places
where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check
was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal
that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment
at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this
light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.
[23]
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying,
therefore, that the court of the place where the check was
deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the
fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued,
and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC
of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that
the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment
at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of
Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case
and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be
dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section
35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all
criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals.[24] Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal
on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State.[25]
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted
an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of
the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil
aspect of a decision of a lower court,[26] when there is denial
of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its
agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and
the private offended party,[27] when there is grave error
committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial
justice so requires.[28]
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the
assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not
tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy,[29] in
violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal
or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.[30]
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not
under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the
interest of the Republic, the same should be summarily
dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendant in
the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the
Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal
of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule
that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the
accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to
Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case
against the accused will not result in his acquittal.[31] In the
oft-cited People v. Salico,[32] the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the
legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide
the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form
and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal
is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its:
evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court
dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in
such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the
case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case,
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense
before a court of competent jurisdiction.[33]
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case
on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the
offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let
alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based
on the evidence proffered by the prosecution.[34] The appellate
court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that
none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower
court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the
evidence failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an
acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated
only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot
be struck down as improper. In a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of
law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is
not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts
and which does not call for an existence of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.[35] In De
Vera v. Spouses Santiago,[36] the Court categorically ruled that
the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the
RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to
wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the
RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law.
The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law
[B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of
circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages.
[37]
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is
precisely "whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense
was committed within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently,
therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our
procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the
commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the
law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission.[38] Thus, when a case
involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence
with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints
filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be
properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.[39]
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant
case cannot be considered as an acquittal of respondent herein,
he cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to
protection against double jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v.
Hon. Gimenez,[40] the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions
thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid
down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of
the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely
legal so that should the dismissal he found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.[41]
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the
presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage
of respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC,
respondent had already been moving for the dismissal of the
case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to
have been with respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier
mentioned, the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based
upon a consideration of the merits. Third, the question raised in
this case is based purely on a question of law. In view therefore
of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that
petitioner's appeal of the appellate court's dismissal cannot be
barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant
petition in the absence of the OSG's participation, the
circumstances herein warrant the Court's consideration.
In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[42] the Court gave due regard
to the ends of substantial justice by giving due course to a
petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo,
however, provided an exception to the above doctrines in this
manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State
in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the
ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the
issues in this action could be determined in a more just,
speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition
at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance
against Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged
murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the
affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer
any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely
a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be
left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
[43]
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of
substantial justice, it must give due course to the instant petition
and consequently rule on the merits of the same. The
circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner with no
other suitable recourse but to appeal the case herself. Not only
was there an absence of support from the OSG, said
government office also took a position in contrast to the rights
and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the
arguments which ran counter to petitioner's interest as well as
the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to
the issue at hand. In fact, these erroneous contentions were
adopted by the appellate court in their entirety, dismissing the
instant case in a manner not in accord with law and applicable
jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply procedural rules in
their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA
had, petitioner's action poses serious consequences tantamount
to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can
postpone criminal prosecution and delay the administration of
justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous ground of lack
of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open
loopholes in our criminal justice system.[44]
Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant
case demand that the Court forego a rigid application of the
technicalities under
the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave
injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner had already
fulfilled her end of the agreement in giving respondent, as early
as in the year 2003, construction materials amounting to half a
million pesos and yet up until now, she has not been paid
therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the
satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly
violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the appropriate court,
her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the
mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without providing
any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start
from the very beginning and refile her complaint before the
same court which already had jurisdiction in the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict
procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto
lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly
stringent application of the rules.[45] Rules of procedure are
meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of
achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play
takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.
[46] Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial
justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13,
2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos.
08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated
September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal
Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.